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Secrecy and the young researcher
0160-791X/86 $3.00 + .OO Copyright o 1986 Pergamon Journals Ltd
Technology In So&y, Vol. 8, pp. 267-271(1986) Printed in the USA. All tights reserved.
Secrecy and the Young Researcher Cad Etnier
ABSTRACT. The et&a/ dilemmas posed by the increasing cba//enges to openness in science are particularly acute for young researchers. Institutional policies can enhance openness. A survey of the science and engineering f&&y at Cornell University demonstrated that existing policies toward openness are not being carefully followed, perhaps because they are not well understood Increased dircussion of openness on campus may improve comphnce, but the burden of setting stanahrds remains heavily on the individual young scientist.
There are a number of reasons behind the trend toward increased secrecy in academic and corporate science. I would like to mention just one more before looking more carefully at the effects of this trend on young scientists. Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has reversed classification policies that had been in place from Truman to Carter. These earlier administrations had officially treated information as being most valuable if available to the maximum number of people. If there was a doubt as to whether a document ought to be classified or not, the federal government was to leave it unclassified rather than risk being unnecessarily restrictive. The same policy applied in deciding to which of seven levels of classification a document, if classified, was assigned. Any document that fell between two levels was presumed to be in the more open category. This presumption was reversed by the early actions of the Reagan Administration. National Security Directive 12356, put into effect several years ago, gave the government the right to classify any federally funded research, regardless of which agency funds it. And it provided the rule: When in doubt, classify. Moreover, it seems to provide the authority to stop publication of information whether or not it was gathered from classified documents. Recall the Progressive case, in which the federal government tried to prevent a reporter from publishing an article he had researched-from unclassified material-on how to build an H-bomb, Today, the government would have authority to classify the article. (Whether or not the authority would stand the scrutiny of judicial review, as the government case against The Progressive did not, is an open question.) Add the threat of federally imposed secrecy to other forces and it is easy to appreciate that tremendous pressures are operating on scientists to be secretive about some aspects of their work. The only pressures operating in the other direction, Car/ Etnier wil/ receive a B.S. in agricuhure firn founder of Student Pugwash at Cornell. 267
Cornel/ hive&y
in 1987. He ir the
268
C. Et&r
toward openness, are the traditions within science enforced through peer pressure and the values of individual scientists. A survey at Cornell that I did with Vincent Marchetti, a graduate student in physics, suggests that peer pressure is not always reliable, since university scientists are not unanimous about what degree of secrecy is permissible. (More on the survey below.) In the absence of a consensus among academicians, the individual responsibility of a researcher- both to address the ethical questions and consistently apply whatever response he or she develops - becomes paramount. Though it is difficult to do so, it is vital that the scientist try to apply individual standards while young. During his or her difficult early years of work, every professional is socialized into a discipline. Standards and norms learned early become internalized and operate throughout a person’s career. If a scientist begins a career working under secretive conditions, that will become her norm. Once that has occured, the metaphorical warning bells in the back of her head will not ring later in her career when a similar situation presents itself to her or to one of her students. Independently assessing what secrecy is ethically permissible and applying that standard is particularly difficult for the young scientist trying to become established in a field. Most university research requires outside funding, which is not always easy to find. The early stages of a career are when a scientist can least afford to be choosy about funding sources. Unless backed by university policy, therefore, it is hard for the scientist to turn down grants from agencies that provide funds with secrecy requirements attached. Many universities have policies on secrecy and openness which all their researchers must follow. A policy takes some of the burden for setting ethical standards off the individual and places it on the university office of sponsored research, which must scrutinize contracts for potential violations. This division of labor has the attractiveness of apparent efficiency-scientists have more time to think about research because they let the bureaucrats worry about secrecy, and one centralized office can more consistently monitor openness than autonomous professors who have other things on their minds. The attractiveness is,superficial, however, for no administration can police its faculty; it must rely on their individual understanding of and cooperation with policy. Our survey of the science and engineering faculty at Cornell University bears this out. Of American universities, Cornell has one of the oldest and best policies on secrecy. Shortly after World War II, Cornell decided that it would not take any classified research, and the faculty reaffirmed that in 1967. The policy also prohibits contracts which allow sponsors to specify who may participate in the research. That is, a Cornell professor may not accept a grant from a corporation or government agency if the terms of the grant remove from the professor final say over who has access to the lab facilities or the technical data produced in the project. Finally, no deletions or changes in results may be dictated by sponsors of research in any potential publication; that control must remain with the professor. Vincent Marchetti and I found that having a policy provides less than complete protection against inappropriate secrecy. With the stated Cornell policy in mind, let us examine what professors told us they were actually doing. Fourteen questions comprised the questionnaire, but a few suffice to convey the tenor of the response.
Secrecy and the Young Researcher
269
TABLE 1 Yes responses Have you, in the past five years, been asked to restrict non-U.S. citizens from access to technical information related to your research?
2
If yes, did you comply with the request?
2
Have you, in the past five years, been asked to restrict non-U.S. citizens from access to your laboratory facilities?
1
If yes, did you comply with the request?
1
In the past five years, have you submitted a paper to a sponsoring agency, foundation, or corporation for pre-publication review?
37
If yes, have you been asked to delete or change parts of a publication for national security or corporate proprietary reasons?
2
If so, did you comply with the request?
1
In the first section of the questionnaire, we asked the faculty members what secrecy they had engaged in during the past five years. Responses to the most signifiicant questions are in Table 1. The second section was a series of hypothetical questions designed to elicit to what extent the respondent would compromise openness in order to receive a grant. Table 2 contains responses to selected questions of this type. The sample size of this questionnaire was n = 129 out of approximately 750 distributed. The responses show that all three respondents who were asked to keep foreign nationals away from lab facilities or ignorant of technical data complied with the request. Written comments indicated that one of the cases involved Sandia Na-
TABLE
2 Yes Responses
Would you be willing to accept a contract or grant with a clause: *a. that non-U.S. citizens be restricted from access to technical information related to your research? *b. that non-U.S. facilities?
citizens be restricted
from access to laboratory
*c. that the sponsor could require you to change or delete parts of a publication for national security or corporate proprietary reasons?
20
16
34
270
C. Etnier
tional Laboratory, which furnished some data to the researcher on the condition that it be kept confidential. Since this data was not generated at Cornell, treating it in this way falls within the bounds of Cornell policy. The other two respondents indicated no such extenuating circumstances. Two professors, furthermore, were asked to change or delete information from at least one article apiece, and one agreed, he said, “after discussion.” It is difficult to know to what extent he retained final authority over the published version. Even were he to say that he had final say, there is a heightened potential for deleterious self censorship when a professor changes an article on any grounds but scientific. The numbers may look small- two, maybe three professors do violate the university rules, one might comment, but what is that out of the large Cornell faculty? I do not want to make too much of these cases; perhaps there will be bad apples in any barrel. But it was disturbing when we found any at all in the response to a questionnaire whose rate of return was less than 20%. If anything, the results should measure greater openness than actually exists, since the nature of secrecy is to be difficult to discover. Given the inherent bias of the results, the responses to the second part of the questionnaire were quite surprising indeed. Approximately 15 % and 12% of the respondents would be willing to restrict foreign nationals from their data or labs, respectively. And a full 26% of the respondents would withhold information in their articles if they were asked to do so by their grant providers. This suggests that serious questions ought to be raised about the activities of the hundreds of professors who did not respond. Possible policy recommendations hinge on how one interprets the data. Either there is a very high level of cynicism and disrespect for policy among the Cornell professoriate, or the policy is neither widely known nor well understood. We suggest the latter hypothesis is the more plausible. If so, then opening doors now closed is merely a matter of assuring that all professors know university policy. Methods of publicity are easy to imagine-letters from deans to faculty members, public forums on secrecy, faculty senate debates, op-ed pieces in school newspapers, and so on. More difficult is motivating people to put their efforts into this area. Faculty members with whom we have worked here have indicated that their more senior colleagues, who are most influential in policy matters, have been unwilling to lead such discussions. Their long tenure has witnessed several comings and goings of interest in secrecy, and they assume that everyone is as well versed in the issues and the policy as they are. We are told, however, that the results of our survey changed their minds on this count. Perhaps a similar inquiry would be helpful at other universities where complacency prevails. (Since the original survey was done, publicity over secrecy threats from Strategic Defense Initiative research on campus and an administrative reaffirmation of Cornell policy toward classified and sensitive research have increased general awareness of the issues. We are resurveying those who responded to our first questionnaire to see whether there has been any change in attitudes.) Someday, perhaps all universities will endorse openness as strongly as Cornell does, and perhaps these official policies will receive enthusiastic support from all
Secrecy and the Young Researcher
271
the faculty members. Unfortunately, young researchers train in the world as it is, not the world as we would like it to be. Even if secrecy as an issue is publicized in the ways suggested, the onus of setting standards remains heavily on the fledgling scientist. The pressures to compromise with openness are numerous and strong; the Student Pugwash challenge of individual responsibility is as important as ever.
Technology In So&y, Vol. 8, pp. 267-271(1986) Printed in the USA. All tights reserved.
Secrecy and the Young Researcher Cad Etnier
ABSTRACT. The et&a/ dilemmas posed by the increasing cba//enges to openness in science are particularly acute for young researchers. Institutional policies can enhance openness. A survey of the science and engineering f&&y at Cornell University demonstrated that existing policies toward openness are not being carefully followed, perhaps because they are not well understood Increased dircussion of openness on campus may improve comphnce, but the burden of setting stanahrds remains heavily on the individual young scientist.
There are a number of reasons behind the trend toward increased secrecy in academic and corporate science. I would like to mention just one more before looking more carefully at the effects of this trend on young scientists. Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has reversed classification policies that had been in place from Truman to Carter. These earlier administrations had officially treated information as being most valuable if available to the maximum number of people. If there was a doubt as to whether a document ought to be classified or not, the federal government was to leave it unclassified rather than risk being unnecessarily restrictive. The same policy applied in deciding to which of seven levels of classification a document, if classified, was assigned. Any document that fell between two levels was presumed to be in the more open category. This presumption was reversed by the early actions of the Reagan Administration. National Security Directive 12356, put into effect several years ago, gave the government the right to classify any federally funded research, regardless of which agency funds it. And it provided the rule: When in doubt, classify. Moreover, it seems to provide the authority to stop publication of information whether or not it was gathered from classified documents. Recall the Progressive case, in which the federal government tried to prevent a reporter from publishing an article he had researched-from unclassified material-on how to build an H-bomb, Today, the government would have authority to classify the article. (Whether or not the authority would stand the scrutiny of judicial review, as the government case against The Progressive did not, is an open question.) Add the threat of federally imposed secrecy to other forces and it is easy to appreciate that tremendous pressures are operating on scientists to be secretive about some aspects of their work. The only pressures operating in the other direction, Car/ Etnier wil/ receive a B.S. in agricuhure firn founder of Student Pugwash at Cornell. 267
Cornel/ hive&y
in 1987. He ir the
268
C. Et&r
toward openness, are the traditions within science enforced through peer pressure and the values of individual scientists. A survey at Cornell that I did with Vincent Marchetti, a graduate student in physics, suggests that peer pressure is not always reliable, since university scientists are not unanimous about what degree of secrecy is permissible. (More on the survey below.) In the absence of a consensus among academicians, the individual responsibility of a researcher- both to address the ethical questions and consistently apply whatever response he or she develops - becomes paramount. Though it is difficult to do so, it is vital that the scientist try to apply individual standards while young. During his or her difficult early years of work, every professional is socialized into a discipline. Standards and norms learned early become internalized and operate throughout a person’s career. If a scientist begins a career working under secretive conditions, that will become her norm. Once that has occured, the metaphorical warning bells in the back of her head will not ring later in her career when a similar situation presents itself to her or to one of her students. Independently assessing what secrecy is ethically permissible and applying that standard is particularly difficult for the young scientist trying to become established in a field. Most university research requires outside funding, which is not always easy to find. The early stages of a career are when a scientist can least afford to be choosy about funding sources. Unless backed by university policy, therefore, it is hard for the scientist to turn down grants from agencies that provide funds with secrecy requirements attached. Many universities have policies on secrecy and openness which all their researchers must follow. A policy takes some of the burden for setting ethical standards off the individual and places it on the university office of sponsored research, which must scrutinize contracts for potential violations. This division of labor has the attractiveness of apparent efficiency-scientists have more time to think about research because they let the bureaucrats worry about secrecy, and one centralized office can more consistently monitor openness than autonomous professors who have other things on their minds. The attractiveness is,superficial, however, for no administration can police its faculty; it must rely on their individual understanding of and cooperation with policy. Our survey of the science and engineering faculty at Cornell University bears this out. Of American universities, Cornell has one of the oldest and best policies on secrecy. Shortly after World War II, Cornell decided that it would not take any classified research, and the faculty reaffirmed that in 1967. The policy also prohibits contracts which allow sponsors to specify who may participate in the research. That is, a Cornell professor may not accept a grant from a corporation or government agency if the terms of the grant remove from the professor final say over who has access to the lab facilities or the technical data produced in the project. Finally, no deletions or changes in results may be dictated by sponsors of research in any potential publication; that control must remain with the professor. Vincent Marchetti and I found that having a policy provides less than complete protection against inappropriate secrecy. With the stated Cornell policy in mind, let us examine what professors told us they were actually doing. Fourteen questions comprised the questionnaire, but a few suffice to convey the tenor of the response.
Secrecy and the Young Researcher
269
TABLE 1 Yes responses Have you, in the past five years, been asked to restrict non-U.S. citizens from access to technical information related to your research?
2
If yes, did you comply with the request?
2
Have you, in the past five years, been asked to restrict non-U.S. citizens from access to your laboratory facilities?
1
If yes, did you comply with the request?
1
In the past five years, have you submitted a paper to a sponsoring agency, foundation, or corporation for pre-publication review?
37
If yes, have you been asked to delete or change parts of a publication for national security or corporate proprietary reasons?
2
If so, did you comply with the request?
1
In the first section of the questionnaire, we asked the faculty members what secrecy they had engaged in during the past five years. Responses to the most signifiicant questions are in Table 1. The second section was a series of hypothetical questions designed to elicit to what extent the respondent would compromise openness in order to receive a grant. Table 2 contains responses to selected questions of this type. The sample size of this questionnaire was n = 129 out of approximately 750 distributed. The responses show that all three respondents who were asked to keep foreign nationals away from lab facilities or ignorant of technical data complied with the request. Written comments indicated that one of the cases involved Sandia Na-
TABLE
2 Yes Responses
Would you be willing to accept a contract or grant with a clause: *a. that non-U.S. citizens be restricted from access to technical information related to your research? *b. that non-U.S. facilities?
citizens be restricted
from access to laboratory
*c. that the sponsor could require you to change or delete parts of a publication for national security or corporate proprietary reasons?
20
16
34
270
C. Etnier
tional Laboratory, which furnished some data to the researcher on the condition that it be kept confidential. Since this data was not generated at Cornell, treating it in this way falls within the bounds of Cornell policy. The other two respondents indicated no such extenuating circumstances. Two professors, furthermore, were asked to change or delete information from at least one article apiece, and one agreed, he said, “after discussion.” It is difficult to know to what extent he retained final authority over the published version. Even were he to say that he had final say, there is a heightened potential for deleterious self censorship when a professor changes an article on any grounds but scientific. The numbers may look small- two, maybe three professors do violate the university rules, one might comment, but what is that out of the large Cornell faculty? I do not want to make too much of these cases; perhaps there will be bad apples in any barrel. But it was disturbing when we found any at all in the response to a questionnaire whose rate of return was less than 20%. If anything, the results should measure greater openness than actually exists, since the nature of secrecy is to be difficult to discover. Given the inherent bias of the results, the responses to the second part of the questionnaire were quite surprising indeed. Approximately 15 % and 12% of the respondents would be willing to restrict foreign nationals from their data or labs, respectively. And a full 26% of the respondents would withhold information in their articles if they were asked to do so by their grant providers. This suggests that serious questions ought to be raised about the activities of the hundreds of professors who did not respond. Possible policy recommendations hinge on how one interprets the data. Either there is a very high level of cynicism and disrespect for policy among the Cornell professoriate, or the policy is neither widely known nor well understood. We suggest the latter hypothesis is the more plausible. If so, then opening doors now closed is merely a matter of assuring that all professors know university policy. Methods of publicity are easy to imagine-letters from deans to faculty members, public forums on secrecy, faculty senate debates, op-ed pieces in school newspapers, and so on. More difficult is motivating people to put their efforts into this area. Faculty members with whom we have worked here have indicated that their more senior colleagues, who are most influential in policy matters, have been unwilling to lead such discussions. Their long tenure has witnessed several comings and goings of interest in secrecy, and they assume that everyone is as well versed in the issues and the policy as they are. We are told, however, that the results of our survey changed their minds on this count. Perhaps a similar inquiry would be helpful at other universities where complacency prevails. (Since the original survey was done, publicity over secrecy threats from Strategic Defense Initiative research on campus and an administrative reaffirmation of Cornell policy toward classified and sensitive research have increased general awareness of the issues. We are resurveying those who responded to our first questionnaire to see whether there has been any change in attitudes.) Someday, perhaps all universities will endorse openness as strongly as Cornell does, and perhaps these official policies will receive enthusiastic support from all
Secrecy and the Young Researcher
271
the faculty members. Unfortunately, young researchers train in the world as it is, not the world as we would like it to be. Even if secrecy as an issue is publicized in the ways suggested, the onus of setting standards remains heavily on the fledgling scientist. The pressures to compromise with openness are numerous and strong; the Student Pugwash challenge of individual responsibility is as important as ever.