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Stigma in divorces and its deterrence effect
Journal of Socio-Economics 31 (2002) 31–44
Stigma in divorces and its deterrence effect Jeong-Yoo Kim a,* , Hyunju Kim b a
Department of Economics, Dongguk University, 3-26 Pildong, Chungku, Seoul 100-715, South Korea b Department of Adolescent Science, Chung-Ang University, 221, Huksuk-dong, Dongjak-ku, Seoul 156-756, South Korea Received 1 October 1999; accepted 1 October 2001
Abstract We develop a simple economic model of divorce by incorporating the labeling effect into rational choice theory. In our model, we provide an explanation of the process through which a divorced person is being stigmatized and explore theoretically the relationship between the experience of having divorced and the likelihood of divorce. Contrary to a widely held belief, our theoretical model predicts that a once-divorced person is not necessarily more likely to divorce, as is the case in Asian countries. This is because a divorced person may hesitate more to divorce one more time for fear of being labeled as pathological or abnormal. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: J12 Keywords: Divorce; Stigma; Rational choice theory
1. Introduction A fairly standard sociological definition describes marriage as a socially approved mating relationship. Because the operative words are ‘socially approved’, there are many variations of marriage across subgroups and culture. However, one of the most common myths about marriage and the family is that marrying is a ‘natural’ thing to do. Divorce is challenging the socially accepted myths that marriage is a natural form of mating relationship. Divorce threatens social integration. Unchecked individualism and free choice have created a “cultural separation”, which manifests itself in high divorce rates (Bella et al., 1985). ∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-2-2260-3716; fax: +82-2-2260-3716. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.-Y. Kim). 1053-5357/02/$ – see front matter © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 0 5 3 - 5 3 5 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 1 3 9 - 1
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Divorcing behavior could be explained in the same way as sociologists explain deviance.1 One group of sociologists explain deviance in terms of broad social conditions in which deviance is most likely to grow by looking at the structural characteristics of society (e.g., Merton, 1938; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). Another group explains deviant behavior focusing on the characteristics of individuals that are most highly associated with learning deviant acts (Sutherland, 1947). There is also a line of thought which stresses the importance of the labeling (or stigmatizing) effect. According to this, interpersonal reactions to deviance may have a significant effect of increasing the likelihood of subsequent deviant behavior (Becker, 1963). Compared with the first two schools of thought which are mainly interested in primary deviance, this theory focuses on secondary deviance.2 However, rational choice theorists, including economists represented by Gary Becker, have argued that an individual chooses to conform or violate the social norm by calculating the risk of social punishment or pain versus potential gain and pleasure derived from the act, and thus explaining that an individual engages in deviance since the benefit from violating the norm exceeds the cost of it. In this paper, we develop an economic theory of divorce in a framework of rational choice theory on deviance. Rational choice theory predicts that individuals in different conditions (in time or space) have different incentives to deviate. Also, the theory suggests that the incentive of an individual to deviate may vary with a change of a given condition. One of the important factors affecting an individual’s incentive to deviance must be his/her experience of violating norms and resultant perceptions of his/her mentality by other community members,3 which will be no exception in the case of divorces. According to our model, a normal person may find it in his/her interest to follow the social custom of keeping his/her marriage life even if his/her short-run benefit from breaking it exceeds the cost of doing so, if he/she takes into account the long-run stigma effect. By considering this general model, we will tackle two important issues not addressed so far in sociology as well as in economics; through what process a divorced person is being labeled and, more importantly, whether or not a divorced person is more likely to divorce than a never-divorced one. Sociologists who believe in the labeling theory of deviance (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989) assert that stigmatizing a person as delinquent or criminal more often encourages rather than discourages sequential deviant behavior and puts him/her at high risk of behaving consistently to the label, playing out the role of a deviant, and developing a self-concept as irrevocable deviator. However, this paper will highlight a possible positive aspect of the stigma effect that a divorce has, rather than the negative effect most sociological literature focuses on. The main theoretical finding is that a once-divorced person is not necessarily more likely to redivorce, contrary to a widely held belief. This is because of once-divorced, one may hesitate more to divorce one more time lest he/she should be labeled as a pathological deviant.4 That is, the possibility of severe stigmatization has a deterrent effect, when we assume that an individual is rational so as to calculate benefits and costs before choosing what to do. Some empirical evidence supporting this theoretical finding can be found in Korean divorce cases. According to the study by the Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations (1996), about 21% of the interviewed remarried women ended their second marriage in divorce after having been married for 5–10 years and about 33% divorced after having been married for
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more than 10 years. Thus, in total, 54% maintained their marriages for more than 5 years. Compared with the divorce rates of all marriage in 1996, the second marriage stayed longer before the second divorce. In 1996, about 32.0% of all marriages ended in divorce after being married for less than 5 years, and about 24.4% ended in divorce after being married for 5–10 years. In Korea, the highest percent of married couples in their first marriage ended in divorce within 3–4 years of marriage.5 This can be due to the endeavor of remarried persons not to end their remarriages even though they may not be happy with their married lives, since they are afraid that one divorce may be excused but two divorces would make people believe them abnormal or pathological. In Korea, there are relatively severe stigma attached to the divorced. There would be three mediating processes existing in the moving from the first divorce to the second divorce. First of all, as suggested by Liska (1981), structural opportunities are restricted upon the first divorce. Structural opportunities are more restricted for women than men. As the duration of marriage increases, a wife’s relation-specific investment increases (England and Farkas, 1986). However, this relation-specific investment is not so fluid that this kind of investment cannot be applied to the other alternative relationship, neither to the paid employment market. Women who divorced after being married several years have less chance of getting a decent or well paid job, because they did not invest much on their human capital which is useful in the job market. The division of labor between husbands and wives into the roles of housekeeper and bread-earner, respectively, is very effective for the unit of household, as argued by the “new home economics” (Becker, 1981) or by the “role differentiation” (Parsons, 1955). In fact, there were about 6 million housewives in 1997, although there were only 47,000 househusbands in the same year in Korea (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 170–171). However, this kind of division of labor is very defective for wives after divorce. In most cases, divorced wives experience economic hardship. A woman’s family income typically declines substantially following divorce—about 33% declination in the first year (Hoffman and Duncun, 1988). A study about the single-mother family reported that about 56.8% of the divorced women are employed, and 78.9% of them worked as salespersons or had temporary jobs (Kong, 2000). In 1998, about 22.4% of female workers whose marital status was widowed or divorced worked in the service sector such as wholesales, retail trade, restaurant and hotel. Also about 26.2% of divorced or widowed female workers worked in the sector of agriculture, forestry and fishing (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 186–187). Furthermore, female workers’ income level was about 61.7% of male workers’ income level (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 234–235). In the skilled agricultural and fishery working sector which is the category in which the highest portion of widowed or divorced female workers were employed, female workers earned only 48.3% of male workers’ income (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 236–237). Men who are divorced also experience economic hardship because they cannot gain benefits from unpaid household labor done by the wives when they were in marriage. They have to pay expenses for housekeeping, and child-care, so their economic opportunities are restricted. After the first divorce, interpersonal networks are deformed, which works as a stigma and cost in personal relationship. Interpersonal networks are lessened after divorce. The divorced lose one-half of the networks which are related to the former spouse. They are estranged from kin networks of the former spouse. Since Koreans depend relatively heavily on kin
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networks for support of child-care and emotional intimacy due to the lack of well established institutions, losing this support from kin networks has negative effects on the divorced. Kin from the husband’s side usually provide institutional support while those from the wife’s side provide emotional support (Women’s Paper, 1991). According to one’s gender, remaining social networks after divorce have different characteristics. Men usually maintain their social networks related to their jobs. However, they are lacking in emotional support out of social networks, because they no longer have wives who carry out the emotional role in the nuclear family as Parsons (1955) suggested and male friends are not very emotionally supportive in Korea. On the other hand, women lose social networks relating to public areas. Women who are housewives are used to being connected with the public areas through the husband. By divorcing, women can usually have informal networks through their own kinship and friends. As an alternative, a divorced person can participate in voluntary social support groups, such as so-called ‘a wild goose’. However, the chance of participation is so limited that this kind of voluntary association cannot sufficiently substitute the social networks lost as a result of divorce. These social support groups cannot perform an effective function in socializing a new major role i.e., the divorced, so the stigma of divorce cannot be reduced much by participating in such group meetings. Changed self-perception as a failure or an abnormal would have a negative effect on deciding to divorce again. Koreans prefer marriage. Social status of being married has several advantages, such as being free from pressures for marriage, and gaining an adult status in the family as well as in the society, and also having financial benefits in taxation as well as in salaries. Divorces per 100 marriages were as few as 5.7 in 1980. This ratio continuously increased up to 32.1 in 1998. The ratio increased rapidly from 19.1 in 1996 to 24.0 in 1997.6 This rapid change in the divorce ratio is not yet supported by the normative changes. Furthermore, most divorced persons remain single. Even though the number of people who flow into the marriage market has increased, the remarriage ratio is still low. The ratio of remarriage per 100 marriages is 10.3 for female and 9.8 for male in 1998 (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000), which is relatively lower than the divorce ratio. A divorced person still experiences stress as an abnormal in the society level, although the pressure seems to be lessened nowadays.
2. The model We introduce a simple model explaining a divorce. A person considers divorcing when he/she finds his/her marriage life unsatisfactory. There are two types of individuals, normal and pathological, in the population. A normal (or rational) individual, by definition, makes a decision by maximizing his/her expected utility reflecting the cost and benefit of his/her behavior. On the other hand, a pathological individual does not maximize expected utility, but behaves emotionally. Thus, we define a pathological individual as one who does not hesitate to break his/her marriage.7 We assume that the proportion of pathological individuals in the population is λ ∈ (0; 1) and that it is common knowledge. A rational individual’s utility function has two components. One is the intrinsic utility derived directly from his/her behavior and the other is the extrinsic utility derived from social interaction with other community members. A divorce entails benefits and costs directly to the
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divorced. Direct benefits of divorcing include freedom from a painful marriage, no financial obligations and responsibilities for his/her family, etc. while direct costs include the reduced income (especially for women) and loneliness. Let the net benefit from a divorce be denoted by v. Then, v is assumed to have the non-atomic distribution function F (v) over V with the corresponding density function f (v) where 0 ∈ V ≡ [v , v]. ¯ The value of v is the private ¯ to be pathological by the whole information of the individual. If an individual is believed population, it incurs disutility w to him/her; w is assumed to be constant. Then, a rational individual’s utility can be written as U = U I + U E where UI , UE are symbols for intrinsic and extrinsic utility, respectively. We assume that U I = v if he/she divorces and normalize the intrinsic utility of his/her marriage life to U I = 0. The public updates its belief that an individual is pathological, based on its observation of his/her divorcing behavior. Let λˆ be the posterior belief. Then, his/her utility is U = v − λˆ w if he/she divorces and U = −λw if he/she does not.8 The extrinsic utility −λw when an individual maintains his/her marriage reflects the externality generated from the presence of pathological people in the population. Here, λˆ is common belief by the public and will be denominated the reputation for an individual. If λˆ is higher (lower, respectively), it will be said that he/she has a worse (better, respectively) reputation. We are implicitly assuming that, the stronger the belief that a given individual is pathological, the larger proportion of the population keeps away from him/her. So, the disutility of divorced person must suffer from the severance of social relations will be proportional to the posterior belief. For expositional convenience, we are simply assuming that the expected disutility of divorce when the resulting posterior belief λˆ is λˆ w. Suppose a given individual is a rational person without social interaction by nature i.e., w = 0. Then, he/she will keep his/her marriage if v < 0, decide to divorce if v > 0 and randomize if v = 0. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that he/she will divorce with probability 1, if v = 0. Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational individual to divorce in this case is that v ≥ 0. Now, let us consider how the decision making of a rational individual is affected by considering the extrinsic utility from social interaction. If he/she decides not to break his/her marriage, he/she gets −λw. If he/she divorces, the public updates the posterior belief that he/she is pathological according to the Bayes’ law i.e., λˆ = λ/(λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ∗ ))),9 where v ∗ is the net benefit from divorcing that makes him/her indifferent between divorcing and not. Thus, the utility when he/she gets divorced is v − (λ/λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ∗ ))). Then, v ∗ can be determined by λ ∗ −λw = v − w (1) λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ∗ )) Rearranging (1) yields λ ∗ − λ w ≡ φ(v ∗ ) v = ∗ λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ))
(2)
We have φ(v ) = 0 and φ(v) ¯ = (1−λ)w. Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition (NS) for the existence¯ of v ∗ ∈ Int V ≡ (v , v) ¯ such that v ∗ = φ(v ∗ ) is shown in the following equation: ¯ (1 − λ)w < v. ¯
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Fig. 1. Determination of v ∗ .
Furthermore, if we assume that φ (v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ V , he/she divorces if v ≥ v ∗ and does not if v ≤ v ∗ , where v ∗ ∈ (0, v), ¯ since φ (v) > 0 (see Fig. 1). If (1 − λ)w = v, ¯ divorce may ∗ 10 happen but only with zero probability, since v = v¯ and F (v) has no atom. The following proposition summarizes this. Proposition 1. Assume that φ (v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ V .11 Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational individual to divorce with positive probability is that (1 − λ)w = v, ¯ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ (NS) i.e., ∃v ∈ (0, v)v ¯ = φ(v ). Furthermore, in this case, (i) he/she divorces if v ≥ v and does not if v < v ∗ ; (ii) v ∗ > 0. If v ≥ v ∗ , even a rational individual decides to divorce at the expense of higher probability of being considered as pathological, since the cost of maintaining his/her marriage is too high. Also, (ii) implies that a rational individual with private information 0 ≤ v < v ∗ does not divorce even if his/her direct benefit from the divorce exceeds the direct cost, lest he/she should lose his/her future benefit from social interaction. If (NS) condition is satisfied, we have 0 < F (v ∗ ) < 1, so that λ < λˆ < 1. If this condition is violated, it must be that λˆ = 1.12 Thus, in either case, we have λˆ > λ. Proposition 2. Given λ ∈ (0, 1), λˆ > λ. This proposition says that a divorce strictly increases the posterior belief that he/she is abnormal. If λˆ = λ, a divorce would not entail any stigma effect at all, so that a rational person’s decision would be identical to the myopic decision that did not take into account the future payoff. This proposition implies that a long-sighted divorcing decision by a rational person must differ from the myopic decision.
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3. Comparative statics Assuming that (NS) condition is satisfied, we will perform the comparative static analysis that allows us to see the effects of various parameters on the likelihood of divorce. The following propositions describe the comparative static properties of the equilibrium outcome. Proposition 3. v ∗ = 0 if w = 0 and v ∗ is increasing in w. Proof. Obvious from Fig. 1.
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This proposition says that divorce is less likely to occur, as the benefit from social interaction is larger. A person with a larger human network, especially formed in relation with the former spouse, would be more hesitant to divorce. Corollary 1. λˆ is increasing in w. Proof. (∂ λˆ /∂w) = (∂ λˆ ∂v ∗ /∂v∂w) > 0, since (∂ λˆ /∂v) > 0.
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This corollary implies that a larger w makes an individual less inclined to divorce, so that a divorce hurts his/her reputation more seriously. Proposition 4. (i) (∂v ∗ /∂λ) > 0, equivalently, (∂ λˆ /∂λ) > 1 for all λ ∈ (0, λ∈ ) for some λ∈ > 0;13 (ii) (∂v ∗ /∂λ) < 0, or equivalently, (∂ λˆ /∂λ) < 1, for all λ ∈ (1/2, 1). Proof. See Appendix A.
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In an intermediate range of λ(λ∈ < λ < 1/2) however, the direction of a change in v ∗ with an increase in λ is ambiguous. This result has an important implication. By Proposition 2, an individual is believed to be pathological with higher probability after he/she is divorced i.e., λˆ > λ. Then, λˆ becomes the new prior belief of the public that he/she is pathological throughout until he/she divorces one more time. The above result suggests that a previously divorced one is not always more likely to redeviate than a never-divorced one. If λˆ is very small, an experienced one is less likely to divorce. This is because another divorce would increase the probability that he/she is believed to be pathological very much.14 However, if λˆ is large, more specifically, λˆ > 1/2 we can be sure that a once-divorced one is more likely to divorce. The intuitive reason is that, if λˆ is large, the belief that he/she is pathological is not increased very much even if he/she divorces one more time. This may occur when he/she has divorced more than once. The upshot is that a once-divorced one is not necessarily more likely to divorce again. If he/she has divorced only once, he/she would rather be less inclined to divorce again in order not to be believed to be habitual. On the contrary, if he/she has already been divorced more than once, thus the belief that he/she is pathological is high enough, he/she will be more inclined to divorce again, since he/she does not have much reputation to lose. Similarly, it can be implied that a person in a society with a very low divorce rate e.g., Korea will be hesitant to divorce relative to one in a society with a high divorce rate i.e., U.S.15
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4. Discussion 4.1. Voluntary or involuntary divorce In this paper, we are implicitly assuming that a person can divorce whenever he/she wants. However, divorce may be possible only under the mutual agreement of the spouses. Our implicit assumption can be justified on the ground that the term “divorce” used here is not restricted to a legal sense. If the divorce decision is unilateral, some spouses may suffer from involuntary divorce. Unfortunately, data on divorce and remarriage usually do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary divorce. So, it will require some caution to perform an empirical test based on this theoretical model. 4.2. Possibility of future remarriage A person’s divorce decision and the opportunities of his/her future remarriage may be interrelated. The possibility of future remarriage can be incorporated into this model either exogenously or endogenously. First, if a person divorces, the reputation of his/her being pathological is increased. This restricts his/her opportunities of social interaction, implying that opportunities of his/her future remarriage are also restricted. Second, the benefit from divorcing will be higher for those with higher chances of future remarriage. The arguments above suggest that a high possibility of remarriage can be modeled by high v (exogenously) or by low λˆ (endogenously). A high possibility of remarriage, that can be represented by high v, strengthens the incentive of a decision-maker to divorce, which will in turn have an effect of reducing the possibility of being remarried once again. 4.3. Dynamic model A long-sighted individual would make a divorce decision based on his/her expected utility from the next marriage. This feature can be captured by considering a dynamic model involving more than one decision-making period. Analyzing such a dynamic model is beyond the scope of this paper. However, even in a dynamic model that enables us to take into account the long-run effect of a divorce, it can be shown that a once-divorced person may be less likely to redivorce.16
5. Concluding remarks Divorce is still considered as a social problem, because it destroys the value of relationspecific investments and generates additional social costs.17 In this paper, we argued that stigmatization ex ante has the positive effect of deterring divorce, while ex post it has the negative effect of making the stigmatized person not hesitant to redivorce. That is, it can discourage current divorce, but it does encourage next divorce. For larger positive effect, a
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divorce must increase λˆ − λ very much. Therefore, the tendency to hesitate to divorce again for fear of being stigmatized can appear only in the early stage of a divorcing career. Recently, the Korean government decided to delete one’s divorce record out of his/her family register. Since divorce is still regarded as shameful in Korea, this decision has been welcomed by many suffering divorced persons (in particular, women) who could be negatively stigmatized. However, it may also have the effect of increasing the divorce rate. If the Korean government does worry about the currently growing divorce rate and consider it as a social concern, the policy measure may backfire. Although some empirical data has been provided in the introduction, this paper does not contain a satisfactory empirical analysis supporting the theoretical finding due to the difficulty in collecting a large sample of data essential for meaningful empirical analysis. However, this model can be applied to test empirically the changing self-identity, financial status, and also narrowing social network which are suggested as mediating factors from the first divorce and to remarriage and redivorce. Self-identity is not a fixed concept. The concept of self-identity is affected by social reputation and also the result of people’s accomplishment. The divorced in a society where people believe that marriage is natural and normative behavior may experience the changes in self-identity. Based on this model, we can test the effect of stigmatization of divorce on the concept of self-identity. Usually, economic hardship after divorce is reported only for women. However, we can test based on our model whether or not the effect of restrictions of structural opportunity has the same effect for men. Also we can test whether reduced social network has stigma effects for both men and women, and what kinds of support reduce or increase the stigmatizing effect through the process of first divorce, remarriage and redivorce. Furthermore, we noticed the positive effects of labeling which oblige people to conform to the norms, in this case staying married. We are sure that empirical researches testing those hypotheses will have substantial academic value and have a significant implication on policy making. Notes 1. Although it may be the case that a divorce is no longer deviant behavior in U.S. as many sociologists argue, it is still considered deviant behavior in most Asian countries. 2. In sociologists’ terminology, secondary deviation refers to the responses that people make to problems created by the societal reaction to their deviance, while primary deviation refers to the enactment of deviant behavior itself. 3. For details, see Kim and Lee (1999). 4. Cherlin (1978) made a similar but very informal claim that “The previously divorced may be more hesitant to divorce again because of the stigma attached to divorcing twice,” quoted in Cherlin, p. 641. 5. Some may argue that this is because those who remarry are older, on the average, than those marrying for the first time, and thus, presumably more mature. 6. This statistics are found in Statistical Yearbook on Women published by Korean Women’s Development Institute in 2000 (p. 76). 7. Alternatively, we can define a pathological individual as a rational one whose value of v is extraordinarily high. Then, in the following analysis, the value of v that makes him
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Fig. 2. Case of λ0 = 0.05, w = 1, v¯ = 10.
Fig. 3. Case of λ0 = 0.05, w = 5, v¯ = 10.
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Fig. 4. Case of λ0 = 0.05, w = 10, v¯ = 10.
Fig. 5. Case of λ0 = 0.001, w = 1, v¯ = 10.
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Fig. 6. Case of λ0 = 0.001, w = 5, v¯ = 10.
Fig. 7. Case of λ0 = 0.001, w = 10, v¯ = 10.
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8. 9.
10.
11. 12. 13.
14.
15.
16. 17.
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indifferent between divorcing and not must be characterized as well. Our assumption is, therefore, to simplify the analysis. Kreps and Wilson (1982) assert the equivalence of the two definitions in the context of entry deterrence. If he/she does not divorce, the posterior belief will remain unchanged i.e., λˆ = λ. The Bayes’ law says that P (A|B) = P (A∩B)/P (B) = P (B|A)P (A)/(P (B|A)P (A)+ P (B|Ac )P (Ac )), where Ac is the complement of A. Let A and B, respectively be the event that a person is pathological and the event that he/she divorces. Then, P (A) = λ, P (B|A) = 1 and P (B|Ac ) = 1 − F (v ∗ ), so that the derivation of λˆ is immediate. If (1 − λ)w > v, ¯ any v ∈ V does not satisfy (2). In this case, a rational individual would maintain his/her marriage for all v. This could occur especially when w is sufficiently large that a divorce seriously impairs the reputation of the divorced. f (v) = 0 i.e., a uniform distribution satisfies this condition. If (1 − λ)w = v, ¯ it is obvious that F (v ∗ ) = 1, so that λˆ = 1. This result is contrasted with Rasmusen (1996) following assertion, “The stigma from a first conviction is greater than from subsequent convictions, and after enough convictions the marginal effect is negligible,” quoted in Rasmusen, p. 536. In fact, Proposition 4 (point (i)) does not imply this statement directly, because another divorce does increase the posterior belief but not infinitesmally. Figs. 2–7 provide simulated examples of the equilibrium dynamics of individual’s behavior pattern. For a numerical simulation, it is assumed that v has a uniform distribution which is symmetric about 0 i.e., v = −v¯ and F (v) = (v + v)/2v; ¯ vn and λn are defined recursively as satisfying vn = ¯(λn − λn−1 )w and λn = λn−1 /λn−1 + (1 − λn−1 )(1 − F (vn )), where λ0 = λ. That is, vn is the borderline type of an individual who has divorced (n − 1) times and λn is the posterior belief of the public when it has observed an individual divorcing n times. The U.S. has the highest remarriage rate in the world. Over 50% of youth will be stepsons or stepdaughters by the year 2000 (Glick, 1989). Over 40% of marriages are remarriages for one of both spouses. People not only remarry at a high rate but also they go so relatively soon—typically within 3 years after a divorce (Coleman and Ganong, 1991). Readers interested in this issue may refer to Kim and Lee (1999) addressing the issue in the context of general deviance. There is another way of looking at divorce that respects the wishes of those divorcing. Divorce might be seen not as a failure but as a successful strategy, a solution for problems faced by married couples.
Acknowledgments We would like to thank David George, Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Louis LevyGarboua for helpful comments as well as seminar participants at the conference of the Korean Sociology Association and Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE) held at San Diego State University. We also wish to acknowledge the financial support from non-directed research fund, Korea Research Foundation.
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Appendix A Proof of Proposition 4. Given v, let 1−F (v)≡q and define Λ = λˆ −λ = (λ/λ(1−λ)q)−λ. If q = 1 i.e., v = v , is identically zero, so that (∂Λ/∂λ) = 0 for any λ. If q = 1, (∂Λ/∂λ) > 0 ¯ q) < 0 where ψ(λ; q) = (1 − q)λ2 + 2qλ − q. is equivalent to ψ(λ; First, since ψ(0; q) = −q < 0, ∃λ∈ (v)(> 0)∀λ < λ∈ (v), ψ(λ; q) < 0 for any given v, and thus, we have (∂Λ/∂λ) > 0 for any λ < λ∈ (v). Thus, φ(v) schedule is shifted upwards with an increase in λ, so that v ∗ is increased as λ is increased. On the other hand, if ψ(λ; 1) = 2λ − 1 > 0 i.e., λ > 1/2, we have ψ(λ; q) > 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1], since ψ(λ; 0) = λ2 > 0 and ∂ψ/∂q = −(λ − 1)2 < 0, and thus, (∂Λ/∂λ) < 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for any v = v , (∂Λ/∂λ) < 0, which implies that an increase in λ shifts φ(v) schedule downwards, so that ¯v ∗ is decreased with an increase in λ. 䊐
References Becker, H., 1963. The Outsiders. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Becker, G., 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Bella, R.N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W.M., Swindler, A., Tipton, S.M., 1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. University of California Press, Berkeley. Braithwaite, J., 1989. Crime, Shame, and Reintegration. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Cherlin, A., 1978. Remarriage as an incomplete institution. American Journal of Sociology 84, 634–650. Cloward, R., Ohlin, L., 1960. Delinquency and Opportunity. Free Press, New York. Coleman, M., Ganong, L.H., 1991. Remarriage and stepfamily research in the 1980s. In: Booth, A. (Ed.), Contemporary Families: Looking Forward, Looking Back. National Council on Family Relations, Minneapolis, pp. 192–207. England, Paula, Farkas, G., 1986. Households, Employment, and Gender: A Social, Economic, and Demographic View. Aldine de Gruyter, New York. Glick, P.C., 1989. Remarried families, stepfamilies, and stepchildren. Journal of Marriage and the Family 50, 861–873. Hoffman, S.D., Duncun, G.J., 1988. What are the economic consequences of divorce? Demography 25, 641–645. Kim, J., Lee, G., 1999. An Economic Theory of Deviance, Mimeo. Kong, S.-Y., 2000. A study on the experience and adjustment of single-mother family. Unpublished Dissertation, Ewha Womans University. Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations, 1996. Remarriages, it’s another beginning (in Korean). In: Proceedings of the Conference Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of the Center. Kreps, D., Wilson, R., 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253–279. Liska, A.E., 1981. Perspectives on Deviance. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Merton, R., 1938. Social structure and anomie. American Sociological Review 3, 672–682. Parsons, T., 1955. The American family: its relations to personality and to the social structure, in family, socialization and interaction process. In: Parsons, T., Bales, R.F. (Eds.), Macmillan, New York, pp. 3–33. Rasmusen, E., 1996. Stigma and self-fulfilling expectations of criminality. Journal of Law and Economics 39, 519–543. Sutherland, E., 1947. Principles of Criminology, 4th Edition. Lippincott, Philadelphia.
Stigma in divorces and its deterrence effect Jeong-Yoo Kim a,* , Hyunju Kim b a
Department of Economics, Dongguk University, 3-26 Pildong, Chungku, Seoul 100-715, South Korea b Department of Adolescent Science, Chung-Ang University, 221, Huksuk-dong, Dongjak-ku, Seoul 156-756, South Korea Received 1 October 1999; accepted 1 October 2001
Abstract We develop a simple economic model of divorce by incorporating the labeling effect into rational choice theory. In our model, we provide an explanation of the process through which a divorced person is being stigmatized and explore theoretically the relationship between the experience of having divorced and the likelihood of divorce. Contrary to a widely held belief, our theoretical model predicts that a once-divorced person is not necessarily more likely to divorce, as is the case in Asian countries. This is because a divorced person may hesitate more to divorce one more time for fear of being labeled as pathological or abnormal. © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: J12 Keywords: Divorce; Stigma; Rational choice theory
1. Introduction A fairly standard sociological definition describes marriage as a socially approved mating relationship. Because the operative words are ‘socially approved’, there are many variations of marriage across subgroups and culture. However, one of the most common myths about marriage and the family is that marrying is a ‘natural’ thing to do. Divorce is challenging the socially accepted myths that marriage is a natural form of mating relationship. Divorce threatens social integration. Unchecked individualism and free choice have created a “cultural separation”, which manifests itself in high divorce rates (Bella et al., 1985). ∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +82-2-2260-3716; fax: +82-2-2260-3716. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.-Y. Kim). 1053-5357/02/$ – see front matter © 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. PII: S 1 0 5 3 - 5 3 5 7 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 1 3 9 - 1
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Divorcing behavior could be explained in the same way as sociologists explain deviance.1 One group of sociologists explain deviance in terms of broad social conditions in which deviance is most likely to grow by looking at the structural characteristics of society (e.g., Merton, 1938; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). Another group explains deviant behavior focusing on the characteristics of individuals that are most highly associated with learning deviant acts (Sutherland, 1947). There is also a line of thought which stresses the importance of the labeling (or stigmatizing) effect. According to this, interpersonal reactions to deviance may have a significant effect of increasing the likelihood of subsequent deviant behavior (Becker, 1963). Compared with the first two schools of thought which are mainly interested in primary deviance, this theory focuses on secondary deviance.2 However, rational choice theorists, including economists represented by Gary Becker, have argued that an individual chooses to conform or violate the social norm by calculating the risk of social punishment or pain versus potential gain and pleasure derived from the act, and thus explaining that an individual engages in deviance since the benefit from violating the norm exceeds the cost of it. In this paper, we develop an economic theory of divorce in a framework of rational choice theory on deviance. Rational choice theory predicts that individuals in different conditions (in time or space) have different incentives to deviate. Also, the theory suggests that the incentive of an individual to deviate may vary with a change of a given condition. One of the important factors affecting an individual’s incentive to deviance must be his/her experience of violating norms and resultant perceptions of his/her mentality by other community members,3 which will be no exception in the case of divorces. According to our model, a normal person may find it in his/her interest to follow the social custom of keeping his/her marriage life even if his/her short-run benefit from breaking it exceeds the cost of doing so, if he/she takes into account the long-run stigma effect. By considering this general model, we will tackle two important issues not addressed so far in sociology as well as in economics; through what process a divorced person is being labeled and, more importantly, whether or not a divorced person is more likely to divorce than a never-divorced one. Sociologists who believe in the labeling theory of deviance (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989) assert that stigmatizing a person as delinquent or criminal more often encourages rather than discourages sequential deviant behavior and puts him/her at high risk of behaving consistently to the label, playing out the role of a deviant, and developing a self-concept as irrevocable deviator. However, this paper will highlight a possible positive aspect of the stigma effect that a divorce has, rather than the negative effect most sociological literature focuses on. The main theoretical finding is that a once-divorced person is not necessarily more likely to redivorce, contrary to a widely held belief. This is because of once-divorced, one may hesitate more to divorce one more time lest he/she should be labeled as a pathological deviant.4 That is, the possibility of severe stigmatization has a deterrent effect, when we assume that an individual is rational so as to calculate benefits and costs before choosing what to do. Some empirical evidence supporting this theoretical finding can be found in Korean divorce cases. According to the study by the Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations (1996), about 21% of the interviewed remarried women ended their second marriage in divorce after having been married for 5–10 years and about 33% divorced after having been married for
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more than 10 years. Thus, in total, 54% maintained their marriages for more than 5 years. Compared with the divorce rates of all marriage in 1996, the second marriage stayed longer before the second divorce. In 1996, about 32.0% of all marriages ended in divorce after being married for less than 5 years, and about 24.4% ended in divorce after being married for 5–10 years. In Korea, the highest percent of married couples in their first marriage ended in divorce within 3–4 years of marriage.5 This can be due to the endeavor of remarried persons not to end their remarriages even though they may not be happy with their married lives, since they are afraid that one divorce may be excused but two divorces would make people believe them abnormal or pathological. In Korea, there are relatively severe stigma attached to the divorced. There would be three mediating processes existing in the moving from the first divorce to the second divorce. First of all, as suggested by Liska (1981), structural opportunities are restricted upon the first divorce. Structural opportunities are more restricted for women than men. As the duration of marriage increases, a wife’s relation-specific investment increases (England and Farkas, 1986). However, this relation-specific investment is not so fluid that this kind of investment cannot be applied to the other alternative relationship, neither to the paid employment market. Women who divorced after being married several years have less chance of getting a decent or well paid job, because they did not invest much on their human capital which is useful in the job market. The division of labor between husbands and wives into the roles of housekeeper and bread-earner, respectively, is very effective for the unit of household, as argued by the “new home economics” (Becker, 1981) or by the “role differentiation” (Parsons, 1955). In fact, there were about 6 million housewives in 1997, although there were only 47,000 househusbands in the same year in Korea (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 170–171). However, this kind of division of labor is very defective for wives after divorce. In most cases, divorced wives experience economic hardship. A woman’s family income typically declines substantially following divorce—about 33% declination in the first year (Hoffman and Duncun, 1988). A study about the single-mother family reported that about 56.8% of the divorced women are employed, and 78.9% of them worked as salespersons or had temporary jobs (Kong, 2000). In 1998, about 22.4% of female workers whose marital status was widowed or divorced worked in the service sector such as wholesales, retail trade, restaurant and hotel. Also about 26.2% of divorced or widowed female workers worked in the sector of agriculture, forestry and fishing (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 186–187). Furthermore, female workers’ income level was about 61.7% of male workers’ income level (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 234–235). In the skilled agricultural and fishery working sector which is the category in which the highest portion of widowed or divorced female workers were employed, female workers earned only 48.3% of male workers’ income (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000, pp. 236–237). Men who are divorced also experience economic hardship because they cannot gain benefits from unpaid household labor done by the wives when they were in marriage. They have to pay expenses for housekeeping, and child-care, so their economic opportunities are restricted. After the first divorce, interpersonal networks are deformed, which works as a stigma and cost in personal relationship. Interpersonal networks are lessened after divorce. The divorced lose one-half of the networks which are related to the former spouse. They are estranged from kin networks of the former spouse. Since Koreans depend relatively heavily on kin
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networks for support of child-care and emotional intimacy due to the lack of well established institutions, losing this support from kin networks has negative effects on the divorced. Kin from the husband’s side usually provide institutional support while those from the wife’s side provide emotional support (Women’s Paper, 1991). According to one’s gender, remaining social networks after divorce have different characteristics. Men usually maintain their social networks related to their jobs. However, they are lacking in emotional support out of social networks, because they no longer have wives who carry out the emotional role in the nuclear family as Parsons (1955) suggested and male friends are not very emotionally supportive in Korea. On the other hand, women lose social networks relating to public areas. Women who are housewives are used to being connected with the public areas through the husband. By divorcing, women can usually have informal networks through their own kinship and friends. As an alternative, a divorced person can participate in voluntary social support groups, such as so-called ‘a wild goose’. However, the chance of participation is so limited that this kind of voluntary association cannot sufficiently substitute the social networks lost as a result of divorce. These social support groups cannot perform an effective function in socializing a new major role i.e., the divorced, so the stigma of divorce cannot be reduced much by participating in such group meetings. Changed self-perception as a failure or an abnormal would have a negative effect on deciding to divorce again. Koreans prefer marriage. Social status of being married has several advantages, such as being free from pressures for marriage, and gaining an adult status in the family as well as in the society, and also having financial benefits in taxation as well as in salaries. Divorces per 100 marriages were as few as 5.7 in 1980. This ratio continuously increased up to 32.1 in 1998. The ratio increased rapidly from 19.1 in 1996 to 24.0 in 1997.6 This rapid change in the divorce ratio is not yet supported by the normative changes. Furthermore, most divorced persons remain single. Even though the number of people who flow into the marriage market has increased, the remarriage ratio is still low. The ratio of remarriage per 100 marriages is 10.3 for female and 9.8 for male in 1998 (Statistical Yearbook on Women, 2000), which is relatively lower than the divorce ratio. A divorced person still experiences stress as an abnormal in the society level, although the pressure seems to be lessened nowadays.
2. The model We introduce a simple model explaining a divorce. A person considers divorcing when he/she finds his/her marriage life unsatisfactory. There are two types of individuals, normal and pathological, in the population. A normal (or rational) individual, by definition, makes a decision by maximizing his/her expected utility reflecting the cost and benefit of his/her behavior. On the other hand, a pathological individual does not maximize expected utility, but behaves emotionally. Thus, we define a pathological individual as one who does not hesitate to break his/her marriage.7 We assume that the proportion of pathological individuals in the population is λ ∈ (0; 1) and that it is common knowledge. A rational individual’s utility function has two components. One is the intrinsic utility derived directly from his/her behavior and the other is the extrinsic utility derived from social interaction with other community members. A divorce entails benefits and costs directly to the
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divorced. Direct benefits of divorcing include freedom from a painful marriage, no financial obligations and responsibilities for his/her family, etc. while direct costs include the reduced income (especially for women) and loneliness. Let the net benefit from a divorce be denoted by v. Then, v is assumed to have the non-atomic distribution function F (v) over V with the corresponding density function f (v) where 0 ∈ V ≡ [v , v]. ¯ The value of v is the private ¯ to be pathological by the whole information of the individual. If an individual is believed population, it incurs disutility w to him/her; w is assumed to be constant. Then, a rational individual’s utility can be written as U = U I + U E where UI , UE are symbols for intrinsic and extrinsic utility, respectively. We assume that U I = v if he/she divorces and normalize the intrinsic utility of his/her marriage life to U I = 0. The public updates its belief that an individual is pathological, based on its observation of his/her divorcing behavior. Let λˆ be the posterior belief. Then, his/her utility is U = v − λˆ w if he/she divorces and U = −λw if he/she does not.8 The extrinsic utility −λw when an individual maintains his/her marriage reflects the externality generated from the presence of pathological people in the population. Here, λˆ is common belief by the public and will be denominated the reputation for an individual. If λˆ is higher (lower, respectively), it will be said that he/she has a worse (better, respectively) reputation. We are implicitly assuming that, the stronger the belief that a given individual is pathological, the larger proportion of the population keeps away from him/her. So, the disutility of divorced person must suffer from the severance of social relations will be proportional to the posterior belief. For expositional convenience, we are simply assuming that the expected disutility of divorce when the resulting posterior belief λˆ is λˆ w. Suppose a given individual is a rational person without social interaction by nature i.e., w = 0. Then, he/she will keep his/her marriage if v < 0, decide to divorce if v > 0 and randomize if v = 0. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that he/she will divorce with probability 1, if v = 0. Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational individual to divorce in this case is that v ≥ 0. Now, let us consider how the decision making of a rational individual is affected by considering the extrinsic utility from social interaction. If he/she decides not to break his/her marriage, he/she gets −λw. If he/she divorces, the public updates the posterior belief that he/she is pathological according to the Bayes’ law i.e., λˆ = λ/(λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ∗ ))),9 where v ∗ is the net benefit from divorcing that makes him/her indifferent between divorcing and not. Thus, the utility when he/she gets divorced is v − (λ/λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ∗ ))). Then, v ∗ can be determined by λ ∗ −λw = v − w (1) λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ∗ )) Rearranging (1) yields λ ∗ − λ w ≡ φ(v ∗ ) v = ∗ λ + (1 − λ)(1 − F (v ))
(2)
We have φ(v ) = 0 and φ(v) ¯ = (1−λ)w. Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition (NS) for the existence¯ of v ∗ ∈ Int V ≡ (v , v) ¯ such that v ∗ = φ(v ∗ ) is shown in the following equation: ¯ (1 − λ)w < v. ¯
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Fig. 1. Determination of v ∗ .
Furthermore, if we assume that φ (v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ V , he/she divorces if v ≥ v ∗ and does not if v ≤ v ∗ , where v ∗ ∈ (0, v), ¯ since φ (v) > 0 (see Fig. 1). If (1 − λ)w = v, ¯ divorce may ∗ 10 happen but only with zero probability, since v = v¯ and F (v) has no atom. The following proposition summarizes this. Proposition 1. Assume that φ (v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ V .11 Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational individual to divorce with positive probability is that (1 − λ)w = v, ¯ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ (NS) i.e., ∃v ∈ (0, v)v ¯ = φ(v ). Furthermore, in this case, (i) he/she divorces if v ≥ v and does not if v < v ∗ ; (ii) v ∗ > 0. If v ≥ v ∗ , even a rational individual decides to divorce at the expense of higher probability of being considered as pathological, since the cost of maintaining his/her marriage is too high. Also, (ii) implies that a rational individual with private information 0 ≤ v < v ∗ does not divorce even if his/her direct benefit from the divorce exceeds the direct cost, lest he/she should lose his/her future benefit from social interaction. If (NS) condition is satisfied, we have 0 < F (v ∗ ) < 1, so that λ < λˆ < 1. If this condition is violated, it must be that λˆ = 1.12 Thus, in either case, we have λˆ > λ. Proposition 2. Given λ ∈ (0, 1), λˆ > λ. This proposition says that a divorce strictly increases the posterior belief that he/she is abnormal. If λˆ = λ, a divorce would not entail any stigma effect at all, so that a rational person’s decision would be identical to the myopic decision that did not take into account the future payoff. This proposition implies that a long-sighted divorcing decision by a rational person must differ from the myopic decision.
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3. Comparative statics Assuming that (NS) condition is satisfied, we will perform the comparative static analysis that allows us to see the effects of various parameters on the likelihood of divorce. The following propositions describe the comparative static properties of the equilibrium outcome. Proposition 3. v ∗ = 0 if w = 0 and v ∗ is increasing in w. Proof. Obvious from Fig. 1.
䊐
This proposition says that divorce is less likely to occur, as the benefit from social interaction is larger. A person with a larger human network, especially formed in relation with the former spouse, would be more hesitant to divorce. Corollary 1. λˆ is increasing in w. Proof. (∂ λˆ /∂w) = (∂ λˆ ∂v ∗ /∂v∂w) > 0, since (∂ λˆ /∂v) > 0.
䊐
This corollary implies that a larger w makes an individual less inclined to divorce, so that a divorce hurts his/her reputation more seriously. Proposition 4. (i) (∂v ∗ /∂λ) > 0, equivalently, (∂ λˆ /∂λ) > 1 for all λ ∈ (0, λ∈ ) for some λ∈ > 0;13 (ii) (∂v ∗ /∂λ) < 0, or equivalently, (∂ λˆ /∂λ) < 1, for all λ ∈ (1/2, 1). Proof. See Appendix A.
䊐
In an intermediate range of λ(λ∈ < λ < 1/2) however, the direction of a change in v ∗ with an increase in λ is ambiguous. This result has an important implication. By Proposition 2, an individual is believed to be pathological with higher probability after he/she is divorced i.e., λˆ > λ. Then, λˆ becomes the new prior belief of the public that he/she is pathological throughout until he/she divorces one more time. The above result suggests that a previously divorced one is not always more likely to redeviate than a never-divorced one. If λˆ is very small, an experienced one is less likely to divorce. This is because another divorce would increase the probability that he/she is believed to be pathological very much.14 However, if λˆ is large, more specifically, λˆ > 1/2 we can be sure that a once-divorced one is more likely to divorce. The intuitive reason is that, if λˆ is large, the belief that he/she is pathological is not increased very much even if he/she divorces one more time. This may occur when he/she has divorced more than once. The upshot is that a once-divorced one is not necessarily more likely to divorce again. If he/she has divorced only once, he/she would rather be less inclined to divorce again in order not to be believed to be habitual. On the contrary, if he/she has already been divorced more than once, thus the belief that he/she is pathological is high enough, he/she will be more inclined to divorce again, since he/she does not have much reputation to lose. Similarly, it can be implied that a person in a society with a very low divorce rate e.g., Korea will be hesitant to divorce relative to one in a society with a high divorce rate i.e., U.S.15
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4. Discussion 4.1. Voluntary or involuntary divorce In this paper, we are implicitly assuming that a person can divorce whenever he/she wants. However, divorce may be possible only under the mutual agreement of the spouses. Our implicit assumption can be justified on the ground that the term “divorce” used here is not restricted to a legal sense. If the divorce decision is unilateral, some spouses may suffer from involuntary divorce. Unfortunately, data on divorce and remarriage usually do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary divorce. So, it will require some caution to perform an empirical test based on this theoretical model. 4.2. Possibility of future remarriage A person’s divorce decision and the opportunities of his/her future remarriage may be interrelated. The possibility of future remarriage can be incorporated into this model either exogenously or endogenously. First, if a person divorces, the reputation of his/her being pathological is increased. This restricts his/her opportunities of social interaction, implying that opportunities of his/her future remarriage are also restricted. Second, the benefit from divorcing will be higher for those with higher chances of future remarriage. The arguments above suggest that a high possibility of remarriage can be modeled by high v (exogenously) or by low λˆ (endogenously). A high possibility of remarriage, that can be represented by high v, strengthens the incentive of a decision-maker to divorce, which will in turn have an effect of reducing the possibility of being remarried once again. 4.3. Dynamic model A long-sighted individual would make a divorce decision based on his/her expected utility from the next marriage. This feature can be captured by considering a dynamic model involving more than one decision-making period. Analyzing such a dynamic model is beyond the scope of this paper. However, even in a dynamic model that enables us to take into account the long-run effect of a divorce, it can be shown that a once-divorced person may be less likely to redivorce.16
5. Concluding remarks Divorce is still considered as a social problem, because it destroys the value of relationspecific investments and generates additional social costs.17 In this paper, we argued that stigmatization ex ante has the positive effect of deterring divorce, while ex post it has the negative effect of making the stigmatized person not hesitant to redivorce. That is, it can discourage current divorce, but it does encourage next divorce. For larger positive effect, a
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divorce must increase λˆ − λ very much. Therefore, the tendency to hesitate to divorce again for fear of being stigmatized can appear only in the early stage of a divorcing career. Recently, the Korean government decided to delete one’s divorce record out of his/her family register. Since divorce is still regarded as shameful in Korea, this decision has been welcomed by many suffering divorced persons (in particular, women) who could be negatively stigmatized. However, it may also have the effect of increasing the divorce rate. If the Korean government does worry about the currently growing divorce rate and consider it as a social concern, the policy measure may backfire. Although some empirical data has been provided in the introduction, this paper does not contain a satisfactory empirical analysis supporting the theoretical finding due to the difficulty in collecting a large sample of data essential for meaningful empirical analysis. However, this model can be applied to test empirically the changing self-identity, financial status, and also narrowing social network which are suggested as mediating factors from the first divorce and to remarriage and redivorce. Self-identity is not a fixed concept. The concept of self-identity is affected by social reputation and also the result of people’s accomplishment. The divorced in a society where people believe that marriage is natural and normative behavior may experience the changes in self-identity. Based on this model, we can test the effect of stigmatization of divorce on the concept of self-identity. Usually, economic hardship after divorce is reported only for women. However, we can test based on our model whether or not the effect of restrictions of structural opportunity has the same effect for men. Also we can test whether reduced social network has stigma effects for both men and women, and what kinds of support reduce or increase the stigmatizing effect through the process of first divorce, remarriage and redivorce. Furthermore, we noticed the positive effects of labeling which oblige people to conform to the norms, in this case staying married. We are sure that empirical researches testing those hypotheses will have substantial academic value and have a significant implication on policy making. Notes 1. Although it may be the case that a divorce is no longer deviant behavior in U.S. as many sociologists argue, it is still considered deviant behavior in most Asian countries. 2. In sociologists’ terminology, secondary deviation refers to the responses that people make to problems created by the societal reaction to their deviance, while primary deviation refers to the enactment of deviant behavior itself. 3. For details, see Kim and Lee (1999). 4. Cherlin (1978) made a similar but very informal claim that “The previously divorced may be more hesitant to divorce again because of the stigma attached to divorcing twice,” quoted in Cherlin, p. 641. 5. Some may argue that this is because those who remarry are older, on the average, than those marrying for the first time, and thus, presumably more mature. 6. This statistics are found in Statistical Yearbook on Women published by Korean Women’s Development Institute in 2000 (p. 76). 7. Alternatively, we can define a pathological individual as a rational one whose value of v is extraordinarily high. Then, in the following analysis, the value of v that makes him
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Fig. 2. Case of λ0 = 0.05, w = 1, v¯ = 10.
Fig. 3. Case of λ0 = 0.05, w = 5, v¯ = 10.
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Fig. 4. Case of λ0 = 0.05, w = 10, v¯ = 10.
Fig. 5. Case of λ0 = 0.001, w = 1, v¯ = 10.
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Fig. 6. Case of λ0 = 0.001, w = 5, v¯ = 10.
Fig. 7. Case of λ0 = 0.001, w = 10, v¯ = 10.
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8. 9.
10.
11. 12. 13.
14.
15.
16. 17.
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indifferent between divorcing and not must be characterized as well. Our assumption is, therefore, to simplify the analysis. Kreps and Wilson (1982) assert the equivalence of the two definitions in the context of entry deterrence. If he/she does not divorce, the posterior belief will remain unchanged i.e., λˆ = λ. The Bayes’ law says that P (A|B) = P (A∩B)/P (B) = P (B|A)P (A)/(P (B|A)P (A)+ P (B|Ac )P (Ac )), where Ac is the complement of A. Let A and B, respectively be the event that a person is pathological and the event that he/she divorces. Then, P (A) = λ, P (B|A) = 1 and P (B|Ac ) = 1 − F (v ∗ ), so that the derivation of λˆ is immediate. If (1 − λ)w > v, ¯ any v ∈ V does not satisfy (2). In this case, a rational individual would maintain his/her marriage for all v. This could occur especially when w is sufficiently large that a divorce seriously impairs the reputation of the divorced. f (v) = 0 i.e., a uniform distribution satisfies this condition. If (1 − λ)w = v, ¯ it is obvious that F (v ∗ ) = 1, so that λˆ = 1. This result is contrasted with Rasmusen (1996) following assertion, “The stigma from a first conviction is greater than from subsequent convictions, and after enough convictions the marginal effect is negligible,” quoted in Rasmusen, p. 536. In fact, Proposition 4 (point (i)) does not imply this statement directly, because another divorce does increase the posterior belief but not infinitesmally. Figs. 2–7 provide simulated examples of the equilibrium dynamics of individual’s behavior pattern. For a numerical simulation, it is assumed that v has a uniform distribution which is symmetric about 0 i.e., v = −v¯ and F (v) = (v + v)/2v; ¯ vn and λn are defined recursively as satisfying vn = ¯(λn − λn−1 )w and λn = λn−1 /λn−1 + (1 − λn−1 )(1 − F (vn )), where λ0 = λ. That is, vn is the borderline type of an individual who has divorced (n − 1) times and λn is the posterior belief of the public when it has observed an individual divorcing n times. The U.S. has the highest remarriage rate in the world. Over 50% of youth will be stepsons or stepdaughters by the year 2000 (Glick, 1989). Over 40% of marriages are remarriages for one of both spouses. People not only remarry at a high rate but also they go so relatively soon—typically within 3 years after a divorce (Coleman and Ganong, 1991). Readers interested in this issue may refer to Kim and Lee (1999) addressing the issue in the context of general deviance. There is another way of looking at divorce that respects the wishes of those divorcing. Divorce might be seen not as a failure but as a successful strategy, a solution for problems faced by married couples.
Acknowledgments We would like to thank David George, Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Louis LevyGarboua for helpful comments as well as seminar participants at the conference of the Korean Sociology Association and Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE) held at San Diego State University. We also wish to acknowledge the financial support from non-directed research fund, Korea Research Foundation.
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Appendix A Proof of Proposition 4. Given v, let 1−F (v)≡q and define Λ = λˆ −λ = (λ/λ(1−λ)q)−λ. If q = 1 i.e., v = v , is identically zero, so that (∂Λ/∂λ) = 0 for any λ. If q = 1, (∂Λ/∂λ) > 0 ¯ q) < 0 where ψ(λ; q) = (1 − q)λ2 + 2qλ − q. is equivalent to ψ(λ; First, since ψ(0; q) = −q < 0, ∃λ∈ (v)(> 0)∀λ < λ∈ (v), ψ(λ; q) < 0 for any given v, and thus, we have (∂Λ/∂λ) > 0 for any λ < λ∈ (v). Thus, φ(v) schedule is shifted upwards with an increase in λ, so that v ∗ is increased as λ is increased. On the other hand, if ψ(λ; 1) = 2λ − 1 > 0 i.e., λ > 1/2, we have ψ(λ; q) > 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1], since ψ(λ; 0) = λ2 > 0 and ∂ψ/∂q = −(λ − 1)2 < 0, and thus, (∂Λ/∂λ) < 0 for any q ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for any v = v , (∂Λ/∂λ) < 0, which implies that an increase in λ shifts φ(v) schedule downwards, so that ¯v ∗ is decreased with an increase in λ. 䊐
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