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Software copyrighting attacked
-5Although the majority of suppliers are totally honest and ethical, there are some who are not. A pound saved at purchase could mean a thousand lost in maintenance, licencing penalties and system crashes. The cheapest system to purchase may not be the best in the long run.
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHTING ATTACKED
Speaking at the "Success in Software" seminar this summer in Palo Alto, California, Edwin Lee, chief executive officer of Pro Log Corp., Monterey, Calif., said most software on the market today is legally protected by unreasonable licensing arrangements that "put the survival of systems companies at the mercy of software vendors". Largely from financial motivation, Lee said, software vendors today are doing as much as possible to keep their products secret, both by employing legal protection measures such as copyrights and by providing poor quality or incomplete documentation. "This practice is responsible in large part for accelerating the so-called 'software crisis"', he said "by making it necessary to create more and more programmers rather than providing easy access to tools that will increase the efficiency of existing programmers."
System software unchangeabZe
Lee explained that the software involved in system end-products consists of three levels: application software, system software and hardware drivers. The user typically designs his own hardware drivers and application software, over which he has complete control. The middle level - e.g. an operating system such as CP/M - is owned by an independent OEM and rented or leased to the user, who pays a royalty for each copy. Thus, according to Lee, "the user gives up control over a fundamental portion of his product. He cannot modify or duplicate that portion. If he does, he violates the copyright, and the lessor can require him to destroy all existing copies. Thus the software vendor gains a life-or-death hold over his customers". Furthermore, he said, patents involving hardware invention traditionally have been used to protect the inventor for a limited period , while at the same time disclosing the invention to promote a free exchange of ideas. Copyrights, on the other hand, were designed to reward an artist or novelist indefinitely for a creative act. "By copyrighting software, we're treating that software as a work of art", Lee said. "But it's not - it's a professional design, just like hardware. Software copyrights not only keep a useful professional design under wraps forever; they also prevent any exchange based on that design."
Documentation essantia2
But the real key to gaining control of the product design, Lee added, is good software documentation. "Most software comes with an operation manual that describes how to implement, interface and actually use the software. What's missing is the design manual, with specifications, descriptions, data structures, maps, flow charts and source listings." The real test of the Pro-Log philosophy, Lee said, will come as Pro-Log begins to market its own software products. The company recently announced a series of sub-system-level modules to be sold
Volume 4 Number 12
0 Elsevier
International
Bulletins.
-6-
complete with design rights and full documentation. Only the design manuals will be copyrighted: the software itself can be modified and/or copied to suit the purchaser's needs.
SECURE SYSTEMS
Kernel
OPERATING
pro0
$
For several years now, the United States Department of Defense (DOD) has sponsored research into what are referred to as secure operating systems. The motivation is to devise computer systems which can be used safely for simultaneous processing of information at various levels of secrecy. At present, if one wants to process Top Secret data on a typical commercial computer system, all processing at lower classification levels must be flushed from the computer, and people who don't have TS clearances must be barred from the computer room. Obviously this is a disruptive arrangement, but it has been the only way to conform with DOD regulations for the protection of classified information. The idea behind secure operating systems is simple: a secure operating system is designed so that all of the program modules which control access to system resources are identified and isolated into a separate part of the operating system which is often referred to as a kernel. The kernel itself is then subjected to a formalized proof that it performs as intended, that is to say it will not permit states to exist which are not intended. By formalized proof, we mean that the logic of the kernel can be described mathematically and the description can be subjected to a computerized testing process. The objective is to produce what are referred to as "trusted" computer systems wherein one can safely mix Top Secret and Unclassified work. A number of contracts have been awarded over the past few years to modify existing operating systems to "kernelize" them, and also to develop the automated tools needed to verify or "prove" the correctness of the implementation of the security feature. While we describe the process in a few words, one should not assume it has been easy. Rigorous proof of correctness has been an elusive goal. As a result some software designers are asking that the system operators accept on faith that a software module can be (Hmmm?) "trusted" because of its "obviously" trustworthy design.
'FooZing' the corriputer
If a CPU Other difficulties relate to specifics of the hardware. has only one state, one must use software flats to determine if it is executing a user process, or acting under the control of the operating system. This can create opportunities for the intruder. Sometimes it is possible to "fool" the system into thinking it is in its supervisory state while a user process is in control. The classic example is the system which hasn't been prepared to deal with nonsense commands like "Rewind the Card Reader" or "Read From The Line Printer". Software experts, particularly university (Question: How students, delight in finding these kinds of flaws. many individuals with this sort of "training" are working in your computer room?). Some CPUs have two states, one of which can be reserved for the supervisory state, but even so difficulties remain. Hardware with multiple states appears to have important advantages to the designer. Much of the work in trusted operating systems has been sponsored by the DOD Computer Security Initiative, under the direction of Mr Steve Walker in the Office of the Secretary of Defence. When this research work showed that trusted operating systems could, in fact, be produced, it became apparent that a mechanism was needed to
Volume 4 Number 12
Elsevier
International
Hullctin:
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHTING ATTACKED
Speaking at the "Success in Software" seminar this summer in Palo Alto, California, Edwin Lee, chief executive officer of Pro Log Corp., Monterey, Calif., said most software on the market today is legally protected by unreasonable licensing arrangements that "put the survival of systems companies at the mercy of software vendors". Largely from financial motivation, Lee said, software vendors today are doing as much as possible to keep their products secret, both by employing legal protection measures such as copyrights and by providing poor quality or incomplete documentation. "This practice is responsible in large part for accelerating the so-called 'software crisis"', he said "by making it necessary to create more and more programmers rather than providing easy access to tools that will increase the efficiency of existing programmers."
System software unchangeabZe
Lee explained that the software involved in system end-products consists of three levels: application software, system software and hardware drivers. The user typically designs his own hardware drivers and application software, over which he has complete control. The middle level - e.g. an operating system such as CP/M - is owned by an independent OEM and rented or leased to the user, who pays a royalty for each copy. Thus, according to Lee, "the user gives up control over a fundamental portion of his product. He cannot modify or duplicate that portion. If he does, he violates the copyright, and the lessor can require him to destroy all existing copies. Thus the software vendor gains a life-or-death hold over his customers". Furthermore, he said, patents involving hardware invention traditionally have been used to protect the inventor for a limited period , while at the same time disclosing the invention to promote a free exchange of ideas. Copyrights, on the other hand, were designed to reward an artist or novelist indefinitely for a creative act. "By copyrighting software, we're treating that software as a work of art", Lee said. "But it's not - it's a professional design, just like hardware. Software copyrights not only keep a useful professional design under wraps forever; they also prevent any exchange based on that design."
Documentation essantia2
But the real key to gaining control of the product design, Lee added, is good software documentation. "Most software comes with an operation manual that describes how to implement, interface and actually use the software. What's missing is the design manual, with specifications, descriptions, data structures, maps, flow charts and source listings." The real test of the Pro-Log philosophy, Lee said, will come as Pro-Log begins to market its own software products. The company recently announced a series of sub-system-level modules to be sold
Volume 4 Number 12
0 Elsevier
International
Bulletins.
-6-
complete with design rights and full documentation. Only the design manuals will be copyrighted: the software itself can be modified and/or copied to suit the purchaser's needs.
SECURE SYSTEMS
Kernel
OPERATING
pro0
$
For several years now, the United States Department of Defense (DOD) has sponsored research into what are referred to as secure operating systems. The motivation is to devise computer systems which can be used safely for simultaneous processing of information at various levels of secrecy. At present, if one wants to process Top Secret data on a typical commercial computer system, all processing at lower classification levels must be flushed from the computer, and people who don't have TS clearances must be barred from the computer room. Obviously this is a disruptive arrangement, but it has been the only way to conform with DOD regulations for the protection of classified information. The idea behind secure operating systems is simple: a secure operating system is designed so that all of the program modules which control access to system resources are identified and isolated into a separate part of the operating system which is often referred to as a kernel. The kernel itself is then subjected to a formalized proof that it performs as intended, that is to say it will not permit states to exist which are not intended. By formalized proof, we mean that the logic of the kernel can be described mathematically and the description can be subjected to a computerized testing process. The objective is to produce what are referred to as "trusted" computer systems wherein one can safely mix Top Secret and Unclassified work. A number of contracts have been awarded over the past few years to modify existing operating systems to "kernelize" them, and also to develop the automated tools needed to verify or "prove" the correctness of the implementation of the security feature. While we describe the process in a few words, one should not assume it has been easy. Rigorous proof of correctness has been an elusive goal. As a result some software designers are asking that the system operators accept on faith that a software module can be (Hmmm?) "trusted" because of its "obviously" trustworthy design.
'FooZing' the corriputer
If a CPU Other difficulties relate to specifics of the hardware. has only one state, one must use software flats to determine if it is executing a user process, or acting under the control of the operating system. This can create opportunities for the intruder. Sometimes it is possible to "fool" the system into thinking it is in its supervisory state while a user process is in control. The classic example is the system which hasn't been prepared to deal with nonsense commands like "Rewind the Card Reader" or "Read From The Line Printer". Software experts, particularly university (Question: How students, delight in finding these kinds of flaws. many individuals with this sort of "training" are working in your computer room?). Some CPUs have two states, one of which can be reserved for the supervisory state, but even so difficulties remain. Hardware with multiple states appears to have important advantages to the designer. Much of the work in trusted operating systems has been sponsored by the DOD Computer Security Initiative, under the direction of Mr Steve Walker in the Office of the Secretary of Defence. When this research work showed that trusted operating systems could, in fact, be produced, it became apparent that a mechanism was needed to
Volume 4 Number 12
Elsevier
International
Hullctin: