Small town triage: a rural settlement policy for the American Midwest

Journalof Rural Smiia. Vol. 3. No. 3. pp. 273-230. Printed

in Great

1987

071X)167 87 S3.W + 0.00 Psrgamon Journals Ltd.

Britain

Small Town Triage: a Rural Settlement Policy for the American Midwest Thomas L. Daniels” and Mark B. Lapping? *Department Iowa State

of Community and Regional Planning in the Collegi of Design at University; f College of Architecture and Design at Kansas State University. U.S.A.

Abstract -

The American Midwest of the 19SOs has suffered from a depressed farm economy which has led to rural depopulation. Small towns of fewer than 2500 people have been especially hard hit, and state and federal government spending cuts will tend to accelerate the decline of these towns. The State of Iowa has a multitude of small towns struggling for survival. Iowa faces the choice of spreading public resources among many towns or concentrating those resources on a relative few. In fact, a key settlement policy may be emerging as a means to create growth centers in rural areas and thus limit depopulation and promote economic diversification. Potential growth centers and investment strategies need to be further identified so that state economic development funds can be targeted spent in the most cost-effective manner. This will require considerable regional and state planning and coordination in implementation.

Introduction

limit

federal

budget

deficits

through

spending

cuts,

works grants and agricultural subsidies are likely to be reduced. This \vill place further pressure on rural communities to pay their own way for public services and economic diversification programs. Many rural communities, especially those below 2500 people, will struggle simply to survive. both

The countryside of the vast American Midwest’ has a popular image of tranquil, unchanging farmsteads and small towns. But in recent years, the countryside and small towns in particular have been undergoing profound changes. The increased world production of grain, oil, and natural gas has resulted in sharply lower commodity prices, incomes, and land values throughout the rural Midwest. The decline of the farm and energy economies is the most severe since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Thousands of farmers face bankruptcy and cutbacks in energy exploration have cost thousands of jobs. Rural small towns, which often depend heavily upon farming or energy production, have suffered from declining populations and stagnant economies.

public

A prime question for public policymakers is whether rural economic and demographic change should be encouraged or retarded and to what degree. The answer largely depends upon the current status of rural areas and the cost of promoting or limiting change. Essentially, there are three choices: (1) relying on the market; (2) government subsidies; and (3) regional settlement policies. The market option would eliminate subsidies to farmers and most public works grants. The result would be a sharp drop in income throughout the rural Midwest (where farmers earn billions of dollars in subsidies each year) and further depopulation. In reality, the Reagan Administration intends to cut farm price supports by 10% over the next three years (Des Moines Register, 31 March 19S6).

These trends raise the question of whether there should be state or federal rural settlement policies and, if so, what these policies should attempt to do. American rural settlement policy heretofore has loosely consisted of federal agricultural subsidies (the bulk going to large farmers) and sporadic public works grants.’ Regional policies for rural areas have tended to emphasize infrastructure over human resource development. Little expenditure of funds has been made toward long range strategic plans for maintaining or expanding rural settlements. But in an era of increasing capital scarcity, with moves to

The subsidy approach would tend to maintain farm incomes and town budgets, but at a heavy cost. For example, subsidies to U.S. farmers are expected to reach $34 billion in 1986 (The Economist, 16 August

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19S6). This level of federal largesse cannot long be supported in light of an expected budget deficit of $230 billion for 1956. A regional settlement policy. on the other hand. should seek to promote regional centers with a ‘critical mass’ of people, public services. and economic activity which in turn can be expected to grow and support a number of small towns within a radius of up to 30 miles. Government investment in such centers of an estimated ~500-15.000 people” represents a more efficient use of public money for infrastructure not likely to be underutilized or abandoned. as very \vell might be the case in smaller communities. Moreover, the critical mass of population in larger towns enables government programs to take advantage of economies-of-scale in the provision of public services. thus lowering unit costs. Finally. regional growth centers can be targeted for a comprehensive package of housing, employment, services. and transportation links. A major advantagc of a regional settlement policy is that it can be established and administered by state and regional governments, rather than the federal bureaucracy. State and regional governments tend to: (1) know the territory and people better; (2) be more sensitive to their needs; and (3) respond faster to changing conditions. Although many difficulties may arise in implementing a growth center strategy. the current situation in the rural Midwest suggests a continued economic and population shrinkage unless people can find adequate employment and affordable services.

The British experience with key settlements

Most of the literature on rural settlement policy in developed countries has British roots. Lockhart (19S3) states that key settlement policies have been the principal means of planned change in post-war rural Britain. Key settlement policy involves the selection of certain villages where public and private investment and population growth will be concentrated at the espense of other rural settlements. Cloke (1977a) distinguishes key settlement policy from other rural planning policies by two features: is planned for compre(1) The key settlement hensive growth in housing, services. and often employment. The key settlement policy incorporates an over(2) view of an area’s settlement pattern and emphasizes the relationship between the key settlement and other settlements served by it. Blacksell and Gilg (19Sl) contend that a dispersed network of public and private services is both unnecessary and uneconomic. Greater mobility has

and Mark B. Lapping reduced the demand for services in isolated locations. and there has been a trend in the U.K. tokvards the centralization and rationalization of services in selected rural locations. Hanrahan and Cloke (1984) also cite the high unit cost of service provision in rural areas as a justification for rationalization. (A similar cost structure exists in the rural United States. see Clawson, 1966.) The problem arises. however. of how to decide which services should be rationalized, how. and where? Too many centers will spread growth too thinly; too few centers will mean the exclusion of peripheral rural areas (Cloke. 1979). Moreover, the anticipated ‘trickle down’ may not be dispersed enough in a more concentrated strategy. The concept of a hierarchy of settlements with different services available at different size settlements is the basis for virtually all settlement policies. In the U.K.. a key settlement provides a vital link between regional urban centers and rural villages. The key settlement serves as a ‘groivth pole’ which can take advantage of: (1) economies of scale in infrastructure and public services; (2) agglomeration economies - diverse labor markets and a variety of private services; (3) the ability to spread growth to peripheral areas; and (1) the ability to reduce, if not halt. regional depopulation. For more than 25 years, Gilg (1978) esplains, most county plans in counties with areas of rural depopulation have attempted to restructure the existing settlement pattern into a smaller number of expanded key settlements. County planners accept that certain areas or villages will continue to decline and that while planning cannot reverse these trends, planning can affect the rate of change and the spatial distribution of population. The performance of the key settlements policy has been mixed. Lockhart (19S3) reported that key settlement policies in Scotland have been successful in building up designated villages into growth centers and have had a stabilizing effect on peripheral villages. Cloke (1977b) determined that a key settlement policy in Devon has only somewhat halted the population decline of remote rural areas. In 1972, Devon designated 70 key settlements, but slightly over half of these places each had fewer than 1000 people. This lack of a critical mass in many key settlements may, in part, explain the lack of success of the key settlement policy in more remote areas. Several other problems with the key settlement policy have become apparent. First. it is difficult to control the movement of people in a free society. The mobility of both capital and labor is crucial for economic growth in a market economy. But to be mobile, capital and labor must overcome moving

Small Town Triage: a Rural Settlement Policy for the American Midwest costs, time. and rigidities in capital and labor markets. Thus, it may be difficult to achieve population growth targets within key settlements or to confine growth within the boundaries of the settlements. Second. housing cannot simply be moved from a small village to a key settlement. Third. private investment in key settlements can be encouraged, but not guaranteed. Fourth, a lack of coordination among government agencies may hinder the provision of public services in key settlements. Fifth, there is often overall difficulty in coordinating population growth, housing. employment, and efficient transportation networks (Gilg. 1978). Blacksell and Gilg (1981) recommend that the key settlement policy be relaxed. Apparently, the implementation of the policy has attempted to target too many villages as key settlements, often without an adequate population or level of economic activity to support public investment or attract new population. By contrast, Cloke (1979) argues that key settlements are the most efficient means of servicing a scattered rural population and that resources can be concentrated in key settlements amid areas of greatest need. Small towns in the American

Midwest

A classic problem for regional policy lies in determining which community typologies are relevant for policy formulation and implementation. It is possible to identify four kinds of rural town in the American Midwest according to criteria of economic reliance and trends in the local population and economy (see Table 1). Economically independent towns have rather self-sustaining economies, as in the case of growing towns, or lack exposure to economic activity as in remote stagnant towns. Economically dependent towns either rely on regional centers for employment and services or on distant markets to sell their products. Growing towns feature a diversified local economic base and a population of more than 2500 people; these towns most often include the county seat town. which is the Table 1. Small town typology

Economic reliance

Population and economic trends Growing

Independent

Dependent

Stagnant

Economically diversified communities

Remote, declining communities

Commuter communities

Natural resource-based communities

275

traditional political, legal. and retain center. and the commuting town within reach of a regional center. Stagnant towns have experienced a loss of population over the past five to ten years along with negative or negligible economic growth. These towns typically have fewer than 2500 inhabitants, are remotely situated, and are heavily dependent upon a single land-based industry, such as agriculture or energy extraction. These towns rely especially upon the importation of goods and services, and because the price of locally-produced commodities (wheat, maize, soybeans, oil, and natural gas) has fallen significantly in recent years, the purchasing power of these townspeople has also declined. Towns of fewer than 2500 people generally are able to support only businesses offering day-to-day goods and services, such as grocery stores, gas stations, and taverns. Stagnant towns tend to show a large leakage of retail trade dollars to regional centers where consumers can find a greater variety of goods and services, often at lower prices. In addition, both the quantity and quality of public services in stagnant towns are frequently low; local residents are usually either reluctant or financially unable to raise taxes to defray the costs of maintaining or upgrading services necessary to attract new businesses and industry. Thus, stagnant towns seeking to revitalize themselves must struggle against a vicious circle: they do not have enough people to attract new retail and nor do they have the service establishments, financial capacity to construct adequate infrastructure thought necessary to attract manufacturing firms. The precarious situation of stagnant towns raises several policy questions, the most basic of which are, ‘Which towns should be helped?‘, ‘How should they be helped?‘, and ‘How much money should be spent?‘. Because of the large number of towns in need and the limited amount of public funds, some means of rationing scarce funds most effectively needs to be developed. An emerging strategy mirrors the method of triage used by a numb& of French medical personnel in World War I to treat wounded soldiers. Triage is a selection process in which the mortally wounded and slightly wounded do not receive immediate medical attention; the former because there is little hope of survival, and the latter because there is little threat of death. Rather, the moderately wounded would be attended to first, given the reasonable probability of being able to save their lives. Under a policy of small town triage, public sector funds would first be allocated to the smaller, growing towns which could achieve sustained growth

276

Thomas L. Daniels and Mark B. Lapping

with some financial assistance. Second priority would be diverted to larger growing towns which have the ability to generate new economic activity, but may require additional state funds to help provide new and expanded infrastructure. Stagnant towns without much prospect for rejuvenation receive the lowest priority. In essence, the triage strategy seeks to promote rural central places of 2500-5000 people which can provide appropriate services and some employment opportunities to the surrounding hinterlands. A secondary goal is to promote towns of 5000-15,000 people which can serve as growth centers and hopefully slow down regional out-migration. The Iowa experience

The State of Iowa is comprised of a web of small towns and county seats, reflecting a settlement pattern based on the ‘horse and buggy’ era of the mid-1800s. Almost half of Iowa’s 2.9 million people reside in 900 communities of fewer than 5000 people each; only Texas and Illinois have more small towns. In 73 of Iowa’s 99 counties. more than 50% of the population live in rural areas; 45 counties lack a town of at least 5000 people.

0

Biggest Gainers

0

Biggest Losers

Between 1960 and 1980. there was a notable shift in rural population away from isolated areas to towns within commuting distance of major regional centers (see Figs 1 and 2). From I970 to 1980. rural Iowa lost 0.2% of its population, while the entire state grew by 3.1%. The consolidation of farms into larger units contributed to the decrease in rural inhabitants, as did the outflow of young people. Sixty of Iowa’s 92 nonmetropolitan counties had more than 15% of their residents aged 65 or older in 19S0 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980). (The national average is ll%).) In addition, 51 of those 60 counties had

fewer than 20.000 inhabitants. In sum, aged populations tend to be associated with sparsely-settled areas which are remotely situated and economically dependent on farming. Between 19SO and population decline, population losses. inhabitants. 42 had (Daniels, 19S6a).

19S5, Iowa suffered a 0.1% though 69 counties registered Of those counties which lost fewer than 15,000 inhabitants

An estimated three-quarters of the rural Iowa economy is dependent upon farming. especially the production of maize, soybeans, hogs and cattle. Farm machinery manufacturing and the patronage

(Between 1960 and 1980, slus or minus 25',)

Figure 1. State of Iowa, 99 counties, and

population

changes,

\..I

1%X$--1980.

Small Town Triage: a Rural Settlement of Iowa’s 115.000 farmers at retail and service establishments have been important to both small towns and regional centers. Iowa leads the United States in the production of maize and hogs. and Iowa exports more of its farm commodities ($3.3 billion in 1984) than any other state (Daniels, 1986a). When the value of the dollar in foreign exchange increased by 40% between 1981 and 1985, America’s farm exports began to suffer. Between 1984 and 1986, U.S. farm exports decreased from $40 billion to an estimated $27 billion (Nebv York Times, 28 June 1986). Commodity prices also declined. In 19S4, soybeans sold for $6 a bushel, but fetched only $5 a bushel in November 1986. Similarly, maize fell from $2.70 a bushel in 1984 to $1.70 in late 1986. Although federal subsidies exist for maize and soybean growers, they are not always sufficient to cover even the cost of production. Subsidies have been unable to halt the slide in Iowa farmland values from an average of $2100 an acre in 19S4 to $900 an acre in 1986 (Des Moines Register, 3 January 1986). Meanwhile, the falling land values and farm prices has made farm debt more difficult to service. About 15% of Iowa’s farmers currently have

Figure 2.

Policy for the American Midwest

277

debt to asset ratios of greater than 70% and will probably leave farming in the near future (Daniels, 1986a). Moreover, given the huge world grain surplus, it is unlikely that the lowa or Midwest farm economy will recover in the short run (Heffernan and Heffernan, 1986). The reduction in farm income and the debt squeeze have been quickly felt in small towns where farmers have traditionally purchased goods and services. Stone (1985) indicates that statewide retail sales declined each year between 1979 and 1983, and the 1983 level of retail sales was 17% below the 1979 figure. But, more significantly, between 1983 and 1984, 61 Iowa counties (nearly all of them rural) experienced a fall in retail sales. This loss of trade amounted to an estimated $38 million in sales and the closing of four to five thousand businesses (Stone, 1985). Table 2 shows an index of retail sales pulling power for rural Iowa towns between 1979 and 1984. An index of greater than 1.0 indicates a draw of sales into the town from outside buyers; whereas an index of less than 1.0 indicates a net retail sales leakage.

Incorporated towns in Iowa.

278

Thomas

L. Daniels

Table 2. Index of pulling power of Iowa towns based on real per capita retail sales. lY7Y-1YS-I TONXIsize

Fiscal year

Pull factor

Fewer than 500

1979 1YSZ 1YS-l

o.so 0.7-I 0.63

1979 1952 19s-l

o.s9 0.7s 0.69

1001-3000

1979 1982 1964

1.13 1.02 1.00

3001-8000

1979 lYS2 1984

1.57 1.43 1.41

SO01 and more

1979 1982 1984

1.31 1.39 I.41

500- 1000

__-___ Source: Stone (lYS5).

Since 1979, only towns of more than SO00 inhabitants have increased their pull of retail sales. But towns of 3001-8000 people have generally maintained a strong retail sales pull. By contrast, towns of fewer than 1001 residents have experienced sharply uorsening trade leakages. Furthermore, towns of 1001-3000 people are not, on average, pulling in much outside trade. In short, towns of more than 3000 people appear to be the most likely to grow in the future. Iowa’s rural financial institutions have come under considerable pressure in recent years. The 1970s saw grain prices steadily rise and farmland values jumped five-fold on a statewide basis. Banks were optimistic and even eager to lend money to farmers who were suddenly wealthy, at least on paper. Between 1984 and 1986, both farmland values and farm commodity prices fell sharply, and have yet to recover. Suddenly, many farmers found themselves struggling to pay off their debts. Over one-third of Iowa’s $17 billion in farm debt is held by farmers with debt equal to 40% or more of their assets (Daniels, 19S6b). Of Iowa’s 461 rural banks (most with deposits of only $10-35 million), several have over one-quarter of their loans in the agricultural sector. In 1984. one-sixth of the banks in towns of fewer than 5000 people lost money. Fortyseven Iowa banks are currently on the federal government’s list of troubled financial institutions; and eleven rural banks failed in 19S5. Moreover. nearly a quarter of Iowa’s rural banks have troubled loans in excess of 30% of total capital (Daniels,

and Mark B. Lapping 1986b). In sum, there is not an abundance capital available to finance small town diversification programs.

of private economic

A further barrier to economic diversification in rural Iowa is that public service costs are high. For example, in Des Moines. 5000 gallons of water costs $7, whereas in rural areas the same amount of water costs at least $20 and as much as $59 (Des Moines Register, 16 April 19S5). More than half of the 100 Iowa hospitals with fewer than 100 beds averaged fewer than 20 patients a day in 1984. Many of these hospitals are running deficits and tax monies are not available for upgrading services. Rural public transit networks will be forced to reduce services or increase fares if proposed cuts are made in federal rural transit funds. This would especially affect the elderly and low-income people who rely on public transport for shopping and medical visits to regional centers.

State, regional programs

and local small

town development

While the concentration of resources in designated towns makes sense in theory, the implementation of such a program faces considerable difficulties. A major barrier lies in the limited planning capabilities of state and regional agencies. The most important state role in influencing the growth or stagnation of towns is deciding on which towns will receive how much in state grant monies. There are three main areas of state support: education, transportation, and economic development. But state programs in these areas have not been coordinated to promote certain growth centers or to discourage growth in other towns. As a result, some programs have tended to promote the concentration of services while other programs have supported dispersal. For example, in the past 10 years, many rural Iowa school districts have been consolidated to reduce education costs. This consolidation has tended to favor larger towns at the expense of smaller towns and rural areas. The potential exists for further consolidation of schools, but that decision would likely be made by the state legislature, rather than state education administrators. Similarly, county and town governments receive state gasoline tax revenues from the State Department of Transportation for the maintenance and construction of roads. Roads are the lifeblood of rural areas. and many small towns have survived because of road systems which make them accessible. Iowa‘s road system has aided in the dispersal of population and economic activity. rather than conresources. Iowa’s Governor centrating public

Small Town Triage: a Rural Settlement Branstad recently proposed widening two roads into four-lane highways through southern and western Iowa to promote the survival of these rural areas. State economic development programs for small towns are generally weak, featuring a reactive, rather than a proactive planning style. Iowa communities under 2500 people can receive up to $3~,~ in state block grant funds for one year or multi-year development projects. Some critics argue, however, that this level of funding is not adequate to construct capital improvements to attract industry. But. state grant monies are awarded on a competitive basis. For example, in 1985, the state doled out over $21 million in community block grants, but few small towns had the expertise or organization to put together a competitive grant proposal. Most of the money was awarded for projects in towns of over 2500 people. Even if state agencies were able to coordinate efforts to promote growth in designated towns, adequate funding is likely to remain a problem. Between 1977 and I983, state assistance to Iowa governments declined by 18% and federal assistance fell by 29% (Des Moines Register, 22 December 1985). Tight state budgets and the end of the federal revenue-sharing program suggest that a greater burden for planning may fall on regional, county and town agencies. Regional Councils of Government serve mainly as grant writers and technical advisors to counties and towns in a reactive style. There is no indication that the councils have favored planning and development in larger towns over smaller towns. But councils have no political base and have limited authority to draft development blueprints for an entire region. Most rural counties are already dominated by the county seat town and are currently operating with very limited financial resources. individual towns, meanwhile, are competing with each other for new industry and development. Over 300 towns have formed local economic development commissions. although it is unlikely that there is enough new industry available for more than a few dozen towns. A common theme in state, regional and county planning agencies seems to be that each town has an equal right to compete for growth and development grants. This democratic principle works fairly well in thriving economic times, but is likely to result in a thin and ineffective dispersal of public resources in a depressed economy. For example, a recent study of the Iowa economy (Schwartz, 1985) recommended that Iowa target 14 growth centers, basically those communities which already contain the largest population concentrations. Such an approach, however, is heavily urban-oriented and ignores the need for

Policy for the American Midwest

279

rural settlement planning. Moreover. it is doubtful that such an approach would touch enough peripheral areas or win political support in a state with 956 communities. At the local level, some of the most promising efforts are typified by the National Main Street Center’s revitalization program. Iowa has lately become the 16th ‘Main Street State’ and is currently selecting 15 towns over the next 3 years for special state development funds. But the primary criterion for the selection of the ‘Main Street Towns’ reflects a form of triage: generally. only towns from 5000 to 50.000 people are eligible (though other states have chosen a few towns just under 5000). In addition, towns must demonstrate a capacity for local leadership, including the support of local government, businesses and lending institutions. The towns selected thus have the critical mass of people and the financial commitment to upgrade the town’s appearance and public services and attract new businesses. Nonetheless, the Main Street program may overlook just where regional development is needed. For example, each of the initial five towns selected for the Main Street program are in eastern Iowa where two-thirds of the state’s population is located. Rural areas in western Iowa are sorely in need of viable regional centers. Conclusions and policy implications

The 1970s trend toward a greater decentralization of U.S. population and the growth of small towns depended on the ability of rural inhabitants to earn a decent living. If the 1980s trend of low or declining prices for food and energy continues, then fewer rural people will be able to earn a living in the primary industries of agriculture and energy development. Although these industries include only 10% of all rural employment in America, they are important components of rural economies in the Midwest (Hines et al.. 1975). If these primary industries continue to perform poorly. secondary employment in services and retail and wholesale trades will also lag. The Iowa example of migration from rural areas toward regional centers of 500050,000 people and major urban areas wilf become the norm. While stagnant towns have shown a remarkable resiliency, ghost towns are not unfamiliar to the American landscape. Iowa alone witnessed the disappearance of some 200 communities between 1880 and 1950. Key settlement policy or a triage approach (the difference essentially being one of semantics) will be needed to ration finite state and regional government resources so that an adequate long-term

280

Thomas

L. Daniels

pattern of rural settlement can survive and provide a nurturing environment in which to live and work. But it remains to be seen whether state and regional planning agencies can develop the planning capacity. coordination, and funding needed to focus resources in designated growth centers. Until a growth center policy is put into practice, the current dispersed pattern of settlement will become increasingly difficult and expensive to service. Individual towns and counties have very limited financial resources to promote economic development; moreover, competition among hundreds of towns for relatively few new firms is likely to be an expensive and, indeed, wasteful process. Even so, larger towns are more likely to win out in the long run. One of the major problems of rural settlement policy is the lack of mobility of assets, such as homes and businesses. In addition, people often feel a strong sentimental attachment to where they have lived and worked for many years. It may not be realistic to expect rural and small town inhabitants to move to regional centers just because this move would create greater efficiency in the provision of public services and increase the critical mass of inhabitants for attracting new development. At

the

same time, Iowa’s rural and small town in towns of fewer than 500 cannot expect state and federal funds to continue to cover up to 42% of local public service costs (Des Moirzes Register, 31 March 1986), given that unit costs are often substantially lower in larger population centers. Many rural and small town residents in Iowa and throughout the Midwest face the inevitable choice of either moving into or near a regional center, or else ‘withering on the vine’. Yet, government policies and planning could ease the trauma of transfer by ensuring decent housing, promoting private investment, and making infrastructure investments in designated growth centers. dwellers

Notes

For the purposes of this paper, the Midwest is defined as the area known as the Corn Belt, from Indiana west through Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri. and Nebraska. and the Great Plains States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. The major U.S. experiment in settlement planning after World War II is the Appalachian Regional Commission founded in 1963. The Commission targeted growth centers in 13 states for federal economic development funds. The Commission selected 23 regional centers, 68 primary centers, and 122 secondary

and Mark B. Lapping centers. Yet. the majority of the S-L billion in federal grants has been spent on highway construction (Raitz and Ulack. 19d4). The Reagan Administration has proposed eliminating the Commission and its programs. Unemployment in .\ppalachia remains at about 10%. well above the national average of 6.5%. 3. The U.S. Bureau of the Census defines a settlement of 2500 or more people as urban. Perhaps a more useful definition of urban settlement is the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area kvhich applies to counties with a city of at least 50.000 people. The Bureau of the Census considers settlements of fewer than 2500 people as rural.

References

Blacksell, M. and Gilg. A.W. (1981) irhe Countryside: Planning and Change. George Allen 6: Unwin. London. Clawson, M. (1966) Factors and forces affecting the optimum future rural settlement pattern in the United States. Economic Geography 442. X-293. Cloke, P.J. (1977a) In defense of key settlement policies. The Village 17. 19-31. Cloke, P.J. (1977b) The Use of Key Settlement Policies in the Planning of Rural Areas. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of London. Cloke, P.J. (1979) Key Serrlemencs in Rural Areas. Methuen, London. Cloke, P.J. (19S3) An Inrrodrccrion 10 Rwaf Settlement Planning. Methuen, London. Daniels, T.L. (1986a) Rural Banking Trends: Implications for Economic Development in Nonmetro Areas. Paper presented at the Conference on the Small City. March. Stevens Point, Wisconsin. Daniels, T.L. (19S6b) Small Town Triage. Paper presented at the American Planning Association Conference, April. Los Angeles, California. Gilg, A.W. (1975) Cowyvside Planning. David & Charles, Newton Abbot. Hanrahan, P.J. and Cloke. P.J. (1984) Towards a critical appraisal of rural settlement planning in England and Wales. Sociologia Ruralis 23, 109-129. Heffernan, W.D. and Heffernan, J.B. (1986) Impact of the farm crisis on rural families and communities. The Rural Sociologist 6, 160- 170. Hines, F.K., Brown. D.L. and Zimmer, J.M. (1975) Social and Economic Characreristics of rhe Popularion it? Metro and Nonmerro Coanfies, 1970. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington. D.C. Lockhart, D. (19S3) Key village and related settlement policies in Scotland. In The Changing Countryside, Clark, Gorenendijk. J. and Thissen. F. (eds). Geo Books, Norwich. Raitz, K.B. and Vlack, R. (1984) Appakachia: a Regional Geography. Westview Press. Boulder. Colorado. Schwartz, Gail Garfield Associates, Inc. (1985) Rebuilding Iowa’s Economy: Comprehensive Srate Economic Development Plan. Gail Garfield Schwartz Associates. Inc., Washington, D.C. Stone, K. (1985) Effect of the Agricultural Recession on Communities and Business Firms. Paper presented at the National Planning Association Conference, October. San Francisco, California. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1982) Iolra Census. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.