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Space policy for late comer countries: A case study of South Korea
Space Policy 27 (2011) 227e233
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Space policy for late comer countries: A case study of South Korea Joosung J. Lee*, Seungmi Chung Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 7 April 2010 Accepted 1 July 2011 Available online 14 October 2011
Korea’s space development program was created almost 40 years behind those of the advanced countries but it has nevertheless made remarkable progress. Korean space development has been focused on technology catch-up, where commercialization and growth of industrial competitiveness are important rationales. However, the program has several problems, including: lack of a space equipment manufacturing industry, total system companies in the space manufacturing industry and communication between industry and researchers, and much concentration of projects and initiatives in the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). This study analyzes the problem by comparing space agencies and programs in Korea and other countries, particularly Japan and the USA. It is shown that the role of a national laboratory is critical in space industry development and argued that KARI should make greater efforts to promote the Korean space industry by encouraging technology transfer, sharing equipment and communication between companies. For successful space development, the main organization e usually the national research institute e should change its role from a research-only laboratory to manager and supporter of space development and industry. Such a move would invigorate Korea’s space industry and allow it to catch up with countries with a similar environment. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.2. Scope of space industry in Korea
1.1. Overview and structure of research
Most of the academic literature and law related to the aerospace industry explicitly refers to air and space together since these two terms have a strong relation to each other. Article 2 of the Korean Aerospace Development Act (amended on 29 February 2008) states that ‘aerospace industry’ refers to the industry related to producing airplanes, spacecraft, and relevant avionic devices or materials. It also refers to the applied technology industry of airplanes and spacecraft defined under the Decree of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy [1]. In 2009 research on the actual condition of the Korean space industry defined it as including a space equipment manufacturing industry, space services industry, and an indirect space industry. The report goes on to define the space industry as comprising goods and services produced through the process of space development [2]. The space industry is categorized differently in different countries and organizations, and the methods to categorize it can be summarized as follows. The Space Foundation shows four categories: satellite services, launch industry, satellite manufacturing and ground equipment. The Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales (French Association of Aeronautics and Space Industry e GIFAS) divides it into three categories: space systems manufacturers (satellite industry), propulsion systems manufacturers, and equipment manufacturers. Based on research,
The Republic of Korea’s space development program was created almost 40 years behind those of the advanced countries but it has nevertheless made remarkable progress. This includes the construction of the Naro Space Center and the development of 10 satellites using indigenous technology. Space development planning, policy implementation, research and development (R&D) and commercialization of spacecraft have thus far been led by the government. Earlier Korean space policy was mainly focused on technology catch-up, while an industrial development strategy was not well considered, leading to problems such as a dearth of total system space manufacturing companies, a lack of communication between industry and researchers and a concentration of projects inside the country’s principle space research institute, the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). This article argues that KARI’s role needs to be changed to one with a much greater emphasis on technology transfer in order to invigorate Korean space companies and to guide the strategic growth of the industry.
* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.J. Lee). 0265-9646/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.09.008
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KARI also has its own categories, as shown in Fig. 1 [2]. These definitions and categorizations of the space industry are different according to the industrial condition of each country and reflect specific circumstances. Thus, in order to discuss the Korean space industry, it is necessary to know the definition and categorization of it. For this reason, we will discuss the space industry and policy of Korea using the country’s own definition.
Table 1 Rationales and space policy [4]. Time line activity
Beginnings
Present
Future
Military
Military Space
Scientific
Space Science
Force Support Force Enhancement Earth Science Astronomy
1.3. Importance of space industry in Korea
Civil
1.3.1. Ideology of space development During the first space era, countries pursued space development for economic advantage, for military advantage, for prestige, and for the dream of space [3]. Generally, in the early stages, national rationales of space development focused on scientific knowledge and national security. The space race between the USA and the USSR also could be shown as a demonstration of technology and latent military power; however, it changed to one of commercial applications and economic benefit [4]. Humanity’s thirst for knowledge or adventure was the rationale for space development in the very early stages. Van Dyke says the motives for US space development were military security both immediate and conjectural, peace and cooperation, science and technology, economics and social progress, national prestige, a variety of “special interests and ulterior motives,” and national pride. Recently T.C. Schelling has argued that deeper space development, such as exploration of Mars, should accompany practical and tangible benefits [5]. The various rationales for pursuing a space program are shown in Table 1. However, unlike these advanced countries, Korea started its space development some 30 or 40 years later, and the budget available for space activity is also limited. Because of this, Korea cannot handle the whole area of space development, but has to focus on the most important and most urgent areas. According to Kim, the Korean government has seen space development as a way to reinforce its industrial competitiveness. For this reason, the budget for space exploration and development has been increased continuously, regardless of changes in administration [6]. Fig. 2 shows the increase in the space budget under this principle. Under this principle, the ultimate goals of Korean space development are as follows: to achieve an independent capability in space by development of core space technologies; to become one of the top 10 countries in the world’s space industry market; to improve the national quality of life through achievements and applications in space; and to inspire public pride with successful space development. Cho argues that Korean science and technology policy is based on “techno nationalism”. That is, industrial competitiveness is a key component in science and technology
Commercial
Human Spaceflight Technology Development
Space Control Force Application Planets Asteroids Environment Human Habitation Human Exploration Economic Competitiveness
Space Industry
Satellite
Launch
Ground Facility
Satellite Application
System Main body Payload
System The 2nd stage The top part Pairing
Satellite and launch vehicle support
Remote sensing Broadcasting Communication GPS system Space science
Fig. 1. Categories of the Aerospace Industry [2].
Space Shuttle Space Station Commercial Applications
policy [8], and the main goal of Korean space development is commercialism with enhancement of industrial competitiveness. 2. Space development elsewhere Various countries have pursued space development and prioritized their space industry. This section considers the space policies of other countries in order to gain insights from their experiences which may aid Korea’s space industry. 2.1. Space development of Western countries After the end of the Second World War, German rocket scientists were scattered to countries which belonged to the Allied side, specifically the USA, the USSR and France. There they provided the technological base for these countries’ space programs through their development of the V-2 rocket, the ancestor of all modern rockets. These countries led space development world-wide; each had a national agency or laboratory for space development. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was founded in 1958 and has expanded continuously from its establishment. It holds the leading position in world space development as the biggest civil space organization. In addition, NASA has performed co-work with private companies including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman [9e11]. European countries have followed a similar path. France was the first country to start space projects in Europe. It wanted to decrease the gap with the USA in the space field, so public research institutes were established. These institutes cooperated with industry on an enormous technology program. The Centre National D’études Spatiales (French National Space Research Institute; CNES) was founded in 1961 and led a national launch vehicle program. The UK also started space development in the early 1960s. British space policy was to make industry and science contribute to society by reinforcing industrial competitiveness. This concept led the UK to concentrate on communications technology. After the establishment of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975, the UK turned over foundational research such as launch vehicle development to ESA and focused on support activities which had a high probability of industrial development. British space development was led by the British National Space Centre (BNSC), which performed the role of managing space projects and operating local centers. In 2010, the BNSC was replaced by a new United Kingdom Space Agency. ESA now leads European space development [12,13]. China, as a communist country, has shown a different strategy. Although Chinese space development was also led by the government, it pursued development not by national laboratory, but by administrative agencies. China started its space development in 1956 as part of a strategy for national economic development and founded its first research institution e the fifth Academy of the Ministry of National Defense. Because China considered the
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(billion won) 350
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0 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
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2004
2005
2006
2007
(year) Fig. 2. Annual Budget of Space Development of Korean Government [7].
development of rocket and propulsion engine technology to be one of its national priorities, it established specialist administrative agencies, e.g. the seventh ministry of Machine-Building Industry (1964) and the Ministry of Aerospace Industry (1988). The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) was founded in 1993. In this way, although the form of leading agency has been different, China has developed a space industry well. After the breakdown of its relationship with the USSR in 1960, China succeeded in making the Dong Feng 1, a rocket based on the Soviet R-2 rocket that same year. By launching the Dong Fang Hong-1 using the Changzeong 1, China became the fifth country to launch a satellite with its own technology. Chinese space technology has advanced continuously, and the country has succeeded in launching a manned spaceship. Chinese space policy is aiming for the establishment of an Earth observation system for civil and military use, an independent GPS system, and commercialization of space technology in the 2000s [14,15]. Japanese space development started with rocket research. Research on a pencil rocket by the Institute of Industrial Science in the University of Tokyo was the starting point and the institute was renamed the Institute of Space Aeronautical Science (ISAS) in 1964. The National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) and National Space Development Agency (NASDA) were established in 1963 and 1969, respectively, while the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) was founded in 2003 and included NAL, NASDA, and ISAS. Japanese space technology has developed for over 50 years, and the country has achieved many successes. Although it was dependent on US technology in the early years, it has achieved its own technological excellence, and is now independent in the space field. However, while successful in terms of technology development, Japan has thus far failed to establish a strong industrial base. Lately it has tried to change the focus of its space development to concentrate on practical applications, private needs, and international cooperation [16e19].
institute, KARI. Korea’s space development started in the late 1980s with the establishment of the Satellite Technology Research Center (SaTReC) and KARI. KITSAT-1, the first Korean satellite, was launched in 1992, and then KITSAT -2 and KITSAT-3 were developed. Note that Korea learned about satellite technology via partnerships with international companies and by sending engineers abroad for training. After that, the leadership of Korean space development was concentrated in KARI rather than SaTReC. In 1996, the Korean government created a long-term and midterm plan for space development. Based on this the country developed further satellite missions, including the Science and Technology Satellite series (STSAT-1, 2); the Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite projects (KOMPSAT-1, 2); and the KOREASAT series (KOREASAT-1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Korea also launched a Communication, Ocean and Meteorological Satellite (COMS) successfully, so it has 12 satellites, as of the time of this writing. Research on rocketry has also been performed. KARI developed the Korean Science Rocket series (KSR-1, 2, 3); within this, KSR-III was the first Korean liquid propellant rocket. The Korean Satellite Launch Vehicle-I (KSLV-I) is anticipating a third launch, and KSLV-2 has also been developed. At present, Korea is making efforts to develop technology for space applications. The first Korea Astronaut Program ran from 2006 to 2008 with Russia. Participation in a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Project and the International Space Station (ISS) also illustrated Korea’s efforts to participate in international cooperative missions and the practical use of space. KARI has the leadership role in most Korean space development projects. Other participants in space activities include the Agency of Defense Development (ADD), the SaTReC, and several companies. While these other organizations contribute to Korean space projects, KARI remains firmly in charge [12,20e22]. 3.2. Problem of Korean space development
3. Korean space policy 3.1. Space development of Korea Like many other space advanced countries, Korea has undertaken its space development mainly through a national research
Korea has followed a widespread strategy by using a national research institute, and Korean space development has progressed well. However, many problems have also surfaced. The main problem is an immature level of space industry development. Although the rhetoric of the Korean space program emphasizes the
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goal of reinforcing industrial competitiveness, scientific aims have dominated the program until now. As mentioned above, because most space development has been done by government research institutions, the space industry has not had the opportunity to grow. The size of the Korean space industry has gradually increased, from a value of 779 billion won (2005) to one of 981 billion won (2008). Despite this increase, total industry size is still very small and the workforce is also small. Only 307 people worked in the space industry in 2009. To give some perspective, 9473 people worked in the aviation industry in 2009 [2]. The challenges faced by the Korean space industry can be divided into several specific problems. One is that the Korean space industry is mainly composed of space services and applications companies. Although it is natural for this industry to be larger than the space manufacturing industry because of the size of the market, the satellite application industry occupies over 70% of the Korean space industry. This shows that the industry has a weak foundation in technological design and fabrication. Without a domestic space manufacturing industry, the Korean space community has to depend on other advanced countries. The space equipment manufacturing industry in Korea has been growing quickly, but it is still very small compared with the space applications industry. Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate this situation. The structure of the space equipment manufacturing industry is also a source of concern. While there are 65 companies involved with space development, few of these have the capacity to develop complete space systems or key satellite components. An exception to this trend is the Satrec Initiative (Satrec-I) company, a spin off from the SaTReC university laboratory. Satrec-I has the capability to serve as system integrator for small Earth observation satellites, but its activities mainly serve foreign clients. For domestic programs Korea needs to import many technologies and components from other countries at high cost in order to develop new systems such as a space launch vehicle. Over 60% of the space-related companies have fewer than 100 employees, while 47.7% of these companies have turnovers of less than 1 billion won in sales [2]. Because there are few large companies that serve as total system integrators or manufacture key components, small companies cannot secure enough orders from the large firms, making it difficult for small companies to grow. This is one of the key limitations of the Korean space industry. Table 2 shows the structure of Korean space industry. The second problem is that research in universities and research institutions is divorced from most companies’ needs. The proportion of activities within the space industry supports this assertion. The majority of the market is found in space applications and services. It is 72.1% of industrial profit in the space market. In contrast, research institutions and universities
Ground facillity 20%
Launch vehicle 3%
Satellite 5% Satellite application 72%
Fig. 3. Market Size of Korean Space Industry [2].
concentrate on the manufacturing of space equipment such as satellites, launch vehicles and ground equipment [2]. This mismatch hinders further space industry development. Korean space companies and research institutions should have better communication and cooperation for more efficient space industry development given limited resources and market size. The central problem is that most space development projects are monopolized by the national research institution, and there is limited support from government and the national institution for the private sector. It is very difficult for a private enterprise to use expensive experimental devices and materials that belong to the government. Therefore the government needs to establish a program of standard fees for using devices and materials, in order to support private enterprises R&D activities. While Korean space development started with a very small university research laboratory (SaTReC), the Korean government’s current emphasis is in space development mostly evolves around the bigger institution, KARI. Since the government’s current system is focused on KARI and long-established enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises which entered the aerospace industry late face difficulties. In such a situation good scientists and engineers prefer to work for a government research institution rather than for small companies. This means that core technologies are mainly developed in government research laboratories. Technology transfer from the government research institution to the private sector is also lacking. It is difficult to make synergistic space industry development within the nation-wide aerospace industry because of the dearth of information and technology exchanges between institutions and businesses in Korea. 4. The future direction for space industry development in Korea Space development is highly risky and requires a great amount of resources (budget, time and personnel). Consequently, Korean space development has been led by government via the national research institute, KARI. Despite this strategy, Korea remains at the level of an immature space industry. For this reason, we need to examine how a vibrant space industry was developed elsewhere through leadership of a national institute. In the following section, the role of the national laboratory in space industry development in the USA and Japan will be analyzed. Then proposals regarding the future role of KARI will be made. 4.1. National agencies and laboratories in the USA and Japan 4.1.1. The case of the USA NASA has performed a crucial role supporting technology transfer to the private sector and commercialization of space technology in the USA, the most developed country in space. NASA’s individual centers manage Technology Transfer Offices separately; however, these are connected and support technology transfer between each other. At the central leadership level at NASA Headquarters, the Office of the Chief Technologist coordinates the center-based offices for technology transfer out of and into NASA [12]. NASA also operates websites and programs to support technology transfer and commercialization. NASA TechFinder is one website the agency manages to support commercialization of its technology. The TechFinder site is “a resource that enables commercial and private users to perform searches or request more detailed information for technology opportunities, licensing opportunities, past success stories, and feature technology leads.” This quote shows its aim of technology transfer clearly [24].
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Fig. 4. Sales Turnover of Korean Space Industry.
Other programs are Biz Tech, Emerging Technology Center (ETC), NASA Commercialization Center (NCC), Mississippi Enterprise for Technology (MET), Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program. NCC and MET have set their sights on commercialization of NASA’s research and NASA has researched new technology in partnership with companies in the ETC and SBIR programs, with the technology subsequently to be commercialized and enter the market. NASA also has supported technology transfer to US industry via other institutions like the National Technology Transfer Center (NTTC) since 1989. NTTC provides information on federal
technology and services related to technology transfer. It also operates a training program on technology commercialization with NASA [10,23]. In this way, NASA has performed a major role in commercialization and growing the space industry. 4.1.2. The case of Japan [16,25e27] Japan has many similarities with Korea: its government leads national space development, and it has also prioritized industrial development and technology catch-up. For these reasons, Japan’s experience offers lessons for Korea. In the Japanese case, the
Table 2 Distribution of Korean space companies.
Satellite
Launching vehicle
Total System
Main Component
Sub Component
Fabrication
Satrec-I
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) Korean Air Hyundai Wia Corporation Satrec-I
KTM Engineering Hanback Electronics PDK M&M Lynx Dodam Systems Swagelok High Gain Antenna Doowon Heavy Industry Ureatac Ensol Samyang Composite Technology Hanyang Navicom Firstec
Daesan Korean E&G Yeonhab Precision AMI
Hanwha (Aerospace Division) Korea Air Samsung Techwin C&Space Vitzrotech
Hanwha Hanyang ENG S&S Valve Doowon Heavy Industry Danam Systems Ground Facility Satellite Application
Samsung Techwin
Firstec STX Engine
HizeAero Daemyung Hy-Lok Korea
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national research institution, JAXA, has led development of the space industry. Japanese politicians said that they would support industrial competitiveness and commercialization of space technology through JAXA in the agency’s founding ceremony. Cooperation with industry was a key component of the new space policy implemented through JAXA. The strategy of the Japanese space industry consists of various approaches, including technology transfer to the private sector; sharing capital equipment; bridging research laboratories and companies; and raising public awareness. Technology transfer is performed by the Intellectual Property Program, Technology Transfer Program and Venture Supporting Program. JAXA holds a great deal of intellectual property (IP) in the space field because its major space activity is related to new technology R&D at national research institutes. To use the IP commercially JAXA makes the IP and ideas available on a website. Many research results have an impact on industrial development and are reapplied outside the space field as spin-offs. The financial effect of such spin-offs is estimated at over 60 trillion yen. The other mode of technology transfer is supporting venture companies. This differs from other technology transfer programs because the main actors are the members of JAXA. Using these technology transfer methods, JAXA puts its technology to practical use. While research can be done more efficiently by a research laboratory, commercialization should be performed by private companies. The Japanese case is a good example for Korea. JAXA shares its capital equipment with outside organizations. Many types of equipment for space development and research are highly specialized and extremely expensive for private firms to access. Because of this challenge, it is difficult for each company to have all the facilities they need. Sometimes this factor forms a barrier that limits the ability of private companies to enter the space industry. JAXA grants concessions that allow private companies to use its facilities when it is not using them itself. JAXA has regional branches in order to maintain better connections with different areas of the country. JAXA’s headquarters and the Earth Observation Research Center are in Tokyo, but other research centers are spread all round the country, e.g. the Nosiro Testing Center and Tsukuba Space Center. At least eight regional branches provide support that allows companies to use JAXA’s facilities. JAXA also serves as the bridge between research laboratories and companies, or between companies. The Space Open Lab program is an online, virtual laboratory for businesses in the space field. Companies, universities, researchers or other users can communicate with each other in the Space Open Lab. Such cooperation facilitates efficient solutions which can be supported by JAXA. This enhanced communication not only produces new projects, but also helps the research laboratory study the technologies that companies practically need. JAXA provides support in various ways, such as technology consulting to increase participation in the Space Open Lab. In addition, JAXA holds a number of events to raise public awareness in cooperation with industry, universities and government. 4.2. Proposed role of KARI The national research institute is important in space development and the growth of the industry. The US and Japanese cases show the importance of the national agencies and research institutes in technology transfer and the development of a domestic space industry. Korea has several similarities with Japan. Korean space development has been government-led, and Korea is heading toward more mature space industry development. This section argues that the structure and role of KARI should be shifted to advance the Korean space industry’s capacity. Several recommendations are presented below.
4.2.1. Local branches Many countries manage not just one central research institution, but also local branches of the laboratory. KARI has centers in two places: the main research facility in Daejeon and the Naro Space Center in Goheung in Jeollanam-do. The Naro Space Center was established to launch the KSLV-1 (Korean Satellite Launch Vehicle-1). It is only used as a launch site for rockets and as the home of the space science museum, not as a hub for development of the space industry [28]. It can be said, therefore, that KARI does not truly have local branches to support the space industry. One effect of having more regional branches of KARI would be to help the local space industry become more efficient. As in the Japanese case, a local branch of KARI also can facilitate the sharing of equipment, facilities for testing and experiences within the industry. Many Korean space companies are small so it is difficult for them to own all the facilities they need. This problem is one reason that companies cannot enter the space industry easily. Sharing equipment lowers the entry barrier to the space industry, and it encourages more companies to participate. Having local branches of KARI could also help existing companies. KARI is currently in charge of quality certification of space products. Industrial participants are required to go to KARI in Daejeon in order to have their products examined for quality tests. If local branches could perform the role of test center, companies could get their products certified more easily. This would encourage space development at a wider industry level. A key example is the province of Gyeongsang, where there are many aerospace companies; other examples include Sacheon and Youngchen, which have an aerospace industrial estate. The proposal for a local branch of KARI follows the pattern of many other countries. Local branches of KARI would be a basic strategy for encouraging the space industry. 4.2.2. Supporting program for establishment and growth of companies This paper has argued that a major shortfall of the Korean space industry is that almost all manufacturing companies are small fabrication and sub-component companies. This situation is the result of a policy in which KARI leads most space projects, and research results are only available within KARI for security reasons. Most space systems can only be made by KARI, or ADD. Satrec-I is the only company that can serve as the prime contractor for complete satellite systems. KARI should encourage other firms to achieve this capability through technology transfer. The US and Japanese cases show several effective strategies; two of which may be useful to stimulate more vigorous industry growth. One strategy is to encourage members of KARI to start venture companies. The USA and Japan have used this method to encourage their space industries and Satrec-I is a successful case in the Korean space industry, showing that it can be done. Satrec-I was founded by members of the SaTReC at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Companies established this way have reliable technology, which gives them a high probability of success. A second strategy would be for KARI to transfer its technology to private companies. This could done more promptly than the previous method; however, it is hard to transfer technology completely and make firms competitive. As more firms are created to serve as prime contractors for complete space systems, small component and fabrication companies will be able to get more work from domestic prime contracting companies. This will invigorate the Korean space industry.
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4.2.3. Creating a space policy for communication among industry participants We propose an open space for communication between industry, universities, and research laboratories like the Japanese Open Lab. Intimate relationships and strong communication between researchers and companies are extremely important for supporting industrialization and commercialization. Most research funds in universities come from government agencies. The amount of university research funding from government is almost 14 times larger than funding from private organizations. Technology transfer from researchers to companies also does not occur frequently. This suggests that scientists and engineers study different areas from those that technology companies want. An open space for free communication among members of the space industry would facilitate the “match-making” between technology supplies and industry needs. When researchers work more closely with industry partners and response directly to international trends in space technology development, technology transfer will be performed more effectively.
5. Conclusion Korea’s space development efforts were initiated 40 years behind advanced countries. It has nevertheless been making remarkable progress, including the construction of Korea’s Naro Space Center and the possession of a sizable number of satellites developed by Korean technology. There are, however, a number of problems in Korean space development policy. The overall challenges for the immature Korean space industry include the absence of prime contracting companies, lack of communication between researchers and industry, and concentrated authority within KARI. This has to be improved to allow a better future for Korean space development. For successful space development, Korea should establish a new role for the country’s central organization (KARI), involving countrywide branches, delegation of research work and creation of a space for all players in the space industry to communicate, in order to invigorate commercialization of its space industry.
Acknowledgments We thank Danielle Wood at MIT for her valuable comments and assistance with improving the manuscript. This work was supported by KAIST Research Grant #G04100014.
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Space Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol
Space policy for late comer countries: A case study of South Korea Joosung J. Lee*, Seungmi Chung Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 7 April 2010 Accepted 1 July 2011 Available online 14 October 2011
Korea’s space development program was created almost 40 years behind those of the advanced countries but it has nevertheless made remarkable progress. Korean space development has been focused on technology catch-up, where commercialization and growth of industrial competitiveness are important rationales. However, the program has several problems, including: lack of a space equipment manufacturing industry, total system companies in the space manufacturing industry and communication between industry and researchers, and much concentration of projects and initiatives in the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). This study analyzes the problem by comparing space agencies and programs in Korea and other countries, particularly Japan and the USA. It is shown that the role of a national laboratory is critical in space industry development and argued that KARI should make greater efforts to promote the Korean space industry by encouraging technology transfer, sharing equipment and communication between companies. For successful space development, the main organization e usually the national research institute e should change its role from a research-only laboratory to manager and supporter of space development and industry. Such a move would invigorate Korea’s space industry and allow it to catch up with countries with a similar environment. Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.2. Scope of space industry in Korea
1.1. Overview and structure of research
Most of the academic literature and law related to the aerospace industry explicitly refers to air and space together since these two terms have a strong relation to each other. Article 2 of the Korean Aerospace Development Act (amended on 29 February 2008) states that ‘aerospace industry’ refers to the industry related to producing airplanes, spacecraft, and relevant avionic devices or materials. It also refers to the applied technology industry of airplanes and spacecraft defined under the Decree of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy [1]. In 2009 research on the actual condition of the Korean space industry defined it as including a space equipment manufacturing industry, space services industry, and an indirect space industry. The report goes on to define the space industry as comprising goods and services produced through the process of space development [2]. The space industry is categorized differently in different countries and organizations, and the methods to categorize it can be summarized as follows. The Space Foundation shows four categories: satellite services, launch industry, satellite manufacturing and ground equipment. The Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales (French Association of Aeronautics and Space Industry e GIFAS) divides it into three categories: space systems manufacturers (satellite industry), propulsion systems manufacturers, and equipment manufacturers. Based on research,
The Republic of Korea’s space development program was created almost 40 years behind those of the advanced countries but it has nevertheless made remarkable progress. This includes the construction of the Naro Space Center and the development of 10 satellites using indigenous technology. Space development planning, policy implementation, research and development (R&D) and commercialization of spacecraft have thus far been led by the government. Earlier Korean space policy was mainly focused on technology catch-up, while an industrial development strategy was not well considered, leading to problems such as a dearth of total system space manufacturing companies, a lack of communication between industry and researchers and a concentration of projects inside the country’s principle space research institute, the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). This article argues that KARI’s role needs to be changed to one with a much greater emphasis on technology transfer in order to invigorate Korean space companies and to guide the strategic growth of the industry.
* Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.J. Lee). 0265-9646/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.09.008
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KARI also has its own categories, as shown in Fig. 1 [2]. These definitions and categorizations of the space industry are different according to the industrial condition of each country and reflect specific circumstances. Thus, in order to discuss the Korean space industry, it is necessary to know the definition and categorization of it. For this reason, we will discuss the space industry and policy of Korea using the country’s own definition.
Table 1 Rationales and space policy [4]. Time line activity
Beginnings
Present
Future
Military
Military Space
Scientific
Space Science
Force Support Force Enhancement Earth Science Astronomy
1.3. Importance of space industry in Korea
Civil
1.3.1. Ideology of space development During the first space era, countries pursued space development for economic advantage, for military advantage, for prestige, and for the dream of space [3]. Generally, in the early stages, national rationales of space development focused on scientific knowledge and national security. The space race between the USA and the USSR also could be shown as a demonstration of technology and latent military power; however, it changed to one of commercial applications and economic benefit [4]. Humanity’s thirst for knowledge or adventure was the rationale for space development in the very early stages. Van Dyke says the motives for US space development were military security both immediate and conjectural, peace and cooperation, science and technology, economics and social progress, national prestige, a variety of “special interests and ulterior motives,” and national pride. Recently T.C. Schelling has argued that deeper space development, such as exploration of Mars, should accompany practical and tangible benefits [5]. The various rationales for pursuing a space program are shown in Table 1. However, unlike these advanced countries, Korea started its space development some 30 or 40 years later, and the budget available for space activity is also limited. Because of this, Korea cannot handle the whole area of space development, but has to focus on the most important and most urgent areas. According to Kim, the Korean government has seen space development as a way to reinforce its industrial competitiveness. For this reason, the budget for space exploration and development has been increased continuously, regardless of changes in administration [6]. Fig. 2 shows the increase in the space budget under this principle. Under this principle, the ultimate goals of Korean space development are as follows: to achieve an independent capability in space by development of core space technologies; to become one of the top 10 countries in the world’s space industry market; to improve the national quality of life through achievements and applications in space; and to inspire public pride with successful space development. Cho argues that Korean science and technology policy is based on “techno nationalism”. That is, industrial competitiveness is a key component in science and technology
Commercial
Human Spaceflight Technology Development
Space Control Force Application Planets Asteroids Environment Human Habitation Human Exploration Economic Competitiveness
Space Industry
Satellite
Launch
Ground Facility
Satellite Application
System Main body Payload
System The 2nd stage The top part Pairing
Satellite and launch vehicle support
Remote sensing Broadcasting Communication GPS system Space science
Fig. 1. Categories of the Aerospace Industry [2].
Space Shuttle Space Station Commercial Applications
policy [8], and the main goal of Korean space development is commercialism with enhancement of industrial competitiveness. 2. Space development elsewhere Various countries have pursued space development and prioritized their space industry. This section considers the space policies of other countries in order to gain insights from their experiences which may aid Korea’s space industry. 2.1. Space development of Western countries After the end of the Second World War, German rocket scientists were scattered to countries which belonged to the Allied side, specifically the USA, the USSR and France. There they provided the technological base for these countries’ space programs through their development of the V-2 rocket, the ancestor of all modern rockets. These countries led space development world-wide; each had a national agency or laboratory for space development. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was founded in 1958 and has expanded continuously from its establishment. It holds the leading position in world space development as the biggest civil space organization. In addition, NASA has performed co-work with private companies including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman [9e11]. European countries have followed a similar path. France was the first country to start space projects in Europe. It wanted to decrease the gap with the USA in the space field, so public research institutes were established. These institutes cooperated with industry on an enormous technology program. The Centre National D’études Spatiales (French National Space Research Institute; CNES) was founded in 1961 and led a national launch vehicle program. The UK also started space development in the early 1960s. British space policy was to make industry and science contribute to society by reinforcing industrial competitiveness. This concept led the UK to concentrate on communications technology. After the establishment of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975, the UK turned over foundational research such as launch vehicle development to ESA and focused on support activities which had a high probability of industrial development. British space development was led by the British National Space Centre (BNSC), which performed the role of managing space projects and operating local centers. In 2010, the BNSC was replaced by a new United Kingdom Space Agency. ESA now leads European space development [12,13]. China, as a communist country, has shown a different strategy. Although Chinese space development was also led by the government, it pursued development not by national laboratory, but by administrative agencies. China started its space development in 1956 as part of a strategy for national economic development and founded its first research institution e the fifth Academy of the Ministry of National Defense. Because China considered the
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(billion won) 350
300
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200
150
100
50
0 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
(year) Fig. 2. Annual Budget of Space Development of Korean Government [7].
development of rocket and propulsion engine technology to be one of its national priorities, it established specialist administrative agencies, e.g. the seventh ministry of Machine-Building Industry (1964) and the Ministry of Aerospace Industry (1988). The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) was founded in 1993. In this way, although the form of leading agency has been different, China has developed a space industry well. After the breakdown of its relationship with the USSR in 1960, China succeeded in making the Dong Feng 1, a rocket based on the Soviet R-2 rocket that same year. By launching the Dong Fang Hong-1 using the Changzeong 1, China became the fifth country to launch a satellite with its own technology. Chinese space technology has advanced continuously, and the country has succeeded in launching a manned spaceship. Chinese space policy is aiming for the establishment of an Earth observation system for civil and military use, an independent GPS system, and commercialization of space technology in the 2000s [14,15]. Japanese space development started with rocket research. Research on a pencil rocket by the Institute of Industrial Science in the University of Tokyo was the starting point and the institute was renamed the Institute of Space Aeronautical Science (ISAS) in 1964. The National Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) and National Space Development Agency (NASDA) were established in 1963 and 1969, respectively, while the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) was founded in 2003 and included NAL, NASDA, and ISAS. Japanese space technology has developed for over 50 years, and the country has achieved many successes. Although it was dependent on US technology in the early years, it has achieved its own technological excellence, and is now independent in the space field. However, while successful in terms of technology development, Japan has thus far failed to establish a strong industrial base. Lately it has tried to change the focus of its space development to concentrate on practical applications, private needs, and international cooperation [16e19].
institute, KARI. Korea’s space development started in the late 1980s with the establishment of the Satellite Technology Research Center (SaTReC) and KARI. KITSAT-1, the first Korean satellite, was launched in 1992, and then KITSAT -2 and KITSAT-3 were developed. Note that Korea learned about satellite technology via partnerships with international companies and by sending engineers abroad for training. After that, the leadership of Korean space development was concentrated in KARI rather than SaTReC. In 1996, the Korean government created a long-term and midterm plan for space development. Based on this the country developed further satellite missions, including the Science and Technology Satellite series (STSAT-1, 2); the Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite projects (KOMPSAT-1, 2); and the KOREASAT series (KOREASAT-1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Korea also launched a Communication, Ocean and Meteorological Satellite (COMS) successfully, so it has 12 satellites, as of the time of this writing. Research on rocketry has also been performed. KARI developed the Korean Science Rocket series (KSR-1, 2, 3); within this, KSR-III was the first Korean liquid propellant rocket. The Korean Satellite Launch Vehicle-I (KSLV-I) is anticipating a third launch, and KSLV-2 has also been developed. At present, Korea is making efforts to develop technology for space applications. The first Korea Astronaut Program ran from 2006 to 2008 with Russia. Participation in a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Project and the International Space Station (ISS) also illustrated Korea’s efforts to participate in international cooperative missions and the practical use of space. KARI has the leadership role in most Korean space development projects. Other participants in space activities include the Agency of Defense Development (ADD), the SaTReC, and several companies. While these other organizations contribute to Korean space projects, KARI remains firmly in charge [12,20e22]. 3.2. Problem of Korean space development
3. Korean space policy 3.1. Space development of Korea Like many other space advanced countries, Korea has undertaken its space development mainly through a national research
Korea has followed a widespread strategy by using a national research institute, and Korean space development has progressed well. However, many problems have also surfaced. The main problem is an immature level of space industry development. Although the rhetoric of the Korean space program emphasizes the
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goal of reinforcing industrial competitiveness, scientific aims have dominated the program until now. As mentioned above, because most space development has been done by government research institutions, the space industry has not had the opportunity to grow. The size of the Korean space industry has gradually increased, from a value of 779 billion won (2005) to one of 981 billion won (2008). Despite this increase, total industry size is still very small and the workforce is also small. Only 307 people worked in the space industry in 2009. To give some perspective, 9473 people worked in the aviation industry in 2009 [2]. The challenges faced by the Korean space industry can be divided into several specific problems. One is that the Korean space industry is mainly composed of space services and applications companies. Although it is natural for this industry to be larger than the space manufacturing industry because of the size of the market, the satellite application industry occupies over 70% of the Korean space industry. This shows that the industry has a weak foundation in technological design and fabrication. Without a domestic space manufacturing industry, the Korean space community has to depend on other advanced countries. The space equipment manufacturing industry in Korea has been growing quickly, but it is still very small compared with the space applications industry. Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate this situation. The structure of the space equipment manufacturing industry is also a source of concern. While there are 65 companies involved with space development, few of these have the capacity to develop complete space systems or key satellite components. An exception to this trend is the Satrec Initiative (Satrec-I) company, a spin off from the SaTReC university laboratory. Satrec-I has the capability to serve as system integrator for small Earth observation satellites, but its activities mainly serve foreign clients. For domestic programs Korea needs to import many technologies and components from other countries at high cost in order to develop new systems such as a space launch vehicle. Over 60% of the space-related companies have fewer than 100 employees, while 47.7% of these companies have turnovers of less than 1 billion won in sales [2]. Because there are few large companies that serve as total system integrators or manufacture key components, small companies cannot secure enough orders from the large firms, making it difficult for small companies to grow. This is one of the key limitations of the Korean space industry. Table 2 shows the structure of Korean space industry. The second problem is that research in universities and research institutions is divorced from most companies’ needs. The proportion of activities within the space industry supports this assertion. The majority of the market is found in space applications and services. It is 72.1% of industrial profit in the space market. In contrast, research institutions and universities
Ground facillity 20%
Launch vehicle 3%
Satellite 5% Satellite application 72%
Fig. 3. Market Size of Korean Space Industry [2].
concentrate on the manufacturing of space equipment such as satellites, launch vehicles and ground equipment [2]. This mismatch hinders further space industry development. Korean space companies and research institutions should have better communication and cooperation for more efficient space industry development given limited resources and market size. The central problem is that most space development projects are monopolized by the national research institution, and there is limited support from government and the national institution for the private sector. It is very difficult for a private enterprise to use expensive experimental devices and materials that belong to the government. Therefore the government needs to establish a program of standard fees for using devices and materials, in order to support private enterprises R&D activities. While Korean space development started with a very small university research laboratory (SaTReC), the Korean government’s current emphasis is in space development mostly evolves around the bigger institution, KARI. Since the government’s current system is focused on KARI and long-established enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises which entered the aerospace industry late face difficulties. In such a situation good scientists and engineers prefer to work for a government research institution rather than for small companies. This means that core technologies are mainly developed in government research laboratories. Technology transfer from the government research institution to the private sector is also lacking. It is difficult to make synergistic space industry development within the nation-wide aerospace industry because of the dearth of information and technology exchanges between institutions and businesses in Korea. 4. The future direction for space industry development in Korea Space development is highly risky and requires a great amount of resources (budget, time and personnel). Consequently, Korean space development has been led by government via the national research institute, KARI. Despite this strategy, Korea remains at the level of an immature space industry. For this reason, we need to examine how a vibrant space industry was developed elsewhere through leadership of a national institute. In the following section, the role of the national laboratory in space industry development in the USA and Japan will be analyzed. Then proposals regarding the future role of KARI will be made. 4.1. National agencies and laboratories in the USA and Japan 4.1.1. The case of the USA NASA has performed a crucial role supporting technology transfer to the private sector and commercialization of space technology in the USA, the most developed country in space. NASA’s individual centers manage Technology Transfer Offices separately; however, these are connected and support technology transfer between each other. At the central leadership level at NASA Headquarters, the Office of the Chief Technologist coordinates the center-based offices for technology transfer out of and into NASA [12]. NASA also operates websites and programs to support technology transfer and commercialization. NASA TechFinder is one website the agency manages to support commercialization of its technology. The TechFinder site is “a resource that enables commercial and private users to perform searches or request more detailed information for technology opportunities, licensing opportunities, past success stories, and feature technology leads.” This quote shows its aim of technology transfer clearly [24].
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Fig. 4. Sales Turnover of Korean Space Industry.
Other programs are Biz Tech, Emerging Technology Center (ETC), NASA Commercialization Center (NCC), Mississippi Enterprise for Technology (MET), Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program. NCC and MET have set their sights on commercialization of NASA’s research and NASA has researched new technology in partnership with companies in the ETC and SBIR programs, with the technology subsequently to be commercialized and enter the market. NASA also has supported technology transfer to US industry via other institutions like the National Technology Transfer Center (NTTC) since 1989. NTTC provides information on federal
technology and services related to technology transfer. It also operates a training program on technology commercialization with NASA [10,23]. In this way, NASA has performed a major role in commercialization and growing the space industry. 4.1.2. The case of Japan [16,25e27] Japan has many similarities with Korea: its government leads national space development, and it has also prioritized industrial development and technology catch-up. For these reasons, Japan’s experience offers lessons for Korea. In the Japanese case, the
Table 2 Distribution of Korean space companies.
Satellite
Launching vehicle
Total System
Main Component
Sub Component
Fabrication
Satrec-I
Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) Korean Air Hyundai Wia Corporation Satrec-I
KTM Engineering Hanback Electronics PDK M&M Lynx Dodam Systems Swagelok High Gain Antenna Doowon Heavy Industry Ureatac Ensol Samyang Composite Technology Hanyang Navicom Firstec
Daesan Korean E&G Yeonhab Precision AMI
Hanwha (Aerospace Division) Korea Air Samsung Techwin C&Space Vitzrotech
Hanwha Hanyang ENG S&S Valve Doowon Heavy Industry Danam Systems Ground Facility Satellite Application
Samsung Techwin
Firstec STX Engine
HizeAero Daemyung Hy-Lok Korea
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national research institution, JAXA, has led development of the space industry. Japanese politicians said that they would support industrial competitiveness and commercialization of space technology through JAXA in the agency’s founding ceremony. Cooperation with industry was a key component of the new space policy implemented through JAXA. The strategy of the Japanese space industry consists of various approaches, including technology transfer to the private sector; sharing capital equipment; bridging research laboratories and companies; and raising public awareness. Technology transfer is performed by the Intellectual Property Program, Technology Transfer Program and Venture Supporting Program. JAXA holds a great deal of intellectual property (IP) in the space field because its major space activity is related to new technology R&D at national research institutes. To use the IP commercially JAXA makes the IP and ideas available on a website. Many research results have an impact on industrial development and are reapplied outside the space field as spin-offs. The financial effect of such spin-offs is estimated at over 60 trillion yen. The other mode of technology transfer is supporting venture companies. This differs from other technology transfer programs because the main actors are the members of JAXA. Using these technology transfer methods, JAXA puts its technology to practical use. While research can be done more efficiently by a research laboratory, commercialization should be performed by private companies. The Japanese case is a good example for Korea. JAXA shares its capital equipment with outside organizations. Many types of equipment for space development and research are highly specialized and extremely expensive for private firms to access. Because of this challenge, it is difficult for each company to have all the facilities they need. Sometimes this factor forms a barrier that limits the ability of private companies to enter the space industry. JAXA grants concessions that allow private companies to use its facilities when it is not using them itself. JAXA has regional branches in order to maintain better connections with different areas of the country. JAXA’s headquarters and the Earth Observation Research Center are in Tokyo, but other research centers are spread all round the country, e.g. the Nosiro Testing Center and Tsukuba Space Center. At least eight regional branches provide support that allows companies to use JAXA’s facilities. JAXA also serves as the bridge between research laboratories and companies, or between companies. The Space Open Lab program is an online, virtual laboratory for businesses in the space field. Companies, universities, researchers or other users can communicate with each other in the Space Open Lab. Such cooperation facilitates efficient solutions which can be supported by JAXA. This enhanced communication not only produces new projects, but also helps the research laboratory study the technologies that companies practically need. JAXA provides support in various ways, such as technology consulting to increase participation in the Space Open Lab. In addition, JAXA holds a number of events to raise public awareness in cooperation with industry, universities and government. 4.2. Proposed role of KARI The national research institute is important in space development and the growth of the industry. The US and Japanese cases show the importance of the national agencies and research institutes in technology transfer and the development of a domestic space industry. Korea has several similarities with Japan. Korean space development has been government-led, and Korea is heading toward more mature space industry development. This section argues that the structure and role of KARI should be shifted to advance the Korean space industry’s capacity. Several recommendations are presented below.
4.2.1. Local branches Many countries manage not just one central research institution, but also local branches of the laboratory. KARI has centers in two places: the main research facility in Daejeon and the Naro Space Center in Goheung in Jeollanam-do. The Naro Space Center was established to launch the KSLV-1 (Korean Satellite Launch Vehicle-1). It is only used as a launch site for rockets and as the home of the space science museum, not as a hub for development of the space industry [28]. It can be said, therefore, that KARI does not truly have local branches to support the space industry. One effect of having more regional branches of KARI would be to help the local space industry become more efficient. As in the Japanese case, a local branch of KARI also can facilitate the sharing of equipment, facilities for testing and experiences within the industry. Many Korean space companies are small so it is difficult for them to own all the facilities they need. This problem is one reason that companies cannot enter the space industry easily. Sharing equipment lowers the entry barrier to the space industry, and it encourages more companies to participate. Having local branches of KARI could also help existing companies. KARI is currently in charge of quality certification of space products. Industrial participants are required to go to KARI in Daejeon in order to have their products examined for quality tests. If local branches could perform the role of test center, companies could get their products certified more easily. This would encourage space development at a wider industry level. A key example is the province of Gyeongsang, where there are many aerospace companies; other examples include Sacheon and Youngchen, which have an aerospace industrial estate. The proposal for a local branch of KARI follows the pattern of many other countries. Local branches of KARI would be a basic strategy for encouraging the space industry. 4.2.2. Supporting program for establishment and growth of companies This paper has argued that a major shortfall of the Korean space industry is that almost all manufacturing companies are small fabrication and sub-component companies. This situation is the result of a policy in which KARI leads most space projects, and research results are only available within KARI for security reasons. Most space systems can only be made by KARI, or ADD. Satrec-I is the only company that can serve as the prime contractor for complete satellite systems. KARI should encourage other firms to achieve this capability through technology transfer. The US and Japanese cases show several effective strategies; two of which may be useful to stimulate more vigorous industry growth. One strategy is to encourage members of KARI to start venture companies. The USA and Japan have used this method to encourage their space industries and Satrec-I is a successful case in the Korean space industry, showing that it can be done. Satrec-I was founded by members of the SaTReC at Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Companies established this way have reliable technology, which gives them a high probability of success. A second strategy would be for KARI to transfer its technology to private companies. This could done more promptly than the previous method; however, it is hard to transfer technology completely and make firms competitive. As more firms are created to serve as prime contractors for complete space systems, small component and fabrication companies will be able to get more work from domestic prime contracting companies. This will invigorate the Korean space industry.
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4.2.3. Creating a space policy for communication among industry participants We propose an open space for communication between industry, universities, and research laboratories like the Japanese Open Lab. Intimate relationships and strong communication between researchers and companies are extremely important for supporting industrialization and commercialization. Most research funds in universities come from government agencies. The amount of university research funding from government is almost 14 times larger than funding from private organizations. Technology transfer from researchers to companies also does not occur frequently. This suggests that scientists and engineers study different areas from those that technology companies want. An open space for free communication among members of the space industry would facilitate the “match-making” between technology supplies and industry needs. When researchers work more closely with industry partners and response directly to international trends in space technology development, technology transfer will be performed more effectively.
5. Conclusion Korea’s space development efforts were initiated 40 years behind advanced countries. It has nevertheless been making remarkable progress, including the construction of Korea’s Naro Space Center and the possession of a sizable number of satellites developed by Korean technology. There are, however, a number of problems in Korean space development policy. The overall challenges for the immature Korean space industry include the absence of prime contracting companies, lack of communication between researchers and industry, and concentrated authority within KARI. This has to be improved to allow a better future for Korean space development. For successful space development, Korea should establish a new role for the country’s central organization (KARI), involving countrywide branches, delegation of research work and creation of a space for all players in the space industry to communicate, in order to invigorate commercialization of its space industry.
Acknowledgments We thank Danielle Wood at MIT for her valuable comments and assistance with improving the manuscript. This work was supported by KAIST Research Grant #G04100014.
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