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Self-rumination, self-reflection, and depression: Self-rumination counteracts the adaptive effect of self-reflection
Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 260–264
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Self-rumination, self-reflection, and depression: Self-rumination counteracts the adaptive effect of self-reflection Keisuke Takano*, Yoshihiko Tanno Tanno Laboratory, Department of Cognitive and Behavioral Science, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 26 June 2008 Received in revised form 19 November 2008 Accepted 19 December 2008
Self-focused attention has adaptive and maladaptive aspects: self-reflection and self-rumination [Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and the Five-Factor Model of personality: distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 284–304]. Although reflection is thought to be associated with problem solving and the promotion of mental health, previous researches have shown that reflection does not always have an adaptive effect on depression. Authors have examined the causes behind this inconsistency by modeling the relationships among self-reflection, self-rumination, and depression. One hundred and eleven undergraduates (91 men and 20 women) participated in a two-time point assessment with a 3-week interval. Statistical analysis with structural equation modeling showed that self-reflection significantly predicted selfrumination, whereas self-rumination did not predict self-reflection. With regard to depression, selfreflection was associated with a lower level of depression; self-rumination, with a higher level of depression. The total effect of self-reflection on depression was almost zero. This result indicates that self-reflection per se has an adaptive effect, which is canceled out by the maladaptive effect of selfrumination, because reflectors are likely to ruminate and reflect simultaneously. Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Rumination Reflection Depression
Introduction Self-focused attention and negative outcomes Focusing on depressed mood, problems, and other negative selfexperiences has negative outcomes. Increased self-focused attention is associated with depression (Ingram, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). In particular, rumination, conceptualized as the tendency to repetitively focus on symptoms of distress and the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), is known to be a serious risk factor for depression. Prospective studies have shown that rumination predicts the duration and severity of depressive symptoms, and predicts the new onset of major depressive episodes (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). In addition, recent researches have suggested that rumination is associated with less effective problem-solving strategies, increased recall of negative autobiographical memories, and increased effects of a low sense of mastery on depression
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ81 3 5454 6259; fax: þ81 3 5454 6979. E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Takano). 0005-7967/$ – see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.12.008
(Lyubomirsky et al.,1998 Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999). Adaptive and maladaptive functions of self-focus However, in addition to negative outcomes, self-focused attention can also have adaptive and beneficial outcomes. Selffocused attention, even recurrent thoughts such as rumination, can also be conceptualized as a process of problem-solving or selfregulation and can serve to increase self-knowledge and facilitate psychological adjustment (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Considering the contradictory aspects of self-focused attention, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) distinguished between the rumination and reflection subtypes of private self-consciousness, based on the motivation and five-factor model of personality, and they developed the Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ) to assess both subtypes. ‘‘Self-rumination’’ is a form of negative, chronic, and persistent self-focus that is motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self and is associated with neuroticism and depression. ‘‘Self-reflection’’ is a contrasting form of self-focus that is motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self and is associated with openness to experiences.
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Theoretically, self-reflection promotes self-knowledge and enhances mental health. Previous researches have indicated that self-rumination has a negative correlation with perspective taking and the happiness of memories, and a positive correlation with personal distress and the unhappiness of memories; however, self-reflection has a positive correlation with perspective taking and empathic concern (Joireman, Parrott, & Hammersla, 2002; Teasdale & Green, 2004). In addition, research on identity has demonstrated that self-rumination moderates the association between information-oriented style and depressive symptoms; however, self-reflection moderates the association between the information-oriented style and the formation of identity commitments (Luyckx, Soenens, Berzonsky, Smits, Goossens, & Vansteenkiste, 2007). In line with Trapnell and Campbell (1999), recent researches have suggested that self-focused attention or repetitive thought about the self have both adaptive and maladaptive functions (for review, see Watkins, 2008). Treynor, Gonxalez, and NolenHoeksema (2003) also indicated that self-focused attention can be subdivided into adaptive reflective and maladaptive ruminative factors; the former refers to ‘‘reflective pondering,’’ which is characterized as attempts to understand the reasons for depressive moods, and the latter refers to ‘‘brooding,’’ which is characterized as dwelling on the negative consequences of depressive symptoms. Reflective pondering predicted reduced future depression at 1 year follow- up after controlling for baseline depression, whereas brooding predicted increased future depression. Although the two dichotomies, self-reflection versus selfrumination, and reflective pondering versus brooding, have been argued in different contexts (studies on private self-consciousness and depressive rumination), these sets of constructs have a number of common features. First, self-reflection and reflective pondering are characterized as a form of self-focus aimed at understanding the self and overcoming problems and difficulties, whereas selfrumination and brooding are characterized as neurotic and chronic forms of self-focus, such as gloomy, anxious, or depressed thinking (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003). Second, these constructs have similar patterns in their correlations with other variables such as depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. Previous studies reported that self-rumination and brooding are associated with higher levels of depression and anxiety and with a lower level of self-esteem, although self-reflection and reflective pondering have little or no associations with these variables (Joireman et al., 2002; Rude, Maestes, & Neff, 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003). These empirical and theoretical implications suggest that self-reflection and reflective pondering have the same adaptive functions associated with self-regulation; however, selfrumination and brooding have the same maladaptive functions associated with dysphoria. Thus, the findings about reflective pondering versus brooding would be relevant to the argument pertaining to self-reflection versus self-rumination.
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reflective pondering is related to forms of adaptive primary coping and secondary coping, such as problem solving or distraction (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Treynor et al. (2003) showed that reflection predicted less depression after controlling for the baseline depression level. Other studies found that suicidal and non-suicidal groups differed significantly in terms of the levels of reflection, which indicates that deficits in reflection are linked to suicidality in major depression (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). However, researches supporting maladaptive outcomes of reflective pondering indicated that reflective pondering was positively correlated with depression (Rude, et al., 2007; Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005). Prospective studies suggested that reflective pondering predicted depression level and suicidal ideation after controlling for baseline depressive symptoms (Kwon & Olson, 2007; Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007). The inconsistency in the literature with regard to the relation between reflection and depression may be due to the confounding factor that affects the association between reflection and depression. Joormann, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) discussed that reflection might be adaptive in the absence of the negative ruminative component and depressive symptoms, and they proposed that there might be a perpetuation cycle between the reflective and ruminative component, which blurs the distinction between adaptive and maladaptive cognitive styles. Furthermore, Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema (2007) noted that attempts at understanding current problems turn to negative and passive perpetuating thoughts when individuals are not successful at generating solutions during their problem-solving attempts. From these discussions, it is expected that the adaptive effect of reflection is initially contaminated by the maladaptive effect of rumination because reflectors tend to simultaneously ruminate about and reflect on themselves. This contamination by rumination would lead to the instability of the results pertaining to reflection. Thus, we eliminated the maladaptive effect of rumination and investigated the true effect of reflection on depression. Present study The aim of the present study was to model the relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination, based on Trapnell and Campbell’s dichotomy of self-reflection versus self-rumination (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Following this model, we evaluated the true effect of self-reflection. If a reflector tends to ruminate at the same time that he/she reflects, it is expected that the true adaptive effect of self-reflection will be contaminated and canceled out by the maladaptive effect of self-rumination. Further, we hypothesized that there might be a perpetuation cycle between self-reflection and self-rumination, as argued by Joormann et al. (2006). Thus, in the present study, by incorporating such a relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination into the model, we examined the unique effect of self-reflection on depression after eliminating the influence of self-rumination.
Reflection Method Although there is consensus that self-rumination or brooding leads to a maladaptive self-focus and is associated with depression, the adaptive nature of reflection is still controversial. Previous literature on self-reflection has indicated only positive correlations with openness or other constructive cognitive styles but no direct association with manifestations of distress such as depression or anxiety, although self-reflection was thought to have functions of self-regulation or psychological adjustment (Joireman et al., 2002; Luyckx et al., 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Furthermore, there are mixed findings for reflective pondering. Researches supporting the adaptive function of reflective pondering have indicated that
Participants and procedure The participants of the present study were recruited from the introductory psychology course at the University of Tokyo. A total of 123 undergraduates completed the initial assessment (T1). After 3 weeks (T2), 111 undergraduates (91 men and 20 women) from the initial sample completed the second assessment. Although 12 participants dropped out, there were no influences of attrition, because those who dropped out did not differ from the rest of the participants in the group in terms of any of the measures at T1.
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Measures Rumination and reflection The participants completed the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) at both T1 and T2. The questionnaire was used to assess the participants’ tendency to ruminate about and reflect on themselves. The RRQ contains self-rumination and self-reflection subscales. Each subscale consists of 12 items. All the items have to be rated on a 5-point scale, whose anchors range from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1) to ‘‘strongly agree’’ (5). Previous studies have shown good testretest reliability and convergent validity of the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). In this study, the Japanese-translated version of the questionnaire was used. The Japanese version of the scale was also found to have good reliability (a ¼ 0.89 for rumination, a ¼ 0.89 for reflection) and convergent validity (Takano & Tanno, 2008). Depressive symptoms Participants completed the Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS; Zung, 1965) at T1. The SDS is a scale that is widely used to assess depressive symptoms. The SDS consists of 20 items. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale, whose anchors range from ‘‘little of the time’’ (1) to ‘‘most of the time’’ (4). In the present study, the Japanese version of the scale (Fukuda & Kobayashi, 1973) was used.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
1. T1 Rumination 2. T2 Rumination 3. T1 Reflection 4. T2 Reflection 5. T2 Depression
Mean
SD
1.
2.
3.
4.
44.60 42.36 39.57 39.45 42.36
7.76 8.25 8.48 8.60 7.10
– 0.80* 0.39* 0.35* 0.40*
– – 0.44* 0.44* 0.50*
– – – 0.85* 0.02
– – – – 0.07
*p < 0.01.
Model estimation The estimation results are presented in Fig. 1. The hypothesized model provided an excellent fit to the data (c2(3) ¼ 3.65, p > 0.10, GFI ¼ 0.99, RMSEA ¼ 0.04). The path from T2 self-reflection to T2 self-rumination was significant (b ¼ 0.17, p < 0.01); however, the path from T2 selfrumination to T2 self-reflection was not (b ¼ 0.03, n.s.). With regard to the relation with depression, a significant negative association was found between T2 self-reflection and T2 depression (b ¼ 0.19, p < 0.05). On the other hand, there was a strong positive association between T2 self-rumination and T2 depression (b ¼ 0.59, p < 0.01). The total effect of T2 self-reflection on T2 depression was 0.08. Multiple regression analysis
Results Correlation matrix Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix are presented in Table 1. Each T1 and T2 self-rumination is positively correlated with T2 depression (r ¼ 0.40, p < 0.01; r ¼ 0.50, p < 0.01), whereas selfreflection at each time had no significant correlation with depression (r ¼ 0.02, not significant (n.s.); r ¼ 0.07, n.s.). This pattern of correlation between the two types of self-focus and depression is consistent with the results of previous research (e.g., Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Model construction Structural equation modeling (SEM) was conducted to test the hypothesis. Since it is expected that there is a perpetuation cycle between self-reflection and self-rumination, as is argued in Joormann et al. (2006), the hypothesized model included bi-directional paths between self-reflection and self-rumination. To estimate such a reciprocal relation, we added the T1 observed variables (selfrumination and self-reflection) predicting the T2 variables (selfrumination and self-reflection, respectively) into the model as instrumental variables. Based on this synchronous effects model (Finkel, 1995), the paths from self-rumination and self-reflection to depression were assumed to facilitate the examination of the unique effects of self-reflection and self-rumination on depression.1 For the model estimation, the SAS CALIS procedure was used.
1 It is possible that depression can have the reverse effects on these two subtypes of self-focus (rumination and reflection). Therefore, we investigated models wherein the causal paths from rumination and reflection on depression are reversed and compared the fit of each model. The originally hypothesized model (presented in Fig. 1) showed a better fit (c2(3) ¼ 3.65, p ¼ 0.30; RMSEA ¼ 0.045; AIC ¼ -2.35) than the models containing the reversed path from depression to rumination (c2(3) ¼ 23.18, p < 0.01; RMSEA ¼ 0.25; AIC ¼ 17.18) or the path from depression to reflection (c2(3) ¼ 7.61, p ¼ 0.05; RMSEA ¼ 0.12; AIC ¼ 1.61). Therefore, we only employ the original model and excluded the models with reversed paths.
To verify the association between self-reflection and self-rumination described above, multiple regressions of variable T1 on variable T2, controlling for the other T1 variable were conducted (Table 2). The results indicated that T1 self-reflection predicted T2 self-rumination after controlling for T1 self-rumination (b ¼ 0.14, t ¼ 2.43, p < 0.05), while T1 self-rumination did not predict T2 selfreflection after controlling for T1 self-reflection (b ¼ 0.03, n.s.). These results suggested that there was a one-way causal relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination. Discussion The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination and to evaluate the unique effects of self-reflection and self-rumination on depression. The results of the SEM and multiple regression analysis indicated that self-reflection predicted self-rumination but self-rumination did not predict self-reflection. With regard to the relation with depression, self-reflection was associated with lower levels of depression; self-rumination, with higher levels of depression. The effect of self-reflection on self-rumination Although the reciprocal, causal relationship between selfreflection and self-rumination was assumed in the hypothesized model, the statistical analysis showed that self-reflection significantly predicted self-rumination, whereas self-rumination did not predict self-reflection. These results indicate that a reflector is more likely to ruminate about himself/herself, while this is not necessarily the case with a ruminator. This one-way relation does not support the suggestion of Joormann et al. (2006) that there may be a perpetuation cycle between self-reflection and self-rumination. Once reflectors engage in self-rumination and are stuck in the vicious cycle between self-rumination and depression (NolenHoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007), they are no longer able to adopt a constructive approach to their current problems, which is consistent with the suggestions from previous researches that even self-reflection, when used in the context of problem-solving, can lead to negative cycles of self-rumination and can increase
K. Takano, Y. Tanno / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 260–264
T1 Self-Rumination
.74**
T2 Self-Rumination .17**
263
.59**
.03
T2 Depression
Fit indices χ2(3) = 3.65, p = .30
T1 Self-Reflection
.84**
T2 Self-Reflection
-.19*
GFI = .99 AGFI = .94 RMSEA = .045 CFI = 1.00
Fig. 1. Estimated model of self-reflection, self-rumination, and depression. Note: Standardized coefficients are presented. For ease of presentation, error terms were omitted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
dysphoric mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996). Self-reflection may easily turn into self-rumination, when individuals attempting to understand their current problems fail to generate solutions during their problem-solving attempts (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007). Distinction between self-reflection and self-rumination in relation to depression Our results indicated that self-reflection is negatively associated with depression, while self-rumination is positively associated with it. The positive association between self-rumination and depression is consistent with previous researches that showed that selfrumination predicts depressive symptoms and disorders (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoesksema & Morrow, 1991). Negative, chronic self-focused attention, or rumination, may be a vulnerability factor for depression. On the contrary, the results showed a direct negative association between self-reflection and depression after the elimination of the positive association between self-reflection and depression mediated by rumination. These distinct associations with depression are consistent with the results of Treynor et al. (2003), who found that the ruminative component, or brooding, predicted an increase in depression, whereas the reflective component, or reflective pondering, predicted reduced subsequent depression. Self-reflection per se may be an adaptive cognitive style that is useful in solving current problems or regulating depressed mood, only in the absence of self-rumination (cf. Joormann et al., 2006). However, self-reflection is easily contaminated by self-rumination and the adaptive effect is canceled out by the mediated maladaptive effect of self-rumination; as a result, the effect on depression disappears totally, which can be seen in the total effect of T2 self-reflection on T2 depression (0.08). Future research In the present study, we argued that the inconsistency in the literature about the relation between reflection and depression might be due to a confounding factor that affects this relation. However, an alternative accounts may be that reflection is a compositive construct, which may affect the relation between reflection
Table 2 Multiple regression of T1 variables on T2 variables. T2 self-rumination (adjusted R2 ¼ 0.65)
T1 self-rumination T1 self-reflection *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
T2 self-reflection (adjusted R2 ¼ 0.71)
Estimates
SE
Estimates
SE
0.79** 0.14*
0.07 0.06
0.03 0.85**
0.06 0.06
and depression. This is because reflective pondering includes multidimensional elements and is not based on a clear theoretical model, because it was only determined from the post-hoc factor analysis. Thus, a number of potential variables would affect the relation between reflection and depression. It is important to investigate the components that are included in reflection and to reveal the factors that determine whether self-focused attention has adaptive or maladaptive outcomes. Furthermore, investigating the factors aggravating maladaptive self-focus and promoting adaptive self-focus would provide some clinical implications with regard to the prevention of and intervention for depression. First, one of these factors would be the individual’s motive to initiate self-focus, as suggested in Trapnell and Campbell (1999). Self-reflection is an openness-related self-focus motivated by intellectual curiosity and is associated with epistemic outcomes such as self-enhancement or self-regulation. This curiosity-motivated self-focus may facilitate self-knowledge and help a person to regulate himself/herself, leading to the control of depression. On the other hand, self-rumination is a neuroticism-related self-focus motivated by threats, losses, or injustices to the self and is associated with neurotic outcomes such as depression or anxiety. Self-rumination may trigger self-evaluative doubts and worries, exacerbating depressive symptoms. It is possible that such a motivational basis is a key factor for determining the consequences of self-focus. Second, the valence of thought content would be one of the important factors that distinguish adaptive self-focus from maladaptive self-focus. The multidimensional scaling of repetitive thoughts such as rumination and worry identified positive versus negative content valence as an important dimension that affects psychological and physical well-being (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003). By conducting a meta-analysis, Mor and Winquist (2002) revealed that a focus on the negative aspects of the self was related to greater negative affect, whereas a focus on the positive aspects of the self was related to lesser negative affect. Third, the outcomes of self-focus would depend on the intrapersonal context in which self-focus occurs (Watkins, 2008). For individuals already in dysphoric mood, self-focus exacerbates negative mood (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). Moreover, trait factors would moderate the relation between selffocus and depression. Experimental studies have suggested that forms of rumination and negative cognition, such as high dysfunctional attitudes or low self-esteem, interacted with and amplified each other’s effects on dysphoria (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007). These intrapersonal variables would influence the effects of self-focus. Fourth, the level of construal of thought process would be an important factor that determines whether self-focus has adaptive or maladaptive consequences (Watkins, 2008). Watkins and Teasdale (2004) also distinguished between the adaptive and maladaptive subtypes of self-focus experiential and analytical, respectively. Analytical self-focus is characterized as an abstract, intellectual, and evaluative cognitive style, whereas experiential self-focus is characterized as the concrete processing of experiences
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in the present moment. Experimental studies indicated that the analytical form was associated with increased overgeneral autobiographical memory and reduced social problem-solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Further, Rude et al. (2007) found that reflective pondering is positively correlated with depression, but non-judging reflection, which involves rewording to de-emphasize evaluative judgments, is not correlated with depression. This indicates that attention cloaked in negative judgments is indeed harmful. Such a non-judging and non-evaluative attitude oriented to the present experience, or ‘‘mindful’’ component, may be a decisive factor in determining whether the outcome of self-focus is adaptive or maladaptive. In future research, considering the factors described above, we need to determine the components that are included in adaptive self-focus. Limitations The present study has a number of limitations. First, the present study employed a semi-longitudinal design, wherein the causal chains between the subtypes of self-focus and depression were inferred based on a cross-sectional correlation matrix, whose factors had no temporal relations. Thus, longitudinal studies such as those predicting the residual change in depressive symptoms are needed to confirm the causal relations between the factors. Second, the sample in the present study comprises undergraduates. Joormann et al. (2006) showed that there were differences in the reflective pondering of the mean scores of clinical and nonclinical samples, which indicates the possibility that there may be a qualitative difference in reflection between clinical and nonclinical samples. It would be essential to examine whether the obtained result is replicated in a clinical sample. Third, the participants in the present study largely comprised men. Therefore, we were unable to examine gender differences in the relation among the two distinct types of self-focus and depression. A number of researches have reported gender differences in depression and rumination, and these researches have indicated that women are more depressed than men and are also more likely to ruminate than men (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994, 1999). Further, it was found that gender differences in depression are mediated by gender differences in rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994, 1999). Other studies suggested that only brooding, but not reflective pondering, mediates and moderates the relation between gender and depression (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Treynor et al., 2003). Thus, it is possible that the relation between self-rumination and depression is reinforced among women, although self-reflection may be unaffected by gender differences. Future research should examine a model including gender to determine whether our model is applicable to a sample comprising both men and women. References Burwell, R. A., & Shirk, S. R. (2007). Subtypes of rumination in Adolescence: Associations between brooding, reflection, depressive symptoms, and coping. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 36, 56–57. Butler, L. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1994). Gender differences in response to depressed mood in a college sample. Sex Roles, 30, 331–346. Ciesla, J., & Roberts, J. E. (2007). Rumination, negative cognition, and their interactive effects on depressed mood. Emotion, 7, 555–565. Crane, C., Barnhofer, T., & Williams, J. M. G. (2007). Reflection, brooding and suicidality: A preliminary study of different types of rumination in individuals with a history of major depression. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46, 497–504. Finkel, S. E. (1995). Causal analysis with panel data. California: Sage Publications. Fukuda, K., & Kobayashi, S. (1973). Jiko-hyoka-shiki yokuutsu-sei shakudo no kenkyu [A study on a Self-rating Depression Scale]. Psychiatria et Nuerologia Japonica, 75, 673–679.
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Self-rumination, self-reflection, and depression: Self-rumination counteracts the adaptive effect of self-reflection Keisuke Takano*, Yoshihiko Tanno Tanno Laboratory, Department of Cognitive and Behavioral Science, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 26 June 2008 Received in revised form 19 November 2008 Accepted 19 December 2008
Self-focused attention has adaptive and maladaptive aspects: self-reflection and self-rumination [Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and the Five-Factor Model of personality: distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 284–304]. Although reflection is thought to be associated with problem solving and the promotion of mental health, previous researches have shown that reflection does not always have an adaptive effect on depression. Authors have examined the causes behind this inconsistency by modeling the relationships among self-reflection, self-rumination, and depression. One hundred and eleven undergraduates (91 men and 20 women) participated in a two-time point assessment with a 3-week interval. Statistical analysis with structural equation modeling showed that self-reflection significantly predicted selfrumination, whereas self-rumination did not predict self-reflection. With regard to depression, selfreflection was associated with a lower level of depression; self-rumination, with a higher level of depression. The total effect of self-reflection on depression was almost zero. This result indicates that self-reflection per se has an adaptive effect, which is canceled out by the maladaptive effect of selfrumination, because reflectors are likely to ruminate and reflect simultaneously. Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Rumination Reflection Depression
Introduction Self-focused attention and negative outcomes Focusing on depressed mood, problems, and other negative selfexperiences has negative outcomes. Increased self-focused attention is associated with depression (Ingram, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). In particular, rumination, conceptualized as the tendency to repetitively focus on symptoms of distress and the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), is known to be a serious risk factor for depression. Prospective studies have shown that rumination predicts the duration and severity of depressive symptoms, and predicts the new onset of major depressive episodes (Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; NolenHoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). In addition, recent researches have suggested that rumination is associated with less effective problem-solving strategies, increased recall of negative autobiographical memories, and increased effects of a low sense of mastery on depression
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ81 3 5454 6259; fax: þ81 3 5454 6979. E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Takano). 0005-7967/$ – see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.12.008
(Lyubomirsky et al.,1998 Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999). Adaptive and maladaptive functions of self-focus However, in addition to negative outcomes, self-focused attention can also have adaptive and beneficial outcomes. Selffocused attention, even recurrent thoughts such as rumination, can also be conceptualized as a process of problem-solving or selfregulation and can serve to increase self-knowledge and facilitate psychological adjustment (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Considering the contradictory aspects of self-focused attention, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) distinguished between the rumination and reflection subtypes of private self-consciousness, based on the motivation and five-factor model of personality, and they developed the Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ) to assess both subtypes. ‘‘Self-rumination’’ is a form of negative, chronic, and persistent self-focus that is motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self and is associated with neuroticism and depression. ‘‘Self-reflection’’ is a contrasting form of self-focus that is motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self and is associated with openness to experiences.
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Theoretically, self-reflection promotes self-knowledge and enhances mental health. Previous researches have indicated that self-rumination has a negative correlation with perspective taking and the happiness of memories, and a positive correlation with personal distress and the unhappiness of memories; however, self-reflection has a positive correlation with perspective taking and empathic concern (Joireman, Parrott, & Hammersla, 2002; Teasdale & Green, 2004). In addition, research on identity has demonstrated that self-rumination moderates the association between information-oriented style and depressive symptoms; however, self-reflection moderates the association between the information-oriented style and the formation of identity commitments (Luyckx, Soenens, Berzonsky, Smits, Goossens, & Vansteenkiste, 2007). In line with Trapnell and Campbell (1999), recent researches have suggested that self-focused attention or repetitive thought about the self have both adaptive and maladaptive functions (for review, see Watkins, 2008). Treynor, Gonxalez, and NolenHoeksema (2003) also indicated that self-focused attention can be subdivided into adaptive reflective and maladaptive ruminative factors; the former refers to ‘‘reflective pondering,’’ which is characterized as attempts to understand the reasons for depressive moods, and the latter refers to ‘‘brooding,’’ which is characterized as dwelling on the negative consequences of depressive symptoms. Reflective pondering predicted reduced future depression at 1 year follow- up after controlling for baseline depression, whereas brooding predicted increased future depression. Although the two dichotomies, self-reflection versus selfrumination, and reflective pondering versus brooding, have been argued in different contexts (studies on private self-consciousness and depressive rumination), these sets of constructs have a number of common features. First, self-reflection and reflective pondering are characterized as a form of self-focus aimed at understanding the self and overcoming problems and difficulties, whereas selfrumination and brooding are characterized as neurotic and chronic forms of self-focus, such as gloomy, anxious, or depressed thinking (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003). Second, these constructs have similar patterns in their correlations with other variables such as depression, anxiety, and self-esteem. Previous studies reported that self-rumination and brooding are associated with higher levels of depression and anxiety and with a lower level of self-esteem, although self-reflection and reflective pondering have little or no associations with these variables (Joireman et al., 2002; Rude, Maestes, & Neff, 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Treynor et al., 2003). These empirical and theoretical implications suggest that self-reflection and reflective pondering have the same adaptive functions associated with self-regulation; however, selfrumination and brooding have the same maladaptive functions associated with dysphoria. Thus, the findings about reflective pondering versus brooding would be relevant to the argument pertaining to self-reflection versus self-rumination.
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reflective pondering is related to forms of adaptive primary coping and secondary coping, such as problem solving or distraction (Burwell & Shirk, 2007). Treynor et al. (2003) showed that reflection predicted less depression after controlling for the baseline depression level. Other studies found that suicidal and non-suicidal groups differed significantly in terms of the levels of reflection, which indicates that deficits in reflection are linked to suicidality in major depression (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). However, researches supporting maladaptive outcomes of reflective pondering indicated that reflective pondering was positively correlated with depression (Rude, et al., 2007; Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Khan, 2005). Prospective studies suggested that reflective pondering predicted depression level and suicidal ideation after controlling for baseline depressive symptoms (Kwon & Olson, 2007; Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007). The inconsistency in the literature with regard to the relation between reflection and depression may be due to the confounding factor that affects the association between reflection and depression. Joormann, Dkane, and Gotlib (2006) discussed that reflection might be adaptive in the absence of the negative ruminative component and depressive symptoms, and they proposed that there might be a perpetuation cycle between the reflective and ruminative component, which blurs the distinction between adaptive and maladaptive cognitive styles. Furthermore, Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema (2007) noted that attempts at understanding current problems turn to negative and passive perpetuating thoughts when individuals are not successful at generating solutions during their problem-solving attempts. From these discussions, it is expected that the adaptive effect of reflection is initially contaminated by the maladaptive effect of rumination because reflectors tend to simultaneously ruminate about and reflect on themselves. This contamination by rumination would lead to the instability of the results pertaining to reflection. Thus, we eliminated the maladaptive effect of rumination and investigated the true effect of reflection on depression. Present study The aim of the present study was to model the relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination, based on Trapnell and Campbell’s dichotomy of self-reflection versus self-rumination (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Following this model, we evaluated the true effect of self-reflection. If a reflector tends to ruminate at the same time that he/she reflects, it is expected that the true adaptive effect of self-reflection will be contaminated and canceled out by the maladaptive effect of self-rumination. Further, we hypothesized that there might be a perpetuation cycle between self-reflection and self-rumination, as argued by Joormann et al. (2006). Thus, in the present study, by incorporating such a relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination into the model, we examined the unique effect of self-reflection on depression after eliminating the influence of self-rumination.
Reflection Method Although there is consensus that self-rumination or brooding leads to a maladaptive self-focus and is associated with depression, the adaptive nature of reflection is still controversial. Previous literature on self-reflection has indicated only positive correlations with openness or other constructive cognitive styles but no direct association with manifestations of distress such as depression or anxiety, although self-reflection was thought to have functions of self-regulation or psychological adjustment (Joireman et al., 2002; Luyckx et al., 2007; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Furthermore, there are mixed findings for reflective pondering. Researches supporting the adaptive function of reflective pondering have indicated that
Participants and procedure The participants of the present study were recruited from the introductory psychology course at the University of Tokyo. A total of 123 undergraduates completed the initial assessment (T1). After 3 weeks (T2), 111 undergraduates (91 men and 20 women) from the initial sample completed the second assessment. Although 12 participants dropped out, there were no influences of attrition, because those who dropped out did not differ from the rest of the participants in the group in terms of any of the measures at T1.
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Measures Rumination and reflection The participants completed the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) at both T1 and T2. The questionnaire was used to assess the participants’ tendency to ruminate about and reflect on themselves. The RRQ contains self-rumination and self-reflection subscales. Each subscale consists of 12 items. All the items have to be rated on a 5-point scale, whose anchors range from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1) to ‘‘strongly agree’’ (5). Previous studies have shown good testretest reliability and convergent validity of the RRQ (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). In this study, the Japanese-translated version of the questionnaire was used. The Japanese version of the scale was also found to have good reliability (a ¼ 0.89 for rumination, a ¼ 0.89 for reflection) and convergent validity (Takano & Tanno, 2008). Depressive symptoms Participants completed the Self-rating Depression Scale (SDS; Zung, 1965) at T1. The SDS is a scale that is widely used to assess depressive symptoms. The SDS consists of 20 items. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale, whose anchors range from ‘‘little of the time’’ (1) to ‘‘most of the time’’ (4). In the present study, the Japanese version of the scale (Fukuda & Kobayashi, 1973) was used.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
1. T1 Rumination 2. T2 Rumination 3. T1 Reflection 4. T2 Reflection 5. T2 Depression
Mean
SD
1.
2.
3.
4.
44.60 42.36 39.57 39.45 42.36
7.76 8.25 8.48 8.60 7.10
– 0.80* 0.39* 0.35* 0.40*
– – 0.44* 0.44* 0.50*
– – – 0.85* 0.02
– – – – 0.07
*p < 0.01.
Model estimation The estimation results are presented in Fig. 1. The hypothesized model provided an excellent fit to the data (c2(3) ¼ 3.65, p > 0.10, GFI ¼ 0.99, RMSEA ¼ 0.04). The path from T2 self-reflection to T2 self-rumination was significant (b ¼ 0.17, p < 0.01); however, the path from T2 selfrumination to T2 self-reflection was not (b ¼ 0.03, n.s.). With regard to the relation with depression, a significant negative association was found between T2 self-reflection and T2 depression (b ¼ 0.19, p < 0.05). On the other hand, there was a strong positive association between T2 self-rumination and T2 depression (b ¼ 0.59, p < 0.01). The total effect of T2 self-reflection on T2 depression was 0.08. Multiple regression analysis
Results Correlation matrix Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix are presented in Table 1. Each T1 and T2 self-rumination is positively correlated with T2 depression (r ¼ 0.40, p < 0.01; r ¼ 0.50, p < 0.01), whereas selfreflection at each time had no significant correlation with depression (r ¼ 0.02, not significant (n.s.); r ¼ 0.07, n.s.). This pattern of correlation between the two types of self-focus and depression is consistent with the results of previous research (e.g., Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
Model construction Structural equation modeling (SEM) was conducted to test the hypothesis. Since it is expected that there is a perpetuation cycle between self-reflection and self-rumination, as is argued in Joormann et al. (2006), the hypothesized model included bi-directional paths between self-reflection and self-rumination. To estimate such a reciprocal relation, we added the T1 observed variables (selfrumination and self-reflection) predicting the T2 variables (selfrumination and self-reflection, respectively) into the model as instrumental variables. Based on this synchronous effects model (Finkel, 1995), the paths from self-rumination and self-reflection to depression were assumed to facilitate the examination of the unique effects of self-reflection and self-rumination on depression.1 For the model estimation, the SAS CALIS procedure was used.
1 It is possible that depression can have the reverse effects on these two subtypes of self-focus (rumination and reflection). Therefore, we investigated models wherein the causal paths from rumination and reflection on depression are reversed and compared the fit of each model. The originally hypothesized model (presented in Fig. 1) showed a better fit (c2(3) ¼ 3.65, p ¼ 0.30; RMSEA ¼ 0.045; AIC ¼ -2.35) than the models containing the reversed path from depression to rumination (c2(3) ¼ 23.18, p < 0.01; RMSEA ¼ 0.25; AIC ¼ 17.18) or the path from depression to reflection (c2(3) ¼ 7.61, p ¼ 0.05; RMSEA ¼ 0.12; AIC ¼ 1.61). Therefore, we only employ the original model and excluded the models with reversed paths.
To verify the association between self-reflection and self-rumination described above, multiple regressions of variable T1 on variable T2, controlling for the other T1 variable were conducted (Table 2). The results indicated that T1 self-reflection predicted T2 self-rumination after controlling for T1 self-rumination (b ¼ 0.14, t ¼ 2.43, p < 0.05), while T1 self-rumination did not predict T2 selfreflection after controlling for T1 self-reflection (b ¼ 0.03, n.s.). These results suggested that there was a one-way causal relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination. Discussion The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between self-reflection and self-rumination and to evaluate the unique effects of self-reflection and self-rumination on depression. The results of the SEM and multiple regression analysis indicated that self-reflection predicted self-rumination but self-rumination did not predict self-reflection. With regard to the relation with depression, self-reflection was associated with lower levels of depression; self-rumination, with higher levels of depression. The effect of self-reflection on self-rumination Although the reciprocal, causal relationship between selfreflection and self-rumination was assumed in the hypothesized model, the statistical analysis showed that self-reflection significantly predicted self-rumination, whereas self-rumination did not predict self-reflection. These results indicate that a reflector is more likely to ruminate about himself/herself, while this is not necessarily the case with a ruminator. This one-way relation does not support the suggestion of Joormann et al. (2006) that there may be a perpetuation cycle between self-reflection and self-rumination. Once reflectors engage in self-rumination and are stuck in the vicious cycle between self-rumination and depression (NolenHoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007), they are no longer able to adopt a constructive approach to their current problems, which is consistent with the suggestions from previous researches that even self-reflection, when used in the context of problem-solving, can lead to negative cycles of self-rumination and can increase
K. Takano, Y. Tanno / Behaviour Research and Therapy 47 (2009) 260–264
T1 Self-Rumination
.74**
T2 Self-Rumination .17**
263
.59**
.03
T2 Depression
Fit indices χ2(3) = 3.65, p = .30
T1 Self-Reflection
.84**
T2 Self-Reflection
-.19*
GFI = .99 AGFI = .94 RMSEA = .045 CFI = 1.00
Fig. 1. Estimated model of self-reflection, self-rumination, and depression. Note: Standardized coefficients are presented. For ease of presentation, error terms were omitted. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
dysphoric mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996). Self-reflection may easily turn into self-rumination, when individuals attempting to understand their current problems fail to generate solutions during their problem-solving attempts (Miranda & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2007). Distinction between self-reflection and self-rumination in relation to depression Our results indicated that self-reflection is negatively associated with depression, while self-rumination is positively associated with it. The positive association between self-rumination and depression is consistent with previous researches that showed that selfrumination predicts depressive symptoms and disorders (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoesksema & Morrow, 1991). Negative, chronic self-focused attention, or rumination, may be a vulnerability factor for depression. On the contrary, the results showed a direct negative association between self-reflection and depression after the elimination of the positive association between self-reflection and depression mediated by rumination. These distinct associations with depression are consistent with the results of Treynor et al. (2003), who found that the ruminative component, or brooding, predicted an increase in depression, whereas the reflective component, or reflective pondering, predicted reduced subsequent depression. Self-reflection per se may be an adaptive cognitive style that is useful in solving current problems or regulating depressed mood, only in the absence of self-rumination (cf. Joormann et al., 2006). However, self-reflection is easily contaminated by self-rumination and the adaptive effect is canceled out by the mediated maladaptive effect of self-rumination; as a result, the effect on depression disappears totally, which can be seen in the total effect of T2 self-reflection on T2 depression (0.08). Future research In the present study, we argued that the inconsistency in the literature about the relation between reflection and depression might be due to a confounding factor that affects this relation. However, an alternative accounts may be that reflection is a compositive construct, which may affect the relation between reflection
Table 2 Multiple regression of T1 variables on T2 variables. T2 self-rumination (adjusted R2 ¼ 0.65)
T1 self-rumination T1 self-reflection *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
T2 self-reflection (adjusted R2 ¼ 0.71)
Estimates
SE
Estimates
SE
0.79** 0.14*
0.07 0.06
0.03 0.85**
0.06 0.06
and depression. This is because reflective pondering includes multidimensional elements and is not based on a clear theoretical model, because it was only determined from the post-hoc factor analysis. Thus, a number of potential variables would affect the relation between reflection and depression. It is important to investigate the components that are included in reflection and to reveal the factors that determine whether self-focused attention has adaptive or maladaptive outcomes. Furthermore, investigating the factors aggravating maladaptive self-focus and promoting adaptive self-focus would provide some clinical implications with regard to the prevention of and intervention for depression. First, one of these factors would be the individual’s motive to initiate self-focus, as suggested in Trapnell and Campbell (1999). Self-reflection is an openness-related self-focus motivated by intellectual curiosity and is associated with epistemic outcomes such as self-enhancement or self-regulation. This curiosity-motivated self-focus may facilitate self-knowledge and help a person to regulate himself/herself, leading to the control of depression. On the other hand, self-rumination is a neuroticism-related self-focus motivated by threats, losses, or injustices to the self and is associated with neurotic outcomes such as depression or anxiety. Self-rumination may trigger self-evaluative doubts and worries, exacerbating depressive symptoms. It is possible that such a motivational basis is a key factor for determining the consequences of self-focus. Second, the valence of thought content would be one of the important factors that distinguish adaptive self-focus from maladaptive self-focus. The multidimensional scaling of repetitive thoughts such as rumination and worry identified positive versus negative content valence as an important dimension that affects psychological and physical well-being (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003). By conducting a meta-analysis, Mor and Winquist (2002) revealed that a focus on the negative aspects of the self was related to greater negative affect, whereas a focus on the positive aspects of the self was related to lesser negative affect. Third, the outcomes of self-focus would depend on the intrapersonal context in which self-focus occurs (Watkins, 2008). For individuals already in dysphoric mood, self-focus exacerbates negative mood (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). Moreover, trait factors would moderate the relation between selffocus and depression. Experimental studies have suggested that forms of rumination and negative cognition, such as high dysfunctional attitudes or low self-esteem, interacted with and amplified each other’s effects on dysphoria (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007). These intrapersonal variables would influence the effects of self-focus. Fourth, the level of construal of thought process would be an important factor that determines whether self-focus has adaptive or maladaptive consequences (Watkins, 2008). Watkins and Teasdale (2004) also distinguished between the adaptive and maladaptive subtypes of self-focus experiential and analytical, respectively. Analytical self-focus is characterized as an abstract, intellectual, and evaluative cognitive style, whereas experiential self-focus is characterized as the concrete processing of experiences
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in the present moment. Experimental studies indicated that the analytical form was associated with increased overgeneral autobiographical memory and reduced social problem-solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004). Further, Rude et al. (2007) found that reflective pondering is positively correlated with depression, but non-judging reflection, which involves rewording to de-emphasize evaluative judgments, is not correlated with depression. This indicates that attention cloaked in negative judgments is indeed harmful. Such a non-judging and non-evaluative attitude oriented to the present experience, or ‘‘mindful’’ component, may be a decisive factor in determining whether the outcome of self-focus is adaptive or maladaptive. In future research, considering the factors described above, we need to determine the components that are included in adaptive self-focus. Limitations The present study has a number of limitations. First, the present study employed a semi-longitudinal design, wherein the causal chains between the subtypes of self-focus and depression were inferred based on a cross-sectional correlation matrix, whose factors had no temporal relations. Thus, longitudinal studies such as those predicting the residual change in depressive symptoms are needed to confirm the causal relations between the factors. Second, the sample in the present study comprises undergraduates. Joormann et al. (2006) showed that there were differences in the reflective pondering of the mean scores of clinical and nonclinical samples, which indicates the possibility that there may be a qualitative difference in reflection between clinical and nonclinical samples. It would be essential to examine whether the obtained result is replicated in a clinical sample. Third, the participants in the present study largely comprised men. Therefore, we were unable to examine gender differences in the relation among the two distinct types of self-focus and depression. A number of researches have reported gender differences in depression and rumination, and these researches have indicated that women are more depressed than men and are also more likely to ruminate than men (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994, 1999). Further, it was found that gender differences in depression are mediated by gender differences in rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994, 1999). Other studies suggested that only brooding, but not reflective pondering, mediates and moderates the relation between gender and depression (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Treynor et al., 2003). Thus, it is possible that the relation between self-rumination and depression is reinforced among women, although self-reflection may be unaffected by gender differences. Future research should examine a model including gender to determine whether our model is applicable to a sample comprising both men and women. References Burwell, R. A., & Shirk, S. R. (2007). Subtypes of rumination in Adolescence: Associations between brooding, reflection, depressive symptoms, and coping. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 36, 56–57. Butler, L. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1994). Gender differences in response to depressed mood in a college sample. Sex Roles, 30, 331–346. Ciesla, J., & Roberts, J. E. (2007). Rumination, negative cognition, and their interactive effects on depressed mood. Emotion, 7, 555–565. Crane, C., Barnhofer, T., & Williams, J. M. G. (2007). Reflection, brooding and suicidality: A preliminary study of different types of rumination in individuals with a history of major depression. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 46, 497–504. Finkel, S. E. (1995). Causal analysis with panel data. California: Sage Publications. Fukuda, K., & Kobayashi, S. (1973). Jiko-hyoka-shiki yokuutsu-sei shakudo no kenkyu [A study on a Self-rating Depression Scale]. Psychiatria et Nuerologia Japonica, 75, 673–679.
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