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Spain: highs and lows of 20 years of HSR operation
Journal of Transport Geography 31 (2013) 201–206
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Transport Geography journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jtrangeo
Viewpoint
Spain: highs and lows of 20 years of HSR operation Begoña Guirao ⇑ Departamento de Ingeniería Civil: Transportes, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), Spain ETSI Caminos, Canales y Puertos, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Avda. Profesor Aranguren, s/n., 28040 Madrid, Spain
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords: High-speed rail line Transportation planning Economic assessment Accessibility impacts
a b s t r a c t This paper has been written in response to the Viewpoint contribution by the author Button (2012) entitled: ‘‘Is there any economic justification for high-speed railways in the United States?’’. In this article, the Spanish HSR high-speed rail network is used as an argument against certain HSR investments. Several of the data presented by the author are misleading and some of the information given in connection with Spain is incomplete. As the Journal of Transport Geography is widely read by policymakers and the scientific community, Button’s misrepresentation could cause serious damage. We therefore set out to clarify the data used by Kenneth Button and to explore some points in greater detail, although in no case eschewing criticism of Spain. Although excessive Spanish investment in public infrastructure over the last twenty years has probably had a negative impact on the real estate bubble, investments in HSR infrastructure in Spain have specifically been accompanied by two particular facts that need to be distinguished from other countries’ experience. These facts cannot be overlooked and will be discussed in this paper. They relate firstly to the total amount of European funds used in HSR construction and secondly to the technological and scientific innovations developed in Spain linked to the HSR market. Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Some real facts presented by Kenneth Button The construction of the first high-speed rail (HSR) lines in countries like United States and the UK, immersed in a climate of financial instability since the onset of the global crisis of 2007–2008, has reopened the debate among the scientific community specializing in HSR. In 2012, Volume 22 of the Journal of Transport Geography included –at a very timely moment– a special section on rail transit systems and high-speed rail (Goetz, 2012) featuring an in-depth discussion of the first American HSR Strategic Plan (FRA, 2009) developed by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). This special section contained an analysis that made clear and continuous reference to the European HSR experience. Although some authors support the new projects (Johnson, 2012; Ryder, 2012), opponents express grave concerns over the extremely elevated costs of highspeed and the ability of today’s governments to fund these systems. Button’s (2012) contribution belongs to the latter group and most of his arguments are accurately referenced. In February 2009 and as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Congress allocated 8 billion dollars to be granted to states for intercity rail projects, with priority to projects that support the development of high speed intercity service (Goetz, 2012). Previously, high-speed rail in the United States had ⇑ Address: Departamento de Ingeniería Civil: Transportes, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), Spain. Tel.: +34 913366784; fax: +34 913366654. E-mail address: [email protected] 0966-6923/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2013.05.010
been limited to Amtrak’s Acela Express Service, which runs along the Northeast Corridor (from Boston to Washington, DC) at speeds averaging 110 km/h for the entire distance, although briefly reaching 240 km/h at times. This ARRA was accompanied in April 2009 by the publication of the first American High-Speed Rail (HSR) Strategic Plan, an ambitious document proposing ten priority HSR corridors. As Button remarks, the US scenario for the implementation of HSR differs widely from its European counterparts. Furthermore, most authors (Guirao, 2010) concur as to the ‘‘controversial’’ nature of the definition of HSR given in the American Strategic Plan, as it refers not to a new infrastructure but to the type of service (Express, Regional and Emerging). Emerging and Regional lines (with speeds under 250 km/h) cannot be considered ‘‘pure HSR’’ under European standards (The Council of the European Union, 1996), and the vast majority of the HSR corridors in the American Strategic Plan barely fall into this last group (Emerging). In 2011, the development of the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program HSIPRP (FRA, 2011a) by the Federal Railroad Administration showed clearly that the first express route scheduled for construction as a new infrastructure that can realistically be termed ‘‘highspeed’’ according to European standards is the California portion, consisting of the San Francisco–Sacramento–Los Angeles–San Diego line (CHSRA, 2012). In view of the fact that only new American HSR Express corridors will have construction and operation costs comparable to European and Asian HSR lines, the FRA takes an interesting approach
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in its Strategic Plan: not all the proposed HSR corridors will require the same type of passenger rail service. This approach reveals a genuine HSR planning process, in which an analysis is made of the particular features of each candidate corridor before funding. The FRA should have developed a mechanism to assess which corridors across the nation have the greatest potential demand for high-speed rail, and would thus provide the greatest transportation, economic, and social benefits. This type of approach has not been used in Europe, even in countries that currently have an extensive HSR network (such as Spain or France), and this has caused subsequent problems of rail accessibility and transport integration for some populations. France and Spain both have custom-built HSR lines, and conventional trains rarely share tracks with HSR trains. Germany uses a coordinated program of improvements in infrastructure, rolling stock, and service, upgrading much of the mainline track network for speeds of 200 km/h. This has allowed Intercity Express ICE trains to efficiently share tracks with other trains and enabled Germany to expand its HSR network quickly and cost-effectively. One of the main problems in the Spanish transportation infrastructure network in the last twenty years concerns the planning process: the HSR network should have been better integrated into the transportation network. Givoni and Banister (2012) pointed out that ‘‘. . .the promotion of HST is often at the expense, and not in addition, to other rail initiatives. . . Most of the passengers transferring to HST from other modes are likely to have used conventional rail services before. In such a competitive situation, the HST investment is likely to take preference over other rail investments. This can result in the deterioration of conventional rail services, and may in turn reduce the overall viability of rail transport across a country or region, even if HST gains a significant market share in the few city pairs it serves. Such effects can be seen in France and Spain.’’ It is quite possible that with fewer kilometers of new HSR lines but a better integrated rail system Spain would have enjoyed better results in terms of profitability. In relation to HSR profitability specifically, the paper by Spanish researchers De Rus and Nombela (2007) was the first to estimate the required minimum level of demand from which investment in HSR could be considered profitable from a social perspective. They used the real costs of construction, maintenance and rolling stock for the European HSR lines in operation, in addition to potential time savings, standard values of time and expected growth of demand. They conclude that ‘‘from actual construction, rolling stock, maintenance and operating costs of European HSR lines, average values of time, a reasonable range of potential travel time savings, and a 5% discount rate, we have found that HSR investment is difficult to justify when the expected first-year demand is below 8–10 million passengers for a line of 500 km, an optimal length for HSR to compete with road and air transport (assuming that the volume of demand is high enough to get a low average fixed cost, or alternatively HSR fares are subsidized)’’. Although this approach is generally accepted by the scientific community, it is clear that the wider economic benefits of high speed are difficult to estimate, as they are swamped by many – not inconsiderable – external factors such as territorial impacts. Social benefits can be estimated not only according to potential time savings, standard values of time or expected growth of demand. Territorial impacts may lead directly to social and economic benefits, and although they are difficult to estimate and analyze, some Spanish authors have attempted to study these benefits. Gutierrez (2001) directly measured the accessibility impacts of the future Madrid–Barcelona–French border HSR line. His estimate revealed that while the new HSR line would increase territorial inequity at the national level, the same line would reduce the disparity in accessibility at the European and corridor level (as peripheral small and medium-sized cities would gain greater accessibility benefits than large central cities). These early studies on the
territorial impacts of HSR focused on polarization, and warned of the risk of ‘‘peripheralization of the periphery’’ in order to achieve equity in terms of territorial cohesion. In most cases, the introduction of HSR services has diminished the number of conventional long-distance services that also provided regional and sub-regional connections. This is a different approach from the traditional efficiency impact studies that analyze HSR in terms of providing an efficient link between major urban areas. Recent studies following this same line of research include Ortega et al. (2012) which analyzed the impact of high-speed rail on territorial cohesion at different planning levels with accessibility indicators. Ureña et al. (2009) studied HSR impacts at different territorial levels and concluded that HSR systems helped large intermediate cities attract mid-level business and technical consultancy firms, urban tourism, and interregional conferences, in addition to increasing the regional centrality of these cities in relation to smaller cities. Garmendía et al. (2012) noted that – at the territorial level – most academic research is devoted to two phenomena: new inter-city relationships, and the wider spatial implications of HSR. These authors indicated in regard to this latter issue that HSR can modify the urban hierarchy of the regional system. On the local level, one of the main challenges for the development of European HSR is the way in which cities will be served by the stations, as the role played by HSR stations can also condition territorial impacts. This review of the literature clearly reveals that these territorial impacts are barely taken into account in HSR profitability studies (probably due to the complexity of their analysis and quantification). Button refers to HSR profitability in his article, and points out that only the Paris–Lyon (France) and Tokyo–Osaka (Japan) HSR lines cover their full costs. We agree that these two lines are the oldest and most consolidated HSR in the world. However, when discussing the French HRS operator (SCNF), Button mentions the Spanish network in footnote 4 (page 300): The costs of the Spanish Alta Velocidad Española (AVE) network do not include the $130 billion in construction costs borne by taxpayers. The Toledo, Cuenca and Albacete line, which cost €3.5 billion and opened in late 2010, carried only nine passengers per day and the route, which failed even to cover its €18,000 daily operating costs, was closed in summer 2011 (Govan, 2008). These statements are totally misleading. Fig. 1 shows the current Spanish HSR network. Spain, with more than 20 years of operating experience, has the longest HSR network in Europe (2900 km) and is the second in the worldwide ranking after China. Toledo–Cuenca–Albacete was not an infrastructure line, but a ‘‘service’’ with a stop at Atocha station in Madrid. The Madrid– Toledo line (75 km) was opened in 2005 to link the national capital with one of the most popular tourist destinations in our country (Guirao and Soler, 2009). Madrid–Cuenca–Albacete is part of the Madrid–Valencia line (opened in 2010, 391 km). Traffic between Madrid and Toledo was 1,490,000 passengers in 2011, while the O–D pair of Madrid–Valencia totaled 1,836,500 in 2011. It is true, as Button remarked, that services between Toledo and Albacete were closed in the summer of 2011 due to practically non-existent demand. The decision to open this service was completely unjustified owing to the lack of planning and demand forecasts; however, the figure of €3.5 billion does not correspond only to this segment of infrastructure, and the tracks still continue to be used for all the remaining services. It should also be noted that the service offered by the operator failed to attract its full potential demand due to two significant failings which had not been resolved by June 2010. One was that the HSR trains stopped in Madrid, which increased travel time between the rest of the destination pairs (Toledo, Albacete and
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Fig. 1. The Spanish HSR network (2012).
Cuenca). The other factor reducing passenger demand was that the features of the service such as the schedule, frequency and fares did not allow for commuting. For a better understanding of the development of the Spanish HSR network, it should be noted that the Spanish HSR network today has a clearly radial architecture, although for over ten years only 471 km were in operation. The Madrid–Seville line, inaugurated in 1992, marked the beginning of the construction of an ambitious high-speed railway network in Spain (Guirao, 2006), which has been used from the start for two types of services: long-distance services and regional shuttle services, both with practically the same quality of trains and speeds. In Spain, competition between air transportation and HSR rail has caused the loss of over 40% of the market share in links such as Madrid–Seville (opened in 1992), Madrid–Malaga (2007), Madrid–Barcelona (2008) and Madrid–Valencia (2010). Despite this fact, the busiest Spanish domestic air route is Madrid–Barcelona
which in 2008 was also the busiest route inside the European Union, carrying 3,497,696 passengers. Table 1 contains a detailed description of current HSR services in Spain, divided into long-distance and regional services. Regional HSR links offer a high frequency of service (from 22 to 26 shuttles per workday, both ways) and the possibility of buying a season ticket (40 trips a month) with discounts of up to 50% off the single ticket fare. This type of service has generated high commuter HSR traffic and is the reason that today some cities located less than 200 km away from Madrid can be considered as being part of its metropolitan area (Ciudad Real, Toledo, Segovia, etc.). For example, the first regional link shown in Table 2 is Madrid–Ciudad Real– Puertollano. Shuttles depart from Madrid to Ciudad Real (171 km from Madrid, 50 min) and continue onto Puertollano (209 km from Madrid, 15 min from Ciudad Real). These shuttles use a portion of the Madrid–Seville line, but return to Madrid after their stop in Puertollano. Taking into account all the services provided by the
Table 1 Spanish HSR services. Source: Observatorio del Ferrocarril en España. 2011. Fundación de los Ferrocarriles Españoles. Origin (population)
a
Destination (population)
Distance (km)
Year service opened
Travel time from origin (min)
Passengers 2011
Main long-distance HSR services Madrid (3,265,038) Seville (703,021) Zaragoza (674,725) Malaga (568,030) Barcelona (1,615,448) Valencia (798,033)
471 306 513 621 391
1992 2003 2007 2008 2010
150 75 150 150 100
2,137,026 1,175,053 1,433,361 2,545,907 1,836,500
Main regional HSR servicesa Madrid Ciudad Real (74,798) Puertollano (52,200) Madrid Toledo (83,108) Madrid Segovia (55,220) Valladolid (313,437) Seville Cordoba 328,547 Malaga (568,030) Barcelona Tarragona (140.323) Lérida (138,416)
171 209 75 70 180 127 296 98 206
1992 1992 2005 2008 2007 2004 2008 2008 2008
50 65 30 35 56 45 65 35 70
596,944 295,536 1,497,660 596,944 547.471 557,979 104,317 86,597 359,307
Only shuttle services. Traffic 2011 does not include passengers using long-distance trains with stops in these medium-sized cities.
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Table 2 European financing of the Spanish high-speed network. Source: European Parlament (June 2012). Policy department d: budgetary affairs. Political, Economic and Regional Situation in Spain. Background note CONT delegation to Spain. 19–21 June 2012. High speed lines co-financed with European funds
EU amount
Co-financed by
Madrid–Barcelona–French border
€3.3581 billion €70.9 million €10.6 million
Cohesion Fund (2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Seville
€267.3 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
Cordoba Malaga
€953.8 million €1 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)(2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Valladolid
€1,573.7 million €193.3 million €20.6 million €177.5 million €68 million €750 million
Cohesion Fund (2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Toledo
€102.2 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Castilla La Mancha–Valencia–Murcia Region (Levante Line)
€574.1 million €99.4 million €28.5 million €48.2 million €725.8 million €159.4 million €246 million €67.6 million €1.3 million
Cohesion Fund (2000–2006 period)
€201.2 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the 2007–2013 Operational Program of Galicia
Madrid–Galicia–Ourense–Santiago and Zamora Lubian
TEN-T Funding (2000–2006 period) TEN-T Funding (2007–2013 period
European Investment Bank (EIB)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (2000–2006 period) TEN-T Funding (2000–2006 period) Cohesion Fund within the Cohesion Fund – EDRF Operational Program (2007–2013 period) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (2007–2013 period) European Investment Bank (EIB)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Valencia Region’s Integrated Operational Program (2000–2006 period) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Murcia Region’s Integrated Operational Program (2000–2006 period) TEN-T Funding (2000–2006 period) Cohesion Fund within the ERDF Cohesion Fund Operational Program (2007–2013 period) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Valencia Region’s 2007–2013 Integrated Operational Program Operational Program of Castile-La Mancha 2007–2013 Operational Program of Murcia 2007–2013 European Investment Bank (EIB)
operating company (RENFE Operadora) the Madrid–Seville tracks were used in 2011 by more than 7 million passengers. The Spanish experience has demonstrated that the success or failure of a new HSR line does not rely only on speed, but on door-to-door travel time; and this factor depends on the integration of the entire transport system. As indicated by Givoni and Banister (2012), speed is the less important element of the high-speed train. Fortunately, the HSR California project is being developed following the model of Transit Oriented Development (TOD). Throughout the literature, TOD projects are referred to by a variety of names, including transit-focused development, transit-based development, transit-supportive development, or transit villages. As with its name, the definition of TOD varies between researchers. According to Bernick and Cervero (1997), who prefer the term ‘‘transit village,’’ TOD consists of a ‘‘compact, mixed-use community, centered on a transit station that, by design, invites residents, workers, and shoppers to drive their cars less and ride mass transit more.’’ Thankfully, in 2011 the American High-Speed Intercity Rail Program HSIRP did include a call for transit-oriented development around stations (FRA, 2011b), and the layout of the HSR line will connect the main California airports.
2. The added value generated by high-speed rail in Spain Button’s conclusions (page 302) end with a paragraph containing a clear reference to Spain’s current financial crisis: ‘‘Simply stimulating an open economy by increasing public indebtedness inevitably pulls in imports, unless it more than proportionately enhances the economic efficiency of the nation’s economy. The Spanish idea that all major cities should be linked by HSR or the US’s idea that 80% of the population should have access to HSR, both concepts paying no regard to cost or demand, are arbitrary with no solid foundation in analysis, and as countries such as Spain have found out, can have serious adverse consequences on employment and the well-being of future generations’’. There is no clear direct cause–effect relationship between the Spanish financial crisis and HSR investments. Although the latest Spanish investments in high-speed rail at the start of the financial crisis were highly controversial (one of the most widely debated subjects at the time), there are two facts that cannot be overlooked: first, the total amount of funds received from the EU to
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B. Guirao / Journal of Transport Geography 31 (2013) 201–206 Table 3 World’s largest transportation developersa. Source: Public Works Financing newsletter ‘‘International Major Projects database’’. October 2012. Company
1. ACS Group/Hochtief (Spain) 2. Global Vía-FCC-Bankia (Spain) 3. Abertis (Spain) 4. Macquarie Group (Australia) 5. Vinci/Cofiroute (France) 6. Hutchison Whampoa (China) 7. Ferrovial/Cintra (Spain) 8. OHL (Spain) 9. Sacyr (Spain) 10. NWS Holdings (China)
State of the concession
Concession location
Operating or under const.
Sold or expired
Bid targets
US
Canada
Home country
All other
64 45 36 36 35 33 32 32 25 25
33 1 6 10 3 2 21 1 15 0
32 8 10 6 12 0 15 11 14 1
2 1 1 4 0 0 5 1 0 0
5 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0
20 29 11 1 11 10 8 8 15 25
37 14 24 30 22 23 16 23 10 0
a 2012 Survey of public–private partnerships worldwide. Ranked by number of road, rail, airport and seaport concessions operating or under construction as of October 2012.
construct the Spanish HSR network since 1992; and second, the technological and scientific innovations that have been developed in Spain in relation to the HSR market. 2.1. Funds received by the EU Table 2 shows the EU financing of the Spanish HSR network. Madrid–Barcelona is at the top of the most funded origin–destination links (with more than 3.3581 billion euros). Did the Spanish government make the wrong choice in its allocation of the economic help provided by the EU? 2.2. Spanish scientific and technological innovation The construction of the Spanish HSR network over the last 20 years has been developed practically entirely by Spanish research and innovation centers. This industry has evolved a significant degree of specialization and experience and is highly regarded around the world. Consultancy, engineering, construction and industrial companies cover all stages of HSR railway development: research studies, design construction, rolling stock systems, and operation and maintenance services. Spanish companies have upgraded their industrial skills and their management experience throughout the whole of the value chain of a HSR investment. The following data are revealing: 27% of exports from Spanish engineering companies correspond to railway projects (consultancy, design, project management and works supervision, operations and maintenance), and Spanish transport developers have invested over 176 BnUSD in 229 concessions (58% of all PPPs). Six of the ten largest concessionaires in transport infrastructure around the world in 2012 were Spanish (see Table 3). The companies involved in these six concessionaires have played an active role in the construction of the Spanish HSR network and are backed by widespread international experience. Behind the construction of a new HSR line are not only construction companies but also industries focused on what it is termed ‘‘rail superstructure’’ (track, signaling, electrification, detection systems, communication, control centers, rolling stock). As an example, the TALGO and CAF companies specialize in the design and manufacture of trains, as well as in the provision of maintenance services to railway operators worldwide. CAF has played a major role in supplying the Spanish high-speed train (AVE) for the Madrid–Seville and Madrid–Barcelona lines. CAF has also taken part in the production of RENFE’s shuttle service trains, which run at 250/270 km/h on intermediate sections of the same line. In 2005, CAF became the first Spanish company to export high speed technology, with the supply of 12 units to Turkish Railways.
On January 14 2012, TALGO signed a contract for a high-speed railway line between Mecca and Medina in Riad, the Saudi capital, together with the member companies of the Spanish Consortium. The award of this project to the Spanish consortium represents an overall sum of around 6700 million euros. This contract consists of an order of 1600 million euros for TALGO, which may increase to 2400 million euros with the implementation of further options. Additionally, OHL (position 8 in the ranking in Table 3), together with TALGO, is a member of the Spanish consortium scheduled to build the new Mecca–Medina HSR line. The recent invitation to tender for California’s first HSR line was met by ACS (position 1 in the ranking in Table 3), Acciona and Ferrovial (position 7). The Spanish companies Ferrovial and Acciona are part of the team California Backbone Builders, while ACS, Samsung in South Korea and PuliceT in the US are all part of another consortium. The same companies were present in the various consortia that submitted a tender for the unsuccessful Florida project. The exports of these Spanish companies and the international contracts signed represent revenues and employment for the Spanish economy, and these data should not be totally overlooked when aiming to give a balanced view. Additionally, as proved by this paper, there is a broad sector of the Spanish scientific community working on economic and territorial impact studies of HSR to great international acclaim. Finally, the reasons underlying the present Spanish financial crisis are complex, and it is probably true, as Kenneth Button remarks, that some of the infrastructure investments (not only HSR) made by the Spanish Administration should have been decided using a more rational approach. However, in our opinion, the conclusions drawn by the author at the end of his paper are an unjustified criticism which is unfairly extended to the entire process of national planning and innovation in Spain.
References Bernick, M., Cervero, R., 1997. Transit Villages in the 21st Century. McGraw Hill, New York. Button, K., 2012. Is there any economic justification for high-speed in the United States. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 300–302. California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA), 2012. Revised 2012 Business Plan. April 2012.CHSRA. Federal Railroad Administration, 2011a. High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail. Program HSIPRP. United States. Department of Transportation, Washington, DC. Federal Railroad Administration, 2011b. Office of Railroad Policy and Development. Station Area Planning for High-Speed and Intercity Passenger Rail. FRA, 2011, Washington, DC. Federal Railroad Administration FRA, 2009. Vision for High-Speed Rail in America. High-speed Strategic Plan. US Department of Transportation. FRA. April 2009, pp. 1–19. Garmendía, M., Ribalaygua, C., Ureña, J.M., 2012. High speed rail: implications for cities. Cities 29 (Suppl. 2), S26–S31.
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Givoni, M., Banister, D., 2012. Speed: the less important element of high-speed train. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 306–307. Goetz, A., 2012. Guest editorial: introduction to the special section on rail transit systems and high speed rail. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 219–220. Govan, 2008. Spain cuts high speed ‘ghost train’. The Telegraph, January, 22. Guirao, B., 2006. The Madrid–Seville experience. Journal of the Institution of Civil Engineering 159, 109–115. Guirao, B., Soler, F.J., 2009. Regional High Speed lines and small cities mobility: Toledo, a Spanish experience. In: TRB 88th Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers DVD. Washington, DC. Guirao, B., Soler, F.J., 2010. New high-speed services in the United States. Lessons from Spain. In: TRB 89th Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers DVD. Washington, DC. Gutierrez, J., 2001. Location, economic potential and daily accessibility impact of the high-speed line Madrid–Barcelona–French border. Journal of Transport Geography 9 (4), 229–242.
Johnson, B.E., 2012. American intercity passenger rail must be truly high-speed and transit-oriented. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 295–296. Ortega, E., Monzón, A., López, E., 2012. Territorial cohesion impacts of high-speed at different planning levels. Journal of Transport Geography 24, 130–141. Rus, G., Nombela, G., 2007. Is investment in high-speed rail socially profitable? Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 41 (1), 3–23. Ryder, A., 2012. High-speed rail. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 303–305. The Council of the European Union, 1996. Council Directive 96/48/CE of 23 July 1996 on the Interoperability of the Trans-European High-Speed Rail System. Appendix 1 on the Trans-European High Speed Rail, System. Ureña, J.M., Meneraut, P., Garmendía, M., 2009. The high-speed rail challenge for big intermediate cities: a national, regional and local perspective. Cities 26, 266– 279.
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of Transport Geography journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jtrangeo
Viewpoint
Spain: highs and lows of 20 years of HSR operation Begoña Guirao ⇑ Departamento de Ingeniería Civil: Transportes, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), Spain ETSI Caminos, Canales y Puertos, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Avda. Profesor Aranguren, s/n., 28040 Madrid, Spain
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords: High-speed rail line Transportation planning Economic assessment Accessibility impacts
a b s t r a c t This paper has been written in response to the Viewpoint contribution by the author Button (2012) entitled: ‘‘Is there any economic justification for high-speed railways in the United States?’’. In this article, the Spanish HSR high-speed rail network is used as an argument against certain HSR investments. Several of the data presented by the author are misleading and some of the information given in connection with Spain is incomplete. As the Journal of Transport Geography is widely read by policymakers and the scientific community, Button’s misrepresentation could cause serious damage. We therefore set out to clarify the data used by Kenneth Button and to explore some points in greater detail, although in no case eschewing criticism of Spain. Although excessive Spanish investment in public infrastructure over the last twenty years has probably had a negative impact on the real estate bubble, investments in HSR infrastructure in Spain have specifically been accompanied by two particular facts that need to be distinguished from other countries’ experience. These facts cannot be overlooked and will be discussed in this paper. They relate firstly to the total amount of European funds used in HSR construction and secondly to the technological and scientific innovations developed in Spain linked to the HSR market. Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Some real facts presented by Kenneth Button The construction of the first high-speed rail (HSR) lines in countries like United States and the UK, immersed in a climate of financial instability since the onset of the global crisis of 2007–2008, has reopened the debate among the scientific community specializing in HSR. In 2012, Volume 22 of the Journal of Transport Geography included –at a very timely moment– a special section on rail transit systems and high-speed rail (Goetz, 2012) featuring an in-depth discussion of the first American HSR Strategic Plan (FRA, 2009) developed by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). This special section contained an analysis that made clear and continuous reference to the European HSR experience. Although some authors support the new projects (Johnson, 2012; Ryder, 2012), opponents express grave concerns over the extremely elevated costs of highspeed and the ability of today’s governments to fund these systems. Button’s (2012) contribution belongs to the latter group and most of his arguments are accurately referenced. In February 2009 and as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Congress allocated 8 billion dollars to be granted to states for intercity rail projects, with priority to projects that support the development of high speed intercity service (Goetz, 2012). Previously, high-speed rail in the United States had ⇑ Address: Departamento de Ingeniería Civil: Transportes, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), Spain. Tel.: +34 913366784; fax: +34 913366654. E-mail address: [email protected] 0966-6923/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2013.05.010
been limited to Amtrak’s Acela Express Service, which runs along the Northeast Corridor (from Boston to Washington, DC) at speeds averaging 110 km/h for the entire distance, although briefly reaching 240 km/h at times. This ARRA was accompanied in April 2009 by the publication of the first American High-Speed Rail (HSR) Strategic Plan, an ambitious document proposing ten priority HSR corridors. As Button remarks, the US scenario for the implementation of HSR differs widely from its European counterparts. Furthermore, most authors (Guirao, 2010) concur as to the ‘‘controversial’’ nature of the definition of HSR given in the American Strategic Plan, as it refers not to a new infrastructure but to the type of service (Express, Regional and Emerging). Emerging and Regional lines (with speeds under 250 km/h) cannot be considered ‘‘pure HSR’’ under European standards (The Council of the European Union, 1996), and the vast majority of the HSR corridors in the American Strategic Plan barely fall into this last group (Emerging). In 2011, the development of the High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program HSIPRP (FRA, 2011a) by the Federal Railroad Administration showed clearly that the first express route scheduled for construction as a new infrastructure that can realistically be termed ‘‘highspeed’’ according to European standards is the California portion, consisting of the San Francisco–Sacramento–Los Angeles–San Diego line (CHSRA, 2012). In view of the fact that only new American HSR Express corridors will have construction and operation costs comparable to European and Asian HSR lines, the FRA takes an interesting approach
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in its Strategic Plan: not all the proposed HSR corridors will require the same type of passenger rail service. This approach reveals a genuine HSR planning process, in which an analysis is made of the particular features of each candidate corridor before funding. The FRA should have developed a mechanism to assess which corridors across the nation have the greatest potential demand for high-speed rail, and would thus provide the greatest transportation, economic, and social benefits. This type of approach has not been used in Europe, even in countries that currently have an extensive HSR network (such as Spain or France), and this has caused subsequent problems of rail accessibility and transport integration for some populations. France and Spain both have custom-built HSR lines, and conventional trains rarely share tracks with HSR trains. Germany uses a coordinated program of improvements in infrastructure, rolling stock, and service, upgrading much of the mainline track network for speeds of 200 km/h. This has allowed Intercity Express ICE trains to efficiently share tracks with other trains and enabled Germany to expand its HSR network quickly and cost-effectively. One of the main problems in the Spanish transportation infrastructure network in the last twenty years concerns the planning process: the HSR network should have been better integrated into the transportation network. Givoni and Banister (2012) pointed out that ‘‘. . .the promotion of HST is often at the expense, and not in addition, to other rail initiatives. . . Most of the passengers transferring to HST from other modes are likely to have used conventional rail services before. In such a competitive situation, the HST investment is likely to take preference over other rail investments. This can result in the deterioration of conventional rail services, and may in turn reduce the overall viability of rail transport across a country or region, even if HST gains a significant market share in the few city pairs it serves. Such effects can be seen in France and Spain.’’ It is quite possible that with fewer kilometers of new HSR lines but a better integrated rail system Spain would have enjoyed better results in terms of profitability. In relation to HSR profitability specifically, the paper by Spanish researchers De Rus and Nombela (2007) was the first to estimate the required minimum level of demand from which investment in HSR could be considered profitable from a social perspective. They used the real costs of construction, maintenance and rolling stock for the European HSR lines in operation, in addition to potential time savings, standard values of time and expected growth of demand. They conclude that ‘‘from actual construction, rolling stock, maintenance and operating costs of European HSR lines, average values of time, a reasonable range of potential travel time savings, and a 5% discount rate, we have found that HSR investment is difficult to justify when the expected first-year demand is below 8–10 million passengers for a line of 500 km, an optimal length for HSR to compete with road and air transport (assuming that the volume of demand is high enough to get a low average fixed cost, or alternatively HSR fares are subsidized)’’. Although this approach is generally accepted by the scientific community, it is clear that the wider economic benefits of high speed are difficult to estimate, as they are swamped by many – not inconsiderable – external factors such as territorial impacts. Social benefits can be estimated not only according to potential time savings, standard values of time or expected growth of demand. Territorial impacts may lead directly to social and economic benefits, and although they are difficult to estimate and analyze, some Spanish authors have attempted to study these benefits. Gutierrez (2001) directly measured the accessibility impacts of the future Madrid–Barcelona–French border HSR line. His estimate revealed that while the new HSR line would increase territorial inequity at the national level, the same line would reduce the disparity in accessibility at the European and corridor level (as peripheral small and medium-sized cities would gain greater accessibility benefits than large central cities). These early studies on the
territorial impacts of HSR focused on polarization, and warned of the risk of ‘‘peripheralization of the periphery’’ in order to achieve equity in terms of territorial cohesion. In most cases, the introduction of HSR services has diminished the number of conventional long-distance services that also provided regional and sub-regional connections. This is a different approach from the traditional efficiency impact studies that analyze HSR in terms of providing an efficient link between major urban areas. Recent studies following this same line of research include Ortega et al. (2012) which analyzed the impact of high-speed rail on territorial cohesion at different planning levels with accessibility indicators. Ureña et al. (2009) studied HSR impacts at different territorial levels and concluded that HSR systems helped large intermediate cities attract mid-level business and technical consultancy firms, urban tourism, and interregional conferences, in addition to increasing the regional centrality of these cities in relation to smaller cities. Garmendía et al. (2012) noted that – at the territorial level – most academic research is devoted to two phenomena: new inter-city relationships, and the wider spatial implications of HSR. These authors indicated in regard to this latter issue that HSR can modify the urban hierarchy of the regional system. On the local level, one of the main challenges for the development of European HSR is the way in which cities will be served by the stations, as the role played by HSR stations can also condition territorial impacts. This review of the literature clearly reveals that these territorial impacts are barely taken into account in HSR profitability studies (probably due to the complexity of their analysis and quantification). Button refers to HSR profitability in his article, and points out that only the Paris–Lyon (France) and Tokyo–Osaka (Japan) HSR lines cover their full costs. We agree that these two lines are the oldest and most consolidated HSR in the world. However, when discussing the French HRS operator (SCNF), Button mentions the Spanish network in footnote 4 (page 300): The costs of the Spanish Alta Velocidad Española (AVE) network do not include the $130 billion in construction costs borne by taxpayers. The Toledo, Cuenca and Albacete line, which cost €3.5 billion and opened in late 2010, carried only nine passengers per day and the route, which failed even to cover its €18,000 daily operating costs, was closed in summer 2011 (Govan, 2008). These statements are totally misleading. Fig. 1 shows the current Spanish HSR network. Spain, with more than 20 years of operating experience, has the longest HSR network in Europe (2900 km) and is the second in the worldwide ranking after China. Toledo–Cuenca–Albacete was not an infrastructure line, but a ‘‘service’’ with a stop at Atocha station in Madrid. The Madrid– Toledo line (75 km) was opened in 2005 to link the national capital with one of the most popular tourist destinations in our country (Guirao and Soler, 2009). Madrid–Cuenca–Albacete is part of the Madrid–Valencia line (opened in 2010, 391 km). Traffic between Madrid and Toledo was 1,490,000 passengers in 2011, while the O–D pair of Madrid–Valencia totaled 1,836,500 in 2011. It is true, as Button remarked, that services between Toledo and Albacete were closed in the summer of 2011 due to practically non-existent demand. The decision to open this service was completely unjustified owing to the lack of planning and demand forecasts; however, the figure of €3.5 billion does not correspond only to this segment of infrastructure, and the tracks still continue to be used for all the remaining services. It should also be noted that the service offered by the operator failed to attract its full potential demand due to two significant failings which had not been resolved by June 2010. One was that the HSR trains stopped in Madrid, which increased travel time between the rest of the destination pairs (Toledo, Albacete and
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Fig. 1. The Spanish HSR network (2012).
Cuenca). The other factor reducing passenger demand was that the features of the service such as the schedule, frequency and fares did not allow for commuting. For a better understanding of the development of the Spanish HSR network, it should be noted that the Spanish HSR network today has a clearly radial architecture, although for over ten years only 471 km were in operation. The Madrid–Seville line, inaugurated in 1992, marked the beginning of the construction of an ambitious high-speed railway network in Spain (Guirao, 2006), which has been used from the start for two types of services: long-distance services and regional shuttle services, both with practically the same quality of trains and speeds. In Spain, competition between air transportation and HSR rail has caused the loss of over 40% of the market share in links such as Madrid–Seville (opened in 1992), Madrid–Malaga (2007), Madrid–Barcelona (2008) and Madrid–Valencia (2010). Despite this fact, the busiest Spanish domestic air route is Madrid–Barcelona
which in 2008 was also the busiest route inside the European Union, carrying 3,497,696 passengers. Table 1 contains a detailed description of current HSR services in Spain, divided into long-distance and regional services. Regional HSR links offer a high frequency of service (from 22 to 26 shuttles per workday, both ways) and the possibility of buying a season ticket (40 trips a month) with discounts of up to 50% off the single ticket fare. This type of service has generated high commuter HSR traffic and is the reason that today some cities located less than 200 km away from Madrid can be considered as being part of its metropolitan area (Ciudad Real, Toledo, Segovia, etc.). For example, the first regional link shown in Table 2 is Madrid–Ciudad Real– Puertollano. Shuttles depart from Madrid to Ciudad Real (171 km from Madrid, 50 min) and continue onto Puertollano (209 km from Madrid, 15 min from Ciudad Real). These shuttles use a portion of the Madrid–Seville line, but return to Madrid after their stop in Puertollano. Taking into account all the services provided by the
Table 1 Spanish HSR services. Source: Observatorio del Ferrocarril en España. 2011. Fundación de los Ferrocarriles Españoles. Origin (population)
a
Destination (population)
Distance (km)
Year service opened
Travel time from origin (min)
Passengers 2011
Main long-distance HSR services Madrid (3,265,038) Seville (703,021) Zaragoza (674,725) Malaga (568,030) Barcelona (1,615,448) Valencia (798,033)
471 306 513 621 391
1992 2003 2007 2008 2010
150 75 150 150 100
2,137,026 1,175,053 1,433,361 2,545,907 1,836,500
Main regional HSR servicesa Madrid Ciudad Real (74,798) Puertollano (52,200) Madrid Toledo (83,108) Madrid Segovia (55,220) Valladolid (313,437) Seville Cordoba 328,547 Malaga (568,030) Barcelona Tarragona (140.323) Lérida (138,416)
171 209 75 70 180 127 296 98 206
1992 1992 2005 2008 2007 2004 2008 2008 2008
50 65 30 35 56 45 65 35 70
596,944 295,536 1,497,660 596,944 547.471 557,979 104,317 86,597 359,307
Only shuttle services. Traffic 2011 does not include passengers using long-distance trains with stops in these medium-sized cities.
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Table 2 European financing of the Spanish high-speed network. Source: European Parlament (June 2012). Policy department d: budgetary affairs. Political, Economic and Regional Situation in Spain. Background note CONT delegation to Spain. 19–21 June 2012. High speed lines co-financed with European funds
EU amount
Co-financed by
Madrid–Barcelona–French border
€3.3581 billion €70.9 million €10.6 million
Cohesion Fund (2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Seville
€267.3 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
Cordoba Malaga
€953.8 million €1 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)(2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Valladolid
€1,573.7 million €193.3 million €20.6 million €177.5 million €68 million €750 million
Cohesion Fund (2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Toledo
€102.2 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (2000–2006 period)
Madrid–Castilla La Mancha–Valencia–Murcia Region (Levante Line)
€574.1 million €99.4 million €28.5 million €48.2 million €725.8 million €159.4 million €246 million €67.6 million €1.3 million
Cohesion Fund (2000–2006 period)
€201.2 million
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the 2007–2013 Operational Program of Galicia
Madrid–Galicia–Ourense–Santiago and Zamora Lubian
TEN-T Funding (2000–2006 period) TEN-T Funding (2007–2013 period
European Investment Bank (EIB)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (2000–2006 period) TEN-T Funding (2000–2006 period) Cohesion Fund within the Cohesion Fund – EDRF Operational Program (2007–2013 period) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (2007–2013 period) European Investment Bank (EIB)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Valencia Region’s Integrated Operational Program (2000–2006 period) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Murcia Region’s Integrated Operational Program (2000–2006 period) TEN-T Funding (2000–2006 period) Cohesion Fund within the ERDF Cohesion Fund Operational Program (2007–2013 period) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) through the Valencia Region’s 2007–2013 Integrated Operational Program Operational Program of Castile-La Mancha 2007–2013 Operational Program of Murcia 2007–2013 European Investment Bank (EIB)
operating company (RENFE Operadora) the Madrid–Seville tracks were used in 2011 by more than 7 million passengers. The Spanish experience has demonstrated that the success or failure of a new HSR line does not rely only on speed, but on door-to-door travel time; and this factor depends on the integration of the entire transport system. As indicated by Givoni and Banister (2012), speed is the less important element of the high-speed train. Fortunately, the HSR California project is being developed following the model of Transit Oriented Development (TOD). Throughout the literature, TOD projects are referred to by a variety of names, including transit-focused development, transit-based development, transit-supportive development, or transit villages. As with its name, the definition of TOD varies between researchers. According to Bernick and Cervero (1997), who prefer the term ‘‘transit village,’’ TOD consists of a ‘‘compact, mixed-use community, centered on a transit station that, by design, invites residents, workers, and shoppers to drive their cars less and ride mass transit more.’’ Thankfully, in 2011 the American High-Speed Intercity Rail Program HSIRP did include a call for transit-oriented development around stations (FRA, 2011b), and the layout of the HSR line will connect the main California airports.
2. The added value generated by high-speed rail in Spain Button’s conclusions (page 302) end with a paragraph containing a clear reference to Spain’s current financial crisis: ‘‘Simply stimulating an open economy by increasing public indebtedness inevitably pulls in imports, unless it more than proportionately enhances the economic efficiency of the nation’s economy. The Spanish idea that all major cities should be linked by HSR or the US’s idea that 80% of the population should have access to HSR, both concepts paying no regard to cost or demand, are arbitrary with no solid foundation in analysis, and as countries such as Spain have found out, can have serious adverse consequences on employment and the well-being of future generations’’. There is no clear direct cause–effect relationship between the Spanish financial crisis and HSR investments. Although the latest Spanish investments in high-speed rail at the start of the financial crisis were highly controversial (one of the most widely debated subjects at the time), there are two facts that cannot be overlooked: first, the total amount of funds received from the EU to
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B. Guirao / Journal of Transport Geography 31 (2013) 201–206 Table 3 World’s largest transportation developersa. Source: Public Works Financing newsletter ‘‘International Major Projects database’’. October 2012. Company
1. ACS Group/Hochtief (Spain) 2. Global Vía-FCC-Bankia (Spain) 3. Abertis (Spain) 4. Macquarie Group (Australia) 5. Vinci/Cofiroute (France) 6. Hutchison Whampoa (China) 7. Ferrovial/Cintra (Spain) 8. OHL (Spain) 9. Sacyr (Spain) 10. NWS Holdings (China)
State of the concession
Concession location
Operating or under const.
Sold or expired
Bid targets
US
Canada
Home country
All other
64 45 36 36 35 33 32 32 25 25
33 1 6 10 3 2 21 1 15 0
32 8 10 6 12 0 15 11 14 1
2 1 1 4 0 0 5 1 0 0
5 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0
20 29 11 1 11 10 8 8 15 25
37 14 24 30 22 23 16 23 10 0
a 2012 Survey of public–private partnerships worldwide. Ranked by number of road, rail, airport and seaport concessions operating or under construction as of October 2012.
construct the Spanish HSR network since 1992; and second, the technological and scientific innovations that have been developed in Spain in relation to the HSR market. 2.1. Funds received by the EU Table 2 shows the EU financing of the Spanish HSR network. Madrid–Barcelona is at the top of the most funded origin–destination links (with more than 3.3581 billion euros). Did the Spanish government make the wrong choice in its allocation of the economic help provided by the EU? 2.2. Spanish scientific and technological innovation The construction of the Spanish HSR network over the last 20 years has been developed practically entirely by Spanish research and innovation centers. This industry has evolved a significant degree of specialization and experience and is highly regarded around the world. Consultancy, engineering, construction and industrial companies cover all stages of HSR railway development: research studies, design construction, rolling stock systems, and operation and maintenance services. Spanish companies have upgraded their industrial skills and their management experience throughout the whole of the value chain of a HSR investment. The following data are revealing: 27% of exports from Spanish engineering companies correspond to railway projects (consultancy, design, project management and works supervision, operations and maintenance), and Spanish transport developers have invested over 176 BnUSD in 229 concessions (58% of all PPPs). Six of the ten largest concessionaires in transport infrastructure around the world in 2012 were Spanish (see Table 3). The companies involved in these six concessionaires have played an active role in the construction of the Spanish HSR network and are backed by widespread international experience. Behind the construction of a new HSR line are not only construction companies but also industries focused on what it is termed ‘‘rail superstructure’’ (track, signaling, electrification, detection systems, communication, control centers, rolling stock). As an example, the TALGO and CAF companies specialize in the design and manufacture of trains, as well as in the provision of maintenance services to railway operators worldwide. CAF has played a major role in supplying the Spanish high-speed train (AVE) for the Madrid–Seville and Madrid–Barcelona lines. CAF has also taken part in the production of RENFE’s shuttle service trains, which run at 250/270 km/h on intermediate sections of the same line. In 2005, CAF became the first Spanish company to export high speed technology, with the supply of 12 units to Turkish Railways.
On January 14 2012, TALGO signed a contract for a high-speed railway line between Mecca and Medina in Riad, the Saudi capital, together with the member companies of the Spanish Consortium. The award of this project to the Spanish consortium represents an overall sum of around 6700 million euros. This contract consists of an order of 1600 million euros for TALGO, which may increase to 2400 million euros with the implementation of further options. Additionally, OHL (position 8 in the ranking in Table 3), together with TALGO, is a member of the Spanish consortium scheduled to build the new Mecca–Medina HSR line. The recent invitation to tender for California’s first HSR line was met by ACS (position 1 in the ranking in Table 3), Acciona and Ferrovial (position 7). The Spanish companies Ferrovial and Acciona are part of the team California Backbone Builders, while ACS, Samsung in South Korea and PuliceT in the US are all part of another consortium. The same companies were present in the various consortia that submitted a tender for the unsuccessful Florida project. The exports of these Spanish companies and the international contracts signed represent revenues and employment for the Spanish economy, and these data should not be totally overlooked when aiming to give a balanced view. Additionally, as proved by this paper, there is a broad sector of the Spanish scientific community working on economic and territorial impact studies of HSR to great international acclaim. Finally, the reasons underlying the present Spanish financial crisis are complex, and it is probably true, as Kenneth Button remarks, that some of the infrastructure investments (not only HSR) made by the Spanish Administration should have been decided using a more rational approach. However, in our opinion, the conclusions drawn by the author at the end of his paper are an unjustified criticism which is unfairly extended to the entire process of national planning and innovation in Spain.
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Givoni, M., Banister, D., 2012. Speed: the less important element of high-speed train. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 306–307. Goetz, A., 2012. Guest editorial: introduction to the special section on rail transit systems and high speed rail. Journal of Transport Geography 22, 219–220. Govan, 2008. Spain cuts high speed ‘ghost train’. The Telegraph, January, 22. Guirao, B., 2006. The Madrid–Seville experience. Journal of the Institution of Civil Engineering 159, 109–115. Guirao, B., Soler, F.J., 2009. Regional High Speed lines and small cities mobility: Toledo, a Spanish experience. In: TRB 88th Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers DVD. Washington, DC. Guirao, B., Soler, F.J., 2010. New high-speed services in the United States. Lessons from Spain. In: TRB 89th Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers DVD. Washington, DC. Gutierrez, J., 2001. Location, economic potential and daily accessibility impact of the high-speed line Madrid–Barcelona–French border. Journal of Transport Geography 9 (4), 229–242.
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