Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 13–18

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Journal of Experimental Social Psychology j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / j e s p

Spontaneous goal inferences are often inferred faster than spontaneous trait inferences☆ Frank Van Overwalle a,⁎, Marijke Van Duynslaeger a, Daphné Coomans a, Bert Timmermans b a b

Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital of Cologne, Germany

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 7 February 2011 Revised 17 June 2011 Available online 6 July 2011 Keywords: Spontaneous inferences Multiple Inferences Goals Traits

a b s t r a c t We present four experiments in which participants were exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and goals. Results from a false recognition task with varying response deadlines revealed heightened activation of goal inferences already within a 350 ms response deadline. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when there was no response deadline, and when the behavior also implied a goal. These results indicate that spontaneous inferences on goals are often encoded more strongly in memory and are reactivated much more quickly in comparison with spontaneous trait inferences. Moreover, spontaneous trait inferences are often facilitated when an inference is first made on the goal of the behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent developmental and neuroscientific evidence on social inferences, and current theories on impression formation. © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

When you see two runners sprinting towards the finish line, what thoughts spring to your mind immediately? That each of them wants to win (i.e., their goals), or that they are very athletic (i.e., their traits)? Behavioral research has established that observers often make inferences when observing others' actions spontaneously, that is, without explicit intention to do so and unaware of making the inference itself (Uleman, 1999). Spontaneous inferences are made about a variety of social targets, such as an actor's traits or dispositions (for an overview, see Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996), an actor's goals (Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005; Van Duynslaeger et al., submitted for publication), situational circumstances (e.g. Duff & Newman, 1997; Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1990), and external causes of events (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2002). More importantly, it has been documented that social inferences about an actor's stable traits and transitory situations can be activated spontaneously at the same time, and co-occur together (Ham & Vonk, 2003; Todd, Molden, Ham, & Vonk, 2011). That behaviors spontaneously activate multiple co-occurring inferences is consistent with a young history of theorizing and research on person impression (Idson & Mischel, 2001; Read, Jones, & Miller, 1990; Reeder, 2009; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004; Trzebinski, McGlynn, Gray, & Tubbs, 1985) and research on text comprehension (e.g., Graesser, Lang, & Roberts, 1991; Kintsch, 1988).

☆ We express our gratitude to three anonymous reviewers who provided numerous helpful suggestions for improving an earlier version of this manuscript. ⁎ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussel, Belgium. E-mail address: [email protected] (F. Van Overwalle). 0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.016

However, social research has rarely explored whether different types of spontaneous inferences are inferred equally easily and spontaneously. That is, even if trait and goal inferences are activated concurrently, one of them could overshadow the other, or made with more ease and speed than the other, which might reflect the dependency of one inference on the other. Reconsider the example above. When you see two athletes approaching the finish, what inference comes to mind most quickly? We propose that “wants to win” comes to mind foremost, and only later on we wonder who the best athlete is. That is, quite often, goals are primary and traits are secondary. In the social literature on impression formation, there is considerable work on goals as the basis of many trait inferences. In one of the most recent accounts, Reeder (2009, p. 1) argued that “perceivers draw a sharp distinction between intentional and unintentional behavior. Intentional behavior is explained primarily in terms of the actor's aims and motives. In turn, perceivers use their inferences about motive to fashion trait judgments about the actor.” Reeder illustrates this process with the following example. If during a sports contest one player makes an aggressive move toward an adversary, the inferences depend on the player's motive. If the player had been insulted by the adversary, the inference centers on the motive for revenge. Conversely, if the adversary had been performing extremely well and was about to win, the inference centers on the goal of personal gain (“wanting to win”). Although revenge is not an admirable motive, it is more socially accepted than personal gain, so that the player will be seen as less morally corrupt when the aggressive move was motived by revenge rather than personal gain. As this example shows, it are not so much the situational circumstances that shape the trait inference, but rather the inferred

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goals and motives (see also Hilton, McClure, & Sutton, 2010). This seems to indicate that earlier impression theories that take into account only (a) behavioral cues and (b) situational constraints in forming a trait impression (e.g., Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Trope, 1986) are insufficient to explain trait attributions drawn from intentional (or goal-directed) behavior. Although it is possible that many immediate goals aid in the identification of behaviors, these theorists did not conceive goals or motives as part of this identification process and largely neglected them. Along the same lines, Read et al. (1990) reported that goals are central to the meaning and structure of many traits and strongly predict the confidence with which perceivers draw trait inferences from intentional behaviors (see also Trzebinski et al., 1985). They concluded that “inferring the goals for which an individual is striving is a central part of the trait inference process”(p. 1056). Perhaps more dramatic, Idson & Mischel (2001) demonstrated that close and important others are often described more in terms of specific variables such as goals, at the expense of broad and uncontextualized traits. Of interest is that Read et al. (1990) suggested that goals are probably most central to social (i.e., interpersonal and moral) traits and less so for competence-related traits (e.g., ability). Their reasoning is that these social traits developed to capture the regularities based on generative mechanisms of actions, such as goals. However, our introductory example illustrates that competence-related judgments of talent may also be increased when accompanied with effort and ambition. Developmental and neuroscientific evidence also supports our hypothesis that goals are often primary. Ample research from the developmental literature indicates that young infants of about 6 months old can implicitly identify goal-directed behavior from self-propelled shapes or humans (e.g., Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995; Lakusta, Wagner, O'Hearn, & Landau, 2007). Other research indicates that even 3-month-old infants prefer self-propelled shapes that help another shape as opposed to hindering it (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007, 2010), indicating that preverbal infants assess individuals on the basis of their behavior towards others. Subsequently, at about 15 months infants begin to make implicit attributions to an actor's internal beliefs (that may differ from reality; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; for an overview, see Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Sodian & Thoermer, 2008). In contrast, traits seem to play a less central role in person perception of young children. Only at the age of about 4 years do they use dispositional qualities or traits such as shy, neat or silly, to describe someone (Gonzalez, Zosuls, & Ruble, 2010). In a recent meta-analysis of over 200 neuroscientific studies on social inferences by adults, Van Overwalle (2009) proposed that (verbal) descriptions of behavior activate the so-called mentalizing brain network. The first area in this network is involved in the identification of momentary goals (temporo-parietal junction). This area projects to the prefrontal cortex, where the medial wall identifies permanent dispositions and traits of actors. Based on these social, developmental and neuroscientific findings, we propose that under many circumstances, actions and goals are identified before trait inferences are made. Moreover, we suggest that for many traits, some minimal amount of goal-directedness or intentionality in human behavior needs to be identified, before trait inferences are made. For instance, it is difficult to conclude that the winner was the best athlete, if this win was due to an adversary's accident or drugs, rather than own efforts. Recent neuroscientific research on goal and trait inferences seems to support the primacy of goals over traits. A series of experiments was conducted in which electro-encephalogram (EEG) measurements were taken while participants read behavioral descriptions from which they could make incidental goal and trait inferences. Eventrelated potentials (ERPs) were extracted from the EEGs, time-locked at the critical word that implied a goal or trait. It was found that goals were recognized relatively quickly, at about 200 ms after the presentation of the critical goal-implying word (Van der Cruyssen,

Van Duynslaeger, Cortoos & Van Overwalle, 2009). In contrast, it took about 400–600 ms before traits were identified (Van Duynslaeger, Sterken, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2008; Van Duynslaeger, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2007). Even more telling, when traits were embedded in a stream of goal-directed behaviors, they were detected more rapidly at about 200–300 ms (Van Overwalle, Van den Eede, Baetens, & Vandekerckhove, 2009). This evidence seems to affirm that often goals are primary, and may even facilitate the activation of spontaneous trait inferences. This runs counter to the majority of research on spontaneous social inferences that focused mainly on permanent traits and dispositions, and potentially undermines assumptions about the privileged status of trait inferences in attribution judgments (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986). An important limitation of this ERP research, however, is that in order to obtain pure brain measurement on spontaneous inferences, uninterrupted and uncontaminated by other task demands and processes, the validation of the spontaneous inferences was made with surprise memory tasks after the ERP experiment. Even though such memory measures show significant correlations with ERP effects (e.g., Van der Cruyssen, Van Duynslaeger, Cortoos, & Van Overwalle, 2009), there remain doubts on the interpretation of the early 200 ms ERP timing of goal inferences, as these might reflect an early attentional response to goal-related cues instead of a veridical inference. Perhaps even more critical is the question: Does it matter? Do early ERP timing differences have observable effects at the behavioral level among adults? Can we measure the primacy in the ease and timing of goal over trait inferences in behavior itself? The aim of the present set of experiments is to investigate this question. Measuring the speed of spontaneous inferences Several methods have been used to show that while reading short behavioral descriptions (e.g., approached the finishing line), the implied goal (e.g., to win) or trait (e.g., athletic) is made spontaneously and stored in memory. One category of methods rests on storage of trait information in long-term memory (e.g., savings in relearning, Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; false recognition, Todorov & Uleman, 2002) and one of these methods (cued recall, Winter & Uleman, 1984) was also used in earlier ERP research to measure spontaneous inferences after reading all the material. Another category rests on the temporal activation in memory of trait concepts, and is used in the present study. Specifically, we measured spontaneous inferences immediately after each sentence affording an incidental inference. We used an on-line false recognition task, in which participants have to indicate, immediately after reading behavioral descriptions, whether they recognize the implied inference (goal or trait) as part of the sentence. As the goal or trait itself was not part of the behavioral sentence, the correct answer is “no”. However, to the extent that the goal or trait is inferred while reading and temporarily encoded in memory together with the sentence, this may induce the participants to incorrectly recognize the inference as part of the sentence and wrongly answer “yes” (or it takes extra response time to avoid this error; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Van Overwalle, Drenth, & Marsman, 1999). Earlier work demonstrates that the false recognition paradigm is quite robust against alternative explanations in terms of strategic processing during test, and shows that spontaneous inferences are made during encoding of the behavior. First, the demand to provide correct recall runs against the possibility to find evidence for spontaneous inferences. Second, it appears that inferences are not made strategically after recalling the original behaviors. Using a false recognition paradigm quite similar to the present task, Todorov & Uleman (2002) found that false recognition is unrelated to the retrieval of the behavioral information (see also McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011). Third, time constraints have little effect on it, as varying the time to read and encode the behavior (5 to 10 s) has no effect on false recognition (Todorov & Uleman, 2002). Fourth, several studies that confirmed the existence of

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spontaneous goal or trait inferences employed other paradigms such as lexical decision (Hassin et al., 2005) or relearning (Ham & Vonk, 2011) where strategic retrieval is even less likely. Crucially for the present purpose, to measure the ease and strength of the inference, we additionally impose a deadline in this false recognition procedure (see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Van Duynslaeger et al., submitted for publication; Van Overwalle et al., 1999). Although this deadline procedure was originally developed to avoid strategic processes at test as much as possible (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986), it can also be used to measure the strength of incidental inferences. If spontaneous goal inferences are strongly encoded during reading, they should reach a high level of reactivation very quickly during test and consequently result in false recognition at an early deadline. In contrast, if trait inferences are less strongly encoded at a more shallow level, extra processing time is needed to reach the same degree of reactivation as goals, resulting in false recognition only at a later deadline. We know of no other paradigms where such a deadline procedure has been successfully applied. Specifically, we imposed a varying deadline of 350 ms (Experiment 1), 650 ms (Experiment 2) or 1000 ms (Experiment 3), or no deadline at all (Experiment 4). We predict that only strongly identified and encoded goals are falsely recognized within a short time constraint of 350 ms, while more weakly identified and encoded traits are falsely recognized at a later deadline, or if there is no deadline at all. In addition, to explore the potential facilitatory effect of goals on trait inferences, we used sentences that afforded multiple goal and trait inferences or only single (trait-only or goal-only) inferences. We predict that trait inferences are detected more easily when they are embedded in sentences that also afford goal inferences as opposed to sentences that do not imply goals. Method Participants Participants were male and female freshmen students from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, who participated for a partial course requirement. There were 76 participants in Experiment 1, 116 in Experiment 2, 79 in Experiment 3, and 98 in Experiment 4. Approximately half of the participants were randomly assigned to the single inference condition, while the other half was assigned to the multiple inference condition. Stimulus material The experimental sentences and implied goals and traits were selected during a series of pilot studies, in which 203 students participated in several groups. First, participants read sentences describing an event in which the actor engaged in a behavior. One group of participants was asked to write down up to three possible goals for the behavior of the actor, a second group to write down up to three possible personality traits for the actor. A sentence was selected as a goal and trait implying sentence if the same goal and trait (or a close synonym) were given by at least 70% of the participants. Sentences for which 70% of the participants gave the same goal (or trait) and less than 30% the same trait (or goal), were selected as goalonly (trait-only) implying sentences. Second, for sentences implying a goal or a trait, we verified if a semantic association existed between the implied goal and trait. Participants were asked to associate 3 words with the implied goal or trait. For none of the selected sentences the implied goals and traits were semantically associated. Finally, for each experimental sentence we developed control sentences, containing the same words as the experimental sentence, but without implying the same goal or trait. We presented these sentences to another group of participants who had to provide up to three possible goals or traits. A control sentence was selected if less than 30% of the participants made an association with the implied goal

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or trait (or a close synonym). As a result of these pilot studies, 12 sentences implying a goal and a trait remained for the main study, as well as 10 goal-only and 10 trait-only implying sentences (see Appendix). Sentence length was kept constant across these conditions.

Procedure The experiment was closely modeled after the deadline procedure in Experiment 4 of McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) and Experiment 3 of Van Overwalle et al. (1999). Participants were seated in front of a personal computer; they individually went through the instructions and tasks. They were instructed that all their responses had to be given within a deadline of 300 ms (although the actual deadline was 350 ms to avoid an excess loss of data, Experiment 1), 650 ms (Experiment 2), 1000 ms (Experiment 3), or no deadline was imposed (Experiment 4). To familiarize the participants with the deadline procedure used in the main experimental task (Experiments 1–3 only), they were given training to respond within the imposed time limit at an unrelated lexical decision task (taken from Van Overwalle et al., 1999). Each probe item in the lexical decision task began with a row of +'s displayed for 500 ms. Then a letter string appeared on the next line. After 250 ms, a row of asterisks was presented below it. Subjects were instructed to respond within the deadline after the asterisks appeared with “yes” if the string was a word or with “no” if the string was not a word. The “v” and “n” keys served as “yes” and “no” responses and were counterbalanced between the participants. Half of the probe items required a “yes” answer, and the other half a “no” answer. After the participant's response, the RT was displayed for 750 ms together with the word error if the response was incorrect. After every 10th probe item, the participants were given summary feedback displaying the number of errors and the mean RT for the last 10 probe items. When participants made more than 3 errors or when their mean RT went beyond the deadline, they were encouraged to try better next time. Participants went through 20 series of 10 probe items. This training phase was omitted in Experiment 4. In the main experiment, about half of the participants read paragraphs implying only single goal or trait inferences, whereas the other half read paragraphs implying combined goal and trait inferences. The participants learned that after reading two paragraphs, they had to decide within the imposed deadline whether a probe word exactly matched one of the words in the paragraphs. After a brief number of practice trials, each subject went through the experimental trials. At each trial, two short paragraphs were presented one at a time. One paragraph implied a goal and/or trait and was composed of one sentence; the other paragraph was a filler paragraph composed of two or three sentences. The paragraphs appeared in randomized order. Experimental paragraphs (composed of one sentence) were presented for 4 s. Filler paragraphs composed of two sentences were presented for 5 s, and those composed of three sentences for 7 s. Between the two paragraphs there was a 2 second pause. There were another 6 trials in which only two filler paragraphs were presented. After having read the paragraphs, the participants were warned that a series of probe words would begin. Participants saw a row of +'s at the center of the screen for 500 ms. Then a probe word appeared on the next line for 300 ms, after which a row of asterisks appeared below it. The timing of the response started as soon as the asterisks were shown (and hence do not include the reading of the probe word). The probe word stayed on the screen until participants made a response using the “yes” and “no” key as in the training phase. Then the participants received feedback about their RT, together with the word error if they had made an error. This feedback information was displayed on the screen for 750 ms. Then, after a 500 ms pause, the next probe item appeared. After the sixth probe word, participants

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received summary feedback about their accuracy and had to press the space bar to continue with the next two paragraphs. Thus, for each pair of paragraphs of the experimental trials, six probe words were presented. One of the probe words was the goal or trait implied by the experimental paragraph (“no” answer). Another of the six probe items consisted of a word from the experimental paragraph (“yes” answer). The other four probe items were two words from the filler paragraph (“yes” answer) and two unrelated words (not from any paragraph, “no” answer). So half of the probe words required a “yes” response, the other half a “no” response. The order in which the probe words appeared was randomized, with the restriction that the experimental probe word (implied goal or trait) never appeared first, and that it appeared before the probe word taken from the experimental paragraph. Results We analyzed only error rates, because given a deadline, all response times were squashed together and therefore revealed no effects of interest. The analyses were based on mean error rates for each participant in each condition, transformed to z-scores (i.e., normalized) to allow comparison between experiments. Responses that exceeded the deadline were excluded from the analysis. For the error rates, this resulted in a loss of 4 participants (2 in the single and 2 in the multiple condition) in Experiment 1, while no further participants were lost in the other experiments. The mean error rates (see Fig. 1) were subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with Experiment (1 to 4) and Inference (goal vs. trait) as between-participants factor and Number of inferences (single vs. multiple) and Sentence Type (experimental vs. control) as withinparticipants factor. Consistent with predictions, this analysis revealed a strong main effect of Sentence Type, F(1, 357) = 15.35, p b .001, η2 = .041, indicating that there were more errors after experimental sentences than after control sentences, and this main effect was further qualified by an interaction with Inference, F(1, 357) = 9.98, p b .002, η2 = .027, indicating that more errors were made after goal-implying sentences than after trait-implying sentences. There was also a strong main effect of Number of Inferences, F(1, 357) = 24.58, p b .001, η2 = .064, further qualified by a three-way interaction with Experiment and Sentence Type, F(3, 357) = 2.92, p b .05, η2 = .023. To explore these interactions and to confirm our hypotheses, we conducted planned contrasts within each experiment. As predicted, participants made more errors after goal-implying sentences compared to control sentences in the single conditions of Experiment 1, 3 and 4, Fs = 4.78-6.22, p b .05, and in the multiple conditions of Experiment 2 and 4, Fs = 4.09–15.07, p b .05 (and approaching significance in Experiment 3, F = 2.94, p b .09). In contrast, as predicted, for trait inferences, an effect of trait-implying versus control sentences was significant only without a deadline in Experiment 4 given multiple inferences, F(1, 96) = 4.42, p b .05, but not given single trait inferences, F(1, 96) b 1.70, ns. Given that goal inferences under a deadline (Experiments 1–3) revealed some variability in that they showed up either under single or multiple conditions, we reran all these data together across different deadlines to test the robustness of these effects. Planned contrasts revealed that participants made more errors after goalimplying sentences given single inferences, F(1, 265) = 8.26, p b .01, as well as multiple inferences F(1, 265) = 11.63, p b .001. Other planned comparisons involving traits were not significant. Discussion This series of experiments investigated whether inferences on goals are spontaneously made prior to inferences on traits. We employed an on-line false recognition measure with a deadline (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Van Overwalle et al., 1999), which allowed us to explore not only whether spontaneous goal and trait inferences

Fig. 1. Error rates (in %, untransformed) given a 350 ms, 650 ms, 1000 ms or no deadline. Asterisks indicate significantly more false recognition after an experimental sentence (full bars) implying a goal or trait compared to a control sentence (striped bars), p b .05 (between parentheses, p b .10).

are made, but also whether they differ in their strength of encoding and subsequent speed of reactivation at test. In a single condition, we presented sentences that implied either a single goal or a single trait, but not both. The error rates in this condition showed increased false recognition of the goal or trait implied by the sentences in comparison with control sentences that did not imply them. These results demonstrate that goals and traits can be spontaneously inferred and encoded from behavioral descriptions, in line with a bulk of research that attests to the spontaneity of goal and trait inferences (Hassin et al., 2005; Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996; Van Duynslaeger et al., submitted for publication). More interestingly, in a multiple condition, we presented sentences that implied both a goal and a trait of the actor. The error rates in this condition also showed increased false recognition of the goal and trait implied by the sentences. These results demonstrate that spontaneous goals and traits can be inferred and encoded concurrently from the same behavioral descriptions. This extends recent research on the co-occurrence of spontaneous trait and situational inferences (Ham & Vonk, 2003; Todd et al., 2011) to other social inferences such as goals, in line with the multiple inference account by Reeder (2009).

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Of most importance, in both the multiple and single conditions, it was found that goal inferences were already made within a 350 ms response deadline, attesting to their very strong encoding and rapid reactivation while responding. In contrast, trait inferences were made only when no deadline was imposed, which demonstrates their much weaker spontaneous encoding and reactivation at test. The early encoding of goal inferences confirms and extends earlier behavioral research on person impression and development work with infants, as well as neurological research with adults which also attest to the privileged detection of goals. Theorizing on person impression formation suggests that trait inferences are often guided, not only by behavioral identification and situational constraints as traditional accounts suggest (Gilbert et al., 88; Trope, 86), but also by the goals and motives underlying intentional behaviors (Read et al., 1990; Reeder, 2009). Similarly, research with infants suggests that young, preverbal infants make goal inferences and preferences based on the observation of an individual's actions (Gergely et al., 1995; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Hamlin et al., 2007, 2010; Lakusta et al., 2007; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), while they are not yet capable of making use of trait inferences (Gonzalez et al., 2010). Recent neurological research with adults using ERPs points to the same conclusion, but was hereto limited by a lack of on-line memory measures (Van der Cruyssen et al., 2009; Van Duynslaeger et al., 2008, 2007; Van Overwalle et al., 2009). A comparison between the multiple and single conditions further revealed that spontaneous trait inferences were made only when inferences were also afforded on goals. This suggests an additional interesting conclusion. It supports the notion that trait inferences are made with more ease and confidence if the behavior was guided by a goal (see Read et al., 1990; Reeder, 2009). To illustrate, we can only judge someone's talent in achievement or social skills if the person tried hard, not when no effort was made at all, or when success was due to illegal aids (e.g., doping) or lucky circumstances (e.g., accident of adversaries). Perhaps a stronger conclusion would be that goal inferences are a necessary prerequisite for making trait inferences. Although our data certainly are consistent with this interpretation, it seems premature to draw such strong conclusion. First, the distinction between the single and multiple conditions was not always very clear-cut, as a goal inference effect was sometimes observed in one of the two conditions (with short deadlines ≤650 ms), and sometimes in both (with long deadlines ≥1000 ms). Second, goals are not always sufficient in shaping a trait inference. To illustrate with one of our experimental sentences, when a person grudgingly runs with a water hose to a car, the implied goal (i.e., to wash) by itself does not directly leads to the appropriate trait inference (i.e., lazy), but it does so in combination with a description of the manner in which the behavior was performed (“grudgingly”). Thus, not only goals, but also other cues and inferences may be needed to inform the perceiver about the likely trait of a person, consistent with a multiple inference approach by Reeder (2009; Reeder et al., 2002, 2004). Third, several authors acknowledged that some traits escape this required inference of goals or motives (e.g., a lucky or happy person seems to be lucky or happy without any observable effort of being so; Read et al., 1990; Reeder, 2009). It has been suggested that such traits relate to non-social dispositions or traits based on unintentional behaviors (e.g., feeling states). Fourth, the absence of a common goal (on which less than 30% of the respondents agreed) in our trait-only sentences does not exclude the possibility that these respondents inferred some goal, albeit a relatively idiosyncratic one. However, such greater interindividual variation in goal attribution seems not a very likely explanation for the reduced trait-only inferences, because a lack of a strong goal inference seems much more parsimonious and plausible. Unfortunately, in the absence of a common goal, it is impossible to rule out whether or not a goal inference was spontaneously made (as participants have to respond to a goal word at some moment in the spontaneous measurement process), a limitation that is inherent to all

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methods of spontaneous inference based on verbal material (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Todorov & Uleman, 2002; Van Overwalle et al., 1999). Taken together, more research is needed on a larger variety of behaviors and traits using perhaps a different spontaneous inference method, before a more definitive conclusion can be reached on this point. A potential limitation of the present research is that goals are just another way of understanding or summarizing behaviors. Hence, our data may well fit with earlier theorizing claiming that upon observing a behavior, observers form an initial interpretation of what the behavior means and then make a trait inference (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986). However, this argument fails to take into account that there is a crucial theoretical difference between the identification of behavior and attributing goals. Reeder (2009) illustrated this with the earlier example on a player's aggressive move motivated by revenge or personal gain, leading to different attributions of morality. As another illustration based on research of young infants, jumping to avoid an obstacle seems perfectly reasonable and motivated, while jumping in empty air over a removed obstacle seems awkward and less purposeful. The same behavior may invite different immediate responses depending on the inferred goal underlying the behavior (see Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2010). Together with the present findings, this seems to imply that traditional theorizing on person impression (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986) may be in need of refinement. Our data confirm that behaviors are first identified before other inferences are made, but add the suggestion that this initial identification often entails the implied goal of the behavior. This view is consistent with research on person impression which strongly suggests that goals play a central role in shaping interpersonal and moral traits, based on intentional behaviors (Read et al., 1990; Reeder, 2009; Reeder et al., 2002, 2004; Trzebinski et al., 1985). It is also in line with recent neurological theorizing on the primacy of goal inferences over trait inferences in the mentalizing brain network (Van Overwalle, 2009). Appendix Best possible translation from Dutch stimuli. Although the translated goal (G) or trait (T) probe might consist of more than one word, in the original Dutch version it consisted only of a single word. Multiple goal and trait-implying sentences and probe words (between parentheses) Each morning, the man put his cap and goggles on his head, and jumped into the water. (G = to swim; T = sportive) The girl turned red, when she stood in front of the class with her papers. (G = to give a talk; T = shy) After paying the bill, she left 5 euros on the table. (G = to tip; T = generous) Right after the meal, he went to the waiter with his card. (G = to pay; T = impatient) With the rope around his neck, he jumped from the stool. (G = to commit suicide; T = unhappy) The teacher always took her red pen and marked what was wrong. (G = to improve; T = severe) When the man saw the finish line, he began to run faster. (G = to win; T = persisting) She never spends all her money, unless she really has to. (G = to save [money]; a T = stingy) Lisa asked her mother where the stars come from. (G = to gain knowledge; T = curious) After running, he lay on the couch. (G = to rest; T = sportive) He believed that no-one else should be on the list of candidates. (G = to be elected,b T = egoistic)

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Grudgingly he runs with the garden hose toward the car. (G = to wash; T = lazy) Goals-only The boy took the ball and ran outside. (G = to play) After the festivities, she decided to run each day. (G = to lose weight) She went with the books to the counter and showed her card. (G = to borrow) The man with the hat on his head pointed to the cash register. (G = to steal) He turned to the tree and opened his zipper in one movement. (G = to urinate) After dinner he asked for a light from the boy who sat next to him. (G = to smoke) When it was white outside, he took his runners. c (G = to ski) She tore the package open with her mouth. (G = to eat) He ran with a growling stomach to the bakery. (G = to eat) He gave a telling wink to the beautiful girl. (G = to seduce) Traits-only Daphné goes every Sunday to church and says her prayers every night before bedtime. (T = religious) Little Oscar never says "thank you". (T = impolite) Marijke drops everything on the floor and never finds her stuff. (T = sloppy) Marjorie often stumbles, and when she is doing the dishes, she often breaks the glasses and dishes. (T = clumsy) Martin does not even remember the appointments he made the day before. (T = forgetful) Willy refuses to rent cars to blacks. (T = racist) Eddy drove to the newspaper stand, only one street away. (T = lazy) Karl stepped on the toes of his girlfriend during the foxtrot. (T = clumsy) Nadine always checks the house of the neighbors to see who is going in or out. (T = curious) Tom tried for the past 4 years to play in the basketball team of the university. (T = persisting) Note: aA single probe word in Dutch (“sparen”) that does not contain the word “money” as in this translation. bTwo probe words in Dutch. cIn this context, in Dutch this refers only to skis. References Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994). Savings in the relearning of trait information as evidence for spontaneous inference generation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 840–880. Duff, K. J., & Newman, L. S. (1997). Individual differences in the spontaneous construal of behavior: Idiocentrism and the automatization of the trait inference process. Social Cognition, 15, 217–241. Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naive theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 287–292. Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193. Gilbert, D. T., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1988). On cognitive busyness: When person perceivers meet persons perceived. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 733–740. Gonzalez, C. M., Zosuls, K. M., & Ruble, D. N. (2010). Traits as dimensions or categories? Developmental change in the understanding of trait terms. Developmental Psychology, 46, 1078–1088. Graesser, A. C., Lang, K. L., & Roberts, R. M. (1991). Question answering in the context of stories. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 120, 254–277. Ham, J., & Vonk, R. (2003). Smart and easy: Co-occurring activation of spontaneous trait inferences and spontaneous situational inferences. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 434–447. Ham, J., & Vonk, R. (2011). Impressions of impression management: Evidence of spontaneous suspicion of ulterior motivation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 466–471.

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