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Social anxiety and self-other biases in causal attribution
JOURNAL
OF RESEARCH
IN PERSONALITY
18.
64-80
(1984)
Social Anxiety and Self-Other Biases in Causal Attribution HEDWIG
TEGLASI AND SHARON SPITZ FAGIN University
qf Muryland
Causal attributions of three groups of subjects varying in social anxiety according to the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test were assessed, either from the perspective of the self or from the viewpoint of another person in three negative situations. Interactions between self-other perspective and anxiety reached significance for the stability and globality dimensions as well as for affect. These interactions supported the major hypothesis that self--other biases in causal attribution, typically reported in the social psychological literature which are favorable to the self, are absent or reversed in situations which are problematic for socially anxious individuals. The main effect of perspective was modified by the above interactions and indicated that the typical self-other bias was demonstrated but only in the low-anxious group. The expectancy variable showed only main effects of perspective and anxiety. Higher anxious groups had higher expectancies for the occurrence of the negative events. Expectancies were higher for others than for the self. There were no significant main effects or interactions for the causal dimensions of locus and control. A general implication of the present data is that adequate adjustment may require attributional sets which enhance one’s sense of competency relative to others. Furthermore, attributionbased approaches to counseling may need to focus on a network of causal ascriptions and specifically address self-other discrepancies in perceptions of causality.
Recent research and theory in attribution have focused on the role of causal attribution in psychological well being (Abramson, Seligman, 8~ Teasdale, 1978; Arnkoff & Mahoney, 1979; Brockner & Holton, 1978; Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Storms & McCaul, 1976; Tennen & Eller, 1977; Valins & Nisbett, 1971). The attributional approach to personal adjustment assumes that individuals actively formulate explanations for life events by making causal inferences. These causal ascriptions are assumed to determine, in part, an individual’s feeling about and subsequent coping with stressful life events such as loss of employment as well as reactions to more routine incidents such as receiving critical feedback (Dweck, The authors would like to thank Jeremy Finn for help with data analyses. Request for reprints should be sent to Hedwig Teglasi, Department of Counseling and Personnel Services, University of Maryland, Cottege Park, MD 20742. 64 0092-6X%/84
$3.00
Copyright Q 1984 by Academic Press, Inc All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
65
1975; Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; Riemer, 1975; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971). Taxonomies of causes have been proposed (Abramson et al., 1978; Rosenbaum, 1972; Weiner, 1979; Weiner et al., 1971), and the following dimensions of causality which define the meaning of a cause and which are thought to be related to adjustment have been identified: (a) locus of the cause-refers to the perception of a cause as internal (pertaining to a characteristic of a person) or as external (due to other people or circumstances) and has implications for self-esteem and affect (Riemer, 1975; Weiner et al., 1978). Feelings of competence, pride, and shame are greater when internal attributions are made (Riemer, 1975; Weiner, 1979); (b) stability of the cause-refers to the extent to which a cause for a specific situational outcome can be altered over time. Stability has been related to expectations about future success or failure which, in turn, affect motivation to attain success (Valle & Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976). For example, a failure outcome ascribed to lack of effort, a cause which is modifiable, keeps one’s expectations of future success intact, while failure attributed to lack of ability leads to diminished hope for future success and decreased effort; (c) globality of the cause- refers to the extent to which the cause of an outcome is generalized over a wide range of situations or is viewed as limited to the specific situation at hand. A global attribution for an outcome will have broad implications for expectancy, affect, and behavior, while the consequences of a situation-specific causal explanation are restricted to the specific event about which the attribution is made. According to the Abramson et al. (1978) reformulated model of learned helplessness, the three dimensions of locus, stability, and globality are associated with depression. An internal attribution for negative life events leads to depressed affect and lowered self-esteem particularly when the cause is perceived as stable, thus diminishing hope for the future. A global attribution generalizes the lowered expectancy, low self-esteem, and depressed affect to other situations resulting in a general feeling of helplessness, hopelessness, and depression; (d) control-refers to a dimension of causality first identified as intentionality (Heider, 1958; Rosenbaum, 1972) and later reformulated as control (Weiner, 1979). The causal dimension of control refers to one’s estimated responsibility and control over an event. While Seligman’s (1975) model of learned helplessness highlights the dangers of underestimating one’s responsibility and control over events, Beck’s (1967) model of depression points out the drawbacks of overestimating one’s responsibility for outcomes (especially for negative events). The extent to which lack of control is perceived as universal or as personal (Garber & Hollon, 1980), as affecting
66
TEGLASI
AND
FAGIN
significant or insignificant areas of life (Lefcourt. 1979), or as temporary or stable adds further meaning to this concept. A complicating factor is that some situations are inherently more controllable than are others. and perhaps a match between the situation and beliefs about controllability is optimal. Kelley’s (1967) information processing model assumes that individuals will base attributions on self-comparison with others as well as on observations of one’s own behavior across time and across situations. Some evidence suggests that a negative self-evaluation is accompanied by overly positive evaluations of others. In a situation completely determined by chance, depressed individuals believed that others have more power and skill than they do (Colin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977). On the other hand, nondepressed subjects ascribed more power and skill to themselves than to another person. Negative self-evaluation may be related to ascribing exaggerated competency to others, while positive self-evaluation may be associated with perceptions which enhance one’s own competency in relation to others. The social-psychological literature comparing attributions of normal subjects about the self and about others has generally found actorobserver discrepancies which are enhancing of the self in comparison to others. Individuals tend to attribute negative outcomes of their own actions to situational requirements, whereas they attribute the same actions of others to stable personal dispositions (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973). Furthermore, observers attribute actors’ behavior more to situational causes when the behavior has a positive rather than a negative outcome (Stephan, 197.5). By contrast. actors attribute success to internal causes but attribute failure and negative experiences to external causes (Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979; Eisen, 1979; Miller, 1976; Stevens & Jones, 1976). Thus, in the general population, attributional biases promote a favorable perception of the self in comparison to others. Adequate adjustment may require some distortions along the lines of the typical actor-observer discrepancies demonstrated in the socialpsychological literature. The absence or the reversal of the self-enhancing biases may be related to adjustment problems and focusing only on selfattributions may not provide an adequate basis for understanding the role of causal attributions. Depressed individuals state low expectancies of favorable outcomes for themselves but generate expectancies for others in the same manner as nondepressives do for themselves (Garber & Hollon, 1980). Low expectancies for the self may not be related to depression unless they are coupled with higher expectancies for others. The relationship between ascriptions regarding the self in comparison to others has not been systematically investigated as a factor in adjustment
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
67
nor as a target of counseling intervention. The major hypothesis of the present study is that unproductive causal attributions about the self are embedded in a self-other evaluative matrix. Therefore, the following general prediction is made: in situations which are considered problematic for socially anxious individuals (dating and making friends in a new city), those who are high in social anxiety will not exhibit the typical selfother bias in causal attributions, while individuals who are low in social anxiety will. More specifically, interactions between level of social anxiety and perspective are predicted for the date and new city situations (but not for a job situation) for the following variables: locus, stability, globality, control, expectancy, and affect. Confirmation of this hypothesis would suggest that attribution-based approaches to counseling focus on the selfevaluative implications of causal ascriptions and specifically address selfother discrepancies in perceptions of causality. METHODOLOGY Instruments Social Interaction Self-Statement Test. The measurement technique used to assess social anxiety was the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST) developed by Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, and Larsen (1982). The questionnaire contains 30 self-statements, 15 positive and 15 negative which individuals often think during social interactions. The self-statements were empirically derived from subjects reporting extreme social anxiety and represent specific short-term cognitions which occur before, during, and after a heterosocial interaction. Validity checks. Self-report information was gathered as a validity check on the SISST and as additional descriptive information about the subjects. Participants rated how outgoing they were and how outgoing they would like to be. Subjects were asked to describe typical situations which cause anxiety (including situations which are avoided), the frequency of such situations, and the intensity of the anxiety usually elicited. Intensity and duration of experiences with depression were also rated. Attribution questionnaire. The attribution questionnaire contained three interpersonal situations with negative outcomes. The following two situations were considered closely related to social anxiety based on a survey by Zimbardo (1977): a date going badly and not making friends in a new city. A third situation, making mistakes at a new job, was thought to be more remotely related. The three situations were introducted either from the perspective of the self (i.e., you go out on a first or second date and it goes badly) or from the perspective of another (John goes out on a first or second date and it goes badly). A male was named in describing the event from the other perspective. Following each situation was a list of about 10 possible causes, and subjects were asked to choose the most likely cause (from either of two perspectives). Subsequently, they were asked to rate the following four underlying causal dimensions of the cause they selected: amount of control over the causes of the event, the locus (internality or externality) of the cause of the event, the degree of stability of the cause, and the globality or specificity of the cause. Two additional variables of expectancy and uficr which are closely linked in the literature with attribution (see Kelley & Michela, 1980, for a review) were also rated on 7-point Likert scales. The list of causes following each situation was derived from a previous study (Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982) in which shy and nonshy subjects gave causes in a free response format and subsequently rated these causes on Likert scales similar to those employed in the present study. The reliability of these ratings averaged .82. The
68
TEGIASI
AND
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dependent variables of interest were the ratings on three situations, and not the specific causes selected. order to clarify the task for the subject\.
the The
6 L.ikert l&t
scales
of causes
for has
each
of the
provided
in
Subjects All subjects were undergraduate students from a large eastern university and from a community college. Two hundred ninety students in psychology, education. and economics classes were asked to fill out the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST), the attribution questionnaire, and the validity check items. The questionnaires from the self and other perspective were arranged in alternate order so that students sitting next to each other in class received different versions. Those students scoring in the top and bottvm 20% of the sample in the SISST comprised the high- and low-anxious groups, respectively. with the middle 60% being a third group. The high socially anxious group was comprised of 55 students, 28 male and 27 femaie with ages ranging from 18 to 50. The low socially anxious group was comprised of 56 students, 26 male and 30 female. with ages ranging from 17 to 46. The middle group was comprised of 174 students, 74 male and 100 female with ages ranging from 18 to 45. Half of the total number of subjects administered the questionnaire took the attribution items from the self-perspective, while the rest took it from the other perspective. Five questionnaires were dropped from the study due to incomplete responses, leaving a total of 285 subjects.
Procedure The questionnaires were distributed in a variety of undergraduate classes. Students were requested to read all directions carefully and to answer every item in the order of presentation, which was counterbalanced for situations. It was stressed that the questionnaires were anonymous and, therefore, confidentiality was assured. Students were encouraged to raise their hands if they did not fully understand any of the items or directions. Following administration, if the class instructor expressed an interest, the background and purpose of the study were explained to the class.
RESULTS Validity
Checks
A Hotelling p test was conducted to compare the low- and highanxious groups on eight dependent variables comprising the vaiidity checks. The primary interest was in demonstrating whether low or high scores on the SISST, a cognitive test, was associated with reiated affective (anxiety and depression) and behavioral (self-r&ings on outgoingness) variables. For the sake of simplicity , only the low and high sacially anxious groups were compared for the validity cbcks. 2% m.&ivarictte analysis indicated that these variables signi&antiy di&zrcjntiated the two groups, F(7, 102) = 5.65, p c 3001. The summary of the results for the follow-up univariate tests each conducted at 1 and 109 degrees of freedom are described below. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of variables included in these analyses. Anxiety. (a) The frequency with which anxiety provoking situations occur was not significantly different in the two groups. (b) The intensity of the anxiety elicited in typically encountered stressful situations was
CAUSAL
TABLE MEANS
AND
STANDARD
DEVIATIONS
1
OF SELF-REPORT
DEPRESSION,
Self-report
69
ATTRIBUTIONS
VARIABLES
RELATED
TO ANXIETY,
AND SOCIALIZING
variables
Anxiety-related (a) Frequency of typical anxiety provoking situations (free response coded by raters with over 90% agreement) (b) Intensity of anxiety typically encountered (Likert scale, 1 = mild, doesn’t affect behavior, not tenibly unpleasant; 5 = moderately aversive, has minimal effect on behavior; 9 = intense, affects behavior so that others notice, feels extremely uncomfortable and unpleasant) Depression-related (c) Frequency of depression (checklist-i.e., at least one per week, every 2 weeks, one per month, a few times per year-coded) (d) Duration of depression (checklist-i.e., few hours, a day, and so on-coded) (e) Intensity of depression (Likert scale, 1 = mildly intense to 9 = extremely intense) Socially outgoing (f) Description of self on Likert scale (1 = very outgoing, loves to meet new people; 5 = reserved and cautious when meeting new people; 9 = very shy, meeting new people or going to parties is painful) (g) Description of how outgoing subject would like to be (same Likert scale as above) (h) Discrepancy between real and ideal (difference between f and g)
High socially anxious Mean SD
Low socially anxious Mean
SD
3.51
1.46
3.26
1.17
6.53
1.63
4.95
2.16
2.91
1.12
1.73
1.00
2.16
1.28
1.86
.81
5.60
1.92
4.38
1.72
5.36
1.85
2.86
1.60
2.50
1.33
2.08
.99
2.86
1.88
.76
.92
significantly different, t = 2.71, p < .009. The high socially anxious group reported higher intensity of anxiety than did the low-anxious group. Depression. (c) The reported frequency of depression differed significantly for the two groups, c = 3.98, p < .OOOl. The high-anxious group reported more frequently experiencing depression than did the low-anxious group. (d) The two groups did not differ in the duration of depressive episodes. (e) However, the intensity of each depression differed significantly for the two groups t = 2.42, p < .02. The high socially anxious group experienced significantly greater intensity of depression than the lowanxious group.
70
TEGL.ASI
AND
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Social interaction. (f) The two groups differed significantly on how outgoing they rated themselves to be, t = 5.23. p < .OOOl. Members of the high socially anxious group perceived themselves to be less outgoing than did members of the low-anxious group. (g) The two groups did not differ on how outgoing they would ideally like to be. All subjects wanted to be moderately outgoing. (h) The groups differed significantly in the amount of discrepancy between their current degree of outgoingness and their ideal, t = 4.83, p < .OOl . The high socially anxious group perceived a greater difference between the way they were and the way they preferred to be.
Causal Attributions
for Self and Other
The experimental design used to test for group differences in the attribution related variables was a 3 x 2 x 2 multivariate analysis of variance: anxiety (low-medium-high) x perspective (self-other) x sex (male-female). The program used to compare the groups was MULTIVARIANCE for unequal N’s (Finn & Mattsson, 1978). Analyses were performed separately on each of the six dependent variables, with the three situations treated through multivariate procedures. Thus, there were three dependent variables for each of six multivariate analyses. Univariate F’s are only reported to support significant multivariate analyses. Since sex of subject did not emerge as a significant variable (with one exception), means and standard deviations for each of the attribution variables presented in Table 2 were pooled across males and females. Table 3 presents the summary of all significant multivariate analyses, the univariate tests, as well as the follow-up multiple comparisons. None of the multivariate tests for main effects or interactions were significant for the variables of locus and of control. Thus, there were no differences for sex, perspective, level of anxiety, or any interactions among the groups for control and locus. Significant interactions of level of anxiety and perspective in stability, globality, and affect were consistent with the mdor hypothesis and modify the significant main effects of anxiety and perspective with regard to these variables. For stability and affect, the interactions were sign&ant for the date and new city situations, white for gIobality, the interaction reached significance only for the date situation. While the main effects for level of anxiety were significant for St&i&y, global&y, as well as for affect (in almost all of the situations), it is apparent from looking at Fig. I that these main effects were evident primarily in the self-perspective. Therefore, given the interactions, the most appropriate interpretation of the anxiety main effects is that the more socially anxious groups made more stable and more global attributions and reported more intense affect
3.75 3.86 3.88 3.27 3.36 3.54 3.66 4.12 3.96 3.57 4.16 4.04 2.88 4.79 4.11 3.67 4.09 3.48
1.71 1.66 1.52 .7l 1.49 1.59 1.63 2.40 1.66 1.74 1.80 1.69 1.79 1.58 1.80 1.50 1.66 2.03
1.67 1.82 1.91 1.68 1.71 1.77
1.54 1.67 1.84 1.64 1.59 2.14
1.45 1.64 1.85 1.57 1.54 1.83
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
Self-perspective
OF ATTRIBUTIONAL
Medium anxious
DEVIATIONS
Low anxious
STANDARD
Date goes badly Control 4.12 Locus 3.24 Stability 2.49 Globality 1.72 Expectancy 3.05 Affect 2.57 Mistakes at new job Control 3.70 Locus 4.01 Stability 2.94 Globality 2.74 Expectancy 3.26 Affect 3.12 Not making friends in a new city Control 2.97 Locus 4.78 Stability 3.28 Globahty 2.80 Expectancy 2.91 Affect 3.00
MEANS AND
--
TABLE
2 FOR THE
3.39 4.91 4.85 4.78 4.88 5.42
3.42 4.67 4.03 3.83 4.59 5.46
3.95 4.49 4.82 4.36 4.61 5.55
Mean
1.46 1.55 I .42 1.36 1.36 1.99
1.64 1.76 1.97 1.86 1.65 1.91
1.56 1.56 1.56 1.98 2.26 1.93
SD
High anxious
VARIABLES
MEDIUM-,
2.73 4.64 4.75 4.18 4.69 4.92
3.56 4.56 3.97 3.90 4.76 5.12
3.96 4.38 3.76 3.91 4.38 5.34
Mean
1.37 2.00 1.79 1.43 1.29 2.44
1.79 1.63 1.55 1.81 1.51 2.31
1.79 1.45 1.62 1.87 1.48 2.39
SD
Low anxious
Low-,
2.90 4.91 4.70 4.58 5.06 5.26
3.06 4.25 3.59 4.02 4.45 5.39
3.86 3.88 3.80 3.89 4.05 4.67
Mean
1.46 1.73 1.46 1.41 .98 2.12
1.44 2.34 1.65 2.48 1.41 2.05
1.48 1.55 1.58 1.49 1.12 1.99
SD
Medium anxious
Other perspective
AND HIGH-ANXIOUS
3.00 5.36 4.64 5.23 5.73 5.64
3.45 4.55 4.73 4.73 5.23 6.18
4.32 4.45 4.36 4.73 4.95 5.50
Mean
I .57 1.32 1.37 1.25 .86 1.86
1.47 I .39 1.21 1.41 1.30 1.79
1.44 1.31 1.53 1.64 1.23 1.91
SD
High anxious
GROUPS
anxiety
city
New
date
job
city
Bad
New
New
>erspective
job
New
Bad date
iocial
main
effect
effect
main
Stability
OF STATISTICAL
F(1, 273) = 9.52, p -c .OOl
N.S.
F(3, 271) = 3.35, p < .05 N.S.
F(6, 542) = 3.65, p ‘c .002 F(2, 272) = 9.18, p < .OOl, LM/LH F(2, 272) = 3.32, p -C .05, LM/LH N.S.
SUMMARY
ANALYSIS
F(6, 542) = 7.27, p < .OOOl F(2, 272) = 14.68, p < .OOOl, LM/LH F(2, 272) = 3.70. p < .05, LH F(2. 272) = 13.55, p < .OOOl, LM/LH F(3, 271) = 20.04, p < .OoOl F(1, 273) = 20.43, p < .ooOl F(I, 273) = 12.27, p < .0006 F(i, 273) = 23.11, p<.OOOl
Globality
TABLE 3 FOR STABILITY, GLOBALJTY, AND AFFECT
F(6, 542) = 8.42, p < .OOOl F(2, 272) = 13.57, p<.OOOl.LH F(2, 272) = 4.18. p < .05, LH F(2, 272) = 15.84, p < .OOOl, LM/LH F(3, 271) = 17.15, p < .wOl F(1, 273) = 19.48, p<.OOOl F(1, 273) = 9.75, p<.OOO2 F(1, 273) = 42.96. p<.OOOl
Expectancy
EXPECTANCY,
F(6. 542) = 6.53. p < .OOOl F(2. 272) = 13.09. p --I “0001. LH F(2. 27’) I: 9.82. p< .OOOl,LH N2. 272) = 10.12. p -: .OOOl. LH F(3, 271) = 17.09. pc .OOOl I=‘( I. 273) = 26.60, p ;: .oool &I. 173) = 29.17. p i .ooal F(I I 273) = 14.43. p i* .oooI
Affect
2 ” z
5 0
4 c: 7 $,:
p < .008
F(3, 271) = 4.27, p < .05, LM/LH N.S. F(3, 271) = 3.25, p < .05, LH
F(3, 271) = 5.55, p < .Ol, LM/LH N.S. N.S.
p < .05
F(6, 542) = 2.30,
N.S.
N.S. N.S.
N.S. .05
p <
N.S. N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
.05
N.S. F(1, 273) = 4.92,
p <
F(3, 271) = 3.06,
.05
F(3, 271) = 6.42, p < .Ol, LM/LH N.S. F(3, 271) = 3.15, p < .05, LH
p <
F-(6, 542) = 2.10,
N.S.
N.S. N.S.
N.S.
Note. Where there were significant main effects and interactions, follow-up tests were performed to see whether there were differences between the low-medium- and low-high-anxious groups. LM differences were significant between the low- and medium-anxious groups. LH differences were significant between the low- and high-anxious groups.
New job New city
Bad date
F(6, 542) = 2.85,
N.S.
N.S. N.S.
Bad date New job
New city Perspective x social anxiety interactions
N.S.
Sex main effect
m” 5 9 m
2
5
F
!i2
h kg
-I
ZQ /
?..I
3.0
3.Y
4.P
4.5
5.0
5.1
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
75
to negative outcomes of situations than the less anxious groups but only when the situations were described as happening to the self. For the expectancy variable, the interaction of anxiety and perspective was not significant. One can see from Fig. 1 that the anxiety main effect for the expectancy variable is similar for both self and other perspectives, and that higher levels of anxiety are associated with higher expectancies for the occurrence of negative events (in all three situations) described as happening to the self as well as to another person. The main effects of perspective which were significant for stability (new city), globality (all three situations), affect (all three situations), and expectancy (all three situations) are consistent with the literature on actor-observer biases in causal attribution. However, in light of the significant anxiety x perspective interactions in the stability, globality, and affect variables, the most appropriate interpretation of the perspective main effect is that while others were perceived as more distressed by the negative events than the self and attributions tended to be more stable and more global for another person than for the self, this pattern was most pronounced in the lower anxious groups. Examining Fig. 1, it is apparent that the self-other bias was greatest in the low-anxious groups. In the date situation, the typical self-other bias was actually reversed in the high-anxious group with regard to the stability variable. With regard to globality and affect, the self-other bias was either absent or was significantly lower in the high-anxious than in the lower anxious groups for the date and new city situations. In general, the absence or the reversal of the self-other bias in the high-anxious group in stability, globality, and affect was not due to rating others more positively but to rating the self more negatively in comparison to the lower anxious groups. The main effect of perspective for the expectancy variable was not modified by a significant anxiety x perspective interaction and is consistent with the typical self-other bias. The expectancy for the occurrence of all three negative situations was greater for another person than for the self. The main effect of sex reached significance only for expectancy and only for the job situation. Females had a significantly higher expectation of making mistakes at a new job situation than did males. In general, sex did not emerge as a strong determinant of attribution. In summary, the interactions of social anxiety and perspective in the stability, globality, and affect variables were consistent with the major hypothesis that the self-other biases which have been well documented in the social psychological literature will be absent or reversed in the high socially anxious groups. As predicted, these interactions reached significance for the social situations (date and new city) but not for a job situation.
76
‘TEC~L.451
AND
FAGIN
DISCUSSION
The results lend support to the hypothesis that biases in causal attribution which are more favorable for the self than for others may be required for adequate adjustment. Stability and globality were the two attributional variables associated with social anxiety. The favorable self-other bias typically reported in the social-psychological literature was also found in the present study but only in the low socially anxious groups. Among the highly socially anxious subjects. this bias was absent or reversed. Low-anxious subjects rated causes as more stable and global (date and new city situations) for others than for the self, while high-anxious subjects generally rated the self and others similarly. In one situation, the selfother bias was not only absent but reversed in the high-anxious group; subjects rated the cause for a date going badly as more stable for the self than for others. Affect, which is considered a joint consequence of causal attribution and of situational outcomes (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978) showed a self-other bias analogous to that found with the causal dimensions of stability and globality. The low-anxious group members rated others as being more distressed by negative outcomes than the self (date and new city), but there were no self-other differences in the high-anxious group. The tendency of higher anxious subjects to rate causes as more stable and global than lower anxious subjects was apparent only from the selfperspective. Similarly, higher ratings of negative affect by the higher anxious subjects was found primarily from the self-perspective. Furthermore, the absence or reversal of the self-other bias among the highanxious subjects stems from overly negative evaluations of the self rather than increased positive evaluations of others. Group differences in self-other biases reached significance only in the social situations (date and friends in a new city) but not in the job situation as predicted. The fact that subjects were classified into groups on the basis of problematic cognitions in heterosocial interactions adds further weight to the idea that the absence of favorable self-other biases occurs in situations that are experienced as problematic by the individual. The degree to which the relationship between causal attribution and adjustment rests on attributions about the self or on self-other differences in causal ascriptions is an interesting research question, The social comparison process is viewed as a basic human response (Sulz, 1977). Even primary school children have been shown to use social comparison information in making causal attributions (Frieze & Bar-Tal, 1980). Adequate emotional adjustment may require systematic distortions with respect to self-perceptions which enhance one’s sense of mastery and competence in relation to others. Most of the attributional studies focused on attributional biases from the self-perspective only. For example, high self-
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
77
esteem subjects rated their performance as higher than low-esteem subjects, even though the actual outcomes did not differ (Shrauger & Terbovic, 1976). Depressed persons, unlike their nondepressed counterparts, did not have the illusion of control in a chance situation (Gollin, Terre& Weitz, & Drost, 1979). Furthermore, depressed individuals were more realistic in their self-evaluations than were members of a control group in terms of a match between self-evaluations and ratings from observers in a group interaction (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980). There were no attributional differences on the causal dimensions of locus (internal-external) and of control. One cannot conclude, however, that social anxiety is unrelated to perceived locus and to degree of control, but rather that these causal dimensions may not differentiate groups representing extremes of an essentially normal population. In a more clinical sample of subjects with a highly similar methodology (Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982), locus as well as stability significantly differentiated the shy subjects from a comparison group in situations which were considered problematic for shy subjects (degree of control was not rated). Furthermore, a study by Girodo, Dotzenroth, and Stein (1981) which utilized a forced-choice format for eliciting causal attributions (causes were presented in pairs and subjects were asked to choose one) found that males with low scores on a Social Self-Esteem Inventory differed significantly from males with high scores on both the locus and stability dimensions. There were no group differences in self-other biases in expectancy. All subjects stated higher expectancies for the occurrence of all three negative events for others than for the self. However, the higher anxious groups had a greater expectancy for the negative events than did the low-anxious group. The only sex difference emerging in the present study was that women stated a greater likelihood of making mistakes at a new job than did men. One of the most clearly documented sex differences in the literature on achievement related attributions is the highly consistent finding that females of all ages have lower expectancies for success than do males (e.g., Crandall, 1969; Cole, King, & Newcomb, 1977; Frieze et al., 1978). The sex difference in expectancy did not occur in situations describing social interactions but only in the task related situation. The absence of a perspective x sex interaction suggests that men and women stated equivalent self-other differences in expectancies. Therefore, in the present study, the sex difference represents a generalized expectancy rather than a devaluing of the self (females) as compared with others (males). Attribution-based interventions have attempted to alter attributions by providing causal information which would lead to changes in the interpretation of events. However, there is no commonly accepted pattern
of causal attributions considered helpful in all circumstances. Furthermore, the factors that determine the utility of an attributional approach to counseling have not been delineated, with the exception of some evidence pointing to the importance of initial beliefs regarding locus of control (Altmaier, Leary, Forsyth. B Ansel, 1979; Forsyth & Forsyth. 1982). Interpretations that are congruent with client’s beliefs about their problems are more likely to influence adjustment (Claiborn, Ward, & Strong, 1981). Little is known about the conditions under which new information has an impact upon attributions that are firmly held (Kelley & Micheia, 19801. Research is needed to discover whether attributions about situations which involve negative evaluations of the self in comparison to others (those which showed anxiety x perspective interaction) require different intervention approaches than ascriptions which are similar for self and others. Future research on attributional counseling may need to focus on establishing a favorable balance (likely a biased one) between attributions about the self and about others. Counselors must be aware that a mild form of attributional distortion may be the norm, allowing individuals to regulate their sense of self-esteem. The dimension of globality unlike that of stability has not been the focus of attribution-based interventions. The current data suggest that globality is related to social anxiety. Emphasizing the situation-specific nature of interpersonal difficulties so that attributions become less global may help to reduce social anxiety. One possible explanation for the self-other discrepancies in the attributions of socially anxious subjects is that the anxiety may detract from interpersonal effectiveness and may provide evidence for negative selfevaluations. Furthermore, the self-focus produced by the anxiety may interfere with perceiving and processing interpersonal information and contributing to an unfavorable balance between evaluation of the self and others. Processing interpersonal information with clients may be helpful if the counselor guards against giving interpretations that are contrary to the available evidence and is cautious when giving causal interpretations which are likely to be rejected because they conflict with strongly held self-perceptions. REFERENCES Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P.. & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74. Altmaier, E. M., Leary, M. R., Forsyth, D. R., & Ansel, J. C. (1979). Attribution therapy: Effects of locus of control and timing of treatment. Journal of Counseling fsycho/ogy, 26, 481-486. Arnkoff, D. B., &Mahoney, M. J. (1979). The role of perceived controt in psychopathology. In L. C. Perlmuter, & R. A. Monty (Eds.), Choice andperceivad control. NJ: Edbaum. Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinicml, experimental. and theoretical aspects. New York: Harper & Row. Brockner, J.. & Hulton, A. J. B. (1978). How to reverse the vicious cycle of low selfesteem: The importance of attentional focus. Journd c~fExperimentu/ Socid P.sycholopy,
CAUSAL
79
ATTRIBUTIONS
Claiborn, C. D., Ward, S. R., & Strong, S. R. (1981). Effects of congruence between counselor interpretations and client beliefs. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 28, 101-109. Cole, D., King, K., & Newcomb, A. (1977). Grade expectations as a function of sex, academic discipline, and sex of instructor. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 1, 380385. Crandall, V. C. (1969). Sex differences in expectancy, intellectual and academic reinforcement. In C. P. Smith (Ed.), Achievement-related morives in children. New York: Russell Sage. Cunningham, J. P., Starr, P. A., & Kanouse, D. (1979). Self as actor, active observer, and passive observer: Implications for causal attributions. Journal of Personuliry and Social Psychology, 37, 1146-l 152. Dweck, C. S. (1975). The role of expectations and attributions in the alleviation of learned helplessness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 674-685. Eisen, S. V. (1979). Actor-observer differences in information influence and causal attributions. Journal
of Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
37, 267-272.
Finn, J. D., & Mattsson, I. (1978). Multivariate analysis in educational research: Applications of the multivariance program. Chicago: National Educational Resources. Forsyth, N. L., & Forsyth, D. R. (1982). Internality, controllability, and the effectiveness of attributional interpretations in counseling. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 29, 140-150. Frieze, I. H., & Bar-Tal, D. (1980). Developmental trends in cue utilization for attributional judgments. Journal of Applied Developmenral Psychology, 1, 83-94. Frieze, I. H., Fisher, J., Hanusa, B., McHugh, M. C., & Valle, V. A. (1978). Attributions of the causes of success and failure as internal and external barriers to achievement in women. In J. Sherman & F. Denmark (Eds.), Psychology of women: Future directions of research. New York: Psychological Dimensions. Garber, J., & Hollon, S. D. (1980). Universal versus personal helplessness in depression: Belief in uncontrollability or incompetence. Journal ofAbnormal Psychology, 89, 5666. Girodo, M., Dotzenroth, S. E., & Stein, S. J. (1981). Causal attribution bias in shy males: Implications for self-esteem and self-confidence. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 5, 325-338. Glass, C. R., Merluzzi, T. V., Biever, J. L., & Larsen, K. H. (1982). Cognitive assessment of social anxiety: Development and validation of a self-statement questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy
Golin,
and
S., Terrell,
Journal
Research,
6, 37-55.
F., & Johnson, B. (1977). Depression and the delusion of control.
of Abnormal
Psychology,
86, 440-442.
Golin, S., Terrell, F., Weitz, J., & Drost, P. L. (1979). The illusion of control among depressed patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 454-457. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. Janoff-Bulman, R. (1979). Characterological versus behavior self-blame: Inquiries into depression and rape. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1798-1809. Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1972). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett, S. Vahns, & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior (pp. 79-94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1980). Attribution theory and research. Annual Review of Psychology,
31, 457-501.
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Klein, D. C.. Fencil-Morse, E., & Seligman. M. E. P. (1976). Learned helplessnes\. depression, and the attribution of failure. Journal oJ‘Per.wnuhty und Sociut Psyc,hol, rp v. 33, 50X-516. Lefcourt, H. M. (1979). Locus of control for specific goals. In L. C. Perlmuter Yc R. .%. Monty (Eds.), Choice und perceived c.ontrn/. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. Lewinsohn, P. M.. Mischel, W., Chaplin, W., & Barton, R. (1980). Social competence and depression: The role of illusory self-perceptions. Jottrnul ofAbnormal Psy~hologv. 89, 203-212. Miller. D. T. (1976). Ego involvement and attributions for success and failure. Journul oj Personality und Social Psychology, 34, 901-906. Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P.. & Maracek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. Journnl ofPersonality and Social Psychology. 21, 154-164. Riemer. B. S. (1975). Influence of causal beliefs on affect and expectancy. Journui of Personality und Social Psychology, 31, 1163-l 167. Rosenbaum, R. M. (1972). A dimensionul unalysis of the perceived causes oj’success trnd fuilurr. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. Seligman, M. E. P. (197.5). Helplessne,\s: On depression development and death. San Francisco: Freeman. Shrauger, J. S., & Terbovic, M. L. (1976). Self-evaluation and assessments of performance by self and by others. Journal of Consulting and Clinicul Psychology, 44, 564-572. Stephan, W. G. (1975). Actor versus observer: Attributions to behavior with positive or negative outcomes and empathy for the other role. Journul of Experimental So&/ Psychology,
11, 205-214.
Stevens, L., & Jones, E. E. (1976). Defensive attribution of Personality
and
Social
Psychology,
and the Kelley cube. Journal
34, 809-820.
Storms, M. D., & McCaul, K. D. (1976). Attribution processes and emotional exacerbation of dysfunctional behavior. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), N~M, directions in attribution research (pp. 143-144). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. Sulz, J. M. (1977). Social comparison theory and research: An overview from 1954. ln J. M. Sulz & R. L. Miller (Eds.). Social comparison process. Washington, DC: Hemisphere. Teglasi, H.. & Hoffman, M. A. (1982). Causal attributions of shy subjects. Jaurnul of Research
in Personality,
16, 376-385.
Tennen, H., & Eller, S. J. (1977). Attributionat components of learned helplessness and facilitation. Journul of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 265-271. Valins, S., & Nisbett, R. E. (1971). Attribution process in the development and treutment of emotional disorders. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Valle, V. A., & Frieze, 1. H. (1976). The stability of causal attributions as a mediator in changing expectations for success. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 579-587. Weiner, B. (1979). A theory of motivation for some classroom experiences+ Journal of Educational
Weiner,
Psychology,
71, 3-25.
B., Frieze, I., Kukla,
A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. (1971). andfailure. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Weiner, B., Nierenberg, R., & Goldstein, M. (1976). Social learning (locus of control) versus attributional (causal stability) interpretations of expectancy of success. Journal Perceiving
of Personality,
the causes
of success
44, 52-68.
Weiner, B., Russell, D., & Lerman, D. (1978). Affective consequences of causal ascriptions. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), Nrw Directions in Attribution Research, Vol. 2. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Zimbardo, P. G. (1977). Shyness: What it is und what to do about it. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
OF RESEARCH
IN PERSONALITY
18.
64-80
(1984)
Social Anxiety and Self-Other Biases in Causal Attribution HEDWIG
TEGLASI AND SHARON SPITZ FAGIN University
qf Muryland
Causal attributions of three groups of subjects varying in social anxiety according to the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test were assessed, either from the perspective of the self or from the viewpoint of another person in three negative situations. Interactions between self-other perspective and anxiety reached significance for the stability and globality dimensions as well as for affect. These interactions supported the major hypothesis that self--other biases in causal attribution, typically reported in the social psychological literature which are favorable to the self, are absent or reversed in situations which are problematic for socially anxious individuals. The main effect of perspective was modified by the above interactions and indicated that the typical self-other bias was demonstrated but only in the low-anxious group. The expectancy variable showed only main effects of perspective and anxiety. Higher anxious groups had higher expectancies for the occurrence of the negative events. Expectancies were higher for others than for the self. There were no significant main effects or interactions for the causal dimensions of locus and control. A general implication of the present data is that adequate adjustment may require attributional sets which enhance one’s sense of competency relative to others. Furthermore, attributionbased approaches to counseling may need to focus on a network of causal ascriptions and specifically address self-other discrepancies in perceptions of causality.
Recent research and theory in attribution have focused on the role of causal attribution in psychological well being (Abramson, Seligman, 8~ Teasdale, 1978; Arnkoff & Mahoney, 1979; Brockner & Holton, 1978; Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Storms & McCaul, 1976; Tennen & Eller, 1977; Valins & Nisbett, 1971). The attributional approach to personal adjustment assumes that individuals actively formulate explanations for life events by making causal inferences. These causal ascriptions are assumed to determine, in part, an individual’s feeling about and subsequent coping with stressful life events such as loss of employment as well as reactions to more routine incidents such as receiving critical feedback (Dweck, The authors would like to thank Jeremy Finn for help with data analyses. Request for reprints should be sent to Hedwig Teglasi, Department of Counseling and Personnel Services, University of Maryland, Cottege Park, MD 20742. 64 0092-6X%/84
$3.00
Copyright Q 1984 by Academic Press, Inc All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
65
1975; Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; Riemer, 1975; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971). Taxonomies of causes have been proposed (Abramson et al., 1978; Rosenbaum, 1972; Weiner, 1979; Weiner et al., 1971), and the following dimensions of causality which define the meaning of a cause and which are thought to be related to adjustment have been identified: (a) locus of the cause-refers to the perception of a cause as internal (pertaining to a characteristic of a person) or as external (due to other people or circumstances) and has implications for self-esteem and affect (Riemer, 1975; Weiner et al., 1978). Feelings of competence, pride, and shame are greater when internal attributions are made (Riemer, 1975; Weiner, 1979); (b) stability of the cause-refers to the extent to which a cause for a specific situational outcome can be altered over time. Stability has been related to expectations about future success or failure which, in turn, affect motivation to attain success (Valle & Frieze, 1976; Weiner, 1979; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976). For example, a failure outcome ascribed to lack of effort, a cause which is modifiable, keeps one’s expectations of future success intact, while failure attributed to lack of ability leads to diminished hope for future success and decreased effort; (c) globality of the cause- refers to the extent to which the cause of an outcome is generalized over a wide range of situations or is viewed as limited to the specific situation at hand. A global attribution for an outcome will have broad implications for expectancy, affect, and behavior, while the consequences of a situation-specific causal explanation are restricted to the specific event about which the attribution is made. According to the Abramson et al. (1978) reformulated model of learned helplessness, the three dimensions of locus, stability, and globality are associated with depression. An internal attribution for negative life events leads to depressed affect and lowered self-esteem particularly when the cause is perceived as stable, thus diminishing hope for the future. A global attribution generalizes the lowered expectancy, low self-esteem, and depressed affect to other situations resulting in a general feeling of helplessness, hopelessness, and depression; (d) control-refers to a dimension of causality first identified as intentionality (Heider, 1958; Rosenbaum, 1972) and later reformulated as control (Weiner, 1979). The causal dimension of control refers to one’s estimated responsibility and control over an event. While Seligman’s (1975) model of learned helplessness highlights the dangers of underestimating one’s responsibility and control over events, Beck’s (1967) model of depression points out the drawbacks of overestimating one’s responsibility for outcomes (especially for negative events). The extent to which lack of control is perceived as universal or as personal (Garber & Hollon, 1980), as affecting
66
TEGLASI
AND
FAGIN
significant or insignificant areas of life (Lefcourt. 1979), or as temporary or stable adds further meaning to this concept. A complicating factor is that some situations are inherently more controllable than are others. and perhaps a match between the situation and beliefs about controllability is optimal. Kelley’s (1967) information processing model assumes that individuals will base attributions on self-comparison with others as well as on observations of one’s own behavior across time and across situations. Some evidence suggests that a negative self-evaluation is accompanied by overly positive evaluations of others. In a situation completely determined by chance, depressed individuals believed that others have more power and skill than they do (Colin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977). On the other hand, nondepressed subjects ascribed more power and skill to themselves than to another person. Negative self-evaluation may be related to ascribing exaggerated competency to others, while positive self-evaluation may be associated with perceptions which enhance one’s own competency in relation to others. The social-psychological literature comparing attributions of normal subjects about the self and about others has generally found actorobserver discrepancies which are enhancing of the self in comparison to others. Individuals tend to attribute negative outcomes of their own actions to situational requirements, whereas they attribute the same actions of others to stable personal dispositions (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973). Furthermore, observers attribute actors’ behavior more to situational causes when the behavior has a positive rather than a negative outcome (Stephan, 197.5). By contrast. actors attribute success to internal causes but attribute failure and negative experiences to external causes (Cunningham, Starr, & Kanouse, 1979; Eisen, 1979; Miller, 1976; Stevens & Jones, 1976). Thus, in the general population, attributional biases promote a favorable perception of the self in comparison to others. Adequate adjustment may require some distortions along the lines of the typical actor-observer discrepancies demonstrated in the socialpsychological literature. The absence or the reversal of the self-enhancing biases may be related to adjustment problems and focusing only on selfattributions may not provide an adequate basis for understanding the role of causal attributions. Depressed individuals state low expectancies of favorable outcomes for themselves but generate expectancies for others in the same manner as nondepressives do for themselves (Garber & Hollon, 1980). Low expectancies for the self may not be related to depression unless they are coupled with higher expectancies for others. The relationship between ascriptions regarding the self in comparison to others has not been systematically investigated as a factor in adjustment
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
67
nor as a target of counseling intervention. The major hypothesis of the present study is that unproductive causal attributions about the self are embedded in a self-other evaluative matrix. Therefore, the following general prediction is made: in situations which are considered problematic for socially anxious individuals (dating and making friends in a new city), those who are high in social anxiety will not exhibit the typical selfother bias in causal attributions, while individuals who are low in social anxiety will. More specifically, interactions between level of social anxiety and perspective are predicted for the date and new city situations (but not for a job situation) for the following variables: locus, stability, globality, control, expectancy, and affect. Confirmation of this hypothesis would suggest that attribution-based approaches to counseling focus on the selfevaluative implications of causal ascriptions and specifically address selfother discrepancies in perceptions of causality. METHODOLOGY Instruments Social Interaction Self-Statement Test. The measurement technique used to assess social anxiety was the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST) developed by Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, and Larsen (1982). The questionnaire contains 30 self-statements, 15 positive and 15 negative which individuals often think during social interactions. The self-statements were empirically derived from subjects reporting extreme social anxiety and represent specific short-term cognitions which occur before, during, and after a heterosocial interaction. Validity checks. Self-report information was gathered as a validity check on the SISST and as additional descriptive information about the subjects. Participants rated how outgoing they were and how outgoing they would like to be. Subjects were asked to describe typical situations which cause anxiety (including situations which are avoided), the frequency of such situations, and the intensity of the anxiety usually elicited. Intensity and duration of experiences with depression were also rated. Attribution questionnaire. The attribution questionnaire contained three interpersonal situations with negative outcomes. The following two situations were considered closely related to social anxiety based on a survey by Zimbardo (1977): a date going badly and not making friends in a new city. A third situation, making mistakes at a new job, was thought to be more remotely related. The three situations were introducted either from the perspective of the self (i.e., you go out on a first or second date and it goes badly) or from the perspective of another (John goes out on a first or second date and it goes badly). A male was named in describing the event from the other perspective. Following each situation was a list of about 10 possible causes, and subjects were asked to choose the most likely cause (from either of two perspectives). Subsequently, they were asked to rate the following four underlying causal dimensions of the cause they selected: amount of control over the causes of the event, the locus (internality or externality) of the cause of the event, the degree of stability of the cause, and the globality or specificity of the cause. Two additional variables of expectancy and uficr which are closely linked in the literature with attribution (see Kelley & Michela, 1980, for a review) were also rated on 7-point Likert scales. The list of causes following each situation was derived from a previous study (Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982) in which shy and nonshy subjects gave causes in a free response format and subsequently rated these causes on Likert scales similar to those employed in the present study. The reliability of these ratings averaged .82. The
68
TEGIASI
AND
FAGIN
dependent variables of interest were the ratings on three situations, and not the specific causes selected. order to clarify the task for the subject\.
the The
6 L.ikert l&t
scales
of causes
for has
each
of the
provided
in
Subjects All subjects were undergraduate students from a large eastern university and from a community college. Two hundred ninety students in psychology, education. and economics classes were asked to fill out the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST), the attribution questionnaire, and the validity check items. The questionnaires from the self and other perspective were arranged in alternate order so that students sitting next to each other in class received different versions. Those students scoring in the top and bottvm 20% of the sample in the SISST comprised the high- and low-anxious groups, respectively. with the middle 60% being a third group. The high socially anxious group was comprised of 55 students, 28 male and 27 femaie with ages ranging from 18 to 50. The low socially anxious group was comprised of 56 students, 26 male and 30 female. with ages ranging from 17 to 46. The middle group was comprised of 174 students, 74 male and 100 female with ages ranging from 18 to 45. Half of the total number of subjects administered the questionnaire took the attribution items from the self-perspective, while the rest took it from the other perspective. Five questionnaires were dropped from the study due to incomplete responses, leaving a total of 285 subjects.
Procedure The questionnaires were distributed in a variety of undergraduate classes. Students were requested to read all directions carefully and to answer every item in the order of presentation, which was counterbalanced for situations. It was stressed that the questionnaires were anonymous and, therefore, confidentiality was assured. Students were encouraged to raise their hands if they did not fully understand any of the items or directions. Following administration, if the class instructor expressed an interest, the background and purpose of the study were explained to the class.
RESULTS Validity
Checks
A Hotelling p test was conducted to compare the low- and highanxious groups on eight dependent variables comprising the vaiidity checks. The primary interest was in demonstrating whether low or high scores on the SISST, a cognitive test, was associated with reiated affective (anxiety and depression) and behavioral (self-r&ings on outgoingness) variables. For the sake of simplicity , only the low and high sacially anxious groups were compared for the validity cbcks. 2% m.&ivarictte analysis indicated that these variables signi&antiy di&zrcjntiated the two groups, F(7, 102) = 5.65, p c 3001. The summary of the results for the follow-up univariate tests each conducted at 1 and 109 degrees of freedom are described below. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of variables included in these analyses. Anxiety. (a) The frequency with which anxiety provoking situations occur was not significantly different in the two groups. (b) The intensity of the anxiety elicited in typically encountered stressful situations was
CAUSAL
TABLE MEANS
AND
STANDARD
DEVIATIONS
1
OF SELF-REPORT
DEPRESSION,
Self-report
69
ATTRIBUTIONS
VARIABLES
RELATED
TO ANXIETY,
AND SOCIALIZING
variables
Anxiety-related (a) Frequency of typical anxiety provoking situations (free response coded by raters with over 90% agreement) (b) Intensity of anxiety typically encountered (Likert scale, 1 = mild, doesn’t affect behavior, not tenibly unpleasant; 5 = moderately aversive, has minimal effect on behavior; 9 = intense, affects behavior so that others notice, feels extremely uncomfortable and unpleasant) Depression-related (c) Frequency of depression (checklist-i.e., at least one per week, every 2 weeks, one per month, a few times per year-coded) (d) Duration of depression (checklist-i.e., few hours, a day, and so on-coded) (e) Intensity of depression (Likert scale, 1 = mildly intense to 9 = extremely intense) Socially outgoing (f) Description of self on Likert scale (1 = very outgoing, loves to meet new people; 5 = reserved and cautious when meeting new people; 9 = very shy, meeting new people or going to parties is painful) (g) Description of how outgoing subject would like to be (same Likert scale as above) (h) Discrepancy between real and ideal (difference between f and g)
High socially anxious Mean SD
Low socially anxious Mean
SD
3.51
1.46
3.26
1.17
6.53
1.63
4.95
2.16
2.91
1.12
1.73
1.00
2.16
1.28
1.86
.81
5.60
1.92
4.38
1.72
5.36
1.85
2.86
1.60
2.50
1.33
2.08
.99
2.86
1.88
.76
.92
significantly different, t = 2.71, p < .009. The high socially anxious group reported higher intensity of anxiety than did the low-anxious group. Depression. (c) The reported frequency of depression differed significantly for the two groups, c = 3.98, p < .OOOl. The high-anxious group reported more frequently experiencing depression than did the low-anxious group. (d) The two groups did not differ in the duration of depressive episodes. (e) However, the intensity of each depression differed significantly for the two groups t = 2.42, p < .02. The high socially anxious group experienced significantly greater intensity of depression than the lowanxious group.
70
TEGL.ASI
AND
FAGIN
Social interaction. (f) The two groups differed significantly on how outgoing they rated themselves to be, t = 5.23. p < .OOOl. Members of the high socially anxious group perceived themselves to be less outgoing than did members of the low-anxious group. (g) The two groups did not differ on how outgoing they would ideally like to be. All subjects wanted to be moderately outgoing. (h) The groups differed significantly in the amount of discrepancy between their current degree of outgoingness and their ideal, t = 4.83, p < .OOl . The high socially anxious group perceived a greater difference between the way they were and the way they preferred to be.
Causal Attributions
for Self and Other
The experimental design used to test for group differences in the attribution related variables was a 3 x 2 x 2 multivariate analysis of variance: anxiety (low-medium-high) x perspective (self-other) x sex (male-female). The program used to compare the groups was MULTIVARIANCE for unequal N’s (Finn & Mattsson, 1978). Analyses were performed separately on each of the six dependent variables, with the three situations treated through multivariate procedures. Thus, there were three dependent variables for each of six multivariate analyses. Univariate F’s are only reported to support significant multivariate analyses. Since sex of subject did not emerge as a significant variable (with one exception), means and standard deviations for each of the attribution variables presented in Table 2 were pooled across males and females. Table 3 presents the summary of all significant multivariate analyses, the univariate tests, as well as the follow-up multiple comparisons. None of the multivariate tests for main effects or interactions were significant for the variables of locus and of control. Thus, there were no differences for sex, perspective, level of anxiety, or any interactions among the groups for control and locus. Significant interactions of level of anxiety and perspective in stability, globality, and affect were consistent with the mdor hypothesis and modify the significant main effects of anxiety and perspective with regard to these variables. For stability and affect, the interactions were sign&ant for the date and new city situations, white for gIobality, the interaction reached significance only for the date situation. While the main effects for level of anxiety were significant for St&i&y, global&y, as well as for affect (in almost all of the situations), it is apparent from looking at Fig. I that these main effects were evident primarily in the self-perspective. Therefore, given the interactions, the most appropriate interpretation of the anxiety main effects is that the more socially anxious groups made more stable and more global attributions and reported more intense affect
3.75 3.86 3.88 3.27 3.36 3.54 3.66 4.12 3.96 3.57 4.16 4.04 2.88 4.79 4.11 3.67 4.09 3.48
1.71 1.66 1.52 .7l 1.49 1.59 1.63 2.40 1.66 1.74 1.80 1.69 1.79 1.58 1.80 1.50 1.66 2.03
1.67 1.82 1.91 1.68 1.71 1.77
1.54 1.67 1.84 1.64 1.59 2.14
1.45 1.64 1.85 1.57 1.54 1.83
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
Self-perspective
OF ATTRIBUTIONAL
Medium anxious
DEVIATIONS
Low anxious
STANDARD
Date goes badly Control 4.12 Locus 3.24 Stability 2.49 Globality 1.72 Expectancy 3.05 Affect 2.57 Mistakes at new job Control 3.70 Locus 4.01 Stability 2.94 Globality 2.74 Expectancy 3.26 Affect 3.12 Not making friends in a new city Control 2.97 Locus 4.78 Stability 3.28 Globahty 2.80 Expectancy 2.91 Affect 3.00
MEANS AND
--
TABLE
2 FOR THE
3.39 4.91 4.85 4.78 4.88 5.42
3.42 4.67 4.03 3.83 4.59 5.46
3.95 4.49 4.82 4.36 4.61 5.55
Mean
1.46 1.55 I .42 1.36 1.36 1.99
1.64 1.76 1.97 1.86 1.65 1.91
1.56 1.56 1.56 1.98 2.26 1.93
SD
High anxious
VARIABLES
MEDIUM-,
2.73 4.64 4.75 4.18 4.69 4.92
3.56 4.56 3.97 3.90 4.76 5.12
3.96 4.38 3.76 3.91 4.38 5.34
Mean
1.37 2.00 1.79 1.43 1.29 2.44
1.79 1.63 1.55 1.81 1.51 2.31
1.79 1.45 1.62 1.87 1.48 2.39
SD
Low anxious
Low-,
2.90 4.91 4.70 4.58 5.06 5.26
3.06 4.25 3.59 4.02 4.45 5.39
3.86 3.88 3.80 3.89 4.05 4.67
Mean
1.46 1.73 1.46 1.41 .98 2.12
1.44 2.34 1.65 2.48 1.41 2.05
1.48 1.55 1.58 1.49 1.12 1.99
SD
Medium anxious
Other perspective
AND HIGH-ANXIOUS
3.00 5.36 4.64 5.23 5.73 5.64
3.45 4.55 4.73 4.73 5.23 6.18
4.32 4.45 4.36 4.73 4.95 5.50
Mean
I .57 1.32 1.37 1.25 .86 1.86
1.47 I .39 1.21 1.41 1.30 1.79
1.44 1.31 1.53 1.64 1.23 1.91
SD
High anxious
GROUPS
anxiety
city
New
date
job
city
Bad
New
New
>erspective
job
New
Bad date
iocial
main
effect
effect
main
Stability
OF STATISTICAL
F(1, 273) = 9.52, p -c .OOl
N.S.
F(3, 271) = 3.35, p < .05 N.S.
F(6, 542) = 3.65, p ‘c .002 F(2, 272) = 9.18, p < .OOl, LM/LH F(2, 272) = 3.32, p -C .05, LM/LH N.S.
SUMMARY
ANALYSIS
F(6, 542) = 7.27, p < .OOOl F(2, 272) = 14.68, p < .OOOl, LM/LH F(2, 272) = 3.70. p < .05, LH F(2. 272) = 13.55, p < .OOOl, LM/LH F(3, 271) = 20.04, p < .OoOl F(1, 273) = 20.43, p < .ooOl F(I, 273) = 12.27, p < .0006 F(i, 273) = 23.11, p<.OOOl
Globality
TABLE 3 FOR STABILITY, GLOBALJTY, AND AFFECT
F(6, 542) = 8.42, p < .OOOl F(2, 272) = 13.57, p<.OOOl.LH F(2, 272) = 4.18. p < .05, LH F(2, 272) = 15.84, p < .OOOl, LM/LH F(3, 271) = 17.15, p < .wOl F(1, 273) = 19.48, p<.OOOl F(1, 273) = 9.75, p<.OOO2 F(1, 273) = 42.96. p<.OOOl
Expectancy
EXPECTANCY,
F(6. 542) = 6.53. p < .OOOl F(2. 272) = 13.09. p --I “0001. LH F(2. 27’) I: 9.82. p< .OOOl,LH N2. 272) = 10.12. p -: .OOOl. LH F(3, 271) = 17.09. pc .OOOl I=‘( I. 273) = 26.60, p ;: .oool &I. 173) = 29.17. p i .ooal F(I I 273) = 14.43. p i* .oooI
Affect
2 ” z
5 0
4 c: 7 $,:
p < .008
F(3, 271) = 4.27, p < .05, LM/LH N.S. F(3, 271) = 3.25, p < .05, LH
F(3, 271) = 5.55, p < .Ol, LM/LH N.S. N.S.
p < .05
F(6, 542) = 2.30,
N.S.
N.S. N.S.
N.S. .05
p <
N.S. N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
N.S.
.05
N.S. F(1, 273) = 4.92,
p <
F(3, 271) = 3.06,
.05
F(3, 271) = 6.42, p < .Ol, LM/LH N.S. F(3, 271) = 3.15, p < .05, LH
p <
F-(6, 542) = 2.10,
N.S.
N.S. N.S.
N.S.
Note. Where there were significant main effects and interactions, follow-up tests were performed to see whether there were differences between the low-medium- and low-high-anxious groups. LM differences were significant between the low- and medium-anxious groups. LH differences were significant between the low- and high-anxious groups.
New job New city
Bad date
F(6, 542) = 2.85,
N.S.
N.S. N.S.
Bad date New job
New city Perspective x social anxiety interactions
N.S.
Sex main effect
m” 5 9 m
2
5
F
!i2
h kg
-I
ZQ /
?..I
3.0
3.Y
4.P
4.5
5.0
5.1
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
75
to negative outcomes of situations than the less anxious groups but only when the situations were described as happening to the self. For the expectancy variable, the interaction of anxiety and perspective was not significant. One can see from Fig. 1 that the anxiety main effect for the expectancy variable is similar for both self and other perspectives, and that higher levels of anxiety are associated with higher expectancies for the occurrence of negative events (in all three situations) described as happening to the self as well as to another person. The main effects of perspective which were significant for stability (new city), globality (all three situations), affect (all three situations), and expectancy (all three situations) are consistent with the literature on actor-observer biases in causal attribution. However, in light of the significant anxiety x perspective interactions in the stability, globality, and affect variables, the most appropriate interpretation of the perspective main effect is that while others were perceived as more distressed by the negative events than the self and attributions tended to be more stable and more global for another person than for the self, this pattern was most pronounced in the lower anxious groups. Examining Fig. 1, it is apparent that the self-other bias was greatest in the low-anxious groups. In the date situation, the typical self-other bias was actually reversed in the high-anxious group with regard to the stability variable. With regard to globality and affect, the self-other bias was either absent or was significantly lower in the high-anxious than in the lower anxious groups for the date and new city situations. In general, the absence or the reversal of the self-other bias in the high-anxious group in stability, globality, and affect was not due to rating others more positively but to rating the self more negatively in comparison to the lower anxious groups. The main effect of perspective for the expectancy variable was not modified by a significant anxiety x perspective interaction and is consistent with the typical self-other bias. The expectancy for the occurrence of all three negative situations was greater for another person than for the self. The main effect of sex reached significance only for expectancy and only for the job situation. Females had a significantly higher expectation of making mistakes at a new job situation than did males. In general, sex did not emerge as a strong determinant of attribution. In summary, the interactions of social anxiety and perspective in the stability, globality, and affect variables were consistent with the major hypothesis that the self-other biases which have been well documented in the social psychological literature will be absent or reversed in the high socially anxious groups. As predicted, these interactions reached significance for the social situations (date and new city) but not for a job situation.
76
‘TEC~L.451
AND
FAGIN
DISCUSSION
The results lend support to the hypothesis that biases in causal attribution which are more favorable for the self than for others may be required for adequate adjustment. Stability and globality were the two attributional variables associated with social anxiety. The favorable self-other bias typically reported in the social-psychological literature was also found in the present study but only in the low socially anxious groups. Among the highly socially anxious subjects. this bias was absent or reversed. Low-anxious subjects rated causes as more stable and global (date and new city situations) for others than for the self, while high-anxious subjects generally rated the self and others similarly. In one situation, the selfother bias was not only absent but reversed in the high-anxious group; subjects rated the cause for a date going badly as more stable for the self than for others. Affect, which is considered a joint consequence of causal attribution and of situational outcomes (Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978) showed a self-other bias analogous to that found with the causal dimensions of stability and globality. The low-anxious group members rated others as being more distressed by negative outcomes than the self (date and new city), but there were no self-other differences in the high-anxious group. The tendency of higher anxious subjects to rate causes as more stable and global than lower anxious subjects was apparent only from the selfperspective. Similarly, higher ratings of negative affect by the higher anxious subjects was found primarily from the self-perspective. Furthermore, the absence or reversal of the self-other bias among the highanxious subjects stems from overly negative evaluations of the self rather than increased positive evaluations of others. Group differences in self-other biases reached significance only in the social situations (date and friends in a new city) but not in the job situation as predicted. The fact that subjects were classified into groups on the basis of problematic cognitions in heterosocial interactions adds further weight to the idea that the absence of favorable self-other biases occurs in situations that are experienced as problematic by the individual. The degree to which the relationship between causal attribution and adjustment rests on attributions about the self or on self-other differences in causal ascriptions is an interesting research question, The social comparison process is viewed as a basic human response (Sulz, 1977). Even primary school children have been shown to use social comparison information in making causal attributions (Frieze & Bar-Tal, 1980). Adequate emotional adjustment may require systematic distortions with respect to self-perceptions which enhance one’s sense of mastery and competence in relation to others. Most of the attributional studies focused on attributional biases from the self-perspective only. For example, high self-
CAUSAL
ATTRIBUTIONS
77
esteem subjects rated their performance as higher than low-esteem subjects, even though the actual outcomes did not differ (Shrauger & Terbovic, 1976). Depressed persons, unlike their nondepressed counterparts, did not have the illusion of control in a chance situation (Gollin, Terre& Weitz, & Drost, 1979). Furthermore, depressed individuals were more realistic in their self-evaluations than were members of a control group in terms of a match between self-evaluations and ratings from observers in a group interaction (Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980). There were no attributional differences on the causal dimensions of locus (internal-external) and of control. One cannot conclude, however, that social anxiety is unrelated to perceived locus and to degree of control, but rather that these causal dimensions may not differentiate groups representing extremes of an essentially normal population. In a more clinical sample of subjects with a highly similar methodology (Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982), locus as well as stability significantly differentiated the shy subjects from a comparison group in situations which were considered problematic for shy subjects (degree of control was not rated). Furthermore, a study by Girodo, Dotzenroth, and Stein (1981) which utilized a forced-choice format for eliciting causal attributions (causes were presented in pairs and subjects were asked to choose one) found that males with low scores on a Social Self-Esteem Inventory differed significantly from males with high scores on both the locus and stability dimensions. There were no group differences in self-other biases in expectancy. All subjects stated higher expectancies for the occurrence of all three negative events for others than for the self. However, the higher anxious groups had a greater expectancy for the negative events than did the low-anxious group. The only sex difference emerging in the present study was that women stated a greater likelihood of making mistakes at a new job than did men. One of the most clearly documented sex differences in the literature on achievement related attributions is the highly consistent finding that females of all ages have lower expectancies for success than do males (e.g., Crandall, 1969; Cole, King, & Newcomb, 1977; Frieze et al., 1978). The sex difference in expectancy did not occur in situations describing social interactions but only in the task related situation. The absence of a perspective x sex interaction suggests that men and women stated equivalent self-other differences in expectancies. Therefore, in the present study, the sex difference represents a generalized expectancy rather than a devaluing of the self (females) as compared with others (males). Attribution-based interventions have attempted to alter attributions by providing causal information which would lead to changes in the interpretation of events. However, there is no commonly accepted pattern
of causal attributions considered helpful in all circumstances. Furthermore, the factors that determine the utility of an attributional approach to counseling have not been delineated, with the exception of some evidence pointing to the importance of initial beliefs regarding locus of control (Altmaier, Leary, Forsyth. B Ansel, 1979; Forsyth & Forsyth. 1982). Interpretations that are congruent with client’s beliefs about their problems are more likely to influence adjustment (Claiborn, Ward, & Strong, 1981). Little is known about the conditions under which new information has an impact upon attributions that are firmly held (Kelley & Micheia, 19801. Research is needed to discover whether attributions about situations which involve negative evaluations of the self in comparison to others (those which showed anxiety x perspective interaction) require different intervention approaches than ascriptions which are similar for self and others. Future research on attributional counseling may need to focus on establishing a favorable balance (likely a biased one) between attributions about the self and about others. Counselors must be aware that a mild form of attributional distortion may be the norm, allowing individuals to regulate their sense of self-esteem. The dimension of globality unlike that of stability has not been the focus of attribution-based interventions. The current data suggest that globality is related to social anxiety. Emphasizing the situation-specific nature of interpersonal difficulties so that attributions become less global may help to reduce social anxiety. One possible explanation for the self-other discrepancies in the attributions of socially anxious subjects is that the anxiety may detract from interpersonal effectiveness and may provide evidence for negative selfevaluations. Furthermore, the self-focus produced by the anxiety may interfere with perceiving and processing interpersonal information and contributing to an unfavorable balance between evaluation of the self and others. Processing interpersonal information with clients may be helpful if the counselor guards against giving interpretations that are contrary to the available evidence and is cautious when giving causal interpretations which are likely to be rejected because they conflict with strongly held self-perceptions. REFERENCES Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P.. & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74. Altmaier, E. M., Leary, M. R., Forsyth, D. R., & Ansel, J. C. (1979). Attribution therapy: Effects of locus of control and timing of treatment. Journal of Counseling fsycho/ogy, 26, 481-486. Arnkoff, D. B., &Mahoney, M. J. (1979). The role of perceived controt in psychopathology. In L. C. Perlmuter, & R. A. Monty (Eds.), Choice andperceivad control. NJ: Edbaum. Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinicml, experimental. and theoretical aspects. New York: Harper & Row. Brockner, J.. & Hulton, A. J. B. (1978). How to reverse the vicious cycle of low selfesteem: The importance of attentional focus. Journd c~fExperimentu/ Socid P.sycholopy,
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