Some effects of aspect on tense construal

Lingua 117 (2007) 464–502 www.elsevier.com/locate/lingua

Some effects of aspect on tense construal Karen Zagona Department of Linguistics, University of Washington, Box 354340, Seattle, WA 98195, USA Received 10 January 2005; received in revised form 15 July 2005; accepted 20 August 2005 Available online 2 November 2005

Abstract This article presents an approach to tense construal that assumes that Times are arguments of TP, and proposes an account of how Times are represented in the syntax without there being lexical items that refer to them. It is argued that VP material is copied into positions that are construed as temporal argument positions. The ‘copy’ approach to Reference time and Speechtime is argued to account for the influences of VP and DP features on temporal ordering. The ‘copy’ approach also makes available a new analysis of the relationship between Event time (E) and Reference time (R). That relationship has most often been characterized as either a finite tense-ordering relation or an aspectual relation. It is argued here that when R and E are not coreferential the relation between them is one of temporal partitivity. # 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Bare plurals; Perfect tenses; Progressive; Reference time; Temporal partitivity; Tense

1. Introduction This article takes as a starting point the traditional view (Jespersen, 1924; Reichenbach, 1947) that tense is an ordering relationship between Times, and that reference to ‘Times’ is a consequence of their licensing as arguments of the Tense Phrase (TP) of clauses (Zagona, 1990, 1995). However, times are unlike atemporal entities in an important respect: for the most part, they are not constructed from lexical items. Except where adverbials mention specific times, there are no independent lexical items that refer to the times that enter into tense-ordering relations. Since syntactic objects are generally built from lexical items, the question arises as to why there aren’t overt words for times. I will claim that the times that enter directly into tense-ordering relations are a syntactic construct, based on features of events, their participants and modifiers. It is commonly held that the verb phrase of a clause contains (or itself represents) the eventive material of a clause; from this, it is possible to establish a ‘‘translation’’ of events into E-mail address: [email protected]. 0024-3841/$ – see front matter # 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.lingua.2005.08.004

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times-of-events. What about the other times that participate in tense ordering: the Reichebachian Reference time and Speechtime? These are not lexical items either, which is somewhat surprising, since it is not controversial that Speechtime, and in at least some cases a distinct Reference time, are syntactically represented in sentences with finite tenses. In what follows, I argue that Time arguments are produced by copying event-related features from VP into higher specifier positions. This accounts for their absence in the lexicon, and I will show that it also explains why the properties of time arguments vary with features of VP. It has been observed previously that there is a homomorphism between events and their run time (Krifka, 1998; Jackendoff, 1996). It will be argued below that other times in a clause (Reference time, Speechtime) inherit some features of events as well, which in turn affects the ordering relations that time arguments can enter into. A second claim argued for below concerns the temporal relation between Reference time and Event time (R and E, respectively). I argue that the relation between R and E is either (a) antecedence or (b) a part–whole relation. This proposal differs from previous accounts, which generally treat the R/E relation as either a finite relation (like finite tense) or an aspectual relation. Aspect describes ‘‘the internal temporal constituency of a situation’’ (Comrie, 1976:3); the aspectual approach analyzes R as picking out part of the event or all of it. Following Zagona (2005) I propose that the reverse can also be true: E can be a part of a complex R. The discussion will show that part–whole relations between R and E are not determined by aspectual morphology alone, but are also affected by event and DP features. This accounts for temporal mismatches between R and E that arise when R and E do not share all their grammatical features. The interpretation of R/E relations is thus not fixed by aspectual morphology. The discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background assumptions concerning times and their representation as arguments of TP. I discuss motivation for distinguishing R from E, then give a preliminary sketch of their mapping. Section 3 discusses the derivation of R with progressive, perfect and morphologically null aspect. Section 4 considers the derivation of Speechtime (the external evaluation time of the clause), and its relation to R in present tense clauses. The inclusion relation in present tense could be derived by finite tense or as an aspectual relation. I will argue for the latter for English present tense. Section 5 summarizes the discussion of previous sections, providing an overview of the issues of the approach to them that is developed here, based on syntactically derived time arguments and on the notion of temporal partitivity. 2. Structure of tenses: time arguments This section discusses time arguments, particularly the distinction between Event time and Reference time. Generative accounts of the syntax of tense have generally assumed that tense establishes an ordering relation between an event and its evaluation time—in main clauses, typically Speechtime (henceforth S). The notion of a third time, Reference time, was introduced by Reichenbach (1947) as a component of all tenses, and has been argued for in recent generative accounts (particularly Hornstein, 1981, 1990). In section 2.1, I describe briefly the concept of Reference time in the Reichenbach framework, and summarize what is proposed in regard to it below. In section 2.2, I show that Reference time is distinguishable from Event-time in simple tenses, which motivates a uniform structure of finite clauses as representing both Event time and Reference time in all tenses. Section 2.3 gives a preliminary account of the mapping of R and E based on Zagona (1990, 1995).

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2.1. Reference time Prior to Reichenbach’s seminal study, tense was described as a relation between an event and the time of speaking, as in Jespersen (1924). For example in: Fred arrived at noon, the time of Fred’s arrival precedes the time of speaking. Compound tenses express a relation between a ‘reference time’ and the time of speaking. For example, in: Kim will have arrived by 3p.m., the future tense orders a reference time relative to the time of speaking—in this example, the time 3p.m. The relation between Kim’s arrival and 3p.m. is an aspectual relation rather than a finite ordering relation between independent times. Reichenbach (1947) proposed that all tenses, whether compound or not, encode three times and two ordering relations: (1)

Times: a. Speechtime (‘S’) b. Reference time (‘R’) c. Event time (‘E’)

(2)

Ordering relations: a. Precedence b. Simultaneity

Simple and compound tenses are illustrated in (3); both are represented with three times: (3)

a. b.

Sue had eaten lunch at noon. Sue ate lunch at noon.

E
The difference between compound and simple tenses concerns whether R and E are simultaneous or not. Due to the simultaneity relation, two potentially disjoint times are construed as coreferential in simple tenses. This difference is apparent in the construal of the adverb at noon, which, in general, can modify R or E. In (3a), at noon is ambiguous, showing that E and R refer to different times. The non-ambiguity of (3b) shows that E and R are simultaneous. The approach described in the present article adopts elements from both of the preceding systems. Based on the Reichenbach framework I assume (4): (4)

‘Reference time’: Both simple and compound tenses represent a ‘reference time’ R, which is ordered relative to Speechtime.

Hornstein (1981, 1990) and numerous other studies within the Reichenbach framework have argued that ‘reference time’ is grammatically significant in simple and compound tenses alike. In section 2.2, additional motivation for distinguishing R from E in simple tenses will be given. In a departure from the Reichenbach framework, I will argue that the relation between R and E is non-finite, that is, not a tense-ordering relation. Furthermore, the relation is not always aspectual in the standard sense of aspect (as concerning the internal temporal constituency of a situation). I propose that the R/E relation is more generally based on partitivity, which subsumes the case of standard aspect as one instance. R can be part of E (R = an aspect of the event time), but also, E can be construed as part of R (E = an aspect of reference time). This is summarized in (5):

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(5)

467

R/E relations: (a) R=E (b) (i) R = part of E (ii) Part of R = E

It has been proposed previously, for example in Smith (1997), that aspect focuses on part of an event,1 a perspective that shares certain features with the generalization in (5bi), that R can correspond to part of E. I claim that the reverse is also possible: E can be construed as part of R, as in (5bi). That is, under certain conditions, R and E can form a complex temporal constituent, just as VP together with a PP can form a complex E, such as a derived resultative. Summarizing, the approach to be developed below agrees with Reichenbach-based approaches in the assumption that tense interpretation involves a finite ordering relation between S and R. What is distinctive is the analysis of R and the nature of its relation to E. I will argue that R can vary in its own properties and in its relation to E. The properties that R has in a given derivation are determined compositionally. These properties and those of the Event affect in turn the antecedence relation between R and E, as summarized in (5) above. 2.2. Evidence for R distinct from E in simple tenses We turn now to evidence supporting the claim in (4), that R is a constituent of both simple and compound tenses. Hornstein (1981, 1990) argues extensively for a uniform reference time R, on the basis of the form of rules that produce ‘derived tense structures’, such as adverb-linking rules and sequence-of-tense rules, which make crucial use of R. The argument elaborated below is based on the generalization that in simple, non-compound tenses, there are cases in which the run time of events is a subpart of a larger interval, which is in turn the temporal object that is ordered relative to Speechtime (S). This is illustrated for present tense clauses in (6): (6)

a. b. c.

Sue sings madrigals. Fred is studying chemistry (this semester). Kim may buy a new chair.

The events of singing, studying and buying in (6) should have an ‘ongoing’ reading if E were simultaneous with S. But present tense often lacks this reading, as in habitual activity and ability readings, for example.2 In the examples in (6), what is simultaneous with S is a reference interval that is not strictly identical to E. (6a), for example, involves an interval that includes Speechtime and an indefinite number singing times and potentially, non-singing times3: (7)

Reference interval: [ --E---E---E---E----> ]R

No assertion is made in (6a) as to whether Speechtime coincides with a time of singing or non-singing. If Reference time were always identical to event time, or if Reference time were not posited, the present tense inclusion relation would incorrectly hold relative to times of singing, and 1

Smith (1997) refers to this type of aspect as viewpoint aspect, distinct from situation aspect. English present tense disallows the ongoing reading even under conditions which allow it in other languages; see section 4.2. 3 The partitioning of the interval into times of singing and of non-singing may be due to pragmatic factors, rather than grammatical ones. At the same time, there is no grammatical requirement that the interval be analyzed as times of singing exclusively. 2

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an ongoing reading would always be produced. The same is true of (6b): Fred may or may not be studying at Speechtime. In (6c), the event does not coincide with S. Here, the Reference time is the time of the present possibility state expressed by may, which does not correspond to the time of the event; (6c) does not mean that it is possible that Kim is buying a chair at Speechtime. These examples all have in common that the time that includes S is not an event time. An account of how we understand the relation between events and S in present tenses requires recourse to a time interval other than event time. R can be an interval that contains E in the past tense also. For example, sentences with plural events can be distributed in a larger interval: (8)

a. b.

Terri broke glasses for an hour. People voted for three hours.

In (8b), for three hours is ambiguous between a reading where it modifies how long it took individuals to vote, and a reading where the period of three hours contains numerous events of voting. Informally speaking, the second reading is a ‘‘perfective-E/imperfective-R reading’’: the events and their run times are perfective, but they occur within a Reference interval that is imperfective or unbounded. The fact that the events are bounded is apparent from the possibility of in-phrases in the same clauses with for-phrases, but only if the event has its own process interval: (9)

a. b.

People voted in three minutes for an hour. ??Kim broke glasses in three minutes all day.

In (9a), there was an interval of an hour in which there were multiple events of voting, and the events took three minutes (or less). The inflelicity of (9b) is due to the punctual nature of glass-breaking, so an in-phrase cannot be used to describe how long individual events took.4 Since the R-interval is unbounded, modified by the for-phrase, the in-phrase cannot be licensed as a modifier of R. Support for the claim that the imperfective interval is R comes from the distribution of the for-phrases. Like other adverbs that modify R, the for-phrases in (8) can be preposed: (10)

a. b.

For an hour, Terri broke glasses. For three hours, people voted.

Hornstein (1990) shows that temporal adverbs can be preposed only if they modify reference time, not event time, as shown by the contrast between (11a) and (11b): (11)

a. b.

The secretary had eaten lunch at noon. At noon the secretary had eaten lunch.

(at noon = R or E) (at noon = R only).

Further support comes from the impossibility of ordering R after E on the perfective-E/ imperfective R reading: (12)

4

a. b.

*?For an hour, Terri had (already) broken glasses. *?For three hours, people had (already) voted.

With punctual events an in-phrase can be used to modify the time between event time and Reference time, as in Kim will break a glass in three minutes.

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In (12), the addition of already in the past perfect leads to a conflict in the interpretation of the reference interval: the semantics of already puts the perfective events before the reference interval; the imperfective reading of R, due to the plural people, is construed with the perfective events within the R interval. A second instance of mismatch between R and E occurs with singular events that are understood as followed by post-event states or locations: (13)

a. b. c. d.

Fred left/got up/sat down for a while. Sam untied his shoes for an hour. Mary put the book away for a while. Kim turned the radio on for a while.

The predicates in (13) consist of bounded or ‘telic’ events with an implied result state in the presence of the for-phrase. The implied result state is similar to the states introduced by resultative secondary predicates like those in (14): (14)

a. b. c.

Sue painted the walls beige (for the afternoon). The furnace got the house warm (for a while). Sandra left the door open (for an hour).

The secondary predicates in (14) make the result state an explicit part of the interpretation regardless of the presence or absence of the time adverb. In (13) on the other hand, the result state reading appears only in the presence of the for-phrase. In both types of examples—(13) as well as (14), the result states are semantically linked to the event, in the sense that the result state is a state of an event participant, and is due to the occurrence of the event. Temporally, however, the result states in (13) and (14) are outside the scope of the event’s run time; they are temporally identified with R, not E. Note that the result state is the state of ‘present relevance’ in the present perfect: (15)

a. b. c. d.

Fred has sat down for a while. Sam has untied his shoes for an hour. The furnace has gotten the house warm. Sandra has left the door open.

Since Speechtime is understood to be within the duration of a while in (15a), or an hour in (15b), the for-phrases make explicit the extent of R. This is parallel to the states of the house being warm in (15c), and the door being open in (15d), which also still hold at Speechtime.5 Likewise in the past perfect, the for-phrase coincides temporally with preposed at-phrases, which as noted above are unambiguous R modifiers. Recall that in (11b), repeated as (16a), the at-phrase modifies R, which is preceded by E, as shown in (16b): 5 There is also an existential reading of the perfect, which lacks the ‘present relevance’ interpretation. This reading is made salient by adverbs as in (i): (i) Once or twice in the past, Sam has untied his shoes for an hour. The examples in (15) in the text have an existential reading in addition to the ‘present relevance’ reading that is assumed in the text discussion.

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With temporally specified result states like those illustrated in (13), the at phrase is interpreted relative to the result phrase. This is shown in (17) and (18):

In (17), the time-measure phrase for an hour specifies the duration of the state of the shoes, and the R modifier at noon defines the endpoint of the hour. In (18), the relations are the same; the phrase a while has no intrinsic endpoint, so noon establishes an arbitrary end. If the for-phrases in (17) and (18) were temporally part of Event-time, at noon should be understood as a time after an hour in (17), or after a while in (18). From the behavior of the result phrases in the perfect, then, I conclude that the result is outside the temporal scope of Event-time, and is temporally construed as Reference time. In these cases then, R is a complex constituent. It has an event time as its onset, and its duration and endpoint are specified by adverbs, as schematized in (19): (19)

[R

Onset(=E)

State . . . ]

Resultatives therefore support the generalization that even in simple tenses, R is part of the representation, and is not necessarily simultaneous with E. The relation between E and R can be partitive. 2.3. Syntactic mapping of times and the derivation of R The ‘Temporal Argument Structure’ hypothesis (Zagona, 1990, 1995; Stowell, 1993) claims that times are present in syntactic structure as arguments of Tense. The preceding discussion showed that all tenses, whether simple or complex, represent a reference time R as well as event time E and speechtime (S). Zagona (1990) proposed that the three times, S, R and E, were

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analogous to thematic roles: semantic relations assigned by a predicate to its arguments. In this case the preidcate is Tense, and the roles temporal ones, assigned to its external and internal arguments, as illustrated in (20):

The verb phrase instantiates the Event-time role; the arguments ‘R’ and ‘S’ are hypothesized to have semantic roles in the tense system determined by TP. Since it is generally the case in the principles-and-parameters framework that the potential for reference depends on argumenthood, the status of times as ‘entities’ is accounted for.6,7 This approach also goes some way toward explaining the upper bound on the number of times that tenses refer to (Hornstein, 1981): (21)

Maximal tense structure: no Tense refers to more than three times.

The limit of three times per tense is illustrated by the fact that alongside the past perfect in (22a), there is no past–past-perfect (22b): (22)

a. b.

Kim had read the chapter. *Kim had had read the chapter.

The structure in (20) provides a partial explanation: since Tense is the only predicate that selects time-denoting arguments, no times are ever introduced into derivations other than those associated with TP, resulting in a maximum of three times per clause. However, the reason why three is the upper bound was not explained—beyond the observation that there are no lexical items of any category that take more than three arguments. It may be that the restriction derives in part from the fact that in a linguistic sense, times only have reference in relation to events and to each other. Either the semantic relations that contribute to their meaning, or grammatical reflexes 6 As Enc¸ (1987:640) pointed out, languages have lexical items that refer to times (such as calendar expressions: Sunday, noon, etc.). A reviewer points out that it is also possible to analyze expressions like now and then as proforms that refer back to time constituents, as in (i): (i) Lars was watching the movie at 3:00. the police arrested him then. 7 The analysis of Times as arguments of TP leads to the expectation that tenses have the distribution of TP in any given language—usually clauses, but also DPs in some cases (Nordlinger and Sadler, 2004; Lecarme, 2004). It is proposed below that what makes time arguments visible for mapping to the timeline is their grammatical relation, via Agree, with a polarity head. This analysis predicts that TP could occur in constituents other than clauses as long as the constituents have a polarity head that makes the time arguments visible for interpretation.

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of them, may limit the expression of time arguments in any given derivation. Section 3.4 presents one possible account. The issue also arises as to whether all three arguments must be projected. I will assume that S must be projected whenever Tense1 is [+finite], otherwise it could not satisfy its ordering relation. Following Hornstein (1990), I assume that S is not projected in infinitives. Tense1 in (12) may be absent in infinitives, or it may lack a semantic feature (perhaps the ordering feature) that would allow an argument in its Spec to be interpreted as an argument. As for the projection of R, it was shown above that R is available in all tenses, whether compound or simple, which implies that it is always projected. I will argue below that the significant role that R has derives from its grammatical features, not from its independent semantic role. In fact, R is not always an independent argument of Tense2. It can also be derived by raising, as shown in (23):

In (23) R is raised from within E. In this type of derivation, R is a part of the event. What determines whether R is underlying or derived is the features of Tense2 head: be has no intrinsic semantic features,8 so it cannot select an argument as its specifier, so R must be raised. The auxiliaries that select independent R constituents are have and do. If R is sometimes derived by raising, it follows that it has a grammatical relation, as much as a semantic relation, to the clause. It is proposed below that the grammatical relation involves checking of a polarity feature in the TP projection, which licenses an assertion or ‘assertion time’ (Smith, 1997). Note that R and S are covert constituents. If they are in fact syntactically explicit arguments, they are expected to occupy complement or specifier positions, and on classical principles-andparameters assumptions, they should be instantiated by lexical items, present at every level of representation. It is unexpected in this framework that S and R are not lexicalized in any language, and that there is no direct evidence of their presence in specifier positions. I believe the explanation for this lies in the nature of the relationship between times and events. Times seem to be intrinsically relational entities. Unlike ordinary entities, which can be quantized without reference to other objects, times seem in human languages to be referred to only in relation to situations that characterize them. If this is generally right, it may be that events provide the lexical material from which times are constructed, in such a way that times inherit certain features of the events on which they are formed. This type of ‘‘derived’’ entity would have had no easy formulation in pre-Minimalist versions of the P&P framework. Under Minimalist assumptions, 8

Although be lacks intrinsic semantic features, the structure as a whole has semantic features, since the complement of be has event features, and the raised constituent has features.

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however, the notion of ‘derived’ argument is possible. I will propose below that the Reference time and Speechtime ae sometimes derived arguments, produced by copying material from events. 2.4. Summary This section has shown how an analysis of times as arguments of TP can capture the basic form of finite tenses, which have recourse to three times. It was also argued that simple tenses have a Reference time that can be temporally independent of Event time. This shows that R is projected even in the absence of aspectual morphology such as perfect have. Furthermore, the fact that R and E are not always coreferential in simple tenses leads to the need for refinements in the description of how R and E are related. Section 3 discusses the relation between R and E in progressive, perfect and null aspect clauses. Section 4 discusses similarities between null aspect and the construal of the S/R relation in present tense clauses. 3. Morphology and the R/E relation This section discusses the derivation of R and its construal relative to E, in light of two factors: (a) aspectual morphology and (b) grammatical agreement. The R/E relation is sometimes analyzed as a tense or tense-like, especially in perfect tenses, where it seems that E precedes R, as discussed in section 2.1. In progressives, the R/E relation is often described as aspectual, since it appears that progressive morphology introduces a particular way of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation, focusing on the process part of the event. Two claims concerning the R/E relation will be developed below. First, it will be argued that in both perfect tenses and progressives, the derivation of R establishes a part–whole relation, although the relations are differ in the two cases: progressive morphology identifies R as a subpart of E; perfect morphology identifies E as a part of R:

In (24a), the onset or ‘‘activity’’ subpart of an event is reference time. In perfect tenses, the Event time is the onset of a complex reference interval. This implies that R can have internal structure, just as events do. The derivation of progressive structures like (24a) is discussed in section 3.1, and perfect clauses in section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses clauses without overt aspect. These clauses allow an examination of the conditions under which R and E corefer, versus conditions under which temporal mismatches of the type discussed in section 2.2 are licensed. I argue that R and E corefer when they agree in specified number—essentially, when the event is quantized. Otherwise a part–whole relation is licensed. On this analysis, it is expected that partitive readings are independent of aspectual

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morphology, a prediction that is supported by the fact that perfect, progressive and null aspect clauses show similar effects. This implies that, like situation-type aspect, the R/E relation has a significant compositional component to it. Finally, section 3.4 discusses how this framework accounts for the syntax of aspect, in particular, for possible sequences of auxiliaries, in light of the expected non-recursion of time arguments. 3.1. Progressives The goal of this section is to provide an account of how progressives refer to a situation in progress (Comrie, 1976:33). Following Klein (1995), Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria (2000) observe that in (25b), unlike (25a), the speaker makes no assertion about the whole situation of book-writing: (25)

a. b.

Laı¨la wrote a book. Laı¨la was writing a book.

(D & U-E 2000:160)

In (25a), the speaker makes a statement about the whole event of bookwriting, including its initial state, internal process and endstate. In (25b), the speaker’s statement is narrower: it does not include the endstate. To account for this difference, we look first at how the initial part of an event is differentiated from its endstate in vP (section 3.1.1), and how the initial part comes to be interpreted as the time about which a speaker makes a statement (section 3.1.2). We then consider briefly the relationship between progressive and habituality with progressive morphology (section 3.1.3), returning to this topic in further detail in section 3.3. 3.1.1. Subevent structure I will assume, in the spirit of Klein (1995) and D & U-E (2000) that R defines the time about which the speaker makes an assertion. I continue to refer to reference time as R, and discussed in section 3.1.2 how the restricted assertion is produced in the derivation. We focus here on the question of how R comes to be identified with the initial portion of an event. It has been argued in many studies (Travis, 1991; Borer, 1994; Hale and Keyser, 1993; Higginbotham, 2000; Travis, 2000) that the internal structure of the verb phrase structurally represents the components of complex events. In what is perhaps the standard approach, Hale and Keyser (1993) propose that separate verbal heads within vP express separate subevents; the argument that appears as a specifier of a particular head is interpreted as a participant in that subevent. For example, the verb phrase Laı¨la write a book consists of a ‘v’ or light verb meaning CAUSE, together with a verb write:

The NP in the specifier of the causative verb is construed as causer (Agent); the NP that appears in the complement of the lexical verb write is interpreted as Theme—the participant that undergoes

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a change to a final state. This vP is actually a complex event: it consists of two events that are related: Laı¨la’s event of causation and activity, and the book’s event of coming into existence. These are sometimes referred to as the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ events, respectively. Travis (2000) has shown that each of these event components has a corresponding Aspect head:

I assume that these Aspect heads are determiners; the Asp-V relation is parallel to the Det-N relation. In DP, the determiner theta-binds N (Higginbotham, 1985), producing reference to an entity with N properties. In AspP, the aspect head theta-binds V, producing reference to an (sub)eventive entity with V properties. The two Aspect heads in (27) are not different categories. Asp1 is interpreted as the initiative event by virtue of the meaning of vCAUSE. Asp2 is the event that represents transitions of the book, by virtue of (a) the meaning of write, (b) the position of [write the book] relative to the CAUSE predicate (it is the ‘object’ of causation) and (c) features of the book.9 For expository purposes, I refer here to the heads as: AspI and AspF, where AspI is the subevent that initiates the event, and AspF is the subevent that culminates in a state that ends the event. Let us return now to the generalization that a progressive makes a statement about a process, rather than about a whole event. Given the structure in (27), this can be understood in terms of restricting the statement to Asp1. In section 3.1.2, the manner in which the restriction comes about is addressed. 3.1.2. Progressives as raising Asp1 In section 3.1.1, I claimed that progressives ‘‘pick out’’ AspP1 from more complex events. I propose that the manner in which AspP1 comes to be the constituent about which the clause makes a statement is a result of two raising processes: (28)

A. B.

AspI moves to the Spec of TP2 AspI moves to the Spec of PolarityP.

The first step (28A) copies Asp1 (containing the complex Asp0 + V-ing) to the specifier of TP2, where it is interpreted as R: 9

Each of the events discussed here is itself a complex constituent (Zagona, 2004). The causation event, for example, consists of a transition from an initial state-of-non-activity to a state of causative activity. The event involving the book is also complex, as it consists of a succession of transitions, or states-of-change of the book, and culminates in a final state of completion, at which no change is possible.

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Raising is possible (and necessary) because of the defectivity of be, and of AspP headed by -ing. It is generally assumed that be does not take a DP argument because it lacks intrinsic semantic content as a state or event, so it cannot be interpreted as having a participant. I propose that beTNS is a temporal existential predicate: it asserts the existence of a time, but it does not specify any restriction on the time, because it contains no additional state or event features10: (30)

Aspectual be is a (purely) temporal existential predicate.

This time argument inherits from the complement of be its specification for state or event features. Conversely, the AspP headed by -ing is defective in the opposite sense. Non-defective Asp0 heads are temporal determiners. They take events and map them to times; -ing is defective—it lacks this mapping function. Raising of AspI to the Spec of TP2 produces a derived complex that is a complete determiner. Be inherits eventive content from AspI, and AspI inherits a temporal frame from be. In effect, the raised constituent is an ‘‘associate’’ of be and its temporal argument. If raising did not occur, neither be nor its temporal argument would be interpretable. I leave aside here the implementation of this generalization in terms of features. The appearance of -ing on V accounts for why only the initiative subevent is raised, and why AspI is construed as a time that is independent of AspF. The AspF subevent is the path along which the AspI subevent occurs, but the temporal link between the two is not made. Instead, AspI enters into a temporal relation with the time introduced by be. Assuming that R—the time in the Spec of TP2 is the time that represents the propositional content of the clause, it follows that progressives make statements only about the initiative subevent of complex events, not about the whole. However, we can take this account a step further, and account for why the second subevent is not part of what the speaker makes a statement about in progressives.11 Let us assume that clauses ‘‘make statements’’ only about constituents that have a value for polarity: either [+Neg] or [ Neg]. In John crossed the street and John didn’t cross the street, the whole events are either positive or negative, so we interpret the past reference time as a time of John’s crossing the street or not. In progressives, only Asp1 is associated with reference time. If the scope of [Neg] in a clause is restricted to events or subevents that are temporally related to R, the limited statement of 10 11

See Gue´ron (2004:317 & ff.) for insightful discussion of the temporal properties of auxiliaries. Klein (1995) and D & U-E (2000) describe Reference time as the Assertion-time of the clause.

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progressives is explained. Let us suppose that the scope of polarity is determined by Agree, rather than by c-command. For purposes of illustration, assume that Agree holds in a Spec-head configuration:

Only the constituent in the Spec of NegP has a value for polarity. The parts of TP2 that are not in a formal Agree relation with the polarity head are implicit: they are not part of the propositional content of the clause. This would affect the interpretation of (25b), compared with (25a), repeated below: (25)

a. b.

Laı¨la wrote a book. Laı¨la was writing a book.

In the progressive (25b), only the initiative subevent has raised to Spec of TP2 and from there raises to Spec of the Polarity head in (31). The structure prior to movement is:

This sentence will express a proposition about the initiative subevent of the event, not the whole event. Because the ‘inner’ subevent, headed by AspF does not have a fixed value for polarity, it is neither stated to have occurred nor not to have occurred. In non-progressives, the entire event corresponds to R and therefore enters into the agree relation with the polarity head of the clause:

Although the derivation of non-progressives has not yet been discussed, we can provisionally adopt the standard description, according to which R = E. In this case, the entire Event [AspI+AspF] agrees with R in polarity. The clause is a proposition about the entire event. Summarizing, it was proposed here that progressives make statements about the process part of an event as a consequence of two processes. The first process involves raising of the initiative subevent to the specifier of TP2. This step resolves the defectivity of be as a predicate, and resolves the defectivity of -ing as a temporal determiner. The result of raising is that R corresponds to a time of activity of the first participant. Progressives make statements about just

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this initiative subevent because only that (part of the) event that corresponds to R agrees with the Polarity phrase of the clause, and is therefore interpreted as propositional. 3.1.3. Plural event progressives The preceding discussion showed how progressives ‘‘pick out’’ the initiative subevent of an event, and map that subevent to the reference time of the clause, making only that subevent part of the proposition of the clause. On this approach, the morphology does not impose an interpretation of an event-in-progress; it establishes only that there is a relation between an ‘‘outer subevent’’ (vP) and a non-event time. The nature of the relation is not specified further. This is advantageous because there are exceptions to the generalization that progressives pick out the process (initiative subevent) of an event. This section points out that the reference time in progressive clauses does not necessarily correspond to an event-internal AspI. This is shown by sentences with plural subevents like (34)12: (34)

a. b.

Kim was breaking the glasses. The women were moving the piano into the study.

In these sentences, the relation between R and E is ambiguous; in (34a) can be read as a single event of glasses-breaking that is in progress, or as multiple events that may or may not be cotemporaneous. On this reading, what is in progress is the events taken as a collection or series, not the initiative subevent of individual events. Similarly in (34b), the causative events may or may not be simultaneous, although the difference is less salient because the causative events are all related to a single event of movement of the piano. Suppose, for example, each woman acted individually in moving the piano for a while. The singular piano undergoes these various transitions, culminating in a single endstate—its location in the study. What the plural progressive seems to pick out is the collection of causative activities, whether carried out by different individuals—in (34b), or the same individual, as in (34a). These examples show that the relation between AspI and R can be a part–whole relation. The time of any individual Initiative subevent can be a part of the reference time. Furthermore, when the plurality which gives rise to partitivity originates in the inner event, as in (34a), the whole event is ‘‘serialized’’: the endpoints of some of the individual events are part of the proposition of the clause. The fact that this is one reading of (34a), and not just an inference, is made clear by examples like (35), (35)

People were giving up.

where the most salient reading is that the (endpoints of) individual events are completed. The (punctual) events have no individual process parts—only the collection amounts to a process. It is therefore undesirable to characterize the progressive in terms of the process part of events, or even specifically in terms of any internal parts of events. The ‘‘progessive reading’’—what is usually taken as the true progressive—seems to be just a special instance of partitivity in the R/E relation: the case in which the collection of transitions of AspI are all transitions within a single subevent.

12

(i)

The reading discussed in (34) is blocked if the inner event has a specified number, as opposed to simple plurals: Kim was breaking 5 glasses. See section 3.3 for further discussion.

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3.1.4. Summary It was claimed above that progressives differ from non-progressives in that their reference time corresponds to the initiative subevent of complex events. On singular progressive readings discussed above, this produces a reading where only the initiative subevent is part of the proposition of the clause. This is due to two syntactic processes, the first is the raising of AspI to the Spec of TP2, where it provides an event restrictor for reference time. Raising is necessary because aspectual be and Asp0 -ing are both defective, and raising provides the missing features for each. It was also proposed that progressives makes statements about the process part of an event because only the part of an event that is identified with R can in turn enter into an Agree relation with the polarity head of the clause; only constituents with specified polarity features are included in the proposition of the clause. Finally, it was shown that this syntactic, compositional approach to progressives is consistent with the fact that sequences of be + V-ing have non-process interpretations, when the relation between R and E is partitive. 3.2. Perfect tenses Comrie (1976:52) notes that the perfect is often treated separately from other aspects, because ‘‘it tells us nothing directly about the situation itself, but rather relates some state to a preceding situation.’’13 It proposed here that perfect tenses tell us something about the internal temporal constitution of R, rather than E. In the perfect, E corresponds to the initiative, or onset part of a complex R. Recall from the discussion of section 3.1 that in singular event progressives, R corresponds to the initiative part of E. In perfect tenses, the reverse is true: E corresponds to the initiative part of R. Recall from section 3.1.1 that complex events consist of separate predicate argument pairs. In Kim ate the apple, the ‘outer’ or initiative event is the CAUSE predicate whose argument is Kim; the ‘inner’ or Final event is the event of consumption, whose argument is the apple. These two together constitute the event, and the corresponding Aspect phrases constitute the event time. I propose here that Reference time can also be complex:

In (36), R has two subconstituents, which correspond E and R of the Reichenbach framework. This is illustrated informally in (37)14:

In (37b), the reference interval consists of a state, R2, whose onset, R1 is the event time of Kim’s eating an apple. In (37b), it appears that R2 is ordered after R1, and this in fact gives the right 13 Furthermore, as Comrie (1976) points out, aspectual information about the event can be provided by other morphology in the perfect, as in progressive perfects: John has been feeding the goldfish. 14 Binnick’s (1991) review of the perfect describes a notion of ‘phase’ which, according to its use by different authors, may be taken as similar in spirit to the complex reference time posited here, with the event and subsequent state as phases of the interval. See Binnick (1976:201 & ff., 210) for discussion.

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reading for (37a). However, I will argue that this is not a necessary relation; it derives from a secondary relation that holds by inference between the terminative state of E and R2. When there is no discrete endpoint to the event, the overlap between parts of E and the state R2 become manifest. Crucially, then, R1 and R2 form a complex whole, in the same way that a transitive event, for example, an event of Kim’s eating an apple, the ‘outer’ event of Kim’s causation and the ‘inner’ event of the apple’s consumption, are construed as one complex whole. The extent to which the two overlap is constrained by features of the event. The discussion is organized as follows. In section 3.2.1 I motivate the claim that E and R form a complex constituent. Section 3.2.2 discusses the derivation of the constituent. In section 3.2.3, the perfect in ‘preteritizing’ languages is discussed. 3.2.1. E as the onset of a complex reference time This approach to perfect aspect makes several predictions that differentiate it from other approaches. Since R is a complex temporal constituent that contains E as a subpart, it is predicted that there can be temporal overlap between the event time and the subsequent state. This is expected because the relation is aspectual—not an ordering relation in the tense system. Within complex events, subevents typically overlap temporally. Consider an event such as Kim’s eating an apple, where the time of Kim’s activity overlaps with the time of changes of state of the apple. The only point at which the subevents do not overlap is the endstate. The endstate is the point at which neither participant is involved in any transition—the event is no longer in progress. (For other events, there may be minimal overlap: Terri boiled the water; Sandra pushed the bicycle into the ditch.) On an analysis of perfect tenses in which R and E form a complex whole, it is therefore expected that overlap between the event time (R1) and the interval (R2) is possible, and that it is variable, i.e., conditioned by lexical properties of the constituents, not by perfect morphology. If the two constituents did not form a complex whole, and were instead externally ordered (R < E), E should never overlap with R, since the subsequence relation would apply to the whole event in relation to the whole state interval. The potential for overlap between E (=R1) and R2 can be brought out by durative adverbs like for an hour, all day, that are construed as including Speechtime, as illustrated in (38), versus (39): (38)

a. b. c.

All day, Fred has been available. All week, Kim has found new restaurants. For a year, Sue has eaten meat.

(39)

a. b. c.

(*All day) Fred has eaten the apple. (*All evening) Kim has seen that movie. (*For an hour) Terri has written a novel.

In (38), the state or activity expressed by R1 is unbounded, and potentially overlaps with R2. The state can also end at some unspecified time that precedes the interval that includes Speechtime.15 In (39), R1 has a discrete bound, and does not overlap with R2, which includes Speechtime. The 15

Iatridou et al. (2001) discuss cases like (38) under the rubric of ‘‘universal’’ perfect. They argue that this reading is available only in the presence of adverbs. Another possibility, which will be assumed here is sentences without adverbs are ambiguous, and adverbs like all day or since 1990 disambiguate. In the absence of an adverb, the situation may or may not have an enpoint before speechtime. This is supported by the possibility for different types of continuations: (i) a. For a year, Sue has eaten meat—and in fact she’s eating some now. b. For a year Sue has eaten meat, but she just stopped.

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contrast between (38) and (39) shows that what appears to be a precedence relation between E and R (in present terms, between R1 and R2) is an R-internal aspectual phenomenon, due to the boundedness of E, not due to perfect aspect itself. Another prediction of the present account approach concerns the scope of the proposition in perfect clauses. Assuming, as discussed in section 3.1.2, that Reference time determines the constituent that agrees with the polarity head of the clause, and is therefore understood as propositional, is predicted that the whole R interval in (37b), for example, is part of the proposition. This supported by the implication that an endstate of an event continues to hold at Speechtime in a present perfect, illustrated by the contrast in (40): (40)

a. b.

I have lost my penknife. (Comrie, 1976:52) I lost my penknife.

According to Comrie, the implication of (40a) is that the penknife is still lost; (40b) lacks this implication. This implication appears to follow from the identification of the endstate of E (the time at which the penknife is lost, ending E), with R2, the state that forms a constituent with R1 as part of the proposition. In (40b), the endstate of E is not part of the proposition, so its status subsequent to E is not determined. Time adverbs provide another type of evidence showing that the entire complex reference time structure is part of the proposition in perfect clauses. Time adverbs cannot modify a subevent that is outside the scope of the proposition. This is shown by the contrast in (41) and (42): (41)

a. b.

Terri framed the picture in an hour. *Terri was framing the picture in an hour.

(42)

a. b.

Terri framed the picture at noon. (noon is event onset or endpoint) Terri was framing the picture at noon. (noon cannot be endpoint)

In (41a), the in-phrase modifies the duration of the transition experienced by the picture—the ‘inner’ event. In (41b), addition of an in-phrase is impossible because the inner event is not part of the proposition in progressives. In (42a), the punctual adverb at noon can modify either the time of Terri’s activity or the time of onset of the picture being framed.16 In (42b), at noon only modifies Terri’s activity, not the endpoint—the onset of the picture being framed. In clauses with perfect aspect, a time adverb can modify any subevent, and when R1 and R2 do not overlap, an adverb can modify R2 separately. This is illustrated in (43): (43)

a.

b.

Terri had framed the picture at noon. at noon = (a) onset of Terri’s activity, (b) endpoint of the picture’s being framed (the onset of the post-event interval, R2) At noon, Terri had framed the picture. (Noon = R2).

Summarizing, there is evidence that E and R form a complex constituent, all of which constitutes the time included in the proposition of the clause. This is shown by the fact that the parts of R1 and R2 can temporally overlap, just as the parts of complex events can overlap; there is no overriding 16 The reading of at noon as modifying the time of completion of the event—the onset of the endstate—is marked. It is more generally available with punctual events (Sue arrived at noon; Fred crossed the line at noon), but can also refer to the endpoint of certain processes (They made the noise stop at noon versus: At noon, they made the noise stop.)

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ordering relation between the parts. It is also shown by the scope of the proposition of perfect clauses, which includes both the event and the subsequent interval. 3.2.2. Derivation of complex R The derivation of a temporally complex R constituent is parallel to that of a temporally complex event. Recall from section 3.1 that ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ events each have an Aspect head which functions as a temporal determiner, mapping events to event times. The parts of a complex event have to be construed as a single event, or ‘telic pair’ (Higginbotham, 2000). I assume that this occurs by chain formation of some type; for concreteness, I assume the lower head adjoins to the higher one:

In (44), the lower Aspect2 adjoins to Aspect1; forming a complex (or compound) constituent that is understood as the event and (Event time) of the clause. At the level of temporal argument structure, the same mechanism applies, adjoining Event time to Reference time to form a complex (or compound) Reference time interval:

In (45), the Event-time Aspect Phrase adjoins to the (covert) temporal argument of have, forming a complex interval. Let us consider now what forces the raising of Asp, and how it comes to be interpreted as the onset of R. The Aspect head that adjoins to R in (45) contains features for -en,

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which I assume to be a ‘‘defective’’ temporal determiner in the following sense. It is a relational determiner (perhaps akin to comparatives) in that it expresses completion or perfectivity of the event interval—relative to some event-external time. The ‘‘missing constituent’’ in the relation is an external interval with state features. Once the complex structure in (45) is derived, the R/E relation is instantiated structurally. Overlap is permitted between the two. Suppose the -en relation is as described in (46): (46)

The -en relation determines a time T in relation to Event-time such that no time in T precedes Event-time as a whole.

This allows that T can overlap Event-time, as long as no part of it precedes all of Event-time. Event-time will always start the complex constituent. Describing the R/E relation as allowing overlap correctly accounts for variability with respect to whether Speechtime is construed as following the end of the event in the present perfect. Recall from section 3.2.1 that some events in the present perfect can be understood as continuing into the present. The is true in (47a), but not (47b): (47)

a. b.

(All day) Fred has been available. Kim has eaten an apple.

(State may overlap Speechtime.) (Event may not overlap Speechtime.)

The fact that there is variation means that there is nothing about the perfect in and of itself that precludes this overlap. The difference between the two should be due to some other interaction between Speechtime and the Event in (47b). In fact, there is such an independent generalization: bounded events in general cannot be located at Speechtime (Smith, 1997). The impossibility of Event-time overlap with Speechtime in (47b) is thus related to the impossibility of *Kim eats an apple with an on-going reading. (See section 4.1 for discussion of bounded events.) 3.2.3. Preteritizing languages Let us briefly consider how ‘preteritizing’ languages would be analyzed under the assumptions outlined above. In these languages, present perfect morphology can have an interpretation that is very close to that of the simple preterite past. It can occur with past punctual adverbs such as at noon, yesterday (Comrie, 1985; Hornstein, 1990; Giorgi and Pianesi, 1997). This is illustrated for French and Italian: (48)

a.

b.

Jean a e´crit le lettre hier. J. hasPRES written the letter yesterday. ‘Jean wrote the letter yesterday.’ Gianni e` partito alle quattro. G. isPRES eaten at four ‘Gianni ate at four.’

Because preteritizing languages also allow non-preterite readings of present perfect morphology, I assume that their grammars have perfect aspect structures that are derived in the same manner as those for English described above: Event-time is the onset of R. However they also admit a structure that cannot be derived in English: one where the scope of the proposition is limited to the Event-time. The contrast between an ‘ordinary’ perfect and the ‘preteritized’ reading is shown in (49) versus (50):

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In (49), where R is complex, the whole R constituent is visible for propositional interpretation as a consequence of its Agree relation with the Polarity head of the clause, as discussed in section 3.1.2. In (50), there is no telic pair; there is only the event itself and the ‘precedence’ relation imposed by participial morphology, (46). The contrast between (49) and (50) concerns the interpretation of the argument of have. I suggest that in preteritizing languages, this can be an implicit argument, one that is ‘‘absorbed’’ under specific morphological circumstances, just as the external argument of passives is ‘‘absorbed’’. If so, the preteritizing parameter should be related to the existence of perfect be in TNS, as an alternative to have. Perfect be is a temporal counterpart to passive be in the sense that it suppresses the mapping of its external argument to an argument position. Perfect be is a TNS head, so the argument that it suppresses is temporal. This triggers raising of the Event-time, the internal temporal argument of TNS2:

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In (51), the derived Reference time still has [R1 R2] structure, since it consists of the raised constituent (=R1), and the implicit argument R2. As an implicit argument, R2 is not subject to polarity agreement with [Neg], and it is therefore not part of the proposition of the clause. R2 still contributes to the interpretation, in that the ‘simultaneity’ (or ‘include’) relation of the present tense is satisfied with respect to it. It cannot be satisfied with respect to R1, since R1 precedes other times in R, and therefore precedes S. The simultaneity relation associated with present tense in TNS1 is satisfied formally with respect to R as a whole. The preterite reading of present perfect is then predicted to be possible in languages that have a passive be that can be employed as a temporal head in TNS2. This proposal remains to be investigated; it has some initial support in Romance: passive be in Spanish is ser, while progressive be is estar; Spanish patterns with English in being non-preteritizing. Notice that languages with auxiliary switch, such as French and Italian, can obscure the alternation between (potentially covert) perfect have and be as TNS heads, due to the effects of alternations between have and be in v, according to the presence or absence of an agree relation between external and internal arguments of vP (Burzio, 1986).17 Summarizing, the approach to perfect tenses proposed here assumes that the Event-time and Reference-time form a complex Reference interval. The Event-time is interpreted as the onset of the complex Reference interval. This approach accounts for why the event together with the subsequent interval constitute the proposition of the clause, and accounts for why there can be temporal overlap between the event and Speechtime in the present perfect of unbounded states and events. The preteritizing parameter is an expression of the ‘‘absorption’’ of the result constituent when TNS is the temporal counterpart of passive be. 3.3. Morphologically null aspect Morphologically null aspect clauses (clauses that have no overt head in TNS2) might be argued to lack a TP2 projection. The temporal structure for (52a), for example, could be as in (52b) or (52c):

On the derivation in (52b), E raises to the position of R (or alternatively is controlled by R). R in turn moves to the specifier of the Polarity phrase and is construed as the time of the proposition. On the alternative possible derivation (52c), TP2 is not projected, so there is no R; E moves to the specifier of Polarity phrase and is construed as the time of the proposition. Both of these derivations are consistent with the non-distinctness of R and E, although they make different claims about its nature. 17 Ellen Thompson (personal communication) points out that Persian has perfective be, but does not have passive be, and is a non-preteritizing language. Persian perfective be should be analyzed as a temporal existential, like English progressive be.

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I will argue that (52b) provides a better description of the temporal relations in the clause, since it accounts for cases in which R and E are distinct as well as cases like (52a) in which they are simultaneous. I propose below that TNS2 has a number feature that triggers agreement, and this has consequences for the R/E relation, even in the absence of semantic features of TNS2. Number agreement affects whether R and E are in a strict antecedence relation or a partitive relation. Contrasts like those in (53) illustrate: (53)

a. b.

Kim broke glasses (*in an hour/ for an hour). Kim broke five glasses ( in an hour/*for an hour)

In (53a), events of glass-breaking are in a part–whole relation to R; in (53b), the event of breaking five glasses is only in a one-to-one (whole/whole) relation to R. The reason for this difference is that R and E agree in number in (53b), but not in (53a). In (53a), nothing is specified about whether individual events of glass-breaking are simultaneous, sequential or just vague. Each event is a part of the whole interval R. The telic event in (53b), on the other hand, forces a reading where R agrees with E. This is shown by the possible in-phrase versus the impossible for-phrase. This allows only a simultaneity (strict antecedence) reading, not a partitive reading. The derivation of the simultaneous reading is outlined in section 3.3.1, and the partitive reading in section 3.3.2. 3.3.1. Simultaneous R/E Two aspects of the derivation of the ‘simultaneous’ or strict antecedence reading require discussion: the nature of the coindexing between R and E, and the conditions under which strict antecedence is required. The coindexing relation between R and E was introduced in the discussion of the derivation (52b), for (52a); these are repeated here for convenience:

The assumptions outlined above lead to the conclusion that R is derived by raising in (52b), so that R and E form a chain. This follows from the hypothesis that TNS2 has no semantic features, which implies that it has no arguments. There is no source for R other than raising from E. Turning now to temporal antecedence, the simultaneous relation between R and E is obligatory when the verbal arguments—the Event participants—have determiners with number features. The effect of DPs on the interpretation of events has been widely discussed in the literature. The quantity of DPs is sometimes described as ‘‘quantizing’’ the events in which they participate, so that the events have bounds; this allows them to be viewed as a whole: ‘‘they are discernable by their bounds’’ (Verkuyl, 1993:18).18 The approach that I take to this generalization is that events are viewed as a whole if the run-time of the event matches the participation time of all the event’s arguments. Otherwise the event and its subevents are viewed in part–whole terms. The grammatical basis for this generalization is that if DPs are specified for number, then the grammatical mechanism of Agree imposes number specification on Event time and in turn on Reference time. 18 According to Verkuyl (1993:18 & ff.), the absence of specified quantity on NPs leads to the possibility for ‘‘leakage’’—the absence of a discernable bound for an event, the effect of which is to produce a durative reading. In the present analysis, ‘‘leakage’’ is a mismatch between R and E that results in a partitive reading of the R/E relation.

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On the simultaneous reading, events, participants and times agree. In the derivation of (52), the first step in the derivation is agreement within AspP: Asp0 maps the event of Sue leaving to an Event-time that agrees in number with the event, via agreement with V and with DP:

The [-pl] feature of Asp0 implies that there is a single time at which Sue is a participant and there is a leaving event. On this analysis, Asp0 is a temporal determiner that establishes a time as having the property of a particular relationship—let us say either ‘‘holistic’’ or ‘‘non-holistic’’— between situations and their participants.19 Asp0 determines this relation by evaluating the presence or absence of a ‘‘match’’ between the countability of events and their participants. The features of the participants are expressed on DP; the features of events are expressed on verbs. If DP has number specification, agreement with the head of the phrase gives the AspP a value for number, giving a ‘‘holistic’’ reading. Now let us turn to the relation between Event-time and Reference time. The next step in the derivation is raising to the Spec of TNS2. If AspP is specified for number, that feature is a property of the chain when AspP undergoes movement to the Specifier of TNS2:

In (54), the raised AspP is an antecedent for Event-time, and the members of the chain are both specified for number. The R/E relation is one of strict antecedence: the number of event times is specified, and this is identical to the reference times; Reference time inherits all the properties of E. We now are in a position to consider the role of TNS2 in the derivation. If it had no properties at all, it should be the case that R is always an exact copy of E. Since this is not always the case, it is reasonable to suppose that TNS2 has some role in distinguishing the two interpretations. I suggest that the role of TNS2 is analogous to the role described above for Asp0. Asp0 determines the part– whole relations between events and their participants, and TNS2 may determine part–whole relations between time frames. It may be that TNS2 does nothing more than determine the presence or absence of agreement between R and E, the simultaneous reading being ‘‘total’’ or holistic agreement of the two temporal constituents. On this analysis TNS2 is a purely 19 Events can have a run-time that differs from a participation-time when the event has more than one participant. For example, in Sue bought a dozen bagels, the ‘‘inner’’ event of a dozen bagels undergoing purchase constitutes a time frame in relation to Sue’s participation-time of making a purchase.

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grammatical formative, without semantic features. It has a number feature that triggers agreement between two constituents: R and E. Agreement is covert, as is the norm in non-finite environments. The agree relation is shown by coindexing in (55):

The raised AspP (=R) agrees with TNS2 and with its trace. Spec-head agreement between TNS2 and AspP can be said to determine a temporal range for TP2 as a whole, which is the time of its specifier, (=R), which is in turn raised from its complement (=E). In (55), the effect is trivial, since AspP (=R) is already the antecedent for E in the chain: (Ri, Ei). Crucially, the two types of antecedence must coincide. In (55), i = j. Suppose, contrary to the situation in (55), TNS2 agreed with a subconstituent of AspP:

Agreement between DP and TNS2 is impossible, since AspP is a more local constituent specified for the feature in question. Therefore, basing temporal antecedence (shown by the superscript j) on the feature of a subconstituent of R is expected not to occur. If it did occur, referential circularity would result, since Spec-head agreement gives TNS2 and TP2 index i as well as j, producing an i-within-i violation.20 Summarizing to this point, a simultaneous R/E reading is due to their identical specification with respect to number. TNS2 appears to compare R and E for values of some features, crucially number. The role of grammatical number in determining temporal antecedence between R and E is supported by the fact that DPs with number specification impose simultaneous readings. DPs without number specification do not, as discussed above (cf. (53)). Borer (2002) argues convincingly that bare plurals lack number specification on their DPs. The apparent plural marking on the plural noun is, Borer argues, a noun classifier, rather than a feature of the determiner. 3.3.2. Partitivity Consider now the derivation of a sentence such as (57), which differs from (52a) only in the absence of number specification on the argument: 20 Note that the process described above produces a non-finite interpretation for TP2. The interpretation is of a temporal relation between its internal constituents, but one which is not located in relation to Speechtime. The latter ordering is determined in TP1.

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(57)

489

People left.

The relevant steps in the derivation include (a) agreement in AspP that determines Event-time, (b) raising to Spec of TNS2, and (c) agreement with TP2 that determines the R/E relation. The first step in the derivation is agreement within AspP:

In (58), since D0 has no number feature, AspP remains unspecified for number. This gives rise to the potential for partitive readings because the relation between event participants and events is not specified. There may be either one event of leaving in which people as a whole group participate, or various events—the relation is not specified. So although AspP contains constituents with number features (NP and V), the relation between them is unspecified. Consequently AspP as a time-referring phrase does not have number specification. The next steps in the derivation are (a) raising AspP to the Spec of TNS2, and (b), agreement in TP2. Raising produces the structure (59):

Since AspP contains constituents with number, but does not have its own number specification, TNS2 can agree with either the Specifier or the head of the AspP:

This analysis claims that in the case of a bare plural argument, the relation between participants and events is just vague, but is also grammatically ambiguous. The Reference time can pick up its characteristics from the leaving event or from the group of participants. In either case, the relationship between individuals and events is not grammatically defined.

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Summarizing to this point, I have proposed that a number feature in TNS2 is responsible for determining whether a simultaneous or partitive relation between R and E is established. Perhaps the most important advantage of this approach is that it accounts for the fact that partitive readings are also possible in sentences with morphologically overt aspect. Recall from the discussion of progressives in section 3.1 and perfect clauses in section 3.2 that R/E mismatches occur with over aspect also: (61)

a. b.

Kim was breaking glasses (all day). Terri has discovered new restaurants (all week).

These sentences also have an event participant that lacks a number feature on D; they are also ambiguous, and vague. They can be analyzed as single (durative) events or as multiple (bounded) events, according to the form of partitive agreement in TNS2. Their most salient reading is of events iterated throughout the interval. The fact that clauses with overt aspect have the potential for partitive readings shows that partitivity must be determined by a feature of TNS2 that is independent of its semantic content. This is accounted for on the present analysis, since number agreement in AspP and in TP2 determines partitivity. 3.4. Sequences of auxiliaries Certain sequences of aspectual auxiliaries are possible, others are not: (62)

Kim had been singing.

(63)

a. b. c.

*Kim had had sung. *Kim was having sung. *Kim was being singing.

The grammaticality of (62) implies that iteration of TP2 is in principle possible:

The most immediate point of interest here is why the English sentences in (63) are ungrammatical; the issue is why there seem to be no tense structures in any language that allow free recursion of times. The analysis of the grammatical aspect system outlined here predicts that one factor that should limit recursion is the part–whole interpretation that grammatical aspect imposes on their specifier in relation to their complements. I will show how this generalization can distinguish the grammatical sequence in (62) from the impossible ones in (63).

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Let us begin with the derivation of the grammatical sequence in (62), in which have occupies TNS2 and takes as its complement an AspP containing [TNS be]:

Stated informally, this derivation is possible because be and -ing are both defective, so they function together to establish a Reference time (the onset of the event); this time is in turn a part of a larger interval, determined by have+-en. There is no conflict between the part–whole relations of progressive and perfect morphology. On the analysis in section 3.1, -ing picks out the onset of the event, but due to its defectivity does not map it to a time; be takes a time (R) as an argument but does not ascribe a situation to it. Chain formation (raising) produces a complete interpretation: a time that is the onset of an event. This Reference time is now interpreted in relation to perfect morphology. As discussed in section 3.2, -en specifiies its complement as the onset of the reference-time RF, the argument of have:

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The external and internal time arguments of have form a ‘‘telic pair’’, with the complement interpreted as the onset of the whole. There is no clash between these relations and the interpretation of RI in the Specifier of TP2. The final steps in the derivation include checking polarity features in a Polarity Phrase, which determines the scope of the proposition, namely the Reference time in the Specifier of TP2, and ordering the proposition time relative to speechtime—the same as for other clauses. The defectivity of be and -ing force -ing to take a verb phrase complement, never a TP complement. The ungrammatical (63b) and (63c), repeated in (67), illustrate: (67)

a. b.

*Kim was having sung. *Kim was being singing.

In these sentences, -ing is a determiner for a TP rather than a VP: (68)

a. b.

[TP1 R was [AspP -ing [TP2 R have [AspP -en [VP sing ]]]]] [TP1 R was [AspP -ing [TP2 R be [AspP -ing [VP sing ]]]]]

These sequences cannot produce an interpretation because -ing does not function as an associate of be. If it does not have a verb phrase complement, it does not specifiy a situation for R. Technically, -ing can be said to have an uninterpretable V-feature; in (68) there is no verb in its complement domain, so this uninterpretable feature remains in the derivation. Relating the illformedness of these sequences to the lack of a verb phrase is supported by the fact that ‘‘main verb’’ be can follow progressive be: (69)

a. b.

Kim was being filmed. Kim was being foolish.

In these sequences, the verb following progressive be is a verb—it does not take a time argument: (70)

[TP1 R was [AspP -ing [vP be [AspP -en [VP filmed ]]]]]

In (70), the uninterpretable V-feature of -ing is satisfied by main verb be. Finally, consider sequences of perfect have, as in (63a), repeated as (71): (71)

*Kim has had left.

The analysis of perfect tenses in section 3.2 leads to an account of (71) in terms of conflict between the relation that R3 has to -en and its relation to have: Informally stated, perfect morphology forms a ‘‘telic pair’’ from an Event time and a larger interval. The whole structure is telic. It cannot in turn be the onset of a larger interval. The relevant relations are illustrated in (72):

In (72) the conflict is in TP2, which is required to have an Initiative interpretation to satisfy -en1, and a telic or Final interpretation to satisfy its head, have2. As discussed in section 3.2, the

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aspectual head -en1, determines its complement as an onset—a time that is not preceded (as a whole) by any other time in an external interval. Have imposes on its specifier a telic reading: a reference interval whose onset is the time of leaving. As expected, instances of have can occur as complements of aspectual have: (73)

a. b.

Sue has had a sandwich. Fred has had to leave.

The main verb have in (73a) does not produce a conflict, since it does not impose any temporal restriction to conflict with the restriction imposed by -en. The semi-modal in (73b) could be said to impose some temporal restriction on its specifier, but in the absence of -en, the conflict does not arise. Summarizing, the particular sequences described above have different explanations, although they have in common that the illformedness arises as a result of a conflict between a TNS morpheme and the affixal head of AspP. 4. Finite tense: speech-time and its relation to reference time It was argued above that the temporal relation between R and E is a part–whole relation, not a relation of ordered independent entities. Past and Future tense, on the other hand, order S and R as independent entities, so they do not overlap. The question arises as to what mechanisms produce Present tense interpretations, since Present does not involve ordering, but something more akin to part–whole relations. Present tense has sometimes been described as simultaneity, sometimes as inclusion. In section 3.4, it was argued that simultaneity and inclusion are both legitimate relations between R and E, and that the reading in any particular context depends on number agreement, which results in ‘‘strict antecedence’’, or simultaneity; otherwise a partitive reading is possible. I will suggest that the same holds for the S/R relation in present tense. Furthermore, I argue that two additional factors restrict the construal of present tense: (74)

Speechtime is intrinsically singular.

(75)

Present tense: Speechtime is Initiative.

What (74) implies is that linguistically, Speechtime is unique in that it is licensed in relation to the speaker as participant. The claim underlying (75) is that non-past intervals are understood as beginning with Speechtime (just as past intervals necessarily end with the present moment.) This has the consequence that present tense is more than a simultaneity or inclusion relation: Speechtime is not an arbitrary point within a present interval, but is the ‘‘first’’ time in the present. In section 4.1 these generalizations are applied to the reading of present tense clauses with Stative and Process situations; section 4.2 will account for the impossibility of bounded events in the present, and section 4.3 discusses future shifting in present tense. 4.1. States and processes in the present The generalizations in (74) and (75) account for the simultaneity of states with Speechtime: (76)

a. b.

Sue likes Fred. Edie is an engineer.

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Stative situations have no internal event structure. They involve no transitions, and they are therefore singular times. In sentences like (76), Speechtime is coreferential with Reference time, which in turn corresponds to the singular State). This is a case of ‘‘strict antecedence’’: TNS1 agrees with its Specifier and with TNS2:

The formal agreement between Speechtime and R, mediated through agreement in TP2, (cf. section 3.3), derives a simultaneous reading. Speechtime is the onset of the present interval in the sense that it establishes the beginning of R. The fact that no other time is part of the interpretation is due to the absence of internal structure of R. Consider next the present readings of processes in (78) with bare and progressive morphology: (78)

a. b.

Sue is singing. Sue sings.

In the absence of adverbs, the most salient reading of (78a) is of a singular event; (78b) can be iterated events or a state of Sue—sometimes called a deontic (ability) reading. The derivation of the singular event reading of (78a) is like the derivation of statives just discussed, in terms of the relationship between TP1 and TP2. A further contribution to the interpretation is made by -ing: R is associated with an event onset:

In (79), Speechtime is the antecedent for R, which is the antecedent for the initiative aspect of the singing event. Speechtime is also the onset of the present interval; it coincides with the onset of the singular event of singing.

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English is exceptional in that it disallows a derivation like (79) with bare morphology:

Since (80a) would be grammatical on an iterated event reading, it is plausible to assume that what fails on the singular event reading in (80a) is agreement between TNS2 and its complement AspP. This is so because agreement occurs if either AspP contains intrinsically singular situation (a state) or if TNS2 contains be, a defective element that forces agreement with its complement. It is not clear whether the absence of agreement in (80a) is a result of some property of TNS2 or to a property of the English AspP when it contains a non-stative verb. I leave this question open here. Whatever the source, the generalization seems to be that English non-statives do not produce full agreement in TP2, so single-event readings are excluded. Iterated event readings are a result of R/E mismatches, as discussed in section 3.3. The Reference interval is a singular interval that contains plural events. Speechtime is the singular onset of the Reference interval. The deontic reading differs minimally from the iterated reading. The difference may concern whether or not plural events are linked to the Reference time or not. Recall from the discussion of section 3.2 that only the (parts of) events that are identified with R are part of the proposition of the clause. 4.2. *Bounded events with present interpretation There is a cross-linguistic prohibition on terminative or ‘bounded’ events with present moment readings (Smith, 1997): (81)

a. b. c.

*Sue builds a house. *Terri backs down. *Fred eats the apple.

(82)

a. b. c.

Sue resembles her sister. Fred collects antiques. Sharon dances the tango.

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The events in (81) are bounded, shown by their compatibility with in-phrases: Sue built a house in an hour; those in (82) are unbounded or durative, shown by their compatibility with for-phrases: Sue resembled her sister for many years. The constraint holds for singular events at Speechtime, not for habitual or iterated events: (83)

a. b.

Sue drives her car to the office, (often/usually) Fred buys the groceries.

the sentences in (83), the R/E relation is a partitive one, as discussed in section 3.3. The constraint against bounded events arises when the R/E relation is one of strict antecedence, when they formally agree in (singular) number, and S/R in turn agree. On the assumptions outlined so far, the restriction is attributable to a clash between the Initiative requirement for Speechtime in the present, and the non-initiative (telic, or Final) event time with which it agrees. The clash results in referential circularity, because Speechtime will ultimately formally agree with the Event, which refers to an endpoint, and with part of the event: its onset. A telic event refers to its endpoint in the sense that its final subevent determines the properties of the event as a whole. In section 3.2.2, the formation of telic pairs of events was illustrated. To review briefly, the Aspect head of the inner event adjoins to that of the outer event. This is illustrated in (44), repeated below:

The head of the derived structure is Asp2, since this is the head that determines the event type of the whole. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the phrase takes in-phases as adjuncts, not for-phrases, due to features of Asp2. Therefore, AspP as a whole is grammatically a projection of Asp2. In a present tense clause, Speechtime and Reference time agree with Asp2, but also agree with the subject: the participant in Asp1. This produces referential circularity. AspP is coindexed with R and with S; so is its onset:

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In (84), the antecedence relations S/R and R/E are determined by agreement with respect to number. This gives rise to a singular event reading, i.e., one based on strict antecedence rather than partitive. S is intrinsically singular, and agrees with R, whose number is inherited from Event time. Event time is grammatically based on the time of the inner event (house-building), not the time of Sue’s activity, since telic pair formation results in Asp having the telic event as its head. At the same time, the participant in AspI, (Sue) agrees in number with TNS1—ordinary finite clause agreement. This results in referential circularity: (85)

[TP1 Si,j

TNSi,j

[TP2 Ri

TNS2i [AspP [Aspi Aspj] VP]i

In (85), Speechtime is coreferential with both Aspi and Aspj, which are not coreferential with each other. One instance of a bounded temporal structure that is compatible with present tense is the reference interval of perfect clauses, which have compound R:

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The analysis of the perfect from section 3.2 gives rise to an apparent paradox, since the temporal structure of R appears to be identical to the illict temporal structure of singular bounded events. The crucial difference between (84b) and (86b) is that (86b) has partitive agreement in TP2. Have agrees with its Specifier, but does not agree with its complement AspP. There are two distinct agreement ‘‘chains’’ in (86): S/R agreement, which agrees with the initiative subevent in which Sue is a participant; and RI/AspP agreement, which agrees with the telic event: (87)

[TP1 Suei [Si [TNSi [pres]] [TP2 [RjI RiF ]i [TNS2 has]i [AspP [Aspi Aspj ]j VP ]j

The morphology in TNS2 and in AspP tells why the constraint against boundedness is not violated: since TP2 is temporally partitive, the two agreement chains do not intersect, and there is no referential circularity. Furthermore, the agreement chains explain two other characteristics of the present perfect. One is that the constraint on S as the onset of present intervals (cf. (75)) is not violated: (87) is just like statives: S = R. This is unexpected, since R contains an event RI, which precedes RF. If the present account is on the right track, the contrast between (86) and (87) shows that the Initiative reading of Speechtime in the present is relative to the Reference interval with which there is grammatical agreement. Second, agreement between the Subject and TP2 headed by have may explain the ‘‘result state’’ that is ascribed to the present perfect in sentences like Sue has lived in Seattle for 10 years, which presupposes that Sue is still alive and in Seattle. Agreement in TP2 appears to make R a secondary event (state) with Sue as its participant. Since R = E, the state holds at Speechtime. 4.3. Future-shifting of present tense Certain types of events can have a ‘future shifted’ interpretation: (88)

a. b. c.

Next year Mary builds a house. The band plays downtown tomorrow night. Their flight leaves at noon.

These sentences are often referred to as ‘‘scheduled future’’ readings because they make a statement about a planned event—one that is presently scheduled, rather than one that is asserted to occur in the future. I propose that these readings involve a mismatch between R and E that is licensed by the adverb. Reference time is interpreted as a present state of the subject: (89)

[TP1 Maryi [Si TNS1 [TP2 Ri TNS2 [AspPj builds a house]]]

The scheduled future shares a characteristic with the present perfect: R is a state of the subject. The absence of the perfect affix results in a different relationship between E and R. I will show how this account explains the core properties of the scheduled future. These include (i), that the reading is impossible without a future adverb: (90)

a. b. c.

The band plays downtown. (*)The flight leaves. Mary builds a house.

and (ii), that the proposition of the clause is about a present state of the subject, not a future event.

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In the absence of a future adverb, E overlaps with R and with S, as described in section 3.3 for morphologically null aspect clauses: R is either a ‘‘strict antecedent’’ for E, or R contains instances of E, as determined by agreement. In scheduled future clauses, PP is either a strict antecedent for E, or PP contains instances of E:

In (91), the event has a participant with specified number. This allows AspP to be specified for number: a singular Event-time. Event time cannot be grammatically linked to R. Because E is bounded, coindexing of R and E would result in referential circularity, as discussed in section 4.2, for sentences like *Sue builds a house. The event time is therefore necessarily dissociated from the finite tense system, and is not part of the proposition of the clause. The adverb is in a sense a surrogate R: it provides an interval within which the Event-time can be located. The reason why such a temporal location is necessary is that TNS2 still has to satisfy its number agreement. In section 3.3, it was proposed that in clauses with morphologically null aspect, TNS2 contains grammatical features for number. It establishes agreement between its Specifier (R) and complement (E). In (91), agreement holds between R and PP; Since PP has no specified number, the relation between R and PP is partitive. PP is an unrealized ‘‘goal’’ of the present interval, similar to the bracketed events in (92): (92)

a. b.

Mary is [to leave tomorrow.] Mary is v [building a house]

Certain types of events are not compatible with structures like (91). The restriction is often described in terms of ‘‘planning’’ or ‘‘scheduling’’. Compare: (93)

a. b. c.

Mary sings at noon. Mary is available at noon. *Mary is thrilled at noon.

(Mary is scheduled to sing.) (Mary is scheduled to be available.) (*Mary is scheduled to be thrilled.)

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I would claim that planning is an indirect result of the temporal relations described above, rather than a basic feature of it. If planning were crucial, there should be a covert planning event that is predicated of the present time. But the reading is that the present time is a state of the ‘‘future actor’’, not a state of a planner. This is captured by the analysis shown in (91), since the subject is the participant in the reference interval. Also, there are clauses in which planning is not sufficient to allow future shifting: (94)

a. b.

?*Fred is a graduate next year. *Sue has the baby next March.

(Sue is scheduled to be a graduate.) (Sue is scheduled to have the baby.)

The states in (94) are arguably planned or scheduled to the same extent that a flight leaving at noon is scheduled or planned. It may be that cases like (94) differ from (93a,b) in the structure of the states. Certain states, I would suggest, can be the (unrealized) ‘‘goal’’ of a prior state: they are quasi-resultatives, having as part of their lexical structure an implicit transition that leads up to them. For example available may be the result of an implicit action or movement that produces the availability. This would account for the use of in-phrases in (95): (95)

a. b.

I’m available in an hour. *I’m thrilled in an hour.

The presence or absence of the implicit transition is not a matter of pragmatics: being thrilled can be the result of activity, just as being available can be an accidental state. If a stative predicate has an implicit transition as part of its interpretation, the implicit ‘‘pre-state’’ state is interpreted as the present state of the subject. In (95a), the subject is such that she is on a path that ends in availability at the end of an hour. 4.4. Summary This section discussed the mechanisms underlying the readings of the present tense. It was argued in section 4.1 that the present readings of states and processes are based on the same relations in TP1 that were discussed in section 3.3 for TP2. In both cases, number agreement between time arguments determines whether their relation is one of strict or partitive antecedence. Number agreement was shown to have a crucial role in accounting for the impossibility of bounded events with present readings in section 4.2. Agreement between S, R and both the onset and endpoint of the event is illicit, because S and R agree with two times that are themselves disjoint. Section 4.3 considered the ‘scheduled future’ reading of the present. It was argued that these sentences have propositional content that refers to a present state, with the ‘‘scheduled’’ event as a goal. The event is not asserted to occur in the future. I claimed that this is due to the adverb, which acts as a ‘‘surrogate’’ reference interval, but is not mapped into the finite time relations of the clause. 5. Summary This article has described an approach to tense construal that derives basic properties of tenses from the following assumptions. First, as argued in section 2, all finite tenses are composed of three times: S (Speechtime), R (Reference time) and E (Event time or situation

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time). Second, I argued in section 3 that the nature of the relation between R and E is neither a finite ordering relation, as in Reichenbach’s original system, nor an aspectual relation, in the ordinary sense of aspect as concerned with the internal temporal constituency of events. I argued that the R/E relation is partitive: in progressives, R corresponds to part of E, but in perfect tenses, E corresponds to part of R. The part–whole relations are reversed. I argued that in clauses with morphologically null aspect, the R/E relation can also be partitive, or it can be a relation of strict antecedence or ‘simultaneity’. The determination as to which of these readings is available in a given derivation is based on grammatical relations, not semantic ones: the distribution of number features and the operation of agreement is the key factor. The nature of grammatical aspect is thus analyzed here as a non-finite relation, and one that is determined in part by TNS and Aspect morphemes, in part by grammatical relations, specifically agreement. In section 4 I extended the discussion to the S/R relation in present tense clauses, since this relation is also arguably not determined by finite ordering. It was shown that agreement in TP1 also produces strict or partitive antecedence for R. This allows for the present reading of states and processes (although the impossibility of English present process readings remains to be investigated). It accounts for the generalization that bounded events cannot have present readings, and for the readings of ‘scheduled future’ events with future adverbs. Acknowledgments Some of the material in this article was presented at the Workshop on Aspect (University of Texas, February 2004), at Chronos VI, (University of Geneva, September 2004), at the University of British Columbia and University of Washington. I wish to thank those audiences for very helpful comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to Paula Kempchinsky and Ellen Thompson for detailed written comments on an earlier draft of the paper. References Binnick, R., 1991. Time and the verb: a guide to tense and aspect. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Borer, H., 1994. The projection of arguments. In: Benedicto, E., Runner, J. (Eds.), University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics, vol. 17. GLSA, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Borer, H., 2002. Some notes on the syntax and semantics of quantity. Paper presented at the Iowa Workshop on the Syntax, Semantics and Acquisition of Aspect. University of Iowa, May 25, 2002. Burzio, L., 1986. Italian Syntax: A Government-Binding Approach. D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Comrie, B., 1976. Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Comrie, B., 1985. Tense. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Demirdache, H., Uribe-Etxebarria, M., 2000. The primitives of temporal relations. In: Martin, R., Michaels, D., Uriagereka, J. (Eds.), Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honor of Howard Lasnik. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 157–186. Enc¸, M., 1987. Anchoring conditions for tense. Linguistic Inquiry 18, 633–657. Giorgi, A., Pianesi, F., 1997. Tense and Aspect: From Semantics to Morphosyntax. Oxford University Press, New York. Gue´ron, J., 2004. Tense construal and the argument structure of auxiliaries. In: Gue´ron, J., Lecarme, J. (Eds.), The Syntax of Time. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 299–328. Hale, K., Keyser, S., 1993. On argument structure and the lexical expression of syntactic relations. In: Hale, K., Keyser, S.J. (Eds.), The View from Building 20: Essays in Linguistics in honor of Sylvain Bromberger. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 53–109. Higginbotham, J., 1985. On semantics. Linguistic Inquiry 16, 547–593. Higginbotham, J., 2000. Accomplishments. Ms., University of Oxford.

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