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Some characteristics of the simulated self
Person.
indioid.
01%
Vol.
13, No.
5, pp.
501-510,
1992
0191~8869192
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
SOME
$5.00
+ 0.00
Copyright ,D 1992 Pergamon Press plc
CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE
SIMULATED
SELF
MICHAEL COWLES,‘* MARY DARLING’ and ANDREA SKANES* ’ Department
of Psychology, Atkinson College, York University, North York, Ontario, Canada M3.l 1P3 and ‘Sheridan College of Applied Arts and Technology, McLaughlin Road, P.O. Box 7500 Brampton, Ontario, Canada L6V 1G6 (Received I3 August 1991) Summary-The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Rotter’s Internal-External Locus of Control Scale, and the Telic Dominance Scale were administered on three occasions to 28 males and 28 females. At the first and second sessions they completed the inventories as though they were their ideal or their worst self, and, at the third session, were asked to report truthfully and accurately on their real self. In general the worst self was more neurotic, more introverted, more psychotic, more telic dominant and more externally oriented than the ideal self and showed low social desirability and Lie Scale scores. Ideal self report produces a marked tendency towards a need for social approval and virtuousness. For extraversion, psychoticism, and locus of control scores, the real self was not significantly different from the ideal self. If real self report reflects the truth, then this finding lends support to the assertion that these scales are not affected by tendencies to idealize the self. There are significant differences in telic dominance scores and (not surprisingly) in Lie Scale and social desirability scores. Significant Sex x Scale interactions produced the suggestion that inviting respondents to complete inventories in accord with a simulated self may offer a way of exploring desired and undesired stereotypical profiles.
INTRODUCTION
Psychometric assessment carries with it a number of difficulties. Among them is the problem of faking and social desirability bias, a problem that raises the issue of test validity in just as acute a fashion as the issue of sociocultural bias even though it escapes the political and ideological concerns of the latter. It is clear that respondents to psychological inventories can attempt to put themselves in a favourable, or, an unfavourable light, or, even in a light that is just dzfirent from the truth, depending, e.g. upon the type of investment that they have in the use to which the results might be put-job placement, promotion, job transfers, diagnostic categories, and so on. Elliott (198 1) has examined some aspects of this problem in selection programmes and concludes that Lie Scales may be measures of the perceived stress or apprehensiveness of the respondent rather than level of motivation and cites studies which suggest that, “responding in a socially desirable fashion is characteristic of the effective rather than the ineffective S.” Can we, in fact, learn anything about the real self from a consideration of simulated self profiles? Furnham (1986) provides an incisive and comprehensive review of the literature on socially desirable response sets. He reaches some important conclusions. The first is that such response bias ought not to be regarded merely as a way of validating or invalidating data obtained from the real scales of personality inventories but as a stable and substantive trait in its own right. He also suggests that the cultural differences in what constitutes acceptable and normal social behaviour may be reflected in cultural or national differences in socially desirable responses. By the same token it might be the case that deliberately manipulated socially desirable or undesirable personality profiles would be relatively homogeneous within a particular group compared with the variation that might be expected from a real group under normal non-manipulated conditions. Presumably the pinnacle of society’s perfection, as with all pinnacles, ought not to be subject to the variation present in the mob. Put somewhat more mundanely, it could be argued that social pressures from the peer group would predispose those subject to such pressures to overtly conform to its prescription of the ideal and the proscribed. On the other hand it can be argued that a self-respecting individual’s ideal self might be related to his/her actual self and not a facsimile of a shared social norm. Deutsch, Kroll, Weible, Letourneau & Goss (1988) suggest that ideal self traits are indeed representative of self-schemas. *To whom
all correspondence
should
be addressed. 501
502
MICHAEL COWLES et al.
Does the ideal self guide behaviour? If it does then one might expect its profile to correspond with that of the real self. Unfortunately a “yes” or “no” answer appears not to be possible. Wojciszke (1987) has developed an Idealism Scale, the construct validity of which seems to show that there are individual differences in the degree to which actual behaviour conforms to the standards set by the ideal self. If we are to assume, and we often do assume, that in the general run individuals, other than malingerers, will show themselves in a somewhat rosier hue than that of the cold light of reality, then research on the relationship of expressed ideals to observed responses might be of great value. Lie Scales are constructed from items that ask questions about behaviours that are desirable but not thought to be common, or, behaviour that ostensibly would be not acceptable but which is, in fact, frequently present. It follows from this that saints have a high risk of being branded as liars and the devil-may-care villain will have all his/her responses accepted at face value! In fact so-called Lie Scales do not measure mere invention and falsification. For example, Pearson and Francis (1989) have identified two subscales of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Lie Scale, one of which identifies the well-behaved, socially conforming individual (items such as, “Have you ever cheated at a game?“) and the other a tendency to “fake good” and to falsify responses (items such as, “Have you ever been late for an appointment or work”). The first of these subscales (which here will be labelled CON for Conformity) correlates with religiosity and seems therefore to measure the truthful reporting of good behaviour. The second subscale (here labelled FAK for Faking) shows that religious adolescents score neither more nor less highly on FAK. These researchers call for an exploration of the dual nature of Lie Scales. It might be hoped that data collected in the research setting would be relatively free from faking, but even here, given the nature of the relationship between many researchers (professors) and many Ss (undergraduate students) and the overt and covert coercion of the latter to take part in investigations, distorted profiles are clearly a possibility. On the other hand, if, as was the case here, the reasons for the investigation are set out clearly and in detail to freely volunteering participants then the data are probably as clean as one could hope for. It is clear that individuals who are informed about the nature of the scales of the Eysenck Personality Inventory are able to identify the scale items (Power & MacRae, 1971). Velicer and Weiner (1975) found that individuals “possessing even a minimum degree of sophistication can successfully fake on this inventory.” Kraht (1989), in a study that examined the outcomes when individuals were asked to fake a specific personality profile rather than merely to attempt to give a good or a bad impression, showed that the distorted responses demonstrated that the participants had achieved an intuitive sense of the structure of the inventory that was employed. Indeed it is possible to go further and to suggest that the scientific constructions of personality theorists, the traits, types, factors, dimensions, temperaments, categories, dispositions and so on, reflect everyday perception and predilection in the assessment of the human condition (see e.g. Semin & Krahe, 1987) so that a socially aware individual could conceivably produce almost any profile that was required. The literature of self’ and self-image (e.g. Rogers & Dymond, 1954; Wylie, 1961) generally sees real-ideal self-image disparity as an index of maladjustment and such indices have been used in clinical settings (Scott, 1958). However the research findings are not without criticism as Furnham and Osborne (1986) have noted. A simple absolute disparity score may be the same for low vs moderate or a moderate vs high rating on a given dimension and it has been suggested that variation within and between Ss on ideal-self ratings is low compared with real-self ratings (see e.g. Schluderman & Schluderman, 1969). These latter authors also found sex differences in correlations between real and ideal self scores on a self-concept inventory, females showing near zero correlation, males a significant relationship. Judd and Smith (1974) also question the validity of disparity scores on the grounds that factor analyses of self-concept and ideal self-concept on a semantic differential showed quite different factor structures. These psychometric doubts mean that disparity scores must be treated with some circumspection and suggest that correlational studies and repeated measures ANOVA (having due regard for homogeneity of variance assumptions) may be a more reasonable way of comparing real and simulated selves. This study was designed to compare the real self with reported ideal and worst selves on a variety of dimensions and to explore the profiles that were obtained in both males and females.
Simulated self
503
Subjects Fifty-six volunteers (28 males & 28 females) enrolled in university undergraduate psychology courses and a community college applied arts programme were asked to complete a battery of questionnaires. A check was made to ensure that all had resided in Canada for an extended period of time in order to help to reduce effects due to differing cultural backgrounds among the respondents. None of the participants had lived in Canada for less than 8 yr and the mean number of yr of residence was 19 for the males and 21 for the females, figures that reflect their mean ages (males: mean 19.57, SD 1.53; females: mean 21.25, SD 5.37).
METHOD
The testing took place in small groups of never more than 10 individuals. Subjects were asked to complete four inventories under each of three conditions-the worst case self, the ideal self, and the real self. The respondents were carefully instructed in the manner in which they were to complete the battery. For the worst case self they were given a set of instructions that asked them to imagine the person that they would least like to be and that they would least like to be thought of as being. It was pointed out that this imagined self need not necessarily be a scoundrel and it was suggested that their real self might even possess some of those undesired characteristics. Imagining the ideal self involved thinking of an individual who the respondent aspired to be and who need not necessarily be a saint or a perfectionist. Again it was suggested that the real self might share some of these characteristics. The experimenter went through the details of these desired simulations answering questions and giving examples where this seemed appropriate. The purpose of the project-to compare simulated and real selves-was discussed with the Ss until it was apparent to the experimenter that the simulations were understood and appreciated and that our manipulation of this independent variable would be effective. Half the participants completed the questionnaires in the worst self condition and half in the ideal self condition on the first occasion, reversing the roles one week later. Finally, and a week later still, the Ss were asked to complete the battery in accord with their real selves. The questionnaires The measures that were used in this study were chosen for a number of reasons. First, they are scales that have achieved some standing. They have been used in a wide variety of studies and have been shown to have more than respectable reliability and validity in these research contexts. Secondly (and leaving aside the Marlowe-Crowne and the EPQ L Scale-obvious checks and choices in studies of this type-and the P and N Scales that have some socially undesirable clinical overtones), the content of the questions does not, in general, lead to immediately obvious and universally agreed-upon “good” or “bad” alternative responses. And, thirdly, the battery can be completed in a reasonably short period of time, thus lessening the effects of boredom and fatigue and assisting in the maintenance of the desired simulations. (I) The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). This measures the fundamental personality dimensions of Extraversion-Introversion (E), Neuroticism-Stability (N) and Psychoticism (P). It also includes a social desirability or Lie Scale (L). The characteristics associated with these dimensions are well-known so that only a brief summary will be presented here. At the high end of the E Scale is the sociable, gregarious, sensation-seeker, an individual who is somewhat aggressive but relatively carefree and optimistic. At the low end is the introvert, serious, quiet, and introspective, the person who avoids arousal and keeps his/her feelings under control. The high N person is an emotional, anxious, and moody individual who worries and frets and overreacts. At the low end of the scale the stable type is controlled, calm and “laid back,” reacting in an unworried fashion to situations that others might find arousing. Tough mindedness marks the high P individual, an aggressive, insensitive loner, sometimes cold and cruel. At the low end of the scale is the individual who does not show these characteristics, more empathetic, sympathetic, and tender-minded. Finally, the L Scale, according to its authors, assesses the extent to which the respondent tends to “faking good.” PAID
13/SB
504
MICHAEL COWLFS et al.
It has been emphasized that these scales are designed to measure personality variables associated with normal behaviour rather than pathology, although, at the extremes, pathology may be apparent. (2) The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (SD) Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This scale was designed to measure need-for-approval and consists of 33 statements expressing extreme virtue, or lack of it. Respondents are asked to respond “true” or “false.” The more virtuous the answers that are given, the stronger the respondent’s drive to win approval and to create a good impression. (3) The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control (LC) Scale (Rotter, 1966). This measure is a 23-item forced-choice questionnaire with 6 filler items. The higher the obtained score the more “external” the individual. Internals appear to be independent individuals with high self-confidence and with a belief in their own ability to keep things under control. Externals are more compliant and dependent, less self-reliant, and more likely to see events as beyond their control. (4) The Telic Dominance Scale (Murgatroyd, Rushton, Apter & Ray, 1978). This consists of three 1Citem subscales, serious-mindedness (the extent to which a person is oriented toward goals that are seen as essential), planning orientation (the degree of organization and planning for the future in the pursuit and achievement of goals), and arousal avoidance (the tendency to avoid high arousal situations and to seek situations where high arousal levels are not likely to be induced). These subscales may be summed to produce a Telic Dominance (TD) score. The more telic an individual the more times s/he spends in a goal-oriented state. Here various behaviours are carried out with an end in view and the individual to some extent feels that the goals are imposed or demanded. On the other hand a state that is more concerned with immediate experience and is associated with freely-chosen activities carried out for their own sake is termed paratelic. Apter (1982) is at pains to point out that these measures are attempts to reflect the individual’s predisposition to experience and interpret his/her world, the metamotivational state, rather than behavioural predictors as such. RESULTS
Figures l-3 illustrate the outcomes of a series of repeated measures analyses of variance, giving MANOVA test criteria, with the self condition and sex as the independent variables. In this instance the F ratios and F approximations for Wilks’ criterion, Pillai’s trace, the Hotelling-Lawley trace, and Roy’s maximum root criterion all give the same value. The worst case self is more neurotic (less emotionally stable), more introverted, scores higher on psychoticism (tough-minded), does not conform or seek social approval, is more goal-oriented, and sees his/her fate as externally controlled compared with the ideal self. For E, P, and LC there is no significant difference between the ideal and the real self. The ideal self differs from both the real and the worst self on telic dominance and separate analyses of the TD subscale scores show that it is Arousal Avoidance (F(2,53) 36.04, P < 0.0001) and Serious Mindedness (F(2,53) 16.37, P < 0.0001) that markedly separate the ideal from the worst selves. The worst self avoids arousal and is serious-minded. It should be noted that all the main effects for self are significant even if the most conservative of tests is applied. The N Scale data shows a Self x Sex interaction. Both males and females see themselves as ideally more stable than their real selves, but for females the difference is dramatic. The L and SD Scales show, not surprisingly, that the ideal self is portrayed as altogether more conforming to social ideals and more virtuous than the worst or real selves. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables by sex and self. The participants’ responses in the three conditions as a function of their relatively high or low standing on L, L subscales, SD, and LC Scales as measured in the real self condition was explored. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of real tendencies to social conformity, need for approval, “faking good,” and feelings of personal control may influence responses in the simulated self situations, as well as perhaps throwing some light on responses in the real self condition. Accordingly, a median split of the data on these variables produced high and low scoring levels and a series of two-way analyses of variance with sex and level as independent factors was carried out. Table 2 shows the significant findings that were obtained from this exercise and Figs 4 and 5 graph the interactions.
Simulated self NEUROTICISM 81 S.If
SCORE
EXTRAVERSION 0” S.lf
N Score
SCORE
E Soor~ 217
16 Self 14
505
Effect
Self x Sex
F(2,53116.65 Effect
p < 0.0001
F12,53)
3.66
19 -
p -z 0.033
17 16 1311O-
Males Self
7 -
F(2,53)
Effect
122.771,
c 0.0001
Females
c Ideal Self
Ideal Self
PSYCHOTICtiM By %I,
SCORE
P Score 18 -
Self
Effect
F(2,53)
122.77~
\;; “1
c 0.0001
11 13 16 3 6 7
Male5
3
Females
1
worst
Real
Ideal Self
Fig. 1
The interactions show, (1) that women who see themselves as being more independent and in control (internals) would, in simulating the worst self, hate to be perceived as being high in emotionality, whereas female externals tend to reject the more stable persona. The reverse situation is observed in males. (2) Females with a low need for approval ideally see themselves as very stable, those with high need for approval show ideal scores that are higher on emotionality. Again the reverse tendency is seen in males. (3) Externally oriented males reject the telic dominant, goal-oriented self, while internals hate to be viewed as non-goal-oriented. In complete accord with this finding, internal males wish, ideally, to be seen as goal-oriented and externals much less so. Among females, locus of control is unrelated to telic dominance, as reported in both the worst and ideal self conditions. LIE SCORE By S*lf
SOCIAL
I. Score
DESIRABILITY BY 5.1,
SCORE
SD score
I
28 22 13 -
Female
14 -
Self
Effect
F(2,53)46.66~<
0.0001
lo6
I
I ldwl
WeI
SSlf
Fig. 2
2
hIal%
P <
Self
Effect
F(2,531
140.61 p 5 0.0001
506
MICHAEL COWLES et al. TELIC
DOMINANCE BY %I‘
SCORE
LOCUS
TD Score
OF
CONTROL BY 5.H
SCORE
LC score
28
16 Self
24
+\
Effect
F(2,53)16.63~
< 0.0001
Self Effect
F( 2,53) 27.15 p .z 0.0001
\
22 20 18 18 -
14 12 I 10
Ideal Self
WOrEI
I worst
Fleai
ideal Sell
RBal
Fig. 3
The most noteworthy finding in the intercorrelations among the L Scales, L subscales, and SD is the substantial relationship between tendencies to fake and to socially conform in females (0.776, P < 0.0001) and the relatively low association of these scales (0.329, NS) in males. The difference between these two correlations is statistically significant (P < 0.0002). Otherwise the scales show relatively high overlap. Intercorrelations across the three situations show negligible relationships between the worst self scores and the real and ideal self scores for the Eysenck Scales and social desirability. Worst self scores for Telic Dominance are negatively related to real and ideal self scores in both males and females. The SD and L Scale relationships across the real and ideal situations are much lower in females than in males. DISCUSSION
It is apparent do not provide
that there is considerable variability in simulated as well as real selves. Our data evidence for the suggestion that there is a relatively uniform worst or ideal self Table I. Means and standard worst Vanable Neuroticism males females Extraversion males females Psychoticism males females Lie Ill&S females Social Desirabibty males females Telic Dominance males females Arousal Avoidance males females Serious Mindedness males females Planning Orientation lIl&S females Locus of Control males
Mean
deviations
Self ____ SD
_
of the principal Ideal Self
variables Real Self
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
13.79 13.89
4.07 4.96
9.29 7.93
5.02 4.89
II.04 12.93
4.80 3.40
8.50 6.61
6.48 5.74
17.61 18.75
3.74 I .84
16.57 16.82
3.80 3.76
16.43 17.50
5.61 6.24
4.46 2.93
3.68 2.80
4.46 2.89
2.59 2.22
3.00 3.36
2.46 3.95
10.54 12.68
5.47 5.19
5.61 7.46
3.02 4.20
5.71 6.00
3.96 5.19
20.54 24.82
6.22 4.55
13.82 15.82
5.19 5.47
21.91 24.06
10.22 8.28
17.34 14.39
6.95 5.91
14.96 12.57
6.14 6.18
8.61 8.88
2.82 2.72
5.25 4.02
2.31 I .87
4.57 3.95
2.32 2.53
7.05 7.90
4.20 2.96
5.66 4.84
3.19 2.41
4.79 3.70
2.42 2.10
6.25 7.29
4.44 3.67
6.43 5.54
3.04 3.01
5.61 4.93
3.32 2.50
15.57 14.43
4.51 3.63
8.32 9.00
4.03 3.72
IO.11 IO.07
5.67 4.01
Simulated Table
2. Analyses
of
variance using B median Effect
variable Neuroticism (worst self)
Neuroticism (ideal
self)
Extraversion (worst self) Extraversion (real self) Extraversion (real self) Extraversion (real self) Psychoticism (real self) Psychoticism (real self) Psychoticism (real self)
Mean
507
split of the Lie Scales and subscales, independent
Dependent
self social
Dependent
P-c
High
Low
Sex x LC 4.28
12.33 4.58
15.69 4.94
females
14.61 5.14
13.07 2.87
males
0.044
10.06
5.08
SD 8.04
0.007 SD 4.88 0.032 LC 4.75 0.034 L 4.53 0.038 FAK 4.39 0.041 LC 7.80 0.007 SD 5.52 0.023 L 4.16 0.046
and locus of control
Effect
SD
F(l.52)
Sex x
desirability
4.45 8.15 4.69 9.14 6.27
4.03 10.27 5.24 5.85 5.61
15.64 4.39
17.75 2.65
self)
as
Mean SD
F(I.52)
variable
P<
Psychoticism
FAK
(real
females
(real
variables
self)
Telic Dominance (worst self)
High
3.63 0.062 Sex x LC 6.90 0.011
males Telic Dominance (ideal self)
sexx LC 4.68 0.035
Telic Dominance (real self)
LC 5.96
LOW
2.92
4.29
2.36
3.67
23.61 8.42 27.85 9.76 14.70 5.90 13.88 6.43 II.77 5.65
24.58 8.41 16.77 7.66 14.04 6.14 20.33 6.08 15.77 6.2 I
16.09 6.71
11.28 4.58
15.25 6.28
12.29 5.91
16.42 6.49
II.63 5.17
8.82 5.11
Il.35 4.33
8.44 4.42
II.42
females males females males
0.018 17.75 2.99
15.64 4.17
Telic Dominance (real self)
17.84 2.63
15.77 4.27
Telic Dominance (real self)
4.46 2.85
2.89 1.87
Telic Dominance (real self)
2.90 2.37
4.52 2.44
Locus
2.93 2.28
4.43 2.56
Locus of Control (real self)
of
Control
(real self)
SD
II.19 0.002 L 4.35 0.042 FAK
II.05 0.002 L 3.94 0.053 FAK 5.48 0.023
4.86
in this population. The notion of the worst self as more neurotic, introverted and psychotic is in accord with what would be termed common knowledge as well as previous research findings (e.g. Farley & Goh, 1976). However the work of Furnham and Henderson (1982) showed no differences between faking good and faking bad on the LC Scale, whereas our data show the worst self to be more externally oriented in both males and females. Furnham (1986) suggests that when a scale is measuring a trait that is not well understood by the lay person then that test would not be easy to fake and he categorizes LC as such a scale. Perhaps our mixed-sex sample of students is somewhat more sophisticated than the general public, but then the Furnham and Henderson’s all-female sample of college students would appear to be similarly different. An interesting finding is the characterization of the worst self as markedly telic dominant, particularly as individuals who, in the aggregate, avoid arousal and are not oriented toward goals that are seen as essential. The ideal self is seen as more telic than the real self but the worst self is highly telic. One possible explanation is the stereotypical picture of youth as seen by, shall we say, the more mature. They are more likely to be living for the day and looking for excitement. NEUROTICISM
SCORE t Worst
ByCO6”S OfControl
Sex x LC Effect Fl1.52)
4.28
Self
I
NEUROTICISM
SCORE
t IdealSelf)
my 5051.1 D.sirobl,ity
P -x 0.044
Sax
Females
Fig. 4
x SO Effect
Ft1,52l
8.04~~
0.007
MICHAELCOWLES et al.
508 TELIC
30
DOMINANCE
SCORE
(Worst
ByLOCUS 0‘ Control
Self
I
TELIC
TDscore
DOMINANCE
SCORE
(Ideal
ByLrJS”, 0, Control
Self
1
TDscore 26
Sex
x LC Effect
F(1,521
6.9Op
.z 0.011
Sex
MOl%
x LC
Effect
F (1,52)
4.66~
-= 0.035
26 Females 4
20 -
1.5
Fig. 5
The characteristics that define very high telic dominance are not seen by the young as desirable. Another view would be that this profile represents a more general dissatisfaction with those aspects of telic dominance that reflect constraint and imposition. It is certainly the case, as Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) note, that extraversion declines with age, particularly in men, and of course extraversion is linked with sensation seeking. This may be the crucial link. A more challenging suggestion that arises from this finding (and others discussed below) is that data obtained from simulated self profiles may have something to tell us about real attitudes and real self-perceptions both in individuals and in groups. Differences on E, P, and LC between the ideal and real selves are not significant, lending support to two conclusions. The first is that if we assume that our real self profiles do indeed reflect the truth then the utility of these scales (at any rate in our relatively neutral research context) is not affected by tendencies to idealize the self. The second is that the real self may be guided by our concept of an ideal self. Intercorrelations across the three situations would support this view. It is a common finding that women’s scores on the N Scale of the EPQ are higher than those of males. When men and women are asked to simulate their worst selves the N scores increase to an almost identical level. However, when simulating the ideal self the drop in N scores for females is quite dramatic and much greater than that for males. At first sight this outcome seems merely to indicate a desire on the part of women to display a degree of emotional stability that is far removed from their perception of their real selves, but further examination of our data shows the situation to be more complex. The Sex x LC interaction shows that women whose locus of control is more internal-those who feel in charge of their own destiny-see high N as undesirable, whereas the externals in the worst self condition have a mean that is virtually no different from the mean for all women on the real self profile. In a similar vein women scoring low on SD, those with a low need for approval, ideally see themselves as highly stable. Those with a high need for approval have an ideal N score that approaches the real self N mean for all the women. Men show patterns that are the reverse of these but the difference between high and low LC and SD groups is not as marked. It is not our intention here to maintain strongly that these results surely reflect social pressures on women who seek approval and are more externally oriented to conform to the stereotype of the more emotionally labile individual, but the data do point to such a conclusion. Women who are internal and do not seek social approval strive for superior emotional stability. The Sex x LC interactions for TD may also arise from self stereotypes. Self-confident, internal males ideally want to be seen as goal-oriented and would hate to be thought of as paratelic people. The external males, more compliant and dependent, are much more concerned with immediate experiences rather than future goals. Women show about the same degree of telic dominance regardless of their locus of control, and, in the ideal state show almost the same level of telic dominance as the external males. What these findings suggest is that, again, simulated self data might help to reveal real feelings and attitudes. Describing ideal and obnoxious or offensive personality profiles by encouraging
Simulated
self
509
individuals to simulate these states from their own personal perspectives may offer a useful way of exploring social and personal beliefs and perceptions. Furnham and Osborne (1986) note that their results indicate that, “the self-concept is a major factor in the control and direction of healthy social behaviour,” and present data that show that, “the actual self score ‘anchored’ the ideal score to some extent”. From the clinician’s standpoint the suggestion that these authors make that high disparity between actual and ideal ratings indicates poor adjustment is one that has occupied and will continue to occupy practitioners. The present study suggests that differences between actual and worst-case self ratings may also be worth further investigation. Katz and Zigler (1967) found that real-ideal self-image disparity was positively related to chronological age in children and suggest, as a reason for this, that capacity for guilt and cognitive differentiation increase with increasing maturity. Data from our study indicate that sex differences may be usefully examined using a general self-image disparity approach. When our sample was split at the median into high and low scores on the L Scale (real self) we find that the high L scorers tend to report higher E, lower P, higher TD, and more internal LC in the real self condition than the low L scorers. What is of great interest is that when these analyses are repeated using the CON and FAK subscales it is the FAK component that leads to the differences. There are no significant differences when the CON component is the independent variable. This result supports Furnham’s (1986) contention that response bias effects, and social desirability in particular, require much more investigation. We find, not surprisingly, that there are substantial correlations between the SD and L Scales in both men and women but the correlation of the L subscales of CON(formity) and FAK(ing) shows a striking sex difference. In women it is substantial, in men it is moderate and insignificant. Does this mean that women who socially conform also tend to “fake good,” but that in men these aspects of the L Scale are more independent? Apparently it does. We have here an indication of differential social pressures to respond in acceptable ways. It is also worth noting that a superficial inspection of the SD Scale would lead to the conclusion that it, too, has both CON and FAK components. Where does all this leave the Lie Scales? After all the problem of dissimulation on psychometric tests cannot be ignored. First we have to be aware of the paradox that the nature of the scales produces. High scores on the L dimension (or more probably its FAK subscale) when an individual is reporting on his/her ideal self surely reflect “faking good.” However, low scores on the scale in the worst self condition equally surely show that the usual interpretation of the scale does not detect “faking bad.” Rodomontade is much easier to detect than malingering The nature and utility of these scales as aids to the validation of test scores requires more study. And it is this study that will bring a greater degree of sophistication to psychometric assessment and an accuracy that is, perhaps, not so dependent upon the honest co-operation of the respondent.
REFERENCES Apter, M. J. (1982). The experience of motivation: The theory of psychological reversals. London: Academic Press. Crowne, D. P. & Marlowe, D. (1964). The approval motive: Studies in evaluative dependence. New York: Wiley. Deutsch, F. M., Kroll, J. F., Weible, A. L., Letourneau, L. A. & Goss, R. L. (1988). Spontaneous trait generation: a new method for identifying self-schemas. Journal of Personality, 56, 3277354. Elliott, A. G. P. (1981). Some implications of lie scale scores in real-life selection. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 54, 9-16. Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. San Diego: Educational and Industrial Testing Service. Farley, F. & Goh, D. (1976). PENmanship: faking the P-E-N. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 15, 139-148. Furnham, A. (1986). Response bias, social desirability and dissimulation. Personality and Individual Differences, 7, 3855400. Furnham, A. & Henderson, M. (1982). The good, the bad and the mad: response bias in self-response measures. Personality and Individual Differences, 3, 31 I-320. Furnham, A. & Osborne, A. (1986). Repression-sensitization, self-image disparity, and mental health. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 46, 125-133. Judd, L. R. & Smith, C. B. (1974). Discrepancy score validity in self- and ideal self-concept measurement. Journal of Counselling Psychology, 21, 156-l 58. Katz, P. & Zigler, E. (1967). Self-image disparity: a developmental approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 186-195. Kraht, B. (1989). Faking personality profiles on a standard personality inventory. Personality and Individual Dtfirences, 10, 437-443.
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Murgatroyd, S., Rushton, C., Apter, M. J. % Ray, C. (1978). The development of the Telic Dominance Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 42, 519-528. Pearson, P. R. & Francis, L. J. (1989). The dual nature of the Eysenckian lie scales: Are religious adolescents more truthful? Personality and Individual Differences, IO, 1041-1048. Power, R. P. & MacRae, K. D. (1971). Detectability of items in the Eysenck Personality Inventory. Brifish Journal of Psychology, 62, 395-401. Rogers, C. & Dymond, R. (1954). Psychofherapy and personality change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80 (1, Whole No. 609). Schluderman, S. & Schludennan, E. (1969). A note on the use of discrepancy scores on a self-concept inventory. Journal of Psychology, 72, 33-34. Scott, W. (1958). Research definitions of mental health and mental illness. Psychological Bulletin, 55, l-45. Semin, G. R. & Krahe, B. (1987). Lay conceptions of personality: eliciting tiers of a scientific conception of personality. European Journal of Psychology, I7, 199-209. Jfelker, W. F. & Weiner, B. J. (1975). Effects of sophistication and faking sets on the Eysenck Personality Inventory. Psychological Reports, 37, 71-73. Wojciszke, B. (1987). Idealism scale for the measurement of individual differences in regulatory functions of the ideal self. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 18, 325-333. Wylie, R. (1961). The self-concept. Omaha: University of Nebraska Press.
indioid.
01%
Vol.
13, No.
5, pp.
501-510,
1992
0191~8869192
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
SOME
$5.00
+ 0.00
Copyright ,D 1992 Pergamon Press plc
CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE
SIMULATED
SELF
MICHAEL COWLES,‘* MARY DARLING’ and ANDREA SKANES* ’ Department
of Psychology, Atkinson College, York University, North York, Ontario, Canada M3.l 1P3 and ‘Sheridan College of Applied Arts and Technology, McLaughlin Road, P.O. Box 7500 Brampton, Ontario, Canada L6V 1G6 (Received I3 August 1991) Summary-The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Rotter’s Internal-External Locus of Control Scale, and the Telic Dominance Scale were administered on three occasions to 28 males and 28 females. At the first and second sessions they completed the inventories as though they were their ideal or their worst self, and, at the third session, were asked to report truthfully and accurately on their real self. In general the worst self was more neurotic, more introverted, more psychotic, more telic dominant and more externally oriented than the ideal self and showed low social desirability and Lie Scale scores. Ideal self report produces a marked tendency towards a need for social approval and virtuousness. For extraversion, psychoticism, and locus of control scores, the real self was not significantly different from the ideal self. If real self report reflects the truth, then this finding lends support to the assertion that these scales are not affected by tendencies to idealize the self. There are significant differences in telic dominance scores and (not surprisingly) in Lie Scale and social desirability scores. Significant Sex x Scale interactions produced the suggestion that inviting respondents to complete inventories in accord with a simulated self may offer a way of exploring desired and undesired stereotypical profiles.
INTRODUCTION
Psychometric assessment carries with it a number of difficulties. Among them is the problem of faking and social desirability bias, a problem that raises the issue of test validity in just as acute a fashion as the issue of sociocultural bias even though it escapes the political and ideological concerns of the latter. It is clear that respondents to psychological inventories can attempt to put themselves in a favourable, or, an unfavourable light, or, even in a light that is just dzfirent from the truth, depending, e.g. upon the type of investment that they have in the use to which the results might be put-job placement, promotion, job transfers, diagnostic categories, and so on. Elliott (198 1) has examined some aspects of this problem in selection programmes and concludes that Lie Scales may be measures of the perceived stress or apprehensiveness of the respondent rather than level of motivation and cites studies which suggest that, “responding in a socially desirable fashion is characteristic of the effective rather than the ineffective S.” Can we, in fact, learn anything about the real self from a consideration of simulated self profiles? Furnham (1986) provides an incisive and comprehensive review of the literature on socially desirable response sets. He reaches some important conclusions. The first is that such response bias ought not to be regarded merely as a way of validating or invalidating data obtained from the real scales of personality inventories but as a stable and substantive trait in its own right. He also suggests that the cultural differences in what constitutes acceptable and normal social behaviour may be reflected in cultural or national differences in socially desirable responses. By the same token it might be the case that deliberately manipulated socially desirable or undesirable personality profiles would be relatively homogeneous within a particular group compared with the variation that might be expected from a real group under normal non-manipulated conditions. Presumably the pinnacle of society’s perfection, as with all pinnacles, ought not to be subject to the variation present in the mob. Put somewhat more mundanely, it could be argued that social pressures from the peer group would predispose those subject to such pressures to overtly conform to its prescription of the ideal and the proscribed. On the other hand it can be argued that a self-respecting individual’s ideal self might be related to his/her actual self and not a facsimile of a shared social norm. Deutsch, Kroll, Weible, Letourneau & Goss (1988) suggest that ideal self traits are indeed representative of self-schemas. *To whom
all correspondence
should
be addressed. 501
502
MICHAEL COWLES et al.
Does the ideal self guide behaviour? If it does then one might expect its profile to correspond with that of the real self. Unfortunately a “yes” or “no” answer appears not to be possible. Wojciszke (1987) has developed an Idealism Scale, the construct validity of which seems to show that there are individual differences in the degree to which actual behaviour conforms to the standards set by the ideal self. If we are to assume, and we often do assume, that in the general run individuals, other than malingerers, will show themselves in a somewhat rosier hue than that of the cold light of reality, then research on the relationship of expressed ideals to observed responses might be of great value. Lie Scales are constructed from items that ask questions about behaviours that are desirable but not thought to be common, or, behaviour that ostensibly would be not acceptable but which is, in fact, frequently present. It follows from this that saints have a high risk of being branded as liars and the devil-may-care villain will have all his/her responses accepted at face value! In fact so-called Lie Scales do not measure mere invention and falsification. For example, Pearson and Francis (1989) have identified two subscales of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Lie Scale, one of which identifies the well-behaved, socially conforming individual (items such as, “Have you ever cheated at a game?“) and the other a tendency to “fake good” and to falsify responses (items such as, “Have you ever been late for an appointment or work”). The first of these subscales (which here will be labelled CON for Conformity) correlates with religiosity and seems therefore to measure the truthful reporting of good behaviour. The second subscale (here labelled FAK for Faking) shows that religious adolescents score neither more nor less highly on FAK. These researchers call for an exploration of the dual nature of Lie Scales. It might be hoped that data collected in the research setting would be relatively free from faking, but even here, given the nature of the relationship between many researchers (professors) and many Ss (undergraduate students) and the overt and covert coercion of the latter to take part in investigations, distorted profiles are clearly a possibility. On the other hand, if, as was the case here, the reasons for the investigation are set out clearly and in detail to freely volunteering participants then the data are probably as clean as one could hope for. It is clear that individuals who are informed about the nature of the scales of the Eysenck Personality Inventory are able to identify the scale items (Power & MacRae, 1971). Velicer and Weiner (1975) found that individuals “possessing even a minimum degree of sophistication can successfully fake on this inventory.” Kraht (1989), in a study that examined the outcomes when individuals were asked to fake a specific personality profile rather than merely to attempt to give a good or a bad impression, showed that the distorted responses demonstrated that the participants had achieved an intuitive sense of the structure of the inventory that was employed. Indeed it is possible to go further and to suggest that the scientific constructions of personality theorists, the traits, types, factors, dimensions, temperaments, categories, dispositions and so on, reflect everyday perception and predilection in the assessment of the human condition (see e.g. Semin & Krahe, 1987) so that a socially aware individual could conceivably produce almost any profile that was required. The literature of self’ and self-image (e.g. Rogers & Dymond, 1954; Wylie, 1961) generally sees real-ideal self-image disparity as an index of maladjustment and such indices have been used in clinical settings (Scott, 1958). However the research findings are not without criticism as Furnham and Osborne (1986) have noted. A simple absolute disparity score may be the same for low vs moderate or a moderate vs high rating on a given dimension and it has been suggested that variation within and between Ss on ideal-self ratings is low compared with real-self ratings (see e.g. Schluderman & Schluderman, 1969). These latter authors also found sex differences in correlations between real and ideal self scores on a self-concept inventory, females showing near zero correlation, males a significant relationship. Judd and Smith (1974) also question the validity of disparity scores on the grounds that factor analyses of self-concept and ideal self-concept on a semantic differential showed quite different factor structures. These psychometric doubts mean that disparity scores must be treated with some circumspection and suggest that correlational studies and repeated measures ANOVA (having due regard for homogeneity of variance assumptions) may be a more reasonable way of comparing real and simulated selves. This study was designed to compare the real self with reported ideal and worst selves on a variety of dimensions and to explore the profiles that were obtained in both males and females.
Simulated self
503
Subjects Fifty-six volunteers (28 males & 28 females) enrolled in university undergraduate psychology courses and a community college applied arts programme were asked to complete a battery of questionnaires. A check was made to ensure that all had resided in Canada for an extended period of time in order to help to reduce effects due to differing cultural backgrounds among the respondents. None of the participants had lived in Canada for less than 8 yr and the mean number of yr of residence was 19 for the males and 21 for the females, figures that reflect their mean ages (males: mean 19.57, SD 1.53; females: mean 21.25, SD 5.37).
METHOD
The testing took place in small groups of never more than 10 individuals. Subjects were asked to complete four inventories under each of three conditions-the worst case self, the ideal self, and the real self. The respondents were carefully instructed in the manner in which they were to complete the battery. For the worst case self they were given a set of instructions that asked them to imagine the person that they would least like to be and that they would least like to be thought of as being. It was pointed out that this imagined self need not necessarily be a scoundrel and it was suggested that their real self might even possess some of those undesired characteristics. Imagining the ideal self involved thinking of an individual who the respondent aspired to be and who need not necessarily be a saint or a perfectionist. Again it was suggested that the real self might share some of these characteristics. The experimenter went through the details of these desired simulations answering questions and giving examples where this seemed appropriate. The purpose of the project-to compare simulated and real selves-was discussed with the Ss until it was apparent to the experimenter that the simulations were understood and appreciated and that our manipulation of this independent variable would be effective. Half the participants completed the questionnaires in the worst self condition and half in the ideal self condition on the first occasion, reversing the roles one week later. Finally, and a week later still, the Ss were asked to complete the battery in accord with their real selves. The questionnaires The measures that were used in this study were chosen for a number of reasons. First, they are scales that have achieved some standing. They have been used in a wide variety of studies and have been shown to have more than respectable reliability and validity in these research contexts. Secondly (and leaving aside the Marlowe-Crowne and the EPQ L Scale-obvious checks and choices in studies of this type-and the P and N Scales that have some socially undesirable clinical overtones), the content of the questions does not, in general, lead to immediately obvious and universally agreed-upon “good” or “bad” alternative responses. And, thirdly, the battery can be completed in a reasonably short period of time, thus lessening the effects of boredom and fatigue and assisting in the maintenance of the desired simulations. (I) The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). This measures the fundamental personality dimensions of Extraversion-Introversion (E), Neuroticism-Stability (N) and Psychoticism (P). It also includes a social desirability or Lie Scale (L). The characteristics associated with these dimensions are well-known so that only a brief summary will be presented here. At the high end of the E Scale is the sociable, gregarious, sensation-seeker, an individual who is somewhat aggressive but relatively carefree and optimistic. At the low end is the introvert, serious, quiet, and introspective, the person who avoids arousal and keeps his/her feelings under control. The high N person is an emotional, anxious, and moody individual who worries and frets and overreacts. At the low end of the scale the stable type is controlled, calm and “laid back,” reacting in an unworried fashion to situations that others might find arousing. Tough mindedness marks the high P individual, an aggressive, insensitive loner, sometimes cold and cruel. At the low end of the scale is the individual who does not show these characteristics, more empathetic, sympathetic, and tender-minded. Finally, the L Scale, according to its authors, assesses the extent to which the respondent tends to “faking good.” PAID
13/SB
504
MICHAEL COWLFS et al.
It has been emphasized that these scales are designed to measure personality variables associated with normal behaviour rather than pathology, although, at the extremes, pathology may be apparent. (2) The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (SD) Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This scale was designed to measure need-for-approval and consists of 33 statements expressing extreme virtue, or lack of it. Respondents are asked to respond “true” or “false.” The more virtuous the answers that are given, the stronger the respondent’s drive to win approval and to create a good impression. (3) The Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control (LC) Scale (Rotter, 1966). This measure is a 23-item forced-choice questionnaire with 6 filler items. The higher the obtained score the more “external” the individual. Internals appear to be independent individuals with high self-confidence and with a belief in their own ability to keep things under control. Externals are more compliant and dependent, less self-reliant, and more likely to see events as beyond their control. (4) The Telic Dominance Scale (Murgatroyd, Rushton, Apter & Ray, 1978). This consists of three 1Citem subscales, serious-mindedness (the extent to which a person is oriented toward goals that are seen as essential), planning orientation (the degree of organization and planning for the future in the pursuit and achievement of goals), and arousal avoidance (the tendency to avoid high arousal situations and to seek situations where high arousal levels are not likely to be induced). These subscales may be summed to produce a Telic Dominance (TD) score. The more telic an individual the more times s/he spends in a goal-oriented state. Here various behaviours are carried out with an end in view and the individual to some extent feels that the goals are imposed or demanded. On the other hand a state that is more concerned with immediate experience and is associated with freely-chosen activities carried out for their own sake is termed paratelic. Apter (1982) is at pains to point out that these measures are attempts to reflect the individual’s predisposition to experience and interpret his/her world, the metamotivational state, rather than behavioural predictors as such. RESULTS
Figures l-3 illustrate the outcomes of a series of repeated measures analyses of variance, giving MANOVA test criteria, with the self condition and sex as the independent variables. In this instance the F ratios and F approximations for Wilks’ criterion, Pillai’s trace, the Hotelling-Lawley trace, and Roy’s maximum root criterion all give the same value. The worst case self is more neurotic (less emotionally stable), more introverted, scores higher on psychoticism (tough-minded), does not conform or seek social approval, is more goal-oriented, and sees his/her fate as externally controlled compared with the ideal self. For E, P, and LC there is no significant difference between the ideal and the real self. The ideal self differs from both the real and the worst self on telic dominance and separate analyses of the TD subscale scores show that it is Arousal Avoidance (F(2,53) 36.04, P < 0.0001) and Serious Mindedness (F(2,53) 16.37, P < 0.0001) that markedly separate the ideal from the worst selves. The worst self avoids arousal and is serious-minded. It should be noted that all the main effects for self are significant even if the most conservative of tests is applied. The N Scale data shows a Self x Sex interaction. Both males and females see themselves as ideally more stable than their real selves, but for females the difference is dramatic. The L and SD Scales show, not surprisingly, that the ideal self is portrayed as altogether more conforming to social ideals and more virtuous than the worst or real selves. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables by sex and self. The participants’ responses in the three conditions as a function of their relatively high or low standing on L, L subscales, SD, and LC Scales as measured in the real self condition was explored. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of real tendencies to social conformity, need for approval, “faking good,” and feelings of personal control may influence responses in the simulated self situations, as well as perhaps throwing some light on responses in the real self condition. Accordingly, a median split of the data on these variables produced high and low scoring levels and a series of two-way analyses of variance with sex and level as independent factors was carried out. Table 2 shows the significant findings that were obtained from this exercise and Figs 4 and 5 graph the interactions.
Simulated self NEUROTICISM 81 S.If
SCORE
EXTRAVERSION 0” S.lf
N Score
SCORE
E Soor~ 217
16 Self 14
505
Effect
Self x Sex
F(2,53116.65 Effect
p < 0.0001
F12,53)
3.66
19 -
p -z 0.033
17 16 1311O-
Males Self
7 -
F(2,53)
Effect
122.771,
c 0.0001
Females
c Ideal Self
Ideal Self
PSYCHOTICtiM By %I,
SCORE
P Score 18 -
Self
Effect
F(2,53)
122.77~
\;; “1
c 0.0001
11 13 16 3 6 7
Male5
3
Females
1
worst
Real
Ideal Self
Fig. 1
The interactions show, (1) that women who see themselves as being more independent and in control (internals) would, in simulating the worst self, hate to be perceived as being high in emotionality, whereas female externals tend to reject the more stable persona. The reverse situation is observed in males. (2) Females with a low need for approval ideally see themselves as very stable, those with high need for approval show ideal scores that are higher on emotionality. Again the reverse tendency is seen in males. (3) Externally oriented males reject the telic dominant, goal-oriented self, while internals hate to be viewed as non-goal-oriented. In complete accord with this finding, internal males wish, ideally, to be seen as goal-oriented and externals much less so. Among females, locus of control is unrelated to telic dominance, as reported in both the worst and ideal self conditions. LIE SCORE By S*lf
SOCIAL
I. Score
DESIRABILITY BY 5.1,
SCORE
SD score
I
28 22 13 -
Female
14 -
Self
Effect
F(2,53)46.66~<
0.0001
lo6
I
I ldwl
WeI
SSlf
Fig. 2
2
hIal%
P <
Self
Effect
F(2,531
140.61 p 5 0.0001
506
MICHAEL COWLES et al. TELIC
DOMINANCE BY %I‘
SCORE
LOCUS
TD Score
OF
CONTROL BY 5.H
SCORE
LC score
28
16 Self
24
+\
Effect
F(2,53)16.63~
< 0.0001
Self Effect
F( 2,53) 27.15 p .z 0.0001
\
22 20 18 18 -
14 12 I 10
Ideal Self
WOrEI
I worst
Fleai
ideal Sell
RBal
Fig. 3
The most noteworthy finding in the intercorrelations among the L Scales, L subscales, and SD is the substantial relationship between tendencies to fake and to socially conform in females (0.776, P < 0.0001) and the relatively low association of these scales (0.329, NS) in males. The difference between these two correlations is statistically significant (P < 0.0002). Otherwise the scales show relatively high overlap. Intercorrelations across the three situations show negligible relationships between the worst self scores and the real and ideal self scores for the Eysenck Scales and social desirability. Worst self scores for Telic Dominance are negatively related to real and ideal self scores in both males and females. The SD and L Scale relationships across the real and ideal situations are much lower in females than in males. DISCUSSION
It is apparent do not provide
that there is considerable variability in simulated as well as real selves. Our data evidence for the suggestion that there is a relatively uniform worst or ideal self Table I. Means and standard worst Vanable Neuroticism males females Extraversion males females Psychoticism males females Lie Ill&S females Social Desirabibty males females Telic Dominance males females Arousal Avoidance males females Serious Mindedness males females Planning Orientation lIl&S females Locus of Control males
Mean
deviations
Self ____ SD
_
of the principal Ideal Self
variables Real Self
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
13.79 13.89
4.07 4.96
9.29 7.93
5.02 4.89
II.04 12.93
4.80 3.40
8.50 6.61
6.48 5.74
17.61 18.75
3.74 I .84
16.57 16.82
3.80 3.76
16.43 17.50
5.61 6.24
4.46 2.93
3.68 2.80
4.46 2.89
2.59 2.22
3.00 3.36
2.46 3.95
10.54 12.68
5.47 5.19
5.61 7.46
3.02 4.20
5.71 6.00
3.96 5.19
20.54 24.82
6.22 4.55
13.82 15.82
5.19 5.47
21.91 24.06
10.22 8.28
17.34 14.39
6.95 5.91
14.96 12.57
6.14 6.18
8.61 8.88
2.82 2.72
5.25 4.02
2.31 I .87
4.57 3.95
2.32 2.53
7.05 7.90
4.20 2.96
5.66 4.84
3.19 2.41
4.79 3.70
2.42 2.10
6.25 7.29
4.44 3.67
6.43 5.54
3.04 3.01
5.61 4.93
3.32 2.50
15.57 14.43
4.51 3.63
8.32 9.00
4.03 3.72
IO.11 IO.07
5.67 4.01
Simulated Table
2. Analyses
of
variance using B median Effect
variable Neuroticism (worst self)
Neuroticism (ideal
self)
Extraversion (worst self) Extraversion (real self) Extraversion (real self) Extraversion (real self) Psychoticism (real self) Psychoticism (real self) Psychoticism (real self)
Mean
507
split of the Lie Scales and subscales, independent
Dependent
self social
Dependent
P-c
High
Low
Sex x LC 4.28
12.33 4.58
15.69 4.94
females
14.61 5.14
13.07 2.87
males
0.044
10.06
5.08
SD 8.04
0.007 SD 4.88 0.032 LC 4.75 0.034 L 4.53 0.038 FAK 4.39 0.041 LC 7.80 0.007 SD 5.52 0.023 L 4.16 0.046
and locus of control
Effect
SD
F(l.52)
Sex x
desirability
4.45 8.15 4.69 9.14 6.27
4.03 10.27 5.24 5.85 5.61
15.64 4.39
17.75 2.65
self)
as
Mean SD
F(I.52)
variable
P<
Psychoticism
FAK
(real
females
(real
variables
self)
Telic Dominance (worst self)
High
3.63 0.062 Sex x LC 6.90 0.011
males Telic Dominance (ideal self)
sexx LC 4.68 0.035
Telic Dominance (real self)
LC 5.96
LOW
2.92
4.29
2.36
3.67
23.61 8.42 27.85 9.76 14.70 5.90 13.88 6.43 II.77 5.65
24.58 8.41 16.77 7.66 14.04 6.14 20.33 6.08 15.77 6.2 I
16.09 6.71
11.28 4.58
15.25 6.28
12.29 5.91
16.42 6.49
II.63 5.17
8.82 5.11
Il.35 4.33
8.44 4.42
II.42
females males females males
0.018 17.75 2.99
15.64 4.17
Telic Dominance (real self)
17.84 2.63
15.77 4.27
Telic Dominance (real self)
4.46 2.85
2.89 1.87
Telic Dominance (real self)
2.90 2.37
4.52 2.44
Locus
2.93 2.28
4.43 2.56
Locus of Control (real self)
of
Control
(real self)
SD
II.19 0.002 L 4.35 0.042 FAK
II.05 0.002 L 3.94 0.053 FAK 5.48 0.023
4.86
in this population. The notion of the worst self as more neurotic, introverted and psychotic is in accord with what would be termed common knowledge as well as previous research findings (e.g. Farley & Goh, 1976). However the work of Furnham and Henderson (1982) showed no differences between faking good and faking bad on the LC Scale, whereas our data show the worst self to be more externally oriented in both males and females. Furnham (1986) suggests that when a scale is measuring a trait that is not well understood by the lay person then that test would not be easy to fake and he categorizes LC as such a scale. Perhaps our mixed-sex sample of students is somewhat more sophisticated than the general public, but then the Furnham and Henderson’s all-female sample of college students would appear to be similarly different. An interesting finding is the characterization of the worst self as markedly telic dominant, particularly as individuals who, in the aggregate, avoid arousal and are not oriented toward goals that are seen as essential. The ideal self is seen as more telic than the real self but the worst self is highly telic. One possible explanation is the stereotypical picture of youth as seen by, shall we say, the more mature. They are more likely to be living for the day and looking for excitement. NEUROTICISM
SCORE t Worst
ByCO6”S OfControl
Sex x LC Effect Fl1.52)
4.28
Self
I
NEUROTICISM
SCORE
t IdealSelf)
my 5051.1 D.sirobl,ity
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Sax
Females
Fig. 4
x SO Effect
Ft1,52l
8.04~~
0.007
MICHAELCOWLES et al.
508 TELIC
30
DOMINANCE
SCORE
(Worst
ByLOCUS 0‘ Control
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I
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TDscore
DOMINANCE
SCORE
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x LC Effect
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.z 0.011
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x LC
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-= 0.035
26 Females 4
20 -
1.5
Fig. 5
The characteristics that define very high telic dominance are not seen by the young as desirable. Another view would be that this profile represents a more general dissatisfaction with those aspects of telic dominance that reflect constraint and imposition. It is certainly the case, as Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) note, that extraversion declines with age, particularly in men, and of course extraversion is linked with sensation seeking. This may be the crucial link. A more challenging suggestion that arises from this finding (and others discussed below) is that data obtained from simulated self profiles may have something to tell us about real attitudes and real self-perceptions both in individuals and in groups. Differences on E, P, and LC between the ideal and real selves are not significant, lending support to two conclusions. The first is that if we assume that our real self profiles do indeed reflect the truth then the utility of these scales (at any rate in our relatively neutral research context) is not affected by tendencies to idealize the self. The second is that the real self may be guided by our concept of an ideal self. Intercorrelations across the three situations would support this view. It is a common finding that women’s scores on the N Scale of the EPQ are higher than those of males. When men and women are asked to simulate their worst selves the N scores increase to an almost identical level. However, when simulating the ideal self the drop in N scores for females is quite dramatic and much greater than that for males. At first sight this outcome seems merely to indicate a desire on the part of women to display a degree of emotional stability that is far removed from their perception of their real selves, but further examination of our data shows the situation to be more complex. The Sex x LC interaction shows that women whose locus of control is more internal-those who feel in charge of their own destiny-see high N as undesirable, whereas the externals in the worst self condition have a mean that is virtually no different from the mean for all women on the real self profile. In a similar vein women scoring low on SD, those with a low need for approval, ideally see themselves as highly stable. Those with a high need for approval have an ideal N score that approaches the real self N mean for all the women. Men show patterns that are the reverse of these but the difference between high and low LC and SD groups is not as marked. It is not our intention here to maintain strongly that these results surely reflect social pressures on women who seek approval and are more externally oriented to conform to the stereotype of the more emotionally labile individual, but the data do point to such a conclusion. Women who are internal and do not seek social approval strive for superior emotional stability. The Sex x LC interactions for TD may also arise from self stereotypes. Self-confident, internal males ideally want to be seen as goal-oriented and would hate to be thought of as paratelic people. The external males, more compliant and dependent, are much more concerned with immediate experiences rather than future goals. Women show about the same degree of telic dominance regardless of their locus of control, and, in the ideal state show almost the same level of telic dominance as the external males. What these findings suggest is that, again, simulated self data might help to reveal real feelings and attitudes. Describing ideal and obnoxious or offensive personality profiles by encouraging
Simulated
self
509
individuals to simulate these states from their own personal perspectives may offer a useful way of exploring social and personal beliefs and perceptions. Furnham and Osborne (1986) note that their results indicate that, “the self-concept is a major factor in the control and direction of healthy social behaviour,” and present data that show that, “the actual self score ‘anchored’ the ideal score to some extent”. From the clinician’s standpoint the suggestion that these authors make that high disparity between actual and ideal ratings indicates poor adjustment is one that has occupied and will continue to occupy practitioners. The present study suggests that differences between actual and worst-case self ratings may also be worth further investigation. Katz and Zigler (1967) found that real-ideal self-image disparity was positively related to chronological age in children and suggest, as a reason for this, that capacity for guilt and cognitive differentiation increase with increasing maturity. Data from our study indicate that sex differences may be usefully examined using a general self-image disparity approach. When our sample was split at the median into high and low scores on the L Scale (real self) we find that the high L scorers tend to report higher E, lower P, higher TD, and more internal LC in the real self condition than the low L scorers. What is of great interest is that when these analyses are repeated using the CON and FAK subscales it is the FAK component that leads to the differences. There are no significant differences when the CON component is the independent variable. This result supports Furnham’s (1986) contention that response bias effects, and social desirability in particular, require much more investigation. We find, not surprisingly, that there are substantial correlations between the SD and L Scales in both men and women but the correlation of the L subscales of CON(formity) and FAK(ing) shows a striking sex difference. In women it is substantial, in men it is moderate and insignificant. Does this mean that women who socially conform also tend to “fake good,” but that in men these aspects of the L Scale are more independent? Apparently it does. We have here an indication of differential social pressures to respond in acceptable ways. It is also worth noting that a superficial inspection of the SD Scale would lead to the conclusion that it, too, has both CON and FAK components. Where does all this leave the Lie Scales? After all the problem of dissimulation on psychometric tests cannot be ignored. First we have to be aware of the paradox that the nature of the scales produces. High scores on the L dimension (or more probably its FAK subscale) when an individual is reporting on his/her ideal self surely reflect “faking good.” However, low scores on the scale in the worst self condition equally surely show that the usual interpretation of the scale does not detect “faking bad.” Rodomontade is much easier to detect than malingering The nature and utility of these scales as aids to the validation of test scores requires more study. And it is this study that will bring a greater degree of sophistication to psychometric assessment and an accuracy that is, perhaps, not so dependent upon the honest co-operation of the respondent.
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