Sticks and carrots to manage groundwater over-abstraction in La Mancha, Spain

Agricultural Water Management 194 (2017) 113–124

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Sticks and carrots to manage groundwater over-abstraction in La Mancha, Spain Alvar Closas a,∗ , Franc¸ois Molle a,b , Nuria Hernández-Mora c a b c

International Water Management Institute (IWMI), 15G Radwan Ibn el Tabib, PO BOX 2416, ICARDA, Cairo, Egypt Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, Montpellier, France Independent researcher

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 5 January 2017 Received in revised form 13 June 2017 Accepted 31 August 2017 Keywords: Spain Groundwater management Regulation Policy Incentives State

a b s t r a c t Over recent decades, groundwater-fed irrigation has sustained the social and economic development of La Mancha, Spain. Without much initial regulation and control, groundwater resources and aquifer levels decreased dramatically, threatening agriculture and also highly valuable groundwater-dependant wetland ecosystems. This paper presents as a historical analysis of the different policy tools used to manage and regulate groundwater abstraction in the Western Mancha Aquifer after Spain approved its 1985 Water Law. It analyses the panoply of control and management instruments laid out by the state to counter the resource depletion trend, demonstrating the necessity by regulatory bodies to complement soft incentives (carrots) with the threat of sanctions and groundwater access limitations (sticks). As this case study shows however, each policy modality has its legal and practical loopholes which can be negotiated and exploited by groundwater users to their own advantage. Improvements in groundwater levels starting in 2010 seem to be linked to aquifer recharge following an unprecedented wet cycle rather than the effectiveness of the policy tools. © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction With groundwater over-abstraction being a vexing issue in many parts of the world (Famigletti, 2014; Faysse and Petit, 2012; ˜ 2013; Gleeson et al., 2012), a panoply of Foster and Garduno, policy instruments has been devised by governments and regulatory agencies to manage and control groundwater abstraction (Montginoul and Rinaudo, 2009; Mukherji and Shah, 2005; OECD, 2015; Theesfeld, 2010). In policy making, commonly-known ‘sticks’ are regulatory instruments acting as disincentives with potentially punitive consequences, economic or otherwise (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998). In groundwater management these can be quotas limiting groundwater abstraction, tariffs, or command and control instruments such as sanctions or well closure. ‘Carrots’ are used to regulate actions through positive incentives usually in the form of economic support. In groundwater management these can range from energy subsidies, financial incentives for technology improvements, to water rights buy-back programs. The case presented here is the Upper Guadiana basin in Spain. Spain is a largely semi-arid country known for the importance of surface and groundwater resources in its economy, its highly

∗ Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (A. Closas). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2017.08.024 0378-3774/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

developed water storage capacity, and its high number of wells, estimated between 1 and 2 million (De Stefano et al., 2015; Llamas and Garrido, 2007). In 2013, groundwater represented 22% of the total water use with agriculture its main user (73% of the total groundwater use) (De Stefano et al., 2013). Of its 699 water bodies underlying around 70% of the country, 232 are at risk according to European Water Framework Directive (WFD) regulation, including the Western Mancha Aquifer, located in the Upper Guadiana River Basin (IGME, 2012; De Stefano, 2013). This paper reviews the use of policy instruments applied to groundwater management and regulation in Spain and concretely in the Upper Guadiana River Basin. Even though previous publications have already attempted such undertaking (e.g. Bromley et al., 2001; De la Hera et al., 2016; Llamas and Garrido, 2007; LópezGunn, 2002, 2012; Martínez-Santos et al., 2008; Varela-Ortega, 2007), they have only provided fragments of a much longer and more complex story. This paper tries to give a full and updated historical account, looking at the evolution of groundwater policy over the past 30 years in the Western Mancha Aquifer. As virtually every policy instrument has been tested, attempts to draw generic lessons from such regulatory diversity are made, reflecting on the interplay between various regulatory instruments and actors. The paper also looks at how legal loopholes are negotiated and exploited by groundwater users and the state to reorder groundwater regulation and management. In order to further understand the impact

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Fig. 1. The Western Mancha Aquifer. Source: Varela-Ortega et al. (2011).

of these instruments, the paper also examines the process of policy making vis-à-vis groundwater rules in Spain, focusing on the distribution of decision-making power and how local dynamics and individual behaviors are linked to higher level regulations and policies and the effects on groundwater management.

2. Characterization of the Western Mancha aquifer and its groundwater fever The La Mancha region in south-central Spain, has hot and dry summers and short winters and an annual rainfall average of 415 mm (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008). The Western Mancha Aquifer, with an area of 5500 km2 , is part of the Upper Guadiana sub-basin with an area of 16,130 km2 , itself part of the Guadiana River Basin, a 60,256 km2 transboundary basin shared by Spain and Portugal (Fig. 1). The Upper Guadiana basin is drained by the Guadiana River and tributaries in a highly interconnected network of rivers, wetlands and aquifers. Four hydrologically connected aquifer systems underlie the Upper basin: the Western Mancha, the Campo de Montiel, the Sierra de Altomira and Mancha de Toledo aquifers. The Western Mancha aquifer is the largest, both in terms of areal extent and groundwater storage capacity. The region’s gentle topography (altitude ranging between 600 and 700 m above sea level) together with its geological characteristics are responsible for the poorly defined surface drainage system and the interconnectedness of surface and groundwater resources (Cruces et al., 1998). In 1981, the entire Humid Mancha Ecosystem – a 400,000 ha wetland-rich region–was designated a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (ibid.), incuding the 1980-declared RAMSAR wetland of the Tablas de Daimiel National Park and fed by the Western Mancha aquifer and the Guadiana and Cigüela rivers (IGME, n.d.; Martínez Cortina et al., 2011; Mejías Moreno et al., 2012).

Traditionally, dryland cereals and vineyards were the primary crops together with sheep rearing. From the late 1970s onward, groundwater-fed irrigation spread and water-demanding crops such as corn, sugar beet and alfalfa started to predominate, driven not only by private farmer initiative but also following state-led farmer re-settlement programmes coupled with agriculture subsidies (Closas, 2014). By the mid-1980s, between 105,000 and 135,000 ha were being irrigated from the Western Mancha aquifer (López-Gunn and Hernández-Mora, 2001). Along with a loose regulatory system of groundwater abstraction rights, this state-fueled and farmer-led ‘green revolution’ brought about significant drawdowns in aquifer levels and the environmental degradation of the Mancha Biosphere Reserve. The Tablas de Daimiel National Park underwent a reduction of its naturally inundated area from 1800 ha in the 1960s to a minimum of 15 ha in 2009 (Closas, 2015). Between 1980 and 1995, uncontrolled irrigation expansion was pumping over 650 Mm3 annually against an estimated average natural recharge of 230 Mm3 per year, resulting in average aquifer level drawdowns of 1.8 m/year until 1988 and up to 2.3 m/yr until 1995 (Bromley et al., 2001; IGME, n.d.; Varela-Ortega, 2007). Water table drawdowns were also aggravated by drought periods in the mid-1970s, mid-1990s and in 2005–2009 (MMA, 2008a; Mejías Moreno et al., 2012). Aquifer levels reached a record low in 1995–1996 (Fig. 2) and aquifer storage decreased by an estimated 3790 Mm3 during that time. Between 1996 and 2000 aquifer levels recovered (on average 2.5 m/year) due to higher precipitation and lower pumping volumes in response to the European-funded Wetland Program implemented in the region (Section 4 below), resulting in an estimated aquifer storage recovery of 1750 Mm3 . Between 2000 and 2009 abstractions were stable at fairly high levels, so groundwater levels responded to the evolution of precipitation, with over 1000 Mm3 lost from aquifer storage during this period. Fig. 2 provides an overview of the evolution of

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Fig. 2. Policy chronology, average precipitation and evolution of aquifer levels. Note: Average water table depth measured near the ‘Ojos del Guadiana’. Average precipitation measured for Ciudad Real Province. Source: data from Centro de Interpretacion del Agua, Daimiel for groundwater levels and AEMET for series 1988–2010 and 2013, and INE for 2011–2012 for average monthly precipitation measured at the Ciudad Real weather station.

the water table at a representative piezometer in the aquifer and a chronology of policies enacted and further analysed in this paper. Starting in December 2009, the combination of an exceptionally wet cycle together with new policy initiatives, resulted in a significant recuperation of groundwater levels (Fig. 2). Average water table increases reached 6 m/year in 2011 in some parts of the aquifer, allowing the recovery of about 2000 Mm3 of aquifer storage. The iconic Ojos del Guadiana springs, dry since 1983, reappeared in 2010 following the wettest rainfall period in 25 years (CH Guadiana, 2010; Mejías Moreno et al., 2012). 3. Regulating groundwater abstraction rights in Spain 3.1. Historical groundwater abstraction regulation and reform attempts in 1985 During most of the twentieth century, groundwater abstraction rights in Spain were linked to land ownership. The 1879 Water Law granted private groundwater rights to land owners as a way to sustain private property and increase groundwater abstraction profitability (Closas, 2013). In 1934, a decree was passed stipulating that permits issued by the Ministry of Mines were needed for drilled or dug wells, but only as a method of registering and not to control groundwater abstraction (Closas, 2013). Despite such regulation, wells in Spain continued to be drilled without permits. Weak enforcement was due to the fact that the decree did not supersede higher level laws (e.g. the 1879 Water Law) (Moreu Ballonga, 2002). The reform of this system came in 1985 with a new Water Law, passed in the midst of wider political and socioeconomic changes in Spain after almost 40 years of dictatorship. The 1985 Water Law established River Basin Authorities in interregional river basins (Confederación Hidrográficas or RBAs), with management, regulatory, and planning responsibilities dependant of the central government. The new law also changed the regime of groundwater

abstraction rights from a private to a public one. Water (including aquifers) was declared ‘public domain’ and the state would regulate and control abstractions via concessions for all users issued by RBAs (except wells withdrawing less than 7000 m3 /year) (Closas, 2012). The aim of the law was to put all groundwater rights under the same status, by transforming historically acquired private groundwater rights into concessions after a transitional period (Moreu Ballonga, 1996). The 1985 law required new groundwater users to obtain administrative concessions and, to avoid expropriation claims, gave owners of pre-existing wells two options (Hernández-Mora et al., 2003). The first option was to register historical rights in the Registry of Public Waters as a “temporary private water right” for 50 years. After this period these users would be given priority by the state to receive an administrative concession to continue enjoying their groundwater use right. The second option was to retain the private right indefinitely by registering it in the Catalogue of Private Waters. In either case, a modification of the originally declared characteristics of the well or groundwater volumes abstracted automatically extinguished the preexisting right and required users to request a new concession. The law gave groundwater users 3 years to register their rights through either of these two procedures (Fig. 3). If after this period groundwater users had not declared their rights, they would automatically be considered as part of the Catalogue. Theoretically, the incentive to register groundwater historical rights in the Registry of Public Waters was the ‘administrative protection’ granted by the state under the law which would last for as long as the concession lasted. All groundwater users had to prove that they were abstracting water prior to 1985 by presenting proof of use. This point led to significant administrative chaos for the RBAs, confusion, and procedural backlog as neither the law nor subsequent ministerial regulations specified what documents could be used as proof of use (Hernández-Mora, 1998). In some cases a note

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3 years regulaon period

Private right for up to 50 years – Registry of Waters Permanent private right – Catalogue of abstracons

1934 Ministry of Mines registry

Non-registered rights

Final 3-month period to declare the right

Administrave concession for new groundwater uses Fig. 3. Evolution of private groundwater abstraction rights in Spain.

signed by the mayor of the town where the farm was located was accepted and in others the 1934 certificate from the Ministry of Mines. The decision by the state to maintain the option of private groundwater abstraction rights was designed to avoid the financial compensation to users for the loss of their private right (Cabezas Guijarro and Sánchez, 2012). Some groundwater users saw in this formulation a way to maintain private ownership and hence to avoid the legal imbroglio caused by the new water law (Llamas et al., 2001). Still, many groundwater users were uncertain about the meaning and extent of the ‘administrative protection’ promised by the state, not fully understanding the advantages of being in the Catalogue or the Registry (Requena and García, 2010). The socialist party (PSOE) in government at the time was the main party backing this change from private to public ownership, which would have meant large compensations to private right holders. The main opposition party (the conservative Popular Party, PP), considered this measure unconstitutional, infringing on private property (BOE, 1985). After an appeal was filed by the PP to Spain’s Constitutional Tribunal to revoke the application of the Water Law, the court considered that the 1985 Water Law did not infringe individual rights. What remained was a ‘hybrid system’ where in theory most groundwater abstraction rights would eventually migrate to the public Registry (López-Gunn, 2014, pers. com.; Moreu Ballonga, 2002). The lack of information given by the state combined with the lack of trust from groundwater users vis-a-vis the RBAs, and the fact that many wells had not been registered since 1934 with the Ministry of Mines, resulted in an estimated 10–20% of all private groundwater abstraction rights registered in the Registry, and only 8% in the Catalogue (Fornés Azcoiti et al., 2005). The rest remained unregistered and liable to penalties from the RBAs. The reluctance from groundwater users to relinquish formal historical rights, the politically controversial enforcement of these measures by the state and the lack of public funds, led to a situation where hundreds of thousands of wells remained in legal limbo, outside the regulatory framework established by the 1985 Water Law (Moreu Ballonga, 2002). Delays in the registration process due to a last minute rush in application submissions together with unclear regulatory guidelines and insufficient resources in RBAs meant that, in most cases, well registrations did not start until 1991. The resulting administrative deadlock helped sustain a generalized sense of distrust

and impunity among farmer groups (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008). The situation of the Guadiana RBA was no exception. The new legal measures were undermined by logistics as the submission of an additional 12,000 applications for permits for groundwater abstraction rights, on the last day of the registration period in 1988, overwhelmed the Guadiana RBA (Closas, 2013; Fornés et al., 2005). 3.2. Subsequent regulatory attempts of groundwater abstraction In an effort to regularize groundwater rights, the government launched two consecutive ambitious national programs: ARYCA (Actualization of Registries and Catalogues of Abstractions) and ALBERCA (Actualization of Registry Books and Catalogue). The ARYCA program was envisioned as a census of groundwater abstractions released in 1994 by the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Environment (MOPTMA-MINER, 1994), intending to clarify the legal status of groundwater rights by: 1) completing the registration process of thousands of wells in either the Registry or the Catalogue; and 2) inventorying and registering non-declared abstractions thus identifying potential illegal wells (those drilled after 1985 without an administrative concession) (MOPTMA-MINER, 1994). In 2000 the ARYCA program was decribed as ‘discouraging’, due to the slow registration process and limited budget (MMA, 2000). By 2002, 433,576 wells had been declared: 43% had been registered; 13% were being processed; and the remaining were still pending registration (188,139). However, these estimates did not include wells in those river basins directly managed by autonomous regions and including several intensive water use areas. Other estimates considered the number of wells to be higher: closer to one million (MMA, 2000) or even 2 million (Llamas et al., 2001). With the limited success of the ARYCA program, the 2001 National Hydrological Plan (Law 10/2001) introduced a final 3-month deadline for groundwater users to register their rights. For groundwater uses existing prior to 1985 and for aquifers declared ‘overexploited’, after that deadline the only way to recognize groundwater abstraction rights was to go via the judicial system and obtain a court ruling to prove ownership of the right (Fornés et al., 2005). In 2002, the ALBERCA program aimed to streamline the registration process in the Registry of Public Waters characterizing existing uses (georeferenced), and modernizing the Registry via computerization and online access. In 2010, data provided by the Spanish Agency of Evaluation and Quality stated that around 46% of all reg-

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ularization files in Spain had been processed and resolved (AEVAL, 2010). As of January 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture was processing 466,272 requests for surface and groundwater rights, of which 80% were groundwater use rights (MAGRAMA, 2012a). In the Western Mancha aquifer, Martínez-Santos et al. (2008), estimated that nearly 40,000 wells exist and only 17,000 had been registered at the Guadiana RBA by 2008, with 52,408 ha of illegally irrigated land (without registered permits) (MMA, 2008b).

4. Sticks and carrots to control groundwater abstraction 4.1. The stick of the Guadiana RBA and the 1985 Water Law In 1985, the Water Law allowed the state to declare aquifers overexploited and entrusted RBAs to enforce emergency groundwater abstraction limits. In the case of the Western La Mancha Aquifer, a provisional declaration of overexploitation was approved in 1987. In compliance with such declaration, in 1991 the Guadiana RBA approved the first annual groundwater abstraction regime for the aquifer which included: volumetric restrictions for individual wells, the prohibition to drill new wells; freezing all new groundwater abstraction concessions; and the obligation to create a community of groundwater users to oversee the implementation of the emergency abstraction regime (see Section 6) (Closas, 2013; Hernández-Mora, 1998). Groundwater abstraction limitations were only imposed on users having registered their wells in the Registry of Waters or in the Catalogue, remaining in place as long as the declaration of overexploitation lasted. The 1991 groundwater abstraction regime (quota system 1) put in place by the Guadiana RBA established maximum irrigation quotas calculated on the basis of what was considered normal consumption, set at 4278 m3 /ha/year (average estimate based on existing irrigated area, crops and abstracted groundwater volume). Maximum pumping quotas were varied according to farm size: a 5-ha farm would be able to use its total groundwater allocation (i.e. 4278 m3 /ha) whereas a 20-ha farm would only be allowed to use 2352 m3 /ha, and a farm of 100 ha would be limited to use only 1375 m3 /ha (Closas, 2013). Farmers growing vines had a fixed limited allocation of 2000 m3 /ha/year. In spite of these measures, the continuing depletion of the aquifer drove the Guadiana RBA to declare the definitive overexploitation of the aquifer in 1994 (declaración definitiva de sobreexplotación) and a new groundwater exploitation regime was approved. A new maximum pumping quota (quota system 2) of 2000 m3 /ha was set for all users and crops, except for vine which was given a maximum allowance of 1500 m3 /ha (Varela-Ortega, 2007). These quotas were intended to be modified annually according to evolving climatic and demand conditions. The 1985 Water Law also gave the Guadiana RBA enforcement authority to control groundwater uses and impose sanctions for illegal wells and excessive abstractions, although this authority was significantly limited from the outset by a lack of staff for monitoring and control (AEVAL, 2010). Sanctions ranging from D 3000 to D 30,000 per farmer were put in and meters started to be installed in 1996, with farmers covering installation costs (López-Gunn, 2003). Since not all wells had meters, groundwater abstraction was also monitored via ‘consumption tables’ based on groundwater consumption estimates for different crops (López-Gunn, 2014, pers. com.). The RBA also used remote sensing to assess groundwater use. RBA river agents conducted onsite inspections but had only four guards to cover an area of 5500 km2 (López-Gunn, 2003). The enforcement powers of the Guadiana RBA were all the more critical during drought episodes as Fig. 4 shows, with peak sanctioning periods coinciding with important decreases in average precipitation (in 1992–1994 and 2004–2005).

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Table 1 Total surface area participating in the compensation programme for the reduction of irrigation in the Western Mancha and Campo de Montiel aquifers. Year

Participating hectares

Total theoretical savings (Mm3 )

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

57,973 74,853 85,410 85,834 85,838 85,020 61,127

182. 39 235. 97 298. 19 302. 16 310 not available not available

Source: Hernández-Mora (2002) with data from Rosell and Viladomiu (1997) for 1993–1996; Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nutrition, Castilla-La Mancha autonomous government for the 1997–1999 period (unpublished data).

4.2. The carrot: agro-environmental plans (1992–2005) It was estimated that groundwater abstraction limitations imposed by the abstraction regime would entail a 25% reduction in agriculture workforce (Rosell and Viladomiu, 1997). Farmers also demanded compensations from the RBA as they could no longer use the newly purchased machinery to cultivate water-intensive crops as their water allocation would no longer suffice (Viladomiu, 2014, pers. com.) These reductions led to considerable social unrest and free-riding behaviour with illegal well drilling and increased abstraction (Varela-Ortega, 2007). In 1992 the first Agro-Environmental Plan (AEP1) was established to reduce total groundwater abstractions in the Western Mancha Aquifer to 240 Mm3 per year by compensating farmers willing to stop or reduce pumping (Rosell Foxà, 2001). The Plan was proposed by the Spanish government and the Autonomous government of Castilla-La Mancha to the European Commission. It was meant to alleviate the burden on farmers of measures approved in 1991 under the emergency abstraction regime and to take advantage of the 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which approved funds to support farmers to reduce water use and preserve natural ecosystems (Regulation CEE 2078/1992) (Rosell and Viladomiu, 2000; Viladomiu, 2014, pers. com.). Given the deterioration of the Tablas de Daimiel National Park, Spain combined its (urgent) need for funds to compensate farmers with the necessity to protect the endangered ecosystem (Viladomiu, 2014, pers. com.). AEP1 established three levels of pumping reduction based on an estimated average consumption of 4200 m3 /ha/year: 50%, 70%, and 100% and payments were established per hectare of irrigated land (Varela-Ortega, 2007). The European Commission provided 75% of the funds and Spain the rest. The first phase of the Program was approved for a five-year period (1993–1997), with a total budget of D 96 million (Hernández-Mora, 2002). Participation in the plan was voluntary. Since monetary compensation per hectare largely offset income losses of the abstraction regime – estimated at around D 200–250/ha where average benefits from irrigated agriculture can range between D 25 to D 2300 per hectare (CH Guadiana, 2016a, 2016b; Rosell and Viladomiu, 1997; Varela-Ortega, 2007). Farmers responded positively (Table 1). Rosell and Viladomiu (1997) estimated that in the Western Mancha and Campo de Montiel aquifers, 2652 farmers had joined AEP1 by 1995, representing 85,410 ha of irrigated land and savings of 298 Mm3 (51% of total volumes from wells recognized and authorized by the Guadiana RBA at the time) (AEVAL, 2008) (Table 1). However, the AEP1 program did not include irrigated areas without groundwater abstraction rights (Rosell and Viladomiu, 1997). The estimated reduction of total abstracted volumes was calculated in relation to the average consumption established by the AEP1 (4200 m3 /ha/year). This meant that accepting a reduction of 50% was almost equivalent to the quota of 2000 m3 /ha imposed by

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50 40 30 20 10 0 2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

1999

2000

1998

1996

1997

1995

1994

1992

1993

1991

1990

1989

1987

1988

1986

0

Fig. 4. Registered sanctions at the Guadiana River Basin Authority and average precipitation in La Mancha (1986–2009). Source: data from AEVAL (2010) (for registered sanction dossiers) and AEMET for average precipitation (measured at the Ciudad Real weather station) for series 1988–2010 and 2013, and INE for 2011–2012.

the RBA abstraction regime for vine. Therefore, funds from the EU program were in fact being used to pay farmers to comply with RBA rules. Furthermore, large farms with lower allocations under the 1991 abstraction regime (1375 m3 /ha), could adopt the 70% reduction option of the AEP1 which gave them a right to pump similar volumes (1200 m3 /ha) and entailed larger payments, thus once again being compensated for complying with existing restrictions. With the imposition of stricter pumping quotas (2000 m3 /ha maximum) by the RBA after the definitive declaration of aquifer over-exploitation in 1994 (quota system 2), the number of farmers joining the AEP1 increased. By 1997 almost 86,000 ha had joined and water abstraction was reduced by 60% (around 300 Mm3 ), exceeding the program’s annual objective of 255–270 Mm3 (Varela-Ortega, 2007). However, under quota system 2, the AEP1 was essentially paying farmers to ‘break the law’, since the AEP1 calculated payments based on the initial estimated ‘normal volumes’ of 4200 m3 /ha/year following the initial 1991 groundwater abstraction regime, (quota system 1) and not the revised and lower quota system 2 approved in 1994 by the RBA. In fact, AEP1’s 50% and 70% pumping reduction options exceeded the maximum pumping volumes established in 1994. The Agro-environmental Plan was substantially modified in 2003 (AEP2) to adjust it to the revised abstraction quotas established in 1994. In response to a request from the European Commission, AEP2 only included two options: 50% and 100% reductions in groundwater abstraction of the lower groundwater allocation established by quota system 2 (2000 m3 ). The 70% option was eliminated because it had been difficult to discriminate water savings from the different options and to simplify water accounting (Aragón Cavaller, 2016, pers. comm.). The incentives for farmers to join the program were therefore reduced, since compensations barely covered the income loss resulting from the reduction in groundwater abstraction. As a result of the lack of interest and poor results, the programme was abandoned in 2005 (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008). Although water pricing policies have not been adopted in La Mancha, they have been considered as a possible option in parallel with the AEP plans. Varela-Ortega (2007) estimated the impact of such a policy in groundwater abstractions from the Western Mancha Aquifer. Modeling showed that water demand was relatively inelastic, especially in more intensive farming, and that a water tariff of D 0.054 per m3 would be needed to reduce groundwater abstraction to levels compatible with aquifer recharge. This tariff, however, would reduce farm income by 23%, something

which might help explain why such measures have not been implemented. 4.3. The role of European agricultural policy The contradictions between European environmental programs and the CAP meant that while environmental programs were trying to reduce groundwater stress, agricultural funds were incentivizing groundwater abstraction with crop subsidies (Martínez-Santos et al., 2008). After the 2003 CAP reform, although most agricultural subsidies were unified under one single payment decoupled from production, coupled subsidies were maintained for specific crops such as grapes. In La Mancha, the increase of irrigated vineyards during the 1990s and 2000s and the conversion of rainfed vines to irrigation was the result of specific funds allocated to the modernization of agriculture and EU subsidies for production (Sanjuan, 2013). Specific subsidies and crop conversion to vines included start-up costs for cultivation (soil preparation, land leveling, plant disinfection and treatment) (Ruiz Pulpón, 2013; Sanjuan, 2013). In Castilla-La Mancha, although a mixture of coupled and decoupled subsidies still existed in 2009, coupled subsidies for vine production represented the majority of European funds received (over 90% of CAP funds for the production of grapes) (Ruiz Pulpón, 2013). These subsidies and programmes for vineyards represented a perverse incentive to switch from rainfed vineyard to drip irrigation, leading to an increase of the total area cultivated with irrigated vines and therefore groundwater consumption. Most of the new grapes were grown on ‘espaliers’, a drip irrigation technique requiring more water than conventional ground dripwatered vines (between 2000 and 3000 m3 /ha) (Ruiz Pulpón, 2013; Sanjuan, 2013). Between 2003 and 2009 the Regional Government of Castilla-La Mancha invested D 65 million annually for the transformation of vineyards; with the Western Mancha Aquifer representing the highest concentration of espalier grapes at 41% of the total cultivated area in 2013 (Ruiz Pulpón, 2013; Sanjuan, 2013). In total, irrigated vines increased from 72,000 ha in 1999 to almost 130,000 ha in 2007, 66% of the total irrigated area in Ciudad Real province. 4.4. Technological fixes for groundwater management challenges Infrastructure projects to prevent the further degradation of the Las Tablas de Daimiel National Park were also implemented, becoming technological fixes for the intensive use of groundwa-

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ter and the environmental degradation in La Mancha. In 1988 a regeneration plan was designed to artificially maintain wetland water levels with two small dams inside the national park (Álvarez˜ ˜ et al., 2008; Cirujano et al., no Cobelas et al., 2008; Castano-Casta 1996). Also, a 150-kilometer canal from the Tajo-Segura water transfer to the Ciguela River, a Guadiana tributary, was completed in 1994 allowing the transfer of up to 50 Mm3 /year from the Tajo river to the National Park. This interbasin water transfer proved to be essential in 2009 when an emergency transfer of 20 Mm3 was approved by Spain’s Council of Ministers to transfer water after an especially dry summer which caused the combustion of underground peat in areas of the wetland (Closas, 2013). However it also had the unintended consequence of destroying the Cigüela riparian wetlands, as the river bed had been dredged to enhance water transferred flows to the Tablas de Daimiel wetland (Cruces et al., 1998).

5. The latest carrot: the special plan for the Upper Guadiana Basin and the purchase of groundwater rights The critical situation of the Upper Guadiana wetlands prompted the inclusion of the requirement to develop a Special Plan for the Upper Guadiana basin (Plan Especial del Alto Guadiana) (PEAG) as part of the 2001 National Hydrologic Plan developed by the conservative Popular Party. A first draft emphasizing the regularization of unregistered wells was presented in December 2003, but was rejected by the socialist government of Castilla-La Mancha who developed an alternative proposal more in line with the goals WFD, which had been approved in 2000 and transposed to Spanish legislation in 2003. After a surprise win by the socialist party in the 2004 national elections, the incoming government negotiated a new PEAG proposal together with agricultural organizations, national environmental groups and the government of Castilla-La Mancha. The new proposal was presented in 2006 and finally approved in January 2008, At the time, the aquifer depletion situation had gathered international attention. In June 2008 UNESCO had threatened to cancel the status of the Humid Mancha as a biosphere reserve, giving the Spanish government until 2011 to regenerate the wetland ecosystem or it would no longer be considered an internationally-recognized protected reserve (Closas, 2013). In 2008 the socialist government was re-elected but, while the 2004–2008 legislature had been characterized by a significant push to align water policy in Spain with the European WFD, ecological groups considered that the re-elected government had changed its focus toward more agricultural-friendly environmental policies, exemplified by the merge of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environment (renamed as Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs) (El Confidencial, 2008). At the same time, the Castilla-La Mancha government, still under socialist rule, emphasized its defense of agricultural interests in detriment of the achievement of environmental objectives. The evolution in the implementation of the PEAG has to be understood in this political context. The PEAG, targeting the entire Upper Guadiana basin, was managed by a consortium composed of the state via the Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine Affairs, and the government of Castilla-La Mancha, and was to be implemented between 2008 and 2027 (Calleja and Velasco, 2011). The aim was to sustainably manage the aquifer through a combination of measures, most significantly by acquiring 130 Mm3 of groundwater rights through a ‘public water bank’ (López-Gunn et al., 2013), and continue the policy of land purchase around the Las Tablas de Daimiel National Park initiated in 2000. Up to 30% of the rights bought by the state would be reassigned to professional farmers without legal water rights, or to other priority uses defined by the government of Castilla-La

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Mancha. This was significant in the Western Mancha aquifer where, since the 1987 declaration of overexploitation, no new concessions had been granted. The remaining 70% of purchased water was theoretically designated to improve aquifer levels, with an environmental target of 35 Mm3 reaching the Tablas de Daimiel National Park before 2027 (WWF, 2012). The PEAG also outlined a series of complementary measures including improvements in water use monitoring and control; support to water user associations; and outreach and education programs targeting the farming community and the general public. The original PEAG budget was around D 3000 million, complemented by over D 2000 million from other programs (EU and national) for investments in wastewater treatment, socioeconomic development programs and efficiency improvements in irrigation (MMA, 2008c). Groundwater abstraction rights were purchased by the state though six public acquisition offers, three before the approval of the PEAG and three after (Table 2). During the purchase, the PEAG did not distinguish between private or public rights as long as the rights were registered. Purchase prices ranged between 3000–10,000 D /ha for herbaceous crops and 3000–6000 D /ha for vineyards (Cabezas-Guijarro and Sánchez, 2012; Ferrer Matvieychuc and Martín de la Cal, 2009). Interested farmers without groundwater rights could apply to the Guadiana RBA for a groundwater abstraction concession. Concessions would be granted after a thorough review process and farmers were selected according to several factors: farm size (average of 10 ha), age (between 18 and 40 years old), professional status, and the requirement that agriculture was the main source of income (Aragón Cavaller, 2014, pers. com.; Requena and García, 2010). Farmers having sold groundwater rights would have to keep the land under dryland farming (López-Gunn, 2014, pers. com.; MMA, 2008c). Within a month after the sale, well owners would have to remove pumping equipment and other machinery as well as seal the wells (Requena and García, 2010). Once this had been verified, the RBA would register the changes in the Registry of Public Waters or the Catalogue of Private Waters, the property registry and land cadaster (ibid.). Farmers could also sell only part of their abstraction rights, in which case the RBA would control the meter installed in the well to know the real groundwater consumption and limit the remaining abstraction to what was allowed (Calleja, 2014, pers. com.). The RBA did not allow the expansion of irrigated area by users with remaining rights (Calleja, 2014, pers. com.). What was allowed, however, was the ‘concentration of groundwater abstraction rights’ on smaller irrigated areas, to be monitored by the RBA and the Communities of Groundwater Users via water meters and field visits (Calleja, 2014, pers. com.). In order to improve monitoring and control, the PEAG planned to invest D 223 million in water meters. To that effect, the Guadiana RBA signed a memorandum of understanding with the General Community of Groundwater Users of Aquifer 23 (See following section on user participation) (Calleja, 2014, pers. com.). In the agreement the RBA agreed to provide D 7 million to install 2700 remotely controlled electronic meters. Previous efforts to control groundwater abstractions dated back to the implementation of the Wetlands plan, when D 6.6 million had been invested to install 1700 m in farms receiving AEP subsidies (Cabezas-Guijarro and Sánchez, 2012). In any case, not all wells have installed meters and on-site visits by officials have been infrequent, with no noticeable increase in visits by guards from the RBA to the farms having relinquished their rights (Fernández Lop, 2014, pers. com.). The purchase of water rights under the PEAG helped regularize the use of water for vines (to which most of the new water rights accrued) and incorporate many informal irrigators into the water rights system (with 15,700 ha regularized out of a target of 17,510 ha) (Aragón Cavaller, 2014, pers. com.). This was done by

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Table 2 Public offers of acquisition of groundwater abstraction rights in the Upper Guadiana. Date

Total Budget (D )

Applied Budget(D )

# offers acquired

Total affected hectares

Total volume purchased (Mm3 )

November 2006 April 2007 September 2007 September 2008 March 2009 November 2009 TOTAL

600,000 10,000,000 30,000,000 11,950,000 20,000,000 11,950,000 84,500,000

487,275 9,445,300 12,344,196 11,945,342 19,919,000 11,648,574 65,789,687

4 35 79 85 140 83 426

59 1061 1282 1256 2011 1200 6896

0. 210 4. 434 5. 322 5. 292 8. 405 5. 400 29. 063

Source: Cabezas-Guijarro and Sánchez (2012).

purchasing water rights from farmers irrigating mainly cereals and reallocating them to other users to irrigate less thirsty crops such as vine (López-Gunn et al., 2013). The PEAG disbursed almost D 66 million for the purchase of groundwater rights (only 10% of the initial budget allocated) (Fernández Lop, 2013). The big carrot from the state to illegal well owners was that a water right – bought by the state – would be transferred to them, at no cost, with the additional possibility (once water rights had been registered), in the case of vines, to receive subsidies for ‘technology improvements’ (such as drip irrigation) and shifts to higher value vine varieties. Irregularities were found in the groundwater rights purchase program. Although the PEAG limited the sale of rights to farmers with proven abstraction for at least 3 years before the sale (checked and tested by members of the RBA) (Ferrer Matvieychuc and Martín de la Cal, 2009), research by WWF (2012) found that 83% of the rights purchased by the government had not been used for 5 years prior to the sale. Despite the need for monitoring the RBA did not assign more human resources to control meters or to visit farms. There were instances of meter tampering or direct sabotage, and although many Water User Communities knew who was abstracting more water than allowed, they rarely reported them to the RBA (Fernández Lop, 2014, pers. com.). In addition, the WWF study uncovered that 95% of the rights sold were located outside the priority area designated for purchase (Fig. 5) as farmers in the designated priority area were reluctant to sell (Fernández Lop, 2014, pers. com.). As a result, after the second public acquisition offer, rights were bought from wells that did not comply with the pre-established conditions. Farmers willing to sell their water rights were often retired or not farming anymore (Fernández Lop, 2014). Although the initial agreement with the government of CastillaLa Mancha and the PEAG consortium established that only 30% of the rights acquired would be transferred to the autonomous government to be reallocated for ‘social uses’ (i.e. to users without abstraction rights), in 2010 this requirement changed and most acquired rights were used to regularize illegal abstractions (Requena, 2013). According to Requena (2011), 81% of rights purchased by the PEAG were reallocated to non-authorized users, becoming a de facto regularization of illegal wells and limiting the amount of purchased rights for aquifer recovery. The volume of water left for the environment amounted to 9% of the total volume originally expected to be allocated (Requena, 2011). Additionally, some of the rights purchased continued to be used after the sale (around 8%), and in an even more striking case, rights were purchased from 212 ha within the legally protected ‘public water domain’ on the dried-up Guadiana river bed (WWF, 2012). The outcome of the water rights purchase program was therefore mixed. While it served to appease social tensions surrounding illegal groundwater uses, it did not achieve its original environmental goals of aquifer recovery. In addition, Spain’s economic crisis after 2008 and weak political support for the PEAG from the newly appointed team at the Ministry resulted in a very slow start for the PEAG which, as a ‘siren song’, had planned to invest over D 5000 million for its various activities until 2027 (MMA,

2008d; Calleja and Velasco, 2011). Political changes after Spain’s general election in 2011 and the arrival of a conservative government resulted in a change of direction in national water policy. A “Liquidating Director” was appointed in July 2013 to close the PEAG and the new Guadiana River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) approved in December 2013 resulted in the de facto dissolution of the consortium and its integration within the new river basin plan (MAGRAMA, 2012b). 6. User participation in groundwater management in La Mancha In La Mancha, a ‘General Community of Irrigators of Aquifer 23 (‘Communidad de Regantes del Aquifero 23 ) was created in 1996 after the definitive declaration of over-exploitation of the Western Mancha Aquifer in 1994. The creation of this General Community was a compulsory measure of the 1985 Water Law which stated that, in case of a legal declaration of aquifer overexploitation, users would have to organize themselves into Water User Association that encompassed all groundwater users (VarelaOrtega and Hernández-Mora, 2010). The main objective of the measure was to facilitate the implementation of the groundwater abstraction emergency regime resulting from the declaration of over-exploitation. The long and complex process of creation of the General Community prompted farmers to form individual groundwater user associations (GWUAs) along municipal boundaries following the 1987 provisional declaration of over-exploitation (HernándezMora, 1998). In order to facilitate their consolidation, GWUAs relied on municipal governments, agricultural chambers of commerce and farmer unions for administrative and organizational support (Cabezas Guijarro and Sánchez, 2012). As a result, many GWUAs were captured by established and influential farming unions, effectively becoming lobbying organizations to seek subsidies (especially from the European Agro-Environmental plans) rather than water management bodies, unable to develop themselves from the bottom-up nor to gather internal legitimacy (López-Gunn, 2003; Rosell and Viladomiu, 1997). 7. Discussion The history of groundwater management policy in the Upper Guadiana is paradigmatic due to the variety of policy tools applied and implemented at various political and administrative levels (Table 3), coupled with the serious degradation of the aquifer and of valued groundwater-dependent ecosystems. The case reviewed provides several lessons with regard to implementation weaknesses of state-led groundwater management policies. Conventional approaches suggest that in order to address groundwater over-abstraction, strong regulation, clear legal frameworks, and negative and positive incentives are needed. However, as the case shows, a strong regulatory framework on paper is necessary but not sufficient. The lack of law enforcement, fragmented political realities, and a not so easy legal transition towards well licensing

A. Closas et al. / Agricultural Water Management 194 (2017) 113–124

Fig. 5. Groundwater abstraction rights purchased outside the designated areas. Source: based on Fernández Lop (2013).

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Note: the Tablas de Daimiel Wetland is used as reference and not indicative of scale.

Table 3 Groundwater management policies adopted in the Western Mancha Aquifer. Policy implemented Well registration (1985-ongoing) For historical rights through either a public water concession (Registry of Public Waters) or a recognition of private right (Catalogue of Private Waters) Declaration of overexploitation and emergency abstraction regime (temporary in 1987, final in 1994)

Carrots

Groundwater user association established

AEP1 (1992–2001) Quotas at 50%, 70%, and 100% reduction of original 1987 groundwater abstraction regime AEP2 (2001,2005) Quotas at 50% and 100% reduction of 1994 groundwater abstraction regime

Compensation payments to reduce groundwater abstractions based on original 1987 abstraction volumes

PEAG (2007–2013) Purchase by the RBA of water rights and allocation of water rights to new users and the environment

Public purchase of groundwater rights by the state Allocation by the state of purchased rights to priority users without rights

Compensation payments to reduce groundwater abstractions based on new abstraction volumes after 1994

Outreach and education program Vine restructuring and modernization program

Subsidies for improving irrigation techniques and vine variety

are all problems faced not only by Spain but also by other countries in Europe and around the Mediterranean (Closas and Molle, 2016). Despite different programs since the late 1980s to rectify the lack of control and finalize an inventory of groundwater rights in Spain, results have been partial and inconsistent (Table 3). Some of the weaknesses of these policy tools can be attributed to the logistical complexity, commonplace in groundwater management, with high costs of enforcing regulation due to the large number of independent users. The costs of monitoring were also found to be much higher than expected; despite the use of remote sensing and meters, constantly monitoring what is happening on the ground has proven to be beyond the capacity of the state. The application of rules on the ground has also been made more difficult by confusing legislation, lack of funding, and a lack of political will due to the high social and political cost of enforcement and control measures by the state. Conventional state policy instru-

Sticks

Outcomes

Nonregistered groundwater rights could be affected and rights revoked

Long process to complete the well registration process. Some illegal wells remain and some wells pump more water than they should

Abstraction quotas by hectare No new well permits issued and limitations on deepening or change in location of existing wells Sanctions

Access to water is reduced or controlled unilaterally Political agitation, meter tampering Transformed into lobbying groups; clientelism 85,838 ha of irrigated land and 310 Mm3 of water saved in the first 5-year phase [1992–1997], farm income gains and aquifer recovery Low implementation due to reductions based on already low water allocations. Compensation payments not sufficiently attractive for farmers Regularization of illegal wells, meter tampering Irregularities in the purchase and exchange of rights (wells not in use, outside the designated purchase area, etc.) Underfunded and only partially implemented Increase of irrigated area due to substitution of dry vines to irrigated vine varieties

ments (e.g. quotas, pricing, licensing, bans) often face limitations, and decision-makers tend to overestimate the weight of their regulation and fail to anticipate how they will be weathered down when applied locally. The experience with the strict quotas imposed in 1987 in the Guadiana Basin illustrates that the mere use of such a stick instrument is unlikely to be successful, as it generates free riding and deviant behaviors that are close to impossible to check and politically costly to curb. Furthermore, punitive measures are often not sustainable in the long term because of the high political costs associated with the social unrest caused by such measures. Quotas can be expressed by limits in terms of volume, irrigated area, or volume per area to cap use. Each modality comes with its loopholes that are exploited by farmers to their own advantage. While it is apparent that state-only top-down regulation has clear limits, no co-management of groundwater between users and the state has been possible in the Western Mancha aquifer.

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Poor co-management is due first of all to the unmanageable size of the aquifer and the large number of users. Contrary to the Water Law, which suggests that a federation of users at the aquifer level is a key objective, the aquifer (and the users) are more easily broken down into manageable and hydrologically meaningful units. Farmer lobby groups have successfully exploited Spain’s twoparty politics, hijacked or circumvented policies on the ground, and drawn benefits from inconsistent and sometimes contradictory EU policies. The politicization of the Water User Associations and their pursuit of private benefits has defeated the potential for collective action. Policy weaknesses can also be attributed to the strength of regional and local politics, exemplified by the hijack of the PEAG’s objectives by the autonomous government of Castilla-La Mancha in contravention with the goals of the RBA. Here again, politics trump policies as the multiple levels of decision making and the conflicting interests of farmers, user communities, the General Community, the regional government, the RBA, national ministries, political parties, and finally the EU do not converge toward the same goal. Local user associations are not prepared to inflict stick-like regulations onto themselves and instead become lobbying groups trying to influence policymaking. Carrots given to offset sticks are counterproductive and even worsen the problem, first because farmers have been paid to break the law (which seriously undermines the authority of the state), and because some measures were unsound (e.g. subsidies given to grape cultivation fueling intensification and extension, and eventually increased water consumption). Sticks should be brandished and (moderate) carrots then extended to those who comply with the constraints imposed. The forced acceptance of stick measures to reduce abstraction would require the adaptation of policy frameworks by public agencies if, once policy sticks have been accepted, they are complemented with carrots. Financial payments were tried by the Guadiana RBA with European funds and the PEAG with the purchase of rights, but the politicization of water management in La Mancha and the lack of trust and dialogue were detrimental. The PEAG ended when the funds from the government (the carrots) dried out. Further political struggles and a change of government killed the plan altogether. In spite of the limited success of the above-mentioned policy tools with reversing groundwater depletion, hydrological data from 2010 and after indicate that groundwater levels have been recovering (Fig. 2). However, some critical voices (e.g. WWF, 2012; Mejías Moreno et al., 2012) have warned that such recovery is not the result of state-sponsored policies but, rather, due to exceptionally abundant rainfall periods. In other words, the observed aquifer recharge would bear little connection with the success of policy instruments used, masking once again the complex reality of groundwater over-abstraction and the relative impotence of state policies hitherto.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge the support provided by Jose Ramón Aragón Cavaller, Enrique Calleja, Alberto Fernández Lop, and Elena López-Gunn, during the various exchanges and communications established during this research. Helpful comments on a previous longer report version were also received from Lucia de Stefano and Paul Pavelic. This work was supported by the Middle East Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of the project ‘Groundwater Governance in the Arab World’, Award AID-263-IO-13-00005.

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