Status inconsistency, achievement motivation, and psychological stress

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 9, 362-380 (1980)

Status Inconsistency, Achievement Motivation, and Psychological Stress CARLTON A. HORNUNG Department of Preventive Medicine and Community Health, School of Medicine, University of South Carolina The hypothesized relationship between status consistency and psychological stress is examined. It is suggested that theories of social consistency (e.g., status consistency, status integration, and social mobility) are interrelated with social psychological theories of cognitive consistency. In addition to ambiguities in theories of social consistency, several measurement and analysis problems are noted that may account for the confusing and sometimes contradictory results obtained in previous research. The theory of status consistency is then restated and inconsistency is measured and its effects are isolated in a way that circumvents these problems. The results indicate that basic values concerning achievement function as coping mechanisms for the effects of one's position in the education, occupation, and income hierarchies but amplify the stressful consequences of status inconsistency.

Several studies have examined the relationship between status inconsistency and a number of outcome variables that are hypothesized to be a consequence of inconsistency. Generally this research has not shown status inconsistency to be a powerful predictor and these results have prompted many to argue that although status inconsistency is an interesting topic, it is not a scientifically useful concept (cf. Laumann and Segal, 1971; Olsen and Tully, 1972). There are several factors that may account for the confusing and sometimes contradictory findings in previous research including: weak theoretical linkages between status inconsistency and the consequence variable of interest; weak links between the concept of status inconsistency and its measurement; sophisticated statistical problems inherent in status inconsistency research; and confusion over what constitutes an appropriate test of status inconsistency theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with each of these factors in Revision of a paper presented at the Annual Meetings, North American Conference of the Society for General Systems Research, 1978. 1 would like to thank Howard F. Taylor, B. Claire McCullough, Michael P. Massagli, and Edward Z. Dager for their careful reviews and critical comments. Address requests for reprints to Dr. Hornung, Department of Preventive Medicine, School of Medicine, University of South Carolina, SC 20208. 362 0049-089X/80/040362-19502.00/0 Copyright ~ 1980by AcademicPress, Inc. All rights of reproductionin any formreserved.

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

363

great detail. Nevertheless, their significance and complexity necessitates more than passing mention. We will therefore outline these issues and present the results of an analysis of the relationship between status inconsistency and psychological stress for individuals with different levels of achievement motivation. STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND STRESS: THE CORE QUESTION Status inconsistency, like the other social consistency theories of status integration, social mobility, compositional or structural effects, and equity formulations such as distributive justice and particularly the theory of status value formulated by Berger and his associates (Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, and Cohen, 1972), posits that inconsistent statuses subject their occupants to psychological stress and that this "socially induced" (Martin, 1965) stress results in some form of stress-reducing or coping response. The basic causal structure of social consistency theories is thus the same as that of cognitive consistency theories (Taylor, 1973; Taylor and Hornung, 1979) and is given in Fig. 1. Note that this model posits no direct cause-effect relationship between inconsistency and coping behavior; only an indirect relationship. For the most part inconsistency research has not explicitly tested this model. Instead, research has focused on attitudes and behaviors that are "linked" as consequences of inconsistency by an unspecified causal structure via one or more undefined and unmeasured constructs. As a result, whatever direct effect the structural attribute of inconsistency has on psychological stress and indirect effects via stress on coping or stress-reducing behavior dissipates as the consequence variable of interest (e.g., prejudice, support for extremist political causes) becomes increasingly more remote and the number of unspecified intervening variables multiplies. Fundamentally, theories of inconsistency can not be rejected unless it can be shown that inconsistency is unrelated to stress (Mills, 1975). However, a considerable amount of research has shown that inconsistency is related to stress when stress is loosely defined to include psychological discomfort and dissatisfaction (cf. Bauman, 1968; Hornung, 1972, 1977; Hornung and McCullough, 1981) as well as when stress is measured in terms of physiological manifestations (cf. Jackson, 1962; Jackson and Curtis, 1965; Shekelle, Ostfeld, and Paul, 1969; Shekelle, 1976). It is also important to note that the hypothesized coping responses may function as a source of invalidity in either the stress measure or the Social

Psychological )

Inconsistency

Coping )

Stress

FIG. 1. Basic causal structure of social consistencytheories.

Responses

364

CARLTON A. H O R N U N G

measure of inconsistency that results in understated correlations between inconsistency and stress. Presumably, stress may be coped with by distorting (i.e., false reporting) the values of the statuses; by changing reference groups; and, by simply denying the existence of stress (Adams, 1965). Accordingly, the observed correlation between inconsistency and stress is reduced in proportion to the number of inconsistent individuals who effectively cope with stress through cognitive distortion or other equivalent mechanisms. This invalidity may be especially large when individuals have the opportunity to provide calculated responses to indicators (e.g., questions) of current status attributes or psychological stress. In this respect survey or interview questions about status attributes and psychological functioning are obtrusive measures of inconsistency and stress which permit the respondent to utilize a range of coping mechanisms. This suggests that theories of cognitive consistency are intertwined with and not just parallel to theories of social consistency (cf. Taylor and Hornung, 1979) and that empirical tests of social consistency theories should take cognitive consistency processes into account. House and Harkins (1975) and Hornung and McCullough (1981) make the related observation that tests of inconsistency must specify the conditions under which inconsistency is stressful and can be expected to lead to different attitudinal and behavioral consequences. To accomplish this House and Harkins suggest several individual or situational conditioning variables including age, extrinsic motivation, social congruence rules, and coping styles that result in conditional relationships between inconsistency and perceived stress; perceived stress and coping mechanisms; and, between coping mechanisms and more remote outcomes such as withdrawal from social participation (Lenski, 1956) and maintaining liberal political attitudes (Lenski, 1954; Kenkel, 1956; Kelly and Chamblis, 1966). ISSUES IN THE CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY In addition to the ambiguities in the model being tested, the bulk of previous research has been characterized by simplifications in the conceptualization and measurement of inconsistency which can be expected to attenuate the correlation between inconsistency and the dependent variable of interest. The root of the problem involves assumptions about the relationships between status hierarchies and how these relationships are structured into expectations of behavior. Most basic is the assumption that each of the multiple statuses occupied by an individual gives rise to symmetric expectations about his or her other status attributes. Thus it has been implicit that the ith position or rank in one status dimension (call it D1~), carries with it expectations about the individual's position or rank in another

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

365

status dimension, call it D2(j), and that these expectations are symmetric such that individuals possessing characteristic D1 (~) are expected to possess characteristic D2(~) and individuals possessing D2(~) are expected to possess characteristics D1(~) Moreover it has been assumed that statuses that are expected to be occupied concurrently are equally ranked in their respective hierarchies (i.e., that i = j ) . Following from this are the related assumptions that the multiple statuses occupied by an individual are equally central to his or her identity and equally important in controlling the expectations he or she has of others, others have of them, and he has of himself. The assumptions that status relationships are symmetrical and that consistent statuses are equally ranked are based on the expectation of a strong linear correlation between status variables such as occupation and income. Since the correlation between status variables is generally only moderately strong an additional assumption is made that the deviations from perfect linearity are homoscedastic with respect to each of the status variables (i.e., in the bivariate case the errors about the least squares line are assumed to form a parallelogram). This assumption is very weak because a substantial proportion of the error sums of squares occurs in the middle ranges of the status variables where, for example, skilled-trades workers earn more money while clerical workers earn less than expected on the basis of a linear correlation between occupation and income. The net result of assuming a linear relationship between status variables is measurement error in the calculation of inconsistency which thereby understates the true correlation between inconsistency and the consequence variable being analyzed. The assumptions that the many status characteristics of the individual are equally central to his or her identity and equally important in controlling his or her behavior toward others and other's behavior toward him or her occur in two ways. First, different researchers have measured inconsistency between different status attributes (or used different operational definitions with the same attributes) in an attempt to retest the same hypothesis (compare, for example, Lenski, 1954; Kenkel, 1956; Kelly and Chamblis, 1966; Hunt and Cushing, 1971). Although the results of these analyses may be meaningfully compared, they are not, strictly speaking, replications and any differences in results may be due to a host of factors including cultural changes over times, different populations, or alternative measurement operations which Duncan, Featberman, and Duncan have shown to have profound effects on observed correlations (1972). The second and more common way the assumptions of equal centrality and equal importance occur is in the procedures for measuring inconsistency. This is clearest in Lenski's (1954) initial effort in which he measured an individual's degree of status inconsistency in terms of variation around his mean percentile rank in the occupation, income, ethnicity, and

366

CARLTON A. H O R N U N G

age-adjusted education hierarchies (i.e., inconsistency = 100 - (~(X~ X)2)l/~; where X~ denotes the status variables). Lenski thus treated each status hierarchy as equally central and equally important in the determination of inconsistency both by obtaining an "unweighted mean status" and an ~'unweighted sum of squares. ~' To the extent that each of the statuses occupied by an individual differs in centrality to his or her identity and differs in importance in governing interaction with others, then assuming them to be equally central and equally important widens the "natural gap" between status inconsistency as a concept and status inconsistency as a variable. Comparing the effects of different types of status inconsistency (e.g., education high/occupation low vis-h-vis education low/income high) may recapture part of any differences in the importance of the statuses but such comparisons have often resulted in problems of inflated N ' s and meaningless comparisons (Berry and Martin, 1972). For instance, in Lenski's original study 166 status-inconsistent individuals gave rise to 598 status inconsistencies (inflated N) such that the series of two-factor comparisons often meaninglessly compared an individual to himself. The problems in previous research do not necessarily end with the calculation of inconsistency scores. Given the general formula, Y = filX, + fi2Xz + f13X3 + ClI1 + C212 + C313 + C414 + ey,

where X,, X2, and X~ are status variables and 11, 12, and 13 denote firstorder status inconsistencies between pairs of status variables, and 14 denotes the second-order inconsistency of all three status variables, the equation is unidentifiable ifli is a perfect linear function o f X 1 , X 2 , and/or X~ which occurs, for example, if It is defined as a simple difference between statuses (i.e., 11 = X1 - )(2). There has been much written about the identification problem in status inconsistency research (cf. Blalock, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c) and several solutions have been offered including the use of absolute values of the difference between statuses as a measure of degree of inconsistency (Hornung, 1972) which may be used in conjunction with a dummy variable to define the direction of difference (Ploch, 1968). An alternative is to transform the inconsistency variable so that it no longer is a linear function of the statuses such as, for example, using the log of I~ as the inconsistency variable (Taylor, 1973; Hornung, 1973). The approach followed here is to measure the degree of inconsistency variables in a way that they are not linear functions of the status values, to use their absolute values as a measure of degree of inconsistency, and to use dummy variables and cross-products to examine the effects of direction of inconsistency. What constitutes an appropriate test of status inconsistency theory is also an unresolved question. There are those who maintain that if status inconsistency is to be regarded as a viable concept then it must be capable

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

367

of explaining variance in consequence variables net of the effects of status (Laumann and Segal, 1971; Hope, 1975). Despite the widespread acceptance of this criteria there is no proposition (either explicit or implicit) in the theory of status inconsistency suggesting that it is to be tested net of the effects of status. (In fact, it is equally reasonable to test for the effects of status net of inconsistency). An alternative criterion for assessing the theory is its predictive and explanatory power ignoring the main effects. Theories of social consistency, such as cognitive dissonance, attitude congruity, and balance are generally tested in this way (Taylor and Hornung, 1979). This occurs when, for example, the P:O:X relationship is reduced to a condition of balance-imbalance and the main effects of P, O, and X are ignored. The point is that theories of social consistency can and perhaps should be tested in accordance with this criteria. A REFORMULATION AND TEST OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY The conceptualization of status consistency and inconsistency followed in this paper is rooted in Hughes' classic discussion of the ~'Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status" in which he distinguished between "specific statuses" and "auxiliary statuses." According to Hughes, a specific status characteristic gives rise to a set of expectations about other status characteristics of the individual. In this sense, specific status characteristics are germane in what Berger and his associates refer to as the "status expectation process." Status expectations are anticipatory, normative, and asymmetric. Expectations are anticipatory in that if Person believes Other occupies the ith position in the specific status dimension S (call it S")), then Person anticipates Other to occupy thejth and kth positions in the auxiliary status dimensions A1 and Az (call them A1(j) and A2(k)). These expectations are normative in that both Person and Other come to believe that positions Ax(~) and Az (k) should be occupied by individuals possessing S (~) and that other positions in As and A2 should not be occupied by individuals with S(~). Furthermore, these expectations are asymmetric in that the jth and kth positions in the auxiliary status dimensions are expected to be occupied concurrently with the ith position in the specific status dimension but the ith position in S is not necessarily expected to be occupied by all individuals possessing t h e j t h and/or kth positions in the auxiliary status dimensions (Hornung, 1977). Following Hughes, occupation is defined as the specific status while educational attainment and income are defined as auxiliary status characeristics. The measurement of inconsistency is therefore based on the assumption that an individual's position in the hierarchy of occupations is central to his or her self identity and central to the behavioral expectations others have of him or her. This assumption has been supported on the one hand by Mulford and Salisbury (1964) who found that

368

CARLTON A. H O R N U N G

more than 90% of the males in their sample first defined themselves in terms of their occupational status in response to the Twenty Statements Test and, on the other hand, by Blau and Duncan's (1967) observation that occupation is the single best predictor of socioeconomic standing. Moreover, defining occupation as the specific status implies that the level of education and amount of income an individual is expected to have is conditional on his or her standing in the occupational hierarchy. Thus, on the basis of occupational status, an individual is anticipated (and in many cases legally required) to have attained a certain level of education and receive sufficient financial rewards to afford an appropriate life style. Other individuals engaged in the same or similar occupation constitute a "referential structure" (Berger et al., 1972)and "equity group" (Kemper, 1968). Levels of educational attainment and income that occur in frequent combination among individuals in a given occupation come to be seen by them and by others as "natural" or consistent. These serve as "distribution laws" (Cook, 1975) that define the equity of educational investments and income rewards. Combinations of education and income that occur infrequently among individuals in a given occupation violate these distribution laws and subject their encumbents to feelings of deprivation (i.e., inequity-disadvantage as when rewards are low relative to the level of investments and costs) or guilt (i.e., inequity-advantage as when rewards are high relative to the level of investments and costs). DEGREE OF INCONSISTENCY REGRESSION MODELS Occupation, education, and income give rise to three first-order degree of inconsistency terms involving pairs of statuses and one second-order term involving all three statuses. The equation is of the general form: Y = fi,E + fi20 + f i J + fi4(E,O) + ~5(E,I) + f16(I,O) + flT(E,I,O), (l)

where E is years of education; O is the Census categories of occupation, and, I is income. The inconsistency terms are set off by parentheses to indicate that some mathematical operation is performed on the statuses involved. To measure these degree of inconsistency terms, the median education and median income for respondents in each occupational group were computed. The intersection of the medians (see Fig. 2) defines the "point of maximum education-income-occupation consistency" (i.e., ( E , I , O ) = zero) of each category of occupation.* The degree of inconsistency vari* An alternative strategy would make use of the intersection of the means to define the point of maximum consistency from which the degree of inconsistency could be calculated in standard deviation units. Such a procedure was used by Hornung and McCullough (1981). A third alternative would employ the intersection of the modal values of education and income while another strategy would define the point of maximum consistency as the modal category of the bivariate education and income distribution. This last strategy would be the

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

OCCUPATIONCATEGORY"1" INCOME PERCENTILE DEVIATIONS +49 A (E,I)

369

LINEOF MAXIMUM EDUCATION-INCOME CONSISTENCY /

",,c

Y" /i'".

D~ i / ia

EDUCATION PERCENTILE DEVIATIONS-

~

f FiG. 2.

+49

-49 Degree of inconsistency measures.

ables are defined and operationalized as follows. The degree of inconsistency between education and occupation is the extent to which an individual's years of education differ from the median years of education of others in the same or similar occupation. In other words, (E,O) =f(E]O) and is measured in percentile deviations above or below the median (i.e., the length of line A in Fig. 2). Similarly degree of i n c o m e - o c c u p a t i o n inconsistency is the extent to which an individual's total salaries and wages differs from the median total income of others in the same or similar occupation. Thus, (I,0) = f(I]O) measured as percentile deviations from the median (i.e., the length of line B in Fig. 2). The degree of e d u c a t i o n - i n c o m e inconsistency is the extent to which an individual's years of education differs from his total income relative to others in the same or similar occupation. The 45 ° line passing through the origin defines the coordinates at which e d u c a t i o n - o c c u p a t i o n inconsistency equals i n c o m e - o c c u p a t i o n inconsistency (i.e., A = B). For this reason it is labeled the "line of maximum e d u c a t i o n - i n c o m e consistency" and degree of e d u c a t i o n - i n c o m e inconsistency is measured as the shortest distance between an individual's education and income coordinates and this line (for a similar measure of maximum attitude congruity see Taylor, 1973. P. 1205). Thus, (E,I) =f(E[I[O) and is the length of line C in Fig. 1 (C = .5(2(A - B)Z)vz). most complete synthesis of status inconsistency and status integration theories. We have not pursued exhaustively the consequences of these alternatives but preliminary analysis suggested that these alternatives make little difference in detecting the effects of status inconsistency. We note, however, that these alternatives deserve exploration. It is likely that different categorizations of education and income status variables would affect the sensitivity of the alternative strategies for measuring degree o f inconsistency.

370

CARLTON A. H O R N U N G

The second-order degree of inconsistency variable, which involves all three main effects, is defined as the degree to which an individual's combination of education and income deviates from the "point of maximum education-income-occupation consistency." Therefore ( E , I , O ) = f ( E , l l O ) measured as the length of line D in Fig. 2 (D = (A 2 - B2) 1/=. The equation to test for degree of inconsistency effects is therefore written as: Y = fil E -t- f~zO ÷ f i J + •4 A ÷ flsB + fi6C + firD + e . ,

(2)

whereA, B, C, andD are the inconsistency terms as defined above and in Fig. 2. Note that whether the first-order terms are greater or less than zero indicates the direction of the inconsistency while their magnitude indicates the degree of inconsistency. However, the equation is not entirely suitable in its present form for testing the relationship between degree of inconsistency and stress or, for that matter, other consequences of inconsistency that are hypothesized to be functions of both degree and direction of inconsistency. For instance, stress is predicted to increase as degree of inconsistency increases regardless of the direction of the inconsistency. The relationship is therefore expected to change direction when inconsistency is zero. Testing this type of relationship with Eq. (2) would yield slope coefficients for the firstorder degree of inconsistency variables that approach zero. One might mistakenly interpret such a result as evidence that degree of inconsistency has little or no affect on the outcome variable in question when in fact the theory predicts such a result when such a test is employed. It is therefore necessary to modify the measures of the first-order degree of inconsistency variables by taking their absolute rather than their algebraic values. Information about the direction of inconsistency is recaptured easily by including dummy variables to denote whether the first-order terms are greater or less than zero. A comprehensive examination of the effects of inconsistency can now be achieved by adding to the equation a set of product terms formed from the absolute value degree of inconsistency measures and the binary coded terms that denote direction. Specifically, it can be hypothesized that an inconsistency that involves relative deprivation or inequity-disadvantage will be more stressful than an inconsistency involving inequity-advantage or feelings of guilt. Status inconsistencies that are situations of inequitydisadvantage are when education is high for the level of occupation (i.e., A > 0): when income is low for the level of occupation (i.e., B < 0); and, when education is high relative to income (i.e., I A I > I B I ). In contrast, inequity-advantage occurs when income rewards exceed the level expected for an occupation (i.e., B > 0); when education is below the expected level (i.e., A < 0); and when income is high relative to education (i.e., IBI > lab).

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

371

An equation appropriate for testing these affects is written as:

Y = aU + b l E + b20 +ba I +b4ta] +bs]B] + b6]C[ + brfl~ + (3) bs/~ + bgC' + b,0(A'lA[) + IBI) + bm2(C,lc[)+ bl3D -~- ey For each first-order degree term, a corresponding binary term is coded + 1 if the direction of the inconsistency involves inequity-disadvantage as described above and zero otherwise. The coefficients b4, bs, and b6 measure the effects of degree of inconsistency for those inconsistencies that produce guilt feelings, the coefficients bT, bs, and b9 measure the difference in the intercept, and ba0, b~i, and b12 measure the difference in slope when inconsistency involves deprivation, and b13 m e a s u r e s the effects of second-order inconsistency involving all statuses simultaneously. All coefficients for inconsistency terms are predicted to be positive. A model that ignores the main effects while testing for the effects of degree of inconsistency is written as: Y -- a U + b a l a l

+

+ b3tCl

+

b.f4 + bsB + b6C + bz(A." [a I) + bs(B" IB[) + bg(C-[c[) + b~oD + e,

(4)

Again all coefficients are expected to be positive.

MEASURES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS The data for this analysis were collected from 941 husbands in a mailback questionnaire that was distributed as part of the first panel of data collected in 1956 as part of the Princeton Fertility Study (cf. Westoff, Potter, Sagi, and Mishler, 1961). Although these data are two decades old, they are particularly appropriate for this analysis because the husband's questionnaire contained several items dealing with psychological satisfaction and dissatisfaction with his occupational role and financial situation as well as several measures of social psychological attributes such as achievement motivation. Two measures of psychological stress are employed in this analysis. The first pertains to current occupation and is conceptualized as a perceived lack of intrinsic rewards associated with the occupation role. Although there are several components of work, such as amount and type of supervision, degree of autonomy and self-expression, hours physical conditions, wages, etc., that have each been shown to be related to an individual's level of satisfaction with his or her job (Kalleberg, 1977), no attempt is made in this conceptualization of occupation stress (OS) to evaluate the relative contributions of these components. Rather, as used here, occupation stress is essentially noneconomic in quality and refers to the strength of the individual's preference for engaging in activities other than his current occupational role.

372

CARLTON A. HORNUNG

The second measure of psychological stress pertains to the individual's dissatisfaction with his current financial situation. Financial stress (FS) is conceptualized in terms of the degree to which the individual believes his level of income is insufficient to afford a style of life that he feels he and his family are legitimately entitled to. Measures of these stress variables were constructed from a factor analysis of 13 dichotomous items. Both factor scales were adjusted to have means of 2.5 and standard deviations of 1.25. This adjustment facilitates comparisons of the effects of status inconsistency across the two measures of stress.

INCONSISTENCY AND ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION The distribution laws which define conditions of equity and consistency are based on objective characteristics of individuals and the aggregates (e.g., occupational groups) to which they belong. H o w e v e r , the psychological reaction to these objective conditions and hence the stressful consequences of status inconsistency may be conditioned by a number of social psychological attributes of the individual that may either heighten or lower the stress experienced. One such social psychological attribute that has been shown in previous research (Hornung and McCullough, 1977, 1981) to be consequential for the individual's reaction to status inconsistency is achievement orientation which is a constellation of action tendencies that find expression in a range of work-related behaviors such as, for example, occupational choice, career attainment, and performance on the job. The degree to which the individual endorses achievement values and feels that it is important to get ahead may affect the consequences of status inconsistency in either of two ways. First, believing that it is important to achieve may sensitize the individual to any inconsistent statuses he or she may occupy. That is, individuals with a high achievement motivation are most likely to be aware of their having one status lower than another and, as a consequence of the heightened salience of inconsistency, suffer the most stress from inconsistency. If this is the case, then we would expect status inconsistency to have greater power to explain stress among individuals who have a high achievement orientation than among individuals who are less concerned with status attainment. Conversely, maintaining a high achievement orientation may be a convenient way of coping with the stress of inconsistency. Such a value system may enable an individual to reassure himself or herself that the stress encountered by having one status higher than another is a tolerable cost in view of the importance of achieving. Further, such an individual may also perceive their inconsistency to be a t e m p o r a r y state to be endured in the process of status attainment. If such a belief system functions as a coping mechanism, then we would e x p e c t status inconsistency variables

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

373

to be more powerful predictors of psychological stress among individuals who do not regard achievement as important than among individuals with a high achievement orientation. Achievement motivation cannot be directly measured but it is possible to obtain a suitable surrogate measure in terms of the importance the individual places on getting ahead. The husband's questionnaire contained five items that provide a measure of beliefs about the importance of getting ahead. The text of these items is: (1) I feel that the most important thing about work is the chance it offers to get ahead; (2) I spend a lot of time thinking about how to improve my chances for getting ahead; (3) I am pretty well satisfied with the chances for getting ahead in my present work; (4) I am very anxious to get much further ahead; and, (5) getting ahead is one of the most important things in life to me. Summing responses to these dichotomous items forms a six-point scale of importance of getting ahead that was trichotomized to yield approximately 30% of the cases in each of the low and high categories and 40% in the middle category. The regression equations for the main and inconsistency effects were solved for respondents in each of these categories as well as for all respondents. RESULTS The results are contained in Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1 are the unstandardized regression coefficients for Eq. (3) which contains the main effects of education, occupation, and income in addition to the effects of the 10 inconsistency variables. Ignoring beliefs about achievement finds the main effects explaining nearly 13% of the variation in the measure of occupation stress and just over 11% of the variation in financial stress. Adding the inconsistency terms to the equation increases the explained variation by just over 4% for occupation stress and 3% for financial stress. This small increase in explained variation is similar to what has been found in previous research and what has prompted some to argue for the abandonment of the status inconsistency concept. Examining the coefficients relative to their standard errors does lend some support to the status consistency concept; particularly in the analysis of occupation stress. Here we find statistically significant main effects for education and income but an effect for occupation that is not significant. In the regression of the financial stress measure using Eq. (3) we find that the only significant main effect is income. However, Eq. (3) yields six significant inconsistency effects in the regression of occupation stress and two significant inconsistency effects in the regression of financial stress. In the analysis of occupation stress we find significantly different intercepts for two of the three types of inequity-disadvantage such that stress is higher when inequity involves income low for occupation (B) and

374

CARLTON A. HORNUNG

,-<

.-~< I

~ 1 1

I

I

I

<;>==

~1

['-" =

I

I

~q

i

II

I

~1

~-=

._~

J

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

~ N

........ ~1

~ I

I

~

~ II

~M

g~

?

5 + .E

=

~.~.E ,=

~

-J~&-

~+~

~=~ '~'~ ~ m o ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ~ <

=~ "~ ._=

x V ~ .~

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

375

income low relative to education (C). It is also interesting to note that the slopes of inconsistency between education and occupation are equal and opposite in sign for inequity-advantage, which leads to less occupation stress, and inequity-disadvantage, which leads to higher stress in the occupational role. Thus, had we analyzed the partial effects of degree of inconsistency between occupation and education without distinguishing between inequity-advantage and -disadvantage forms of inconsistency we would have found that an inconsistency between these status hierarchies had no effect on the level of occupation stress. We also find opposite signs for the inequity-advantage and -disadvantage forms of inconsistency between occupation and income. In this case receiving higher income rewards than what the individual can legitimately expect on the basis of his occupation (i.e., inequity-advantage) leads to higher levels of occupation stress. Receiving less income than can be legitimately expected, a condition of inequity-disadvantage, also leads to high levels of occupation stress but at a rate of increase that is less than when inconsistency between occupation and income is inequity-advantage. This is contrary to what we predicted and probably results from the intercept of the inequity disadvantage being significantly higher than the intercept for inequity advantage between occupation and income. In the regression of financial stress we find that education being lower than expected for occupation significantly reduces the intercept. This is not congruent with our predictions and means that financial stress is lower among individuals whose combination of education and occupation constitutes inequity-advantage. However, we do find, as predicted, that financial stress increases directly with the degree of inequity-disadvantage between education and occupation. When we apply Eq. (3) to the analysis of the two stress measures within categories of importance of getting ahead we find that the predictive power of the main effects of education, occupation, and income decrease from nearly 21% in the low importance category to just 8% in the high achievement category when analyzing occupation stress but, in the case of financial stress, their predictive power is about the same (i.e., about 12 to 13%) in the low- and middle-importance categories and then declines by about one-half to just over 6% in the high-importance category. The exact same pattern of results occurs for the variation explained by the main and inconsistency effects. Specifically, the ability of education, occupation, and income and inconsistencies to explain stress associated with the occupation role and, to a somewhat lesser extent, stress associated with current financial situation, declines as individuals place greater importance on achievement and getting ahead. This pattern does not obtain when we examine the explained variation added by the inconsistency variables. In this case inconsistency variables add more explained variation in both measures of stress in the middle

376

CARLTON A. HORNUNG

category of importance of getting ahead than in either the low or high categories. These findings are not consistent with either of the alternatives outlined above and are ambiguous with respect to whether achievement orientation functions as a coping mechanism or as a belief system that amplifies the stress of inconsistency. However, the ambiguity is clarified somewhat when we examine the explained variation added by inconsistency as a percentage of the total variation in the two measures explained by the main effect and inconsistency variables. Approximately one-fifth of the nearly 26% of the variation in occupation stress explained among respondents low in achievement orientation is attributable to status inconsistency. The corresponding percentages for respondents in the middle and high categories of importance of getting ahead are 39.5 and 45.9, respectively. In other words, inconsistency variables account for an increasing fraction of the explained variation in occupation stress as the importance of getting ahead increases while at the same time a smaller fraction of the explained variation can be directly attributable to education, occupation and income status. The results are similar but not identical in the case of financial stress in which 27.4, 22.3, and 33% of the explained variation is attributable to status inconsistency for individuals with low, middle, and high achievement motivation, respectively. The general increase in relative importance of status inconsistency in explaining each measure of psychological stress is particularly noteworthy given that the main effect variables were entered first in the equation and could be expected to account for most of the explainable variation given the moderate level of collinearity between the statuses and the inconsistency variables. Table 2 presents the results obtained with Eq. (4) which ignores the main effects in regressing the measures of stress on the status inconsistency variables. This analysis shows that inconsistency is, by itself, a rather poor predictor of occupation stress (i.e., less than 5%) but a considerably better predictor of financial stress (i.e., 9.4%) among all respondents. It is striking to note that five of the inconsistency variables are significantly related to occupation stress, four of which are in the predicted direction, while only one inconsistency variable is significantly related to financial stress. Occupation stress increases when income rewards exceed the amount that can legitimately be expected (inequityadvantage) as well as in each type of inconsistency that is a condition of inequity-disadvantage. However, contrary to expectations, occupation stress decreases as a function of the degree to which educational investments exceed the level that is equitable for a specific occupation. This may in part be due to the fact that inequity-disadvantage between education and occupation, income and occupation, as well as education and income, each result in a significant and large increase in the intercept for the equation. In other words, inequity-disadvantage between any pair of statuses significantly raises occupation stress.

377

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

TABLE 2 Unstandardized Regression Coefficients and Proportion Variation Explained by Status Inconsistency for Levels of Importance of Getting Ahead (Eq. 4) Occupation stress

Parameter Intercept A B C

A •A B •B C ' C D R2

Financial stress

All Resp.

Low IGA

Mod. IGA

High IGA

All Resp.

Low IGA

Mod. IGA

2.07 .01 .02* -.00 .58* .29* .48" -.03* -.00 .01 -.02 .048

1.93 .00 .01 .00 .26 .68* .74* -.02* -.02* -.01 -.00 .079

2.02 -.02 .01 -.00 .61" .18 .58" -.03* .00 .01 .01 .063

2.16 .04* .05* .00 .85* .20 .18 -.03* -.00 .02 -.06* .071

2.47 .01 .00 .00 -.08 .18 .13 -.00 .02* -.00 -.01 .094

2.16 .01 .01 -.01 -.16 .34 .16 .00 .02 .00 -.02 .105

2.47 .02 .00 .01 -.01 -.00 .11 .01 .03* -.01 -.03 .115

High IGA 2.84 .00 =.01 .00 -.10 .21 .10 .00 .01 -.00 -.00 .053

*p < .05.

The consequences of inequity-disadvantage for occupation stress are also clearly evident and occur in the predicted direction within each category of achievement motivation. Inequity-disadvantage between education and occupation increases occupation stress among individuals who are moderate or high in achievement orientation while inequitydisadvantage between education and income increases occupation stress for individuals who place a low or moderate level of importance on getting ahead. The only level of achievement orientation in which inequitydisadvantage between occupation and income raises occupation stress is for individuals who place little importance on getting ahead. The large increase in stress brought about by the affect of inequity-disadvantage between pairs of statuses may account for the consistent negative slope of degree of education-occupation inconsistency when education exceeds the equitable level for occupation and the negative slope for degree of income occupation inconsistency when income falls below the equitable amount. Finally, with respect to occupation stress, degree of educationoccupation inconsistency when education is lower than expected and degree of income occupation inconsistency when income is higher than expected both lead to high levels of stress among individuals with high achievement motivation. Turning to financial stress we find that inconsistency effects are fairly strong predictors in the sense that they account for an appreciable proportion of the variation except among respondents who are high in achievement motivation. Individuals experience greater financial stress as a function of the degree to which their income falls below the level that is

378

CARLTON A. HORNUNG

equitable for their occupation and this is especially so for those who value getting ahead as moderately important.

DISCUSSION The results of these analyses support the notion that theories of cognitive consistency and status consistency are intertwined in a complex way. There is no clear confirmation or refutation of the alternative ways in which basic values such as achievement motivation either amplify or mollify the stressful consequences of status inconsistency. Rather, the results obtained with Eq. (3) which included the main and inconsistency effects suggest, particularly in the case of occupation stress, that instead of mollifying the stress engendered by inconsistency, maintaining a high achievement motivation seems to be a way of coping with the stress engendered by the statuses themselves but that such a value system increases the psychologically stressful effects of status inconsistency. There are at least three lines for further research suggested by these results. First, it may prove useful to refine the method of measuring status inconsistency presented here by using more precise definitions of equity groups than the Census categories of occupation for purposes of defining inconsistent and inequitable combinations of statuses. Such a refinement might begin by incorporating labor force segmentation theory into the definition of equity groups (cf. Stolzenberg, 1975, 1978) or by adjusting the education variable by age and/or the income variable by tenure in the job. Second, additional analysis is needed with other measures of stress such as psychosomatic symptoms while taking account of achievement motivation and other potential coping mechanisms. Third, attention should be directed to the possibility of stress being a nonlinear function of degree of status inconsistency. In this analysis we imposed the strict assumption of a linear relationship between stress and degree of inconsistency whereas it can be conjectured that stress is a nonlinear function. It may be for instance, that moderate levels of inconsistency are more stressful than extreme disparities between statuses in that extreme inconsistency may be more easily coped with. Our findings of a significant increase in the intercepts of the equations brought about by conditions of inequity-disadvantage between pairs of statuses coupled with the negative slopes of inequity-disadvantage degree of inconsistency are compatible with this hypothesis and warrant further attention.

REFERENCES Adams, J. S. (1965), "Inequality in social exchange," in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (L. Berkowitz, Ed.), Vol. 2, pp. 267-299, Academic Press, New York. Bauman, K. E. (1968), '~Status inconsistency, satisfactory social interaction, and community satisfaction in an area of rapid growth," Social Forces 47, 45-52. Berger, J., Zelditch, M., Jr., Anderson, B., and Cohen, B. P. (1972), "'Structural aspects of distributive justice: A status-value formulation," in Sociological Theories in Progress

INCONSISTENCY, MOTIVATION, AND STRESS

379

(J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr., and B. Anderson, Eds.), Vol. 11, pp. 119-146, Houghton Mifflin, Boston. Berry, K. J.~ and Martin, T. (1972), On the Validity of Profile Analytic Comparisons: The Case of Status Consistency, Paper read at annual meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society, Boston. Blalock, H. M., Jr. (1966), -The identification problem and theory building: The case of status inconsistency," American Sociological Review 31(February), 52-60. (a) Blalock, H. M., Jr. (1966), "Comment: Status inconsistency and the identification problem," Public Opinion Quarterly 30(Spring), 130-132. (b) Blalock, H. M., Jr., (1967), "Status inconsistency and interaction: Some alternative models," American Journal of Sociology 73(November), 305-315. (a) Blalock, H. M., Jr., (1967), ~'Status inconsistency, social mobility, status integration and structural effects," American Sociological Review 32(October), 790-801. (b) Blalock, H. M. Jr., (1967), ~'Tests of status inconsistency theory: A note of caution," Pacific Sociological Review 10(Fall), 69-74. (c) Blau, P. M., and Duncan, O. D. (1967), The American Occupational Structure, Wiley, New York. Cook, K. S. (1975), "'Expectations, evaluations and equity," American Sociological Review 40(June), 372-388. Duncan, O. D., Featherman, D. L., and Duncan, B. (1972), Socioeconomic Background and Achievement, Seminar Press, New York. Hope, K. (1975), "Models of status inconsistency and social mobility effects," American Sociological Review 40 (June), 322-343. Hornung, C. A. (1972), Status Consistency: A Method of Measurement and Empirical Examination. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Syracuse University. Hornung, C. A. (1973), Social Status Models and Political Efficacy, Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society. Hornung, C. A. (1977), "Social status, status inconsistency and psychological stress," American Sociological Review 42(August), 623-638. Hornung, C. A., and McCullough, B. C. (1977), Status Inconsistency in Marriage: Consequences for life and Marital Dissatisfaction, Paper read at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Chicago. Hornung, C. A., and McCullough, B. C. (1981), "Status relationships in dual employment marriages: Consequences for psychological well-being," Journal of Marriage and Family, 43(February), in press. House, J. S., and Harkins, E. B. (1975), "Why and when is status inconsistency stressful?" American Journal of Sociology 81(September), 395-412. Hughes, E. C. (1945), "Dilemmas and contradictions of status," American Journal of Sociology 50(March), 353-359. Hunt, L. L., and Cushing, R. (1971), "Status inconsistency, interpersonal attachment and right wing extremism," Social Science Quarterly 51(December), 587-601. Jackson, E. F. (1962), "Status inconsistency and symptoms of stress," American Sociological Review 27, 469-480. Jackson, E. F., and Curtis, R. F. (1965), '~Effects of vertical mobility and status inconsistency: A body of negative evidence," American Sociological Review 37(August), 701713. Kalleberg, A. L. (1977), "Work values and job rewards: A theory of job satisfaction, American Sociological Review 42(April), 124-143. Kelly, K. D., and Chambtis, W. J. (1966), "'Status consistency and political attitudes," American Sociological Review 31(December), 375-382. Kemper, T. D. (1968), "Reference groups, socialization and achievement." American Sociological Review 33 (February), 31-46.

380

CARLTON A. HORNUNG

Kenkel, W. J. (1956), "The relationship between status consistency and politicoeconomic attitudes," American Sociological Review 21(December), 365-368. Laumann, E. O., and Segal, D. R. (1971), "Status inconsistency and ethno-religious group membership as determinants of social participation," 77(July), 36-61. Lenski, G. (1954), "Status crystallization: A non-vertical dimension of social status," American Sociological Review 19(August), 405-413. Lenski, G. (1956), "Social participation and status crystallization," American Sociological Review 21(August), 458-464. Martin, W. T. (1965), "Socially induced stress: Some converging theories," Pacific Sociological Review 8(Fall), 63-69. Mills, E. W., Jr. (1975), Conceptual Problems in Status Inconsistency Theories of Stress," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco. Mulford, H. A., and Salisbury, W. W., II. (1964), "'Self conceptions in a general population," Sociological Quarterly 5(Winter), 35-46. Olsen, M. E., and Tully, J. C. (1972), "Socioeconomic-ethnic status inconsistency and preference for political change," American Sociological Review 37, 560-574. Ploch, D. R. (1968), Status Inconsistency: A Method of Measurement and Substantive Evaluation, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Shekelle, R. B. (1976), ~Status inconsistency, mobility and CHD: A reply to Horan and Gray," Journal of Health and Social Behavior 17, 83-87. Shekelle, R. B., Ostfeld, A. M., and Paul, O. (1969), "Social status and incidence of coronary heart disease," Journal of Chronic Diseases 22, 381-394. Stolzenberg, R. M. (1975), "Occupations, labor markets and the process of wage attainment," American Sociological Review 40(October), 645-665. Stolzenberg, R. M. (1978), "Bringing the boss back in: Employer size, employee schooling and socioeconomic achievement," American Sociological Review 43(December), 813-828. Taylor, H. F. (1971), Toward an Interaction Model of Cognitive and Social Consistency, Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society, New York. Taylor, H. F. (1973), "Linear models of consistency: Some extensions of Blalock's strategy," American Journal of Sociology 78(May), 1192-1215. Taylor, H. F., and Hornung, C. A. (1979), ~'On a general model for social and cognitive consistency," Sociological Methods and Research 7(February), 259-287. Westoff, C. F., Potter, G. R., Jr., Sagi, P. C., and Mishler, E. L. (1961), Family Growth in Metropolitan America, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J.