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Security management for underground space
Security Management for Underground Space H. Ishioka
Abstract--Currently proposed projects to utilize underground space have provided little information about the necessary security management. This paper discusses risk analysis and probable security management configurations, based on the limited information available. In some cases, security management for underground space is likely to take on a configuration similar to that used for typical buildings on the surface. However, some underground facilities may have the potential for serious danger, created by the interaction of more than two individual risks.
P~sumA--Les projets actuellement soumis pour utiliser l'espace souterrain fournissent peu d'informations au sujet de la ndcessaire gestion des risquss. Ce rapport traite de l'analyse du risque et des configurations probables de gestion des risques, fond/kes sur un nombre limit~ d°informations disponibles. Darts eertains cns, la gestion des risques en espace souterrain prend certainement uns configuration similaire &celle utilis~e clans des immeubles typiquss construits au niveau du sol. Cependant, certaines installations souterraines peuvent prdsenter de s~rieux dangers potentiels, crd~s par l'interaction de plus de deux risques indiuiduels.
1. Introduction
2.2. Security-RelatedSectors
nnmher of projects utilizingurban underground space have been proposed by various sectors. However, from a security company's viewpoint, few subsurface projects seem to have included a deftnite security management plan. In general, a security management plan must be designed on the basis of operational objectives, financial and h11man resource constraints, etc. The projects proposed to date have not prodded that essential information. This paper introduces the general principle of risk analysis for security planning, and discusses security-related problems and feasible methods and/or systems for some currently proposed underground projects.
Although police departments and fire departments have important public service functions in a modern society, individuals are still responsible for taking countermeasures against crime and fire in order to protect properties on their premises. Utility companies are responsible for their own facilities and related dangers. Cooperation with the fire and police sectors provides the basis for any type of security management system, and each sector has its own organization for 24-hour monitoring and dispatch operation. Actual forms of security management vary from self-defense to private bodyguards to specialized companies that offer their subscribers monitoring and dispatching services. In reality, the differences in security management derive not from physical constraints, such as a building's structure or the site configuration, but r a t h e r from financial constraints. Building owners or managers are concerned with minimizing cost, and they tend to adopt the most economical methods to maintain their premises at a certain level of security.
A
2. Process of Security Management 2.1. Purpose of Security Management "Security" is widely recognized as a synonym for "safety', and =security management" is considered to be an act of crime prevention and fire protection to save h u m a n life, property, or business activity. The ultimate purpose of security management is to ellml nate psycho-social fears and threats, as well as physical damage or tangible property losses.
2.3. Security ManagementPlanning Security planning consists of several stages, described below.
2.3.1. Risk analysis and evaluation Security management begins from Presentaddress:HideakiIshioka,Manager, Systems IntegrationDivision,Secom Co., Ltd., Shinjuku Nomura Bldg., 1-26-2 NiRhiAhinjukuShinjuku-ku,Tokyo, Japan.
the analysis and evaluation of probable risks. Although several studies have examined optimization of cost in risk management, the simplest theory can be described as follows:
Tunnelling and UTulerground Space Technology, Vol. 7. No. 4, pp. 335-338, 1992. Printed in Great Britain.
0886-7798/92 $5.00 + .00 Pergamon Press Ltd
Expected loss is estimated as a product of probability and the probable damage caused by the risk. This theory m a y be expressed mathematically as: (Expected loss) = (probability of risk) x (probable damage of loss) Expected loss decreases as expense for security mAnagementincreases; the optimal cost is considered to be the point at which the aggregate of expense and expected loss reaches a mini. mum. In most cases, probable risks are diverse; thus, each risk has to be analyzed and evaluated separately.
2.3.2. Planning of protective methods The major functions of protective methods m a y be roughly categorized as follows: 1. D e t e r r e n c e - - m i n i m i z i n g t h e probability of the risk and vulnerability to the risk (e.g., by prohibiting the use of fire). 2. Prevention--preventing the occurrence of damage and preparing necessary countermeasures (e.g., by instelllng fire extinguishers). 3. Detectionandresponse--moniter-
ing the situationand making the necessary response in case ofemergency (e.g., by monitoring firealarms, and by dispatching necessary personnel). 4. Recovery--preventing the damage from spreading and recovering partial or entire function (e.g.,by commanding fire-fighting activity, or by providing backups for some critical functions).
335
At this stage ofplAnnlng, the proper security grade is assigned to each part of the premises. Security personnel and devices, as well as operational procedures, should then be allocated.
Adoption of a "man-machine system" has two basic configurations, depending on the scale of the building or premises: 1. A "local security system", for large-scale buildings. 2. A "centralized security system", for small or medium-sized buildings.
3. Typical Security Systems Japan's commercial security industry was founded in 1962, and has grown rapidly. During the early days of the industry, the core of security management resided exclusively in the use of professional personnel. However, as labor costs rapidly increased, it became prohibitively expensive to assign many personnel to every required post. In addition, it appeared that personnel were generally unreliable for some jobs, such as those involving monotonous watch duty, because it is nearly impossible for bllmA~ beings to m~intain the required continuously high level of attention under such circ~trngtances. These are the major reasons for the growing use of electronic monitoring and sensing devices that have replaced h u m a n tasks. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to replace all human jobs with electronic devices because of the relatively high installation cost, complexity of the jobs, and questionable reliability of some devices and sensors. The optimal solution combines personnel and electronic devices. This type of security system, called a "manmachine system", combines the abilities of both facets of security, while each compensates for the weaknesses of the other.
[
n~ I ' U S
In many cases, security personnel are also responsible for miscellaneous tasks such as opening]closing of entrance doors or shutters, locking]unlocking of doors, switching and monitoring of escalators and elevators, and proriding information services to visitors. Automation of these h u m a n jobs is desirable in order to increase productivity, and some of them have been already replaced, e.g., by computerized access control systems that use magnetic strip cards or ID cards. However, automation is still costly for many building owners, and it is difficult to justify the initial investment in terms of labor cost reduction.
3.1. Local Security System (Fig. 1) Generally speaking, security management for large-scale buildings remains labor-intensive. The fire alarm s y s t e m , s m o k e d e t e c t o r s , CCTV (Closed- Circuit Television) system, and access control devices are usually monitored by professional security personnel at a security station on the premises. However, m a n y duties are still performed by human beings. Patrol and dispatch on the premises and access control of visitors, for example, require m a n y personnel in this type of system. The security station dispatches security personnel when one of the devices detects an emergency or when a tenant or a m~nager of the building calls the station. After evaluating the situation, security personnel take the necessary action, prescribed by agreement with the customer. I r a crime such as trespassing or robbery has been detected, the security person should search for an intruder and arrest the criminal. Fire-fighting and rescue activities at the early stages of a fire are also an important duty, and the security station may request assistance from the police or fire department.
3.2. CentralizedSecurity System (Fig. 2) Small and medium-sized buildings (usually less t h a n 10,000 m 2floor area) have no security personnel at night or throughout the day. The management of such buildings has a contract with computerized security companies. Electronic sensing and communication devices are installed on the customer's premises, and these devices are linked to regional control stations. I f the sensing device detects an emergency, the nearest control station responds according to an action plan agreed upon with the customer. The control station may contact an emergency depot and dispatch security personnel to evaluate the situation. When necessary, control stations may request assistance from police or fire departments, utility companies, and others.
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Figure 1. Local security system.
336
TUNNELLING
AND UNDERGROUND
SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Volume 7, Number 4,
1992
A u t o m a t i c mon i t o r i ng
P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t
Control Station
- - F i r e D e p a r tree -----U
n t
t i l i t y C o m p a n i e s
OOOO0 00000
00000 00000
S u b s c r i b e P r e r,i i s e s
I, e a s e d Te 1 ephone C i r c u i t s Rad i o Communi
' s
~.2 cat
i on
/\
~Y
I S e c u r i t y P e r s o n n e l
Depot
Patrol
Car
Figure 2. Centralized security system. 4. Risk Analysis and Case Studies Risk ~ a l y s i s for any type of space cannot be completed without a detailed management and operational plan of the space. A security management system for underground space cannot be installed if there is no risk analysis based on the utilization and operational plan. Thus far, almost no subsurface project has provided the infermation necessary for such an analysis; however, tentative risk analysis, based on the presumed operation of the space, is possible.
4.1. Underground Shopping Mall Legally categorized ~underground (public) space" ("Chlka-gai') in J a p a n now totals more t h a n 800,000 m 2. Public underground passages, shops and offices along the passageways are included in this type of underground space. Approximately 240,000 m 2 of currently existing underground space are used as shops. Underground floors of the neighboring buildings along the public u n d e r g r o u n d p a s s a g e a r e categorized as q u a s i - u n d e r g r o u n d space by legal definition. This type of underground space in general has two u s e s - - a s a passage and as a shopping facility. From a security management viewpoint, underground space has characteristics ~dmilar to those of shopping malls on the surface, as well as characteristics unique to underground space. Some probable risksin underground shopping malls are c o m m o n to aboveground malls: damage of goods by fire, poisonous smoke generated by fire, flammable gas leAk.qand ignition,rob-
Volume 7, Number 4, 1992
bery, loitering,and vandalism. Additionaland unique risksin underground space include suffocationby poisonous gas or lack of ventilation,water invasion by heavy precipitation or flood, and destruction of the structure. Because of the high density and the diversity of visitors in shopping malls, casualties can be numerous once a hidden riskbecomes a reality. An unfortunate example is the well-known explosion accident that occurred at Sizuoka Golden Underground Shopping Mall in 1980. Effective countermeasures against these risks may include: • Reinforcement of a structure; • Use of nonflRmmable building materials; • Removal of the likely source of fire; • Fire extinguishing equipment; • Smoke exhaust system. Actual operation is most likely to take the form ofa "localsecuritysystem" or similar arrangement. Under this type of m a n a g e m e n t system, fire detectors, intruder sensors, and CCTV are monitored 24 hours a day by command personnel at the security station. The commander evaluates emergency situations and dispatches security personnel to deal with them. The commander also callsthe policeor firedepartment or utilitycompanies if necessary. U n d e r g r o u n d shopping malls present a complicated problem because various risks interact with others directlyor indirectly,making itvery difficult to evaluate various outcomes using conventional methods.
~L~G
4.2. UUlity Tunnels Since the "Utility ~lnnelAct" passed the Diet in 1963, utility 0,nnels have been constructed in major cities such as Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, as well as in medium-sized cities such as Sendai and Fulmoka. Currently such Omnels total appro~fimately 200 k m in length. NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegram) telephone line, electricity cables, gas pipelines, and water mains for beth civil and industrial use are accommodated in utility tlmnels. The main difference between underground shopping malls and utility t~mnels is the limited access of people to the latter type of facility. Normally only an overseer or maintenance personnel can enter a utility t~mnel, making it unlikely t h a t ordinary people would be harmed by an accident that might occur init. Instead, termlnation ofurban activitiesas a result ofutility t,mnel accident seems to present a more serious consideration forthe public. Such a situationm a y occur w h e n a lifeline system (such as a water main) is damaged. In this vein, a fire accident t h a t occurred in the tunnel of the Setagaya Telephone Station was remarkable partly because of the difficulty of extinguishing the cable fire, but mainly because of the widespread turmoil caused by a malfunction of communication lines, including those used for banking data transmission. Basic measures to guard agaln~ security risks for utility Omnels normally would involve a typical centralized security system. Usually there are no people inside the t~mnel, and various intrusion sensors are effective in detectlug anyintruders. Magnetic or ID cards should be used for necessary entrance.
ANDUNDERGROtrSDSPACETECHNOLOOY337
Some problems remain unsolved. Reliable detection and fire extinction still present challenges to currently available technologies. Robotlzed fire detection and extinction also pose many obstacles to use in a real situation. The ulthnate goal is to provide reliable methods at a reasonable cost.
4.3. Underground Parking The growing number of automobiles in J a p a n has caused serious parking problems such as a lack of parking space and illegal parking on public roads, especially in the city centers. Construction of underground parking fa "cdities has increasingly drawn attention as a solution for parking problems in urban areas.
To date, underground parking has been constructed in conjunction with underground shopping malls. However, underground spaces used specifically or mainly for parking have been proposed by several companies. Underground parking may be divided into two categories, based on the parking method utilized; 1. Self-driving parking. 2. Mechanically-driven parking. In contrast to the conventional selfdriving system, which allows drivers -to move their cars to the parking position, mechanically-driven parking systems relocate a car from the entrance to the parking position automatically. Operation of parking also varies by the charging method, i.e., whether the parking is free or charged; and, ff charged, whether the fee is paid to a person or to a payment machine. Each case presents different risks, and the preferred security management necessarily differs depending on those risks. In general, self-driving parking facilities offer free access to u s e r s - - a n d to other people. Thus, car robbery, thei~ of belongings in a car, arson, and violent crime may have a high probability of occurrence in this type of parking lot. Also, accidents involving two or more cars or a car and a pedestrian are likely to occur. Access control of users, surveillance by CCTV, or patrol by personnel are necessary.
Fire is also a serious threat. The ability to respond to a fire quickly, the evacuation of users, and cooperation with the fire department and/or police department all must be well planned and organized for this type of facility. In mechanically-driven parking facilities, users have no access to the parking area; therefore, neither surveillance nor foot patrols would seem to be necessary. Instead, monitoring of the parking machine's operation is necessary. If the parking machine malfunctions, mRintenance personnel have to be dispatched. Detecting a fire inside a car is difficult in a mechanically-driven parking facility. Furthermore, if the fire spreads on a large scale, extinction of the fire becomes very difficult. During normal operation, the waiting line of cars at the entrance or exit may result in traffic jams or accidents, and security personnel need to provide proper guidance in such situations.
4.4. Underground Waste Incineration Facilities The capacity of waste treatment facilities has not kept pace proportionally with the increasing amount of waste in major cities. Soaring land prices and strong opposition by neighborhoods to new construction plans for waste treatment facilities make it very difficult to expand their capacities. Collection and transportation of garbage are becoming inefficient because of longer transportation routes, ever more serious traffic jams, and a shortage of truck drivers. Thus, it would seem reasonable to construct w a s t e t r e a t m e n t facilities underground, near a city center. Underground facilities leave the ground level free for public uses such as parks. The influence of such facilities on the urban environment, the potential risk of fire, and traffic jams in the surrounding area are currently raised issues. Few projects have proposed utilization of the ground level, but if these projects are based on the assumption that the ground level can be open to the public, it becomes very important to
3 3 8 TUlqNE.LLrNGAND UNDERGROUND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
design proper security management for the open space above the ground level as well as for underground facilities.
5.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted a tentative analysis and evaluation of risks with r e g a r d to c u r r e n t l y p r o p o s e d underground public works projects. However, these projects lack inform a t i o n for s e c u r i t y m a n a g e m e n t pl,nnlng purposs because they have focused m o r e on u t i l i z a t i o n and construction technologies t h a n on operational technologies. In addition, most such projects, despite their strong concern with the physical characteristics of underground space, have paid little attention to the human nature of both users and the personnel in charge of security management. It seems that some people believe that the required level of security can be achieved easily by inst~lllng fire and intrusion a l a r m sensors or devices. However, many past accidents have already shown that an accident may occur even in a building with a state-ofthe-art fire alarm system. Accidents in underground space may paralyze indispensable lifelines of the city. We should be fully aware that risk issues with regard to urban underground development could pose a serious threat to basic functioning over a wide area, and that these issues should be discussed in the overall context of urban risk management. When we discuss risk and its outcomes, we tend to focus on individual risk. However, each individual risk may affect another risk, and thereby cause serious deterioration of the situation. This interaction between or among individual risks is too complex to evaluate by current technology and study organization. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that all of the related sectors coordinate a joint study for interactive risk analysis and cooperative emergency action plans. Safety and security in underground space will be achievable if we study t h e m from various and objective viewpoints. []
Volume 7, Number 4, 1992
Abstract--Currently proposed projects to utilize underground space have provided little information about the necessary security management. This paper discusses risk analysis and probable security management configurations, based on the limited information available. In some cases, security management for underground space is likely to take on a configuration similar to that used for typical buildings on the surface. However, some underground facilities may have the potential for serious danger, created by the interaction of more than two individual risks.
P~sumA--Les projets actuellement soumis pour utiliser l'espace souterrain fournissent peu d'informations au sujet de la ndcessaire gestion des risquss. Ce rapport traite de l'analyse du risque et des configurations probables de gestion des risques, fond/kes sur un nombre limit~ d°informations disponibles. Darts eertains cns, la gestion des risques en espace souterrain prend certainement uns configuration similaire &celle utilis~e clans des immeubles typiquss construits au niveau du sol. Cependant, certaines installations souterraines peuvent prdsenter de s~rieux dangers potentiels, crd~s par l'interaction de plus de deux risques indiuiduels.
1. Introduction
2.2. Security-RelatedSectors
nnmher of projects utilizingurban underground space have been proposed by various sectors. However, from a security company's viewpoint, few subsurface projects seem to have included a deftnite security management plan. In general, a security management plan must be designed on the basis of operational objectives, financial and h11man resource constraints, etc. The projects proposed to date have not prodded that essential information. This paper introduces the general principle of risk analysis for security planning, and discusses security-related problems and feasible methods and/or systems for some currently proposed underground projects.
Although police departments and fire departments have important public service functions in a modern society, individuals are still responsible for taking countermeasures against crime and fire in order to protect properties on their premises. Utility companies are responsible for their own facilities and related dangers. Cooperation with the fire and police sectors provides the basis for any type of security management system, and each sector has its own organization for 24-hour monitoring and dispatch operation. Actual forms of security management vary from self-defense to private bodyguards to specialized companies that offer their subscribers monitoring and dispatching services. In reality, the differences in security management derive not from physical constraints, such as a building's structure or the site configuration, but r a t h e r from financial constraints. Building owners or managers are concerned with minimizing cost, and they tend to adopt the most economical methods to maintain their premises at a certain level of security.
A
2. Process of Security Management 2.1. Purpose of Security Management "Security" is widely recognized as a synonym for "safety', and =security management" is considered to be an act of crime prevention and fire protection to save h u m a n life, property, or business activity. The ultimate purpose of security management is to ellml nate psycho-social fears and threats, as well as physical damage or tangible property losses.
2.3. Security ManagementPlanning Security planning consists of several stages, described below.
2.3.1. Risk analysis and evaluation Security management begins from Presentaddress:HideakiIshioka,Manager, Systems IntegrationDivision,Secom Co., Ltd., Shinjuku Nomura Bldg., 1-26-2 NiRhiAhinjukuShinjuku-ku,Tokyo, Japan.
the analysis and evaluation of probable risks. Although several studies have examined optimization of cost in risk management, the simplest theory can be described as follows:
Tunnelling and UTulerground Space Technology, Vol. 7. No. 4, pp. 335-338, 1992. Printed in Great Britain.
0886-7798/92 $5.00 + .00 Pergamon Press Ltd
Expected loss is estimated as a product of probability and the probable damage caused by the risk. This theory m a y be expressed mathematically as: (Expected loss) = (probability of risk) x (probable damage of loss) Expected loss decreases as expense for security mAnagementincreases; the optimal cost is considered to be the point at which the aggregate of expense and expected loss reaches a mini. mum. In most cases, probable risks are diverse; thus, each risk has to be analyzed and evaluated separately.
2.3.2. Planning of protective methods The major functions of protective methods m a y be roughly categorized as follows: 1. D e t e r r e n c e - - m i n i m i z i n g t h e probability of the risk and vulnerability to the risk (e.g., by prohibiting the use of fire). 2. Prevention--preventing the occurrence of damage and preparing necessary countermeasures (e.g., by instelllng fire extinguishers). 3. Detectionandresponse--moniter-
ing the situationand making the necessary response in case ofemergency (e.g., by monitoring firealarms, and by dispatching necessary personnel). 4. Recovery--preventing the damage from spreading and recovering partial or entire function (e.g.,by commanding fire-fighting activity, or by providing backups for some critical functions).
335
At this stage ofplAnnlng, the proper security grade is assigned to each part of the premises. Security personnel and devices, as well as operational procedures, should then be allocated.
Adoption of a "man-machine system" has two basic configurations, depending on the scale of the building or premises: 1. A "local security system", for large-scale buildings. 2. A "centralized security system", for small or medium-sized buildings.
3. Typical Security Systems Japan's commercial security industry was founded in 1962, and has grown rapidly. During the early days of the industry, the core of security management resided exclusively in the use of professional personnel. However, as labor costs rapidly increased, it became prohibitively expensive to assign many personnel to every required post. In addition, it appeared that personnel were generally unreliable for some jobs, such as those involving monotonous watch duty, because it is nearly impossible for bllmA~ beings to m~intain the required continuously high level of attention under such circ~trngtances. These are the major reasons for the growing use of electronic monitoring and sensing devices that have replaced h u m a n tasks. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to replace all human jobs with electronic devices because of the relatively high installation cost, complexity of the jobs, and questionable reliability of some devices and sensors. The optimal solution combines personnel and electronic devices. This type of security system, called a "manmachine system", combines the abilities of both facets of security, while each compensates for the weaknesses of the other.
[
n~ I ' U S
In many cases, security personnel are also responsible for miscellaneous tasks such as opening]closing of entrance doors or shutters, locking]unlocking of doors, switching and monitoring of escalators and elevators, and proriding information services to visitors. Automation of these h u m a n jobs is desirable in order to increase productivity, and some of them have been already replaced, e.g., by computerized access control systems that use magnetic strip cards or ID cards. However, automation is still costly for many building owners, and it is difficult to justify the initial investment in terms of labor cost reduction.
3.1. Local Security System (Fig. 1) Generally speaking, security management for large-scale buildings remains labor-intensive. The fire alarm s y s t e m , s m o k e d e t e c t o r s , CCTV (Closed- Circuit Television) system, and access control devices are usually monitored by professional security personnel at a security station on the premises. However, m a n y duties are still performed by human beings. Patrol and dispatch on the premises and access control of visitors, for example, require m a n y personnel in this type of system. The security station dispatches security personnel when one of the devices detects an emergency or when a tenant or a m~nager of the building calls the station. After evaluating the situation, security personnel take the necessary action, prescribed by agreement with the customer. I r a crime such as trespassing or robbery has been detected, the security person should search for an intruder and arrest the criminal. Fire-fighting and rescue activities at the early stages of a fire are also an important duty, and the security station may request assistance from the police or fire department.
3.2. CentralizedSecurity System (Fig. 2) Small and medium-sized buildings (usually less t h a n 10,000 m 2floor area) have no security personnel at night or throughout the day. The management of such buildings has a contract with computerized security companies. Electronic sensing and communication devices are installed on the customer's premises, and these devices are linked to regional control stations. I f the sensing device detects an emergency, the nearest control station responds according to an action plan agreed upon with the customer. The control station may contact an emergency depot and dispatch security personnel to evaluate the situation. When necessary, control stations may request assistance from police or fire departments, utility companies, and others.
Access
10fl
Sensor
Cout
ro
1 AU
Devices
(
M 0 n Fi t
I (
i t
I n g
o r
CCTV
e
De
Ollla~
ct
or
[-'a [ 1"o 1 S c o u r ~. L t t
~&d Dispatch
CO[IIIIIIA
I ( 3' I 0
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Figure 1. Local security system.
336
TUNNELLING
AND UNDERGROUND
SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Volume 7, Number 4,
1992
A u t o m a t i c mon i t o r i ng
P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t
Control Station
- - F i r e D e p a r tree -----U
n t
t i l i t y C o m p a n i e s
OOOO0 00000
00000 00000
S u b s c r i b e P r e r,i i s e s
I, e a s e d Te 1 ephone C i r c u i t s Rad i o Communi
' s
~.2 cat
i on
/\
~Y
I S e c u r i t y P e r s o n n e l
Depot
Patrol
Car
Figure 2. Centralized security system. 4. Risk Analysis and Case Studies Risk ~ a l y s i s for any type of space cannot be completed without a detailed management and operational plan of the space. A security management system for underground space cannot be installed if there is no risk analysis based on the utilization and operational plan. Thus far, almost no subsurface project has provided the infermation necessary for such an analysis; however, tentative risk analysis, based on the presumed operation of the space, is possible.
4.1. Underground Shopping Mall Legally categorized ~underground (public) space" ("Chlka-gai') in J a p a n now totals more t h a n 800,000 m 2. Public underground passages, shops and offices along the passageways are included in this type of underground space. Approximately 240,000 m 2 of currently existing underground space are used as shops. Underground floors of the neighboring buildings along the public u n d e r g r o u n d p a s s a g e a r e categorized as q u a s i - u n d e r g r o u n d space by legal definition. This type of underground space in general has two u s e s - - a s a passage and as a shopping facility. From a security management viewpoint, underground space has characteristics ~dmilar to those of shopping malls on the surface, as well as characteristics unique to underground space. Some probable risksin underground shopping malls are c o m m o n to aboveground malls: damage of goods by fire, poisonous smoke generated by fire, flammable gas leAk.qand ignition,rob-
Volume 7, Number 4, 1992
bery, loitering,and vandalism. Additionaland unique risksin underground space include suffocationby poisonous gas or lack of ventilation,water invasion by heavy precipitation or flood, and destruction of the structure. Because of the high density and the diversity of visitors in shopping malls, casualties can be numerous once a hidden riskbecomes a reality. An unfortunate example is the well-known explosion accident that occurred at Sizuoka Golden Underground Shopping Mall in 1980. Effective countermeasures against these risks may include: • Reinforcement of a structure; • Use of nonflRmmable building materials; • Removal of the likely source of fire; • Fire extinguishing equipment; • Smoke exhaust system. Actual operation is most likely to take the form ofa "localsecuritysystem" or similar arrangement. Under this type of m a n a g e m e n t system, fire detectors, intruder sensors, and CCTV are monitored 24 hours a day by command personnel at the security station. The commander evaluates emergency situations and dispatches security personnel to deal with them. The commander also callsthe policeor firedepartment or utilitycompanies if necessary. U n d e r g r o u n d shopping malls present a complicated problem because various risks interact with others directlyor indirectly,making itvery difficult to evaluate various outcomes using conventional methods.
~L~G
4.2. UUlity Tunnels Since the "Utility ~lnnelAct" passed the Diet in 1963, utility 0,nnels have been constructed in major cities such as Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, as well as in medium-sized cities such as Sendai and Fulmoka. Currently such Omnels total appro~fimately 200 k m in length. NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegram) telephone line, electricity cables, gas pipelines, and water mains for beth civil and industrial use are accommodated in utility tlmnels. The main difference between underground shopping malls and utility t~mnels is the limited access of people to the latter type of facility. Normally only an overseer or maintenance personnel can enter a utility t~mnel, making it unlikely t h a t ordinary people would be harmed by an accident that might occur init. Instead, termlnation ofurban activitiesas a result ofutility t,mnel accident seems to present a more serious consideration forthe public. Such a situationm a y occur w h e n a lifeline system (such as a water main) is damaged. In this vein, a fire accident t h a t occurred in the tunnel of the Setagaya Telephone Station was remarkable partly because of the difficulty of extinguishing the cable fire, but mainly because of the widespread turmoil caused by a malfunction of communication lines, including those used for banking data transmission. Basic measures to guard agaln~ security risks for utility Omnels normally would involve a typical centralized security system. Usually there are no people inside the t~mnel, and various intrusion sensors are effective in detectlug anyintruders. Magnetic or ID cards should be used for necessary entrance.
ANDUNDERGROtrSDSPACETECHNOLOOY337
Some problems remain unsolved. Reliable detection and fire extinction still present challenges to currently available technologies. Robotlzed fire detection and extinction also pose many obstacles to use in a real situation. The ulthnate goal is to provide reliable methods at a reasonable cost.
4.3. Underground Parking The growing number of automobiles in J a p a n has caused serious parking problems such as a lack of parking space and illegal parking on public roads, especially in the city centers. Construction of underground parking fa "cdities has increasingly drawn attention as a solution for parking problems in urban areas.
To date, underground parking has been constructed in conjunction with underground shopping malls. However, underground spaces used specifically or mainly for parking have been proposed by several companies. Underground parking may be divided into two categories, based on the parking method utilized; 1. Self-driving parking. 2. Mechanically-driven parking. In contrast to the conventional selfdriving system, which allows drivers -to move their cars to the parking position, mechanically-driven parking systems relocate a car from the entrance to the parking position automatically. Operation of parking also varies by the charging method, i.e., whether the parking is free or charged; and, ff charged, whether the fee is paid to a person or to a payment machine. Each case presents different risks, and the preferred security management necessarily differs depending on those risks. In general, self-driving parking facilities offer free access to u s e r s - - a n d to other people. Thus, car robbery, thei~ of belongings in a car, arson, and violent crime may have a high probability of occurrence in this type of parking lot. Also, accidents involving two or more cars or a car and a pedestrian are likely to occur. Access control of users, surveillance by CCTV, or patrol by personnel are necessary.
Fire is also a serious threat. The ability to respond to a fire quickly, the evacuation of users, and cooperation with the fire department and/or police department all must be well planned and organized for this type of facility. In mechanically-driven parking facilities, users have no access to the parking area; therefore, neither surveillance nor foot patrols would seem to be necessary. Instead, monitoring of the parking machine's operation is necessary. If the parking machine malfunctions, mRintenance personnel have to be dispatched. Detecting a fire inside a car is difficult in a mechanically-driven parking facility. Furthermore, if the fire spreads on a large scale, extinction of the fire becomes very difficult. During normal operation, the waiting line of cars at the entrance or exit may result in traffic jams or accidents, and security personnel need to provide proper guidance in such situations.
4.4. Underground Waste Incineration Facilities The capacity of waste treatment facilities has not kept pace proportionally with the increasing amount of waste in major cities. Soaring land prices and strong opposition by neighborhoods to new construction plans for waste treatment facilities make it very difficult to expand their capacities. Collection and transportation of garbage are becoming inefficient because of longer transportation routes, ever more serious traffic jams, and a shortage of truck drivers. Thus, it would seem reasonable to construct w a s t e t r e a t m e n t facilities underground, near a city center. Underground facilities leave the ground level free for public uses such as parks. The influence of such facilities on the urban environment, the potential risk of fire, and traffic jams in the surrounding area are currently raised issues. Few projects have proposed utilization of the ground level, but if these projects are based on the assumption that the ground level can be open to the public, it becomes very important to
3 3 8 TUlqNE.LLrNGAND UNDERGROUND SPACE TECHNOLOGY
design proper security management for the open space above the ground level as well as for underground facilities.
5.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted a tentative analysis and evaluation of risks with r e g a r d to c u r r e n t l y p r o p o s e d underground public works projects. However, these projects lack inform a t i o n for s e c u r i t y m a n a g e m e n t pl,nnlng purposs because they have focused m o r e on u t i l i z a t i o n and construction technologies t h a n on operational technologies. In addition, most such projects, despite their strong concern with the physical characteristics of underground space, have paid little attention to the human nature of both users and the personnel in charge of security management. It seems that some people believe that the required level of security can be achieved easily by inst~lllng fire and intrusion a l a r m sensors or devices. However, many past accidents have already shown that an accident may occur even in a building with a state-ofthe-art fire alarm system. Accidents in underground space may paralyze indispensable lifelines of the city. We should be fully aware that risk issues with regard to urban underground development could pose a serious threat to basic functioning over a wide area, and that these issues should be discussed in the overall context of urban risk management. When we discuss risk and its outcomes, we tend to focus on individual risk. However, each individual risk may affect another risk, and thereby cause serious deterioration of the situation. This interaction between or among individual risks is too complex to evaluate by current technology and study organization. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that all of the related sectors coordinate a joint study for interactive risk analysis and cooperative emergency action plans. Safety and security in underground space will be achievable if we study t h e m from various and objective viewpoints. []
Volume 7, Number 4, 1992