December 2015
ScienceDirect
Vol. 22 No. 4 62-68
Journal of Northeast Agricultural University (English Edition)
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Sharecropping Contract Experience in Delta State, Nigeria Albert Ukaro Ofuoku Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension, Delta State University, Asaba Campus PMB 95074, Asaba, Delta State, Nigeria
Abstract: Sharecropping has been an age long practice from ancient times. Some scholars saw the practice as being exploitative of the tenants, yet it is still being practiced. The reasons behind it continual practice need to be unveiled. This study was therefore conducted to examine the sharecropping contract experience in Delta State, Nigeria. The landlords decided to practice sharecropping as a result of emigration of their household members, farm size and cost of labours, some of them gave age and their primary occupation as factors for their decisions to opt for sharecropping arrangement. The yields were shared on the basis of 60% for the landlord to 40% for the tenant. The landlords provided all the equipment and inputs, while the tenant's carried out all the farm operations. They faced the constraints of stress, but were able to cope with them, because of hospitals and health centres nearby. The result of the test of hypothesis confirmed the reasons given for deciding on sharecropping arrangement. It was concluded that sharecropping was not exploitative. It was recommended that the practice of sharecropping should be encouraged and not diversified into other sources of livelihood should do so. Key words: sharecropping, contract, Nigeria CLC number: F303.4
Document code: A
Article ID: 1006-8104(2015)-04-0062-07
Roman Empire (61-112 CE). Amanor and Diderutuah
Introduction
(2001) traced its history in Ghana to the 17th century.
Sharecropping contract is an agricultural arrangement
in the study area and other parts of Nigeria when this
between a landlord and a tenant. In this case, the
study was conducted. Sharecropping has long been
tenant pays a fraction of the crop yield to the landlord
criticized by some economists inspired by Karl Marx.
as rentage. This rentage gives the tenant the right to
These economists include Stightz (1974), Robertson
land given by the landlord. Sharecropping is different
(1980), and Pearce (1983), who considered it as an
from wage contract in which the landlord pays the
exploitative contract through which landlords and land
tenant a wage and keeps the entire crop yield. It is also
holding household exploit tenants who are landless
at variance with the fixed rent contact, whereby the
individuals and households. Though the Marxist
tenant pays the landlord an agreed amount of money as
criticism of sharecropping may be true to the situation
rent, but the tenant has the entire crop yield to himself.
in some periods of history and in some parts of the
The landlord owns the plot of land, he supplies all the
world as pointed out by Reid (1973), it has not been
inputs and implements used in the farm.
able to fathom or explain the sustained existence of
Byres (1983) traced the history of sharecropping to
sharecropping contracts that both parties voluntarily
ancient Greece (594-593 BCE), ancient China (722-
enter into various parts of the world as observed
481 BCE), ancient India (fourth century BCE), and the
by Bellemare (2006) and in Pakistan by Jacob and
Received 8 May 2015 Albert Ukaro Ofuoku, E-mail:
[email protected] E-mail:
[email protected]
However, literature has not been found on its history
·63·
Albert Ukaro Ofuoku. Sharecropping Contract Experience in Delta State, Nigeria
Mamsuri (2006), and in other nations by other scholars.
that are an important part of the social system, which
However, sharecropping contract is suspected to be
is what will repeat itself in case of the sharecropping
prompted in these contemporary times by rural-urban
contract farmers. This may also results to society that
migration of young adults which has given rise to farm
may no longer be viable agriculturally.
labour scarcity in the rural areas. Most farmers are not
It is expected that a tenant farmer in the contract
financially buoyant enough to hire labour (Ofuoku,
arrangement should be able to gradually acquire his or
2015). This may cause them to resort to sharecropping
her own plot(s) of farm land and become a landlord. It
contracting with landless farmers. Ofuoku et al. (2014)
is, therefore, worthwhile to undertake a study to have
also found that most farmers were not able to pay
knowledge of the experiences of the parties involved
for high cost of labours. This prompts them to seek
in such contracts. This study is also expected to give
alternative means of continuing with their farming
rise to other studies, aid policy formulation and guide
business which is their major source of livelihood.
agricultural extension agents in their interactions with
From the aforementioned information, the tenants
their clientele.
in the contract are landless farmers. These landless farmers may be indigenes or migrant farmers. A comprehension of sharecropping contract in
Objectives
Delta State context is necessary for the fact that
The major objective of this study was to unveil
many farming household members have emigrated
the experiences of sharecropping contract farmers.
to urban settlements in search of education and
Specifically, it sought to:
white collar jobs, leaving the aged or aging arable
Ⅰ. Identify the reasons behind landlord's option for
crop farming household (HH) heads to carry on with
sharecropping contract.
farming business and Delta State government is
Ⅱ. Examine the terms of the contract.
encouraging people to look beyond oil and go into
Ⅲ. Ascertain the outcome of the contract.
agricultural production. Pari passu geometric increases
Ⅳ. Identify the constraints faced in the contract.
in population and economic growth and development are propelling a direct positive relational increasing demand for arable crops products. Major dynamics
Methodology
in arable farming systems will be enhanced. These
This study was carried out in Delta State of Nigeria.
changes may be tagged as food crop revolution.
This state is situated between Longitudes 5' 00 and
Sharecropping contract implies that more arable crop
6' 45 East of the Greenwich Meridian and Latitudes
farms will be managed by farmers who are not the
5' 00 and 6' 30 North of the Equator. It has a total land
owners, and the way labour will be organized in Delta
mass of 17 440 square kilometers and is constituted
State, arable crop farming system will be progressively
by 25 local government areas with an estimated
dictated by sharecropping contracts.
population of about 4 million people (Delta State
Just as Moritz et al. (2011) opined in the case of
Government, 2003). It is shared into three agricultural
pastoral societies in Africa, it may have significant
zones by Delta State Agricultural Development
results for arable cropping societies in Africa. Just
Programme (DTADP). These zones are Delta North,
like Bonfiglioli (1985) as cited by Moritz et al. (2011)
Central and South Agricultural Zones.
suggested, for instance, that WoDaaBe society could
Arable crops, such as cassava, maize, yam and
no longer be replicated socially as a result of the fact
potato, are mostly cultivated by the farmers. Most
that impoverished pastoralists who worked as hired
arable crop farmers derive their livelihoods from
herders could not participate in livestock exchanges
farming while some take farming as extra source of http: //publish.neau.edu.cn
·64·
Vol. 22 No.4 2015
Journal of Northeast Agricultural University (English Edition)
livelihoods.
The hypothesis was tested with the use of logistic
Data for the study was collected using structured
regression. This model was applied, since the depen-
interview scheduled and narratives from stakeholders
dent variable was dichotomous (Yes or No). The
involved in the sharecropping contract. The stake-
binary response in this study was whether the landlord
holders were the landlords (arable crop farmers who
farmers were still engaged in sharecropping contract
owned the farm land) and the landless farmers. The
farming or not as used by. The logistic model was
landlords were chosen from among arable crop farmers
implicitly captured, thus:
who were registered with DTADP. All the farmers who were identified by DTADP
In
pi = 1|p
i+∑
j×ji+
extension supervisors were purposively selected from
The empirical model defining decision in favour of
the farmers' register. The sharecropping contract
sharecropping contract by the ith landlord farmer was
farmers working with the selected landlord farmers
explicitly specified:
were all also purposively chosen for the study. This led ping contract farmers (landless farmers), giving us a
pi = 1|p Where,
total of 379 respondents (Table 1). The selections and
Y=Decision in favour of sharecropping contract
collection of information were done between February,
(dummy)
2014 and March, 2015.
0=Constant term
to selection of 291 landlord farmers and 88 sharecrop-
In
0
,
X1,
1
X2,
2
3
X3,
4
X4,
5
X5
X1=Age (years) X2=Cost of labour (income per annum)
Table 1 Selection of respondent Agricultural zone
X3=Rural-urban migration of household member No. of respondent
Delta North Landlord farmer
112
Contract farmer
28
Delta Central Landlord farmer
126
Contract farmer
42
Delta South Landlord farmer
53
Contract farmer
18
Total
(dummy) X4=Farm size (ha) X5=Primary occupation (dummy) Ԑ=Error term The decision in favour of sharecropping contract was regressed against the reasons given by the landlord farmer for his decision.
Results Reasons for decision in favour of sharecropp-
Landlord
291
ing arrangement
Contractor
88
The most important reason (Table 2) given by the landlord farmers for deciding on sharecropping was rural-urban migration of members of their
The data collected was analyzed with the use of
households (86.60%). Farm size (69.07%), cost
descriptive statistics, such as frequency counts and
of farm labours (66.67%), primary occupation of
percentages for objectivesⅠ, Ⅱand Ⅲ and Ⅳ were
landlords and minimally the age of the landlord
met with means derived from 4-point Likert type
farmers (36.08%) were other reasons that infor-
scale of strongly agree=4, agree=2 and strongly
med their decision to opt for sharecropping arrange-
disagree=1.
ment.
E-mail:
[email protected]
·65·
Albert Ukaro Ofuoku. Sharecropping Contract Experience in Delta State, Nigeria
helping to lighten their financial burdens, but Ofuoku Table 2 Reasons for sharecropping arrangement as given by landlords (n=291)
(2015) found that for more remittances were made from rural households to rural-urban migrants than from rural-urban migrants to farming households.
Reason
No.
Percentage (%)
There were also some landlords who took arable
Age
105
36.08
crop farming as extra source of income. These ones
Cost of the labour
194
66.67
had their primary occupations elsewhere and were
Farm size
201
69.07
always absent. The only alternative left to them was
Primary occupation
127
43.64
Rural-urban migration of household member
252
86.60
sharecropping arrangement. Some of them were ageing and so could no longer work the way they use to do. As a result, they resorted to sharecropping, especially in the presence of emigration of their household members who found
Rural-urban migration of arable crop farming
it was difficult to make both ends meet in the urban
households' members implied depletion of the house-
settlements.
holds' farm labours. Farming household in this con-
Rural-urban migration, age, farm size and primary
text had no option than to hire labours to make up
occupation informed hiring of labours, but the cost of
for the labours lost to rural-urban migration (Ofuoku,
labours was not affordance to the landlords, therefore,
2015).
they had no option than to decide in favour of share-
Tuan et al. (2000), Ekong (2003), and Adewale
cropping, especially for food security, income/extra
(2005) found that there was farm labour shrinkage
income and security of their heritage (land).
prompted by the emigration of able-bodied young men from rural to urban areas. There were multiple
Terms of contract
responses. These caused farming household heads
Results in Table 3 indicated that landlords and
(farmers) to seek for labours outside.
sharecropping contractors shared the crop yields at
With the shrinked household labour force, the
60/40 in favour of the landlord (mean=3.32) as part of
farmer was no longer able to cover the area they used
the contract terms. The landlord provided the planting
to farm in his farming activities. Meanwhile, farming
materials (seeds) (mean=3.41), implement and tools
operations were time-bound. In such situation the
(mean=3.59), fertilizers (chemical or organic) (mean=
farmers had no choice than to employ hired labours
3.58) and agrochemicals (mean=3.58), such as
so that the farm size could be adequately or totally
herbicides and pesticides.
cultivated. Cost of farm labours tended to be high
The tenants/contractors carried out field preparation
since farm labours had become scarce as a result of
(mean=4.0), sowing (mean=3.64), fertilizer applica-
rural-urban migration. Most farmers were not being
tion (mean=3.54), agrochemicals application (mean=
able to afford the cost farm labours in this scenario.
3.46), and harvesting (mean=3.58). The landlords and
The option left to the farmers was sharecropping
the tenant farmers separately asserted that they did not
arrangement. It was rational to ask of the remittances
share after sales, but shared the yield harvested and
made to farming household heads by rural-urban
that harvesting was done with both parties present. The
migrant members of the households. Ekong (2003),
terms of contract, from the afore-mentioned could not
Dustman and Mestres (2010) suggested that most
be said to be exploitative. One might be tempted to
migrants remitted money regularly to their families
ask, why cut-off mean=2.50 (>2.50=term of con-
for farming purpose and rural development, thereby
tract, <2.50=not term of contract). http: //publish.neau.edu.cn
·66·
Journal of Northeast Agricultural University (English Edition)
Vol. 22 No.4 2015
their landlords and their households. This meant that Table 3 Terns of contract (n=379)
sharecropping was not exploitative and social mobility was a possibility. Moritz et al. (2011) suggested that
Term
Total score
Mean
50/50
484
1.28
60/40
1 258
3.32
tion and social mobility.
70/30
637
1.68
Most (83%) of the tenants were satisfied with
80/20
0
0.0
the income they made from the sharecropping
Planting materials (seeds)
1 293
3.41
Implements
1 360
3.59
diversify into other source incomes, such as trading
Fertilizers
1 358
3.58
Agrochemical
1 358
3.58
and processing; however, they still wanted to continue
Field preparation
1 516
4.00
to get others to replace them. Many of them had been
Share of crop yield (Landlord/Farmers)
Landlord provided
Tenants carry out
labour relations between landlord and the tenant/ contractor/hired labours was a determinant of exploita-
arrangement. Some (51%) of them had been able to
working with their landlords until they would be able
Planting
1 272
3.36
working for their landlord for between 5-8 years. All
Weeding
1 381
3.64
Fertilizer application
1 341
3.54
of the above information were indicative of the fact
Agrochemicals application
1 313
3.46
Harvesting
1 358
3.58
that sharecropping as carried out in the study area was not exploitative in nature and practice. Constraints faced by sharecropping tenants
The landlords had a share of 60% of the harvest
and coping with them
and the sharecropping contractor was having 40%.
The most important constraint faced by sharecropping
The 10% difference might be due for the input provi-
tenants was stress. Stress was a frequent occurrence
sions made for the farming activities. The contract
that increased the expenditure (Scoones, 1998) of
farmers showed they were satisfied with the contract
sharecropping tenants' households. Another important
terms. However, these terms of contract here was at
constraint was shocks. More often than not, stresses
variance with the findings of Amanor and Diderutuah
led to shocks which, according to Moritz et al. (2011),
(2001) and Moritz (2011) in Oil Palm and Citrus
were highly devastating. In the course of this study, we
Belts in Ghana and Northern region of Cameroon,
considered how they were able to manage the stress of
respectively. The terms of contract they have these
ill health in their households.
areas were exploitative. The sustained existence of
We inquired about how they would foot the hospital
sharecropping in Delta State, Nigeria was attributable
bill of the household member that became ill. In most
to the unexploitative nature of the contractual terms.
of the rural settlements, there were health centres that
During the narratives, the landlord and the farming
were manned by nurses and nurses' aides.
contractors at different time opined that the terms of
These health centres were poorly equipped. In
contract were orally drawn. This implied that it was
cases where they were absent, one existed in a village
a "gentleman" agreement they had. Since the proceeds
nearby. They really did not find it difficult to get one
were shared in percentage, the implication was that both
of such health facilities. However, there were hospitals
the landlord and the tenant shared the risk involved.
in big villages that could easily be reached. They indicated that they had no challenge coping
Outcome of the contract
with the stress of ill health. All of them asserted that
During the narratives, 95% of the sharecropping
they had no problem of transportation to the hospital
farmers said that they had cordial relationships with
in case any members of their households were ill
E-mail:
[email protected]
·67·
Albert Ukaro Ofuoku. Sharecropping Contract Experience in Delta State, Nigeria
and that they were able to procure medicines from the hospitals. They said that paying for medicines was difficult initially, but after sometime (their first
Conclusions and Recommendation
harvest), they were able to pay for medicines in the
This study was carried out in Delta State, Nigeria
hospital. During the lean period they were aided freely
to examine the sharecropping experience of tenant
to purchase medicines by their landlords and the
farmers. Some scholars (economists) viewed it as
landlords' relations. In cases when the tenant was sick
being exploitative yet the practice was continually
and was admitted to bed in the hospital, members of
extant. However, none has been able to unveil the
his household, particularly the wife worked in the farm
reason behind its continual practice. In this study,
in the farming season.
291 landlord farmers and 88 tenants were selected and used. The reasons given by the landlords for
Test of hypothesis
sharecropping included emigration of able bodied
The results of the logistic regression analysis (Table 4)
members of their households to urban areas, farm size
confirmed that some societal and demographic factors
and cost of labours. A few of them did because of age.
related to the landlord influenced his decision in
The term of contract, though orally drawn, spelt it
favour of sharecropping. It indicated that the socio
out that the yield was shared on the basis of 60% to the
demographic variables explained 90.2 variation in the
farmer and 40% for the tenant; the landlord provided
decision in favour of decision to opt for sharecropping
input, while the tenant carried out all the farm
alternative (dependent variable). Age (X1) of some
operations. There was harmony between landlords and
landlords, cost of labour (X2), rural-urban migration
the tenants.
of landlords HH members (X 3), farm size (X 4) and
However, they had constraints, such as stress and
primary occupation (X 5) had significant positive
illness, but they were able to cope because health
relationships with decision of the landlord in favour
centres and hospitals were in or close to the village.
of sharecropping arrangement. These results were
The farmers would like to work with their landlords
in consonance with a priori expectation. This was a
and would want to replace themselves. In consideration
confirmation of the factors given by the landlords as
of the aforementioned information, the sharecropping
the reasons behind their decisions in favour of share-
arrangement was not exploitative in the study area. It
cropping contract of their farmlands.
was therefore recommended that: Ⅰ. Sharecropping should be encouraged as this
Table 4 Estimation of factors that informed landlords' decision in favour of sharecropping contract
would create social mobility for tenants and not exploitative to them. Ⅱ. The tenants that had not diversified into other
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
Wald statistic (B)
Constant
0.058
1.333
0.046*
X1 (Age)
0.037
0.488
0.012*
X2 (Cost of labour)
0.478
0.713
0.454*
References
X3 (Rural-urban)
0.117
0.673
0.131*
Adewale J G. 2005. Socio-economic factors associated with rural-urban
X4 (Farm size)
0.026
0.125
0.029*
X5 (Primary occupation)
0.117
0.673
0.031*
Migration of HH members
R2=0.902 * Significant (p<0.05).
sources of livelihoods should be encouraged by agricultural extension service to do so.
migration in Nigeria: a case study of Oyo State, Nigeria. Journal of Human Ecology, 17(1): 13-16. Amanor K S, Diderutuah M K. 2001. Share contracts in the Oil Palm and Citrus Belts of Ghana. Stevenage, Hertfordshire, UK: 11ed and GRET.
http: //publish.neau.edu.cn
·68·
Journal of Northeast Agricultural University (English Edition)
Bellemare M F. 2006. Three essays on agrarian contracts. Cornell University. Bonfiglioli A M. 1985. Evolution de la propriete animale chez les WoDaaBe du Niger. Journal des Africanistes, 55(1/2): 29-38. Braduri A. 1973. A study in agricultural backwardness under semifeudalism. Economic Journal, 83: 120-137.
Vol. 22 No.4 2015
cultural production and socio-economic variables among arable farming households in Nigeria. Journal of Rural Social Sciences, 29(2): 67-80. Pearce R. 1983. Sharecropping: towards a Marxist view. In: Byres J, Tence J. Sharecropping and sharecroppers. Frank Cass, London. pp. 48-52.
Byres T J. 1983. Sharecropping and sharecropping. Frank Cass, London.
Pender J, Fafchamps M. 2006. Land lease markets and agricul-
Dustman C, Mestres J. 2010. Remittances and temporary migration.
tural efficiency in Ethiopia. Journal of African Economics, 15:
Journal of Development Economics, 92(2): 62-70. Ekong E E. 2003. An introduction to rural sociology. Dove Educational Publishers, Uyo, Nigeria. Jaco H G, Masuri G. 2006. Incentives, supervision and sharecropper
251-284. Reid J D. 1973. Sharecropping as an understandable market response: the post-Bellium South. Journal of Economic History, 33: 106-130.
productivity. Development economis research group working paper.
Robertson A F. 1980. Sharecropping. Man, 15: 411-429.
Washington, DC, World Bank.
Scones I. 1998. Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis.
Moritz M, Ritchey K, Kari S. 2011. The social context of herding contracts in the far north region of Cameroon. Journal of Modern African Studies, 49(2): 263-285.
Institute for Development Studies, Brighton. Stiglizt J E. 1974. Incentives and risk-sharing in sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies, 41: 219-255.
Ofuoku A U. 2015. Effect of rural-urban migrants' remittances on arable
Tuan F, Somwaru A, Diao X. 2000. Rural labour migration,
crop production in Delta State, Nigeria. Journal of Agricultural
characteristics and employment patterns: a study based on China's
Sciences, 60(1): 49-59.
agricultural census. Trade and Macroeconomics Division, Inter-
Ofuoku A U, Idoge D E, Ovwigho B O. 2014. Child labour in agri-
E-mail:
[email protected]
national Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, USA.