Semantics and epistemology: The meaning of ‘evidentials’ in a cross-linguistic perspective

Language Sciences, Vol. 16, No. I, pp. 81-137, 1994 Copyright 0 1994 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0388-KQ1/94 $7.oo+o.at

Pergamon

038?34001(93)Emo6-0

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY: THE MEANING OF ‘EVIDENTIALS’ IN A CROSS-LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE ANNA WIERZBICKA The author argues that meaning is encoded not only in words but also in grammatical categories. The meanings encoded in grammar (just like those encoded in the lexicon) are language-specific. If one attempts to identify the meanings encoded in different languages by means of the same, arbitrarily invented labels, one can only conceal and obfuscate the language-specific character of the categories to which they are attached. To be able to compare grammatical categories across language boundaries we need some constant points of reference, which slippery labels with shifting meanings cannot possibly provide. Universal (or near-universal) semantic primitives (or near-primitives) can provide such constant and languageindependent points of reference. They offer, therefore, a secure basis for a semantic typology of both lexicons and grammars. At the same time, they offer us convenient and reliable tools for investigating the universal and the language-specific aspects of human cognition and human conceptualization of the world. In this paper, the author illustrates and documents these claims by analyzing one area of grammar in a number of different languages of the world: that area which is usually associated with the term of ‘evidentiality’. As the goal of the paper is theoretical, not empirical, the data are drawn exclusively from one source: the volume entitled Evidenriolity, edited by Chafe and Nichols (1986). The author reexamines the data presented in this volume by experts on a number of languages, and tries to show how these data can be reanalyzed in terms of universal semantic primitives, and how in this way they can be made both more verifiable (that is, predictive) and more comparable across language boundaries.

Introduction ‘Languages are the best mirrors of the human mind’ (Leibniz 1949: 368). Our conceptualization of the world is reflected in language and, to some extent, is shaped by language. Languages, through their semantic systems, provide the clearest, the most reliable guide to the processes and the activities of the mind. But to be able to investigate the semantic systems of different languages and to reveal the meanings (that is the conceptualizations) encoded in them, we need a language-independent analytical framework; in other words, we need a suitable semantic metalanguage. Ad hoc arbitrary labels will not do; and neither will concepts developed in some other disciplines, for some other purposes (such as those employed in symbolic logic, or in artificial intelligence). A suitable semantic metalanguage must be developed by linguists, on the basis of the study of natural languages. It must not be ethnocentric-nor Euro-centric-based on the concepts encoded in English, or Latin, or in Western logic, or in the British or American philosophy of language.

Correspondence The Australian

relating to this paper should be addressed to: Anna Wierzbicka, Department National University, GPO Box 4, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia. 81

of Linguistics,

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Rather it must be based on concepts which recur, in a recognizable form, throughout the languages of the world. I contend that concepts such as ‘want’, ‘say’, ‘know’, ‘someone’, ‘something’, ‘this’, ‘you’ and ‘I’ are of this kind; and that other universal ‘semantic primitives’ can be tentatively identified and tested by trying to apply them to explicate meanings in different languages, and that they can thus be verified, modified or discarded as necessary. In what follows, I am going to illustrate and document these claims by analyzing one area of grammar in a number of different languages of the world: that area which is usually associated with the term of ‘evidentiality’. As the goal of my paper is theoretical, not empirical, my data will be drawn exclusively from one source: the volume entitled Evidentiality, edited by Chafe and Nichols (1986). I will reexamine the data presented in this volume by experts on a number of languages, and I will try to show how these data can be reanalyzed in terms of universal semantic primitives, and how in this way they can be made both more verifiable (that is, predictive) and more comparable across language boundaries. As it is, the contributors to the volume operate with analytical categories such as ‘direct’ (experience or evidence), ‘personal’, ‘immediate’, ‘first-hand’, ‘witnessed’, and of course ‘indirect’, ‘non-immediate’, ‘second-hand’, ‘not-witnessed’, ‘inferred’, and so on. The trouble is that labels of this kind stand for different things in different languages; and that they have very little predictive value. For example, when we are told that a language distinguishes ‘direct evidence’ from ‘non-direct evidence’, or ‘immediate evidence (or experience)’ from ‘non-immediate evidence’, we may have no idea exactly what these labels mean with respect to this particular language, nor how the categories in question are used in this language; and if exactly the same labels are used with respect to another language we can by no means expect that they will be used in the same sense, nor that the categories bearing these labels in the second language will correspond in use to those bearing the same labels in the first language. By contrast, if we rely on universal semantic primitives such as ‘I’, ‘know’, ‘do’, ‘this’, ‘because’, ‘say’, ‘someone’, ‘something’, ‘see’, or ‘hear’, we can posit intuitively clear categories such as ‘I know because I see it’ or ‘I know because I did it’, which will mean exactly the same with respect to any language for which they are postulated. Formulae of this kind are intuitively verifiable and they are empirically testable. They make clear predictions as to the range of use of the categories which enclose them, so that if we posit the same meaning for two categories in two different languages (e.g. ‘I know it because I did it’), we can expect that these two categories will have the same range of use. If our predictions are not fulfilled the formulae are proved inadequate, or inaccurate, and have to be revised or adjusted. Proceeding in this way, we can obtain an optimal fit between semantic formulae and language use. Whether this fit can be perfect and absolute is an open question. But it can certainly be incomparably better than the fit between traditional labels such as ‘direct’, ‘personal’, ‘immediate’, ‘first-hand’, and language use. These universal

semantic

elements

provide a common

measure

in terms of which

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all meanings in all languages can be described and compared; and presumably it would not have been possible to find such a common measure unless it was inherently ‘there’ in the structure of human cognition, and unless it constituted, to recall Leibniz’s metaphor, an innate ‘alphabet of human thoughts’ (Leibniz 1903). The elements of this alphabet, which are the ultimate units of semantic analysis, must be intuitively intelligible-for ‘si nihil per se concipitur nihil omnino concipietur’ (if nothing is intelligible in itself nothing at all could ever be understood). Furthermore, to produce formulae which are intuitively intelligible, these elements have to be combined in ways which are also intuitively intelligible. What we need to posit, therefore, is not only an ‘alphabet of human thoughts’ but also a minimal ‘grammar of human thoughts’. Jointly, this alphabet and this grammar constitute a kind of mini-language which can be seen both as a convenient tool for analyzing different languages of the world and as a model of an innate and universal ‘lingua mentalis’. l 1. Kashaya Kashaya (of the Porno family of northern California) has a very rich system of verbal suffixes indicating evidentiality-as Oswalt (1986: 29) points out, one of the most elaborate and discriminating in the world. What is particularly interesting about this system is that although it is so elaborate it is also beautifully transparent in its semantics. ‘Doing ’ To begin with, Kashaya has two evidential suffixes (a perfective and an imperfective) which point to the speaker’s personal experience as a self-explanatory source of information. Oswalt calls these suffixes ‘Performative’, and defines them as follows: ‘The performative suffixes signify that the speaker knows of what he speaks because he is performing the act himself or has just performed it’ (p. 34). In our terms the meaning of these suffixes can be represented very simply: -+elu (Performative-Imperfective) I know this because I am doing it (not someone else) -mela (Performative-Perfective) I know this because I did it (not someone else) Oswalt’s examples

of the use of these suffixes include sentences

(1) qowa*qala. (Performative-Imperfective) (underlying form: qowaOq-wela) ‘I am packing (a suitcase). ’ (2) qowahmela. (Performative-Perfective) (underlying form: qowa”q-mela) ‘I just packed.’

(l), (2), and (6):

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(6) mi*-li ?a me-?e-1 there-VISIBLE I your-father-OBJ. ‘Right there I killed your father.’

phakum-mela. kill-PERFORM.

‘Seeing ’ Another pair of complementary suffixes, one imperfective and the other perfective, are what Oswalt calls the ‘Factual-Visual’ pair, 45 and y;i These suffixes ‘signify that the speaker knows of what he speaks because he sees, or saw, it’. In addition, ‘the Factual (not the Visual) also applies to classes of actions or states which have been observed enough by the speaker for him to generalize them as true and to classes which may simply be common knowledge’ (p. 36). Clearly follows:

the meaning

of the ‘Visual

(Perfective)’

suffix can be represented

as

-yii (Visual,) I know this because I saw it This can be illustrated

with sentence

(9):

(9) qowahy. (Visual) (underlying form: qowaOq-ya) ‘(I just saw) he packed, I just saw him pack.’ The ‘Factual’ suffix appears to have two distinct senses, one manifested in sentences referring to specific events, and another, in generic sentences. The specific sense of this suffix parallels that of the ‘Visual’:2 -G (‘Factual’ or Visua12) I know this because I see it This is illustrated

with sentence

(8):

(8) qowri+qh. (Factual) (underlying form: qowa0q48) ‘(I see) he is packing.’ The generic sense of the ‘Factual’ follows: -G (Factual) I know this because everyone

suffix is quite different.

It can be represented

as

knows it

This use of ‘Factual’ can be illustrated with the generic interpretation

of sentence (13):

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(13)

&hta=yachma bird = PLSUBJ . ‘Birds sing. ’

&no-w. sound-FACTUAL

The same sentence, however, can receive a different, (unlike the generic one) implies visual evidence: (13)

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specific interpretation,

which

&no-w. &hta=yachma bird = PL. SUBJ. sound-FACTUAL ‘(I see/saw) birds are/were singing. ’

It doesn’t seem possible to reduce these two different uses of ‘Factual’ to one; and it would perhaps be better to give the suffix in question two different labels: ‘Visual2 for the specific use and ‘Factual’ for the generic use (at the same time renaming Oswalt’s ‘Visual’ as ‘Visual,‘). ‘Hearing ’ In addition to its two ‘Visual’ suffixes (‘Visual,’ and ‘Vist&‘) Kashaya also has an ‘Auditory’ suffix, -I%x.& which ‘signifies that the speaker knows of what he speaks because he heard the sound of the action, but did not see it’ (p. 37). Unlike the ‘Performative’ and the ‘Visual’ suffix, it is indifferent to aspectual distinctions. Oswalt’s examples include (14), (15) and (16): (14)

mo’dun. (Imperfective) A (underlying form: mo-V”d-Vnng) ‘I hear/heard someone running along. ’

(15)

moml*cin. (Perfective) (underlying form: mo-ma%-Vnng) ‘I just heard someone run in.’

(16)

hayu &no-n. ‘I hear a dog barking. ’

The meaning

of the suffix in question

seems quite clear:

-hnii (Auditory) I know this because I hear it ‘Hearsay ’ and ‘personal experience ’ Another suffix, which Oswalt classifies together with the ‘Performative’, the ‘Visual’, the ‘Factual’ and the ‘Auditory’ under the label ‘Direct Evidence’, is -yowii the suffix of ‘Personal Experience’. In narratives, all the other evidentials described so far are replaced with this one suffix. This means that a radical simplification of the evidential system takes place, with all evidential distinctions replaced with just one:

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that between

‘Personal

Experience’

WIERZBICKA

and ‘Quotative’.

The meaning of the ‘Quotative’ as such seems reasonably clear. It ‘is the one evidential for information learned from someone else, contrasted with the many for information learned through the speaker’s own experience’ (p. 41). An example is provided by: (27)

mu1 = f-do_. then = ASS. -QUOT. -NONFINAL ‘Then, they say, the dog barked. ’

Presumably, follows:

here as elsewhere,

hayu dog

calnto-w. sound-ABS .

the meaning of the ‘Quotative’

can be represented

as

-do (Quotative) I say this because someone else said this I don’t say: I know it What is much harder to establish is the meaning of the ‘Personal Experience’ -yowii, which in narratives constitutes the only ‘Direct Evidence’ alternative ‘Quotative’. One possibility

which comes to mind as a hypothetical

meaning

suffix to the

of -yowii is this:

I know because I was there But this interpretation is undermined by the fact that -yowii can be used with respect to ‘moving actions seen on television or in the movies’ (p. 42). It is also hard to reconcile with the fact that what is experienced in dreams, visions, and revelations is also reported with -yowii. In the case of television and movies, it could be argued that the speaker ‘was there’ (in front of the screen); but in the case of dreams, visions, and revelations (which may or may not feature the speaker himself) such an interpretation makes even less sense: if I know something because I have seen it in a dream it is not my physical presence somewhere that matters but my psychological experience. It seems to me, therefore, that we should look for a different, more plausible interpretation of the ‘Personal Experience’ suffix. The fact that in narratives all other devices are reduced to one: ‘Quotative’ vs ‘Personal Experience’, suggests the following interpretation for the latter: -yowii (Personal Experience) I don’t say this because someone I know it Compare

this with the formula

else said this

for the ‘Quotative’

suggested

earlier:

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-do (Quotative) I say this because someone else said this I don’t say: I know it Oswalt (p. 40) comments: ‘The simplification in narratives of the elaborateness of the evidential system is understandable-when one talks of events that may have happened a considerable time previously, the precise type of evidence is less important and, indeed, is often not remembered by the speaker’. Thus, the only question which really arises with respect to narratives is this: does the speaker say this or that on the basis of hearsay or not? ‘Quotative’ signals hearsay; the suffix of ‘Personal Experience’ signals no hearsay. Thus, the ‘hearsay’ suffix does not signal (by virtue of its meaning) an absence of ‘direct experience’. Rather, it is the so-called suffix of ‘Personal Experience’ which signals (by virtue of its meaning) an absence of hearsay. The fact that it is common for a story to have the -do (‘Quotative’) suffix ‘in almost every sentence’ (p. 44) lends, I think, support to this analysis: if most, or nearly all, sentences in a story are marked as based on hearsay, it makes good sense for the speaker to mark those exceptional ones which are NOT based on hearsay. ‘Inference ’

The ‘Inferential I’ suffix -qi? ‘marks an inference based on circumstances or evidence found apart, in space or time, from an actual event or state. . . . To a certain extent -qti is a default category for evidence through senses other than those that have specific sensory suffixes (Visual or Auditory). . . The Kashaya Inferential suffix implies no lack of certainty, merely lack of higher ranking evidence’ (Oswalt p. 38). These comments

seem to suggest that the suffix in question

means:

I know this not because I see it not because I hear it But this is a very implausible (20)

semantic formula. Consider,

for example, sentence (20):

cuhni * mu?&qh. ‘Bread has been cooked.’

uttered by somebody coming into a house and detecting an odour . The formula ‘I know it not because I see it’ might seem to fit this situation, but why should anyone want to say, in addition, ‘not because I hear it’? Consider also sentence (24), when the same suffix is combined (24)

he?& How

ya we

mihya &khe-thin=i-q-a* win-FUT. -not =ASS.-INF.-NONFINAL

mu*kito baq o= eli. him what = in. ‘It appears we’ll never be able to beat him in anything.’

with a future tense:

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Here, the formula

WIERZBICKA

sketched would make no sense:

We’ll never be able to beat him in anything I know this not because I see it not because I hear it We have to agree with Oswalt, therefore, that the suffix in question is ‘inferential’ rather than ‘sensory’, even though it ‘implies no lack of certainty, merely lack of higher ranking evidence’. I propose for this suffix the following semantic formula: -45 (Inferential I) I know this because I know something

else

Kashaya also has another ‘inferential’ suffix, -bi, which Oswalt labels ‘Inferential II’, and another ‘experiential’ suffix, -miyii, which Oswalt labels ‘Remote Past’; but not enough information is provided about these two suffixes to enable us to sketch more than very tentative semantic formulae. Virtually all that Oswalt says about these suffixes is that ‘Remote Past’ is a remote past alternative to -yowii and that ‘Inferential II’, in combination with another suffix -w, is close in meaning to the English ‘turn out’ (e.g. ‘it turned out to be my husband’). As a starting point for further testing we could propose, therefore, the following formulae: -miyii Remote Past I know this not because someone else said something it happened a long time before now

Inferential II -w I know this now because I know something else now I didn’t know it before now -bi-w

2. Quechua According to Adelaar (1977:79, quoted in Weber 1986: 138), Tarma Quechua, a language of central Peru, has three suffixes, -mi, -shi, -chi, which ‘indicate the validity of the information supplied by the speaker’. Adelaar assigns to these three suffixes the following meanings: -mi ‘indicates that the speaker is convinced about what he is saying’, -shi ‘indicates that the speaker has obtained the information that he is supplying

through hearsay’, that the speaker’s

-chi ‘indicates

These definitions

statement

suggest the following

is a conjecture’.

semantic

representation:

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a9

-mi I know this -shi someone else says this I don’t say: I know it

-chi I think this I don’t know it But Weber argues that while Adelaar’s definitions may be appropriate for Tarma Quechua, they are not valid for the dialect that he has investigated himself, namely for Huanuco Quechua. In Tarma Quechua, Weber says, -mi is used only for personal experience. of a number of Tarma texts that he had examined, Weber comments:

Speaking

In all Ignacio Zarate Mayma’s texts in Adelaar (1977: 308-407) and in Puente (1972), I have not found a single case of -shi. Even though much of the material is far beyond the realm of the teller’s experience (including folktales about the fox and the condor), he uses -mi throughout. This is because he believes the stories he is telling. . These facts justify Adelaar’s claims for Tarma (p. 142).

But in Huanuco Quechua, Weber tells us, the situation is different. ‘To the Huanuco Quechua ear, Zarate’s use of -mi seems exceedingly incautious with respect to the information he conveys’ (p. 142). Weber’s informant also mentions a man, referred to by his neighbours as ‘loko’, ‘crazy’, who constantly uses -mi. ‘No one believes what he says because he “always speaks as though he had witnessed what he is telling about” ‘. Apparently, then, there is a difference between the Tarma sense of -mi and the Huanuco sense of -mi: if in Tarma -mi means ‘I know’, or perhaps ‘I can say: I know’, in Huanuco it must mean something different. But what? Weber glosses the Huanuco senses of -mi, -shi, and -chi as ‘direct’ (DIR), ‘indirect’ (IND), and ‘conjecture’ (CNJ), respectively. He insists that in Huanuco, ‘-mi and -shi are basically evidential: -mi means “learned by direct experience” and -shi means “learned by indirect experience (hearsay)” ’ (p. 139). In particular, -mi is not a ‘validational’ (‘indicating commitment to the truth of the proposition’ (p. 139)), but an ‘evidential’ (‘indicating the source of the information’). ‘A validational interpretation for -mi is often appropriate because of the axiom that direct experience is reliable (and thus one is convinced about it)’ (p. 140). The basic meaning of -mi, however, is not ‘validational’ but ‘evidential’, like that of -shi: -shi implies absence of direct experience, and -mi, its presence. But what does it really mean that -mi signals ‘direct experience’? number of things, such as the following: 1.

I know this-because

I saw it.

2.

I know this-because

I heard it.

3.

I know this-because

I perceived

4.

I know this-because

I did it.

5.

I know this-because

it happened to me.

it.

It could mean a

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6.

I know this-because

7.

I know this-not

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I was there.

because someone

said it.

Would any one of these different possibilities cover the whole range of use of -mi? Let us examine Weber’s examples, with these questions in mind. Sentence (la)

(la) refers to a diviner

who has chewed coca and predicts death:

Wanu-nqa-paq-mi die-3FUT-FUT ‘It will die.’

According to Weber, the ‘rhetorical force’ of this utterance (in these particular circumstances) would be ‘I assert that it will die’. Thus, the diviner doesn’t mean ‘I know because I saw it’ or ‘I know because I heard it’, or ‘I know because I was there’, and clearly, he doesn’t mean ‘I know because I did it’ or ‘I know because it happened to me’, although he could conceivably mean ‘I know because SOMETHING happened to me’; and he might mean ‘I know; not because someone said something’. The same two possibilities (3a)

would also hold for sentence

(3a):

Qam-pis maqa-ma-shka-nki-mi you-also hit-lOBJ-PERF-2 ‘You also hit me.’

Here, Weber provides the following additional gloss: ‘I saw/felt you hit me (and was conscious)‘. In this situation, some of the other possibilities listed earlier would also be applicable: ‘I know this because it happened to me’, ‘I know this because I perceived it’ or ‘I know this because I saw it’. But none of these formulae would fit the case of the diviner. Let us consider, ‘My mother’s

in turn, the (unnumbered)

grandfather’s

sentence:

name was John.’

According to Weber’s informant, this sentence ‘is natural with -shi but not with -mi, even if the speaker is convinced that it is true’ (p. 140). Weber explains this fact as follows: ‘This is because with -mi it implies that the speaker has met his greatgrandfather. What is basic for -mi is the source of the information (direct experience), not commitment to the truth of what his name was’ (p. 140). Weber also points out that ‘the same result obtains for a sentence that the speaker does not believe, e.g. “The moon is made of cheese.” According to TCV [Weber’s informant1 this is natural with -shi, indicating that the speaker has been informed that the moon is made of cheese. With -mi, says TCV, it implies that the speaker has been to the moon’ (p. 140). But these comments take us back to the question: What does -mi really mean? The last two examples appear to suggest the following interpretation: ‘I know this because

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I was there’. But clearly, this cannot be the invariant of 4, because this formula does not fit the case of the diviner, or, for that matter, the case of the person hit by someone. It would be absurd to say ‘I know that you hit me because I was there’. Let us examine one further example provided by Weber-sentence (2a), uttered ‘in response to person(s) who have expressed doubt as to the speaker’s ability to make it (e.g. to the top of a mountain)’ (p. 139). (2a)

Noqa-mi chaya-:-man aywar-qa. I arrive-1-COND if:i:go-TOP ‘I would/could/might arrive, if I were to go.’

Clearly, the speaker does not mean here ‘I know this because I was there’. Nor does he mean ‘I know this because I saw it’, or ‘I know this because I did it’, or ‘I know this because it happened to me’, or ‘I know this because something happened to me’. It could be argued that in this case the speaker might mean ‘I know this because I feel something’ (i.e. ‘I have a feeling that I could do it’). But this interpretation would not tit the case of the great-grandfather (‘I know that my great-grandfather’s name was John, because I feel something’). What, then, is the semantic invariant of -mi? It seems to me that we are left with only one possibility which would fit all of Weber’s examples, namely, number 7: ‘I know this; not because someone said something’. If this is right then -mi functions in Huanuco Quechua as a marked category, defined in opposition to the hearsay -shi: -shi I say this because someone else said it I don’t say: I know it -mi I say this not because someone else said it I know it It is not the case, then, that -shi indicates the absence of ‘direct evidence’, and -mi its presence. Rather, -shi indicates the presence of hearsay (as the basis of the speaker’s statement) and -mi its absence. Of course a denial of hearsay could also be compatible with a conjecture and -mi is not compatible with conjectures. But this is accounted for by the component ‘I know’ assigned here to -mi: conjectures are not compatible with ‘I know’. For the Huanuco Quechua element -chi, which Weber characterizes as ‘conjecture’, we can propose the same semantic formula which we have assigned to the Tarma -chi: -chi I think this I don’t know it

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The contrast between the component ‘I don’t know it’ assigned to -chi, and the component ‘I don’t say: I know it’ assigned to -shi, accounts, I think, for the different ‘validational’ force of these two elements. Weber’s examples suggest that -shi can be used in cases where the speaker is not at all certain of the information conveyed, or even when he is highly sceptical (as in the case of the sentence ‘the moon is made of cheese’); but also in cases when the speaker is convinced that the sentence is true (as in the case of the sentence ‘My mother’s grandfather’s name was John’). The component ‘I don’t say: I know it’ is compatible with both these types of situations. On the other hand, the component ‘I don’t know it’, assigned to -chi, suggests a lack of confidence, and would not be compatible with situations when the speaker reports second-hand information that he views as fairly reliable. Of course, in Western culture, second-hand information regarded as reliable is usually not distinguished from first-hand knowledge. But as Weber points out, in Quechua culture ‘(only) one’s own experience is reliable’ (p. 138), and the cultural norm is ‘Avoid unnecessary risk, as by assuming responsibility for information of which one is not absolutely certain’ (p. 138). This explains, for example, why in a booklet on Peruvian history (Cayco Villar 1975) sentences such as ‘Their tools and things are found throughout Peru’ has -hi rather than -mi: as Weber points out, it is so ‘because the author could not possibly have seen all those things found in all those places’ (p. 141). Clearly, the author of the booklet does not wish to imply ‘I don’t know’. But the cautious component ‘I don’t say: I know it’ does not imply lack of knowledge; it implies only an unwillingness to assume personal responsibility for the information provided. Such a cautious attitude might seem unnecessary, and even odd, from a Western point of view, but it is understandable from the point of view of Quechua culture. The analysis of Huanuco Quechua evidentials proposed here explains, it seems to me, the fact that -mi, though labelled by Weber ‘direct’, does not seem to be widely used in sentences based on the speaker’s personal experience, and that many, perhaps most, such sentences occur without any evidentials. ‘For example, ATR [an informant], in telling of going to see a football game, did not use -mi in the parts describing his getting to and from the game (told in the first person), but he did use -mi in describing the events of other people (companions, players, referees)’ (p. 141). If -mi meant something like ‘I know this because I did it’ or ‘I know this because it happened to me’, this absence of -mi in most personal narratives would be puzzling. But if -mi signals that the account is not based on hearsay, this absence of -mi in most personal narratives is understandable: normally, there is no need to say: I did it I know this not because someone

else told me

If the speaker is not suffering from amnesia it would be assumed that he knows what he did without someone else telling him about it. But in the case of other people’s actions, the report could well be based on hearsay, so if it isn’t, it makes sense for

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the speaker to signal this non-hearsay basis of the sentence by means of -mi. Huanuco Quechua differs in this respect from some other languages (e.g. Wintu) described in the same volume, which have markers (also labelled as ‘direct’) signalling ‘personal experience’ of some sort in a positive way rather than ‘absence of hearsay’. Understandably, in these languages the marker in question is used more widely than -mi is used in Huanuco. 3. wintu According to Schlichter (1986), Wintu, a language of northern California, has four evidential suffixes, which she labels as ‘nonvisual sensorial’, ‘hearsay’, ‘inferential’ and ‘expectational’. Here as elsewhere, the labels are expected to provide hints, not explanations: they are not meant to tell the reader what each of the suffixes in question really means and in what range of situations it can be used. ‘Non visual sensorial’

To begin with, the suffix -nFEr ‘is used if the speaker wishes to indicate that the statement he is making describes a fact known to him through one of his senses other than vision, i.e. his hearing, feeling, taste, smell, touch, or any kind of intellectual experience of “sixth sense” ’ (p. 47). As a first approximation, then, we could try to explicate the ‘evidential’ in question as follows: I know this because I perceive(d) something I didn’t see it Let us now test this explication against Schlichter’s illustrative sentences: (1) Heket wira waEa*-binthe+m. someone come cry IM. DUB. ‘Someone is coming crying (I hear).’ (2) Pi k’ilepma. daqEan”e*m. it awfully hot DUB. ‘It’s awfully hot (I feel the heat).’ (3) Poem yel-hurawirzthe*m. earth destroy SE. DUB. ‘The earth will be destroyed (I know, feel).’ (4) ?Uwebe*di war ?unikinfie*m. don’t IMP. QUOT.COM.DUB. ‘He said ‘don’t do it!’ (We heard him say not to do it.)’ (5) Q’otisa-bintieresken. strong IM. You ‘You’re strong (I feel).’ (Said while wrestling) Lsc16,1-G

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(6) T’aqiqmae-binthe.. hurt IM. ‘It hurts (I feel the pain).’ (7) Henuni mis yi*la-kintheri. ? how you send COM.INTER. ‘How did he instruct you (in your hearing)?’ (8) C’epkal ne.1 bae-bin&da. bad we eat IM. we ‘We’ve been eating bad things (I sense).’ (9) Hida naqalma *-binthe *n . very pitiful IM. You ‘You’re so pitiful! (I am emotionally

affected)’

At first sight, all these examples seem to fit the proposed semantic description, but if one examines them more closely one is bound to develop some doubts. For example, could the person who says (6) ‘It hurts.’ or (2) ‘It’s awfully hot.’ really mean ‘I perceive it; I don’t see it’? In other words, could the exclusion of visual evidence possibly be part of the speaker’s intended message? The supposition seems absurd: the very nature of pain, or heat, is such that one would feel it rather than see it, so there would be no need to specifically exclude visual evidence along the lines of: ‘It hurts me; I know this not because I see something’, or ‘It’s hot; I know this not because I see something’. Clearly, it would seem to make more sense to explicate the meaning of the element in question more broadly, as: I know this because I perceive

something

leaving the nature of the relevant

perception

to be specified by context.

If we do this, however, we will not be able to explain why a sentence such as (1) ‘Someone is coming crying -nlhEr’ will be interpreted as implying ‘I hear’, and never as ‘I see’. There must be something in the meaning of -nthEr which excludes seeing. But what is it, if not an explicit component ‘not because I see it’, which would be inapplicable to sentences about pain or temperature? A helpful clue is provided by Schlichter in the following statement: ‘We could say that evidentials are used to mark indirect evidence if we specify that the only evidence accepted as direct is visual evidence whose expression is unmarked. The speaker does not claim to be absolutely sure of anything unless he sees it right then and there together with the addressee’ (p. 54). This statement suggests that out initial formula ‘I know this not because I see it’ may be simply ethnocentric. It would make sense for a Westerner, but perhaps not for a Wintu speaker, to say ‘I know this not because I see it’; for a Wintu speaker,

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if ‘I don’t see something’

then I wouldn’t

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want to say ‘I know it’.

This is, then, what was wrong with our first tentative explication: the use of the phrase ‘I know’. If the visual evidence is excluded then it is not ‘I know’ that we should use in the explication but ‘I think’. The phrase ‘I think’ will by itself exclude direct visual evidence because if I saw something I would say ‘I know’, not ‘I think’. If, however, I say (in the semantic structure) ‘I think’ rather than ‘I know’, then visual evidence is excluded (on the basis of cultural assumptions) and this exclusion doesn’t have to be articulated as part of the speaker’s intended message. So far so good. But ‘I think’ could also be based on inference or on reasonably reliable hearsay; how do we show, then, that this particular evidential (-nthEr) implies sensory evidence? I propose the following:

-nthEr I think this because something

happens (happened)

to me

Pain, heat, a ‘gut feeling’, a sound in my ears, a tension in my muscles (while wrestling), all these things can be seen as ‘something that happens to me’. One could argue that seeing, too, could be viewed as ‘something that happens to me’ but even if we accept this we don’t have to add anything to our formula (to exclude seeing explicitly), because from a Wintu perspective, seeing is already excluded by the phrase ‘I think’ (if one saw, then one would say ‘I know’ rather than ‘I think’). The choice of ‘I think’ rather than ‘I know’ is supported by the fact that -nlhEr is used in sentences such as (9) ‘You’re so pitiful! (I am emotionally affected)‘. Clearly, what the speaker wishes to express here is what he/she thinks, not what he or she knows; and the implication that this thought is based on ‘what is happening to me’ makes perfect sense (‘I am emotionally affected’). On the other hand, the component ‘I think’ might seem to be incompatible with sentences such as (2) and (6): (2) It’s awfully hot (I feel the heat). (6) It hurts (I feel the pain). Surely, experiencing heat, or hurt, is not a matter of opinion? But the phrase ‘I think’ does not have to be interpreted as an expression of (considered) opinion; it can also be interpreted as a record of a spontaneous thought passing through our mind: I think: it’s awfully hot. I think: it hurts. In this sense, sentences such as (2) and (6) are, it seems to me, compatible proposed semantic formula.

with the

As for the second component of the proposed explication (‘because something happens (happened) to me’), it might seem to have been chosen arbitrarily over

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possible competitors such as ‘not because someone said this’, which would also account for the ‘first-hand’, ‘direct’ and ‘personal’ basis of the message expressed. But when tested against a whole range of examples, those competitors lose to the formula proposed here. For example, while the hypothetical component ‘not because someone said this’ could lit sentences such as (3) or (5): (3) The earth will be destroyed (I know, feel) (I say this not because someone said it) (5) You’re strong (said while wrestling) (I say this not because someone said it) it would not fit (6): (6) It hurts (I feel the pain) (? I say this not because someone

else said it)

It would hardly make sense for anyone to wish to indicate that when they register their own pain they don’t do so on the basis of what someone else has told them. ‘Hearsay ’

As Schlichter (1986:49) defines it, ‘the second evidential l-ke. I indicates that the proposition expressed by the verb is known to the speaker through hearsay’. This definition would seem to invite an explication along the following lines: I know this because someone

said it

But this can’t be right because, as we already know, in Wintu ‘evidentials’ are used only when the speaker does NOT want to claim knowledge (‘the speaker does not claim to be absolutely sure of anything unless he sees it right then and there. ‘). To account for the lack of certainty implied by the ‘hearsay’ evidential we could try to represent its meaning as follows: I think [this] because someone

said it

We can now test this formula against Schlichter’s

examples

(10)

Mine1 kirke.m. die COM.DUB. ‘He has died (I’m told).’

(11)

Leendada suke kilake.. long ago stand CON. ‘Long ago they lived (I’m told). ’ (Frequently

(10) through (14):

used to begin a myth)

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

(12)

Wi*ta Ealit sukebtieem. man good stand IM.DUB. ‘It is said that he is a handsome

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man.’

(13)

Eoyi*lake* ni. drunk I ‘I am drunk (I hear). They tell me I’m drunk.’

(14)

K’ilepma. frightfully ‘Frightfully

kuya*btie* mi. sick IM. you sick you are (I hear). ’

Does the proposed formula fit these examples? In most cases, it does. It is not clear, however, that it tits example (1 l), and in particular, whether it is consistent with the comment that (11) is frequently used to begin a myth. Presumably, what happened in a myth would be either accepted as true (‘I know’) or reported as something for which the speaker doesn’t want to take personal responsibility (‘I don’t say: I know’). The phrase ‘I think’ doesn’t really tit myths very well. On the other hand, the formula: -ke * someone says this I don’t say: I know it fits both myths and all the other sentences with the ‘hearsay’ evidential adduced by Schlichter. Furthermore, this last formula allows us to account for the difference between sentences with the ‘hearsay’ evidential and those sentences with the ‘nonvisual sensorial’ evidential which report speech, such as (4) or (7): (4)

He said ‘don’t do it!’ (We heard him say not to do it)

(7)

How did he instruct you (in your hearing)?

Sentences such as (4) and (7) are consistent with the following interpretation: the speaker thinks ‘that’s what the other person said’ because something happened to the speaker himself: the voice reaching his ears. I presume that the ‘nonvisual sensorial’ evidential would normally not be used in retelling a myth, because in this case it would make more sense for the speaker to wish to disclaim personal responsibility for the message (‘I don’t say: I know this’) than to claim personal responsibility for it (‘I think’). I conclude, therefore, that the most likely semantic structure of the ‘hearsay’ evidential in Wintu is indeed this: ‘someone says this; I don’t say: I know it’. ‘Inferential ’ The third Wintu evidential, -re, ‘indicates that the speaker believes his statement to be true because of circumstantial sensory evidence. This evidence turns out to be most often visual’ (p. 51). Illustrative sentences are:

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(20)

ma-n haraskiream. Heke somewhere EX. go COM.DUB. ‘He must have gone somewhere (I don’t see him).’

(21)

Piya mayto. n dekna . sto *n piya ma. n biyakire . m. that EX. be COM.DUB. those feet steps ‘Those tracks of steps! That must have been him.’

(22)

Hadi winthu *h minelbire . m. why! person die IM. DUB. ‘Why, a person must have died (I see or hear someone cry)!’

Interestingly, in sentences of this kind ‘the action referred always has a third person subject’ (p. 51). I propose that the ‘sensory evidence’, as follows:

which is normally

to by the verb stem

visual, can be represented

-re .

I know something

about now (i.e. the present)

whereas the ‘inference’, resented as:

which apparently

I think I can say something

has to concern

a third person,

be rep-

about someone because of this

It seems to me that these two components jointly fit all the examples adduced earlier, as well as Schlichter’s two additional examples (23) and (24): (23)

Hida k’aysare. yo. ! very hurry EX. ‘He must be in a great hurry (I see him run, I can’t catch up with him)!’

(24)

NiEay ?ewin sukere.. nephew here stand ‘My nephew must have been here (I see tracks).’

For example, in (23), what ‘I know about now’ is that ‘I see him run’, and what ‘I think I can say about someone because of this’ is that ‘he is in a great hurry’. Similarly, in (24) what ‘I know about now’ is that ‘I see tracks’ and what ‘I think I can say about someone because of this’ is that ‘my nephew was here’. ‘Expectational ’ According to Schlichter (p. 52), the fourth Wintu evidential, -?el, ‘denotes that the speaker believes his proposition to be true because of his experience with similar situations, regular patterns, or repeated circumstances common in human life’. Schlichter’s prime examples are (25) and (26):

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(25)

Tima minel?el, pira. ?el. cold die starve ‘He might freeze to death, he might starve (it’s cold and he’s alone, helpless, sick) ’

(26)

?Imto - n nuqa *?el. ripe berries ‘The berries must be ripe (it’s that time of year).’

But Schlichter’s data also include several examples where the same evidential is used to indicate hearsay, as in (27) and (28), and she suspects that ‘this may represent a semantic change toward a single evidential for indirect evidence which includes both hearsay and expectation’ (p. 53): (27)

Ho *n?ukin bo . Meres winthu *h biya-kila ?el ?ebasp’urit ko *t. all be CON. they long ago myth people ‘In the myths from long ago they (the animals) were all people.’

(28)

?Uni that way

ma* n EX.

pip’urit they

winthu.hto*t

pip’urit.

people

they

?una* so

suke-kila ?el stand CON.

ho *nto *n long ago

‘That’s the way it was among the people long ago.’ It seems to me, however, that both the ‘expectational’ and the ‘hearsay’ use of the element in question can be accounted for in terms of a unitary semantic formula: - ?el I think this I can’t say: I know it This would apply to the ‘expectational’

examples

as follows:

(25)

I think: he will freeze to death, he will starve I can’t say: I know it

(26)

I think: the berries are ripe I can’t say: I know it

But the same formula would apply to the ‘hearsay’ sentences

with the same suffix:

(27)

I think: in the myths from long ago they (the animals) I can’t say: I know it

were all people

(28)

I think: that’s the way it was among the people long ago I can’t say: I know it

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If this is correct, then there is a subtle difference in meaning between ‘hearsay’ sentences such as (lo)-(14), with the suffix -ke* , and ‘hearsay’ sentences such as (27) and (28), with the suffix -?el. This conclusion seems to me quite consistent with the illustrative sentences offered by Schlichter, but of course it needs to be checked against a more extensive range of data.

4. Maricopa According to Gordon (1986), Maricopa has a number of suffixes which indicate the source of the information. Two of these suffixes, -(k) ‘yuu ‘sight evidential’ and -&)a ‘hearing and other nonvisual sensory evidential’, indicate ‘first-hand knowledge’ of the speaker. Thus, ‘-(k) ‘yuu is found on the final main verb of a sentence in which the speaker is asserting something which he or she knows about on the basis of having directly seen the event expressed in the sentence’ (p. 77). Gordon illustrates the use of the ‘sight evidential’ with the following sentences: (4) M-iima-‘yuu. 2-dance-SEE = EV ‘You danced (I know because I saw it).’ (5) Iima-‘yuu. dance-SEE = EV ‘He danced (I know because I saw it).’ (6) ‘-iima-k’yuu. 1-dance-k = SEE = EV ‘I danced (for sure, in the past).’ But the third of these examples presents a problem. Clearly, in this case the nice simple gloss ‘I know because I saw it’ does not fit, and has to be replaced with something else (‘for sure, in the past’). But if so, then what is the real invariant of the suffix in question? A similar problem arises in the case of the other sensory evidential, -(k) ‘u, which is used ‘to mark that the information in the sentence is from the speaker’s first-hand knowledge, though in this case the knowledge is gained not by having seen the event, but by having otherwise sensed (usually heard) the event or state’ (p. 77). This is illustrated with (7), (8), and (9): (7) M-ashvar-‘a. 2-sing=HR=EV ‘You sang (I know because I heard it).’ (8) Ashvar-‘a. sing-HR = EV ‘He sang (I know because I heard it).’

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(9) ‘ashvar-k’a. 1-sing-k=HR=EV ‘I sang (for sure, in the past; I heard/felt myself).’ But again, in sentence (9) the nice simple gloss ‘I know because I heard it’ does not fit, and has to be replaced with something else. Gordon (p. 78) comments on this difficulty as follows: ‘When these suffixes are used on verbs which have a first person subject, the evidential sense is less prominent and instead they convey a strong assertiveness about the actual occurrence of the event expressed by the sentence’. But what does it mean that ‘the evidential sense is less prominent’? To say this is to dodge the crucial issue of the semantic invariant: is the sense ‘I know this because I saw it’ postulated as the invariant of the suffix -fk) ‘ywr or isn’t it? Similarly, is the semantic component ‘I know this because I heard it’ postulated as the semantic invariant of the suffix -F) ‘a or isn’t it? Since these hy~~eti~ components clearly do not fit sentences with first-person subjects, they camrot constitute the invariants of the suffixes in question. The reason why those hypothetical components do not fit sentences with first-person subject is quite clear. Normally, when we report our own activities we are certain that these activities have actually taken place because we know we have performed them, not because we have seen or heard ourselves performing them. It would make sense, therefore, to say: I danced (I sang) I know this because I did it but hardly: I danced (I sang) I know this because I saw it (heard it) But if we attribute these semantically plausible formulae to sentences with first-person subjects we are left with no invariant. Can we find semantic com~nents which could fit all the uses of the ‘sight evidential’ (that is, both first-person and non-first-bran uses)? And can we find such invariant semantic components for the ‘hearing evidential’? If we can’t do that, could we at least find, for each suffix, two different but related formulae? It seems to me that we can, As a first approximation, I propose the following: -0 ‘YUU I know this one could see it -@‘a I know this one could hear it

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I am not suggesting that these components will always, in all grammatical contexts, be interpreted in exactly the same way. It is possible, even likely, that in first-person volitional sentences the ‘I know’ component will be interpreted as based on ‘internal evidence’ rather than on visual evidence (‘I know because I did it’); but this is not incompatible with the presence of a component appealing to other people’s visual evidence (‘one could see it’). Thus, for first-person volitional sentences I would propose the following analysis: I danced-(k) ‘yuu I danced one could see it I know this because I did it A similar analysis can be proposed for sentences with the ‘hearing evidential’, with two core components assigned to all the occurrences of this evidential, and with one additional component provided by the grammatical context. I sang- &) ‘a I sang one could hear it I know this because I did it For third-person sentences, I propose for consideration of such sentences (A and B): He danced

the following

two analyses

(k) ‘yuu

A.

he danced one could see it I know this because I saw it

B.

he danced I know this one could see it

Version A shows explicitly that the speaker is basing his statement on personal visual knowledge, whereas in version B personal visual knowledge is implied, not spelled out explicitly: what is spelled out explicitly is visual evidence in general. Of these two analyses, A may seem preferable as it may seem to represent the speaker’s communicative intention more accurately. On the other hand, B attributes to -(k) ‘a (as used in non-first-person sentences) a meaning closer to that which can be attributed to them in first-person sentences. To make a justified choice between these two versions one would need further data, beyond those provided in Gordon’s paper. There is, however, one further minimal pair in the paper which may be helpful here, (23) and (24):

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(23)

(24)

Nyaa ‘ayuu I s.t. ‘I was sick.’

‘-rav-k-‘yuu. I-hurt-SS-SEE

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= EV

Pam-sh ‘ayuu rav-‘yuu. Pam-SJ set. hurt-SEE = EV ‘Pam was sick.’

I presume that for (23) we have to posit one of the following two analyses, (B’): (A’)

(B’)

I was sick one could see it I know this because it happened I was sick I know this because it happened one could see it

rather than the unnatural (C’)

(A’) or

to me

to me

(C’):

I was sick one could see it I know this because I saw it

For (24), we could propose one of the following (A”)

Pam was sick one could see it I know this because I saw it

(B”)

Pam was sick I know this one could see it

formulae

(A”) or (B”):

It seems to me that of these last two formulae, the second (B”) is a little more plausible than the first (A”). It is one thing to assert that one has seen somebody dancing, and another, to assert that one has ‘seen’ that somebody was sick. The vaguer formula ‘one could see it’ sounds more appropriate in this case than the explicit and specific claim ‘I saw it’. Tentatively, then, I would propose that the ‘sight evidential’ -(k) ‘yuu in Maricopa has the invariant meaning ‘I know this; one could see it’, and that a specific grammatical context can add to this core meaning a further component ‘because I did it’ in the case of volitional first-person sentences and ‘because it happened to me’ in the case of non-volitional first-person sentences. But I would like to leave the possibility open that third-person sentences provide the additional component ‘because

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I saw it’. Similarly, I would propose that the ‘hearing invariant meaning ‘I know this; one could hear it’.

evidential’

-(k) ‘u has the

One question which should be clarified at this point concerns the possibility of the suffix -(k) ‘a applying to sensory evidence other than hearing. Gordon is not as clear on this point as one would wish. She mentions the possibility of evidence other than auditive (‘in this case the knowledge is gained not by having seen the event, but by having otherwise sensed (usually heard) the event or state’ (p. 77)), but all her examples refer to sounds (singing, crying, saying). She says explicitly that ‘possibly the most typical place for this affix is on verbs of “saying” which report information addressed to the speaker’ (p. 78). The only example when a sensory word other than hear appears in the gloss is (9): (9)

I sang (for sure, in the past; I heard/felt

myself)

But the event referred to in this sentence is auditive, and it is likely that Gordon mentioned ‘feeling’, as well as ‘hearing’ in her gloss only because she felt uncomfortable attributing to the speaker the idea that he knew of his own singing because he heard himself singing. It seems much more reasonable to suppose that the speaker knew of his singing because he did it (that is, on internal grounds), not because he could hear himself do it. This is evidential’ Maricopa that -0 h

not to deny the possibility of a language having a ‘sensory nonvisual with a broader range of use, and I do not exclude the possibility that is such a language. But the evidence provided by Gordon seems to suggest is an ‘auditive’, rather than ‘sensory nonvisual’, evidential.

In addition to the two sensory evidentials, Maricopa also has a ‘hearsay evidential’, consisting of a form of the verb ‘ii-m ‘say’, - ‘ish, followed by the ‘hearing evidential’. This third evidential ‘is used to indicate overtly that the speaker does not vouch for the truth of the utterance, but instead is merely repeating something he or she has heard spoken of (p. 86). (32) is an example of this: (32)

Bonnie-sh chuy-k’ish-‘a. Bonnie-SJ marry-k-say +sh-HR=EV ‘(They said, I hear tell) Bonnie got married.’

(37b) Pam-sh Bonnie tpuy-m-‘ish-‘a. Pam-SJ Bonnie kill-m-suy+sh-HR=EV ‘Pam killed Bonnie (I hear tell).’ The examples offered by Gordon represented as follows: - ‘ish- h people say this I don’t say: I know it

suggest that the meaning

of this evidential

can be

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It is possible, however, that this formula is too restrictive, and that the evidential in question can also be used for information repeated after one specific person (‘someone’, rather than ‘people’).

5. Jaqi According to Hardman (1986: 113), ‘extensive marking of DATA-SOURCE is one of the prime characteristics of the Jaqi family of languages’, which is spoken in the Andes mountains, and includes Jaqaru and Aymara. Within this family, details vary somewhat from language to language, but essentially, they all have ‘three obligatory, major categories’ of data-source marking (p. 117) and a wide range of optional ‘weasels’ or ‘transitional forms’. Hardman calls the three primary categories ‘personal knowledge’, ‘knowledge-through-language’ and ‘nonpersonal knowledge’. The fundamental importance of these categories in Jaqi languages is best illustrated by Jaqi informants’ reaction to the absence of obligatory ‘data-source’ categories in English, as reported by Hardman (p. 133): Every Aymara assistant we have had at the University of Florida has insisted that surely English speakers do mark data-source; if it is not overt, then at least it must be ‘understood’ somehow. It always takes a good deal of persuasion and illustration to lead to the belief that we really are not lying when we use an unmarked sentence to relate material we have not personally experienced. (As when I might say, ‘Wharf was the student of Sapir’-‘No, I did not know them,-but no, I am not lying,-and no, I don’t have to say that I read it.‘) Somehow I think we never quite succeed in the endeavor. . To some degree we find ourselves having to adjust our English.

This sounds as if ‘personal knowledge’ was indicated by the absence of any other data-source markers, but in fact Jaqi languages do have an overt suffix of ‘personal experience’, namely -+~a. The question is what this -wu really means. Hardman explains (p. 115): Personal knowledge is that knowledge acquired by personal experience, through the sensesprimarily, but not exclusively, visual. Thus, bodily states, such as hunger, are personal knowledge in the first person, but can never be so for other persons, because the experience is not direct. Recordings with blind persons have not shown any difference in the use of data-source markings.

This explanation means:

might lead us to the conclusion

(e.g. I am hungry/I was hungry) I know this because it is happening (happened)

that the personal knowledge marker

to me

But this analysis would not fit all of Hardman’s illustrative sentences. For example, ‘future personal knowledge sentences are used as polite commands to same-generation ritual kin (comadres and compadres), to whom it is forbidden to use an imperative’ (p. 115). Clearly, if somebody says to a relative ‘you will do this + -~a’, they can hardly mean ‘I know (you will do it) because it (something?) is happening to me’. What they could conceivably mean is ‘I know (you will do it) because I say this’; but this would force us to postulate two different (though overlapping) formulae. A similar problem arises with respect to volitional first person sentences, such as (2):

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(2) Sarxawa. ‘I’m going (home).’ Presumably, the speaker doesn’t mean here ‘I know this because it is happening me’, but rather ‘I know this because I’m doing it’.

to

Furthermore, none of the three formulae considered so far would account for the ‘personal’ interpretation of the sentence about Whorf and Sapir: Whorf was a student of Sapir I know this *because it happened to me *because I say it *because I did it Nor would any one of these three interpretations knowledge’ marker in sentence (1):

explain

the use of the ‘personal

(1) Utxutxullquq aq”inw utki. ‘Elves live in caves.’ (a sentence which ‘makes an assertion existence’ (p. 115)).

only about where elves live, not their actual

One thing seems clear: in all sentences where it occurs the ‘personal knowledge’ marker signals the meaning ‘I know this’. But what else can it signal in sentences such as those about Whorf and Sapir or about elves? It seems to me that, if anything, it could signal only one thing: ‘not because someone else said it’. In the case of Whorf and Sapir this would imply that the speaker had known Whorf and Sapir. In the case of elves, the knowledge of their habitat could be derived from picture books, movies or television-a conjecture supported by Hardman’s comment that ‘older people mark personal knowledge in these circumstances less than younger people’ (p. 115). Could the formula ‘I know it; not because someone else said something’ apply to all sentences with the ‘personal knowledge’ marker? If it could then we would have a unified semantic formula, instead of a set of formulae. Technically speaking, it probably could. But could the person who says ‘I’m hungry’ mean ‘I know it; not because someone else said something’? A disclaimer of a hearsay basis makes sense in those circumstances where hearsay is possible. But one could hardly say: I’m hungry I know this ?because someone Consequently,

else said something

neither would it make much sense to say:

I am hungry I know this ‘?not because someone else said something

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Similar considerations would apply to first-person volitional action sentences: I went home I know this ??because someone else said something I went home I know this ?not because someone else said something I conclude from this that the so-called ‘personal knowledge’ marker has in fact at least four different interpretations, associated with four different grammatical contexts. In first-person volitional sentences, it means: I know this because I am doing it (did it) In first-person non-volitional sentences it means: I know this because it is happening (happened) to me In future tense second-person volitional sentences it means: I know this because I say it In other second-person sentences, and in all third-person sentences, it means: I know this not because someone else said something If we tried to reduce these four different senses to one we would be left with only one component: ‘I know’. This would no longer be an ‘evidential’ or ‘data-source’ marker, but rather a ‘validational marker’, indicating the speaker’s confidence rather than the source of his information. As such, it could also be applied to reliable secondhand knowledge. But can second-hand knowledge be viewed by Jaqi speakers as reliable? Hardman implies that it can’t (p. 133): Those who come into the community from outside and state as personal knowledge (i.e. with unmarked verbs and {-~a} or in Spanish with tenses corresponding to the simple and future) facts which they know only through language (e.g. things they have read in books) are immediately categorized as cads, as people who behave more like animals than humans.

We are left, then, with two possible analyses for ‘personal knowledge’: 1. We can say that the ‘personal knowledge’ marker really means simply knowledge, rather than ‘personal knowledge’ (‘I know’), and that if it is not applied to reliable

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second-hand knowledge this is for cultural rather than linguistic speakers do not believe in reliable second-hand knowledge).

reasons

(as Jaqi

2. We could say that the ‘personal knowledge’ marker has in fact four different senses, which share one component ‘I know’, but have each one additional component triggered by the grammatical context (‘because I did it’, ‘because it happened to me’, ‘because I say this’, or ‘not because someone else said this’). Turning now to hearsay or ‘knowledge-through-language’ we will note that it ‘includes all knowledge gained through the medium of language. All book learning, all that is gained by reading, and all that is gained from listening to speeches or conversations is also knowledge-through-language, not personal knowledge’ (p. 116). The ‘knowledge-through-language’ forms are also obligatory in referring to bodily states of other people. On the other hand, they ‘are not used for traditional tales or for ancient history, only for information which could conceivably have come from a live source (including books or written materials)’ (p. 120). Here as elsewhere the meaning of the ‘knowledge-through-language’ category includes, it seems, two components: a ‘data-source’ component and a disclaimer of personal responsibility: ‘knowledge-through-language’ someone else says this I don’t say: I know it An example from Jaqaru, where ‘knowledge-through-language’ suffix -mna, is shumyaq t’ant”q palwimna. ‘They say Shumaya ate bread.’

is marked with the

(p. 119)

The third major category of Jaqi data-source is ‘nonpersonal knowledge’, which is ‘appropriate for all situations where witnesses cannot be expected. Nonpersonal knowledge is primarily a remote past and is therefore particularly appropriate for myths, legends, history and tales of spirit encounters’ (p. 116). What exactly do sentences with the ‘nonpersonal knowledge’ markers mean? I presume that, like sentences marked for ‘knowledge-through-language’, they do not include the component ‘I know’; but if ‘knowledge-through-language’ sentences deny knowledge (‘I don’t say: I know this’), ‘nonpersonal knowledge’ sentences deny the very possibility of knowledge: ‘I can’t know this’. (45)

Uknurna jayrkatapna nakshuwata. (Jaqaru) ‘While they were dancing inside, (the rabbit) burned them.’ (Both subordinate and main clauses inflected for nonpersonal.)

It is very interesting to note that ‘nonpersonal ‘surprisals’, as in (54):

knowledge’

markers are also used as

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

(54)

109

Akankaskafuynuw. (Aymara) ‘So here they are!’

I presume that sentences of this kind have a ‘rhetorical force’ similar to English expressions of surprise such as ‘I can’t believe this’ or ‘I can’t believe my eyes’. These are, then, the three major ‘data-source’ categories in Jaqi languages. In addition, Hardman tells us, there are a large number of various ‘attenuators’, which allow the speakers to make a large number of additional distinctions. What these elements mean we can only guess, as in most cases only one example is given, with very little additional information. 1. suffix -pi (‘reconfhmational’-Aymara), which ‘is usually used when the addressee knows or ought to know, through personal knowledge, the matter referred to as well as the speaker’ (p. 121). For example: (7)

Walikpi. ‘OK, of course.’

Possible meaning: I know: you know this 2. -ishi (‘personal remembrance’-Jaqaru). ‘A fact is directly within the personal knowledge of both speaker and hearer, within the personal time line’ (p. 122). For example: (9)

Mawtawishi. ‘I remember

that you went. ’

Possible meaning: I know this I knew it before now I know you knew it before now 3. -xa (‘attenuator’-Aymara). ‘It is the one means of shading within personal knowledge; it is often used when one is unsure of one’s witnessing, as in the first example below, where the child speaking is not sure she does recognize the person spoken to’ (p. 122). The example is: (11)

Iskuylar juttaxa. ‘You’re the one who came to school.’

Possible meaning: I think (I can say): I know this Lsc16,1--H

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4. -ju (‘surprisal attenuator’-Jaqaru). ‘This suffix is used for situations of marginal personal knowledge’ (p. 123). Examples are (14) and (15): (14)

Shumyaq t’ant”q palwija. ‘Shumaya indeed ate bread. ’

(15)

Atz’ik suylja. ‘It is doubtless

cold whey.’

Possible meaning: I think (I can say): I know this I didn’t think I would know it 5. -qilli (Jaqaru). ‘Personal knowledge challenged’ (p. 123). For example: (16)

Possible

but with an edge of doubt, as when being

Nik”aqill aruwtkasa. ‘I already spoke earlier’. (you think I didn’t?) meaning:

I know this I think you think I can’t say it 6. -sk ’ ‘umm (Jaqaru). ‘Marks a contradiction knowledge’ (p. 123). For example: (18)

of what one believed to be personal

Waruwq”kt”sk”umna. ‘I tremble again they say.’ (I thought I was well; I hadn’t noticed the return of the illness.)

Possible meaning: I thought I knew something (i.e. I was well) I know now: I didn’t know it 7. -path (‘inferential ‘-Aymara) . ‘It is used for judgments evidence; inferential is an accurate label’ (p. 124). For example: (20)

Jupax ut k uiijpach. ‘She sees/saw the house. ’ (I infer from, e.g. stuff left.) (‘Habra visto la casa.‘)

Possible meaning:

made on indirect

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SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

I think this because I know something I can’t say: I know it

else

Hardman mentions that the ‘inferential’ in question is ‘the appropriate data-source indicator for the third-person bodily states where the person has not spoken’ (p. 124). I think the formula proposed above is consistent with this fact (for example, I think that someone feels cold because I know that their teeth are chattering; but I can’t say that I know that they feel cold). 8. -jilli (Jaqaru). (24)

‘This is an attenuated

inferential’

(p. 124). For example:

Shumyaq palwijilli t’ant”qa. ‘Shumaya surely ate bread. ’ (‘Shumaya debio haber comido pan. ‘)

Possible meaning: I think this because I know something I don’t know it

else

The difference between ‘I can’t say: I know it’ and ‘I don’t know it’ would account for the intuitive difference between an ‘inferential’ (-pa&u) and an ‘attenuated inferential’ (-jilli), reflected also in the Spanish glosses (‘habrd visto la casa’ vs ‘debib huber comido pan’). 9. -psilli (Jaqaru). ‘An inferential (p. 124), for example: (25)

Mawipsilli. ‘She doubtless

. . . marking

the more direct side of inference’

left.’ (e.g., her books are gone)

Possible meaning: I think I can say: I know this 10. -sk”upsu An example: (26)

(Jaqaru).

‘An inferential

usually based on past experience’

(p. 125).

Qayllkunark “upsu. ‘It’s most likely the children.’

Possible meaning: I think this because I know: the same thing happened 11. -pa (Jaqaru).

before now

‘This is the weakest of the inferentials,

and in most examples

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belongs on the other side of nonpersonal. However, particularly for third-person bodily states where the person referred to has not spoken, it corresponds neatly to the Aymara inferential’ (p. 125). An example: (28)

Possible

Atz’ikiisa. ‘She’s cold.’ meaning:

I think this I can’t say: I know it To account for the fact that this ‘inferential’ seems close to but ‘weaker’ than that illustrated under 7 (-pa&), I have included here the first and the third components assigned to -pa&a, leaving out the second one (‘because I know something else’). Hardman points out that ‘the primary data-source categories and the weasels can be ordered on a scale progressing from personal knowledge through knowledge-throughlanguage to nonpersonal knowledge’ (p. 117), and she offers a diagram presenting this scale in a schematic form. But by placing such categories on a scale one cannot explain to outsiders what they really mean and how they are mutually related. By contrast, discrete semantic formulae of the kind proposed here constitute substantive, testable hypotheses about the meaning of these categories and about their mutual relationships. 6. Patwin According to Whistler (1986), Patwin, a language group of California, has a number of evidential or semi-evidential constructions. But ‘chief among these constructions is the use of the auxiliary bo( .)s/be( .)s, the locational “to be”, as an equivalent to a direct sensory evidential . Since the primary sense of bo(.)s/be( .)s is “to be THERE”, i.e. “to be present in full view”, predications involving bo(-)s/be(.)s generally imply that the evidential basis for that prediction is there in plain sight’ (pp. 67-68). This is illustrated in sentence (10): (10)

Whistler’s formula:

pi! pi! pi! me-m were.-be-s. come-be-s there there there water ‘Look! Look! Look! The water is coming! ’ [said of a world flood about to roll in on the characters gloss ‘to be THERE

bo(-)s/be(-)s

one can know: it is there because one can see it

of a myth]

in sight’ appears to suggest the following

semantic

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AND EPISTEMOLOGY

However, some of Whistler’s comments suggest that a formula along these lines is probably too specific to fit all the cases (‘ . . . direct sensory evidence is not a hard and fast implication of use of bo(*)s/be(*)s, since in expressing continuative (or imperfective) aspect it is not uncommonly applied even when the affected state or action is not directly present and visible’ (p. 68)). This can mean one of the following two things: either the imperfective use of the auxiliary in question can be separated from its evidential use and the formula proposed above can be allowed to stand (for the evidential), or the two uses manifest the same meaning, which is in fact ‘validational’ rather than ‘evidential’: ‘one can know this’, with the implication of visibility being triggered by certain kinds of contexts. Which of these two interpretations is correct cannot be determined without further data. It should be pointed out, however, that the ‘richer’ interpretation (the one including the component ‘because one can see it’) is not really ‘evidential’ either: it does not refer to the speaker’s personal ‘I see’ but to a general visibility (‘one can see’). For this reason, even the richer interpretation is ‘validational’ rather than truly ‘evidential’. The same applies to another class of Patwin clitics, which Whistler calls ‘assertives’. As he himself points out ‘These, too, are not truly evidentials. What they do is assert the validity of a claim to knowledge’ (p. 69). This is illustrated with sentence (12): ( 12) Eeme-s- ?u pipe1 . have-s-do they two ‘They two have got it. ’ (know for sure) Whistler’s ‘know for sure’ can be translated into the semantic formula ‘I know’. The two categories in question, then, appear to be contrasted as ‘one can know’ (as in (10)) and ‘I know’ (as in (12)) (regardless of any possible implications of visibility in the first one). In addition to the two categories discussed so far, which appear to be ‘validational’ rather than ‘evidential’, ‘there are five suffixes in Hill Patwin whose functioning could be analyzed as primarily evidential in character’ (p. 69). The most important of these is -boti/-beti, which ‘seems to encompass a number of evidential types, including hearsay, logical inference, and inference based on circumstance or appearance’ (p. 69). Whistler’s examples include the following ones: (15a)

likku *n hatthu! ?ilayin bereEoyi-boti. quickly pick children hungry-EVID. ‘Gather up [greens] quickly! [Your] children

(15b)

ma-ne*n we.1 tiwnana hara.-boti. go-EVID . your-mother salt to buy ‘Your mother must have gone to buy salt.’

(1%)

yirma hayba?a-boti pi leg (OBJ.) hurt-EVID. he. ‘ [He told me] his leg hurts. ’ f

must be hungry.’

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The category in question may seem heterogeneous, but Whistler does perceive a unity behind this apparent diversity: ‘what these [different types] seem to share is a disclaimer to knowledge based on direct sensory evidence whose implication is publicly obvious. In this way -boti/-beti contrasts with bo(*)s/be( .)s. ’ (p. 70). These observations suggest the following semantic formula: -boti/-beti I think this (e.g. the children I don’t say: I know it

are hungry,

his leg hurts)

The second Patwin evidential, -mlher/-muther, is translated into English as ‘I think. . .‘, ‘it looks like. . ’ or ‘might’. According to Whistler, it ‘indicates uncertain knowledge, in other words, an opinion rather than a claim of fact, or an assumption based on tenuous evidence rather than certain knowledge’ (p. 71). This is illustrated with sentences (17) and (18): ( 17) muhu-mthere-s pi. sing-might-s he ‘I think he’ll sing. ’ ‘I think he’s singing. ’ ( 18) loti- ii-mthere-s . storm-DEF.FUT.-might-s ‘Looks like it’s gonna storm.’ The semantic

formula

suggested by these comments

and examples

is this:

-mther/-muther I think this I don’t know it The contrast between ‘I don’t know it’ and ‘I don’t say: I know it’ would account for the more ‘tenuous’ and ‘uncertain’ nature of this second evidential (as compared with the preceding one). The third evidential, -mte/-mute . , ‘apparently indicates an assertion based on inference or circumstantial evidence but not direct knowledge’ (p. 72). Whistler is not sure how it differs in use from the preceding one, but he mentions that it is restricted to clauses in the irrealis mood. This could perhaps be accounted for if we differentiated the two formulae in terms of ‘I don’t know it’ (for -mther/-muter) and ‘I can’t know it’ (for -mte/-mute), assigning to the latter the following formula: -mte/-mute I think this I can’t know it For example,

sentence

(19a)

( 19a)

Eu nay-Eeme - hem. Alma-mte-ka drop-must-RR. I my-belonging ‘I (must have) dropped my belonging. ’

could perhaps be interpreted

as follows:

I think: I dropped my belongings I can’t know it The fourth evidential, -m?a/-mu?a, ‘implies certain or near certain knowledge based on inference’; and ‘can . . . be glossed as “must have” . . .’ (p. 72). An example is (20a): (20a)

harme-m ?a. po-ka na*no hilie somebody-IRR. my beads take-must ‘Someone must have taken my beads.’

Since this suffix, like the immediately preceding one, ‘seems to occur only in irrealis’, it might be appropriate to include in its formula, too, some ‘irrealis’ component such as ‘I can’t know it’. At the same time, the ‘certainty’ or ‘near-certainty’ of this evidential suggests some component along the lines of ‘I know’. I propose, then, the following combination of components. 3 -m ?a/-mu ?a I think this (e.g. that somebody has taken my beads) I can’t know it I think this because I know something else (e.g. my beads are not here) The fifth Patwin evidential, -mon?a, is glossed by Whistler as ‘to seem as if, to appear to be’, and is said to indicate ‘inference based on appearance (p. 73). ’ The only example provided is (21): (21)

150.wi-la pi Coyi-man?a-sa. nay I (GEN.) look at-if he sick-seem as if-DEF.PAST ‘It seems to me that he’s [gotten] sick.’

The information provided about this suffix is so limited that it seems pointless to even try to construct a semantic formula which might fit its entire range of use. 7. Tibetan According to DeLancey (1986), Tibetan has two copular (‘be’) verbs: yin and red, and two possessive (‘have’) verbs: yod and ‘dug. ‘The difference between yin and yod on the one hand and red and ‘dug on the other constitutes the core of the Tibetan

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evidential system’ (p. 204). At first sight, the difference between these verbs seems to be determined by the person of the subject: yin and yod tend to be used with first person, and red and ‘dug with non-first persons. (la)

rJa slab-gra-ba yin. I student be ‘I am a student. ’

(lb)

K’or~ slab-gra-ba s/he student ‘S/he is a student.’

red. be

(2a)

rJa la Sa-mo I LOC. hat ‘I have a hat.’

yod. exist

(2b)

Dorje la Sa-mo ‘dug D. LOC. hat exist ‘Dorje has a hat.’

But it is not really the person which determines the choice, since yin and yod can also be used with non-first persons, as in the following examples: (4a)

Bod la gyag yod. Tibet LOC. yak exist ‘There are yaks in Tibet.’

(4b)

Bod la gyag ‘dug. Tibet LOC. yak exist ‘There are yaks in Tibet. ’

What, then, is the difference in meaning sentences with ‘dug such as (4b)?

between sentences with yod such as (4a) and

According to DeLancey, the content in question has to do with old vs new knowledge (p. 207). He elaborates this as follows: ‘the distinction represented here is not, as in more typical evidential systems, the source of the speaker’s knowledge, but rather its relative novelty or the degree to which it has been integrated into the speaker’s overall scheme of knowledge of the world: (4a) would be appropriate for both a Tibetan, who knows of the existence of yaks in Tibet through daily experience, and for someone like me, who knows the fact only by hearsay, but has known it for years. I could use (4a) in describing what I know of the distribution of yaks, while (4b) might be the response of someone who was fascinated with yaks but knew nothing of where they existed until visiting Tibet and encountering one’ (p. 205). Another

minimal

pair which illustrates

the same point is (24a) and (24b):

117

(24a)

k’aq la si-mi rja’i I-GEN. house LOC. cat ‘There’s a cat in my house.’

yod. exist

(24b)

si-mi qa’i k’aq la I-GEN. house LOC. cat ‘There’s a cat in my house.’

‘dug. exist

DeLancey comments: ‘In (24a) the cat is presumably mine, or one that for some reason I expect to find in my house, while (24b) requires that I have no reason to expect there to be a cat in my house-the most likely context for the sentence being if I come home and unexpectedly find a strange cat wandering about. Thus it is not the presence of a first person which requires yod, but rather a situation whose origin the speaker understands’ (p. 212). On the basis of DeLancey’s data and comments I would posit the following semantic representation for ‘dug and red.4 ‘dug, red I know this now I didn’t know it before now Even first-person (11)

sentences

such as (11)

Ba na-gi- ‘dug. I sick-IMPF ‘I’m sick. ’

do seem to fit the unitary formula ‘I know this now; I didn’t know’it before now’, and they don’t seem to differ in this respect from third person sentences such as (9): (9)

K’or~ na-gi- ‘dug. s/he sick-IMPF ‘He’s sick.’

What DeLancey doesn’t tell us is whether yod could also be used in a sentence such as (9) if the speaker had known about the illness for a long time: ?He is sick yod. All we can say at this stage is that all of DeLancey’s examples with ‘dug are consistent with the formula ‘I know it now; I didn’t know it before now’. But what is the meaning of yod and yin ? DeLancey’s expression ‘the old/new knowledge distinction’ seems to invite a symmetrical pair of semantic formulae, with the ‘old knowledge’ elements (yod and yin) being represented as follows:

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I know this (now) I knew it before now or even: I know this I have known it for a long time These formulae appear sentences such as (13): (13)

to derive

additional

support

Da-ltar k’og slob-grwa nas bod-pa’i from Tibet-GEN. now s/he school ‘He’s now studying Tibetan at school.’

from

the interpretation

&ad-yig language

of

bslab-gi-yod. study-IMPF.

‘Auxiliary yod, ordinarily occurring with first person, can occur with nonfirst in a sentence like (13) . . . if the speaker knows that the subject has been doing so for a while’ (p. 207). But this does not mean that these formulae can be assigned to yod in all types of sentences. In particular, they do not fit first-person volitional sentences such as (10) or (1 l), when the speaker would have no reason whatsoever to wish to say something like ‘I knew it before now’ or ‘I’ve known it for a long time’. (10)

rJa las-ka byed-gi-yod. I work do-IMPF. ‘I’m working. ’

(11)

iJa na-gi- ‘dug. I sick-IMPF. ‘I’m sick. ’

Furthermore, an interpretation sentences such as (17): (17)

in terms of ‘old knowledge’

clearly

does not tit

Dmag-mi ‘di-r yorJ-gi-yod. soldier here-to come-IMPF . ‘The soldier is coming this way. ’

which DeLancey himself regards as ‘anomalous’. But this ‘anomaly’ is not restricted to this one sentence. ‘Among the details of the distribution of yod and ‘dug are a few apparently anomalous patterns (several are exemplified in Jin 1979). One which will be of interest in developing a model of the phenomena discussed here is the fact that we find the yod/yin forms used with volitional verbs having nontirst person agents if the action is somehow directed toward first person. “Directed toward first person” includes transitives with first person patients and dative and motional verbs with first person goals’ (p. 208). In addition to (17), which I have already quoted, DeLancey illustrates this phenomenon with sentences (14), (15), and (16):

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

(14)

la ‘k’ryid-gi-yin K’oq gis de he ERG. there to convey-FUT. ‘He’ll take [me] there.’

(15)

bod nas yi-ge K’or~ gis gtog-gi-yod. he ERG. Tibet from letter send-IMPF. ‘He writes [me] letters from Tibet.’

(16)

ga dbyin-ji’i K’or~ gis English he ERG. I ‘He’s teaching me English. ’

119

.

skad language

bslab-gi-yod. teach-IMPF.

It seems to me that the pattern illustrated by these sentences may be ‘anomalous’ from the point of the ‘old/new knowledge’ model, but by itself it is perfectly regular and understandable. It suggests that in sentences with first-person patients yod doesn’t mean ‘old knowledge’, but something else. I propose for such sentences the following semantic formula:5 I can say: I know this because it is happening

(happened)

to me

(For example sentence (17) can be interpreted as implying that the speaker is being approached by someone, perhaps a stranger, and so on.) But if we accept such a formula for sentences with first-person patients then it will be a logical next step to also reject the ‘old knowledge’ analysis of sentences with first-person agents (such as (10) or (11)) and to assign to such sentences the following formula: I can say: I know this because I did it (am doing it) This means that while the auxiliary ‘dug can receive a unitary semantic analysis (‘I know it now, I didn’t know it before now’), the auxiliary yod cannot receive a unitary semantic analysis, but has to be seen as having three distinct functions (manifested in three different grammatical contexts): yod/yin A. I can say: I know this because I did it (am doing it) B. C.

I can say: I know this because it is happening

(happened)

to me

I can say: I know this (because?) I’ve known it for a long time

Of course it would be nice to be able to reduce these three formulae to one, and one can sympathize with DeLancey’s attempt to reduce them all to meaning C; but as

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DeLancey himself recognizes with respect to B (which he calls an ‘anomaly’), this attempt doesn’t really work. I would argue that it doesn’t work for A either; and that rather than call B ‘anomalous’ we’d better recognize that formula C only fits non-firstperson sentences with yod, whereas sentences with first-person agents and patients require formulae A and B, respectively, and not C. Alternatively, one could abandon DeLancey’s unitary analysis in terms of ‘old knowledge’ in favour of a different unitary analysis, ascribing to yod no more than the following meaning: ‘I know this’, or ‘I can say: I know this’. But this would require some explanation for the fact that yod cannot be used for ‘reliable fresh hearsay’. Arguably, such an explanation could be found in cultural knowledge (rather than in purely linguistic facts); one could suggest that perhaps in the Tibetan culture fresh hearsay can never be regarded as very reliable. On this view, one could argue that if yod is interpreted as ‘old knowledge’ in third-person sentences such as (4a): (4a)

There are yaks in Tibet yod.

and as ‘personal

knowledge’

in first-person

(2a)

I have a hat yod.

(3a)

I am in the house yod.

sentences

such as (2a) or (3a):

this difference in the interpretation is due to context, not to the meaning of yod, which is always the same: ‘I can say: I know this’; and that if a sentence such as (5a): (5a)

We have a meeting on Saturday yod.

cannot be interpreted as reliable fresh hearsay, it is because in this culture fresh hearsay cannot be regarded as sufficiently reliable to be compatible with the semantic formula ‘I can say: I know it’. In Western culture, with its reliance on encyclopaedias, libraries, scientific records and so on, information coming from other people can be seen as equally reliable as that based on personal experience, or even more so. But of course in many nonWestern societies basic cultural assumptions are different, and information based on hearsay is often regarded as less reliable than personal knowledge. In this paper, I will not try to decide which of the two analyses sketched in here is correct (the one which involves polysemy or the one which involves cultural knowledge), because to do that in a non-arbitrary fashion one would need further data. At this stage, then, I will simply offer two alternative hypotheses, to be decided by further investigation. 8. Sherpa According to Woodbury (1986), Sherpa, spoken in a district of Nepal, has four main ‘evidential’ morphemes: nok, wi, in, and surf. These morphemes are ‘peculiarly

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AND EPISTEMOLOGY

121

skewed: what marks a particular category in one tense takes on a different meaning in another tense; there, a different morpheme expresses the meaning of the first category’ (p. 189). This sounds like a declaration of polysemy, but this is not what Woodbury has in mind, as his analysis of nok recapitulated below illustrates. nok ( ‘immediate evidence ‘) In present tense sentences, nok has an ‘experiential’ value: it ‘indicates that the speaker purports to see or have seen the present tense narrated event taking place, or to perceive it in some other direct way, e.g. by hearing or feeling it take place’ (p. 190). By contrast, in past-tense sentences, the same morpheme nok ‘indicates that the speaker purports to base the truth of the narrated event on indirect evidence obtained in the present, or in the past after the narrated event had been completed. The evidence may be a tangible result of the narrated event from which the speaker has inferred its truth, or else hearsay’ (p. 193). Having documented the protean and paradoxical nature of nok with numerous examples, Woodbury concludes nonetheless: ‘I propose to treat +nok as having a single basic evidential value, which I will call IMMEDIATE EVIDENCE’ (p. 195). I agree entirely that it is desirable and, I think, possible to reduce all the apparently different senses of nok to one invariant meaning, whose interaction with different grammatical contexts produces different effects. But I am sceptical of the explanatory value of the label ‘immediate evidence’, which is not defined, and which can be applied by other authors to other languages with respect to phenomena rather different from those observed in Sherpa. For example, Nichols (1986) uses the term ‘immediate meaning’ (p. 248) with respect to Chinese Pidgin Russian, where the meaning of the category in question appears to be different from the ‘immediate’ evidential in Sherpa. So what exactly IS the meaning of the Sherpa nok (‘immediate’) first consider Woodbury’s illustrative sentences: (la)

‘ti ‘gi-nok he come-HE ‘He comes: is coming. ’ (I see, have seen. . . )

(2a)

daa saa-p mi ti yembur-laa rice eat-NOMNLZR man he Katmandu-DAT ‘The man who is eating rice lives in Katmandu.’

(3a)

ga ne-nok (< na+i+nok) I sick-HE ‘I am sick.’

(5a)

di khagb-i nary -1aa pye nok. this house-GEN inside-DAT rat LINK ‘This house has rats. ’ (I see, have seen. . )

Three of these four sentences

are glossed with reference

evidential?

de-ki-nok. stay-HE (I see, have seen.

Let us

.)

to seeing, but seeing is not

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part of the semantic invariant, since it is clearly incompatible with sentence (3a), ‘I am sick’. The meaning which is compatible with all these sentences is this: I know something This meaning

(44

Clearly,

about now (i.e. the present)

can also explain the unacceptable

*pe

ca pimi dyerJ I (ERG) tea day every ‘I drink tea every day.’ it would be semantically

sentence

(4a):

thug-ki-nok. drink-HE

incoherent

to say:

I know something about now (i.e. the present): I drink tea every day (‘Every day’ is not ‘now’.) But why does nok in combination with the past tense assume the value of an ‘inferential’, which it clearly doesn’t have in combination with the present tense? Can this be explained in terms of the proposed semantic formula? I think it can. Let us consider sentences (6b) and (7b): (6b)

‘kurSigq ‘ti dzo -nok. ‘ti ‘jon-ki it build-PI John-ERG the chair ‘John built the chair.’ (I infer. . . ; I hear. . .)

(7b)

‘ti-nok. bil-ki iki Bill-ERG letter write-PI ‘Bill wrote a letter.’ (I infer. . . ; I hear.

.)

It seems to me that to get the desired interpretation for these (past-tense) sentences we would have to expand the formula proposed for present-tense sentences with nok as follows: I know something about now (i.e. the present) because of this, I can say something about before now (i.e. the past) It is difficult to decide, without further investigation, whether the past-related component of this formula should be attributed to nok as such or to its grammatical context. But in any case the core component ‘I know something about now’ can be attributed both to the present (‘experiential’) sense of nok and to its past (‘inferential’) use. Furthermore, the same core component can be attributed to nok in future-tense sentences, where it is also said to have an ‘inferential’ value; as in (1 la) and (12a):

123

(114 pe

‘ti-laa ‘sir-urn-nok. S&U I (ERG) he-DAT tomorrow say-FI I will say (it) to him tomorrow.’ (I can tell you right now. . . )

(12a)

rJa ‘khyerq ‘dug-gum-nok. hit-F1 I You ‘I will hit you. ’ (I can tell you right now. . .)

Woodbury tells us that ‘in (1 la) the future inferential has the force of a commitment, and in (12a) the force of a threat or bluff (p. 197). I think that this strong commitment force of nok in future-tense sentences can be accounted for in terms of the following formula: I know something about now (i.e. the present) because of this, I can say something about after now (i.e. the future) In future sentences referring to intentional action the component ‘I know something about now’ is bound to be interpreted as referring to the speaker’s present intention; hence the implication of a ‘firm commitment’. The meaning attributed here to nok also accounts for the fact that ‘when the experiencer is first person the past experiential is favored over the past inferential, but when it is non-first person, the reverse is the case’ (p. 194): (8a)

? Ba naa-nok. I sick-PI ‘I was sick.’ (I infer. . .)

(9a)

‘ti naa-nok. he sick-PI ‘He was sick. ’ (I infer. . . )

It wouldn’t

make much sense to say:

I can say something about before now (i.e. the past) (namely, that I was sick) because I know something about now (i.e. the present) (Normally, one doesn’t infer information about what happened to one in the past from what one knows about the present situation.) But it does make sense to infer information about what happened to someone else in the past from what one knows about the present: I can say something about before now (i.e. the past) (namely, that he was sick) because I know something about now (i.e. the present)

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sq

( ‘past experiential 3 The contrast between first-person sentences and third-person sentences also helps us to understand the difference in meaning between the ‘immediate’ evidential nok and the ‘past experiential’ evidential sq, as illustrated below: (8b)

(9b)

Ba naa-surJ. I sick-PE ‘I was sick. ’ (I felt. . , perceived ? ‘ti naa-sutJ. sick-PE he ‘He was sick.’ (I saw.

.)

directly.

.)

As pointed out by Woodbury, ‘the speaker perceives his own internal states directly as they occur, motivating the past experiential in (8b); someone else’s internal states are usually inferred from tangible evidence, or known by hearsay, motivating the past inferential in (9a)’ (p. 194). What is, then, the meaning of the ‘past experiential’ component which has to be attributed to it is this: I know something

SUIJ? I believe that the first

about before now (i.e. the past)

This component accounts for the past reference of surf, and also for the speaker’s strong claim to knowledge (as opposed to conjecture), evidenced in the minimal pair (6a) and (6b): (6a)

‘ti ‘kurSigq ‘ti ‘jon-ki it John-ERG the chair ‘John built the chair. ’ (I saw.

dzo-sug. build-PE .)

(6b)

‘ti ‘jon-ki ‘kurSirJq ‘ti dzo-nok. it build-PI John-ERG the chair ‘John built the chair.’ (I infer. . . ; I hear.

.)

In (6b), the speaker knows something about the present, and from this infers something about the past; but in (6a), the speaker knows something about the past; and the component ‘I know something about before now’ accounts for this. But how can the speaker KNOW something about the past? Given Sherpa cultural assumptions, confident ‘knowledge’ about the past can only be based on personal experience. We can spell out this assumption assigning a second semantic component to surJ: I know something about before now (i.e. the past) because something happened to me This formula would fit all the examples

provided

by Woodbury,

but it wouldn’t

fit

SEMANTICS

sentences

AND EPISTEMOLOGY

about the speaker’s past intentional

125

actions such as

I built the chair suf) Are such sentences possible in Sherpa? Woodbury doesn’t tell us, so we cannot test the hypothetical second component of sru~. If such sentences are indeed possible then I think we would have to assign to SUIJ just one semantic component, ‘I know something about before now’, assuming that the personal basis of this knowledge is guaranteed by Sherpa extralinguistic cultural assumptions. in (‘@futurefirst person 7 According to Woodbury, in third-person sentences referring to the future the principle marker is what he calls ‘gnomic’, that is, wi. ‘ However, when a first person actor NP is present, the gnomic is joined by two more inflections, the future first person (FF) . . . and the future inferential (FI) . . . . The inflections differ from each other in evidential value’ (p. 196). This is illustrated with two minimal pairs (1 la) and (llb), and (12a) and (12b):

(1la) pe

‘sir-urn-nok. ‘ti-laa Sdi3ii I (ERG) he-DAT tomorrow say-F1 ‘I will say (it) to him tomorrow.’ (I can tell you right now. . .

(lib)

‘sir-in. ‘ti-laa SalXi pe I (ERG) he-DAT tomorrow say-FF ‘I will say (it) to him tomorrow.’ (I think. . .)

(124 qa

‘khyerug ‘dug-gum-nok. I hit-F1 You ‘I will hit you.’ (I can tell you right now. . .)

Wb) qa

‘khyenq ‘dq-in. I hit-FF You ‘I will hit you.’ (I think. . .)

As pointed out earlier, the ‘strong predictive value’ of (1 la) and (12a) can be accounted for in terms of the general semantic formula assigned to nok. I know something and its interaction

about now (i.e. the present) with the future context:

I can say something

about after now (i.e. the future).

By contrast, in implies uncertainty. Woodbury says ‘guessing’, but the word guess doesn’t seem to be well chosen here; one doesn’t ‘guess’ what one is going to do in the future, even if one hasn’t made up one’s mind about it. It is true that in American English the phrase ‘I guess’ can be used to refer to one’s future actions: LX1611-1

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WIERZBICKA

I guess I’ll do it. But the person who says ‘I guess I’ll do it’ is not ‘guessing’. ‘Guessing’ implies that the speaker doesn’t know something might know it. But clearly, this doesn’t apply to the speaker’s I don’t know what I am going to do other people can’t know discussion of the difference between ‘guessing’ and saying ‘I 1987:255-256.)

and that other people own future actions: If it either. (For detailed guess’ see Wierzbicka

I propose that the meaning of in (which cannot be adequately explicated in terms of ‘guessing’) can be explicated in terms of ‘thinking’, along the following lines: I think I will do this I don’t say: one can know it For example,

(1 lb) and (12b) can be interpreted

(1 lb)

I think I will say it to him tomorrow I don’t say: one can know it

(12b)

I think I will hit you I don’t say: one can know it

as follows:

The phrase ‘I think’ by itself implies a degree of uncertainty, and the second component increases this uncertainty. I have phrased the second component of in in terms of ‘one can know it’ rather than ‘I can know it’, because what the speaker wishes to stress here is not so much his own lack of knowledge as a more general unknowability. If we said ‘I don’t say: I know it’ this would leave room for the possibility that somebody else may know it (though I don’t). But clearly this is not the speaker’s intention: what he wishes to emphasize is the uncertainty of the action, not just his personal lack of knowledge. wi ( ‘gnomic 7 Woodbury explains the use of the evidential wi in present-tense sentences by contrasting it with what he calls here the ‘habitual experiential’ nok: ‘The habitual experiential indicates that the speaker purports to see or have seen the present tense narrated event taking place, or to perceive it in some other direct way, e.g. by hearing or feeling it take place. By contrast, the gnomic indicates either that the speaker does NOT purport to have such evidence, or else (in some contexts) that he purports NOT to have it’ (p. 190). This is illustrated with sentences such as (lb) and (2b): (lb)

(2b)

‘ti ‘gi-wi he come-GN ‘he comes, is coming’

(It is known.

. .); ‘he will come’

mi ti yembur-laa daa saa-p rice eat-NOMNLZR man he Katmandu-DAT ‘The man who is eating rice lives in Katmandu.’

de-ki-wi. stay-HE (It is known.

.)

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127

Woodbury’s phrase ‘it is known’ and also his label ‘gnomic’, suggest that wi implies not only the absence of ‘direct personal evidence’ but also the existence of some sort of general knowledge. This suggestion, however, is contradicted by examples such as (3b): (3b)

qa ne-wi. I sick-GN *‘I am sick.’ (But grammatical

for ‘I will be sick’.)

It would hardly make sense for anyone to say: It is known that I will be sick. What, then, is the meaning of wi, that is to say, the meaning which would be consistent with all of these three examples? I propose the following: I think this I don’t say: 1 know it In all the examples where it is used wi appears to function as a distancing device, so to speak: the speaker disclaims responsibility for the validity of the message. Woodbury’s gloss ‘it is known’ implies certainty, but this certainty appears to be incompatible with the obligatory future reading of (3b). The formula proposed here does not imply uncertainty, but it is compatible with it. It also implies a disclaimer of certain knowledge, and this explains, it seems to me, why (3b) cannot have a present reading. 9. Bulgarian and Macedonian Bulgarian and Macedonian have two past tenses, the so-called ‘definite past’ and the ‘indefinite past’. As pointed out by Friedman (1986), in the past these two categories have often been interpreted as evidentials, with the ‘definite past’ signalling ‘direct’ information, and the ‘indefinite past’, ‘indirect’, ‘distanced’, or ‘reported’ information. But Friedman himself argues that these past accounts are ‘greatly oversimplified and not, strictly speaking, accurate’ (p. 168) and that in fact ‘the forms under consideration do not mark the source of information or evidence, but rather the speaker’s attitude toward it’ (pp. 184-185). To show that the ‘definite past’ cannot mean personal witnessing, Friedman mentions the following fact: ‘for example, a Bulgarian colleague of mine, discussing which of his colleagues had attended a conference in America which he had not been able to attend, said of one of them: (1) BeSe tamo. ‘(She) was there.’ This despite the fact that his only source of information

was a report’ (pp. 171-172).

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WIERZBICKA

What could this ‘definite past’ mean, then? Clearly, it cannot mean ‘I know because I saw’, or ‘I know because I was there’; and it can’t even mean ‘I know, not because someone else said it’. It would seem, then, that the only possible invariant which can be attributed to it (in addition to ‘pastness’, that is, ‘before now’) is ‘I know’. This is consistent with the other examples cited by Friedman, such as (2) and (3) (both Macedonian): (2) No podoEna se sluEija raboti za koi ne znaev. but later happened things about which not (I) knew ‘But later things happened [Past Def.] that I didn’t know about.’ [I know this] (3) Od From

najstarite oldest

vreminja times

mesEina moon

vlijae influences

lugeto the-people vrz iivotot on the-life

veruvaa believed na on

‘Since most ancient times people have believed the moon influences life on earth. ’ [I know this1

(past def.)

deka that

zemjata. the-earth [Past Def.1 that

The hypothesis advanced here is also consistent with the fact that the ‘definite past’ cannot be used ‘in subordination to clauses which directly contradict the meaning of personal confirmation’ (p. 172), for example: (4) *Toj ne veruva *Toj ne vjarva not believe he *He doesn’t believe

deka taa go napravi Ee tja napravi that she it did that she did [Past Def.1

toa. (Macedonian) tova. (Bulgarian) it it. ’

If we explicate the ‘definite past’ in terms of the suggested component ‘I know’ we obtain a contradiction between ‘I know’ and ‘I don’t believe’, and this would account for the sentence’s unacceptability. On the other hand, sentences such as: I don’t know who did [Past Def.] it are did the can

acceptable-presumably, because there is no conflict between ‘I don’t know (who it)’ and ‘I know that someone did it’. The subordinate sentence does not identify person in question, so the component ‘I know’ carried by its definite past tense only be linked with the presupposition ‘someone did it’.

The analysis proposed here is fully consistent with Friedman’s assertion that ‘the definite past is marked for the speaker’s confirmation of the information’ (p. 174); or at least with the spirit of this assertion. (Friedman’s examples repeated here make it clear that he doesn’t really mean ‘confirmation’ as opposed to ‘affirmation’; rather, he means a confident assertion, viewed by the speaker as knowledge.)

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On the other hand, Friedman’s analysis of the Bulgarian and Macedonian ‘indefinite past’ as ‘unmarked past’ is harder to accept, given the fact that this supposedly unmarked past ‘has also developed a chief contextual variant meaning of noncontirmativity, reportedness, or evidentiality’ (p. 174). Friedman attributes this apparent meaning of ‘nonconlirmativity’ to the contrast ‘with the markedly contirmative definite past’ (p. 174). But this explanation does not account for the implication of ‘non-confirmativity’ in contexts when there is no contrast between ‘indefinite past’ and ‘definite past’. To take an example of an unmarked lexical category, the unmarked English word dog can be interpreted as ‘he dog’ when it is used in contrast to the marked word birch (e.g. ‘I have a bitch and a dog’); but when it is used on its own (e.g. ‘we have a dog’) there are no implications of maleness. Similarly, if the ‘indefinite past’ was really unmarked we could expect it to imply ‘nonconfirmativity’ in those contexts where it is used in contrast to, or in combination with, the ‘confirmatory’ ‘definite past’; in other contexts, however, we would not expect it to carry such implications. Why is it, then, that the ‘indefinite past’ tends to imply ‘nonconfirmativity’ even in those contexts where it is used on its own? Friedman himself states that ‘it will ordinarily be assumed that the speaker is using this form [i.e. the indefinite past1 in order to avoid personal confirmation of the information, e.g. due to its being based on a report’ (p. 174). But why should it be assumed to be so if the ‘indefinite past’ was really unmarked? For example, why should it normally be assumed that in the sentence (7a)

His father was [Past Indef.1 very fond of flowers.

‘the speaker was basing the statement on indirect information’ (p. 174) if there was nothing in the sentence itself to suggest such an interpretation? Friedman calls the ‘nonconfirmativity’ of the ‘indefinite past’ its ‘contextual meaning’; but in the case of (7a) no context is provided, so the ‘nonconfirmatory’ reading of the ‘indefinite past’ cannot be attributed to the influence of the context. I conclude from this that the ‘indefinite past’ is not an unmarked category but carries a meaning of its own-even though this meaning is hard to establish. Friedman’s motivation for treating the ‘indefinite past’ as unmarked, despite its usual implication of ‘nonconfirmativity’, is quite clear. For example, he says, ‘As it is impossible to assign a single meaning which is present in all uses of the indefinite past, i.e. as there is no specific type of restriction on its occurrence as there is for the definite past, it must be treated as unmarked with respect to the definite past’ (p. 173). But is it really impossible to assign a single meaning to all the uses of the ‘indefinite past’? I don’t think it is; although I quite agree that traditional labels such as ‘indirect narration’, ‘distanced narration’, or ‘reported information’ do not capture the invariant of this category (if there is one). Let us consider Friedman’s sentences adduced to illustrate the unmarked, evidential’ use of the ‘indefinite past’ (Macedonian examples):

‘non-

130

(6)

ANNA

WIERZBICKA

Dosta sme rabotele . enough (we) are worked ‘We’ve worked enough.’ (One retired man commenting their right to a pension)

(7)

Tatko mi bil mnogu meraklija fond father to-me was very ‘My father was very fond of flowers.’

(8)

vo eden. Sum stanal nokeska (I) am got up last night at one ‘I got up at one this morning. ’

za for

to another on

cveka. flowers

I can see why Friedman is reluctant to regard sentences such as these as based on ‘indirect’ or ‘reported’ information. However, I submit that if we look in a different direction we CAN find an invariant-that is, a formula which fits both ‘non-evidential’ uses such as those in (6), (7) and (8), and ‘evidential’ ones such as (7a). Essentially, I propose that the contrast between the ‘definite past’ and the ‘indefinite past’ is not that between ‘I know’ and nothing, but that between ‘I know’ and ‘I think’. Let us test this hypothesis against all of Friedman’s Macedonian sentences with the ‘indefinite past’.

(6)

We’ve worked enough I think we’ve worked enough

(7)

My father was very fond of flowers I think my father was very fond of flowers (I remember him always buying flowers for our house, even when we had very little money)

(8)

I got up at one this morning + I think I got up at one this morning (I didn’t have a watch)

(7a)

His father was very fond of flowers + I think his father was very fond of flowers (I remember him always buying flowers for their house, even when they had very little money)

I think that the proposed interpretation fits all these sentences. fare quite as well when tested against Friedman’s Bulgarian (9)

pokaneni Sto na sto bili 100% (they)were invited ‘Absolutely, they were invited.’ [I think they were invited; I’m absolutely

At first sight, it doesn’t examples such as (9):

certain of it.1

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AND EPISTEMOLOGY

131

But Friedman helpfully supplies a clarifying context for this sentence: ‘it was uttered by a colleague of mine in Sofia during the course of a discussion as to whether a certain delegation had been invited to a congress. My colleague was convinced that they had been invited, although his conviction was not based on any kind of direct or indirect evidence, i.e. the statement was not based on a report or even a deduction, but only on the speaker’s assumptions and expectations regarding the normal conduct of such matters’ (p. 175). It seems to me that this explanation confirms the analysis proposed as it shows clearly that the statement was based on an ‘I think’ rather than an ‘I know’. Let us consider, in turn, Friedman’s data on the Macedonian and Bulgarian pluperfect. Here, ‘the equipollent sharpening of the confirmative/nonconfirmative opposition . . . results in a set of restrictions which are truly evidential in naturewitnessedlnonwitnessed in Macedonian and confirmative/nonwitnessed in Bulgarian’ (pp. 177-178). The evidence for this ‘equipollent sharpening of the opposition’ is found in the fact that ‘in Macedonian the definite pluperfect cannot be subordinated to verbs of reporting, while the indefinite pluperfect cannot be subordinated to verbs of witnessing and direct perception but can only be used for reports and, rarely, deductions and suppositions’ (p. 178). The illustrative sentences are (15) and (16) (Macedonian): (15)

*Toj reEe deka tie ja imaa svrSeno rabotata. finished the-job he said that they it had *‘He said that they had finished [definite pluperfect] the job.’

(16)

*Jas vidov kako/deka toj go iml nupruveno toa. I that saw how/that he it had done *‘I saw how/that he had done it [indefinite pluperfect] it.’

These facts can be accounted

for on the basis of the following

semantic

formulae:

‘dejkite plupegect’ (Macedonian) I know this not because someone said something ‘indefinite pluperfect’ (Macedonian) I think this because someone said something Friedman’s idea of the ‘equipollent sharpening of the confirmative/nonconfirmative opposition’ in the pluperfect is reflected here in the two symmetrical components: ‘not because someone said something’ and ‘because someone said something’; but the contrast between ‘I know’ and ‘I think’ is preserved, and this accounts for the intuitive link between the ‘definite past’ and the ‘definite pluperfect’, as well as for that between the ‘indefinite past’ and the ‘indefinite pluperfect’. (In Bulgarian, the situation is apparently more complex; and as Friedman mentions it only in passing, without any

132

details,

ANNA

WIERZBICKA

I will not attempt to capture it in semantic

formulae.)

One final point which requires a comment is the reference to ‘saying’ in the formula assigned to the Macedonian ‘indefinite pluperfect’. (‘I think this because someone said something’.) Is this formula compatible with suppositions and deductions? I believe it is, even though suppositions and deductions don’t have to be (and usually are not) based on hearsay. The proposed formula does not read: ‘I think this because someOne else said something’, but ‘I think this because someone said something’. Suppositions and deductions may well start with our ‘saying something’ (not necessarily viva vote) along the following lines: ‘if we say that such and such, then we can think that such and such’. It would seem, then, that despite the brilliance of Friedman’s re-analysis, there was some truth in Jakobson’s claim that Macedonian and Bulgarian have ‘true’ evidential categories. If the formulae assigned here to the Macedonian pluperfects are correct, then Macedonian does have categories encoding epistemological meanings such as ‘I think. . because’ and ‘I know. . .not because’. On the other hand, Friedman is probably right in implying that there are no ‘because’ components in the meaning of the Macedonian (or Bulgarian) ‘definite past’ and ‘indefinite past’. What is particularly satisfying is that we can account for both the ‘evidential’ nature of the pluperfects, and the ‘validational’ nature of the pasts, while respecting in our analysis the intuitive links between the pluperfects and the pasts; and reflecting them in the invariant components ‘I know’ and ‘I think’. Conclusion Meaning is encoded not only in words but also in grammatical categories. The meanings encoded in grammar, just like those encoded in the lexicon, are languagespecific. If one attempts to identify the meanings encoded in different languages by means of the same, arbitrarily invented labels, such as, for example, ‘first-hand’ and ‘second-hand’, ‘immediate’ and ‘inferred’, or ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’, one can only conceal and obfuscate the language-specific character of the categories to which they are attached. To be able to compare grammatical categories across language boundaries we need some constant points of reference, which slippery labels with shifting meanings cannot possibly provide. Universal (or near-universal) semantic primitives (or near-primitives) can provide such constant and language-independent points of reference. They offer, therefore, a secure basis for a semantic typology of both lexicons and grammars. At the same time, they offer us convenient and reliable tools for investigating the universal and the language-specific aspects of human cognition and human conceptualization of the world.

NOTES ’

The ‘natural semanrlc metalanguage’ used in this paper (and in the author’s other works such as Wierzbicka 1987, 1988. 1991a, b and 1992a) is the outcome of an extensive empirical study of a wide range of languages, undertaken over two decades by the author and colleagues. On the basis of this search a set

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

133

of lexical universals has been tentatively identified (see Goddard and Wierzbicka (Eds), 1994; Wierzbicka 1992b). The latest version of the lexicon of this metalanguage, arrived at by trial and error, includes the following elements: [substantives] I, you, someone, something, people; [determiners, quantifiers] this, the same, other, one, two, many (much), all; [mental predicates1 know, want, think, feel, see, hear, say; [actions, events1 do, happen; [evaluators] good, bad; [descriptors1 big, small; [intensifier] very; [metapredicates1 can, if, because, no (negation), like (how); [time and place1 when, where, after (before), under (above); [taxonomy, partonymyl kind of, part of. These elements have their own, language-independent syntax. For example, the verb-like elements ‘think’, ‘know’, ‘say’, ‘feel’ and ‘want’ combine with ‘nominal’ personal elements ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘someone’, and take complex, proposition-like complements (such as ‘I think: you did something bad’). (For fuller discussion, see Wietzbicka 1991c.) * Strictly speaking, the formula assigned to the Factual Specific (Imperfective) sense should allow for both present and past events, extending over some time (cf. the gloss assigned to sentence (13)). This could be achieved as follows: for some time I could say: I see this because of this, I can say: I know it ’ This formula contains in it the preceding one. It is possible that in fact the two formulae should overlap, that is, that some additional component should be postulated for the earlier one, but further data would be needed to check this point. 4 I am assuming (on the basis of DeLancey’s data) that the two auxiliaries yod and yin are identical in their evidential value, and that so are the other two elements, red and ‘dug. s The disjunction

‘happening/happened’

could be avoided if the explication

were to be phrased as follows:

I can say: I know this because if something happens to me, I know it Similarly, phrasing:

the disjunction

‘I did/am doing’ in the next explication

1 can say: 1 know this because if I do something,

would be avoided if we used the following

I know it.

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Oxford

University

Press, New York.

WIERZBICKA, A. 1992b The search for universal semantic primitives. In Ptltz, M. (Ed.) Thirry Years of Linguistic Evolution: A Festschrij? for RenP Dirven, pp. 215-242. John Benjamins, Amsterdam. WOODBURY, A. C. 1986 Interactions of tense and evidentiality: A study of Sherpa and English. In Chafe, W. and Nichols, J. (Eds) Evidenrialityc 7he Linguisric Coding of Epistemology, pp. 188-202. (Freedle, R. 0. (Ed.) Advances in Discourse Processes, Vol. XX). Ablex, Norwood.

Appendix:

A Summary

of the Formulae

Kashaya -Gela (Performative-Imperfective) I know this because I am doing it (not someone else) -mela (Performative-Perfective) I know this because I did it (not someone else) -yti (Visual (Perfective)) I know this because I sawit

‘Visual,’

SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMOL.OGY -ti

(Factual (Imperfective)) I know this because I see it

-66 (Factual-generic I know this because everyone

‘Visual,’

sense) ‘Factual’ knows it

-Ati (Auditory) I know this because I hear it -yowii (Personal Experience) I don’t say this because someone else said this I know it -do (Quotative)

I say this because someone else said this I don’t say: I know it -qS (Inferential

I) I know this because I know something

else

-bi -iv (Inferential II -iv) I know this now because I know something else now I didn’t know it before now -miyC (Remote Past)

I know this not because someone else said something it happened a long time before now Quechua (Huanuco

Quechua)

-shi

I say this because someone else said it I don’t say: I know it -mi

I say this not because someone else said it I know it -chi

I think this I don’t know it (Tarma Quechua) -shi

someone else says this I don’t say: I know it -mi

I know this -chi

I think this I don’t know it

135

136

ANNA

WIERZBICKA

Winru -nt”Er (nonvisual sensorial) I think this (non first-person subject): one could see this I know it because I saw it or: I know this one could see it

-(k) ‘a (hearing) I know this one could hear it (First-person volitional sentences): one could hear this I know it because I did it (non-first-person subject): one could hear this I know it because I heard it or: I know this one could hear it

‘ish ‘a (hearsay) people say this I don’t say: I know it -pi (reconfirmational-Aymara) I know: you know this -ishi (personal remembrance-Jaqaru) I know this I knew it before now I know you knew it before now -.ra (attenuator-Aymara) I think (I can say): I know this -ja (surprisal attenuator-Jaqaru) I think (I can say): I know this I didn’t think I would know it qilli (personal knowledge with edge of doubt-Jaqaru) I know this I think you think I can’t say it

-sk’hmna

(contradiction of personal knowledge-Jaqaru) I thought I knew something I know now: I didn’t know it

-pa&a (inferential-Aymara) I think this because I know something else I can’t say: I know it I don’t say: I know it -ml”er/-murder (uncertain knowledge, opinion) I think this I don’t know it

-mte/-mute.(inference) I think this I can’t know it

137

-m?a/-mu?a ((near) certain knowledge based on inference) I think this I can’t know it I think this because I know something else Tibetan ‘dug (have), red (be) I know this now I didn’t know it before now yod (have), yin (be) [first

analysis1

(sentences with first-person agents): I can say: I know this because I did it (am doing it) in (future first person) I think I will do this I don’t say: one can know wi (gnomic) I think this I don’t say: I know Bulgarian and Macedonian definite pasr I know this indejinite past I think this dejnite pluperfect (Macedonian) I know this not because someone said something indefinite pluperfect (Macedonian) I think this because someone said something