Social competence in the schools: Toward an integrative developmental model for intervention

DEVELOPMENTAL

REVIEW

9, 6d-lt)o (1989)

Social Competence in the Schools: Toward an Integrative Developmental Model for Intervention KEITH OWENYEATESANDROBERT Harvard

Medical

School and Graduate

L. SELMAN

School of Education,

Harvard

University

The promotion of social problem-solving skills in school-age children has been only partially successful in improving their social adjustment. The design and evaluation of training programs has been hindered by the inadequacies of most current models of social competence and its relation to social cognition. In this paper, we delineate the necessary components of a coherent model and review the shortcomings of previous approaches. We then describe a model of the development of a specific form of social competence-namely, interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS)-and its social-cognitive underpinnings. The INS model embodies several conceptual advances compared to previous models linking social cognition to social behavior: It integrates functional (information-processing) and structural (cognitive-developmental) approaches, specifies a linkage between social cognition and action within a particular domain of social interaction, and provides for developmental, individual, and contextual variations in the expression of behavior in that domain. The implications of the INS model for social problem-solving training in the schools are reviewed, together with an example of the implementation of the model in a specific educational context. The INS model may help provide a more coherent basis for the school-based delivery of developmentally appropriate interventions designed to foster children’s social skills. 8 1989 Academic

Press, Inc.

In social studies class, the teacher, Ms. Smith, assigns pairs of children to work together on a project about Africa. Two students, Bob and Steve, have different interests: Bob wants to report on wild animals, but Steve wants to report on different tribes. Ms. Smith sees that the two boys are having difictdty resolving their disagreement and wonders how best to help them solve their problem. During recess, Jennifer and Lynn are both picked to be on the same kickball team. They both want to pitch, and begin to argue about who will do so. Jennifer begins to push Lynn, saying, “I’m going to pitch! What are you going to do about it?” Mr. Jones, a teacher monitoring the playground, notices the girls arguing and wants to help them resolve the conflict in a less contentious manner. At the end of lunch one day, the assistant principal, Ms. Davis, notices that one of the cafeteria tables is particularly messy. She asks Keith, the last student sitting at

This paper was begun while the first author was supported by a National Institute of Mental Health postdoctoral research fellowship under the Research Training Program in Social and Behavioral Sciences at the Harvard Medical School. Both authors now are supported in part by grants from the Spencer Foundation and the William T. Grant Foundation. Reprint requests should be sent to either author at Judge Baker Children’s Center, 295 Longwood Ave., Boston, MA, 02115. 64 0273-2297189$3.00 Coovripht AU~&hs

8 1989 bv Academic Press. Inc. of reprodktion in any form reserved.

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the table, to clean it up before going out for recess. Keith replies that he is not responsible for the whole mess and does not want to use all his recess time cleaning the table. Ms. Davis begins to simply order Keith to comply, but then stops, and decides to negotiate in a less authoritarian manner.

Socialization is an integral part of education. Every day, teachers, principals, and other educational professionals invest as much energy in fostering children’s social development as they do in furthering academic progress. Indeed, schools provide a unique context for the promotion of social adaptation, in that children’s social interactions there usually occur under the watchful guidance of adult professionals dedicated to facilitating their charges’ overall well-being. In the past, despite the ubiquitous opportunities for socialization in schools, few systematic guidelines have been available for professionals to use in school to promote children’s social competence. The absence of such guidelines has been particularly distressing in light of accumulating evidence that documents the importance of interpersonal relationships in school as a predictor of both present and future personal adjustment (Asher, 1983; Parker & Asher, 1987; Rubin, 1983). In recent years, the study of social-cognitive development, and especially of the proposed role of social-cognitive development as a mediator of social adjustment, has spurred the growth of more systematic approaches to the promotion of social competence in school. Curricula and training programs have been designed to facilitate social development through instruction in social-cognitive domains. The most extensive efforts have focused on various social problem-solving (SPS) skills, such as alternative, means-end, and consequential thinking (e.g., Gesten, Apodata, Rains, Weissberg, & Cowen, 1979; Spivack, Platt, & Shure, 1976; Weissberg, 1985). Although promising, the results of interventions designed to build SPS skills unfortunately have been inconsistent. Training has produced changes in specific SPS skills, but few changes in broader aspects of interpersonal and personal adjustment have been obtained; and when changes in both SPS skills and social adjustment have been demonstrated, they often have not been correlated (Urbain & Kendall, 1980; Weissberg, 1985). Both conceptual and methodological factors have been proposed to explain the equivocal findings obtained by SPS training programs (Krasnor & Rubin, 1981; Urbain & Kendall, 1980; Weissberg & Gesten, 1982). From our perspective, the most telling critiques have occurred at a theoretical level. We especially concur with the argument that the inconsistent findings stem from the shortcomings of previous model of social competence and its social cognitive underpinnings (Dodge, 1985; Ford, 1986; Shantz, 1983). More specifically, previous conceptual efforts have usually

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failed in several ways: by not defining the nature of social competence; by not specifying either the social-cognitive components and processes that constitute SPS skill, or the nature of their development during childhood; and by not articulating the relationship between social competence and social cognition in specific social contexts. The present paper, therefore, is directed toward integrative model building that addresses these issues. We begin by reviewing the components necessary for a coherent model, and discussing the shortcomings of the two major previous approaches to social cognition-that is, those reflecting functional (i.e., information-processing) and structural (i.e., cognitive-developmental) perspectives- in light of these requirements. We then propose a new model, which has evolved from an ongoing program of basic and applied research on the intertwined growth of interpersonal understanding and social interaction (Selman, 1980, 1981; Selman & Demorest, 1984; Selman & Yeates, 1987). The model melds the functional and structural perspectives on social cognition, and links them to a particular aspect of social competence-namely, the development of interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS). After describing the model, we explicate its implications for future school-based interventions. Our goal is to demonstrate not only how the model can be used in formal training programs, but also how it can serve as a guideline for professionals based in educational settings to intervene informally in the kinds of ongoing, real-life problems presented at the outset. THEORETICAL

PREREQUISITES FOR AN ADEQUATE FOR INTERVENTION

MODEL

In general, the construction of a coherent theoretical model for intervention-one that adequately links SPS skills and social adjustmentrests on a specification of the nature of social competence. Definitions of social competence are legion. Social competence has been variously defined in terms of social-cognitive skills and knowledge, the regulation of affect, behavioral performances in specific contexts, judgments by self and others, and psychosocial risk (Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, dz Brown, 1986). In the end, we believe all these aspects are involved in social competence, although our emphasis on social problem-solving leads us to take as our starting point the role of social cognition. Thus, we might describe social competence as the development of the social-cognitive skills and knowledge, including the capacity for emotional control, that mediate behavioral performances in specific contexts, which are in turn judged by self and others to be successful and thereby increase the likelihood of positive psychosocial adjustment (see Ford, 1982, for a similar definition).

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This general definition of social competence is complex, and its various components require some unpacking. To begin with, social competence is ultimately defined in terms of long-term general outcomes (i.e., positive psychosocial adjustment). This point highlights the culturally bound and socially constructed nature of psychological constructs such as social competence (Gergen, 1986). In the end, social competence does not depend on a specific cognitive process or behavioral manifestation, or even on short-term judgments of success in a particular behavioral domain. Instead, it depends on the degree to which such factors lead to positive social adaptation, as defined consensually by the culture within which we live (Ford, 1986). Of course, other more immediate factors do mediate, or predict, longterm adaptation. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence that the prediction of future social adjustment is heavily dependent on judgments of social competence in the present (Hartup, 1983). These judgments have both personal and social aspects; that is, we evaluate ourselves, making judgments about our own competence, while at the same time we are evaluated by others, who also make judgments. Research and theory have suggested that both sides of the equation are important in the prediction of long-term social adjustment. Notions of self-efficacy and self-esteem (Bandura, 1977; Hatter, 1983; White, 1959), on the one hand, and of social status and popularity (Asher, 1983; Rubin, 1983), on the other, reflect the complementary and reciprocal nature of judgments of social competence as a socially constructed phenomena (see Baldwin, 1906). The grounds on which short-term judgments of success are built, in turn, be they intra- or interpersonal, do depend on actions in specific behavioral domains, such as deciding upon an activity, reacting to a provocation, or responding to a request (an example of interactions in each of these domains is presented at the outset). Dodge and his colleagues (Dodge et al., 1986) have called such actions “social tasks,” which they believe are comprised of certain social cues; we prefer a broader term, “behavioral domain,” because of our belief that the definition of a given social interaction is constructed by its participants, rather than defined by a set of purportedly objective cues (see Selman & Yeates, 1987). Regardless of the term used, the existence of these differing action domains is significant because it suggests that judgments of social competence may vary for a given child, reflecting the attainment of consistent success in some of the domains but not others; in other words, a child may be good at peer group entry, but not at resolving disagreements about activity choice. Previous attempts to reach consensus on a single detinition of social competence have been misguided precisely because they have not acknowledged that competence may vary from one domain to

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another, and is not necessarily a unitary characteristic (cf. Anderson & Messick, 1974). To complicate matters even further, even within a specific behavioral domain, the judgment of a specific action’s success may vary as a function of the social context. Thus, the best solution to a problem in a given behavioral domain may depend on the particulars of the context within which it occurs. For instance, in negotiating over the choice of several activities, it might be best for children to negotiate with higher-status peers or adults using a more deferential approach, whereas a more successful approach with lower-status or younger children might be to adopt a more assertive stance. Indeed, it is this “matching” of action and context within specific behavioral domains that is probably of the essence in securing judgments of success and goal-attainment (Dodge et al., 1986). The matching of action and context within domain is mediated itself by specific social-cognitive processes. Along with other investigators, we believe these processes involve a set of information-processing steps, which are hypothesized to occur in sequence, leading from the evaluation of a social problem to the development and implementation of a specific action and its subsequent evaluation (Ford, 1986). The process as a whole can occur consciously, although not necessarily; indeed, it is the making conscious of and consequent alteration of the process that is the cornerstone of SPS training programs, which proceed under the assumption that changes in social information-processing can lead to more effective or successful social actions, and thereby to more positive social adaptation. The adequacy of this assumption, though, depends on the ability to specify what constitutes improvement in social information-processing. The definition of social competence proposed above makes reference to the notion of “development,” which we believe should be the guide to determining whether a change is an improvement or only a difference (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). In other words, the observation of normal developmental changes in social information-processing can help to differentiate improvement in SPS skills from individual differences in SPS style, and hence provide guidelines for articulating the goals of SPS intervention. For instance, as children get older, their methods for resolving dilemmas around activity choices with another peer might be found to increasingly reflect a more balanced or reciprocal integration of both participant’s desires. Thus, doing only what one person wants might give way to taking turns and doing what both want. At any given age, though, the children’s proposed solutions also might vary in the relative emphasis given to the desires of the self as contrasted with those of others: Given an “either/or” choice, one can impose one’s wishes or submit to the

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other’s; when taking turns, one can go first or second. The former type of variability would be more likely to represent a dimension of developmental change, while the latter would probably represent individual differences in style. Of course, the description and differentiation of developmental and stylistic variations in SPS skills does not completely capture the nature of the growth of such skills. Some specification of the mechanisms or agents involved in promoting such growth is also needed. That is, it is not sufficient to describe the natural developmental progression of SPS skills; what is also necessary is some notion regarding how that progression occurs and what powers it along. This requirement is particularly important if a model is to serve as the basis for intervention, which has as its foundation the assumption that one knows how to promote change. An adequate social-cognitive model for intervention, then, must satisfy a number of criteria, which reflect the chain of linkages that lead from the development of social-cognitive skills to judgments of positive psychosocial adjustment. First, it must specify a particular behavioral domain, one in which judgments of success predict long-term social adaptation. Next, it must specify the social information-processing steps that mediate actions within this domain, with particular attention to matching of action to context. Finally, it must specify the nature of the development of those information-processing steps, both descriptively and agentially, and differentiate developmental change in those steps from other stylistic or individual-difference dimensions of variability. Clearly, the satisfaction of these criteria is not easily accomplished. In the following section, we review the adequacy of previous approaches that have attempted to link gains in social-cognitive and social-behavioral competence. These approaches can be grouped into two major categories, representing functional (i.e., information-processing) and structural (i.e., cognitive-developmental) perspectives on social cognition. ADEQUACY

OF PREVIOUS MODELS

FOR INTERVENTION

Functional Perspectives In the study of most psychological phenomena, certain theoretical and empirical endeavors can usually be identified as groundbreaking. As regards the study of SPS skills, the groundbreaking work was undertaken by Spivack, Shure, and their colleagues at the Hahneman Medical College (Spivack et al., 1976; Spivack & Shure, 1985). These investigators began from a functionalist perspective; that is, their work reflected the assumption that children decide how to solve interpersonal conflicts via the application of a number of discrete social information-processing operations. A child’s social competence, therefore, was taken as reflective of the adequacy of those cognitive operations.

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Working primarily with preschool children, this group identified a number of specific social information-processing operations, such as the ability to specify means-end relationships, consequences for social actions, and alternative strategies for resolving interpersonal problems. They related quantitative aspects of these operations to measures of personal adjustment. They also designed intervention programs intended to train teachers to foster the operations in school-age children as a direct means of promoting social adjustment and preventing the emergence of maladaptive forms of social behavior. In general, the results of research in this tradition were inconsistent, and did not establish a clear link between social information-processing operations and social competence or adjustment. Although efforts by the Philadelphia group showed a relationship between SPS skills and adjustment (e.g., Platt, Spivack, Altman, & Peizer, 1974; Shure & Spivack, 1980; Shure, Spivack, & Jaeger, 1971), other researchers reported less convincing findings (e.g., Gillespie, Durlak, & Sherman, 1982; Gesten, Rains, Rapkin, Weissberg, Flores de Apodaca, Cowen, & Bowen, 1982). Intervention programs were successful in promoting SPS skills, but only occasionally affected adjustment as well, and showed little if any evidence of a link between the two kinds of change (Elardo & Caldwell, 1979; Shure & Spivack, 1979; Weissberg, Gesten, Camike, Toro, Rapkin, Davidson, & Cowen, 1981a; Weissberg, Gesten, Rapkin, Cowen, Davidson, Flores de Apodaca, & McKim, 1981b). These inconsistencies, we believe, reflect the failure of early functionalist theories concerning the relationship between SPS skills and social competence to meet the criteria described earlier for an adequate model for intervention. To begin with, the early theories did not specify a particular behavioral domain within which the social information-processing operations occur; instead, the implicit assumption was that the socialcognitive operations generalized across most if not all domains of social behavior. The early models also did not describe the process by which the operations worked together as an ordered system to match action to context; the operations apparently worked separately and in isolation, rather than as a coherent group in an interrelated temporal sequence. Perhaps most importantly, though, the early models did not articulate the nature of developmental change in the operations or differentiate developmental change from stylistic variation; “better” was usually equated with “ more,” agents of change were unidentified, and variations in form were barely acknowledged, much less differentiated as developmental or stylistic. When measuring “alternative solutions,” for example, the number of relevant solutions proposed by a child was the basic score. Only limited provisions were available for sorting solutions into qualitatively different categories, using a classification system that did not dif-

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ferentiate developmental and stylistic variations. Instead, more solutions were assumed to be better; short of direct teaching to increase the number of available solutions, moreover, mechanisms for growth in this skill were unclear. Recently, some significant advances have occurred in functionalist approaches to the linkage between social cognition and social competence. These advances are well represented in the work of Dodge and his colleagues (1985, 1986). According to this group, social competence is a function of a social exchange process. The process begins with a social task, which is comprised of a set of social cues in a specific situation. In order to respond to the demands of a particular social task, the child engages in a ordered set of information-processing steps: encoding the social cues; interpreting the cues; generating potential behavioral responses to the interpreted cues; evaluating the possible responses and choosing one; and enacting the chosen response. The child’s social behavior is then processed as a social cue itself by other children or adults, who both make judgments of competence and respond with further social behavior, continuing a reciprocal cycle. For example, a child might desire to enter a peer group that is playing kickball on the playground. According to this model, the child would first encode various cues, potentially including both relevant and irrelevant ones (e.g., the number of children playing, their facial expressions, their clothing, and the presence or absence of a teacher nearby). The next step would be to give some meaning to the cues, or to “make sense” of the situation. The child might interpret a peer’s scowl upon approaching the group as personal hostility, or perhaps as coincidental to exasperation with the game. After interpreting the specific cues, the child would then generate one or more potential responses, such as asking if he or she can play, grabbing the ball, or waiting to be invited. These alternatives would next be evaluated, and a particular choice made and finally enacted. Thus, the child might ask to play after deciding that such an approach would be more likely to be successful than grabbing the ball and quicker than waiting to be invited. This model has recently been applied with impressive results in several behavioral domains, such as peer group entry and response to a provocation. Dodge and his colleagues (Dodge et al., 1986) have shown that domain-specific measures of each of the proposed information-processing steps predict specific actions within that domain, but not others, and that these measures predict adaptation. Thus, measures of each problemsolving step were derived within two domains, peer group entry and response to a provocation, by interviewing children about videotaped stimuli that presented examples of behavior in each domain. The measures of each step made independent contributions to the prediction of

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adult-judged competence within domain, but did not predict the child’s competence in the opposite domain. Additionally, actions in both domains were related to peer judgments of social status. The conceptual approach advocated by Dodge has not been used to construct an intervention program yet, although the results thus far suggest that such efforts hold promise. The model comes much closer to meeting the criteria described earlier, in that it specifies particular behavioral domains, ones in which actions are linked to judgments of social competence. Additionally, it spells out the process by which a set of information-processing steps leads to the selection of a particular action in a given context in those domains. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental way in which this approach and others like it in the functionalist tradition (McFall, 1982; Rubin & Krasnor, 1986) are lacking. Specifically, they fail to satisfy the third criteria outlined above, which is to articulate the nature of the development of the information-processing steps, and to differentiate developmental change in those steps from other stylistic dimensions of variation (Gottman, 1986). In Dodge’s (Dodge et al., 1986) work, for instance, alternative solutions in specific behavior domains are rated by adults along 5-step scales. At best, these ratings are only implicitly linked to any notion of developmental progress; how a child learns to generate “better” strategies is even less clear. Thus, one of the core deficiencies of the functionalist tradition as a whole is its adevelopmental cast; this is especially apparent when contrasted with work in the structural tradition, to which we now turn our attention. Structural Perspectives The foundation of the structural, or cognitive-developmental, perspective was laid by Piaget (1983), who proposed that children’s cognitive operations could be viewed as traversing a universal and invariant sequence of stages. These stages consisted of qualitatively distinct cognitive structures (or schematas), which serve to organize thought in an increasingly differentiated and integrated fashion. Development through the stages was proposed to result from a process of interaction between the organism and its environment, with conflict between the cognitive and environmental structures powering growth toward a more balanced, or equilibrated, stage of organization. The groundbreaking application of Piagetian ideas in the realm of social cognition was made by Kohlberg (1969). He suggested that socialcognitive development could be understood to reflect the restructuring of the concept of self in its relationship to concepts of other people, with growth represented by increased reciprocity between the self s actions

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and those of others toward the self. He then applied these notions to the realm of moral thought and described a now famous sequence of six stages of moral judgment that were derived from interviews with children and adults about hypothetical moral dilemmas. Social competence, at least in terms of moral action, was thought to be mediated by progress through the stages. The cognitive-developmental approach to social competence, as exemplified by Kohlberg’s work, was extended to numerous other types of social cognition, including conceptions of self (Damon & Hart, 1982), friendship (Selman, 1980), and social rules and conventions (Turiel, 1983). In these and other diverse areas, sequences of cognitive stages were described in considerable detail, and proposed to underlie socialbehavioral competencies. Only in a few instances, though, were individual differences in progress through the stages related to various aspects of social behavior, particularly those thought to index personal adjustment. Moreover, although structural theories served with some frequency as the foundation for school-based training programs designed to produce cognitive-developmental growth (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Reimer, Paolitto, & Hersch, 183) only a few of these training efforts were explicitly designed to facilitate increases in specified forms of adaptive behavior (Blasi, 1980; Reimer & Power, 1980). Not surprisingly, then, the results of these research efforts were mixed and did not convincingly establish cognitive-developmental growth as the basis for social competence or adjustment. We would contend that these mixed findings resulted from the failure of early structural theories to meet the necessary criteria for an adequate model of intervention. Although structural theories have naturally shown a much greater appreciation for developmental change than their functional counterparts, their emphasis has usually been descriptive, and they have often failed to address the means by which growth occurs. Structural-developmental theories also have fallen even shorter of recent functional theories with regard to other criteria for an adequate model. First, they have generally not specified the particular behavioral domains to which they apply; they have instead described social-cognitive growth in broad areas such as moral judgment, interpersonal understanding, or self-concept and left the behavioral domains within which such growth is relevant fuzzy at best. Structural theories also have not described the information-processing steps that underlie the application of cognitive schemata to social contexts, much less the process by which these steps facilitate the matching of specific actions to contexts. In other words, the linkage between cognitive-developmental growth and social competence is unclear, because structural theories have not articulated the information-processing steps that link developmental growth in cog-

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nition and action, the means by which such growth occurs, or the behavioral domains within which it occurs. Some recent advances in structural theorizing have partially overcome these shortcomings. These advances, which stress the importance of the enactment of understanding in context (Shantz, 1983), are represented in the past work of the second author, together with various associates (Selman, 1980; Selman & Schultz, 1988; Selman & Yeates, 1987). In earlier work, he proposed that interpersonal understanding proceeds through a series of stages that reflect increasing differentiation and integration of the social perspectives of self and other. He and his colleagues built on this earlier work by suggesting that actions in a particular behavioral domain-that is, the negotiation strategies used to resolve interpersonal conflict-vary developmentally in terms of the increasing sophistication of social perspective coordination. Interpersonal negotiation strategies that reflect more advanced levels of social perspective coordination are assumed to lead to more successful outcomes, although the specific strategies that reflect a given level can vary from individual to individual in terms of the relative priority given the needs of self versus those of others. This model has not been fully validated, although developmental variations in interpersonal negotiation strategies have been shown to be related to age and IQ (Selman, Beardslee, Schultz, Krupa, & Podorefsky, 1986); to vary as a function of specific contextual factors, such as with whom one is negotiating (e.g., a peer or an adult) and in what setting the negotiation is occurring (e.g., at school or at work; Selman et al., 1986); and to predict various indices of social adjustment, including social status (Beardslee, Schultz, & Selman, 1987; Yeates, Schultz, & Selman, 1988). In addition, the model has served as a useful foundation for an ongoing program of clinical intervention with dyads of emotionally disturbed children, albeit one that has not been the target of a large-group experimental evaluation (Lyman & Selman, 1985; Selman & Demorest, 1984). We currently believe that the apparent potential of this model for guiding intervention stems from its capacity to more fully meet the criteria described earlier. That is, the model specifies a particular behavioral domain, one in which actions are linked to judgments of social competence, and provides for a differentiation between developmental and stylistic variations in the cognitive structures that underlie those actions. Still, this approach, and others like it in the structural tradition, continue to fall short in a critical fashion. That is, they fail to satisfy several criteria outlined earlier, which is to specify the information-processing steps that underlie the performance of specific actions, the process by which such steps work to match action to context, and the mechanisms that promote the development of the steps.

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The Need for Integration The major shortcomings of current structural approaches, then, are in many ways complementary to those of recent functional perspectives. Functional theories place a heavy emphasis on the specification of information-processing steps and are now examining how those steps work as a system to select actions in specific behavioral domains. However, they do not specify the nature or means of developmental growth in the information-processing steps and how that growth differs from other dimensions of variation. Structural theories, on the other hand, are strong in terms of describing developmental progress in social cognition and are beginning to examine the association between such progress and behavior in specific behavioral domains. They fail as adequate models, though, because they do not articulate the information-processing steps that link specific actions and contexts or the means by which these steps undergo developmental growth. Put slightly differently, functional approaches emphasize the adaptive nature of a child’s social-cognitive processes. They are concerned with whether social actions based on social information-processing are “successful,” with success defined by the consensus of external socialization agents. Structural models, on the other hand, tend to relegate behavioral adaptation to secondary status and to emphasize the child’s level of conceptual understanding. They focus on the epistemological sophistication of the child’s operational social knowledge--that is, the developmental complexity of their understanding of social processes and relationships. What is needed, then, is an integration of the two approaches that combines their strengths. In the following section, we present a model that attempts to achieve this goal. The model relies on earlier work by the second author and his colleagues on the development of interpersonal negotiation strategies, but represents a significant advance over that work in that it integrates rather than simply overlays a functional perspective (cf. Selman et al., 1986). In so doing, we believe, the model meets the criteria for an adequate model for intervention described earlier, and in its application should lead to more successful outcomes in programs designed to foster the development of SPS skills. THE INTERPERSONAL

NEGOTIATION

STRATEGY

(INS) MODEL

The model we wish to describe is concerned with a specific behavioral domain-namely, interpersonal negotiation strategies. Interpersonal negotiations strategies are the means by which an individual tries to meet personal needs via interaction with another individual when both partic-

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ipants’ needs are in conflict. In other words, interpersonal negotiation strategies serve to resolve the felt conflict, or intra- and interpersonal disequilibrium, that sometimes arises in interactions with other individuals when trying to accomplish a personal goal. Examples abound in children’s social interactions in school: One student tries to get another to work with him, to convince a new friend to try a favorite activity, or to assert power in a peer group. At first glance, the domain of interpersonal negotiation strategies may seem poorly defined, given that it spans many different types of interactions. Social development can be construed as proceeding simultaneously along two interrelated pathways-one involving themes of intimacy and self-abnegation, and the other themes of autonomy and self-assertion (Ford, 1986; Selman & Yeates, 1987). These pathways are not in opposition or exclusive of each other, but instead represent two complementary directions in interpersonal development, one toward integration and the other toward differentiation. Interpersonal negotiation strategies encompass many of the behavioral manifestations of the latter mode of functioning. In this regard, the domain of interpersonal negotiations spans a wide range of specific social interactions, and so may appear difftcult to specify with precision, thereby failing to meet one of the criteria described earlier for an adequate model for intervention. The concept of interpersonal negotiation seems intuitively attractive, however; and, although interpersonal negotiations overlap with other behavioral domains in some cases, they do not encompass all social interactions and therefore can be meaningfully differentiated. For instance, the second vignette presented at the outset sets the stage for a response to a provocation as well as for a negotiation strategy; in contrast, most forms of sharing and helping do not fall in the domain of negotiation. Thus, despite its broad nature, independent observers of dyadic interactions between children have been able, with good agreement, to differentiate contexts within which interpersonal negotiations are occurring from those within which they are not (Lyman 8z Selman, 1985; Selman & Demorest, 1984). Notably, such contexts are far from static; they can involve a series of strategies employed from moment to moment by the participants, whose affective and motivational characteristics may also vary. The context merely is the frame within which such negotiations occur. When such contexts are specified, variations in the types of interpersonal negotiation strategies that children and adolescents profess to employ in such contexts have been related to measures of overall adaptive functioning. In one study, for instance, the overall adaptive functioning of adolescents with affectively disordered parents was related to their overall level of INS development (Beardslee et al., 1988). A more recent study

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replicated this finding in a general sample of public-school children; perhaps more importantly, though, children’s overall level of INS development was also related to peer nominations elicited from their classmates (Yeates et al., 1988). Further validation of the INS model is needed, particularly by relating direct behavioral observations of goal attainment in interpersonal situations to INS development. At present, though, it appears that the domain of interpersonal negotiation strategies is meaningful, and that actions in the INS domain are related to broader measures of competence. The isolation of a particular social-behavioral domain, though, even one that is related to broader aspects of adaptive functioning, is not sufficient to meet the criteria described earlier for an adequate model for intervention. Another requirement is that the development of this behavior be characterized, both descriptively and agentially, and that dimensions of growth be differentiated from other individual-difference or “stylistic” dimensions of variability. In the INS model, the development of interpersonal negotiation strategies is thought of as proceeding through a series of four levels. These levels reflect behavioral manifestations of variations in the sophistication with which social perspectives are coordinated. Table 1 provides a brief description of the four levels of social-perspective coordination, which can be seen to follow a course of increasing differentiation and integration in the capacity to view oneself as situated in broader social contexts that involve multiple perspectives (Selman, 1980). According to the INS model, interpersonal negotiation strategies involve the enactment of the capacity to coordinate social perspectives. Any particular strategy, therefore, can be classified according to the underlying level of social-perspective coordination it reflects, with higher level strategies reflecting more sophisticated social-perspective coordination. More broadly, the development of interpersonal negotiation strategies across time is enabled by progress in the capacity to coordinate social perspectives. Table 2 provides a brief description of the four levels of interpersonal negotiation and their cognitive underpinnings. Cognitive-developmental theories have been criticized for terming more sophisticated levels of development “higher” or “better.” Part of the problem has been a failure to answer the question: Better in what? One underlying assumption of the INS model is that higher level strategies involve a more thorough consideration and balancing of the participants’ perspectives and hence are more likely to lead to mutually satisfying outcomes. Of course, we acknowledge that higher level strategies may not always be necessary or even adaptive in all contexts. Still, given that higher level strategies are “better” in terms of the amount of interpersonal understanding they reflect in a given social context, we believe

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YEATES AND SELMAN TABLE 1 FOUR LEVELS OF SOCIAL-PERSPECTIVE COORDINATION

Level 0: Egocentric and undifferentiated At Level 0, physical and psychological characteristics of persons are not clearly differentiated. This confusion between objective/physical and subjective/psychological features is seen in the failure to distinguish between acts and feelings, and unintentional and intentional behavior. Subjective perspectives are not differentiated, so that the possibility that another person may interpret the same behavior differently is not recognized. Level 1: Subjective and unilateral The key conceptual advance from Level 0 to Level 1 is the clear differentiation of physical and psychological characteristics of persons. Each person is acknowledged to have a unique, subjective, and covert psychological life. Subjective states of others, however, are thought to be directly observable. The relating of perspectives, moreover, is accomplished in one-way, unilateral fashion, in terms of the perspective of only one actor and the impact of social interaction on him or her. Level 2: Self reflective and reciprocal The major conceptual progression as compared to Level 1 is the ability to step outside oneself mentally and take a second-person perspective on one’s thoughts and actions, along with the realization that others can do so as well. People are understood to be capable of acting in opposition to their thoughts and feelings. Differences between perspectives are seen relativistically. A reciprocity occurs, wherein the perspectives of self and other are both appreciated, albeit not in relationship to one another. Level 3: Third person and mutual Level 3 reflects an advance over Level 2 in that children come to be able to step outside not only their own immediate perspective but indeed outside the self as a system. They can begin to take a truly third-person perspective. The self is seen as both actor and object, as are others. The perspective on relationships simultaneously includes and coordinates the perspective of self and other(s), and the system is seen from a generalized perspective. Reciprocal perspectives are not only acknowledged, but seen to be in need of mutual coordination.

that such strategies are likely in general to lead to “better” social adjustment. Ultimately, though, this is an empirical issue; and, as we have already mentioned, INS development does appear to be linked to various measures of social competence. The developmental nature of interpersonal negotiation strategies can be usefully juxtaposed with another dimension of individual-difference variability along which such strategies also can be arrayed. In describing this dimension, we have coined the terms “self-transforming” and “othertransforming.” The terms are intended to characterize the ends of a continuum across which strategies vary in the relative priority given to achieving one’s own as opposed to the other’s needs. Self-transforming strategies relegate the self s needs to a position of secondary importance vis-a-vis the other’s, while other-transforming strategies assert the primacy of the self.

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TABLE 2 FOUR LEVELS or= INTERPERSONAL NEGOTIATIONSTRATEGIES Level 0: Impulsive Strategies at the first level involve primarily impulsive and physical behavior to get what one wants or to avoid harm. They are based on Level 0 perspective-taking skills, which do not differentiate subjective perspectives or distinguish between actions and feelings. Strategies at this level use either unreflective force to achieve a goal, or unreflective obedience or withdrawal to protect oneself. Level 1: Unilateral Strategies at the next level consist primarily of unilateral attempts to either control or appease the other person. They depend on Level 1 perspective-taking skills, which differentiate subjective perspectives, but do not allow them to be considered simultaneously. Thus, strategies at this level involve either willful one-way orders to assert power, control the other person, and satisfy oneself, or “will-less” submission to the power, control, and wishes of the other person. Level 2: Reciprocal Strategies at this level involve attempts to satisfy the needs of both participants in reciprocal fashion through trades, exchanges, and deals. They rely on Level 2 perspective-taking, which not only differentiates between subjective perspectives, but also allows those perspectives to be considered simultaneously. Reciprocal strategies consciously use either psychological influence to change the other person’s mind, or psychological compliance to protect one’s own interests by making them secondary to the other person’s. Level 3: Collaborative Strategies at the highest level involve attempts to collaboratively change both one’s own and the other person’s wishes in order to develop mutual goals. These strategies rest on Level 3 perspective-taking skills, which permit the ability to coordinate the self s and the other’s perspectives in terms of the relationship between them or from a third-person viewpoint. At this level, strategies use self-reflection and shared reflection to facilitate the process of dialogue that leads to compromise and the construction of mutually satisfactory resolutions. They demonstrate concerns for a relationship’s continuity and the understanding that solutions to immediate problems have a bearing in that regard.

Variations in the selection of self- as opposed to other-transforming strategies are thought of as reflecting complementary ways of exercising control and autonomy in contexts for negotiation (cf. Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). In that regard, this component of the INS model is loosely linked to what appears to be a rather ubiquitous dimension of interpersonal orientation, which has been described in various ways in numerous conceptual frameworks, but that generally captures individual differences in preferences for changing one’s environment as opposed to one’s self (cf. assimilative/accommodative, Block, 1982; externalizing/internalizing, Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978). In keeping with work in these related areas, our work to date suggests

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that development across this dimension proceeds to a more balanced, less extreme repertoire of negotiation strategies. Indeed, such variations in the nature of strategies lead us specifically to avoid value-laden terms such as “submissive” and “assertive” in characterizing its endpoints. That is, we find that other-transforming strategies range from aggression to authoritarianism to persuasion across the developmental levels, while self-transforming strategies range from passivity and withdrawal to obedience to deference. Table 3 illustrates how the dimensions of developmental level and interpersonal orientation can be combined in a framework that allows specific types of negotiation strategies to be classified in a developmentally meaningful fashion. Grabbing, for instance, is usually classified as Level 0 because of its impulsive, physicalistic nature, which reflects a lack of perspective taking. In contrast, bullying most often is classified as Level 1, because it relies more on the assertion of power and threat of harm than on outright, unthinking aggression, reflecting a differentiation of perspectives but an inability to coordinate and balance them. The resultant classification also demonstrates how strategies that appear very different in terms of overt action, because they reflect opposite interpersonal orientations, nonetheless can reflect similar levels of developmental sophistication in perspective coordination. Bullying and giving in, for example, are very different in style, but both typically reflect an “either-or” level of perspective-coordination. Such portrayals highlight the ability of the INS model to differentiate developmental change from individual differences, which is another of the criteria for an adequate model for designing SPS intervention program. The classification of negotiation strategies according to developmental level and interpersonal orientation, however, is not always so straightforward. Because strategies are ultimately classified according to the level of perspective-taking that underlies them, apparently identical forms of behavior can be classified at different developmental levels depending on the underlying integration of the participants’ perspectives. In a context involving object choice, for instance, trades or exchanges are often classified at Level 2, because they are typically fueled by a desire to balance the needs of both participants in an interaction. However, if a child offered to trade his toy for another child’s, but did so purely because he was bored with his own and feared punishment for simply grabbing the other child’s, then the strategy would be classified as Level 1 instead. That is, the use of higher level perspective-taking skills, as construed here, has a motivational as well as cognitive component--one not only realizes that the other child may object to losing his toy, but desires to replace that loss in an equitable fashion. In order for the INS model to serve as an adequate foundation for an

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TABLE 3 A CLASSIFICATIONSCHEMEFORCHILDREN’S INTERPERSONAL NEGOTIATIONSTRATEGIES(INS) Developmental level of INS 0: Impulsive 1: Unilateral 2: Reciprocal 3: Collaborative

Interpersonal orientation of INS Self-transforming

Other-transforming

Fight; grab; hit Whine; flee; hide Obey; give in; wait for help Command; bully; order; tell Give reasons; persuade; Ask for reasons; barter; go first go second Collaborate, reflecting mutual needs and nature of relationship

intervention program, of course, it must do more than describe the nature of developmental variation; it also must specify the means by which such variation occurs. According to the model, developmental variability, in terms of both growth and regression, is a direct result of the ongoing implementation of the information-processing steps and the specific knowledge they represent, because they underlie the application of perspective-taking skills in contexts for negotiation. To describe exactly how this happens, therefore, we must first describe these steps and their operation. In the INS model, the functional process is divided into four sequential steps presented in Table 4. These steps are similar in many ways to those isolated and described by other researchers concerned with constructing functional SPS models (Dodge, 1985; Spivack et al., 1976). Like other workers in this area, we believe that this similarity across different research efforts may reflect the extent to which such steps have some basis in the neural pathways by which social information is processed (Dodge et al., 1986; cf. Ross, 1985). That is, the steps appear to have a certain biological “realness,” following a logical sequence from perception (i.e., defining the problem) to memory (i.e., generating alternative strategies) to action (i.e., selecting and implementing a strategy) to appraisal (i.e., evaluating consequences). Of course, the proposition that the information-processing system outlined above is in some sense real, rather than simply a useful heuristic, is not uncontroversial. Indeed, everyday observations suggest otherwise. For instance, young children do not seem obviously to engage in such a process, especially in stressful situations like those involving interpersonal conflict. Instead, their behavior often appears unthoughtful. Adults, on the other hand, may simply play out fairly automatized scripts or roles in their resolution of social conflict and not require a reflective mode of problem-solving. Yet we would argue that these examples do not belie the INS model. To

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FOUR FUNCTIONAL STEPSIN THE INS MODEL Step 1: Defining the problem This step refers to the ability to define with accuracy the nature of the social problem at hand. Across the INS levels, this step changes from a definition that is largely physicalistic (e.g., “He won’t give me the ball”) to one concerned more with interpersonal relationships (e.g., “I want to maintain our friendship although I don’t appreciate this apparent selfishness”). The manner in which the problem is defined helps clarify the goal of the negotiation process. Step 2: Generating alternative strategies This step refers to the ability to think of more than one potential strategy that may solve the problem at hand. This step changes across the INS levels from an insistence on simple physicalistic strategies (e.g., “I’ll grab the ball”) to the development of a repertoire of strategies that reflect the increasing ability first to acknowledge and coordinate reciprocal social perspectives and second to balance interpersonal orientations (e.g., “First I’ll ask if I can play with him; if that doesn’t work, I’ll offer to share my cassette tapes; and if that doesn’t work, maybe I’ll grab the ball”). Step 3: Selecting and implementing specific strategy This step refers to the ability to choose and enact a particular strategy from the pool of available alternatives. This capacity depends on the ability to anticipate the consequences of the alternatives, and to plan the specific means by which they could be implemented. This step changes from a restricted focus on primarily physicalistic consequences for the self, with little ability to plan and carry out longer sequences of specific behaviors to accomplish a goal (e.g., the child sits passively, thinking, “If I grab it, he’ll beat me up”), to a broader consideration of the consequences, both physical and psychological for self and other, together with an appreciation of the multiple steps that may be required to fashion a particular solution (e.g., the child waits, thinking, “If I grab the ball, he may beat me up. He certainly would be angry and never include me again. Besides, my mother would be upset if I go into a fight, and that would make me sad. In any case, I wouldn’t be able to keep the ball very long anyhow”). The broadening of anticipated consequences and planning of means affects the ability to modulate strategies to meet the demands of new social contexts. Step 4: Evaluating outcomes This final step refers to the ability to evaluate the outcomes of specific negotiation strategies and processes. Development in this step proceeds from a tendency to evaluate results in simple and absolute physical terms (e.g., “I didn’t get the ball”) to the ability to weigh outcomes in a more complex and relativistic fashion that accounts for more psychological variables and acknowledges the role of time in determining results (e.g., “I didn’t get the ball, but my friend is more accepting of me now, and we should be better friends in the future; besides, I can play with the ball later”). The ability to evaluate outcomes with increasing sophistication implies a growing talent for line-tuning negotiation strategies in response to feedback from the environment.

begin with, “unthoughtful” behavior does not necessarily lack cognitive underpinnings; the cognitive process may simply not occur in a conscious, reflective manner. Indeed, we believe that the steps are not always used in a conscious fashion, and would assert that two phenomena

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account primarily for variations in the degree of consciousness in the use of the problem-solving steps. The first produces recurrent fluctuations in reflectivity, while the second yields a general developmental trend first toward greater, and then toward less, reflectivity. The first phenomena is the occurrence of developmental transitions from one level to another. As we describe later, developmental transitions are most likely to occur when lower level strategies fail. Actual progress, though, requires that the child consider why the lower level strategies have failed; that is, the child must “rethink” his social problem-solving. Otherwise, further lower level strategies will be enacted. As a consequence, the degree to which a child uses the social problem-solving steps in a reflective fashion in a given situation depends on whether the chosen strategy represents a developmental level that is already consolidated and whether the strategy is successful. The more consolidated the developmental level, and the more successful the strategy, the less likely is conscious reflection. Throughout development, then, natural fluctuations should occur in the degree to which the social-problem solving steps are employed consciously. Along with these fluctuations, though, is a general trend, first toward and then away from reflection. The young child who acts out Level 0 strategies usually does so in a fairly impulsive, physicalistic fashion and appears to conflate the problem-solving steps. Development, though, as described above, requires a greater differentiation of the problem-solving steps and hence engenders an early trend toward more conscious awareness of the social problem-solving process. Development also brings with it, however, a greater repertoire of strategies, including higher level (and presumably more effective) strategies, which across time become practiced and automatized. In other words, the capacity to act in a more scripted or role-like fashion grows, lessening the likelihood of reflective problem-solving. Opposing the early trend away from impulsive toward reflective problem-solving, then, is a later tendency to produce more scripted responses. This general developmental trend, though, is punctuated by fluctuations in conscious reflection as children make transitions from one developmental level to another. Overall, variability in the conscious use of the problem-solving steps in the INS model reflect an ongoing ontogenetic process of differentiation and integration, such as that described by Werner (1957). We want to acknowledge that these notions are hypothetical; we have no data to either confirm or disconfirm them. But they are empirically verifiable, and will be the focus of further research. For instance, our impression is that we can use interview procedures to identify children who are making a transition from one developmental level to another.

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According to the arguments made above, such children should use the information-processing steps in a more reflective fashion, which we assume should lead to longer latencies to response in contexts of social conflict than are shown by nontransitional peers. Observational studies of children in naturally occurring contexts of social conflict could provide a test of this hypothesis. By way of contrast, we do have findings to meet a somewhat different objection to the information-processing notions in the INS modelnamely, that the steps do not operate as a coherent and ordered system, but instead are simply separate domains of specific knowledge. The uniqueness of the steps in the INS model stems precisely from the manner in which they are integrated with the developmental dimension already described. More specifically, each step is differentiated into four developmental levels, each of which can be enacted in a fashion that reflects any of the four levels of social perspective coordination (see Table 5). In a given situation, however, the level at which each of the steps is enacted is not independent. We expect a reasonable degree of structural coherence based on the underlying level of social perspective-taking, despite contextual variability across situations that may be a function of several factors, including specific knowledge about that situation. In this regard, our concept of developmental level has much in common with that of Fischer (1983). In a recent study (Yeates et al., 1988), certain findings supported these notions. Younger and older children participated in an interview about different hypothetical contexts for negotiation, from which measures of the developmental level of each of the problem-solving steps in each context were derived. Analyses showed that the children’s scores for each problem-solving step collapsed across dilemmas did not vary significantly, while their scores for each dilemma collapsed across problemsolving steps were significantly different; and no interaction between problem-solving step and context for negotiation was reliable. In other words, within a given context, children tended to use the steps at the same developmental level, despite systematic and predictable variation in the average level across contexts. This finding, we think, supports the idea that the problem-solving steps are more than simply separate forms of domain-specific knowledge, but instead work as a structurally coherent system. We cannot prove currently that the steps work in the sequential fashion hypothesized, although we believe that logical arguments in support of this notion are rather compelling and find additional basis in current knowledge regarding neuropsychological functioning (Moskovitch, 1979). Regardless, the steps do appear to be interdependent, reflecting in any given instance an underlying level of social perspective-taking.

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TABLE 5 DEVELOPMENTAL

DIFFERENTIATION

OF THE FOUR FUNCTIONAL Functional

Level

1

STEPS

step

2

3

4

0

Problem defined in physical terms, without reference to psychological states

Strategies are physical, with little differentiation of impulse and action

A strategy is selected to immediately gratify or protect the self

Outcomes are evaluated based on immediate needs of self

1

Problem is defined in terms of either the self s or the other’s needs

A strategy is chosen to please self or other in the short-term

2

Problem defined by contrasting both self and other’s needs, at the same time

Strategies emphasize assertion of power or appeasement, without balance Strategies stress satisfying both participants in a “just” fashion

Outcomes evaluated based on personal satisfaction of either self or other Outcomes evaluated on basis of balance, with an emphasis on a fair exchange

3

Problem defined in terms of mutual goals and long-term relationship

Strategies reflect collaboration, with goals shared by self and other

A strategy is selected to satisfy self and other, and their relationship A strategy is chosen to optimize sense of collaboration and to sustain relationship

Outcomes are evaluated in terms of long-term effects on relationship

The enactment of each of the steps in a given context for negotiation, then, whether at a conscious level or not, depends on the underlying level of perspective-taking, combined with specific knowledge about the particular situation. Let us consider the operation of each of the steps in turn. The first step is defining the problem. The youngster who faces a situation of intra- and inter-personal disequilibrium in a social setting-that is, a context for negotiation-must make sense of the context before acting. His or her understanding of the problem, though, will vary as a function of the capacity for perspective coordination. As Table 5 illustrates, the definition of the problem is not understood as separate from its immediate solution at the egocentric or undifferentiated level of perspective-taking (i.e., Level 0). At the reciprocal or self-reflective level of perspectivetaking (i.e., Level 2), by way of contrast, the problem is defined in terms that take both parties’ viewpoints into account in a balanced fashion.

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Consistent with the nature of developmental progress in perspective coordination (Selman, 1980), our research to date indicates that an important characteristic of higher level definitions of interpersonal problems is an increased emphasis on the intrapsychic feelings and thoughts of the participants, as opposed to a reliance on descriptions of their physical characteristics, overt behavior, or preferred activities. Higher-level definitions are also more likely to refer to the nature of the social relationship between the participants in the negotiation, rather than to each party’s individual status. Returning to the first vignette, for instance, a child might define the disagreement over the topic of the report in terms of relative power, with the understanding that only one participant can really be satisfied (Level 1). Alternatively, he or she might realize that both children have legitimate interests, seek some way to incorporate them into the report while working together, and so help insure a better grade for both (Level 2). After defining the problem, the next information-processing step is to generate possible alternative strategies. We have already described how specific types of interpersonal negotiation strategies reflect the four levels of social perspective-taking and vary in their relative emphasis on the self s and other’s needs. In enacting this functional step, then, the child selects from his or her available repertoire of strategies all those that he or she judges may serve to resolve the conflict. Children who are more advanced developmentally may generate only one strategy, relying on a scripted or automatized response, but they usually have a number of strategies available that represent a range of perspective-taking levels and vary in their interpersonal orientation. Less sophisticated children typically will be more restricted in the range of perspective-taking levels that are represented and may be more rigid in their preference for a particular orientation. After the possible alternative strategies have been generated, the next step is to choose and implement a specific strategy. Why should a child choose to perform one strategy rather than another? We believe the choice and implementation of a specific strategy is grounded in the ability to anticipate consequences and in the capacity to specify the means by which a strategy will be enacted in a particular situation. In choosing a specific strategy from a pool of alternatives, a child reviews the various alternatives and picks the one that is judged or felt most likely to resolve the problem as he or she defines it, provided that the strategy is considered reasonable in that context (e.g., the means for its performance are available). In other words, the child’s choice of strategy is likely to parallel the level of perspective-taking reflected in his or her definition of the problem. However, this will not always be the case. The child may choose a

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less sophisticated strategy for several reasons. For instance, a lower level strategy might be judged less time-consuming or more efficient and just as likely to lead to a satisfying outcome. Alternatively, a higher level strategy could be understood to be preferable but not be considered feasible in the specific context, perhaps because the means to implement it are unclear or because the other child with whom the negotiation is occurring is unlikely to respond to a higher-level strategy. Finally, a lower level strategy might be chosen impulsively, with little reflection, perhaps because a high level of affective arousal leads to a failure to consider other alternatives, or simply because of its salience. Thus, the review of alternatives in terms of anticipated consequences and feasibility may be more or less reflective, and more or less complete, depending on the circumstances of the given conflictual situation. The selection of lower level strategies often reflects a less complete and less reflective consideration of those factors, while the selection of higher level strategies typically involves a more thorough review, which may be done reflectively but may also occur rather automatically because of higher level children’s capacity for matching action to context in a scriptlike fashion. The final step in the INS model involves evaluating the outcome of the chosen strategy. The criteria for evaluating the outcome of a chosen strategy also vary according to the child’s level of perspective coordination (see Table 5). Evaluations based on lower levels of perspectivetaking usually take into account only one person’s needs, with little attention to the relationship itself, while those at higher levels balance both person’s needs and attend to implications for the relationships between the two participants. Of course, judgments of “success” depend on the reactions of the self as well as the individual with whom one is interacting. In other words, evaluations of outcome are in part socially constructed phenomena, which depend on both participants in the ongoing negotiation. The way in which the judgments of self and others are incorporated into the evaluation of outcomes, though, depends on the developmental level of the individuals perspective-taking as manifest in the ongoing interaction (see Table 5). Thus, although constituted through a social process, evaluations of outcome are determined in a personal way by one’s social-cognitive sophistication. In the third vignette, for example, suppose the child elected to clean the table and miss some recess time. Based on a positive response from the teacher, the child at Level 1 might evaluate the outcome as successful because of the need to follow rules and avoid punishments in interactions with teachers, who are seen as having the upper hand. In comparison, a child at Level 2 also might evaluate the outcome as successful, but more

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because the teacher’s request was seen as legitimate in the school context, the child realized that some recess time would be available anyway, and the teacher seemed willing to help. When an outcome is felt or judged to be satisfactory, the process of negotiation usually stops; when an outcome is judged unsatisfactory, though, either internally by the self or externally by the other participant, the entire process usually begins again and continues until some resolution is achieved. That is, we believe the four steps function in a sequential feedback loop (see Fig. l), with the cycle continuing until an acceptable outcome is achieved. It is this aspect of the operation of the functional steps that brings us back to the issue of the means for change. Specifically, we believe that outcomes that are unsatisfactory to oneself or unacceptable to others are particularly important in facilitating developmental variation (see Ford, 1986). That is, the “system” of informationprocessing steps is particularly amenable to reorganization at a different developmental level-perhaps higher, perhaps lower-in response to the challenge of frustration or failure. As long as lower level strategies are felt by a child to achieve reasonably successful outcomes, he or she is unlikely to choose higher level strategies despite recommendations to do so. When challenged by outcomes that are judged to be failures, however, we believe a child is more likely to be responsive to alternative conceptualizations of the problems they face (i.e., ones that reflect more sophisticated perspective-taking) and to adopt higher level strategies as a result, particularly if the child is prompted to “rethink” his or her prior problem-solving process. Mechanisms that may lead to such a positive outcome are several. They include direct instruction (perhaps provided by intervention programs, but also by other significant adults); vicarious learning through observa-

F

Evaluate

Defme

STEP 1: the probiem

7

STEP 4: the outcome

Generate

Select

and

FIG. 1. Feedback

implement

STEP 3: a partlcular

STEP alternative

strategy

loopof functional steps in the INS model.

S: strategrss

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tion and modeling of other, higher level interactions; and higher level responses by the other participant in the ongoing interaction. When agents like these are present, higher level strategies may emerge. In their absence, though, a child is more likely to choose another strategy at the same level as, or a lower level than, the initial one. Indeed, throughout development, the opportunity to be exposed to such agents of change is critical; in their absence, natural failures in socialization may occur in children who are otherwise “normal.” One frequent reason for the failure of lower level negotiation strategies is their lack of appropriateness for a particular context. As noted earlier, the matching of action to context is an essential determinant of social competence. According to the INS model, this matching process is rooted in the sophistication of a child’s capacity for social perspective coordination: At more developmentally advanced levels, a child is not only sensitive to the perspectives of the participants who are in conflict, but also to the situation in which that conflict is occurring and the demands or “pulls” that it creates. Indeed, such a “third-person” perspective is a hallmark of the most complex level of interpersonal understanding. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, more sophisticated levels of perspective taking are more likely to result in an acceptable matching of action to context-that is, in the selection of interpersonal negotiation strategies that are appropriate in terms of both their developmental level and interpersonal orientation. In our research, we have indeed found a number of factors that generally influence the selection of interpersonal strategies, such as the gender and relative ages of participants and the type of relationship in which conflict occurs (Selman et al., 1986; Adalbjarnardottir & Selman, 1988), and we expect to find other situational features that are similarly influential (e.g., the level and orientation of the other participant’s negotiation strategies). Our findings to date suggest that sensitivity to such features varies, though, as a function of children’s underlying capacity for social perspective coordination. Children with more developmentally advanced perspective-taking skills are typically more responsive to contextual features and tailor their strategies in a more differentiated fashion to the particular situation at hand (Yeates et al., 1988). Two factors are probably responsible for this finding. First, children with higher level perspective coordination skills have a broader array of potential strategies available to them, in terms of both level and orientation. Thus, they can be more flexible than their peers with lower level skills. Also relevant, though, is the higher level children’s more sophisticated skills at choosing and implementing specific strategies. That is, when they consider the consequences that are likely to follow from a particular strategy, they are more likely to take into account the specific

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relationship and context within which it will occur, rather than just each individual’s needs. Hence, they are more likely to discard alternatives that are inappropriate to that relationship, even if they would satisfy the participants’ immediate needs. Developmental advances in both the second and third functional steps, then, lead to more successful matching of actions to contexts. For instance, in the second vignette presented at the outset, in which each girl wants to pitch during a kickball game, a child who can appreciate ways to coordinate both her own and the other girl’s perspectives, by somehow allowing each to get a turn, has a “flexibility” advantage over the child who can only appreciate the difference in interests and so believes only one of them can pitch. The more sophisticated youngster has available a broader range of strategies, from three levels (0, 1, and 2) rather than two (0 and I), and so can tailor her response to the particular context. Thus, she could elect to try a Level 2 strategy first (e.g., taking turns), perhaps resorting to a Level 1 strategy (e.g., threatening) in the face of a Level 1 response, while the less-sophisticated youngster can not vary the level of her strategies in response to the social context. In summary, the INS model appears to meet the criteria described earlier for an adequate model for SPS intervention. First, the model specifies a particular behavioral domain, interpersonal negotiation strategies, in which success appears related to overall adaptation. Second, the model explicates the social information-processing steps that mediate actions within this domain and suggests how these steps operate to match actions to contextual features. Finally, the model describes a developmental progression through which each of these steps proceeds and the mechanisms that facilitate such change and differentiates that type of change from another important stylistic dimension of variability. We conclude, therefore, by proposing certain principles of intervention that can be derived from the INS model and considering how these principles apply to the real-world settings faced by educational professionals. THE INS MODEL AND INTERVENTION PROGRAMS: AND APPLICATIONS

PRINCIPLES

For many years, there has been an ongoing debate about the aim of education (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972): Is it to impart knowledge in specific content domains, or is it to encourage development of general cognitive skills? This tension has also been characteristic of efforts to facilitate SPS skills and social adjustment. Functionalist approaches generally stress the acquisition of knowledge about the information-processing steps that their theories say underlie social competence; in contrast, structural approaches stress progress through the cognitive-developmental stages that

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mediate social competence from their theoretical perspective. In other words, the functional approach stresses increasing the acuity of information processing to assist adaptation; in contrast, the structural approach focuses on increasing the complexity of cognition to facilitate a deeper understanding of social interaction. The INS model resolves this tension; from its perspective, the goals of functional and structural intervention approaches are seen as complementary, operating in a figure-ground relationship to one another. The longterm goal of intervention based on the INS model is the development of more sophisticated interpersonal negotiation strategies, which are thought to reflect higher levels of interpersonal understanding. The vehicle for accomplishing this long-term goal is not seen as instruction in the differences between the levels, though, because the provision of that information is unlikely to promote progress through the levels. Instead, the means of promoting growth is instruction and practice in the information-processing steps used to enact specific negotiation strategies. The short-term goal of formal intervention based on the INS model, then, becomes the acquisition of knowledge about the information-processing steps and their operation, and the application of that knowledge in ongoing interaction. Thus, considered as a whole, the intervention’s overt content-its figure-is instruction and practice in the informationprocessing steps, while its underlying dynamic-its ground-is to promote developmental growth in their understanding and operation. These complementary emphases carry with them specific implications for intervention. First, they suggest that intervention programs will be most effective when they combine didactic with experiential components. The acquisition of knowledge about the functional decision-making steps that underlie interpersonal negotiation strategies, which is the short-term goal of intervention, occurs most efftciently through structured teaching. That is, children can be taught the steps most easily in a conflict-free context, one in which their own affective and personal involvement is minimized, using direct instruction, practice, and review, often with reference to hypothetical dilemmas. These are the methods that have been most commonly employed in other SPS training programs (Weissberg & Gesten, 1982). The INS model, however, suggests that acquisition of knowledge about the information-processing steps is not sufficient to promote developmental progress in their implementation. According to the model, such progress is most likely to occur when a child’s preferred means of implementing the steps produces unacceptable outcomes, either from the perspective of the child or those with whom the child is interacting. Yet such “failures” occur largely in the context of real interactions with unpredictable peers and adults, not in structured didactic settings. Thus, to be

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most effective, direct instruction in the functional steps must be supplemented by interventions during ongoing negotiations in meaningful relationships. In other words, to facilitate developmental progress, SPS training programs must let children’s actual social relationships serve as grist for the intervention mill (see also Kendall, 1986). How, though, are interventions to be delivered during ongoing interactions in a fashion that will promote developmental change? Previous research in the structural tradition has indicated that intervention programs are often most effective when they attempt to encourage social-cognitive conceptualizations that are about one step above children’s current levels (e.g., Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Reimer et al., 1983). That is, children often can understand and incorporate ideas and suggestions that are “one step up” from their current stage of cognitive attainment, but are unlikely to make use of interventions that are more than one level higher. For SPS intervention based on the INS model, this principle suggests that interventions should encourage the use of negotiation strategies that are one level more sophisticated than a child usually employs. The child who typically relies on physicalistic, aggressive strategies, for instance, might be encouraged to verbalize his needs in a demanding fashion instead. Similarly, the youngster who passively complies with other children could be encouraged to strike a more balanced deal, even if his or her needs remain subsidiary to those of others. In some cases, this principle may seem undesirable to adults who act as socialization agents. In the first example described above, the intervention would in effect be to encourage a “bossy” strategy rather than an outright aggressive one. For many of us, neither of these alternatives is particularly attractive, even if the substitution of the former for the latter represents progress. Yet the INS model indicates that the aggressive youngster will not be developmentally receptive to more sophisticated, reciprocal level strategies until more unilateral alternatives are first practiced and consolidated. In other words, the encouragement of unilateral strategies must be seen as a necessary waystation on the road to more advanced modes of negotiation. Such a notion, grounded in a specific developmental orientation, is what sets intervention based on the INS model off from other SPS programs. Recently, for instance, a number of programs have been designed to remedy the social skill deficits of the socially rejected child. They have shared many of the general features of our programs, such as the combination of direct instruction and practice (e.g., Bierman, 1986). Yet they are grounded in basic research on the differences between socially rejected children and their peers, a research tradition that generally lacks a specific developmental focus. As a result, we believe such programs may occasionally impose inappropriate developmental expectations. Thus, the

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younger socially rejected child, who may rely on Level 0 negotiation strategies, probably requires a different form of intervention than does the older socially rejected child, who also relies on developmentally inappropriate strategies, but ones that nonetheless are a higher level than his younger counterpart (e.g., Level 1). The emphasis on targeting intervention at appropriate developmental levels can seem rather simplistic, yet the notion can be implemented with considerable sophistication. For any individual child, although each of the information-processing steps that mediate interpersonal negotiation strategies tends to be implemented at a similar level in a given situation because of their underlying structural coherence, some variation is possible because of incomplete consolidation of skills or insufficient knowledge. The ideal objective for any individual child, therefore, is to assess the developmental level at which the child implements each functional step and then to target instruction in a fashion that aims first for consolidation of the weakest steps and later for developmental progress across all steps. In this way, for any group of children, some interventions might be unique to a particular child, while others might be common to all. For example, a child might typically define contexts for negotiation around activities with peers at a reciprocal level (Step I), but have difficulty generating many reciprocal-level strategies for such contexts (Step 2), and instead rely more often on unilateral strategies that are more familiar (Step 3). This profile of skills, with relative deficits in the latter two steps, might be addressed by helping the child to brainstorm around alternative strategies and by providing opportunities to role play or practice the new alternatives, thereby addressing the deficiency in Steps 2 and 3. In contrast, another child might define similar contexts for negotiation at a unilateral level (Step 1) and generate strategies that were by and large also unilateral (Step 2). Given previous failures using such strategies, though, this child might try to employ strategies that commonly would be considered reciprocal, such as taking turns and flipping a coin to decide who goes first; that is, the child might make use of the sort of automatized or scripted strategies that are often inculcated by adults (Step 3). This profile might be addressed by encouraging the child to redefine the problem more reciprocally, but also by brainstorming around other reciprocal strategies, perhaps together with the first child. The implementation of such a sophisticated approach requires a structured method of assessment, paired with a standardized curriculum that combines didactic and experiential components in the manner noted earlier. Currently, we are involved in a project devoted to developing and evaluating such a package. In our program, after an initial assessment of

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their INS skills, two pairs of children are brought together 10 times for once-a-week, hour-long sessions, with each pair assigned to one of two adult trainers, Initially, each meeting is divided into two parts. The first part involves an introduction to the four information-processing steps, together with structured discussions about the application of each step to hypothetical contexts for negotiation presented in filmstrips. Here, the instructors encourage each child to answer specific questions about the dilemma, questions that reflect each of the four information-processing steps (e.g., “What is the problem?“, or “What would be the best way to solve this problem?“). The second part of the meeting is spent with each dyad separately choosing and then performing some age-appropriate activity under their adult trainer’s guidance (e.g., board games, art projects, Legos), with the negotiations between the children processed in an ongoing fashion and reviewed at the completion of the activity period, always in terms of the decision-making model and its functional steps. Later, after the steps have been learned, practiced, and more routinized, the meetings are devoted to a collaborative project involving both members of the dyad. The projects, which are chosen by the trainer, are selected to require ongoing work over a period of weeks. The mandate for collaboration during this portion of the training project almost always prompts ongoing negotiation between the children in the dyad, and it is these interactions that are used by the trainer to target individual interventions for each child. The trainer bases these individual interventions, in turn, on a baseline, pretraining assessment that generates an individual profile of the developmental level of each functional step for a particular child in various school contexts. This assessment utilizes a structured interview instrument we have developed that presents children with hypothetical contexts for negotiation, and then asks a series of questions designed to assess each functional step. The interview produces reliable estimates of the level of each step, which correlate with overall ratings ofthe level of INS strategy by adults who are familiar with the child, as well as with ratings of other aspects of social adjustment, including peer social status (Yeates et al., 1988). Of course, in some circumstances, the luxury of a finely tailored, individualized intervention may not be possible. This is particularly true for teachers and other educational professionals as they oversee the dayto-day interactions among large numbers of children, their peers, and other adults. Yet the INS model is still pedagogically useful in such contexts, because it provides a framework within which to understand such

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interactions and general guidelines concerning how to respond to such interactions in a manner that facilitates children’s social development. For instance, consider the examples of social interaction presented at the outset of this paper. In the first one, two children cannot agree on a topic for a school report. In deciding to assist the children, a teacher might first consider the typical level and orientation of the children. Suppose the two children generally adopt strategies at a unilateral level and cannot find an acceptable solution in this situation because they both want to assert their own interests (i.e., they are both being demanding and bossy). The teacher then might emphasize that the boys have to take each other’s perspectives into account and perhaps could suggest a more reciprocal strategy, such as writing about what one child is interested in for this report but agreeing to work together and write about the other child’s interests on the next report. Suppose, in contrast, that the two children generally adopted reciprocal strategies, but were unable to reach a balance in this situation because they each seemed determined to persuade the other to change his or her mind. In this case, the teacher might encourage them to consider each other’s points and come to a mutually acceptable decision; that is, the teacher might encourage some flexibility in interpersonal orientation. On the other hand, the teacher might also encourage the youngsters to start from scratch and to seek a mutually satisfactory topic on which they would enjoy collaborating; in other words, the teacher could encourage a shift to a more developmentally advanced resolution. The INS model, then, provides teachers and other educational professionals with a framework for facilitating children’s SPS skills, which should lead to more competent social behavior on their part. Notably, the ability of the INS model to provide such guidelines extends not only to the interactions that teachers and other professionals observe, but also to the ones in which they directly participate. That is, the model provides assistance both in instructing students about more desirable negotiation strategies and in modeling such strategies directly, two of the means by which positive developmental growth can be facilitated. For example, in the last example presented at the outset, a teacher makes a request of a student, who maintains that the request is unreasonable because it will deny him something important-his recess time! Many of us, in our dealings with children, would tend to respond to this situation by ordering the student to comply-that is, we would employ an authoritarian, Level 1 strategy. A better response, though, might be to acknowledge the student’s perspective and to suggest a more reciprocal, Level 2 resolution-namely, helping the student fulfill the request so that he can then also have maximum time available for his preferred activity.

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In so doing, we would not only promote the use of more advanced negotiation strategies, but we would also practice what we preach, and in so doing perhaps become more socially competent ourselves. CONCLUSION

The INS model represents an advance over most previous efforts to ground SPS training efforts in a theoretical foundation. By integrating functional and structural perspectives on social cognition, the model meets the criteria for an adequate model for intervention, which have been only partially fulfilled by the perspectives considered separately. The model has received considerable validation to date through basic research, and efforts to evaluate a large-scale intervention project based on the model are currently underway. Our hope is that the application of the model will produce more consistent results than prior SPS training programs and in so doing promote social competence across a larger proportion of children. Our belief in the model is tempered by our realization that theoretical models often are short-lived, surviving only a short while before they are replaced by other more integrative or expansive accounts. For instance, we are aware of at least two practical shortcomings in the model that will probably limit its ability to promote social competence in the schools. To begin with, the model does not encompass all that is meant by “social competence.” It concerns many, but not all, of the means by which children learn to establish autonomy in social relationships, but has little if anything to do with the ways in which they maintain intimacy (Ford, 1986; Selman & Yeates, 1987). Even when restricted to the domain of interpersonal negotiation, moreover, we believe the model faces an uphill battle because of the resistance of children and the contexts in which they live to change in the absence of system-wide involvement. Intervention based on the INS model focuses on real, ongoing social interactions, rather than solely on formal instruction. Although children can learn the problem-solving steps in the model with relative ease, we know from our clinical experience that the promotion of cognitive reflection and alternative actions in conflictual social contexts prompts considerable discomfort for children, and even for many adults. Without a school environment that is involved and supportive in implementing the model, there is little hope for lasting change (Weissberg, 1985; Weissberg & Gesten, 1982). Thus, we do not believe that our model is the final word, nor do we consider it a panacea for the social deficits of all school children. Indeed, we would argue that any model of social competence, including our own,

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is ultimately measured by its positive impact on children’s lives. To the extent that the INS model yields a broader positive impact than earlier models, we consider it an improvement-yet we will gladly concede its preeminence to a more effective replacement and look forward to further theoretical progress. As Kurt Lewin once said, there is nothing so practical as a good theory. REFERENCES Achenbach, T. M., & Edelbrock, C. S. (1978). The classification of child psychopathology: A review and analysis of empirical efforts. Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1275-1301. Adalbjamardottir, S., & Selman, R. L. (1988). How children propose to deal with the criticism

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January 26, 1988; REVISED: October 28, 1988.