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Semantic, pragmatic and syntactic correlates: an analysis of performative verbs based on English data
456
Book reviews
John Geoffrey Partridge, Semantic, pragmatic and syntactic correlates: an analysis of performative verbs based on English data. Tiibinger Beitrage zur Linguistik, 143. Tubingen: Narr, 1982. 172~~. DM 46,00. This monograph is a translation and revision of a doctoral dissertation, originally written in 1976 but accepted by the University of Regensburg in 1979. The ‘theoretical framework employed by the author, John Geoffrey Partridge (henceforward P.), is basically that of prelexical syntax, which, - it should be noted at the outset - has nowadays lost much of the glamour it displayed in the early seventies, when it played a central role in the directionality controversy between generative and interpretative semantics. Its adoption by P. therefore is explained by the fact that the draft was already complete in 1976. In this connection it is not irrelevant to note that the bibliography contains only a very small number of titles written after the above-mentioned date. In this review I wish to give a survey of the contents of the book first; after that I shall comment on the major issues it raises. Chapter 1 deals with the general properties of performative verbs and performative utterances from both a linguistic and a pragmatic point of view. It focuses on such topics as Austin’s performative/constative distinction and on the taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Chapter 2 is concerned with a set of tests which serve to determine which verbs need be classed as performatives. For this purpose P. makes use of the corpus of performative verbs given by Austin in How to do things with words. In chapter 3 P. gives a survey of previous analyses of performative verbs paying special attention to Ross’s much discussed paper On declarative sentences. In the second part of this chapter P. discusses a model of lexical decomposition which he claims to be superior to the feature matrix set up by Ross. Chapter 4 concentrates on the so-called explicitness component which is used as a basic parameter for establishing a classification of performative verbs. Chapter 5 focuses on the problem of performative embedding in general, and on the co-occurrence restrictions of modal verbs and performatives, in particular. Finally, chapter 6 gives a survey of the analyses carried out in the preceding chapters. It also contains a discussion of the status of performatives within a general theory of language. As is clear from the contents, the core of P.‘s investigation is devoted to establishing a procedure for adequately defining the basic properties of performative verbs. Just like many other linguists before him P. strictly rejects Ross’s performative analysis. This may be seen from the following statement: “. . . [ +performative] seems to be a somewhat complex feature involving syntactic and morphological conditions - person, tense and congruence - as well as semantic postulates such as the presence of an “act’‘-component, an explicitness-component and a “say’‘-component, . . . to wish to account for all these
Book reviews
457
factors under a single feature-marking appears rather unrealistic” (p. 17). An original counter-argument against Ross’s thesis concerns a hitherto unnoticed consequence of the performative deletion transformation insofar as it applies to the matrix clause of expressive sentences: “ When apologise and congratulate are concerned, the principle applies even more manifestly: after the deletion of the performative sentence I apologise (to you) (14) I apologise
(to you) for offending
your feelings
becomes (15) (for) offending and after reversal (16) I offended
your feelings (!!!) of Complementizer-Placement:
your feelings”
(p. 58).
In order to avoid the methodological problems inherent in performative analysis as posited by Ross, P. adopts the framework of lexical decomposition, thus defining the semantic structure of performative verbs in terms of three abstract predicates which he indicates with the labels [SAY], [DO] and [EXPLIC]. Since this alternative analysis constitutes the main theme of P.‘s book, I shall concentrate on the status of the above components by examining the arguments offered by P. to justify their introduction. Although [SAY], [DO] and [EXPLIC] are initially discussed in this order, later on arguments are given for intrinsically ordering them in the following way: [DO], [EXPLIC], [SAY]. I shall follow the original presentation by P. The predicate [SAY] is motivated by means of three criteria:
(4
“[SAY] must be an inherent component of the verb heading the utterance: [SAY] is not to be ascribed a purely parenthetic reporting function” (p. 42). (b) “[SAY] must be consciously employed, that is to say, as part of a complex by which a speaker intends to achieve a pragmatic goal which in any given case may only be realised by precisely that utterance, not by any (accompanying) non-linguistic action(s)” (p.43). “The utterance “introduced” by the [SAY] predicate must have a meaning intrinsically retrievable from the verbal content of the sentence . . .” (p. 43).
:c>
.t is obvious from the way in which these criteria are formulated that they are )f a heterogeneous character: (a) is a purely lexico-semantic criterion repreenting the irreducible, primarily given meaning of atomic predicates; (b), on he other hand, bears exclusively on the illocutionary level of the speech act .ccounting for such factors as the intention and the purpose of the speaker;
458
Book reviews
(c), finally, expresses a co-occurrence restriction on the embedded complement of the abstract predicate. Evidently, the problem with the above analysis is that the theory of lexical decomposition does not allow for the amalgamation of lexico-semantic and illocutionary criteria, because that would lead to confusion between the description of the meaning and the conditions on the use of lexical items. It is also strange in this connection that P. speaks of “the utterance ‘introduced’ by the [SAY] predicate”, since abstract predicates do not introduce “ utterances”; they do not even introduce sentences; they introduce propositions. The second predicate, [DO], is postulated in order to distinguish stative from non-stative verbs in the manner proposed by Ross in his paper ‘Act’. Adopting the corresponding framework P. observes: “Performatives represent a special case of ‘non-stative’ or ‘action’ verbs inasmuch as they may as such only appear in the 1st person” (p. 73). However, reference to the speaker is not the only special case which presents itself if one postulates the [DO] component in deep structure. As the system of rules involved in the process of lexical decomposition requires predicate raising to apply optionally, atomic predicates like [DO] appear at surface level in case the rule does not apply. Making a comparison with standard examples that have been treated by generative semanticists, such as kill and remind, which are decomposed into [CAUSE [DIE]] and [STRIKE [SIMILAR]], respectively, we find that the lexical output of atomic predicates arriving at the surface, is claimed to be analyzable in terms of a paraphrase relation with the lexical item representing the output of predicate raising. However, it should be pointed out that this paraphrase relation, which can be stated in terms of word-to-phrase synonymy, has met with serious criticisms, as illustrated in papers by Fodor (1970) and Wierzbicka (1975), both of which are explicitly referred to by P. With respect to P.‘s particular claim that [DO] forms an inherent part of the semantic structure of performative verbs, the problem arises that, if predicate raising does not apply according to the so-called principle of survival, the output of [DO] no longer performs a lexico-semantic function, but is entirely conditioned by contextual or interactional factors. Let me show this by using one of P.‘s examples. In order to derive the performative utterance (a) I promise to buy Letitia a pair of M&S knickers, predicate raising, or, more specifically Do-Gobbling, a prelexical transformation coined by Ross, must apply. If Do-Gobbling does not apply, we get (b) I do promise to buy Letitia a pair of Mb S knickers, which, obviously, should be considered a pragmatically determined, emphatic variant of (a). As for the emphasis involved, we may think, for instance, of the situation where it is the intention of the speaker to produce a particular perlocutionary effect on the hearer in case the latter has thrown doubt upon a previous promise made by the speaker. P. does not envisage this problem for the lexical decomposition involved, but confines himself to observing that [DO] “. . . usually does not appear in surface structure” (p. 71).
Book reviews
459
Let us now turn to the third abstract predicate, [EXPLIC]. It is not an easy matter to gain clear insights into the level or levels of analysis at which P. intends this component to operate. The following quotations may illustrate this point: “Chapter 4 investigates the explicitness component [EXPLIC] on the levels of pragmatics and syntax, splitting performatives on this basis into various categories and sub-categories” (p. 39). “The purpose of this chapter [i.e. again chapter 4, HH] is to investigate the pragma-semantic properties of individual exponents of [EXPLIC]” (p. 81). A similar lack of consistency may be noted in connection with the definition of the intrinsic properties of [EXPLIC], which involves the use of both semantic and pragmatic parameters, as may be seen from such statements as: “[EXPLIC] has purely semantic value and cannot appear in surface structure without [DO] and [SAY]” (p. 80). “The explicitness component has the function of eliminating on the part of the speaker, given the ideal situation postulated here, any misinterpretation on the part of the hearer” (p. 80). From the latter statement and the various analyses carried out by P. in setting up a classification of performative verbs, it can be concluded that the pragmatic properties of [EXPLIC] prevail to such an extent that it can be properly considered an illocutionary-function indicating device. It follows, therefore, that its prelexical status is essentially different from that of [DO] and’[SAY]. To summarize the discussion of the abstract predicates postulated by P., we must conclude that the heterogeneous character they manifest, both intrinsically and extrinsically, makes it impossible to incorporate them in a consistent way into the hierarchically structured framework of lexical decomposition. To recapitulate, the component [DO] denotes the semantic class-membership of performative verbs in terms of non-stativeness; its lexical output, however, is dependent upon contextual or interactional conditions. The component [SAY] is interpreted from both a semantic and an illocutionary point of view, whereas [EXPLIC], as we have just pointed out, is basically related to the illocutionary component of the speech act. As far as theoretical background is concerned, one misses a justification of P’s postulate that not only semantic but also illocutionary criteria are involved in the definition of performative verbs. That this is certainly not a matter of communis opinio, may be shown by the following quotation from Genova (1975), which focuses on the claim that, as far as performative verbs are concerned, “. . . the meaning of certain sentences, not words, requires a reference to speech acts. And it does not necessarily imply anything about the meaning of words because even if we focus on words (as opposed to sentences), it can still be maintained that the meaning of a word must be distinguished from both its linguistic function and primary use. So the fact that certain words may be necessarily related to certain speech acts is compatible with the possibility that no meaning of any word need be explained in terms of any speech act.” (Genova 1975: 239). As for what P. has actually done in his book, our conclusion may be brief.
460
Book reviews
Like many others before him he has rejected Ross’s performative analysis making use of -several sound arguments; however, he has not succeeded in presenting an adequate alternative, since he carries out his analysis within the framework of lexical decomposition, which has never been developed to account for all of the facts he wishes to account for. Henk Haverkate Dept. of Spanish Linguistics University of Amsterdam The Netherlands
References Austin, J.L., 1962. How to do things with words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fodor, J.A., 1970. Three reasons for not deriving “kill” from “cause to die”. Linguistic Inquiry 1: 427-438. Genova, A.C., 1975. Speech acts and illocutionary opacity. Foundations of Language 13: 237-249. Ross, J.R., 1970. ‘On declarative sentences’. In: R.A. Jacobs and P.A. Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English transformational grammar. Waltham: Ginn. pp. 222-272. Ross, J.R., 1972. ‘Act’. In: D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of natural language. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 70-126. Wierzbicka, A., 1975. Why “kill” does not mean “cause to die”: the semantics of action sentences. Foundations of Language 13: 491-528.
Henk Hauerkate (b. 1936) is lecturer in Modern Spanish Linguistics at the University of Amsterdam. He studied Spanish and General Linguistics, taking his Ph.D. at the University of Amsterdam. Main research interests: semantics; particularly, the theory of speech acts. Major publications: 1976. Pragmatic and linguistic aspects of the prepositional infinitive in Spanish. Lingua 40: 223-245. 1978. ‘The vocative phrase in modem Spanish. A contribution to the study of illocutionary functions’. In: W. Zonneveld, ed., Linguistics in the Netherlands 1974-1976. Lisse: Peter de Ridder. 1979. Impositive sentences in Spanish. Theory and description in linguistic pragmatics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Sven Frederik Sager, Sprache und Beziehung. Linguistische Untersuchungen Zusammenhang von sprachlicher Kommunikation und zwischenmenschlicher ziehung. Ttibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1981. 488~~. DM 128,00. *
zum Be-
* I gratefully acknowledge the help of Dr. Richard Brunt, University of Essen, who helped to make my English more colloquial. ._
Book reviews
John Geoffrey Partridge, Semantic, pragmatic and syntactic correlates: an analysis of performative verbs based on English data. Tiibinger Beitrage zur Linguistik, 143. Tubingen: Narr, 1982. 172~~. DM 46,00. This monograph is a translation and revision of a doctoral dissertation, originally written in 1976 but accepted by the University of Regensburg in 1979. The ‘theoretical framework employed by the author, John Geoffrey Partridge (henceforward P.), is basically that of prelexical syntax, which, - it should be noted at the outset - has nowadays lost much of the glamour it displayed in the early seventies, when it played a central role in the directionality controversy between generative and interpretative semantics. Its adoption by P. therefore is explained by the fact that the draft was already complete in 1976. In this connection it is not irrelevant to note that the bibliography contains only a very small number of titles written after the above-mentioned date. In this review I wish to give a survey of the contents of the book first; after that I shall comment on the major issues it raises. Chapter 1 deals with the general properties of performative verbs and performative utterances from both a linguistic and a pragmatic point of view. It focuses on such topics as Austin’s performative/constative distinction and on the taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Chapter 2 is concerned with a set of tests which serve to determine which verbs need be classed as performatives. For this purpose P. makes use of the corpus of performative verbs given by Austin in How to do things with words. In chapter 3 P. gives a survey of previous analyses of performative verbs paying special attention to Ross’s much discussed paper On declarative sentences. In the second part of this chapter P. discusses a model of lexical decomposition which he claims to be superior to the feature matrix set up by Ross. Chapter 4 concentrates on the so-called explicitness component which is used as a basic parameter for establishing a classification of performative verbs. Chapter 5 focuses on the problem of performative embedding in general, and on the co-occurrence restrictions of modal verbs and performatives, in particular. Finally, chapter 6 gives a survey of the analyses carried out in the preceding chapters. It also contains a discussion of the status of performatives within a general theory of language. As is clear from the contents, the core of P.‘s investigation is devoted to establishing a procedure for adequately defining the basic properties of performative verbs. Just like many other linguists before him P. strictly rejects Ross’s performative analysis. This may be seen from the following statement: “. . . [ +performative] seems to be a somewhat complex feature involving syntactic and morphological conditions - person, tense and congruence - as well as semantic postulates such as the presence of an “act’‘-component, an explicitness-component and a “say’‘-component, . . . to wish to account for all these
Book reviews
457
factors under a single feature-marking appears rather unrealistic” (p. 17). An original counter-argument against Ross’s thesis concerns a hitherto unnoticed consequence of the performative deletion transformation insofar as it applies to the matrix clause of expressive sentences: “ When apologise and congratulate are concerned, the principle applies even more manifestly: after the deletion of the performative sentence I apologise (to you) (14) I apologise
(to you) for offending
your feelings
becomes (15) (for) offending and after reversal (16) I offended
your feelings (!!!) of Complementizer-Placement:
your feelings”
(p. 58).
In order to avoid the methodological problems inherent in performative analysis as posited by Ross, P. adopts the framework of lexical decomposition, thus defining the semantic structure of performative verbs in terms of three abstract predicates which he indicates with the labels [SAY], [DO] and [EXPLIC]. Since this alternative analysis constitutes the main theme of P.‘s book, I shall concentrate on the status of the above components by examining the arguments offered by P. to justify their introduction. Although [SAY], [DO] and [EXPLIC] are initially discussed in this order, later on arguments are given for intrinsically ordering them in the following way: [DO], [EXPLIC], [SAY]. I shall follow the original presentation by P. The predicate [SAY] is motivated by means of three criteria:
(4
“[SAY] must be an inherent component of the verb heading the utterance: [SAY] is not to be ascribed a purely parenthetic reporting function” (p. 42). (b) “[SAY] must be consciously employed, that is to say, as part of a complex by which a speaker intends to achieve a pragmatic goal which in any given case may only be realised by precisely that utterance, not by any (accompanying) non-linguistic action(s)” (p.43). “The utterance “introduced” by the [SAY] predicate must have a meaning intrinsically retrievable from the verbal content of the sentence . . .” (p. 43).
:c>
.t is obvious from the way in which these criteria are formulated that they are )f a heterogeneous character: (a) is a purely lexico-semantic criterion repreenting the irreducible, primarily given meaning of atomic predicates; (b), on he other hand, bears exclusively on the illocutionary level of the speech act .ccounting for such factors as the intention and the purpose of the speaker;
458
Book reviews
(c), finally, expresses a co-occurrence restriction on the embedded complement of the abstract predicate. Evidently, the problem with the above analysis is that the theory of lexical decomposition does not allow for the amalgamation of lexico-semantic and illocutionary criteria, because that would lead to confusion between the description of the meaning and the conditions on the use of lexical items. It is also strange in this connection that P. speaks of “the utterance ‘introduced’ by the [SAY] predicate”, since abstract predicates do not introduce “ utterances”; they do not even introduce sentences; they introduce propositions. The second predicate, [DO], is postulated in order to distinguish stative from non-stative verbs in the manner proposed by Ross in his paper ‘Act’. Adopting the corresponding framework P. observes: “Performatives represent a special case of ‘non-stative’ or ‘action’ verbs inasmuch as they may as such only appear in the 1st person” (p. 73). However, reference to the speaker is not the only special case which presents itself if one postulates the [DO] component in deep structure. As the system of rules involved in the process of lexical decomposition requires predicate raising to apply optionally, atomic predicates like [DO] appear at surface level in case the rule does not apply. Making a comparison with standard examples that have been treated by generative semanticists, such as kill and remind, which are decomposed into [CAUSE [DIE]] and [STRIKE [SIMILAR]], respectively, we find that the lexical output of atomic predicates arriving at the surface, is claimed to be analyzable in terms of a paraphrase relation with the lexical item representing the output of predicate raising. However, it should be pointed out that this paraphrase relation, which can be stated in terms of word-to-phrase synonymy, has met with serious criticisms, as illustrated in papers by Fodor (1970) and Wierzbicka (1975), both of which are explicitly referred to by P. With respect to P.‘s particular claim that [DO] forms an inherent part of the semantic structure of performative verbs, the problem arises that, if predicate raising does not apply according to the so-called principle of survival, the output of [DO] no longer performs a lexico-semantic function, but is entirely conditioned by contextual or interactional factors. Let me show this by using one of P.‘s examples. In order to derive the performative utterance (a) I promise to buy Letitia a pair of M&S knickers, predicate raising, or, more specifically Do-Gobbling, a prelexical transformation coined by Ross, must apply. If Do-Gobbling does not apply, we get (b) I do promise to buy Letitia a pair of Mb S knickers, which, obviously, should be considered a pragmatically determined, emphatic variant of (a). As for the emphasis involved, we may think, for instance, of the situation where it is the intention of the speaker to produce a particular perlocutionary effect on the hearer in case the latter has thrown doubt upon a previous promise made by the speaker. P. does not envisage this problem for the lexical decomposition involved, but confines himself to observing that [DO] “. . . usually does not appear in surface structure” (p. 71).
Book reviews
459
Let us now turn to the third abstract predicate, [EXPLIC]. It is not an easy matter to gain clear insights into the level or levels of analysis at which P. intends this component to operate. The following quotations may illustrate this point: “Chapter 4 investigates the explicitness component [EXPLIC] on the levels of pragmatics and syntax, splitting performatives on this basis into various categories and sub-categories” (p. 39). “The purpose of this chapter [i.e. again chapter 4, HH] is to investigate the pragma-semantic properties of individual exponents of [EXPLIC]” (p. 81). A similar lack of consistency may be noted in connection with the definition of the intrinsic properties of [EXPLIC], which involves the use of both semantic and pragmatic parameters, as may be seen from such statements as: “[EXPLIC] has purely semantic value and cannot appear in surface structure without [DO] and [SAY]” (p. 80). “The explicitness component has the function of eliminating on the part of the speaker, given the ideal situation postulated here, any misinterpretation on the part of the hearer” (p. 80). From the latter statement and the various analyses carried out by P. in setting up a classification of performative verbs, it can be concluded that the pragmatic properties of [EXPLIC] prevail to such an extent that it can be properly considered an illocutionary-function indicating device. It follows, therefore, that its prelexical status is essentially different from that of [DO] and’[SAY]. To summarize the discussion of the abstract predicates postulated by P., we must conclude that the heterogeneous character they manifest, both intrinsically and extrinsically, makes it impossible to incorporate them in a consistent way into the hierarchically structured framework of lexical decomposition. To recapitulate, the component [DO] denotes the semantic class-membership of performative verbs in terms of non-stativeness; its lexical output, however, is dependent upon contextual or interactional conditions. The component [SAY] is interpreted from both a semantic and an illocutionary point of view, whereas [EXPLIC], as we have just pointed out, is basically related to the illocutionary component of the speech act. As far as theoretical background is concerned, one misses a justification of P’s postulate that not only semantic but also illocutionary criteria are involved in the definition of performative verbs. That this is certainly not a matter of communis opinio, may be shown by the following quotation from Genova (1975), which focuses on the claim that, as far as performative verbs are concerned, “. . . the meaning of certain sentences, not words, requires a reference to speech acts. And it does not necessarily imply anything about the meaning of words because even if we focus on words (as opposed to sentences), it can still be maintained that the meaning of a word must be distinguished from both its linguistic function and primary use. So the fact that certain words may be necessarily related to certain speech acts is compatible with the possibility that no meaning of any word need be explained in terms of any speech act.” (Genova 1975: 239). As for what P. has actually done in his book, our conclusion may be brief.
460
Book reviews
Like many others before him he has rejected Ross’s performative analysis making use of -several sound arguments; however, he has not succeeded in presenting an adequate alternative, since he carries out his analysis within the framework of lexical decomposition, which has never been developed to account for all of the facts he wishes to account for. Henk Haverkate Dept. of Spanish Linguistics University of Amsterdam The Netherlands
References Austin, J.L., 1962. How to do things with words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fodor, J.A., 1970. Three reasons for not deriving “kill” from “cause to die”. Linguistic Inquiry 1: 427-438. Genova, A.C., 1975. Speech acts and illocutionary opacity. Foundations of Language 13: 237-249. Ross, J.R., 1970. ‘On declarative sentences’. In: R.A. Jacobs and P.A. Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English transformational grammar. Waltham: Ginn. pp. 222-272. Ross, J.R., 1972. ‘Act’. In: D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of natural language. Dordrecht: Reidel. pp. 70-126. Wierzbicka, A., 1975. Why “kill” does not mean “cause to die”: the semantics of action sentences. Foundations of Language 13: 491-528.
Henk Hauerkate (b. 1936) is lecturer in Modern Spanish Linguistics at the University of Amsterdam. He studied Spanish and General Linguistics, taking his Ph.D. at the University of Amsterdam. Main research interests: semantics; particularly, the theory of speech acts. Major publications: 1976. Pragmatic and linguistic aspects of the prepositional infinitive in Spanish. Lingua 40: 223-245. 1978. ‘The vocative phrase in modem Spanish. A contribution to the study of illocutionary functions’. In: W. Zonneveld, ed., Linguistics in the Netherlands 1974-1976. Lisse: Peter de Ridder. 1979. Impositive sentences in Spanish. Theory and description in linguistic pragmatics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Sven Frederik Sager, Sprache und Beziehung. Linguistische Untersuchungen Zusammenhang von sprachlicher Kommunikation und zwischenmenschlicher ziehung. Ttibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1981. 488~~. DM 128,00. *
zum Be-
* I gratefully acknowledge the help of Dr. Richard Brunt, University of Essen, who helped to make my English more colloquial. ._