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Social Movements and Political Violence
Social Movements and Political Violence Lorenzo Bosi, European University Institute, Fiesole, FI, Italy Chares Demetriou, National Research University, Moscow, Russian Federation Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Abstract The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the ways in which political violence and social movements connect, as well as of the ways in which these connections are studied in academia. It delineates and expands on three specific topics: the emergence of political violence, the disengagement from it, and the consequences of it. The reviews of violence emergence and disengagement are broken down by the level of analysis into macro, meso, and micro; the review of the consequences of violence is broken down into the political, economic, social, and biographical areas. At the conclusion of this article, we offer brief remarks on the field’s future directions.
There are two facets to the issue of social movements and political violence. The one facet regards the phenomena to be studied, namely phenomena of social movement-related violence. These phenomena include violence by social movement members as well as violence against them. They are therefore wide-ranging, covering anything from protest by throwing food at politicians to protest by categorical killing, and from police control of street protest to state-approved torture, to mass killing of movement constituencies by militaries. The other facet regards the academic fields that study these phenomena. One field that does so is, of course, the field of social movement studies. But there are other fields, too, and among them the most visible – indeed much more visible and influential than the field of social movement studies – is the field of terrorism studies. Thus the subject matters of the fields of social movement studies and of terrorism studies often overlap. (The former field predominately studies social movements outside the context of violence; the latter field on principle covers also violence which is unrelated to social movements.) As the two fields approach their common subject matter, however, two differences stand out. The one is theoretical. Social movement studies bring to their investigations of violence the field’s standard theories and concepts, rather than developing separate ones particular to violence. In general, the social movement approach has evolved from a structural orientation, characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s, to the so-called political process approach dominant from the 1990s onward. Reflecting the influence of American sociology, the political process approach privileges organizational and relational analysis. It therefore locates political violence within the context of social, political, and cultural conflicts, and considers the turn to violence as being part of broader processes of political contention (Bosi et al., 2014). On its part, the field of terrorism studies has been mainly dominated by security questions – security of the public and/or the state – and has often produced policy-oriented knowledge (Goodwin, 2004). Stemming from a long tradition in political science concerned with a residual category of political violence resultant from the exclusion of interstate warfare, this field has privileged the theories and analytical perspectives dominant in political science. These perspectives, though varied, have in general eschewed the literature
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stemming from the field of social movement studies, though this has been less the case in recent years. The second outstanding difference between the two fields is conceptual, or more precisely, one about labels. Social movement studies avoid the usage of the label ‘terrorism’ (as well as the related ‘terrorist’ and ‘terror’) while obviously the field of terrorism studies thrives on it. For social movement scholars, this label is too political – a tool which sides in a contention employ to degrade their opponents (Tilly, 2004; Porta, 2013). While all labels (and terms) are value-laden, this particular label, the argument goes, is so heavily political that it is impossible to use it in neutral terms. While differences on theory and labels separate the two fields, however, it must be noted that a relatively small body of scholarship claims a position in the middle. This is the scholarship that utilizes both the term ‘terrorism’ and the analytical tools and theories of the social movement field of study. The exposition that follows focuses on three areas of inquiry: the emergence of social movement-related violence, the disengagement from it, and the effects of it. This exposition is predominately concerned with the field of social movement studies, and this is done mostly out of reasons of economy. The literature that directly or indirectly refers to social movementrelated violence is immense, including not just terrorism studies but also approaches to social conflict that range so widely that practically touch on all divisions in the social sciences. Only with regard to the first area of inquiry, on the emergence of violence, do we engage in a more comprehensive discussion. Given that this is the most researched area with respect to social movement-related violence, we juxtaposes insight from the field of social movement studies with insight from the field of terrorism studies. The other two areas of inquiry are far less researched and so we devote less space to them below.
The Emergence of Political Violence Most of the attention of the field of social movement studies concerned with questions of political violence has been on its emergence. This attention covers both violence by social movements and violence by the state, in contrasts with the field
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 22
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of terrorism studies, which tends to ignore state violence (unless it is counterterrorism).
Macro Level A tradition of explanations of the emergence of social movement-related violence exists among mainstream terrorism studies at the macro level of analysis. In this line of studies, attention is placed on conditions that are external to the perpetrators of violence, which is to say, environmental conditions. These are considered to be root causes or permissive factors, setting the stage for political violence to emerge. Accordingly, such causes or factors are sought in the international system, the political culture, or the economy and other material conditions. While these causes/factors are often treated as conditions – hence structural elements affecting the likelihood for violence – processes are sometimes evoked too. In these instances, the processes typically regard modernization, sometimes its advance but more often the interruption of its advance. Either as structural conditions or as processes, these explanations betray a bias of focus, as they eschew state violence. Typically, attention is placed squarely on the populations outside the state that use or may use violence against the state. Hence environmental conditions create ‘populations at risk,’ as per an often-used label: the international system is said to create dominated and indignant populations, the economy populations with grievances, material factors deprived populations, political culture belligerent populations, and so on. Guided by the positivistic epistemology that characterizes much of political science, especially of earlier years, these conditions are often presented as building-blocks to theory by way of discovery of necessary (sometimes even sufficient) conditions. While thought-provoking in their attempts to single out some root causes, however, neither one nor any combination of these conditions can be recognized as necessary (let alone sufficient). The evidence does not allow this; political violence clearly occurs in rich as well as in poor regions, in modern industrialized countries as well as in less developed ones, and so on. Indeed, despite the long line of research in macrolevel terrorism studies, no general theory has emerged to claim wide scholarly adherence. In fact, if one gives this scholarship a careless reading, one can easily be misled. For as Tore Bjorgo writes, the “limitation of the ‘root cause’ approach is that it may give the impression that terrorists are merely passive objects of social, economic and psychological forces: puppets obeying what these causes compel them to do” (2005: 3). Still, considered through nonpositive epistemology, this scholarship can be recognized to have enriched the understanding of the environments fostering violence. The social movement approach has offered only a partial alternative to the search for macrolevel conditions characterizing some terrorism studies. It is a partial alternative because usually – though not always – it is not exclusively a macrolevel approach but rather an approach combining the macro and meso levels, and sometimes the micro level as well. The early collective action models that paid attention to the macro level were structural – hence hardly alternatives when epistemology is concerned. In particular, much of their attention was on the investigation of political opportunity structures, usually
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understood in terms of power configuration. But as structural models gave way to models of political process, attention turned to dynamics that connect different levels of analysis. Charles Tilly is one of the protagonists in this development, advocating and applying a systematic and multilevel exploration at the intersection of political violence and collective action. His approach, like much of the contemporary social movements approach, is organizational and relational, which means that chains of relations are treated as the ‘glue’ holding the various levels of analysis together (Tilly, 1998, 2003). In this approach, the causal dynamics are expected to be varied and even heterogeneous, though typically relational. At the macro level, they generate such figurations as those defining political fault lines and identities as well as powerasymmetries, which is to say figurations which are also articulated at the organizational meso level. Just as with its epistemological scope, the social movements approach has a broader empirical scope than terrorism studies. Specifically, social movement scholars have been more ready than terrorism scholars to include state violence in their studies. Some, like Tilly, advocate the application of the same analytical tools to the study of both state and antistate violence. Others fix their focus on empirical studies of state violence. From these studies, in fact, a growing tradition of macroscopic research on state repression has developed (Porta, 1995). Thus, for example, one brunch in this tradition is concerned with historical patterns of policing protest, and another with the institutionalization of police autonomy.
Meso Level Mainstream terrorism studies have developed a tradition in mesolevel analyses as well, focusing at the level of the group waging violence. Two distinct approaches have dominated this tradition: the ideological perspective and the instrumental perspective. The first approach tends to define armed groups as ideology-driven conspiracies against the political system. The members of these groups are considered to be attached to ideological precommitments, and their action is explained in terms of clashes of ideology or through ideology’s role in recruitment, popular support, activism, selection of tactics, and so on. The second approach considers the members of armed groups to be instrumental actors, hence recognizing them the same capacity for rational choice as it is presumed to characterize all other political actors. The action of these groups is therefore explained through political and tactical calculations connecting means to ends. Whereas the first approach implies that devout adherence to ideology erases or reframes possible scruples regarding the use of violence, the latter approach assumes flexible end-game preferences of which violence is dispassionate calculated means. These two traditions in terrorism studies are often considered contradictory to each other. In a sense, however, they are similar. For in both of them the primary unit of analysis relates to the realm of mental, cognitive operations. By contrast, the epistemology of the social movements approach tends to be both broader and more attentive to organizational analysis. This approach, therefore, may be open to the analysis of cognitive operations – typically through frame analysis or other cultural analysis – but includes organizational analysis as well.
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Social movement strategy formation is a central subject matter that is usually placed under comprehensive analytical frameworks. Organizational analysis, on its part, often distinguishes three areas: the social movement organization, the social movement, and the social movement context. Regarding the social movement organization, the analysis can focus on the structure of hierarchy, the form of decision making, organizational resources, and so on. Also of interest in this area of analysis are issues relating to the clandestine character typical of violent groups; this is a differentiating characteristic vis-à-vis nonviolent movement organizations and can therefore be a point of comparison between violent and nonviolent contention (Zwerman et al., 2000). Regarding the social movement, the analysis typically pertains to the relations among the social movement organizations comprising the movement. These are often competitive relationships – over resources, popular allegiance, division of labor, and more broadly power (Alimi et al., 2012; Demetriou, 2007). In terms of violence, and in particular the switch from peaceful to violent tactics, analysis in these two areas may reveal consequential organizational splintering. The creation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) out of the ranks of the Irish Republican Army is an example of splintering at the level of social movement organization, and the creation of the Red Brigades out of the Italian Left movement is an example of splintering at the level of the social movement; in either case, the splintered organization proved particularly violent. Regarding the social movement context, too, the analysis can be, as it often has been, fruitful. For here one can examine the resources, opportunities, and constraints facing the movement, as well as the relations between the movement and interested publics or the state authorities. To appreciate how pregnant with consequences these relations are, just consider the last one – the relation between the movement and the authorities. This relation may take the form of repression by the authorities which research has shown to be an important factor in instigating political violence. Especially when the repressive measures appear to be hard, illegal, or confrontational, they may delegitimize the state and encourage antistate hostility and sympathy for armed groups (Porta, 1995; Wood, 2003). For example, the activities of the nationalist insurgency in Ireland in 1919–21 were often met with brutal reprisals by the state security forces, aimed at populations perceived as hostile; given that the main goal of the insurgency was the delegitimization of the state, the state through its tactic of reprisals was in effect doing the insurgents’ bit (Demetriou, 2012). In short, the meso level of analysis is the quintessential level of organizational analysis and the one through which social movement studies have thrived. To be sure, not all studies on violent social movements pursue as comprehensive organizational analyses as suggested above, but the developing trend is toward comprehensiveness (e.g., Alimi et al., 2012).
Micro Level At the micro level of analysis, the main quest of terrorism studies is toward the understanding of the motivations of the activists engaging in violence. This follows a more general
tendency, common outside social scientific academia and within the circles of policy-makers interested in counterterrorism, to offer motivation-type answers to the question “Why action happens?” A rich tradition therefore exists offering psychological explanations of the resort to violence. Reflecting an interest with rational choice theory, some scholars in this tradition bestow the motivation of greed on the activists whom they study. Combined with the activist’s instrumentality, greed is therefore said to explain the choices in careers in violence. Other scholars in this tradition hold grievances to be the prime motor of motivation, while still others expand the pool of motivations to cover emotions, including emotive reactions to material conditions. Still other scholars develop violence-prone personality theories, variously privileging such psychological patterns as dependency, circular reaction, or the seeking of identity. Implicitly or explicitly, much work in this latter research agenda treats political violence as psychopathology. Within social movement studies, the tendency is not to engage in microlevel analysis in isolation from broader analysis (Bosi and Porta, 2012). Here exists as well, however, a longstanding interest in the study of activists’ motivations. A body of research covering activists’ narratives exists in particular, though given the practical difficulties associated with interviewing active perpetrators of violence, these tend to be distant post factum accounts by ex-activists. But where the scholarship goes beyond the mere representation of the activists’ voice, as it often does, then broader analysis is engaged in order to draw conclusions on collective behavior. Thus such standard analytical modalities as the examination of opportunity structures, of in-group and ramified relationships, and of framing are broad into the equation. Indeed, social movement research repeatedly demonstrates that the individual choice to join an armed group is better explained as collective choice. Thus, it is demonstrated that preexisting social relationships tend to influence greatly individual decisions to join armed groups. Also, it is shown that small networks of people with dense ties with each other (family relations, group of friends, school, local community, and so on) tend to progressively justify the need to use violence and through this they feel less responsible as single individuals (Bosi, 2012; Viterna, 2006; White, 1989).
The Disengagement from Political Violence What disengagement from social movement-related political violence may mean exactly is open to interpretation. Phenomena of disengagement from violence have affinity with phenomena of political deradicalization and of cycles of violence – after all, it is often the passage of time that tells definite disengagement from temporary disengagement. Thus social movements scholars can, as they often do, study these phenomena indiscriminately (Fillieule, 2010). Nevertheless, a literature on disengagement from political violence does exist as such, and it tends to focus on marked behavioral modification on the part of militants or armed organizations. In this sense, disengagement does not imply necessarily change in values or ideals, but clear change in the means of contention (Bosi, 2013).
Social Movements and Political Violence Macro Level Given their clandestine character, armed groups and activists tend to progressively isolate themselves from the world around them. This may lead them to increasingly supercilious interpretations of their role in politics, highlighting the wisdom of their actions and the follies of their opponents. Still, these activists are never totally disconnected from the world. Armed groups are always and inevitably immersed in the conditions of their environment. There is therefore reason to study the environmental conditions that affect the likelihood for armed groups’ disengagement from violence. In general, such conditions may relate to the closing of political opportunity for the groups or for the movements in which the groups are part, and to the falling supply of the elements that are vital to the survival of the group (membership, armaments, funding, and so on) or the movement (public support, alliances, and so on). What needs to be underlined regarding this course of macrolevel inquiry is that the focus is not so much on the activists’ attribution of environmental changes (which may elude research, if it is done in real time) as on an objective assessment of these changes. State repression is particularly important for the evolution of armed groups, since it can present a barometer of sorts for the political opportunities at hand. However, the available body of research does not offer strong evidence to suggest that repressive policies on their own lead to disengagement from violence. But then again, any isolated environmental condition carries limited efficacy in explaining (or forecasting) disengagement. Combinations of macro factors are more efficacious explanans. But more efficacious still are macrolevel analyses that are combined with mesolevel analyses. This is so because macrolevel analyses may account for the likelihood but not the timing of actual disengagement, where timing is typically analyzed through meso lenses. Thus a repressive policy needs to be analyzed in connection with its timing, which is to say, as a matter of conjuncture more than structure.
Meso Level At the meso level of analysis, research can turn to an array of factors, emulating research done with regard to the emergence of political violence. Indeed, one may expect to find that the reversal of mechanisms precipitating violence may precipitate disengagement from violence. As noted at the introduction, however, the body of research on disengagement is rather limited, at least within the social movements literature. To the extent that one can talk about directions forming within this body or research, one can note an emerging attention to armed groups’ strategy. It is not a forgone conclusion that the use of political violence is met with public criticism. In legitimate polities, however, the likelihood that this may happen vis-à-vis antistate violence is high. In these situations, armed groups may find themselves in crossroads necessitating the adjustment of their strategy. Thus, on the one hand, they may opt to further distance themselves from public, including potentially their own constituency, by ‘purifying’ their stand in order to sustain activists’ commitment in the face of increased adversity. On the other hand, they may opt to become more receptive to public
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opinion and the pull toward moderation which public opinion may represent, especially if this opinion comes from the movement constituency. Whereas the former outcome would lead to the increase of violence, the latter may lead to a progression away from violence. Facing choices such as these, armed groups are constrained by both external dynamics (political opportunities and public support) and internal dynamics (resources and intragroup dissent), all of which are complicated. The pathways toward or away from disengagement are therefore open-ended. For example, groups weak in material resources may react to opposition from their environment by further radicalizing their tactics, since this may shore up their organizational integrity. This may then accentuate group isolation to the point of the group becoming a sect, out of touch with political reality, and provoke revulsion among its actual or potential constituency. Such developments, in turn, may lead to defections from the group, which is to say, individual disengagement from political violence. This, in its turn, may lead to group disengagement form violence, further radicalization of tactics by the group, or group split. Relevant in this sort of dynamics, moreover, is the state counterpolicy, including counterviolence. The course of the movement–state interaction, too, is open-ended. Heavy-handed state policies, for example, certainly influence the course of contention, but not in a preordained direction: they may weaken or strengthen the resolve to antistate violence, reduce or enhance popular support, and so on.
Micro Level To the extent that microlevel analysis is considered to pivot on psychology, disengagement from violence implies turning points in personal histories whereby commitments, emotions, and rationales change. A psychological barrier needs to be crossed. Typical of the social movements approach in general, however, psychological factors are here examined in relation to collectivities and their environments. Hence the attention is not so much on personalities and other attributes of individuals, but on the interactions among individuals, such as the breaking up of strong ties of friendship, loyalty, and trust. Projection on the future is relevant, too, and so the risk of social isolation can be a pivotal factor in ‘changes of heart.’ In other words, according to this line of analysis, maintaining or abandoning commitment to political violence depends on the emergent social psychological price entailed in the alternatives. As with dynamics at the mesolevel of analysis, however, dynamics at the microlevel of analysis are not considered deterministic. Thus, for instance, if activists develop the view that old-standing violent tactics are no longer justified in the face of new political developments, this does not mean that they are able, or even willing, to disengage. Feelings of belongingness, the incapacity to see another possible future apart from that in the armed group, and the fear to live with the bad consciousness of having believed in wrong ideas, all may prolong activists’ participation in armed groups. Indeed, perhaps the single most efficacious predictor of individual behavior is collective behavior – individuals would more likely commit to drastic change in their behavior if they do so in company.
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The Consequences of Political Violence
Economic Area
The research within social movement studies on the consequences of violence is lacking behind the research on disengagement – let alone that on the emergence of political violence. This scarcity of research is striking if we consider that the purpose of the use of violence against the state, or by the state against social movements, is typically to elicit or prevent change. It is all the more striking given that the range of targets is wide. Antistate violence tends to target agents of the state, and violence by the state tends to target agents of social movements. But the two sides also aim at proxy targets – businesses, the media, constituencies – either because they are symbols, knots of power, or simply available. As with the literature examined above, the available social movement literature on the consequences of violence is skewed toward the study of antistate violence. Within the limits of this bias, however, the literature brunches out toward four areas – the areas of the polity, the economy, the society, and biography (Bosi and Giugni, 2012).
Violence obviously affects negatively the economy of the relevant state. It can damage property, prevent the use of capital and movement of goods, cause inflation and unemployment, and more generally inhibit economic growth or bring about outright depression. These effects can have negative regional or global economic ramifications, though the reverse might also be true – e.g., the loss in the tourist industry of a conflict-ridden state may be the gain in the tourist industry of a neighboring state. Analysis can distinguish between direct effects in the short run – including economic effects relating to increased medical provisions as well as to the direct loss of property and the like – to less direct effects in the long run. The latter sort of effects, typical of protracted violent political contention, may relate to anything from the deterioration of the health and educational systems to the loss of workforce through changes in migration patterns. In general, it can be said that the effects of political violence on the economy are negative but not all sectors are affected equally, while some sectors – notably those providing security services, infrastructure, consultancy, or news coverage and commentary – may benefit.
Political Area While political violence typically affects policy, the magnitude of policy change may range greatly. On the one extreme, the change may entail the transformation of the state itself. Historically, this has been especially the case with regard to separatist movements, and the wave of decolonization in the 1960s offers many acute examples. Even separatist movements that fail their ultimate goal may precipitate the limited transformation of the state. For example, partly as a consequence of the campaign by the group Basque Homeland and Freedom, a considerable measure of autonomy was granted to the Basque region (Herrera, 2002). On the other hand, violent political contention may produce what from the claimants’ point of view are negative, regressive effects. The massive and essentially permanent dislocation of Kurdish populations in the eastern part of Turkey by the government during the 1980s, designed as a response to the campaign of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, offers a prominent example of this. More modestly, the effects of violent political contention may regard anything from public order policy (censorship, the banning of organizations, etc.) to legislative outputs (legislation as well as change of legislative procedures), to executive outputs directed at various targets including the armed groups’ constituencies. These policies may outlast the campaigns of violence. Public order policy, typically aiming at treating the effects of violent political contention, may remain in effect permanently. Forms of policy aiming at the perceived causes of such contention may as well have long-lasting effects. For example, from 1972 onward and through the 1980s, the UK government made efforts to redress some of the grievances of the nationalist community in northern Ireland with the hope of undermining the campaign by the PIRA. But as it turned, the general direction of this policy, which included fairer hiring practices in the public sector and electoral reforms, has been the same as that which the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, ending the campaigns of violence, has promoted (Bean, 2007).
Social Area The scope of social change resultant from the use of social movement-related violence is very wide indeed, while the direction of change is not preordained. Obviously the intensity, spread, and duration of violence are factors making a difference, and certain changes are expected to follow certain types of violence – e.g., emigration to follow intense violence against a population. Still, the direction of social change can vary. For instance, the levels of social trust or social integration may be reduced in the face of the dangers associated with the use of violence. Yet, at the same time, opposite phenomena may transpire vis-à-vis segments of a population. Thus the use of political violence may increase communal identification and improve the morale of discriminated communities. This seems to be the case, in fact, for many Muslims in Europe, especially of younger generations, who feel empowered by radical Islam, even when they condemn political violence in the name of Islam (Roy, 2004). Nor are the patterns of public opinion transformation clear. Amid political violence, the prevailing change in the short run may well be the polarization of opinion. But in protracted conflicts, this direction of change may not hold. For example, some of the long-term effects of the Palestinian armed campaigns in the occupied areas in recent decades (the Intifadas, the Tanzim movement, and the campaigns by Hamas) point to the direction of moderation. According to one study, these campaigns contributed to the evolution of the political orientations of local populations by increasing their willingness to accept a Palestinian state and make territorial concessions, and by decreasing right-wing identification (Gould and Klor, 2009).
Biographical Area The effects of violence on those affected by violence is, strictly speaking, a subset of what has just been discussed – i.e., effects
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in the social area. But these effects also present an area of study offering particular insight on broader issues of social movement-related violence, not the least the question of disengagement. On the one hand, under study can be former activists, that is, individuals who had perpetrated violence. Even at low levels of activism, these individuals may face lifelong consequences. An elementary yet important question is whether they honor or denounce their old commitments. Postconflict settings show that both sets of individuals are likely to be present and to complicate even more the political tangle associated with efforts at ‘truth and reconciliation’ – not just issues pertaining to the revision of the meaning of one’s life, but also ones pertaining to culpability, punishment, and social closure. Further, the victims of violence and those related to them may likely face life-long consequences. Much of what said above regarding postconflict contexts applies here too, including the broader question of how the personal experience and the collective experience are linked. Trauma, for example, has both a personal and a collective dimension, becoming in interconnected fashion a point of reference for both the victimized individuals and the communities in which they belong. The social movement literature only made limited inroads in this direction of research, despite the fact that this literature’s rich insight on the interconnection between individual and collective action offers a spring board. Of course, the broader literature concerned with questions of victimhood and conflict – in psychology, social psychology, collective memory studies, and so on – is rich and also offers examples for the social movement scholars to emulate.
Future Directions It is seen that the field of social movement studies has made gains in the area of violence, especially regarding the emergence of violence. At the same time, it is clear that biases and lacunae also exist in the field – i.e., more attention on social movement violence than on state violence, and insufficient attention on the disengagement from violence and on the effects of violence. Moreover, it is seen that the inquiries in the field are also pursued by other fields, especially terrorism studies, with divergent results. Two opposing cases can be made for the future of the investigation of social movement-related violence. The one is in favor of pluralism. According to this position, the existing pluralism among the different fields in terms of theories and analytical frameworks is healthy and must be safeguarded. The other case is the opposite. That is, this pluralism is not healthy because it is the result of lack of knowledge across the fields and the academic disciplines which, to some extent or another, align with the fields; the pluralism must therefore be replaced by more unifying sets of theories. Current trends exist in both directions. The present pluralism is sustained not so much by the intension of the participating scholars as by factors having to do with the general organization of academia; the overall trend is therefore toward the inadvertent perpetuation of pluralism. At the opposite end, various scholars promote broad analytic frameworks intended for research in different traditional fields. The
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‘Contentious Politics Approach’ is the most prominent result from this kind of efforts. Promoted by scholars in the field of social movement studies – Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam, among others – the approach argues that the delineation of research according to the concept ‘social movement’ (as well as ‘terrorism’) must give way to delineation according to the concept ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam et al., 2001). This concept is meant to denote any contention outside the formal channels of government. It therefore covers a broader category of phenomena than the category ‘social movements,’ including episodic contention by way of labor strikes and ethnic conflict. The advocates of this approach hold that such a wide range of forms of contention can be analyzed through a coherent analytical framework, thus allowing comparisons among phenomena which traditionally have been considered incomparable. Further work is needed before this and other similar approaches become mainstream and replace more specialized fields; indeed, the level of the future success of such approaches might be measured by the extent that they entice members of the field of terrorism, since this is not only a large field but one which operates on peculiar sets of incentives. For the moment, it appears that the intellectual movement toward the comprehensive study of violence is gaining ground. If this is the case, however, we believe that a new challenge will emerge. To the extent that an enlarged pool of phenomena covering various forms of violent and nonviolent actions is treated as comparable, the need to arrive at new conceptual distinctions will arise. The challenge ahead might be, then, to produce conceptual differentiation that, while analytically integrating, allows for superior classification of phenomena.
See also: Civil Wars; Conflict and Consensus; Insurgency; Peace Movements; Revolutions, Sociology of; Securitization; Social Protest; Terrorism; Urban Conflicts; Violence, History of.
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Relevant Websites http://cosmos.eui.eu/Projects/cosmos/Home.aspx – COSMOS. http://www.mobilization.sdsu.edu/index.html – Mobilization. http://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/ – Mobilizing Ideas. http://polviolence.net/ – Political Violence Standing Group (ECPR). http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/csms20/current – Social Movement Studies.
Abstract The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the ways in which political violence and social movements connect, as well as of the ways in which these connections are studied in academia. It delineates and expands on three specific topics: the emergence of political violence, the disengagement from it, and the consequences of it. The reviews of violence emergence and disengagement are broken down by the level of analysis into macro, meso, and micro; the review of the consequences of violence is broken down into the political, economic, social, and biographical areas. At the conclusion of this article, we offer brief remarks on the field’s future directions.
There are two facets to the issue of social movements and political violence. The one facet regards the phenomena to be studied, namely phenomena of social movement-related violence. These phenomena include violence by social movement members as well as violence against them. They are therefore wide-ranging, covering anything from protest by throwing food at politicians to protest by categorical killing, and from police control of street protest to state-approved torture, to mass killing of movement constituencies by militaries. The other facet regards the academic fields that study these phenomena. One field that does so is, of course, the field of social movement studies. But there are other fields, too, and among them the most visible – indeed much more visible and influential than the field of social movement studies – is the field of terrorism studies. Thus the subject matters of the fields of social movement studies and of terrorism studies often overlap. (The former field predominately studies social movements outside the context of violence; the latter field on principle covers also violence which is unrelated to social movements.) As the two fields approach their common subject matter, however, two differences stand out. The one is theoretical. Social movement studies bring to their investigations of violence the field’s standard theories and concepts, rather than developing separate ones particular to violence. In general, the social movement approach has evolved from a structural orientation, characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s, to the so-called political process approach dominant from the 1990s onward. Reflecting the influence of American sociology, the political process approach privileges organizational and relational analysis. It therefore locates political violence within the context of social, political, and cultural conflicts, and considers the turn to violence as being part of broader processes of political contention (Bosi et al., 2014). On its part, the field of terrorism studies has been mainly dominated by security questions – security of the public and/or the state – and has often produced policy-oriented knowledge (Goodwin, 2004). Stemming from a long tradition in political science concerned with a residual category of political violence resultant from the exclusion of interstate warfare, this field has privileged the theories and analytical perspectives dominant in political science. These perspectives, though varied, have in general eschewed the literature
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stemming from the field of social movement studies, though this has been less the case in recent years. The second outstanding difference between the two fields is conceptual, or more precisely, one about labels. Social movement studies avoid the usage of the label ‘terrorism’ (as well as the related ‘terrorist’ and ‘terror’) while obviously the field of terrorism studies thrives on it. For social movement scholars, this label is too political – a tool which sides in a contention employ to degrade their opponents (Tilly, 2004; Porta, 2013). While all labels (and terms) are value-laden, this particular label, the argument goes, is so heavily political that it is impossible to use it in neutral terms. While differences on theory and labels separate the two fields, however, it must be noted that a relatively small body of scholarship claims a position in the middle. This is the scholarship that utilizes both the term ‘terrorism’ and the analytical tools and theories of the social movement field of study. The exposition that follows focuses on three areas of inquiry: the emergence of social movement-related violence, the disengagement from it, and the effects of it. This exposition is predominately concerned with the field of social movement studies, and this is done mostly out of reasons of economy. The literature that directly or indirectly refers to social movementrelated violence is immense, including not just terrorism studies but also approaches to social conflict that range so widely that practically touch on all divisions in the social sciences. Only with regard to the first area of inquiry, on the emergence of violence, do we engage in a more comprehensive discussion. Given that this is the most researched area with respect to social movement-related violence, we juxtaposes insight from the field of social movement studies with insight from the field of terrorism studies. The other two areas of inquiry are far less researched and so we devote less space to them below.
The Emergence of Political Violence Most of the attention of the field of social movement studies concerned with questions of political violence has been on its emergence. This attention covers both violence by social movements and violence by the state, in contrasts with the field
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of terrorism studies, which tends to ignore state violence (unless it is counterterrorism).
Macro Level A tradition of explanations of the emergence of social movement-related violence exists among mainstream terrorism studies at the macro level of analysis. In this line of studies, attention is placed on conditions that are external to the perpetrators of violence, which is to say, environmental conditions. These are considered to be root causes or permissive factors, setting the stage for political violence to emerge. Accordingly, such causes or factors are sought in the international system, the political culture, or the economy and other material conditions. While these causes/factors are often treated as conditions – hence structural elements affecting the likelihood for violence – processes are sometimes evoked too. In these instances, the processes typically regard modernization, sometimes its advance but more often the interruption of its advance. Either as structural conditions or as processes, these explanations betray a bias of focus, as they eschew state violence. Typically, attention is placed squarely on the populations outside the state that use or may use violence against the state. Hence environmental conditions create ‘populations at risk,’ as per an often-used label: the international system is said to create dominated and indignant populations, the economy populations with grievances, material factors deprived populations, political culture belligerent populations, and so on. Guided by the positivistic epistemology that characterizes much of political science, especially of earlier years, these conditions are often presented as building-blocks to theory by way of discovery of necessary (sometimes even sufficient) conditions. While thought-provoking in their attempts to single out some root causes, however, neither one nor any combination of these conditions can be recognized as necessary (let alone sufficient). The evidence does not allow this; political violence clearly occurs in rich as well as in poor regions, in modern industrialized countries as well as in less developed ones, and so on. Indeed, despite the long line of research in macrolevel terrorism studies, no general theory has emerged to claim wide scholarly adherence. In fact, if one gives this scholarship a careless reading, one can easily be misled. For as Tore Bjorgo writes, the “limitation of the ‘root cause’ approach is that it may give the impression that terrorists are merely passive objects of social, economic and psychological forces: puppets obeying what these causes compel them to do” (2005: 3). Still, considered through nonpositive epistemology, this scholarship can be recognized to have enriched the understanding of the environments fostering violence. The social movement approach has offered only a partial alternative to the search for macrolevel conditions characterizing some terrorism studies. It is a partial alternative because usually – though not always – it is not exclusively a macrolevel approach but rather an approach combining the macro and meso levels, and sometimes the micro level as well. The early collective action models that paid attention to the macro level were structural – hence hardly alternatives when epistemology is concerned. In particular, much of their attention was on the investigation of political opportunity structures, usually
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understood in terms of power configuration. But as structural models gave way to models of political process, attention turned to dynamics that connect different levels of analysis. Charles Tilly is one of the protagonists in this development, advocating and applying a systematic and multilevel exploration at the intersection of political violence and collective action. His approach, like much of the contemporary social movements approach, is organizational and relational, which means that chains of relations are treated as the ‘glue’ holding the various levels of analysis together (Tilly, 1998, 2003). In this approach, the causal dynamics are expected to be varied and even heterogeneous, though typically relational. At the macro level, they generate such figurations as those defining political fault lines and identities as well as powerasymmetries, which is to say figurations which are also articulated at the organizational meso level. Just as with its epistemological scope, the social movements approach has a broader empirical scope than terrorism studies. Specifically, social movement scholars have been more ready than terrorism scholars to include state violence in their studies. Some, like Tilly, advocate the application of the same analytical tools to the study of both state and antistate violence. Others fix their focus on empirical studies of state violence. From these studies, in fact, a growing tradition of macroscopic research on state repression has developed (Porta, 1995). Thus, for example, one brunch in this tradition is concerned with historical patterns of policing protest, and another with the institutionalization of police autonomy.
Meso Level Mainstream terrorism studies have developed a tradition in mesolevel analyses as well, focusing at the level of the group waging violence. Two distinct approaches have dominated this tradition: the ideological perspective and the instrumental perspective. The first approach tends to define armed groups as ideology-driven conspiracies against the political system. The members of these groups are considered to be attached to ideological precommitments, and their action is explained in terms of clashes of ideology or through ideology’s role in recruitment, popular support, activism, selection of tactics, and so on. The second approach considers the members of armed groups to be instrumental actors, hence recognizing them the same capacity for rational choice as it is presumed to characterize all other political actors. The action of these groups is therefore explained through political and tactical calculations connecting means to ends. Whereas the first approach implies that devout adherence to ideology erases or reframes possible scruples regarding the use of violence, the latter approach assumes flexible end-game preferences of which violence is dispassionate calculated means. These two traditions in terrorism studies are often considered contradictory to each other. In a sense, however, they are similar. For in both of them the primary unit of analysis relates to the realm of mental, cognitive operations. By contrast, the epistemology of the social movements approach tends to be both broader and more attentive to organizational analysis. This approach, therefore, may be open to the analysis of cognitive operations – typically through frame analysis or other cultural analysis – but includes organizational analysis as well.
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Social movement strategy formation is a central subject matter that is usually placed under comprehensive analytical frameworks. Organizational analysis, on its part, often distinguishes three areas: the social movement organization, the social movement, and the social movement context. Regarding the social movement organization, the analysis can focus on the structure of hierarchy, the form of decision making, organizational resources, and so on. Also of interest in this area of analysis are issues relating to the clandestine character typical of violent groups; this is a differentiating characteristic vis-à-vis nonviolent movement organizations and can therefore be a point of comparison between violent and nonviolent contention (Zwerman et al., 2000). Regarding the social movement, the analysis typically pertains to the relations among the social movement organizations comprising the movement. These are often competitive relationships – over resources, popular allegiance, division of labor, and more broadly power (Alimi et al., 2012; Demetriou, 2007). In terms of violence, and in particular the switch from peaceful to violent tactics, analysis in these two areas may reveal consequential organizational splintering. The creation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) out of the ranks of the Irish Republican Army is an example of splintering at the level of social movement organization, and the creation of the Red Brigades out of the Italian Left movement is an example of splintering at the level of the social movement; in either case, the splintered organization proved particularly violent. Regarding the social movement context, too, the analysis can be, as it often has been, fruitful. For here one can examine the resources, opportunities, and constraints facing the movement, as well as the relations between the movement and interested publics or the state authorities. To appreciate how pregnant with consequences these relations are, just consider the last one – the relation between the movement and the authorities. This relation may take the form of repression by the authorities which research has shown to be an important factor in instigating political violence. Especially when the repressive measures appear to be hard, illegal, or confrontational, they may delegitimize the state and encourage antistate hostility and sympathy for armed groups (Porta, 1995; Wood, 2003). For example, the activities of the nationalist insurgency in Ireland in 1919–21 were often met with brutal reprisals by the state security forces, aimed at populations perceived as hostile; given that the main goal of the insurgency was the delegitimization of the state, the state through its tactic of reprisals was in effect doing the insurgents’ bit (Demetriou, 2012). In short, the meso level of analysis is the quintessential level of organizational analysis and the one through which social movement studies have thrived. To be sure, not all studies on violent social movements pursue as comprehensive organizational analyses as suggested above, but the developing trend is toward comprehensiveness (e.g., Alimi et al., 2012).
Micro Level At the micro level of analysis, the main quest of terrorism studies is toward the understanding of the motivations of the activists engaging in violence. This follows a more general
tendency, common outside social scientific academia and within the circles of policy-makers interested in counterterrorism, to offer motivation-type answers to the question “Why action happens?” A rich tradition therefore exists offering psychological explanations of the resort to violence. Reflecting an interest with rational choice theory, some scholars in this tradition bestow the motivation of greed on the activists whom they study. Combined with the activist’s instrumentality, greed is therefore said to explain the choices in careers in violence. Other scholars in this tradition hold grievances to be the prime motor of motivation, while still others expand the pool of motivations to cover emotions, including emotive reactions to material conditions. Still other scholars develop violence-prone personality theories, variously privileging such psychological patterns as dependency, circular reaction, or the seeking of identity. Implicitly or explicitly, much work in this latter research agenda treats political violence as psychopathology. Within social movement studies, the tendency is not to engage in microlevel analysis in isolation from broader analysis (Bosi and Porta, 2012). Here exists as well, however, a longstanding interest in the study of activists’ motivations. A body of research covering activists’ narratives exists in particular, though given the practical difficulties associated with interviewing active perpetrators of violence, these tend to be distant post factum accounts by ex-activists. But where the scholarship goes beyond the mere representation of the activists’ voice, as it often does, then broader analysis is engaged in order to draw conclusions on collective behavior. Thus such standard analytical modalities as the examination of opportunity structures, of in-group and ramified relationships, and of framing are broad into the equation. Indeed, social movement research repeatedly demonstrates that the individual choice to join an armed group is better explained as collective choice. Thus, it is demonstrated that preexisting social relationships tend to influence greatly individual decisions to join armed groups. Also, it is shown that small networks of people with dense ties with each other (family relations, group of friends, school, local community, and so on) tend to progressively justify the need to use violence and through this they feel less responsible as single individuals (Bosi, 2012; Viterna, 2006; White, 1989).
The Disengagement from Political Violence What disengagement from social movement-related political violence may mean exactly is open to interpretation. Phenomena of disengagement from violence have affinity with phenomena of political deradicalization and of cycles of violence – after all, it is often the passage of time that tells definite disengagement from temporary disengagement. Thus social movements scholars can, as they often do, study these phenomena indiscriminately (Fillieule, 2010). Nevertheless, a literature on disengagement from political violence does exist as such, and it tends to focus on marked behavioral modification on the part of militants or armed organizations. In this sense, disengagement does not imply necessarily change in values or ideals, but clear change in the means of contention (Bosi, 2013).
Social Movements and Political Violence Macro Level Given their clandestine character, armed groups and activists tend to progressively isolate themselves from the world around them. This may lead them to increasingly supercilious interpretations of their role in politics, highlighting the wisdom of their actions and the follies of their opponents. Still, these activists are never totally disconnected from the world. Armed groups are always and inevitably immersed in the conditions of their environment. There is therefore reason to study the environmental conditions that affect the likelihood for armed groups’ disengagement from violence. In general, such conditions may relate to the closing of political opportunity for the groups or for the movements in which the groups are part, and to the falling supply of the elements that are vital to the survival of the group (membership, armaments, funding, and so on) or the movement (public support, alliances, and so on). What needs to be underlined regarding this course of macrolevel inquiry is that the focus is not so much on the activists’ attribution of environmental changes (which may elude research, if it is done in real time) as on an objective assessment of these changes. State repression is particularly important for the evolution of armed groups, since it can present a barometer of sorts for the political opportunities at hand. However, the available body of research does not offer strong evidence to suggest that repressive policies on their own lead to disengagement from violence. But then again, any isolated environmental condition carries limited efficacy in explaining (or forecasting) disengagement. Combinations of macro factors are more efficacious explanans. But more efficacious still are macrolevel analyses that are combined with mesolevel analyses. This is so because macrolevel analyses may account for the likelihood but not the timing of actual disengagement, where timing is typically analyzed through meso lenses. Thus a repressive policy needs to be analyzed in connection with its timing, which is to say, as a matter of conjuncture more than structure.
Meso Level At the meso level of analysis, research can turn to an array of factors, emulating research done with regard to the emergence of political violence. Indeed, one may expect to find that the reversal of mechanisms precipitating violence may precipitate disengagement from violence. As noted at the introduction, however, the body of research on disengagement is rather limited, at least within the social movements literature. To the extent that one can talk about directions forming within this body or research, one can note an emerging attention to armed groups’ strategy. It is not a forgone conclusion that the use of political violence is met with public criticism. In legitimate polities, however, the likelihood that this may happen vis-à-vis antistate violence is high. In these situations, armed groups may find themselves in crossroads necessitating the adjustment of their strategy. Thus, on the one hand, they may opt to further distance themselves from public, including potentially their own constituency, by ‘purifying’ their stand in order to sustain activists’ commitment in the face of increased adversity. On the other hand, they may opt to become more receptive to public
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opinion and the pull toward moderation which public opinion may represent, especially if this opinion comes from the movement constituency. Whereas the former outcome would lead to the increase of violence, the latter may lead to a progression away from violence. Facing choices such as these, armed groups are constrained by both external dynamics (political opportunities and public support) and internal dynamics (resources and intragroup dissent), all of which are complicated. The pathways toward or away from disengagement are therefore open-ended. For example, groups weak in material resources may react to opposition from their environment by further radicalizing their tactics, since this may shore up their organizational integrity. This may then accentuate group isolation to the point of the group becoming a sect, out of touch with political reality, and provoke revulsion among its actual or potential constituency. Such developments, in turn, may lead to defections from the group, which is to say, individual disengagement from political violence. This, in its turn, may lead to group disengagement form violence, further radicalization of tactics by the group, or group split. Relevant in this sort of dynamics, moreover, is the state counterpolicy, including counterviolence. The course of the movement–state interaction, too, is open-ended. Heavy-handed state policies, for example, certainly influence the course of contention, but not in a preordained direction: they may weaken or strengthen the resolve to antistate violence, reduce or enhance popular support, and so on.
Micro Level To the extent that microlevel analysis is considered to pivot on psychology, disengagement from violence implies turning points in personal histories whereby commitments, emotions, and rationales change. A psychological barrier needs to be crossed. Typical of the social movements approach in general, however, psychological factors are here examined in relation to collectivities and their environments. Hence the attention is not so much on personalities and other attributes of individuals, but on the interactions among individuals, such as the breaking up of strong ties of friendship, loyalty, and trust. Projection on the future is relevant, too, and so the risk of social isolation can be a pivotal factor in ‘changes of heart.’ In other words, according to this line of analysis, maintaining or abandoning commitment to political violence depends on the emergent social psychological price entailed in the alternatives. As with dynamics at the mesolevel of analysis, however, dynamics at the microlevel of analysis are not considered deterministic. Thus, for instance, if activists develop the view that old-standing violent tactics are no longer justified in the face of new political developments, this does not mean that they are able, or even willing, to disengage. Feelings of belongingness, the incapacity to see another possible future apart from that in the armed group, and the fear to live with the bad consciousness of having believed in wrong ideas, all may prolong activists’ participation in armed groups. Indeed, perhaps the single most efficacious predictor of individual behavior is collective behavior – individuals would more likely commit to drastic change in their behavior if they do so in company.
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The Consequences of Political Violence
Economic Area
The research within social movement studies on the consequences of violence is lacking behind the research on disengagement – let alone that on the emergence of political violence. This scarcity of research is striking if we consider that the purpose of the use of violence against the state, or by the state against social movements, is typically to elicit or prevent change. It is all the more striking given that the range of targets is wide. Antistate violence tends to target agents of the state, and violence by the state tends to target agents of social movements. But the two sides also aim at proxy targets – businesses, the media, constituencies – either because they are symbols, knots of power, or simply available. As with the literature examined above, the available social movement literature on the consequences of violence is skewed toward the study of antistate violence. Within the limits of this bias, however, the literature brunches out toward four areas – the areas of the polity, the economy, the society, and biography (Bosi and Giugni, 2012).
Violence obviously affects negatively the economy of the relevant state. It can damage property, prevent the use of capital and movement of goods, cause inflation and unemployment, and more generally inhibit economic growth or bring about outright depression. These effects can have negative regional or global economic ramifications, though the reverse might also be true – e.g., the loss in the tourist industry of a conflict-ridden state may be the gain in the tourist industry of a neighboring state. Analysis can distinguish between direct effects in the short run – including economic effects relating to increased medical provisions as well as to the direct loss of property and the like – to less direct effects in the long run. The latter sort of effects, typical of protracted violent political contention, may relate to anything from the deterioration of the health and educational systems to the loss of workforce through changes in migration patterns. In general, it can be said that the effects of political violence on the economy are negative but not all sectors are affected equally, while some sectors – notably those providing security services, infrastructure, consultancy, or news coverage and commentary – may benefit.
Political Area While political violence typically affects policy, the magnitude of policy change may range greatly. On the one extreme, the change may entail the transformation of the state itself. Historically, this has been especially the case with regard to separatist movements, and the wave of decolonization in the 1960s offers many acute examples. Even separatist movements that fail their ultimate goal may precipitate the limited transformation of the state. For example, partly as a consequence of the campaign by the group Basque Homeland and Freedom, a considerable measure of autonomy was granted to the Basque region (Herrera, 2002). On the other hand, violent political contention may produce what from the claimants’ point of view are negative, regressive effects. The massive and essentially permanent dislocation of Kurdish populations in the eastern part of Turkey by the government during the 1980s, designed as a response to the campaign of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, offers a prominent example of this. More modestly, the effects of violent political contention may regard anything from public order policy (censorship, the banning of organizations, etc.) to legislative outputs (legislation as well as change of legislative procedures), to executive outputs directed at various targets including the armed groups’ constituencies. These policies may outlast the campaigns of violence. Public order policy, typically aiming at treating the effects of violent political contention, may remain in effect permanently. Forms of policy aiming at the perceived causes of such contention may as well have long-lasting effects. For example, from 1972 onward and through the 1980s, the UK government made efforts to redress some of the grievances of the nationalist community in northern Ireland with the hope of undermining the campaign by the PIRA. But as it turned, the general direction of this policy, which included fairer hiring practices in the public sector and electoral reforms, has been the same as that which the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, ending the campaigns of violence, has promoted (Bean, 2007).
Social Area The scope of social change resultant from the use of social movement-related violence is very wide indeed, while the direction of change is not preordained. Obviously the intensity, spread, and duration of violence are factors making a difference, and certain changes are expected to follow certain types of violence – e.g., emigration to follow intense violence against a population. Still, the direction of social change can vary. For instance, the levels of social trust or social integration may be reduced in the face of the dangers associated with the use of violence. Yet, at the same time, opposite phenomena may transpire vis-à-vis segments of a population. Thus the use of political violence may increase communal identification and improve the morale of discriminated communities. This seems to be the case, in fact, for many Muslims in Europe, especially of younger generations, who feel empowered by radical Islam, even when they condemn political violence in the name of Islam (Roy, 2004). Nor are the patterns of public opinion transformation clear. Amid political violence, the prevailing change in the short run may well be the polarization of opinion. But in protracted conflicts, this direction of change may not hold. For example, some of the long-term effects of the Palestinian armed campaigns in the occupied areas in recent decades (the Intifadas, the Tanzim movement, and the campaigns by Hamas) point to the direction of moderation. According to one study, these campaigns contributed to the evolution of the political orientations of local populations by increasing their willingness to accept a Palestinian state and make territorial concessions, and by decreasing right-wing identification (Gould and Klor, 2009).
Biographical Area The effects of violence on those affected by violence is, strictly speaking, a subset of what has just been discussed – i.e., effects
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in the social area. But these effects also present an area of study offering particular insight on broader issues of social movement-related violence, not the least the question of disengagement. On the one hand, under study can be former activists, that is, individuals who had perpetrated violence. Even at low levels of activism, these individuals may face lifelong consequences. An elementary yet important question is whether they honor or denounce their old commitments. Postconflict settings show that both sets of individuals are likely to be present and to complicate even more the political tangle associated with efforts at ‘truth and reconciliation’ – not just issues pertaining to the revision of the meaning of one’s life, but also ones pertaining to culpability, punishment, and social closure. Further, the victims of violence and those related to them may likely face life-long consequences. Much of what said above regarding postconflict contexts applies here too, including the broader question of how the personal experience and the collective experience are linked. Trauma, for example, has both a personal and a collective dimension, becoming in interconnected fashion a point of reference for both the victimized individuals and the communities in which they belong. The social movement literature only made limited inroads in this direction of research, despite the fact that this literature’s rich insight on the interconnection between individual and collective action offers a spring board. Of course, the broader literature concerned with questions of victimhood and conflict – in psychology, social psychology, collective memory studies, and so on – is rich and also offers examples for the social movement scholars to emulate.
Future Directions It is seen that the field of social movement studies has made gains in the area of violence, especially regarding the emergence of violence. At the same time, it is clear that biases and lacunae also exist in the field – i.e., more attention on social movement violence than on state violence, and insufficient attention on the disengagement from violence and on the effects of violence. Moreover, it is seen that the inquiries in the field are also pursued by other fields, especially terrorism studies, with divergent results. Two opposing cases can be made for the future of the investigation of social movement-related violence. The one is in favor of pluralism. According to this position, the existing pluralism among the different fields in terms of theories and analytical frameworks is healthy and must be safeguarded. The other case is the opposite. That is, this pluralism is not healthy because it is the result of lack of knowledge across the fields and the academic disciplines which, to some extent or another, align with the fields; the pluralism must therefore be replaced by more unifying sets of theories. Current trends exist in both directions. The present pluralism is sustained not so much by the intension of the participating scholars as by factors having to do with the general organization of academia; the overall trend is therefore toward the inadvertent perpetuation of pluralism. At the opposite end, various scholars promote broad analytic frameworks intended for research in different traditional fields. The
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‘Contentious Politics Approach’ is the most prominent result from this kind of efforts. Promoted by scholars in the field of social movement studies – Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam, among others – the approach argues that the delineation of research according to the concept ‘social movement’ (as well as ‘terrorism’) must give way to delineation according to the concept ‘contentious politics’ (McAdam et al., 2001). This concept is meant to denote any contention outside the formal channels of government. It therefore covers a broader category of phenomena than the category ‘social movements,’ including episodic contention by way of labor strikes and ethnic conflict. The advocates of this approach hold that such a wide range of forms of contention can be analyzed through a coherent analytical framework, thus allowing comparisons among phenomena which traditionally have been considered incomparable. Further work is needed before this and other similar approaches become mainstream and replace more specialized fields; indeed, the level of the future success of such approaches might be measured by the extent that they entice members of the field of terrorism, since this is not only a large field but one which operates on peculiar sets of incentives. For the moment, it appears that the intellectual movement toward the comprehensive study of violence is gaining ground. If this is the case, however, we believe that a new challenge will emerge. To the extent that an enlarged pool of phenomena covering various forms of violent and nonviolent actions is treated as comparable, the need to arrive at new conceptual distinctions will arise. The challenge ahead might be, then, to produce conceptual differentiation that, while analytically integrating, allows for superior classification of phenomena.
See also: Civil Wars; Conflict and Consensus; Insurgency; Peace Movements; Revolutions, Sociology of; Securitization; Social Protest; Terrorism; Urban Conflicts; Violence, History of.
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Gould, E., Klor, E., 2009. Does Terrorism Work? Unpublished Paper (No. 7589), Centre for Economic Policy Research. Herrera, E., 2002. Nationalist extremism and outcomes of the state public policies in the Basque country, 1969–2001. International Journal on Multicultural Societies 4 (1), 17–41. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., Tilly, C., 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, New York. Oberschall, A., 2004. Explaining terrorism: the contribution of collective action theory. Sociological Theory 22 (1), 26–37. Porta, Donatella, D., 1995. Political Violence and the State. Cambridge University Press, New York. Porta, Donatella, D., 2013. Clandestine Political Violence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Roy, O., 2004. Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. C. Hurst and Co, London. Tilly, C., 2004. Terror, terrorism, terrorists. Sociological Theory 22 (1), 5–13. Tilly, C., 2003. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Tilly, C., 1998. Micro, macro, or megrim? In: Mikrogeschihte, Makrogeschichte: komplmentar oer inkommensurabel? Mit Beitragen von Maurizio Gribaudi, Giovanni Levi und Charles Tilly. Wallstein Verlag.
Viterna, J., 2006. Pulled, pushed, and persuaded: explaining women’s mobilization into Salvadoran guerrilla army. American Journal of Sociology 112 (1), 1–45. White, R., 1989. From peaceful protest to guerrilla war: micromobilization of the provisional Irish republican army. The American Journal of Sociology 94 (6), 1277–1302. Wood, E., 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Zwerman, G., Steinhoff, P., Porta, Donatella D., 2000. Disappearing social movements: clandestinity in the cycle of new left protest in the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Italy. Mobilization 5, 83–100.
Relevant Websites http://cosmos.eui.eu/Projects/cosmos/Home.aspx – COSMOS. http://www.mobilization.sdsu.edu/index.html – Mobilization. http://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/ – Mobilizing Ideas. http://polviolence.net/ – Political Violence Standing Group (ECPR). http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/csms20/current – Social Movement Studies.