- Email: [email protected]
Somalia
Somalia Food aid in a long-term emergency
Anne M. Thomson
In the various analyses and debates of food aid, the issues arising from emergency food aid are often seen as being narrower than those implied by a regular food aid programme. Is food a suitable response to the emergency? Are appropriate commodities being sent? Are donors able to deliver food aid sufficiently quickly? These are short-term issues, centred round minimizing the inevitable disruption of a food system that occurs after an emergency, whether it be earthquake, flood, drought or armed conflict. Yet there is an increasing number of countries for whom emergencies are becoming almost a way of life, because of worsening climatic variations, refugees from political conflict or both. The impact of continuous flows of ‘emergency’ food aid is important both in terms of the recipient government’s attempts to stabilize the domestic economy and in terms of donor governments’ responses to repeated emergency appeals. From the mid-1970s onwards, Somalia has suffered from a number of Keywords: Somalia; Food aid; Emeremergencies where the u priori case for food aid is quite strong. In gency relief ptugrammes 1973-75, severe drought affected the country, in particular the nomadic Anne M. Thomson is a Research Fel- population, many of whom ended up, at least temporarily, in refugee low at the Institute of Devebpment settlements. In 1977 armed conflict broke out with Ethiopia over control Studies at the University of Sussex, of the Ogaden, that part of Ethiopia next to the Somali border which is Brighton EN1 9RE, UK. populated largely by people of Somali ethnic origin, and to which Somalia Theauthcr~theaubstantial lays claim. This resulted in a large influx of refugees from Ethiopia, many rxntribuliontothe~amtainedinthi of whom are still in the country. The traditional grazing patterns of artidemadebyManfredMetr,andthanks BarbaraHuddle&mofthelntemaMmi pastoralists were also disrupted. Minor climatic problems, such as the Food Policy Research Institutefor helpful flooding in spring 1981, have also arisen. As a result, Somalia has had comments on a previousdraft. high, though variable, levels of food aid inflows throughout much of this period. Much of this food aid has been necessary to mitigate large-scale suffering. However, there have been cumulative effects which cannot be seen in a totally positive light and it is useful to examine how the situation has developed. There are two major problems in analysing the impact of food aid in Somalia. First, data are scarce and often unreliable. This is partly inherent in an economy where pastoralism is important, and much of settled agriculture is non-monetized. It also reflects the undeveloped state of the Somali economy and the low level of technical capacity available. Second, there are analytical difficulties in isolating the impact of food aid itself, from those factors which resulted in the food aid being delivered, ie the drought and the influx of refugees. Given other factors which were simultaneously operating, such as urbanization and the From the mi61979s onwards Somalia has suffered from a number of v - drought, population dlsn@ons, political conflict and minor dlmatlc problems. This artkle examines ths impactofsuch wnunwus~of food ald as a respctnse to such amergsncies, both In terms of the recWent~sattenWs~ staMllzethedofMMMkeconOmy and of donor govemW activities.
0306-9192/63m3OZO9-11$03.00 0 1983 Butterworth8 Co (Publishers)Ltd
setting-up of state farms, comparison of the actual with hypothetical situations is inevitable. Notwithstanding these difficulties, examination of the Somali case is interesting insofar as it furthers understanding of the potential hazards of food aid interventions and the warning signs for which to be alert, especially when both donor and recipient governments can all too easily get caught up in a continuing bond of obligation, on the one part, and perceived necessity on the other.
Trends in cereal production and consumption
llntemaWnal L&our Offic8, Jobs and Skills prOgremme,Ahice, Economic Transition in a SocialistFramework:An Empk~yment ctnd8&c Needs Odnt8d &w&wment Strategy for Somalia, A&Iii Ababa, 1977. Wnnali Democdc Republic, Mistry of -,EerfywamingSystemDepeutment, food Ou#odr 1987, pa98s l-4.
210
As far as one can tell, Somalia was roughly self-sufficient in sorghum and maize at the beginning of the 1970s. When there were bad harvests, because of weather conditions, food imports were necessary, but on the whole there were no structural deficits. Rice and wheatflour imports were primarily for the urban market. This does not mean that the nutritional situation was adequate. It simply reflects the effective demand for.food. During the 197Os, the population grew at an estimated 2.3% per annum, resulting in a national population of about 4.2 million people in 1981. The demand for different types of food commodity has been affected by changes in population structure. The urban population has increased from 17% in 1960 to 30% in 1980, and the proportion of nomads in the population is falling. One factor is increased settlement both in rural and urban areas, often as a result of the impact of drought. Government settlement schemes, partly funded by food aid, encouraged this, although the numbers still remaining in these schemes probably do not exceed 60000. The main factor in the changing population structure, however, is the differential natural growth rate as between the nomadic, settled rural and urban sectors of the population. The International Labour Office estimated, in an employment mission report in 1976 that, whereas the rate of natural increase of the urban population was 4.9% and of the rural settled population 2.2%, that of the nomad population was only 1.7%.’ This has clear implications as far as changing relative dependence on own production as opposed to market distribution for food is concerned. It also means an increase in the relative demand for cereals, as the nomad population consumes a much greater proportion of milk products relative to cereals than other sections of the population. Whereas it is estimated that in 1970,36% of all calories consumed came from animal sources, this had fallen to 27% in 1979 and 21% in 1980.* The majority of the population, probably just under 60%, is still nomadic at present, but the World Bank estimates that this will fall to about one-third by the year 2000. These two factors, the population growth rate and its changing structure, mean that cereal production would have to grow at a minimum of about 3% per annum to keep pace with demand. Table 1 indicates that this has not happened. Sorghum, the dominant dryland crop, which is largely grown for subsistence, has just about kept pace with the growth in settled farming population but as this section of the population has grown more slowly than the population as a whole, this means a drop in overall per capita availability. The production of maize has declined slightly in absolute terms. Monetization of these commodities is limited. Estimates vary from 30% to 60%.
Maize
Production lmpoctsb l~%““gsresaleBupply
-hum
Rice
lmputsb lmportsas%ofaggregatesuppb PrOdudion lmpod
1979-7S 116.9 9.5 7.5% 140.4 5.2 3.5%
197&W 108.6 53.3 32.9% 151.9 0 :.6 77.9 95.3% 0 142.1 100% 264.3 273.3 50.6%
3G 95.3%
WheaF a3wmera9e8. komrneniai imports plus food aid clndudes vdatfburandpastacotweftedto wheat equivalent.
lmpod ~~-&%01a99~~pply Total cereals lmportsb lmpofis as % of aggregate supply
G7 100% 256.9 106.0 29.0%
Soufce:FoodOuthwk1981.
Imports increased over this period also. Maize became a consistently imported crop and the amount of wheatflour and rice imported also increased substantially. About half of cereal imports, by the end of the 197Os, was supplied through food aid, but the remainder was sufficient to have put considerable strain on the Somali balance of payments. Although the influx of refugees complicates the analysis of these figures, if one makes the assumption that all cereal food aid went only to refugees, the dependence of the rest of the economy on cereal imports increased from 29% to 40% over the decade. The figure of 40% is certainly an underestimate, as will become clear below.
Trends in production for export Somalia’s main exports are agricultural, live animals and bananas being the two most important commodities. Although exports have increased their value through the 197Os, this is largely as a result of substantial improvements in the price of live animals, whose value tripled over the period 1972-78, while the volume dropped 9%. Bananas have decreased as a percentage of total export value from 20% to 8% over the same period. Although the value doubled, the volume of banana exports more than halved. Livestock production suffered considerably from drought and its aftermath. However, this is now recovering as Table 2 shows. There is concern that overstocking of the rangelands, to some extent as a result of the Ethiopian-Somalian conflict restricting access to the Ogaden, is resulting in a lower take-off rate from the herds, which is lowering per capita availability of animal products. Livestock population figures are extremely rough, but there appear to be about 5.4 million camels, 3.9 million cattle and 26.5 million sheep and goats. Bananas have declined dramatically in output, partly as a result of a decline in acreage cultivated (from 8989 ha in 1974 to 6831 in 1978 for bananas) but perhaps more importantly from a decline in yield. All crops suffer from erratic yields, due to climatic conditions and in particular droughts, but these downward trends appear to be due to shortages of fertilizer and pesticide, shortage of manpower, and inadequate investment both for maintenance and expansion. Tabb2.Prodw&nofmnJorupoct~ Meat Bananas
Source: Food Outlook.
FOOD FOLEY
August 1983
In6andta197W969(tonmo).
1979 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1978 1977 92.3 94.4 109.2 90.5 71.0 69.2 74.5 63.9 ~~5001506001665001663001577001060009660071700
1976 1979 lgeo 99.9 109.9 107.7 67300 64000 61000
211
Totalmerchandise x Totalagricuitural Imports Agriculhml imports as % total imports
137s72
1973ao
EE
242430 120898
24014 40941
114819 117907
42.3%
47.4%
Source: FAO Trede Yewbooks.
The maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate especially in association, under the fiunco valutu3 system, with a parallel exchange rate at almost double the official rate, also reduced incentive to production. For a crop like banana, imported inputs might be purchased at the parallel rate, because of the lack of government supplies, while exports of the crop had to be made at the official exchange rate. The only exporters not facing this situation were in the livestock sector, where exporters were allowed to use the parallel market to exchange part of their foreign earnings. Significantly this was the part of the export sector which showed the lowest drop in its export volume over this period. Somalia’s balance of trade worsened considerably over the 197Os, as shown in Table 3. The trade gap increased from 37% of total exports to 100% of total exports. Agricultural exports are over 95% of total exports, and agricultural imports have increased slightly as a percentage of total imports. The stagnation both in domestic crop production and in agricultural export production have contributed to this situation. Another factor which may become significant in the future is the heavy dependence on Saudi Arabia as an export market. Between 70% and 80% of exports take the form of live animals and meat products, most of which go to Saudi Arabia. In 1978, 85% of Somalia’s exports, in value terms, were destined for Saudi Arabia. Another major source of foreign exchange for the country is the remittance flow from migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, all of which makes Somalia highly dependent on the Arab oil producers. The overall picture of the Somali food system, as portrayed above, is gloomy. Import requirements of food commodities have increased substantially over time, and although weather variation has played a part in this, an analysis undertaken by the Early Warning System of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1981 warns that more than 50% of the deficit should be regarded as structural. Although the lack of control over migrant remittances, particularly prior to the abolition of the franco vulutu system in 1981, makes balance-of-payments figures unreliable, Somalia undoubtedly faces severe foreign exchange constraints, and has very low reserve levels. Increased commercial food imports would be at the expense of other, possibly intermediate good, imports.
Impact of food aid Food aid to Somalia started to increase dramatically in the mid-197Os, with the 1973-75 drought. It then fell somewhat (see Table 4) until 1980 when the response to the refugee problem started to appear. These flows are substantial, in terms of the overall production levels in Somalia, and could be expected to have a major impact on the food system. Prior to 1978 and the refugee crisis, food aid was used in two major Vhafrancova/utasystemiseffe&velyan ways: directly in projects, in particular projects to resettle nomads; and as officially sanctioned private fcreign ex- bulk food aid, sold on the market. It is in terms of the latter that any dlange~.ThllwasalbvbwdtodevektpinSomaliit0~ Sornaliover- possible contribution of food aid to the stagnation of Somali agriculture seaswolirersintheGlMtomrnitmomof would initially be expected. theireamingsthantbywouidothetwike Since the adoption of socialist principles in 1970, the government has have done at the official overvaluedexplayed a major role in the food and agriculture sector, both in production changerate.
1975 109.8
1978 81.5
1m 75
1973 72.5
1973 87.4
1930 138.8
Source: FAO.
FOODKWCYAUgUSt1903
193-l 3153
Somalia
Maizeandsorghum cotton Rice Bananas
1974 1975 lsre ls77 1918 101 93 89 101 93 121 101 107 105 98 118 99 87 79 92 8578/ 78 7871 89
aNcAnal price deflated by the Mogadiiu consumer Price Index. Source: World Bank.
FOODPOUCYAugust1983
and distribution. There has been a rapid expansion of the state sector in crop agriculture, both in the form of state farms and of govemmentpromoted cooperatives, which are largely on irrigated land. The distribution of inputs - seeds, fertilizer, pesticides - is also controlled by a state monopoly. As far as food distribution is concerned, for the major grain products the retail sector is largely in the hands of licensed private traders, while the wholesale level is controlled by state monopolies. There are two major state organizations concerned with the marketing of cereals. The Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) is repsonsible for domestic purchases of all grains and for the imports of coarse grains (maize and sorghum). The National Trading Corporation (ENC) is responsible for the imports of all other food commodities and for cereals. This means basically rice and wheatflour. Domestically produced rice is sold to ENC by the ADC. Thus, the government has officially controlled the producer price for all the major agricultural crops. Prices have also been fixed at the wholesale and retail level. In real terms, producer prices have fallen over the 197Os, as is shown in Table 5. In addition, until 1981, producer prices were uniform, regardless of quality or geographical location. This encouraged the rise of a parallel market where prices reached three or four times that of the official price. Until the changes in 1981-1982, farmers were required to sell all but 100kg (for home consumption) to the ADC, and the risk involved in operating on the parallel market reduced the incentive for commercial production. How does the food aid situation bear on this? In rather simplified terms, the benefits of food aid can be seen in terms of the ability to ease resource constraints, in particular foreign exchange constraints. The potential negative impacts are in terms of disincentives to local production, both directly through price where market forces are active, and indirectly through government policy when they are not, and possible changes in food consumption patterns away from domestically produced foods. It is probable that all these factors operate in Somalia. Determining how much food aid is additional to normal commercial imports and how much is a substitute, providing balance-of-payments support, involves hypothesizing about trade policy, particularly where food imports are largely under government control. However, given the severe balance-of-payments constraint Somalia is under, it seems reasonable to presume that most bulk sales food aid is straight balance-ofpayments support plus budgetary support for specific projects. Whether this enables more imports of agricultural inputs is difficult to say. The government is certainly neither unaware nor unconcerned about the problems facing the agricultural sector. Since mid-1981 there have been a number of reforms which have liberalized the marketing of agricultural output. Farmers have been permitted to sell their output direct to consumers, though not through middlemen. In effect, however, because of difficulties in controlling this, the parallel market becomes much less risky to use. In June 1981, maize prices were raised by SO%, and similar sorghum price rises took place. Varying farmgate prices, depending on the handling and transport costs, have also been put into effect. Shortly after all this was introduced, the parallel market price for maize halved. Action was also taken on the foreign exchange side. In 1981 thefranco vdutu system was abolished and the Somali shilling devalued, except for 213
imports of certain basic commodities, including cereals. Thus, although there is an implicit subsidy of cereal imports, the worst distortions for input-intensive cash crop production should be eased. It is difficult to estimate what effect these increases in incentives will have on production, in particular of maize and sorghum. There was no immediate response in terms of marketed surplus flowing through government channels despite a good harvest, but this could be the result of a number of factors such as the replenishing of on-farm stocks after a number of bad years, or of increased flows taking place without the government marketing channels. However, it is certain that price policy alone will not be sufficient to revitalize Somali agriculture.
Impact of refugee relief The flow of refugees into Somalia from 1978 onwards as a result of the Ogaden conflict created, potentially, another severe strain on the economy. To a great extent, the burden of supporting this population has been taken over by the international community. When the influx of refugees was reported to have reached 220000 (mid-1979) the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) budgeted a relief programme for the country. The size of this programme was substantially increased in March 1980 and then again until late 1981 when it was generally agreed that the emergency phase of the operation had passed and that concern should be with a stable rehabilitation process. The donor community programme is concerned with refugees in established camps. In 1982 there were 35 such camps in Somalia. There is little reliable evidence of the numbers of refugees outside the camps, although, if for no other reason than the fact that under 10% of the camp population consists of males in the economically active age groups, the numbers cannot be negligible. A figure of 375000 was being used for food planning purposes in 1981. Estimates of the numbers in the camps themselves are questionable and have been the subject of much debate between the government and the donor community. This has implications for the planning of relief programmes. In 1981, until November, the planning figure was 1.3 million. This was then reduced to 700000 though not to the satisfaction of all donors, some of whom felt this was still an overestimate. Although there is Somali registration of entrants into the camps, there is no control over exits, which is a problem given the fluctuating nature of the camp population. A census was carried out in late 1981, but no agreed official figure was immediately forthcoming. Food supplies to the camps come entirely from the international community, almost all directly through food aid with some very minor local purchases, eg of camel meat. Despite the inherent problems in organizing food distribution on this scale to an uncertain level of population, the system in effect by early 1982 appears to function remarkably efficiently. At this time, the agency in overall control on the part of the Somali government and the basic national implementing agency was the National Refugee Commission (NRC). This organization was part of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, but after March 1981 became an autonomous organization under the office of the Presidency. The international agency coordinating the activities of the voluntary agencies, of whom about 30 are active in Somalia, was UNHCR. WFP handled all food aid pledges and coordinated the arrival of food supplies in Somalia. The Emergency Logistics Unit run by the
214
FOOOPOWYAugust1983
s0rnu1ia
voluntary agency CARE (ELU/CARE) was funded by UNHCR and was responsible to NRC. This unit handled the food aid from the port to its storehouses and then distributed rations in ten-day allocations to the various camp~.~ The ELU/CARE unit was set up in response to donor pressure as a result of concern over the amount of leakage before food reached the refugees. Some of this appeared to be going to pay personnel involved in food distribution who were not receiving money wages. As well as instituting appropriate check-in procedures for drivers of food trucks, ELU/ CARE placed monitors in the camps to check the distribution process in the camps, at least to the level of subsection. Many staff were transferred from CARE’s operations in India and were highly experienced in monitoring. ELU/CARE’s annual budget was around US $10 million/ year, much of which went on port-handling costs, transport, fuel and vehicle maintenance, and storage. Not more than 25% appeared to be attributable to personnel costs. Leakages from the distribution process were minimized, partly by distributing rations to refugees in open bags to enable the detection of unopened food aid commodities, deflected to the market before reaching the intended recipients. Evidence on nutritional status in the camps indicates that by 1982 a steady and adequate food supply was in process. A small survey undertaken by the Centre for Disease Control indicated that nutritional status in the camps was, if anything, better than in surrounding areas, and the World Food Programme (WFP) was beginning to close down some of its supplementary feeding programmes in the camps, through lack of demand. Much of this was possible through the high degree of donor coordination. WFP held meetings twice a month with donors to coordinate the nature and timing of food aid donations, to ensure adequate stocks of all commodities without overloading storage capacity. This coordination on logistic planning has also led to discussion and concerted action on issues such as internal distribution problems which led to the introduction of CARE and the setting up of the Emergency Logistics Unit. An uncritical eye could see the use of food aid in the feeding of refugees in Somalia as something approaching a success story. However, two major issues have to be examined. The first concerns the future of the refugees programme. Having reached the stage described above, can it become more self-sufficient or will it continue to require support at that level? The second, broader issue concerns the impact of food aid on the Somali economy and the effect that these two major emergencies in the 1970s have had on the level of food aid support given to Somalia. (Refugee food aid is not the only food aid received by Somalia, nor does all the refugee food aid stay in the camps.)
Refugee programme In many ways the success of the refugee relief programme has created its own problems. Partly because of the risks of creating a totally dependent population, the donor community is concerned to find ways of reducing the overall level of support to the camps, especially as the population stabilizes. By 1982, the level of food supply to the camps was such that it was suspected that a significant number of Somali nationals had taken up ‘UNHCR, Branch Office, Somalia, y&efgee Situafbn in Somalia, Mogadbhu, residence in the camps to benefit from this. It is not always easy to distinguish between refugees and nationals, particularly among the noFOOD POLICYAugust 1983
215
mad population, and one explanation of the highly skewed demographic structure within the camps might well be that the camps are an attractive alternative for the women and children of nomad families, particularly during the dry season. Proposals have been examined for food-for-work programmes in the camps. There are problems with participation when regular food supplies are available. These have been tried experimentally using sugar, a much valued commodity which is not included in the camp rations, as payment, on agricultural production projects and on maintenance programmes for the feeder loads into the camps. The results of these food-for-work projects have been mixed. The kinds of projects which can be undertaken are limited by the fact that the Somali government finds the option of permanent settlement of the refugees politically unacceptable and is reluctant to sanction projects which might give the camps the appearance of permanent settlements.The lack of an effective registration process at the camp level also hinders any move away from total dependence. If those who might be expected to participate in food-for-work programmes cannot be identified systematically, then the overall level of rations supplied free of obligation cannot be significantly reduced without risk of hardship to some sections of the camp population. There appears to be a significant floating population in the camps which moves in and out depending on perceived opportunities outside the camps and on the extent of hostilities in the border region. This complicates the situation still further. Both the issue of registration and that of refugee settlement are essentially political. If the camps were truly isolated from the Somali economy and their existence had no impact on aid donor policy except insofar as the refugee programme itself were concerned, then the refugees could be seen as a problem principally for the donor community, in terms of the continued degree of support necessary. They would be a genuine enclave. This, however, is not the case. Significant amounts of food aid for refugees end up on local markets. The proportion doing so is less than it was prior to 1982, but could still amount to about 2530% of the total, given that in 1982 the refugee figure used for planning purposes was 700000, while few in the donor community believed the actual number in the camps to be more than 450000. There are two main channels through which refugee food aid reaches the local market. The first, and probably the most important since 1981, is through sales by the refugees themselves to obtain items not included in the ration, such as meat, sugar, vegetables, camel’s milk and non-food items such as soap. This is a perfectly valid response when supplies of staples in the camps are more than adequate. The second channel is through the camp officials, such as section chiefs and sub-section chiefs. These officials have not always received money wages in the past, and have recompensed themselves through food aid. The extent of this has been substantially reduced, but probably still exists. These unofficial sales have had a localized effect in terms of lowering cereal prices relative to non-cereal commodities. The amounts refugees get for the food they sell are very low compared to normal prices, but the sin April 1983, the Somali government degree of articulation in rural markets may well be sufficiently low so that a~~~~~nced tin its priarweswithreapeCttc this does not have a significant widespread effect on producer prices in UW *m!u%=sand m, -, first. vohmtary -, ,,etm the parallelmarket. This diversion of food aid also means that some refugee food aid is
216
FOOOKWCYAugust1Q03
s0mu1iu
effectively economy.
acting as overall balance-of-payments
support to the Somali
Overall effect on food aid flows Food aid given in response to an emergency is often discussed in isolation, whereas in reality it may well have an impact on non-refugee flows. It is often difficult to get consistent breakdown figures for food aid that would allow this issue to be examined. Table 6 shows the best estimates, collected by WFP from the recipient end, of food aid arriving in Somalia in 1981 and the use to which it was put.6 From this, it can be seen that in 1981 refugee food aid constituted about 35% of all food aid to Somalia, and slightly less of cereal food aid. A more detailed explanation of the table is illuminating. WFP were operating four prograrnmes at the national level in Somalia (excluding its contribution to refugee feeding): food for work in rangeland development and reforestation; institutional feeding; feeding of vulnerable groups at MCH centres; and resettlement of nomads as farmers and fishermen. Concessional sales consisted almost entirely of US PL 480, Title I food aid. Bilateral non-refugee food aid basically came from three sources: PL 480, Title II food aid for special drought relief, which is being sold in bulk to provide counterpart funds for agriculture development (the remainder of PL 480, Title II went directly to refugee feeding and through WFP programmes); Italian rice, also in the form of bulk sales, which provided funds for the Baidoa-Baardhere road; and that part of EEC direct food aid which is not destined for refugee food aid but again is mainly in the form of bulk sales. Together, these two categories account for about 44% of food aid to Somalia. The figures for this section are the least reliable as there is no overall coordination. Refugee food aid is self explanatory. Drought/flood relief aid was aid donated in response to an appeal made in Spring 1981 when a threatened drought was followed by extensive flooding. In fact, some of this food aid arrived so late that it was almost certainly not used in the immediate emergency programme. Two questions have to be asked. Is the level of non-refugee, nonemergency food aid, and in particular that 44% which takes the form of bulk sales on the market, related to the two major crises Somalia underwent in the 197Os? Should donors, and the recipient government, be concerned about this level of bulk food aid sales? In the absence of detailed food aid use statistics over time, evidence to examine the first question is somewhat indirect. However, the 40000 tonnes of maize given as bilateral non-refugee food aid was donated by WFP, Food Secretariat, Report for Cal- the USA under a programme for special drought relief. In the same endar Year, 1981. category, one-fifth of the rice and four-fifths of the wheatflour came from Table6. Foodaidarrhmd In Somalb,
alnckrdesEEC food ekl. hdudes w milk.
WainlyICSM, CSM,beans,tea,meatanddried
fnlii.
FOOD POUCY August 1983
la61 (whm0 In t0ftn08).
WFPnEibMl plqmnnltea
tYwmuhal aab#
Rice
-
Kz&lJr Maize Edible oil DsMmwM
16092 17022 3620 3135 1172 6079
13400 300 14116 14506 4400
z
Elnon-f8fugm moddd 11360 2000 9475 40000
-
500
Reib6.0 foodti 5600 14000 14060 36306 9106 10231 4100 10699
DrougMl flood mibf 1162.5 1300 7022 2tZ 1162.4 404.6
217
the EEC under its emergency programme. The EEC emergency programme is not confined to use in emergencies in the popular sense of the word, but the size of the donation is indicative that Somalia is seen as a worthy food aid recipient. Even more significant is the fact that Somalia is now applying for food aid to finance development projects such as the Baidoa-Baardhere road, a feeder road to a major dam project. Despite the delays in food aid delivery, a common complaint not restricted to Somalia, this is seen as an easier and quicker way of obtaining project finance, with less complex procedures attached to it than making application for financial aid directly, especially as far as the degree of detail in project proposals is concerned. To put it crudely, both the 1973-75 drought and the refugee situation have launched Somalia convincingly on the food aid circuit. Government officials have gained a certain familiarity with food aid donor procedures and credentials as a food aid recipient have been established. For the past few years Somalia has been, in per capita terms, among the top ten recipients of EEC food aid.
Implications for donors Agriculture is, and will continue to be one of the major sectors in the Somali economy, in terms of its contribution to GDP, to employment and to foreign exchange earnings. Settled arable cultivation is becoming an increasingly important part of total agriculture in employment terms. Yet relatively little is known about food crop production. In this sub-sector the government has chosen to take one of the most difficult paths to organize production, that of central control and servicing of what is still essentially, despite the appearance of state farms in the 1!97Os,traditional peasant agriculture. This responsibility covers input provision and the pricing, and distribution of output. Yet technical capacity to understand and administer such complex, logistic systems is extremely limited in Somalia. The database on which to build them is extremely deficient. IVIany statistics describing the agricultural sector come from the work of expatriates attached to technical assistance programmes. There is a natural tendency to look for solutions to the agricultural problem on a large scale, such as extensive irrigation schemes based on the building of large dams. However, that in itself will not essentially affect the basic problem, that of developing the food production sector from a traditional, rather neglected semi-subsistence sector to a more productive sector, integrated into the market system and capable of supplying not only its own consumption needs but those of the urban sector also. To do that will require extensive local-level work and a level of skilled personnel and administrative capacity which does not appear to exist in Somalia at present. It is difficult to say whether food aid has had a policy disincentive effect. There is clearly concern over local food production and steps have been taken, in pricing policy in particular, to try to improve production incentives. That these steps will not in themselves be enough is less because of disincentive effects of food aid than the very difficult nature of extension and marketing programmes given the technical capacity available in Somalia. The problem is that bulk food aid is a relatively easy way out in the short term and could lead to the postponement of coming to terms with the requirements of the food production sector. The nature of the food aid commodities being donated has to be
218
FoooPoucYAugust1883
Somalia
considered as well. With the exception of maize, cereal food aid is in the form of commodities of which over 90% is imported. Increased consump tion of rice and wheatflour with increased urbanization is a pattern which has appeared all over Africa, and certainly cannot be blamed solely on food aid. However, food aid may accelerate the process. WFP estimated that in 1981, in Somalia, taking past consumption patterns as a basis, there was a surplus of 27000 tonnes of wheatflour and a deficit of 89000 tonnes of cereal grain, mainly maize and sorghum. The overflow of cereals from refugee camps also means that wheat and wheatflour are much more prevalent in rural areas than in the past. In this rather confused picture, one feature stands out clearly. There has been a substantial increase in food aid inflow, in particular since 1980, and much of this food aid is not destined for the refugee programme. At the same time, there is little indication of lasting development in the domestic food production sector, although recent policy decisions indicate government concern. Unlike the refugee programme, non-refugee food aid is not coordinated by donors. Many donors do not monitor its use adequately, nor do they attempt to integrate it with their other aid programrnes. Somali capacity is stretched simply by complying with donor regulations for the reception of food aid. Donors lay themselves open to charges of irresponsibility in increasing food aid in acontext where the technical and administrative constraints on devising and implementing an adequate food aid programme are so severe, without at the same time making substantial efforts to relieve those constraints. Food aid has a beneficial impact in terms of relieving balance-ofpayments constraints. This could allow more imports of inputs to improve food production and distribution, but this should be done in the context of a consistent programme to develop traditional agriculture and integrate it more closely with the rest of the economy. For this to occur technical capacity will have to improve. Donors are becoming aware of this and individual programmes of technical assistance have been instituted. However, as with non-refugee food aid, coordination is lacking and as a result maximum benefit of the resources deployed is not being achieved, in a country where these resources are badly needed. It is no exaggeration to say that the food system in Somalia is at a critical stage. There are good intentions, but there is also technical incapacity. To provide large amounts of food aid without coordination or technical assistance could swing the balance towards aid dependence. The donor community achieved a high level of coordination over the refugee programme. The problems facing that programme now are political rather than technical or logistic. If the will were there, a combination of coordination and integration with technical assistance would enable a positive use of the non-emergency food aid which has built up in the wake of the emergency programme.
FOOO POLICY August 1983
219
Anne M. Thomson
In the various analyses and debates of food aid, the issues arising from emergency food aid are often seen as being narrower than those implied by a regular food aid programme. Is food a suitable response to the emergency? Are appropriate commodities being sent? Are donors able to deliver food aid sufficiently quickly? These are short-term issues, centred round minimizing the inevitable disruption of a food system that occurs after an emergency, whether it be earthquake, flood, drought or armed conflict. Yet there is an increasing number of countries for whom emergencies are becoming almost a way of life, because of worsening climatic variations, refugees from political conflict or both. The impact of continuous flows of ‘emergency’ food aid is important both in terms of the recipient government’s attempts to stabilize the domestic economy and in terms of donor governments’ responses to repeated emergency appeals. From the mid-1970s onwards, Somalia has suffered from a number of Keywords: Somalia; Food aid; Emeremergencies where the u priori case for food aid is quite strong. In gency relief ptugrammes 1973-75, severe drought affected the country, in particular the nomadic Anne M. Thomson is a Research Fel- population, many of whom ended up, at least temporarily, in refugee low at the Institute of Devebpment settlements. In 1977 armed conflict broke out with Ethiopia over control Studies at the University of Sussex, of the Ogaden, that part of Ethiopia next to the Somali border which is Brighton EN1 9RE, UK. populated largely by people of Somali ethnic origin, and to which Somalia Theauthcr~theaubstantial lays claim. This resulted in a large influx of refugees from Ethiopia, many rxntribuliontothe~amtainedinthi of whom are still in the country. The traditional grazing patterns of artidemadebyManfredMetr,andthanks BarbaraHuddle&mofthelntemaMmi pastoralists were also disrupted. Minor climatic problems, such as the Food Policy Research Institutefor helpful flooding in spring 1981, have also arisen. As a result, Somalia has had comments on a previousdraft. high, though variable, levels of food aid inflows throughout much of this period. Much of this food aid has been necessary to mitigate large-scale suffering. However, there have been cumulative effects which cannot be seen in a totally positive light and it is useful to examine how the situation has developed. There are two major problems in analysing the impact of food aid in Somalia. First, data are scarce and often unreliable. This is partly inherent in an economy where pastoralism is important, and much of settled agriculture is non-monetized. It also reflects the undeveloped state of the Somali economy and the low level of technical capacity available. Second, there are analytical difficulties in isolating the impact of food aid itself, from those factors which resulted in the food aid being delivered, ie the drought and the influx of refugees. Given other factors which were simultaneously operating, such as urbanization and the From the mi61979s onwards Somalia has suffered from a number of v - drought, population dlsn@ons, political conflict and minor dlmatlc problems. This artkle examines ths impactofsuch wnunwus~of food ald as a respctnse to such amergsncies, both In terms of the recWent~sattenWs~ staMllzethedofMMMkeconOmy and of donor govemW activities.
0306-9192/63m3OZO9-11$03.00 0 1983 Butterworth8 Co (Publishers)Ltd
setting-up of state farms, comparison of the actual with hypothetical situations is inevitable. Notwithstanding these difficulties, examination of the Somali case is interesting insofar as it furthers understanding of the potential hazards of food aid interventions and the warning signs for which to be alert, especially when both donor and recipient governments can all too easily get caught up in a continuing bond of obligation, on the one part, and perceived necessity on the other.
Trends in cereal production and consumption
llntemaWnal L&our Offic8, Jobs and Skills prOgremme,Ahice, Economic Transition in a SocialistFramework:An Empk~yment ctnd8&c Needs Odnt8d &w&wment Strategy for Somalia, A&Iii Ababa, 1977. Wnnali Democdc Republic, Mistry of -,EerfywamingSystemDepeutment, food Ou#odr 1987, pa98s l-4.
210
As far as one can tell, Somalia was roughly self-sufficient in sorghum and maize at the beginning of the 1970s. When there were bad harvests, because of weather conditions, food imports were necessary, but on the whole there were no structural deficits. Rice and wheatflour imports were primarily for the urban market. This does not mean that the nutritional situation was adequate. It simply reflects the effective demand for.food. During the 197Os, the population grew at an estimated 2.3% per annum, resulting in a national population of about 4.2 million people in 1981. The demand for different types of food commodity has been affected by changes in population structure. The urban population has increased from 17% in 1960 to 30% in 1980, and the proportion of nomads in the population is falling. One factor is increased settlement both in rural and urban areas, often as a result of the impact of drought. Government settlement schemes, partly funded by food aid, encouraged this, although the numbers still remaining in these schemes probably do not exceed 60000. The main factor in the changing population structure, however, is the differential natural growth rate as between the nomadic, settled rural and urban sectors of the population. The International Labour Office estimated, in an employment mission report in 1976 that, whereas the rate of natural increase of the urban population was 4.9% and of the rural settled population 2.2%, that of the nomad population was only 1.7%.’ This has clear implications as far as changing relative dependence on own production as opposed to market distribution for food is concerned. It also means an increase in the relative demand for cereals, as the nomad population consumes a much greater proportion of milk products relative to cereals than other sections of the population. Whereas it is estimated that in 1970,36% of all calories consumed came from animal sources, this had fallen to 27% in 1979 and 21% in 1980.* The majority of the population, probably just under 60%, is still nomadic at present, but the World Bank estimates that this will fall to about one-third by the year 2000. These two factors, the population growth rate and its changing structure, mean that cereal production would have to grow at a minimum of about 3% per annum to keep pace with demand. Table 1 indicates that this has not happened. Sorghum, the dominant dryland crop, which is largely grown for subsistence, has just about kept pace with the growth in settled farming population but as this section of the population has grown more slowly than the population as a whole, this means a drop in overall per capita availability. The production of maize has declined slightly in absolute terms. Monetization of these commodities is limited. Estimates vary from 30% to 60%.
Maize
Production lmpoctsb l~%““gsresaleBupply
-hum
Rice
lmputsb lmportsas%ofaggregatesuppb PrOdudion lmpod
1979-7S 116.9 9.5 7.5% 140.4 5.2 3.5%
197&W 108.6 53.3 32.9% 151.9 0 :.6 77.9 95.3% 0 142.1 100% 264.3 273.3 50.6%
3G 95.3%
WheaF a3wmera9e8. komrneniai imports plus food aid clndudes vdatfburandpastacotweftedto wheat equivalent.
lmpod ~~-&%01a99~~pply Total cereals lmportsb lmpofis as % of aggregate supply
G7 100% 256.9 106.0 29.0%
Soufce:FoodOuthwk1981.
Imports increased over this period also. Maize became a consistently imported crop and the amount of wheatflour and rice imported also increased substantially. About half of cereal imports, by the end of the 197Os, was supplied through food aid, but the remainder was sufficient to have put considerable strain on the Somali balance of payments. Although the influx of refugees complicates the analysis of these figures, if one makes the assumption that all cereal food aid went only to refugees, the dependence of the rest of the economy on cereal imports increased from 29% to 40% over the decade. The figure of 40% is certainly an underestimate, as will become clear below.
Trends in production for export Somalia’s main exports are agricultural, live animals and bananas being the two most important commodities. Although exports have increased their value through the 197Os, this is largely as a result of substantial improvements in the price of live animals, whose value tripled over the period 1972-78, while the volume dropped 9%. Bananas have decreased as a percentage of total export value from 20% to 8% over the same period. Although the value doubled, the volume of banana exports more than halved. Livestock production suffered considerably from drought and its aftermath. However, this is now recovering as Table 2 shows. There is concern that overstocking of the rangelands, to some extent as a result of the Ethiopian-Somalian conflict restricting access to the Ogaden, is resulting in a lower take-off rate from the herds, which is lowering per capita availability of animal products. Livestock population figures are extremely rough, but there appear to be about 5.4 million camels, 3.9 million cattle and 26.5 million sheep and goats. Bananas have declined dramatically in output, partly as a result of a decline in acreage cultivated (from 8989 ha in 1974 to 6831 in 1978 for bananas) but perhaps more importantly from a decline in yield. All crops suffer from erratic yields, due to climatic conditions and in particular droughts, but these downward trends appear to be due to shortages of fertilizer and pesticide, shortage of manpower, and inadequate investment both for maintenance and expansion. Tabb2.Prodw&nofmnJorupoct~ Meat Bananas
Source: Food Outlook.
FOOD FOLEY
August 1983
In6andta197W969(tonmo).
1979 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1978 1977 92.3 94.4 109.2 90.5 71.0 69.2 74.5 63.9 ~~5001506001665001663001577001060009660071700
1976 1979 lgeo 99.9 109.9 107.7 67300 64000 61000
211
Totalmerchandise x Totalagricuitural Imports Agriculhml imports as % total imports
137s72
1973ao
EE
242430 120898
24014 40941
114819 117907
42.3%
47.4%
Source: FAO Trede Yewbooks.
The maintenance of an overvalued exchange rate especially in association, under the fiunco valutu3 system, with a parallel exchange rate at almost double the official rate, also reduced incentive to production. For a crop like banana, imported inputs might be purchased at the parallel rate, because of the lack of government supplies, while exports of the crop had to be made at the official exchange rate. The only exporters not facing this situation were in the livestock sector, where exporters were allowed to use the parallel market to exchange part of their foreign earnings. Significantly this was the part of the export sector which showed the lowest drop in its export volume over this period. Somalia’s balance of trade worsened considerably over the 197Os, as shown in Table 3. The trade gap increased from 37% of total exports to 100% of total exports. Agricultural exports are over 95% of total exports, and agricultural imports have increased slightly as a percentage of total imports. The stagnation both in domestic crop production and in agricultural export production have contributed to this situation. Another factor which may become significant in the future is the heavy dependence on Saudi Arabia as an export market. Between 70% and 80% of exports take the form of live animals and meat products, most of which go to Saudi Arabia. In 1978, 85% of Somalia’s exports, in value terms, were destined for Saudi Arabia. Another major source of foreign exchange for the country is the remittance flow from migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, all of which makes Somalia highly dependent on the Arab oil producers. The overall picture of the Somali food system, as portrayed above, is gloomy. Import requirements of food commodities have increased substantially over time, and although weather variation has played a part in this, an analysis undertaken by the Early Warning System of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1981 warns that more than 50% of the deficit should be regarded as structural. Although the lack of control over migrant remittances, particularly prior to the abolition of the franco vulutu system in 1981, makes balance-of-payments figures unreliable, Somalia undoubtedly faces severe foreign exchange constraints, and has very low reserve levels. Increased commercial food imports would be at the expense of other, possibly intermediate good, imports.
Impact of food aid Food aid to Somalia started to increase dramatically in the mid-197Os, with the 1973-75 drought. It then fell somewhat (see Table 4) until 1980 when the response to the refugee problem started to appear. These flows are substantial, in terms of the overall production levels in Somalia, and could be expected to have a major impact on the food system. Prior to 1978 and the refugee crisis, food aid was used in two major Vhafrancova/utasystemiseffe&velyan ways: directly in projects, in particular projects to resettle nomads; and as officially sanctioned private fcreign ex- bulk food aid, sold on the market. It is in terms of the latter that any dlange~.ThllwasalbvbwdtodevektpinSomaliit0~ Sornaliover- possible contribution of food aid to the stagnation of Somali agriculture seaswolirersintheGlMtomrnitmomof would initially be expected. theireamingsthantbywouidothetwike Since the adoption of socialist principles in 1970, the government has have done at the official overvaluedexplayed a major role in the food and agriculture sector, both in production changerate.
1975 109.8
1978 81.5
1m 75
1973 72.5
1973 87.4
1930 138.8
Source: FAO.
FOODKWCYAUgUSt1903
193-l 3153
Somalia
Maizeandsorghum cotton Rice Bananas
1974 1975 lsre ls77 1918 101 93 89 101 93 121 101 107 105 98 118 99 87 79 92 8578/ 78 7871 89
aNcAnal price deflated by the Mogadiiu consumer Price Index. Source: World Bank.
FOODPOUCYAugust1983
and distribution. There has been a rapid expansion of the state sector in crop agriculture, both in the form of state farms and of govemmentpromoted cooperatives, which are largely on irrigated land. The distribution of inputs - seeds, fertilizer, pesticides - is also controlled by a state monopoly. As far as food distribution is concerned, for the major grain products the retail sector is largely in the hands of licensed private traders, while the wholesale level is controlled by state monopolies. There are two major state organizations concerned with the marketing of cereals. The Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) is repsonsible for domestic purchases of all grains and for the imports of coarse grains (maize and sorghum). The National Trading Corporation (ENC) is responsible for the imports of all other food commodities and for cereals. This means basically rice and wheatflour. Domestically produced rice is sold to ENC by the ADC. Thus, the government has officially controlled the producer price for all the major agricultural crops. Prices have also been fixed at the wholesale and retail level. In real terms, producer prices have fallen over the 197Os, as is shown in Table 5. In addition, until 1981, producer prices were uniform, regardless of quality or geographical location. This encouraged the rise of a parallel market where prices reached three or four times that of the official price. Until the changes in 1981-1982, farmers were required to sell all but 100kg (for home consumption) to the ADC, and the risk involved in operating on the parallel market reduced the incentive for commercial production. How does the food aid situation bear on this? In rather simplified terms, the benefits of food aid can be seen in terms of the ability to ease resource constraints, in particular foreign exchange constraints. The potential negative impacts are in terms of disincentives to local production, both directly through price where market forces are active, and indirectly through government policy when they are not, and possible changes in food consumption patterns away from domestically produced foods. It is probable that all these factors operate in Somalia. Determining how much food aid is additional to normal commercial imports and how much is a substitute, providing balance-of-payments support, involves hypothesizing about trade policy, particularly where food imports are largely under government control. However, given the severe balance-of-payments constraint Somalia is under, it seems reasonable to presume that most bulk sales food aid is straight balance-ofpayments support plus budgetary support for specific projects. Whether this enables more imports of agricultural inputs is difficult to say. The government is certainly neither unaware nor unconcerned about the problems facing the agricultural sector. Since mid-1981 there have been a number of reforms which have liberalized the marketing of agricultural output. Farmers have been permitted to sell their output direct to consumers, though not through middlemen. In effect, however, because of difficulties in controlling this, the parallel market becomes much less risky to use. In June 1981, maize prices were raised by SO%, and similar sorghum price rises took place. Varying farmgate prices, depending on the handling and transport costs, have also been put into effect. Shortly after all this was introduced, the parallel market price for maize halved. Action was also taken on the foreign exchange side. In 1981 thefranco vdutu system was abolished and the Somali shilling devalued, except for 213
imports of certain basic commodities, including cereals. Thus, although there is an implicit subsidy of cereal imports, the worst distortions for input-intensive cash crop production should be eased. It is difficult to estimate what effect these increases in incentives will have on production, in particular of maize and sorghum. There was no immediate response in terms of marketed surplus flowing through government channels despite a good harvest, but this could be the result of a number of factors such as the replenishing of on-farm stocks after a number of bad years, or of increased flows taking place without the government marketing channels. However, it is certain that price policy alone will not be sufficient to revitalize Somali agriculture.
Impact of refugee relief The flow of refugees into Somalia from 1978 onwards as a result of the Ogaden conflict created, potentially, another severe strain on the economy. To a great extent, the burden of supporting this population has been taken over by the international community. When the influx of refugees was reported to have reached 220000 (mid-1979) the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) budgeted a relief programme for the country. The size of this programme was substantially increased in March 1980 and then again until late 1981 when it was generally agreed that the emergency phase of the operation had passed and that concern should be with a stable rehabilitation process. The donor community programme is concerned with refugees in established camps. In 1982 there were 35 such camps in Somalia. There is little reliable evidence of the numbers of refugees outside the camps, although, if for no other reason than the fact that under 10% of the camp population consists of males in the economically active age groups, the numbers cannot be negligible. A figure of 375000 was being used for food planning purposes in 1981. Estimates of the numbers in the camps themselves are questionable and have been the subject of much debate between the government and the donor community. This has implications for the planning of relief programmes. In 1981, until November, the planning figure was 1.3 million. This was then reduced to 700000 though not to the satisfaction of all donors, some of whom felt this was still an overestimate. Although there is Somali registration of entrants into the camps, there is no control over exits, which is a problem given the fluctuating nature of the camp population. A census was carried out in late 1981, but no agreed official figure was immediately forthcoming. Food supplies to the camps come entirely from the international community, almost all directly through food aid with some very minor local purchases, eg of camel meat. Despite the inherent problems in organizing food distribution on this scale to an uncertain level of population, the system in effect by early 1982 appears to function remarkably efficiently. At this time, the agency in overall control on the part of the Somali government and the basic national implementing agency was the National Refugee Commission (NRC). This organization was part of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, but after March 1981 became an autonomous organization under the office of the Presidency. The international agency coordinating the activities of the voluntary agencies, of whom about 30 are active in Somalia, was UNHCR. WFP handled all food aid pledges and coordinated the arrival of food supplies in Somalia. The Emergency Logistics Unit run by the
214
FOOOPOWYAugust1983
s0rnu1ia
voluntary agency CARE (ELU/CARE) was funded by UNHCR and was responsible to NRC. This unit handled the food aid from the port to its storehouses and then distributed rations in ten-day allocations to the various camp~.~ The ELU/CARE unit was set up in response to donor pressure as a result of concern over the amount of leakage before food reached the refugees. Some of this appeared to be going to pay personnel involved in food distribution who were not receiving money wages. As well as instituting appropriate check-in procedures for drivers of food trucks, ELU/ CARE placed monitors in the camps to check the distribution process in the camps, at least to the level of subsection. Many staff were transferred from CARE’s operations in India and were highly experienced in monitoring. ELU/CARE’s annual budget was around US $10 million/ year, much of which went on port-handling costs, transport, fuel and vehicle maintenance, and storage. Not more than 25% appeared to be attributable to personnel costs. Leakages from the distribution process were minimized, partly by distributing rations to refugees in open bags to enable the detection of unopened food aid commodities, deflected to the market before reaching the intended recipients. Evidence on nutritional status in the camps indicates that by 1982 a steady and adequate food supply was in process. A small survey undertaken by the Centre for Disease Control indicated that nutritional status in the camps was, if anything, better than in surrounding areas, and the World Food Programme (WFP) was beginning to close down some of its supplementary feeding programmes in the camps, through lack of demand. Much of this was possible through the high degree of donor coordination. WFP held meetings twice a month with donors to coordinate the nature and timing of food aid donations, to ensure adequate stocks of all commodities without overloading storage capacity. This coordination on logistic planning has also led to discussion and concerted action on issues such as internal distribution problems which led to the introduction of CARE and the setting up of the Emergency Logistics Unit. An uncritical eye could see the use of food aid in the feeding of refugees in Somalia as something approaching a success story. However, two major issues have to be examined. The first concerns the future of the refugees programme. Having reached the stage described above, can it become more self-sufficient or will it continue to require support at that level? The second, broader issue concerns the impact of food aid on the Somali economy and the effect that these two major emergencies in the 1970s have had on the level of food aid support given to Somalia. (Refugee food aid is not the only food aid received by Somalia, nor does all the refugee food aid stay in the camps.)
Refugee programme In many ways the success of the refugee relief programme has created its own problems. Partly because of the risks of creating a totally dependent population, the donor community is concerned to find ways of reducing the overall level of support to the camps, especially as the population stabilizes. By 1982, the level of food supply to the camps was such that it was suspected that a significant number of Somali nationals had taken up ‘UNHCR, Branch Office, Somalia, y&efgee Situafbn in Somalia, Mogadbhu, residence in the camps to benefit from this. It is not always easy to distinguish between refugees and nationals, particularly among the noFOOD POLICYAugust 1983
215
mad population, and one explanation of the highly skewed demographic structure within the camps might well be that the camps are an attractive alternative for the women and children of nomad families, particularly during the dry season. Proposals have been examined for food-for-work programmes in the camps. There are problems with participation when regular food supplies are available. These have been tried experimentally using sugar, a much valued commodity which is not included in the camp rations, as payment, on agricultural production projects and on maintenance programmes for the feeder loads into the camps. The results of these food-for-work projects have been mixed. The kinds of projects which can be undertaken are limited by the fact that the Somali government finds the option of permanent settlement of the refugees politically unacceptable and is reluctant to sanction projects which might give the camps the appearance of permanent settlements.The lack of an effective registration process at the camp level also hinders any move away from total dependence. If those who might be expected to participate in food-for-work programmes cannot be identified systematically, then the overall level of rations supplied free of obligation cannot be significantly reduced without risk of hardship to some sections of the camp population. There appears to be a significant floating population in the camps which moves in and out depending on perceived opportunities outside the camps and on the extent of hostilities in the border region. This complicates the situation still further. Both the issue of registration and that of refugee settlement are essentially political. If the camps were truly isolated from the Somali economy and their existence had no impact on aid donor policy except insofar as the refugee programme itself were concerned, then the refugees could be seen as a problem principally for the donor community, in terms of the continued degree of support necessary. They would be a genuine enclave. This, however, is not the case. Significant amounts of food aid for refugees end up on local markets. The proportion doing so is less than it was prior to 1982, but could still amount to about 2530% of the total, given that in 1982 the refugee figure used for planning purposes was 700000, while few in the donor community believed the actual number in the camps to be more than 450000. There are two main channels through which refugee food aid reaches the local market. The first, and probably the most important since 1981, is through sales by the refugees themselves to obtain items not included in the ration, such as meat, sugar, vegetables, camel’s milk and non-food items such as soap. This is a perfectly valid response when supplies of staples in the camps are more than adequate. The second channel is through the camp officials, such as section chiefs and sub-section chiefs. These officials have not always received money wages in the past, and have recompensed themselves through food aid. The extent of this has been substantially reduced, but probably still exists. These unofficial sales have had a localized effect in terms of lowering cereal prices relative to non-cereal commodities. The amounts refugees get for the food they sell are very low compared to normal prices, but the sin April 1983, the Somali government degree of articulation in rural markets may well be sufficiently low so that a~~~~~nced tin its priarweswithreapeCttc this does not have a significant widespread effect on producer prices in UW *m!u%=sand m, -, first. vohmtary -, ,,etm the parallelmarket. This diversion of food aid also means that some refugee food aid is
216
FOOOKWCYAugust1Q03
s0mu1iu
effectively economy.
acting as overall balance-of-payments
support to the Somali
Overall effect on food aid flows Food aid given in response to an emergency is often discussed in isolation, whereas in reality it may well have an impact on non-refugee flows. It is often difficult to get consistent breakdown figures for food aid that would allow this issue to be examined. Table 6 shows the best estimates, collected by WFP from the recipient end, of food aid arriving in Somalia in 1981 and the use to which it was put.6 From this, it can be seen that in 1981 refugee food aid constituted about 35% of all food aid to Somalia, and slightly less of cereal food aid. A more detailed explanation of the table is illuminating. WFP were operating four prograrnmes at the national level in Somalia (excluding its contribution to refugee feeding): food for work in rangeland development and reforestation; institutional feeding; feeding of vulnerable groups at MCH centres; and resettlement of nomads as farmers and fishermen. Concessional sales consisted almost entirely of US PL 480, Title I food aid. Bilateral non-refugee food aid basically came from three sources: PL 480, Title II food aid for special drought relief, which is being sold in bulk to provide counterpart funds for agriculture development (the remainder of PL 480, Title II went directly to refugee feeding and through WFP programmes); Italian rice, also in the form of bulk sales, which provided funds for the Baidoa-Baardhere road; and that part of EEC direct food aid which is not destined for refugee food aid but again is mainly in the form of bulk sales. Together, these two categories account for about 44% of food aid to Somalia. The figures for this section are the least reliable as there is no overall coordination. Refugee food aid is self explanatory. Drought/flood relief aid was aid donated in response to an appeal made in Spring 1981 when a threatened drought was followed by extensive flooding. In fact, some of this food aid arrived so late that it was almost certainly not used in the immediate emergency programme. Two questions have to be asked. Is the level of non-refugee, nonemergency food aid, and in particular that 44% which takes the form of bulk sales on the market, related to the two major crises Somalia underwent in the 197Os? Should donors, and the recipient government, be concerned about this level of bulk food aid sales? In the absence of detailed food aid use statistics over time, evidence to examine the first question is somewhat indirect. However, the 40000 tonnes of maize given as bilateral non-refugee food aid was donated by WFP, Food Secretariat, Report for Cal- the USA under a programme for special drought relief. In the same endar Year, 1981. category, one-fifth of the rice and four-fifths of the wheatflour came from Table6. Foodaidarrhmd In Somalb,
alnckrdesEEC food ekl. hdudes w milk.
WainlyICSM, CSM,beans,tea,meatanddried
fnlii.
FOOD POUCY August 1983
la61 (whm0 In t0ftn08).
WFPnEibMl plqmnnltea
tYwmuhal aab#
Rice
-
Kz&lJr Maize Edible oil DsMmwM
16092 17022 3620 3135 1172 6079
13400 300 14116 14506 4400
z
Elnon-f8fugm moddd 11360 2000 9475 40000
-
500
Reib6.0 foodti 5600 14000 14060 36306 9106 10231 4100 10699
DrougMl flood mibf 1162.5 1300 7022 2tZ 1162.4 404.6
217
the EEC under its emergency programme. The EEC emergency programme is not confined to use in emergencies in the popular sense of the word, but the size of the donation is indicative that Somalia is seen as a worthy food aid recipient. Even more significant is the fact that Somalia is now applying for food aid to finance development projects such as the Baidoa-Baardhere road, a feeder road to a major dam project. Despite the delays in food aid delivery, a common complaint not restricted to Somalia, this is seen as an easier and quicker way of obtaining project finance, with less complex procedures attached to it than making application for financial aid directly, especially as far as the degree of detail in project proposals is concerned. To put it crudely, both the 1973-75 drought and the refugee situation have launched Somalia convincingly on the food aid circuit. Government officials have gained a certain familiarity with food aid donor procedures and credentials as a food aid recipient have been established. For the past few years Somalia has been, in per capita terms, among the top ten recipients of EEC food aid.
Implications for donors Agriculture is, and will continue to be one of the major sectors in the Somali economy, in terms of its contribution to GDP, to employment and to foreign exchange earnings. Settled arable cultivation is becoming an increasingly important part of total agriculture in employment terms. Yet relatively little is known about food crop production. In this sub-sector the government has chosen to take one of the most difficult paths to organize production, that of central control and servicing of what is still essentially, despite the appearance of state farms in the 1!97Os,traditional peasant agriculture. This responsibility covers input provision and the pricing, and distribution of output. Yet technical capacity to understand and administer such complex, logistic systems is extremely limited in Somalia. The database on which to build them is extremely deficient. IVIany statistics describing the agricultural sector come from the work of expatriates attached to technical assistance programmes. There is a natural tendency to look for solutions to the agricultural problem on a large scale, such as extensive irrigation schemes based on the building of large dams. However, that in itself will not essentially affect the basic problem, that of developing the food production sector from a traditional, rather neglected semi-subsistence sector to a more productive sector, integrated into the market system and capable of supplying not only its own consumption needs but those of the urban sector also. To do that will require extensive local-level work and a level of skilled personnel and administrative capacity which does not appear to exist in Somalia at present. It is difficult to say whether food aid has had a policy disincentive effect. There is clearly concern over local food production and steps have been taken, in pricing policy in particular, to try to improve production incentives. That these steps will not in themselves be enough is less because of disincentive effects of food aid than the very difficult nature of extension and marketing programmes given the technical capacity available in Somalia. The problem is that bulk food aid is a relatively easy way out in the short term and could lead to the postponement of coming to terms with the requirements of the food production sector. The nature of the food aid commodities being donated has to be
218
FoooPoucYAugust1883
Somalia
considered as well. With the exception of maize, cereal food aid is in the form of commodities of which over 90% is imported. Increased consump tion of rice and wheatflour with increased urbanization is a pattern which has appeared all over Africa, and certainly cannot be blamed solely on food aid. However, food aid may accelerate the process. WFP estimated that in 1981, in Somalia, taking past consumption patterns as a basis, there was a surplus of 27000 tonnes of wheatflour and a deficit of 89000 tonnes of cereal grain, mainly maize and sorghum. The overflow of cereals from refugee camps also means that wheat and wheatflour are much more prevalent in rural areas than in the past. In this rather confused picture, one feature stands out clearly. There has been a substantial increase in food aid inflow, in particular since 1980, and much of this food aid is not destined for the refugee programme. At the same time, there is little indication of lasting development in the domestic food production sector, although recent policy decisions indicate government concern. Unlike the refugee programme, non-refugee food aid is not coordinated by donors. Many donors do not monitor its use adequately, nor do they attempt to integrate it with their other aid programrnes. Somali capacity is stretched simply by complying with donor regulations for the reception of food aid. Donors lay themselves open to charges of irresponsibility in increasing food aid in acontext where the technical and administrative constraints on devising and implementing an adequate food aid programme are so severe, without at the same time making substantial efforts to relieve those constraints. Food aid has a beneficial impact in terms of relieving balance-ofpayments constraints. This could allow more imports of inputs to improve food production and distribution, but this should be done in the context of a consistent programme to develop traditional agriculture and integrate it more closely with the rest of the economy. For this to occur technical capacity will have to improve. Donors are becoming aware of this and individual programmes of technical assistance have been instituted. However, as with non-refugee food aid, coordination is lacking and as a result maximum benefit of the resources deployed is not being achieved, in a country where these resources are badly needed. It is no exaggeration to say that the food system in Somalia is at a critical stage. There are good intentions, but there is also technical incapacity. To provide large amounts of food aid without coordination or technical assistance could swing the balance towards aid dependence. The donor community achieved a high level of coordination over the refugee programme. The problems facing that programme now are political rather than technical or logistic. If the will were there, a combination of coordination and integration with technical assistance would enable a positive use of the non-emergency food aid which has built up in the wake of the emergency programme.
FOOO POLICY August 1983
219