Social representations of history: preliminary notes on content and consequences around the pacific rim

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Pergamon

Int[ J[ Intercultural Rel[ Vol[ 12\ No[ 1\ pp[ 104Ð125\ 0888 Þ 0888 Elsevier Science Ltd[ All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 9036Ð0656:88:, ! see front matter

PII] S9036Ð0656"87#99925Ð3

SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF HISTORY] PRELIMINARY NOTES ON CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES AROUND THE PACIFIC RIM JAMES H[ LIU Victoria University of Wellington ABSTRACT[ Social representations of world history were examined among student populations in four Paci_c Rim cultures] Hong Kong\ Japan\ Australia\ and New Zealand[ Nominations of the _ve most in~uential _gures in the last 0999 years revealed a preponderance of political and wartime leaders "48 and 26) overall#\ with Hitler number one by a wide margin[ Nominations of the seven most important events were complementary\ with politics and war again dominating[ World War II was named most frequently\ World War I next[ There was little cultural variation in the emphasis on politics and war\ and all nominations centred around the 19th century[ Each culture showed evidence of relative in!group ontogeny\ or a focus on their own ethnic or national in!group\ but Europe was central to all representations\ and neighbouring cultures relatively unimportant[ Absolute ontogeny was found only at the level of ethnicity\ not nationality\ with Japanese showing the least ontogenic focus[ Taken as wholes\ Chinese and Japanese representations showed potential for con~ict\ but broad historical perceptions were unrelated to individual differences in political preferences or strength of social identity[ Þ 0888 Elsevier Science Ltd[ All rights reserved[

One feature that de_nes the various disciplines in social science is their treatment of culture[ The position each discipline adopts regarding culture is intimately related to the methodology it uses in the pursuit of knowledge[ Soon after its foundation at the turn of the century\ mainstream psy! chology took the position espoused by its _rst paradigm\ radical behavi!

Paper presented at the International Conference on The Transition to HKSARPC\ July 6Ð 8\ 0886\ Hong Kong[ Thanks to Kristy Castiglione\ Yoshihisa Kashima\ Ying!Yi Hong\ Megumi Mizuno\ Yukako Hidaka\ Masaki Yuki\ and Ying Chen for assistance in data collection and coding for this project[ Thanks to Kwok Leung for providing a Chinese translation of the survey[ Please address correspondence to] James H[ Liu\ Department of Psychology\ Victoria Uni! versity of Wellington\ PO Box 599\ Wellington\ New Zealand[ Fax] 53!93!385!4391^ E!mail] james[liuÝvuw[ac[nz

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orism\ and relegated culture to its periphery[ It adopted the experiment as its preferred method of investigation\ augmented by a strictly positivist philosophy of science and an ideology of American individualism "Farr\ 0885#[ General rules were derived from experiments on individuals opera! ting in speci_c settings\ and then generalized "or assumed to generalize# to other settings[ This basic orientation has made the study of culture in psychology a di.cult proposition\ such that cultural "e[g[\ Cole\ 0884^ Green_eld\ 0886# and cross!cultural psychology "e[g[\ Berry\ Poortinga\ Segall + Dasen\ 0881^ Hofstede\ 0879^ Leung + Bond\ 0878\ Triandis + Lambert\ 0879# form only a small portion of the overall enterprise[ Even among cross! cultural psychologists\ one school of thought holds that cultural di}erences must originate in individual processes that should be studied separately from content[ "i[e[\ the knowledge that goes into making culture#[ An important theory that challenges this position and forms the basis for this paper is Moscovici|s "0850\ 0873\ 0877# theory of social representations[ There are two complementary aspects to the study of social rep! resentations] the _rst is patterns of shared meaning^ and the second is the communication of these meanings "Wagner\ 0883#[ According to Mos! covici "0873#\ the two are interconnected[ Social representations refer to the common knowledge and information which members of groups share in the form of common!sense theories and {{facts|| about the social world[ They are used to communicate meaning^ they are used to translate the unfamiliar into the familiar\ they are part of both the process and the content of language and cognition[ The present study describes the content and consequences of shared patterns of meaning regarding history across four locations on the Paci_c Rim] Australia\ Hong Kong\ Japan\ and New Zealand[ These patterns of consensus and di}erence are discussed within the context of dialogues across cultures and nationality[ The twentieth century has been nothing if not epoch!making] the begin! ning of the end of the colonial era^ two World Wars^ the Cold War and its thaw^ the birth of global culture through information technology and international trade[ And now\ at the close of the millennium\ the return of Hong Kong\ one of the last outposts of the British Empire\ to the rising power of China[ How are these and events in earlier periods perceived by citizens of various countries< To what extent is there consensus as to what events are most critical in constituting world history< And what is the message of these events\ in terms of their content] do they emphasize scienti_c achievement^ political leadership\ the discovery of new lands^ politics^ or warfare< What periods are emphasized most< And _nally\ what are the consequences of holding these beliefs for group identity and positions on current political issues< Liu\ Wilson\ McClure + Higgins "0888# have argued that {{history is the story of the making of an in!group||[ They have coined the term {{in!group

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ontogeny|| to describe attempts by a group to {{create a historical self! narrative that tells them not only who they are\ but where they should be going||[ At the level of the nation!state\ the most important social identi_cations would appear to be nationality and ethnicity "or the more problematic concept of {{race||#[ Ethnicity and nationality do not have to coincide\ and at times\ friction between the two can produce massive political upheavals "e[g[\ the Balkans\ central Africa#[ Liu et al[ documented social representations of New Zealand history among Maori "indigenous\ Polynesians# and Pakeha "European descended# survey respondents\ and demonstrated how these historical perceptions provide a context for understanding aspects of intergroup relations in Aotearoa "New Zealand# that are culturally unique[ The greater in!group favouritism shown by Maori "the subordinate ethnic group compared to Pakeha# as regards the most important event in New Zealand history\ the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi\ was a striking example of this[ It contrasts sharply with the typical _nding in the literature where the dominant group shows more favouritism "see Liu\ Campbell + Condie\ 0884^ Sachdev + Bourhis\ 0876^ Sidanius + Pratto\ 0882#[ The data suggest that Maori\ especially students in university\ were actively engaged in the creation of an ethnic historical narrative to bind their various tribes "some of whom have had traditional enmity\ and some of whom fought against one another during the colonial period# together[ The basic idea is that history is essential in providing the raw materials to strengthen social identity at the level of nationality or ethnicity[ For Maori trying to reclaim a position in New Zealand\ not as a conquered or marginalized {{race||\ but as an equal partner as promised under the Treaty of Waitangi\ an onto`enic focus on their history as an ethnic group is a powerful tool[ Maori "e[g[\ Awatere\ 0873^ Walker\ 0889# and Pakeha "e[g[\ Ballara\ 0875^ Belich\ 0885^ Orange\ 0876# are challenging the histories written in a colonial mode[ This {{new narrative|| is in some respects polemical "to use Moscovici|s 0877 term#\ or in opposition to that held by mainstream New Zealand "e[g[\ we|re all just New Zealanders\ New Zea! land has the best race relations in the world#[ The writing of new historical narratives appears to be part and parcel of the process of social change\ and in New Zealand has been associated with Maori separatist movements[ However\ there is much continuity within these important disconti! nuities[ For instance\ there was almost universal agreement as to the centrality of the Treaty of Waitangi\ and overall emphasis on events post!European arrival among the historical representations of all groups studied[ These perceptions were found to provide invaluable context for placing aspects of social identity "e[g[\ Hogg + Abrams\ 0889^ Tajfel + Turner\ 0868^ Turner\ Hogg\ Oakes\ Reicher + Wetherell\ 0876# as cultural phenomena[ Certain perceptions of history were shown to correlate stron! gly with positions on current political issues\ but surprisingly\ they were

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unrelated to individual di}erence measures of the strength of ethnic or national identity[ The focus of Liu et al[|s work was on the dynamics of ethnicity within nationality[ In the present study\ perceptions of world history are examined with a di}erent purpose in mind[ They are used to examine ethnicity and nationality with an international context[ Without substantial and intentional oversampling of minority groups "e[g[\ Maori form only 05) of the total population of New Zealand\ so Liu et al[ had to oversample Maori in their design#\ their numbers would be too small to analyze in a typical social psychological survey with a sample size of a hundred or even two hundred[ In New Zealand\ Australia\ Japan\ and Hong Kong\ the four {{nationalities|| examined in the present research\ the majority ethnic group also comprises 65Ð87) of the national group[ Therefore\ in this preliminary investigation we con~ate the dimensions of ethnicity and nationality to focus on the international rami_cations of the perception of history\ knowing full well that this is a gloss over highly dynamic and possibly contested versions of history within a nation[ For now\ the focus is not on the workings of ethnicity within nationality\ but the workings of nationality and ethnicity within the overarching context of region "e[g[\ Asia or the Paci_c Rim^ see Dirlik\ 0882# or perhaps even {{the world||[ Although there are a broad range of psychological and communicative processes that serve ontogenic function "see Liu et al[\ 0888#\ in this study the term is used more narrowly[ Ontogenic focus refers to the naming of people and events on the world stage relevant to one|s own ethnicity and nationality[ It also refers to the importance placed on events that de_ne one|s own group\ and to the telling of stories that give meaning to these events\ but these broader\ more narrative aspects of in!group ontogeny will not be addressed in the current study[ Here\ ontogenic focus is operationalized as the naming of people within one|s own ethnic or national in!group\ and the consideration of events that occurred within these national or ethnic home territories[ Two forms of ontogenic focus are considered] the strong form\ referred to as {{absolute ontogeny||\ is where a given group names more people from their ethnic or national territories and from their own ethnic or national groups than people or events concerning other groups[ We also consider a weaker form of ontogenic focus\ {{relative ontogeny||\ where the group names more people and events from their national or ethnic groupings relative to what people from other regions name[ It is predicted that each of the four groups studied should display relative onto`eny in their representation of history\ but that absolute onto`eny depends on the power and position of a people and culture[ For instance\ Australians or New Zealanders would be highly unlikely to display absolute ontogeny for their national groups given their peripheral positions in world history\ whereas British or Chi! nese might be more likely to show such a strong focus[

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108

According to Liu et al[\ the motivational links between social identity and the perception of history are two!fold[ First according to social identity theory\ there is psychological self!enhancement] by naming important _gures and events relevant to one|s in!groups\ one may enhance self!esteem by basking in the re~ected glory of others "e[g[\ Beach + Tesser\ 0884#[ Second\ according to Liu et al[\ there is self!veri_cation] so the _gures named might not be so glorious "e[g[\ for many Germans\ Adolph Hitler is a villain#\ but may be considered to be informative about the group[ The three protagonists of The Romance of the Three Kin`doms\ one of the de_nitive Chinese historical narratives\ for example\ were not historical winners "they died failing to achieve a reuni_cation of China#[ Never! theless\ the stories told about their deeds provide valuable knowledge about the nature of traditional Chinese social identity*its focus on honour\ benevolence\ stable relationships\ and social obligations[ In!group nominations are predicted to correlate positively with strength of national or ethnic identity because they may provide a crude index of the extent to which a person has incorporated the ethnic or national in!group narrative as part of their social identity[ De_ning ontogeny in such a rigidly empirical manner may not be able to provide a satisfactory account of the narrative functions that these historical events and persons serve[ If history is focused around warfare\ for example\ the naming of a great enemy could be an essential element for the development of a coherent in!group narrative[ In the fourteenth century Russia\ mothers could silence their crying children by invoking terrifying stories of the Mongolian Khans[ All peoples of the world of the twentieth century have to acknowledge the massive impact of the West in the past few hundred years[ Therefore\ in addition to quantitative analysis\ a qualitative analysis of the possible narrative functions of the various social representations of history is provided[ Aspects of the social representation of history that appear to be hegemonic "or consensual#\ emancipated "di}erent but _t together smoothly#\ and polemical "con~icting#\ to use Moscovici|s "0877# terms\ are considered[ The approach adopted here is to use psychology|s quantitative methods in conducting survey research\ but to analyze and interpret these results as communicative patterns in four locations along the Paci_c Rim[ The following sequence is followed] 0[ Social representations of the most important _gures in world history over the last 0999 years "good or bad# are described[ The _gures are categorized as to what they are famous for "e[g[\ wartime\ political\ spiritual\ artistic achievements etc[# and what period in time they were active[ Patterns of commonality and di}erence across cultures are noted and interpreted[ 1[ Social representations of the most important events are documented[

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Again\ they are categorized as to their signi_cance and time period\ and again patterns of commonality and di}erence across cultures are noted and interpreted[ 2[ The hypothesis of in!group ontogeny is evaluated for nationality and ethnicity across the four cultures studied[ These hypotheses are evalu! ated for both relative and absolute ontogeny\ with the prediction that absolute ontogeny at a national level is more likely for Chinese and Japanese\ and absolute ontogeny at the level of ethnicity "or {{race||# more likely for New Zealanders and Australians[ 3[ Emergent patterns in the perceptions of history are correlated with group or social identity and positions on current political issues "e[g[\ Tajfel + Turner\ 0868#[ The two aspects of historical perceptions exam! ined most closely are the degree to which in!group ontogeny\ as de_ned by the naming of events and _gures of one|s own ethnicity or national! ity\ relates to group identity\ and whether the type of person or event named is related to policy positions[

METHOD In this preliminary investigation\ university students were recruited from four locations] Victoria University of Wellington\ New Zealand^ LaTrobe University in Melbourne\ Australia^ the University of Tokyo\ Japan\ and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology "now in the People|s Republic of China^ at the time a British colony#[ Student populations were chosen to allow comfortable comparisons across culture\ and because their perceptions of history are likely to re~ect recent educational experiences[ Institutional instruction was deemed to be a good starting point for the investigation of social representations[

Sample Characteristics In Australia\ there were 091 survey respondents\ 66 women and 14 men\ with an average age of 12 years "std  5[5\ range 06Ð36#[ Among these\ 72 were born in Australia\ and 65 were Australian citizens^ 5 had lived in Australia less than 09 years[ All but 8 respondents were of European ethnicity\ but within this\ tracing their ancestry from a wide range of European nations[ About half were psychology majors\ the other half in physical sciences:engineering[ In Japan\ 80 surveys were completed by 27 women and 41 men "0 gender unknown#[ Their average age was 10 "std  5[9\ range 07Ð43#[ Among these\ 75 respondents were born in Japan\ 74 claimed Japanese ethnicity^ the remainder were from other parts of Asian\ and among these 2 were recent immigrants[ Survey respondents were either in the physical sciences or business management[

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The Hong Kong sample consisted of 50 women and 51 men\ with an average age of 10[4 "std  0[6\ range 07Ð26#[ Among these\ 093 were born in Hong Kong and 05 in China^ 05 claimed {{Hong Kong|| nationality\ whereas 89 British National "Overseas#\ and 06 were Chinese nationals[ British National "Overseas# is not equivalent to a United Kingdom pass! port\ but it is not equivalent to Hong Kong identity papers either\ high! lighting the ambiguous nationality of this sample[ All but one survey respondent claimed Chinese ethnicity[ Six had lived in Hong Kong for less than 09 years[ In terms of majors\ about half were from the physical sciences:engineering\ and the other half business:_nance[ The New Zealand sample were 66 women and 24 men\ average age 12 "std  5[5 range\ 07Ð36#[ Among these\ 81 were New Zealand born\ and 82 were citizens of New Zealand[ Ethnically\ 090 were of European descent\ 4 were of Maori!European descent\ 2 were Paci_c Islanders\ and 2 were Asian[ Five had lived in New Zealand for less than 09 years[ The vast majority were psychology majors\ and among these half had double majors with some other _eld[ Students in Japan and Hong Kong completed surveys in Japanese and Chinese respectively\ whereas in Australia and New Zealand English lan! guage surveys were used[ In analyzing the data\ a philosophy was adopted to include as many survey respondents as possible as long as this made sense "e[g[\ in considering the relationship between strength of national identity and in!group ontogeny\ it does not make sense to include non! nationals*in Hong Kong\ therefore\ those of PRC nationality were excluded#[ The reason is that the distribution of ethnicity\ nationality\ and length of residence appeared to re~ect the varying characteristics of the four cultures studied "e[g[\ Australia has a liberal immigration policy compared to Japan#[ As the study of social representations involves shared meanings\ it seemed inappropriate to exclude recent immigrants from the measurement of social consensus\ especially when such immigration patterns are a matter of national policy[

Materials All participants completed a 2!page survey[ The _rst section contained demographic questions[ The second section contained open!ended items to assess social representations of history[ Here\ the _rst question asked respondents to {{Write down the names of the 4 people born in the last 0999 years whom you consider to have had the most impact\ good or bad\ on world history[ When you are done\ circle a number from 0Ð6 to indicate how much you admire each of them||[ The scale endpoints ranged from {{Don|t admire at all|| to {{Admire greatly||[ A thousand year period was chosen to avoid an over!reliance on religious _gures[ The second two questions\ not analyzed in the current investigation\ asked respondents to

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name the greatest artists\ writers\ poets\ or musicians\ and then to write down the 4 most important inventions[ The fourth question stated {{Imagine that you were giving a seminar on world history[ What 6 events would you teach as the most important in world history< How positively or negatively do you regard each event< ðon a 6!point scale ranging from Very Negative to Very PositiveŁ||[ Because of a clerical error\ the Japanese participants were only asked to name 4 events[ Participants were then asked what country they considered to be the best in the world and why[ Finally\ they completed a number of Likert! type scale items[ Luhtanen + Crocker|s "0881# collective self!esteem scale was adapted to provide a measure of national identity[ Also measured were ethnic identity\ using a 4 item scale "{{I feel that I can trust people of my own ethnic group more than people from other ethnic groups||^ {{My ethnicity is not very important to me|| ðreversedŁ^ {{I hardly ever think of myself in terms of my ethnicity|| ðreversedŁ^ {{I feel more comfortable with people of the same ethnicity as myself||^ and {{I feel a sense of great pride in my ethnic group||# and social dominance orientation "SDO] a general measure of a support for inequality in the form of group!based hierarchies\ see Pratto\ Sidanius\ Stallworth + Malle\ 0883#[ A few of the positions on political issues "{{I would like it if all countries in the British Commonwealth would stay on as members forever||# and perception of foreign policy aims for various nations "{{How closely do you feel that the foreign policy aims of the people from each of the following places corresponds to "or _ts with# what|s best for you and your country<||# were selected for use "these scales were in a 6!point Likert format#[ All scales had satisfactory reliability coe.cients across cultures "SDO alphas from 9[63Ð9[78\ ethnic identity 9[46Ð9[79\ national identity\ 9[66Ð9[78#[ The questionnaires took 19Ð14 min to complete[

RESULTS Most Important Fi`ures in the Last 0999 Years Lists of the most important world _gures in the last 0999 years and the most important world events were tallied[ Any participant who did not enter a single _gure or event was deleted from that particular analysis\ and it should be noted that in the Japanese sample\ this reduced the sample signi_cantly "from 80 to 67#[ The average number of _gures named was 3[4 in Japan\ 3[6 in Hong Kong\ and 3[3 in New Zealand and Australia "out of a possible 4#[ Examining Table 0\ there is no question who is the most important _gure in world history in the last 0999 years] Adolph Hitler[ The only other person to make the top 09 in all four cultures was Albert Einstein\ and he does not begin to approach Hitler|s numbers[ In Australia and

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TABLE 1 Most important world figures in the last 1000 years

Hong Kong Rank (N = 122) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Mao Sun Yat-sen Hitler Einstein Deng Xiaoping Newton Napoleon Qin Emperor Bill Clinton Edison

Japan % (N = 78) 63 58 49 38 29 17 11 9 9 9

Hitler Napoleon Edison Mao Lincoln Nobunaga Kennedy H. Toyotomi Einstein Columbus

Australia % (N = 101)

New Zealand % (N = 111)

54 26 19 15 15 14 14 13 10 10

85 23 22 21 19 16 15 14 12 11

Hitler Mandela Einstein M. Luther King Gandhi Kennedy Capt. Cook Karl Marx Sigmund Freud Churchill

Hitler Einstein Gandhi Napoleon Churchill M. Luther King Mandela Mother Theresa Newton Columbus Thatcher Shakespeare

% 88 36 22 14 13 12 11 11 10 9 9 9

New Zealand\ Hitler was named by almost 89) of participants\ and in Japan he received twice the nominations as the next most commonly named _gure[ Only in Hong Kong did other individuals achieve greater levels of consensus than Hitler\ and even there\ he was named by fully half the respondents[ Hitler|s evaluation is negative in all four cultures[ In Hong Kong and Japan\ his mean admiration ratings were 0[7 and 1[1 respectively on a 6 point scale[ In Anglo!speaking New Zealand and Australia\ he is the prototypical archvillain\ with admiration ratings of 0[2 "{{Don|t admire at all||#[ His function as the {{Great Enemy|| of Anglo!speaking peoples is under! lined by the concurrent nomination of his great foe Winston Churchill in the top ten for New Zealand and Australia[ The nomination of England|s Churchill rather than America|s Roosevelt is indicative of the colonial roots of these two countries that will be discussed in greater detail in the section on in!group ontogeny[ Here\ it is su.cient to note the surprising result that the villain of the tale is considered to be so much more important than the hero[ The only _gure indigenous to the four ethnicities:nations studied who received a reasonable number of nominations from all four locations was Mao Zedong[ He was perceived to be more benevolent than Hitler\ but not very much so\ even among Chinese[ Mao received the highest mean favorability rating in Australia "X  2[74\ N  6#\ then Japan "X  2[14\

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N  01#\ followed by Hong Kong "X  1[64\ N  66# and New Zealand "X  0[56\ N  5#[ Looking more broadly at all of the nominations\ there is an over! whelming preponderance of twentieth century _gures[ Overall\ 58) of historical nominations from Hong Kong\ 69) from Australia\ 60) from New Zealand\ but only 37) from Japan were active in the twentieth century "a considerable number of Japanese nominations were from their Shogun period#[ Albert Einstein|s position as the only _gure besides Hitler to appear on all four lists may be indicative of the importance of scienti_c advance in this century\ but is something of an anomaly given the other major generalization in the pattern of nominations] the central characters in world history across these cultures are wartime political leaders[ Tables 1 and 2 elaborate this point[ Biographies of history were con! sulted to provide guidelines for coding why each historical _gure was nominated[ Nine general categories were developed] political^ wartime^ scienti_c^ artistic^ humanitarian^ spiritual^ exploration^ athletic^ and mis! cellaneous[ Each historical _gure was categorized into one or two cate! gories[ Overall\ about 59) of the _gures named by all respondents could be classi_ed as political leaders[ Among these political leaders\ fully 71) played signi_cant roles during wartime[ The category of wartime leaders emerged as a subset of political leaders^ only 0 person was nominated as a general in war without being a political leader as well[ Humanitarian and spiritual leadership went together as well\ but not so tightly[ As seen

TABLE 2 Realms of achievement for important historical persons Hong Kong %

Japan %

Australia %

New Zealand %

Average %

Political Wartime

69 42

58 35

54 35

53 35

59 37

Scientific Artistic Humanitarian

17 8 4

12 5 1

18 16 19

19 14 17

17 11 10

9 2 2

9 5 1

Achievement

Spiritual Exploration Athletic

1.6 1.4 1

10 4.5 2.4

7 3 2

Columns do not total to 100% because figures were coded for two categories where appropriate.

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114

TABLE 3 Realms of achievement for first historical figure named

Achievement Political Wartime

Hong Kong %

Japan %

Australia %

New Zealand %

Average %

78 51

71 61

66 53

79 71

74 59

in Table 2\ the con~uence between politics and war is exaggerated for the _rst _gure that came to mind] here\ three!quarters of these _gures were politicians\ and 48) had signi_cant wartime roles[ There is little variation in this pattern of results[ Across cultures\ the leading characters in narratives of history are leaders in politics\ most frequently the politics of war[ Science is the third most frequent reason for historical fame[ It is a stand alone category with little cultural variation in frequency as well[ On the other hand\ Australians and New Zealanders nominated _gures with artistic\ humanitarian\ and explorational achieve! ments more often than Japanese or Hong Kong respondents[ Hong Kong residents named fewer spiritual leaders compared to members of the other cultures[

In!`roup Onto`eny in Fi`ures Named After categorizing the _gures broadly according to nine regions of origin "Europe\ North America\ Latin America including Mexico\ Africa\ Australasia : Australia¦New Zealand\ Paci_c Islands\ Middle East\ India\ Far East#\ and then breaking them down further by country of origin\ two trends were immediately evident[ First\ there is evidence of relative in!group ontogeny in the nominations from each culture[ Chinese named more Chinese\ Japanese named more Japanese\ Australians named more Australians\ and New Zealanders named more New Zealanders relative to how many were named by the other groups "see the diagonal of Table 3#[ There was considerable variation in the degree and form of absolute in! group ontogeny[ Australians and New Zealanders nominated only a small percentage of _gures from their countries of origin\ but they nominated a huge percentage of Europeans[ Thus\ absolute ontogeny was evident at the level of ethnicity for these two groups[ Most Australasians trace their ethnic origins back to Europe\ and while New Zealand and Australia are no longer colonies\ they are still active members of the British Com!

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J[ H[ Liu TABLE 4 Ethnic origins of the figures named

Ethnic Origins Chinese

Japanese

Australian New Zealander European N. American Total nominations

Hong Kong %

Japan %

Australia %

New Zealand %

45

Far East not including Japan: 8 28

Total Far East:

Total Far East:

3

2

0 0 37 21

4 0 61 17

0 6 65 18

N = 353

N = 447

N = 490

Far East not including China: 14 0 0 37 11 N = 573

Note: Columns do not total to 100% because some figures could not be classified or fell into categories irrelevant for the purposes of this paper.

monwealth[ There is little evidence of ontogeny at a national level for these groups\ it is more ethnic or {{racial||[ Detailed tallies showed that the majority of Europeans they named were from the United Kingdom rather than continental Europe[ Hong Kong has "or had# been a colony of Great Britain for about as long as New Zealand and Australia\ but its historical narrative is substantially di}erent[ For Hong Kong Chinese\ the focus was on China in the twentieth century\ with Mao Zedong and Sun Yat!sen representing the dual forces of Communism and Social Democracy\ and Deng Xiaoping a more pragmatic\ market!oriented Communism[ The _rst Qin Emperor was nominated as well\ despite violating the 0999 year limit[ Hong Kong Chinese showed absolute ontogeny at the ethnic level\ and at the national level if they are considered as Chinese nationals rather than as a colony of the British empire "which they were at the time of data collection#[ The Japanese sample showed the least ontologically focused narrative[ The only Japanese _gures in their top ten were Nobunaga and Hideyoshi Toyotomi\ two Shogun!era political and wartime leaders[ These two were named by less than 04) of survey respondents[ Alone among the four cultures studied\ they did not include a twentieth century _gure connected to World War II from their own ethnic:national in!group[ Nor did any _gures from the Meiji Restoration receive high levels of consensus[ The Japanese sample did not show absolute ontogeny at either the national or

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116

ethnic levels "which coincide#\ but rather named more Europeans than Japanese[ The second trend evident in the data is the importance of Europe in the narratives for all four cultural groups[ This should not be surprising for the three former British colonies\ but it is striking that the Japanese sample should name more _gures from Europe than Japan[ The history of the world as construed by these samples does not seem to be able to avoid Europe^ this is true to a lesser extent about North America[ Africa\ Latin America\ Australasia\ India\ the Middle!East\ and the Paci_c Islands all had marginal roles comparatively[ The two Asian cultures "especially Hong Kong# did name a fairly high percentage of people from their ethnic in!groups\ but few other Asians[

Most Important Events in World History Analysis of the most important events in world history yielded a comp! lementary set of results[ As seen in Table 4\ World War II is considered as the most important event in world history across cultures by a wide

TABLE 5 Most important events in world history

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Hong Kong (N = 119)

%

Japan (N = 75)

WWII WWI French Revolution Industrial Revolution 23 Vietnam War

%

Australia (N = 98) WWII WWI Man on the Moon Holocaust

World War II World War I Tien An Men Sino–Japanese War USSR Breakup

81 52 45 39

52 29 23 17

Cultural Revolution German Reunification Gulf War

19 Cold War

17 Destruction of Hiroshima 12 Industrial Revolution 11 Vietnam War

16 Crusades 15 Atomic Bomb

American War of 14 Discovery of Independence America French Revolution 14 Korean War American War of Independence

9 Discovery of Australia 9 Women’s Rights & Suffrage 7 Birth of Christ 7

%

New Zealand (N = 107)

%

68 60 24 21

WWII WWI Man on the Moon Women’s Suffrage

73 64 37 21

21 Birth of Christ

21

19 Industrial Revolution 20 18 Fall of Rome

19

16 Fall of Berlin Wall

16

16 Discovery of America 16 15 French Revolution

15

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margin\ with World War I receiving the second most nominations[ No other event achieved enough consensus to make the top ten across the four cultures studied[ If Hitler is portrayed as the great villain in world history\ then World War II was his stage\ and the story that was written has reverberated throughout the Paci_c Rim[ Again\ the twentieth century is the time period that received the most attention\ accounting for 53) of nominated events from Australia\ 59) from New Zealand\ 59) from Japan\ and 68) from Hong Kong[ Although a time limit was not set for the events\ the prior nomination of individuals within the past 0999 years probably in~uenced this result to some extent[ The set of events that constitute the top ten for Hong Kong residents is particularly interesting[ Nine out of the ten were twentieth century events\ and the two events receiving the most nominations after the World Wars were the Tienanmen Massacre and the SinoÐJapanese War "that domi! nated Chinese concerns for the _rst half of the century#[ Several speci_c events within the rubric of the SinoÐJapanese War were named\ including the May 3th Movement of 0808\ the July 6th Incident of 0826\ and the Nanjing Massacre[ The Japanese set of nominations forms a stark contrast[ Without prior knowledge\ one might never guess what country these ten events came from^ Europe or the United States would seem most likely[ Besides the Second World War\ the only event of central concern to Japan was the Atomic Bomb "and this received lower consensus than among the Australian sample#[ The absence of the SinoÐJapanese War is conspicuous\ and suggests that representations of Japanese military expansion prior to and during the Second World War will continue to be a source of friction between Japan and other Paci_c Rim nations[ They are simply not rep! resented in our data*but neither are such critical events within Japan|s own history as the Meiji Restoration\ the postwar economic miracle\ or the Shogun era[ There is a striking lack of ontogenic focus in the Japanese top ten\ even compared to Australia and New Zealand[ This is a surprising result given the economic successes of Japan in the twentieth century\ and the focus on the twentieth century overall\ but it reminds us that sometimes forgetting is an important part of remembrance[ The Australian sample shared consensus that the discovery of their own continent was important "and given the concurrent nomination of Captain James Cook among important _gures\ this likely refers to the European discovery of Australia rather than the aboriginal#[ The New Zealand sample chose women|s su}rage\ which their country was the _rst to obtain[ Otherwise\ it is striking to note how similar the two lists are[ Both New Zealand and Australia\ as areas recently colonized by Europeans\ named more events to do with exploration and discovery than Japan and Hong Kong[

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Congruent with the data on important people\ the reasons for the events nominated again centre around politics and war\ with war pre!eminent "see Table 5#[ Each event was coded into only a single category "unlike the persons\ where two categories were allowed#\ and as a result science and technology again came in a distant third behind politics and war[ Finally\ in!group ontogeny followed a similar pattern to that observed for the important _gures[ Each group nominated relatively more events on their home territories compared to the others[ Furthermore\ New Zealand and Australia nominated a preponderance of events from Europe\ showing absolute ontogeny again at the level of ethnicity[ Hong Kong and Japan focused on events in Asia within China and Japan respectively\ and paid little attention to other parts of the Far East[ But whereas the Hong Kong Chinese showed absolute ontogeny in favour of their in!group\ the Japanese again nominated more events from Europe than their home territory[ For all four groups\ European and to a lesser extent North American events were frequently nominated\ and Latin America\ Africa\ the Middle! East\ the Paci_c Islands\ Australasia\ and India received little attention[ For the Japanese and Chinese samples\ the majority of Far Eastern nomi! nations were on events within their respective national boundaries[

TABLE 6 Type of event

Event Type War Other Political Science & Technology Disasters Exploration & Discovery Peace Treaties Birth & Death of People Eras (non-specific events) Miscellaneous

Hong Kong Japan (N = 716) (N = 299) (%) (%)

Australia (N = 574) (%)

New Zealand (N = 565) (%)

Average

41 37 8

52 26 6

36 22 5

36 23 4

41 27 6

3 1

3 5

2 12

2 13

2.5 8

1 3

1 2

2 5

4 6

2 4

7

4

12

8

10

1

2

3

1

2

Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because of rounding.

129

J[ H[ Liu TABLE 7 Location of important historical events

Location Europe North America Latin America Africa Australia & New Zealand Pacific Islands Middle East Indian Subcontinent Far East Not Regional

Hong Kong (N = 716) (%)

Japan (N = 299) (%)

Australia (N = 574) (%)

New Zealand (N = 565) (%)

Average

24 12

33 7

49 13

52 17

40 12

0 0

4 8

3 9

2 4

1 3 0 23 33

1 5 1 8 11

1 4 0 5 6

1 4 0 19 17

0.6 0 0 4 0 41 19

Note: 0s refer to zero nominations. Columns may not sum to 100% because of rounding.

Correlations with Individual Difference Measures Social representations concern the content and communication of shared meaning\ so the relationship of these representations to individual di}er! ence measures is not central to the theory[ However\ it would seem that within each culture\ those individuals who show greater ontogenic focus by nominating more events and persons pertaining to their in!groups should also show higher levels of identi_cation with the in!group[ This hypothesis was tested in each culture by computing separate tallies of the number of people and events as {{in!group referents||[ In Hong Kong\ in!group was de_ned as Chinese historical _gures\ and there were two indices of events\ de_ned as taking place in Asia or in China[ In Australia and New Zealand\ two indices were computed for both people and events\ one for the home country\ and one combining the home country with Europe[ For these three cultures\ there is some question as to whether such a rigidly quantitative de_nition should be applied to all persons "e[g[\ some Hong Kong Chinese may consider themselves more British than Chinese#[ In Japan\ the in!group can be de_ned as Japanese with less ambiguity[ Each individual was assigned a score from 9 "no in! group referents# to 4 "all in!group referents# for the historical _gures\ and 9Ð6 "9Ð4 for the Japanese sample# for historical events[ But across all four groups\ there were no statistically signi_cant correlations between these measures of ontogenic focus and strength of national or ethnic identity[

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A second analysis concerned the representation of warfare[ For each individual\ the total number of wartime events was tallied\ giving a score from 9Ð6 "except in Japan\ where there were only a maximum of 4 events nominated per person#[ This was correlated with measures of social domi! nance orientation\ and the degree of shared foreign policy interests with several countries[ The correlations did not reach signi_cance for any of the four locations[ Given the absence of relationship between these broadly constructed indices and psychological measures of individual di}erences\ the last set of analyses speci_cally examined the Hong Kong sample[ First\ the mea! sures of ontogeny and war were correlated against the measure of support for staying in the British Commonwealth\ and no relationship was found[ Second\ survey respondents were categorized into whether they had named an event in the SinoÐJapanese War] this was found to be unrelated to the perceived degree of shared interests with China or Japan|s foreign policy aims[ Third\ among respondents who named Deng\ Mao\ or Sun among the most important _gures in world history\ their subjective evaluation of the admirability of each of the three men was correlated with perceived degree of congruence of foreign policy aims with China\ strength of national and ethnic identity\ and support for the British Commonwealth[ None of these correlations was statistically signi_cant[ A potential explanation for this lack of relationship between broad historical indices and group identity may be speci_c to the four cultures studied[ Among the 47) of the Australian\ 55) of New Zealand\ 42) of Japanese\ and 30) of the Hong Kong sample who claimed that their country of residence was the best in the world\ only 0 "from Hong Kong# o}ered history as a reason why in their open!ended responses[

DISCUSSION The preliminary investigation of social representations of history in four Paci_c Rim cultures revealed four basic features] "0# World War II is the most important event in world history\ and Adolph Hitler is its most important character[ "1# The major themes of world history are politics and war\ not necessarily in that order\ but intimately connected[ "2# Though relative in!group ontogeny is evident throughout the four cultures\ absolute ontogeny depends on the particular group studied\ and there is a broad level of consensus as to the central position of Europe and the twentieth century in world history "this is true to a lesser extent of North America#[ "3# Social representations of history as broadly construed in this study do not relate to individual di}erence measures involving group identity\ social dominance orientation\ or current political issues[ Ethnicity appeared to be more important than nationality in three of the four locations studied[ For New Zealanders and Australians\ European

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"or ethnic in!group _gures# rather than Australian or New Zealand nation! als dominated the nominations\ while for Hong Kong Chinese\ also colon! ized by Great Britain\ ethnic Chinese _gured strongly in the nominations[ This pattern did not hold for Japan\ where Europe and to a lesser extent the United States predominated among the people and events nominated[ Whereas relative ontogeny was documented among all four groups\ absolute ontogeny was evident only in ethnicity for New Zealand\ Australia\ and Hong Kong\ and not at all for Japan[ Clearly\ there appear to be powerful {{reality constraints|| on ontogenic focus in the construction of world history[ Future research\ using larger samples\ should begin further to disentangle the relationship between ethnicity "or race# and nationality[ The data also suggest that great villains may be just as important\ or maybe even more important then great heroes in de_ning the historical narrative[ Hong Kong Chinese thought Mao was the most important _gure in the last 0999 years\ but they certainly did not admire him[ Because of the open!ended format of this preliminary investigation\ we were unable to test quantitatively the extent to which historical nominations serve self! enhancing vs self!veri_catory functions\ but future investigations\ using more controlled measures\ should be able to do so[ The fact that the number of wartime events nominated per person did not correlate with relevant individual di}erence measures as social dominance orientation and perceived foreign policy congruence is not really surprising given the level of consensus that history is about politics and war[ Although there was variability on the number of events nomi! nated\ there may be insu.cient variability as to the meanin` of world history] everyone may consider it to relate to a large extent to the politics of warfare[ Somewhat more disconcerting is the lack of connection between in! group nominations "or ontogenic focus# and measures of the strength of national or ethnic identity\ especially given the role that historical discourse has played in recent upheavals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda\ to name two salient examples[ One possibility is that the method of counting used in this study is simply not detailed enough to capture the meaning of the historical narrative[ If more detailed accounts of the events were elicited\ perhaps they would be more intimately associated with individual di}erences in identi_cation with in!groups[ Another issue that warrants further attention is the communication processes involved in the con! struction of these social representations[ It may be that historical rep! resentations become elaborated as a resource in politics when political elites are attempting to accomplish certain objectives[ But these expla! nations are less than satisfactory in considering the data from Hong Kong[ With the handover imminent\ it is surprising that the evaluations of Mao\ and Deng in particular\ should be unrelated to the perception of congru!

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ence of foreign policy with China[ It may be that a strong ethnic or national identity is associated with the perception that one|s own group is more signi_cant that other regional groups one is in close contact with^ in this case\ the perception of world history may be the wrong place to look[ However\ an important caveat to note is that the samples described here were all students\ younger adults in their early twenties[ Historical representations may be qualitatively di}erent for older persons[ There will be cohort e}ects^ the events nominated may be more idiosyncratic\ and couched in experience rather than taken from a text[ We might expect historical representations\ especially of twentieth century events\ to exert stronger e}ects on behavior and social judgment for older adults "e[g[\ see Fazio\ 0875#[ In spite of the limitations of the sample\ another explanation that bears further investigation is the question of how important history is in de_ning the ethnicity or nationality of a people[ None of the four samples in this study considered history to be any part of the reason why they rated their country as {{the best||[ In line with social identity theory "Tajfel + Turner\ 0868#\ it may only be peoples who as a whole can make favourable comparisons on historical dimensions that use world history to de_ne the strength of their degree of ethnic or national identity[ If this hypothesis is supported\ it would provide another reason why representations of history should be studied cross!culturally[ Liu et al[ "0886# found that historical perceptions were most strongly related to positions on current political issues in New Zealand when they involved subjective evaluations of a speci_c historical event with a strong bearing on the issue at hand\ and Hilton\ Erb\ McDermott + Molian "in press# reported similar conclusions in examining European attitudes towards reuni_cation[ The approach adopted here may be more useful for eliciting broad!based social representations than to study the impact of history on present day individual di}erences[ They lend support to Liu et al[|s conclusion that historical perceptions are more relevant for estab! lishing the social context surrounding intergroup relations than for directly providing content[ Of course\ a broader sampling of cultures and popu! lations would increase con_dence in this assertion[ Nevertheless\ certain elements of the social "that is\ collective# rep! resentation of history across the four cultures bear comment[ First\ the Westernization of history is striking among the Japanese sample[ One might speculate that this may serve the function of avoiding guilt for aggressive acts prior to and during World War II\ but it may also re~ect the in~uence of the American occupation of Japan following the war[ The SinoÐJapanese War and the occupation of Korea are largely absent from the data\ but so are events from Japan|s own long history as an Asian nation[ In Japan\ unlike Germany\ neighbouring countries had little to do with postwar education on history^ the American occupiers| agenda for

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depicting Japan|s role during World War II would have been quite di}erent to that of Asian nations[ However\ it is evident that even Hong Kong Chinese\ who as subjects of the British Empire have probably received a more Westernized history than many Asians\ have a fairly detailed remembrance of con~ict with Japan[ This forgetting by Japan and remembrance in other quarters\ whatever their reasons\ will continue to be a source of friction within the rising tide of economic relations between Asian and Paci_c nations[ For Japanese\ what is not said about world history may be more important than what is said[ This could be examined in greater detail by looking at how history is taught in these countries[ Virtually all nations and people in Asia and the Paci_c were colonized militarily by the West to greater or lesser degrees\ whether they be Maori in New Zealand\ Aboriginals in Australia\ Japanese in Japan\ or Chinese in Hong Kong[ This is evident in the strength of Europe in representations of history described here[ Some commentators have noted the incredible economic development of Asia up until recent years and anticipated the twenty!_rst century as an {{Asian Paci_c century|| "e[g[\ Marsella + Choi\ 0882#[ In terms of the perception of history\ however\ it would appear that Asians of di}erent nationality may have a better understanding of their relationship to the West than to one another\ despite centuries of shared interchange in culture\ cultural values\ and material goods "e[g[\ Hwang\ 0884#[ The psychological rendition of world history as a twentieth century phenomenon obscures the shared cultural and historical roots of Asian nations and orients them towards the West\ which has dominated the last two centuries[ As for New Zealand and Australia\ they are two countries on the edge of the Paci_c Rim with increasing trade links to Asia\ but their historical orientation is almost entirely Western[ As globalization continues at a frenetic pace\ it remains to be seen whether global culture\ at least in terms of the perception of history\ will continue in its present form\ with Europe and to a lesser extent North America at its centre\ or whether the currents of change will shift towards a more Asian!Paci_c Rim orientation "Dirlik\ 0882#[

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Cole\ M[ "0884#[ Culture and cognitive development] From cross!cultural research to creating systems of cultural mediation[ Culture + Psycholo`y\ 0\ 14Ð43[ Dirlik\ A[ "0882#[ What is in a rim< Critical perspectives in the Paci_c Re`ion idea[ Boulder\ CO] Westview Press[ Farr\ R[ M[ "0885#[ The roots of modern social psycholo`y[ Oxford\ U[K[] Blackwell[ Fazio\ R[ H[ "0875#[ How do attitudes guide behavior< In R[ M[ Sorrentino + E[ T[ Higgins "Eds#\ pp[ 194Ð132\ The handbook of motivation and co`nition[ New York] Guilford Press[ Green_eld\ P[ M[ "0886#[ Culture as process] Empirical methodology for cultural psychology[ In J[ W[ Berry\ Y[ H[ Poortinga + J[ Pandey "Eds#\ Theory and method "Vol[ 0#\ Handbook of cross!cultural psycholo`y[ Boston] Allyn + Bacon[ Hilton\ D[ J[\ Erb\ H[!P[\ McDermott\ M[\ Molian\ D[ J[ "in press#[ Social rep! resentations of history and attitudes to European uni_cation in Britain\ France\ and Germany[ To appear in G[ Breakwell + E[ Lyons "Eds#\ Chan`in` European identities] Social psycholo`ical analyses of social chan`e[ Oxford] Pergamon Press[ Hofstede\ G[ "0879#[ Culture|s consequences] International differences in work! related values[ London] Sage[ Hogg\ M[ A[\ + Abrams\ D[ "0889#[ Social identity theory] Constructive and critical advances[ New York] Harvester Wheatsheaf[ Hwang\ K[ K[ "0884#[ Easternization] Socio!cultural impact on productivity[ Tokyo] Asian Productivity Organization[ Leung\ K[\ + Bond\ M[ H[ "0878#[ On the empirical identi_cation of dimensions for cross!cultural comparisons[ Journal of Cross!Cultural psycholo`y\ 19"19#\ 022Ð040[ Liu\ J[ H[\ Campbell\ S[ M[\ + Condie\ H[ "0884#[ Ethnocentrism in dating pref! erences for an American sample] The in!group bias in social context[ European Journal of Social Psycholo`y\ 14\ 84Ð004[ Liu\ J[ H[\ Wilson\ M[\ McClure\ J[\ + Higgins\ T[ R[ "0888#[ Social identity and the perception of history] Cultural representations of Aotearoa:New Zealand[ Under review[ Luhtanen\ R[\ + Crocker\ J[ "0881#[ A collective self!esteem scale] Self!evaluation of one|s social identity[ Personality and Social Psycholo`y Bulletin\ 07"2#\ 291Ð 207[ Marsella\ A[ J[\ + Choi\ S[ C[ "0882#[ Psychological aspects of modernization and economic development in East Asian nations[ Psycholo`ia\ 25\ 190Ð102[ Moscovici\ S[ "0850#[ La psychanalyse\ son ima`e et son public[ Paris] Paris Uni! versity Press[ Moscovici\ S[ "0873#[ The phenomenon of social representations[ In R[ M[ Farr + S[ Moscovici "Eds#\ Social representations "pp[ 2Ð69#[ Cambridge] Cambridge University Press[ Moscovici\ S[ "0877#[ Notes towards a description of social representations[ Eur! opean Journal of Social Psycholo`y\ 07\ 100Ð149[ Orange\ C[ "0876#[ The Treaty of Waitan`i[ Wellington] Bridget Williams Books[ Pratto\ F[\ Sidanius\ J[\ Stallworth\ L[ M[\ + Malle\ B[ F[ "0883#[ Social dominance orientation] A personality variable relevant to social roles and intergroup relations[ Journal of Personality and Social Psycholo`y\ 56\ 630Ð652[

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Sachdev\ I[\ + Bourhis\ R[ "0876#[ Status di}erentials and intergroup behaviour[ European Journal of Social Psycholo`y\ 06\ 166Ð183[ Sidanius\ J[\ + Pratto\ F[ "0882#[ The dynamics of social dominance and the inevitability of oppression[ In P[ Sniderman + P[ Tetlock "Eds#\ Prejudice\ politics\ and race in America today\ "pp[ 062Ð100#[ Stanford\ CA] Stanford University Press[ Tajfel\ H[\ + Turner\ J[ "0868#[ An integrative theory of intergroup relations[ In W[ Austin + S[ Worchel "Eds#\ The psycholo`y of inter`roup relations "pp[ 22Ð 36#[ Monterey\ CA] Brooks:Cole[ Turner\ J[ C[\ Hogg\ M[ A[\ Oakes\ P J[\ Reicher\ S[ D[\ + Wetherell\ M[ S[ "0876#[ Rediscoverin` the social `roup] A self!cate`orization theory[ New York] Basil Blackwell[ Triandis\ H[ C[\ + Lambert\ W[ W[ "0879# "Eds#[ Handbook of Cross Cultural Psycholo`y\ Boston] Allyn + Bacon[ Wagner\ W[ "0883#[ Fields of research and the socio!genesis of social rep! resentations] A discussion of criteria and diagnostics[ Social Science Information\ 22"1#\ 088Ð117[ Walker\ R[ "0889#[ Ka whawhau tonu "Stru``le without end#[ Auckland] Penguin Books[