Strangers and Sierra Leone mining: cultural heritage and sustainable development challenges

Journal of Cleaner Production xxx (2014) 1e10

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Strangers and Sierra Leone mining: cultural heritage and sustainable development challenges Fenda A. Akiwumi School of Geosciences, College of Arts and Sciences, University of South Florida, 4202 E Fowler Ave, NES 107 Tampa, FL 33620, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 1 July 2013 Received in revised form 23 December 2013 Accepted 29 December 2013 Available online xxx

The Sustainable Development Framework (SDF) adopted by the International Council on Metals and Minerals (ICMM) represents a major step in the mineral industry’s quest to respect cultural heritage and promote community development in host communities for sustainable and conflict-free mining. Using Sierra Leone, West Africa, as a case study, textual analysis of relevant state policies and laws and other pertinent documents, this paper reveals the inherent conflicts between centuries-old customary conceptions of land use and management practicesdspecifically, the landlordestranger cultural institutiondand modern, largely western, conceptions of land use by multinational mining companies and the national government. The inability of government to formulate, and implement a cultural heritage friendly land and mining policy has led to recurrent conflict and militates against sustainable community development. The mining multinational corporation, the embodiment of the powerful stranger, usurps customary land rights through state-level legal statutes and mining policy, and this has created the stranger hegemony phenomenon. The paper also argues the colonial and postcolonial state has been complicit in reconfiguring landlordestranger relationships in mining areas. The study reveals that the stranger presence in mining areas has become an entrenched problem exacerbated by power imbalances embedded in statutory laws. The findings enable an understanding of the complexities of meeting social sustainability goals on cultural heritage and community development as articulated by the ICMM. Rectifying these imbalances call for more culturally sensitive policy and legal reforms. Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Sierra Leone Landlordestrangers Cultural heritage Mining communities Sustainable development

1. Introduction The global mineral industry recognizes the importance of the social dimensions of its sustainable development agenda, which includes several thematic categories. These include governance and regulation at global, national and local levels; differences in the perspectives and power of indigenous host communities and mining developers to make decisions about resource development and employment of indigenous people; native title and agreement making; and community engagement and community development (Solomon et al., 2008, 143). The establishment of the Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) Project in 2002 and the subsequent creation of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) represent major forward steps in the mining industry’s sustainability agenda. The ICMM, made up of member multinational corporations, devised a Sustainable Development Framework (SDF) comprised of ten principles to guide mining operations. Multinationals operationalized the SDF principles through

E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected].

initiatives such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and voluntary principles (Hilson, 2012; Kemp et al., 2011, 2012; Luning, 2012). Respecting the cultural heritage of indigenous host communities is a key component of Principle 3. Cultural heritage encompasses upholding fundamental human rights and respecting the customs and values of mining communities. Principle 9 commits multinationals to contributing to the social, economic, and institutional development of host communities (ICMM, 2008). ICMM member Rio Tinto explains the essence of its sustainable development objectives is to build trust in host communities through protecting and celebrating their cultural heritage. This commitment, Rio Tinto believes, is critical to preventing conflict and promoting business success. Rio Tinto defines cultural heritage as: “The collective social manifestation of a community, generally handed down by tradition or with some historical association. The manifestations can be tangible, such as . landscapes and artefacts . and intangible, such as . customary practice” (Bradshaw et al., 2011, 122). Rio Tinto further recognizes a cultural heritage feature as: a place or object to which is ascribed cultural, spiritual, aesthetic, historic, scientific, research or social significance for

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past, present or future generations. This can include places of ‘sacred’ significance to traditional custodians, such as burial sites, performance grounds, rock art, waterholes, and hills or other physical manifestations of mythological or historical events (Bradshaw et al., 2011, 122). Yet, mining multinationals and national governments, particularly in developing countries, do not genuinely embrace the tenets of cultural heritage. Inadequate involvement and loss of lands, including sacred places, and livelihoods are at the core of intractable conflicts between host communities and multinationals worldwide that hinders sustainable community development (Calvano, 2008; O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, 2008; Ukaga et al., 2012). In fact, Alao (2007) stressed that an often downplayed but important category of land conflict in Africa is the clash of spiritual considerations with political and economic realities of land use. Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012) contend that response to conflict about cultural and spiritual norms is a major driver of mining company CSR agendas. To prevent or alleviate these conflicts, anthropological data become invaluable in assisting mining companies understand cultural nuances, develop policies and inform practices that promote community development (Gilberthorpe, 2013). But the problem is two-fold. Cultural worldview significantly influences how host communities understand and interpret their relationships with foreign multinationals, particularly with respect to CSR, community engagement, and development (Idemudia, 2011; Panella, 2010; Werthmann, 2006). Misunderstanding about these important issues is compounded by varying concepts of “community” within host communities and between host communities and multinationals (Chenga and Cronje, 2008; Hilson and Maconachie, 2013). In the West African context, for example, strangersdresidents who have no ancestral kinship rights to land or claims to indigeneity in a placedare rarely considered legitimate members of a community by their hosts (landlords), regardless of their length of residency (Njoh, 2007). A decade after the inauguration of the ICMM’s Sustainable Development Framework, such misunderstandings have resulted in continuing challenges in community development (Buxton, 2012). Using Sierra Leone as a case study, this paper illustrates how the centuries-old customary West African landlordestranger, or tutorat-tuteur, land management institution (Boas, 2009; Brooks, 2003) is central to an understanding of the cultural heritage and sustainable community development problems in mining areas. The landlordestranger institution collaborates with power associations or secret societies (poro for men and bondo for women) to determine how, and by whom, land resources can be accessed (Brooks, 2003; Fanthorpe, 2007). Landlords have ancestral land rights and may welcome, host and protect strangers, who traditionally are traders or subsistence farmers. In this reciprocal relationship, landlords receive first rights to trade and entitlement to a portion of a stranger’s profits. Strangers accessing land must pay the annual customary gift or tribute to both the landlord and the ruling chief. Chiefs who govern the traditional administrative unit, the chiefdom, are from land-holding families and function as custodians of land. They are expected, in collaboration with senior members of land-holding lineages, to protect land against outsiders and to hold it in sacred trust for future generations (Dorjahn and Fyfe, 1962; Mouser, 1980). The tribute, or greeting kola as it is known in Sierra Leone, as Renner-Thomas (2010, 172) points outis “a symbolic acknowledgment of the chief’s jurisdiction, and a formal indication by the stranger that he is prepared to respect and abide by the laws and customs of the chiefdom.” Being a stranger is therefore an inherently subordinate and insecure position in traditional land space (Unruh, 2008).

Sierra Leone, like many mineral-rich countries in Africa, derives much of its revenue from mining. In 2010, mining accounted for nearly 60 percent of export revenues (Revenue Watch Institute, 2013). Capital-intensive mining is a non-traditional form of land use managed by multinational corporations. Shack and Skinner (1979, 13) contend that the multinational corporation has become a new uninvited stranger, “exercising powerful control over the key economic sectors of African states and often engaging overtly in manipulating the political machinery of government.” In Sierra Leone, for example, multinationals negotiate favorable mining laws to the disadvantage of the state and host mining communities. Mining operations create core-periphery microcosms in mining areas characterized by power differentials, marginalizing landlordcommunities and causing sustained low-level conflicts with periodic outbursts of violence (Akiwumi, 2012). Members of landlordcommunities do not typically benefit from the anticipated jobs of a new mining operation because they often lack the specialized skills of the industry (Solomon et al., 2008). Consequently, these communities respond to their inability to access the new avenues of wealth and power from mining with fervent claims to their indigeneity (Werthmann, 2006). The ICMM acknowledges that, even though multinationals abide by mining laws, their operations contribute to the erosion of indigenous cultures (ICMM, 2008). Indeed, land statutes of many African nation states built on colonial precepts supersede and undermine traditional legal practices and raise questions about who has legitimate rights to determine how to use and exploit natural resources (von Benda-Beckmann, 1997). Owen and Kemp (2013) argue that simply acknowledging the consequences of the inequitable national mining laws under which they operate does not absolve ICMM member multinationals from responsibility. These multinationals violate the subsidiarity principle of sustainable development when they exclude communities from participating in development projects that affect them, such as mining. For indigenous communities with ancestral and spiritual attachment to a place, the ways multinationals conceive of and use land denote “a very different sense of ‘belonging’ e from someone belonging to a place to a property belonging to someone; in short, a shift from inclusion to exclusion” (Peters, 2004, 305). Further, such uninvited strangers use land “in ways landlords consider unsympathetic to their spiritual and cultural beliefs” (Alao, 2007, 86). In Sierra Leone, land-based sustenance and production processes such as subsistence farming and blacksmithing are intricately linked to rituals carried out at sacrosanct places such as sacred bush, shrines and ancestral burial grounds. Such places bind present-day land-holding families with ancestors and future generations (Lebbie and Freudenberger, 1996; Lentz, 2013). The stranger problem arises because such pre-colonial traditional ways of managing land coexist and intermingle with post-colonial forms. Postcolonial modifications include commodifying land and appropriating it for externally-generated uses like mining. Such uses are often sanctioned by statutory law. In so doing, nation-states encode Western concepts of land rights at the expense of customary practices (Peters, 2012). The stranger presence in mining development in Sierra Leone is a historically entrenched policy problem (Sutherland, 1977; Van der Laan, 1965). Power imbalances embedded in statutory laws exacerbate the problem. As a typical African state, politically weak and economically dependent on its mining revenue stream, Sierra Leone responds to the conflicts arising from the multinational presence with rhetoric; some national politicians even use the stranger issue to their advantage for economic exclusion and political domination (Vlassenroot and Huggins, 2005). This paper shows how the landlordestranger institution in Sierra Leone confronts the national and global mining agendas and

Please cite this article in press as: Akiwumi, F.A., Strangers and Sierra Leone mining: cultural heritage and sustainable development challenges, Journal of Cleaner Production (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.12.078

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Fig. 1. Sierra Leone Provinces highlighting principal diamond, gold, iron ore and rutile mining areas.

highlights the cultural heritage and community development dimensions of the confrontation between policy and practice. More specifically, the study examines how (1) the colonial and postcolonial states have been complicit in reconfiguring landlorde stranger relationships in mining areas; (2) stranger hegemony drives mining policy and law at the state level; (3) cultural conflict ensues between the landlordestranger institutional approach to land management and the state’s mineral development agenda that incorporates global mining policies; and (4) recurrent conflicts mitigate against peaceful, mutually beneficial mining and sustainable community development.

newspapers and other media sources, and scholarly journal articles to glean additional perspectives. The Sierra Leone case study, though particularistic, nevertheless allows for generalizations based on similar historical processes, patterns, and circumstances (Stake, 1995). For example, many sub-Saharan African countries share comparable political, economic, and socio-cultural dynamics such as the colonial legacy of dual governance systems, significant foreign direct investments in the mining sector facilitated by favorable legal reforms that benefit multinationals, and the landlordestranger institution. Therefore, the findings, conclusions and recommendations from the Sierra Leone case can be applied to other sub-Saharan countries.

2. Method and source materials 3. Results and discussion This case study used information primarily from a comprehensive textual analysis of relevant published and unpublished historical and contemporary documents on land and mining in Sierra Leone. I carefully reviewed government policy and legislative documents from both the colonial and postcolonial periods. These documents revealed the means and extent that customary law and cultural heritage issues have been addressed in land and mining policy and law over time. I also examined annual reports of the government’s Mines Department, mining company reports,

3.1. Land statutes and reconfiguring the landlordestranger relationship In Sierra Leone’s dual governance legal system, customary law predominates in the provincial areas (Fig. 1), sub-divided into districts and chiefdoms. Statutory law applies in the Western Area, including the capital Freetown. In customary governance, the Paramount Chief (PC), sub-chiefs, and elders of land-holding

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lineages, and vital craftsmen like blacksmiths constitute the governing Chiefdom Council (formerly Tribal Authorities). The Chiefdom Council promulgates policies and regulations (involving poro sanctions) that control land use practices and social behavior, including strangers’ use of land. The Sierra Leone colonial government confronted the landlorde stranger institution while trying to modify elements of customary land management to accommodate new land uses such as mining. This legislation resulted in the Protectorate Land Ordinance of 1927 that reconfigured the landlordestranger relationship by proclaiming anyone who “is employed by a person engaged in any industrial undertaking” (Sierra Leone Govt. 1960a, 1271) is exempt from traditional stranger obligations to chiefs. This clause exempting strangers employed in industry (including mining) thus weakened the power of the host landlord-communities to manage strangers in customary ways. The Provinces Land Ordinance of 1933, which repealed the 1927, ordinance contained the same exemption but used the term “nonnative” rather than stranger to define anyone not entitled by customary law to land in provincial areas. Although recognizing customary land rights, this ordinance gave the colonial Provincial Secretary and his subordinate, the District Officer, authority to control indigenous institutions. These government officials had the legal authority to make final decisions on “any matters that have their origin in poro laws, native rights or customs, [and] land disputes.” (Renner-Thomas, 2010, 12). This colonial vestige was not expressly repealed by the Local Government Act of 2004, which was formulated, supposedly, to empower traditional governance institutions (Sierra Leone Govt. 2004). This loophole still exists today, continuing the marginalization of customary governance. Such loopholes underscore the considerable power asymmetry between government statutes and customary law and have serious implications for sustainable development. Sierra Leone’s policy statements and statutes with respect to land rights variously use the terms native, native/citizen, origin, nationality, non-native/non-citizen, and indigenous-citizen, thereby revealing much ambiguity (IPS, 1998; Renner-Thomas, 2010). The draft bill for an overarching Land Acquisition and Commercial Use of Land Act, crafted in 2005 to repeal the colonial Provinces Land Ordinance but not yet passed into law, uses the terms citizen and non-citizen. The draft bill, more importantly, aims “to ensure equal access to land anywhere in Sierra Leone for all Sierra Leoneans” (Renner-Thomas, 2010, 380). This clause clearly deemphasizes the notion of landlord customary rights to land based on ancestral rights to a place. Notwithstanding, the bill states that those occupying leased land still need “the consent” of the Chiefdom Council in consultation with landholding families. In reality, clauses calling for consent from landholding families, by their very nature, usurp the landlords’ decision-making rights to govern lands appropriated by the state for commercial purposes. Further, and in relation to ICMM SDF principle 9, such inequity generates conflicts that do not foster social, economic, and institutional development of the communities in which mining operates. Land as defined in the 2005 draft bill includes mines and minerals, a major change from the colonial non-mining related land ordinances that did not include minerals. The 2005 draft bill’s inclusion of mines and minerals illustrates the continuing importance of mining in Sierra Leone and leaves open the possibility of more appropriation of customary lands. Specific to mining, the current government policy on small-scale artisanal mining declares that “only people of Sierra Leonean origin and nationality” can participate in this activity and market precious minerals (Sierra Leone Govt., 2013, 7). Incorporating the term “nonnative”, the Sierra Rutile Agreement of 2002 for mining titanium minerals requires a portion of rent from mining companies as non-

natives leasing land to be paid to the land-holding lineages and chiefs. Power imbalances, however, between statutory and customary land governance are embedded in the law. For instance, the law locates final approval of amounts to be paid at the national level of governmentdin the jurisdiction of the District Officer in collaboration with his superior, the Provincial Secretary (Sierra Leone Govt., 2002). Further, the use of the terms citizen or noncitizen, nationality, and origin for land and mining rights in postcolonial reforms is ambiguous compared with a clearer definition of a non-native in colonial laws regarding ancestral rights. While the term stranger is rarely used in recently reformed policy and legal documents, it is informally used by government officials and widely employed in the popular press (e.g. FBIS, 1982; The Eagle, 1992; Sierra Leone Govt., 2003). Such common usage of the term stranger suggests an awareness of the importance of this customary institution by both the government and the general public. 3.2. Stranger hegemony and the Sierra Leone mining environment In Sierra Leone large-scale, capital intensive, multinational operations mining iron ore, and rutile, for example, have occurred concurrently with small-scale artisanal projects working alluvial diamonds and gold. Mining is governed by law. The Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) is the overarching governmental framework, but large-scale mining occurs within customized agreements. The country is signatory to international mining initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Process. Since mining began in the late 1920s, mineral extraction as a new land use practice broadened the conventional roles of strangers beyond traders and subsistence farmers. In fact, large-scale mining elevated the multinationals to the premier stranger within and around mining communities and enabled them to hire other strangers, such as expatriate mine engineers, geologists and wage laborers of varied race, nationality, and ethnicity. At the same time as the multinationals dominated the Sierra Leone mining environment, they spawned sub-categories of hegemonic strangers including Europeans, Lebanese, and Maraka (Mandingo) diamond dealers or financiers (locally called supporters). Some of these groups are long-established immigrants in Sierra Leone. Less hegemonic but also new strangers were the small-scale legal and illegal artisanal miners and the service providers that catered to them. Combined, these actors have created a new social hierarchy with real and perceived hegemonic powers (Table 1). Land-holding families and traditional stranger-farmers became, in real and perceived ways, relegated to the bottom of the new socioeconomic and political structures. Table 1 Changes to traditional socio-political structures caused by mining. Traditional social hierarchy (administering subsistence livelihoods)

Restructured social hierarchy from mining

Chiefs and Poro Council Core members of landholding lineages Dependents/Subjects (farm families) Immigrant farmers (strangers)

MNC and mining company professional employees (expatriates, Sierra Leoneans) (strangers) Diamond dealers, financiers, license holders, smugglers Immigrant wage-labor, legal and illegal artisanal miners, retailers, service providers, (strangers) Chiefs and Poro Council Core members of land-holding lineages Dependents/Subjects (farm families). Refugees, ex-combatants, illegal diggers (strangers)

Source: Author.

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Strangers such as Europeans and Lebanese began dominating mining in Sierra Leone from the onset. Table 2 shows the nationality of license holders in the gold mining industry between 1929 and 1944. Foreign mining companies such as Maroc Co Ltd. had the capital, expertise, and technology to carry out capital-intensive mining. By 1936, Lebanese and Syrian businessmen, using lowtechnology artisanal mining and cheap African labor, became the dominant mining license holders. Creoles, descendants of freed slaves, although tallied as African license holders, were actually British subjects and were completely marginalized by 1938. Africans served as wage-labor though only a small percentage was actually indigene Temne from the host communities. Even when government introduced alluvial mining schemes to purportedly increase indigenous participation for gold in 1946, and later for diamonds in1956, stranger-financiers were behind the so-called “native firms” where “more than half of the share capital is held by natives of Sierra Leone.” (Sierra Leone Govt., 1961, 11). Lebanese dominance has continued into the post-colonial period when state government mining policies continued to facilitate dominance by such strangers with capital to invest in mining. Although records show only two broad categories of citizens and non-citizens as displayed in Table 3, many Lebanese are Sierra Leone citizens (Sierra Leone Govt. 1970; Partnership Canada Africa, 2004). Periodically in the history of mining in Sierra Leone, the national government has given Tribal Authority (now Chiefdom Councils) some power to collaborate with governmental authorities to disburse mining plots and licenses but not for diamond dealer and exporter licenses, which are granted at the national government level (Sierra Leone Govt., 1958a; Wilson, 2013). Today, landlordcommunity concerns about the pervasive presence of Lebanese and Marakas remain, and both groups are seen as enjoying “.the golden opportunities of mining diamonds in Kono” at the expense of Sierra Leoneans who accommodate strangers to their detriment (The Eagle, 1992, 4). In colonial times, mining legislation specifically referencing strangers was written to protect lease areas of companies from illegal mining, an early illustration of the multinational companies’ ability to influence how legislation was written. Under rules associated with the Minerals Ordinance of 1927, a mining company could demarcate and enclose areas within its mining lease, forbid entry and/or search any entrants into these demarcated areas with the exception of authorized officials (Sierra Leone Govt. 1936).

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Table 3 Number of alluvial diamond dealers’ licenses held by citizens and non-citizens, 1959e1971. Year

Natives of Sierra Leone/Citizen

Non-natives/Non-citizen

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Total

176 209 192 95 65 70 63 48 57 65 76 47 58 1221

85 127 101 74 103 122 129 116 23 115 134 127 121 1377

Source: SL Govt. Report of the Mines Department and Mines Division, Ministry of Lands, Mines and Labour, 1959e1972.

Authorized officials included stranger-expatriate mine employees but not landlord-community members. This ordinance was inconceivable to the host community/landlords who considered themselves owners of the land. A series of ordinances in the 1950s dealing with strangers and diamond mining employed a number of strategies to control strangers. These strategies included the periodic redefinition of a stranger, mass expulsions of strangers, and cooptation of landlord chiefs in Kono District through stipend payments in exchange for controlling strangers. Furthermore, the alluvial mining schemes were purportedly enacted to increase indigenous participation in mining, but, more importantly, to control illicit extraction by strangers (Sierra Leone Govt., 1948). The 1959 Report of the Mines Division actually revealed the truth: The purpose of amendments to The Diamond Industry Protection Ordinance (1956) dealing with strangers was “.to effect removals and exclusions of undesirables from Diamond Protected Areas.” (Sierra Leone Govt., 1960b, 7). These amendments, however, were mostly ineffective. Of interest is the fact that statutes never considered multinationals and their employees as strangers. This omission once again reveals the privileged status of the multinationals with respect to land use. In addition to legislation inscribing multinational hegemony, the state has since colonial times provided military and

Table 2 License holders in the gold mining industry and African labor, 1929e1944. Year

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 Total

No. of companies & syndicates

Mining license holders

Foreign co.

Local co.

Syndicates

3 2 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 49

0 0 1 0 0 0 5 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 20

0 1 0 0 0 2 3 7 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 23

European

142 0 0 0 0 11 13 13 11 7 5 6 6 4 3 79

Lebanese

0 0 0 3 8 15 15 18 27 32 21 17 12 8 176

African labor African Creole

Indigenous

0 0 0 7 13 15 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 46

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 8

64 n/a 2362 3395 5782 8401 7946 7830 10,509 9913 7445 3314 1235 542 68,880

Source: Annual Reports of the Geological and Mines Department, 1929e1944.

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police support to protect multinational leases against encroachment by indigenes and other strangers and has facilitated several stranger expulsion drives (Harbottle, 1976; IPS, 1994; Peters, 2011; Sierra Leone Govt. 1958b). These measures were clearly not to protect the landlordestranger institution but rather to preserve the multinationals’ ability to continue to operate and generate revenues that the national government needed. The erosion of landlord rights and roles due to the stranger problem in mining areas and government support of the mining industry have always been contentious policy issues. For example, the 1958 colonial-era Legislative Council debates over the Tribal Authorities “Control of Strangers” Order, supposedly an initiative of Paramount Chiefs of the seven most diamond-rich chiefdoms, revealed these disputes. Members of the Council included expatriate colonial officers, Sierra Leonean state politicians, and Paramount Chiefs who were customary landlords. Government support of the multinational Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) and other powerful stranger groups and disrespect for cultural heritage dominated the deliberations. One vocal Legislative Council member stated that the Sierra Leonean colonial government intended “to follow the precepts of the South African policy of ‘apartheid’ against natives of their own country while using as an instrument, the agency of the Tribal Authorities” (Sierra Leone Govt. 1958b, 241e 242). However, some Paramount Chiefs, in support of modernity, stressed the importance of creating an investor friendly environment for mining multinationals “to encourage further investment for our economic development” (Sierra Leone Govt. 1958b, 241). This cultural heritage dilemma persists today. Traditional rulers are torn between their customary roles and modern realities, and state politicians push for development from mining. 3.3. Is this land mine? Landlords, strangers and cultural heritage conflicts Mining law since colonial times has vested to the state: “All rights of ownership in and control of minerals in, under or upon any land in Sierra Leone and its continental shelf.” Land includes “land beneath water, the seabed and sub-soil” (Sierra Leone Govt. 2009a). Customary law considers land as “.the surface soil and things found naturally under, on or above the surface, such as minerals and wild plants and trees” (Renner-Thomas, 2010, 177). Within customary law land is inalienable (Renner-Thomas, 2010). This differentiation reveals the inherent legal conflict over land in mining areas because customary law does not recognize the state’s right to ownership of land nor do landlords agree with their exclusion from land decisions. The Kono Chiefdom Council have since colonial times called for the government and diamond multinationals to respect the rights and entitlements of Kono’s indigenous people (Hayward, 1972; Conteh, 1979). As recently as January 2010, a dispute between the Paramount Chief of a gold-bearing chiefdom and the Lion Company management ensued over disrespect for landlordestranger reciprocities. This disagreement resulted in violence and the destruction of company equipment that necessitated mediation at the national level by the Minister of Mines and Political Affairs (Mansaray, 2010). Complaints have also arisen at the rutile, gold, and iron ore mines about limited mining employment opportunities for landlord-community members (SEM, 2009; Mansaray, 2010; Fofana, 2012). At a number of workshops in various landlord-communities between 2006 and 2009, deliberations on issues such as civil society, mining laws, CSR, and land reclamation revealed indigenous perspectives on customary land rights, negotiation of agreements, and power imbalances in how decisions are made regarding the development of land resources. At the rutile mine, a community member complained: “We are living as strangers in our own land, without the

right to be involved in negotiations before our fertile agricultural lands are leased out to the company” (SEM, 2009). Affected communities lamented that the revised Sierra Rutile Agreement of 2002“. failed to absolutely guarantee them as indigenes of the land their right [italics added] to enjoy the vast wealth” coming from mining in their region. Another concern was the loss of traditional heritage sites to mining operations (SEM, 2009). 3.4. Local cosmology and global capital; sacred bush and conflict Ferme (2001, 39) argued that the indigenous Sierra Leonean worldview on mineral substances is “linked cosmologically to the concealed domains of ancestors and spirits located under the surface of local soils and waters.” Newspaper articles periodically address the significance of honoring rituals to appease the spirits of lands violated by mining and to ensure success with mineral production and protect mine workers (Awareness Times, 2008; The Eagle, 1992). A 2011 Awareness Times article cautioned against the violation of sacred bush and called for extractive industries to be informed by sociologists and anthropologists on socio-cultural sensitivity (Fofana, 2011). Sacred bush conflicts have been variously about compulsory acquisition, valuation and compensation, and desecration in diamond (NMJD, 2006), rutile (SEM, 2009), and iron ore (McClanahan, 2010) mining areas. The Colonial Minerals Ordinance of 1927 stipulated that prospecting and mining were forbidden.on or under land habitually used or occupied for sacred or ceremonial purposes or within 100 yards (30 m) of such a place. The ordinance also stipulated compensation for destruction of trees (economic) and crops(Sierra Leone Govt. 1960a). According to a narrative by a geologist working for Maroc Co Ltd, a gold mining company from 1930 to 32, there was enforcement of the clause relating to sacred places(Fowler-Lunn, 1938). In the postcolonial period, however, there is weak implementation of this provision, and this has caused conflict about sacred places. The current Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) of 2009, unlike the customized agreements for large-scale mining of diamonds, iron ore and rutile, recognizes the existence of sacred bush. Yet, under this act, the national government can override any decisions made by traditional local, authorities to deny access into sacred bush for geological mapping or other mining-related purposes. The MMA and Sierra Leone’s Core Mineral Policy (CMP) and the statutory instrument for environmental and social regulations for the minerals sector incorporate language derived from the ICMM Sustainable Development Framework on recognizing and respecting rights, customs, traditions, values, religion and cultural heritage features such as sacred places in host communities (Sierra Leone Govt. 2013, 2011, 2009a). However, customized agreements for extracting certain minerals do not explicitly recognize sacred bush (Sierra Leone Govt. 2002). Such contradictions within statutory law and inconsistencies with customary law preclude conflict-free mining and effective community engagement and development. Ambiguous and disingenuous government and company responses to community demands in both voluntary and regulatory ways are not a recent phenomenon but date back to the beginnings of mining in Sierra Leone (Conteh, 1979). As an illustration of cultural practices as a driver of CSR, mining companies since colonial times have responded to conflicts over sacred bush, and state representatives have led in determining value and compensation. The SLST not only paid the costs for rituals to re-consecrate new sacred bush but also initiated a Sacred Bush Demarcation and Compensation Scheme. In response to SLST accusations that Konos were creating fictitious sacred bush as cover for illegal mining and false compensation claims, indignant Kono landlords retorted that exploiting resources on one’s own land was not illegal, thus underscoring the firmly held belief in land inalienability (Conteh, 1979). The Sierra Rutile Ltd. also

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compensated for sacred bush, burial grounds, shrines, churches and mosques (Knight Piesold and Co, 2001). A recent monetary compensation package offered to iron ore landlord-communities by African Minerals for destruction of sacred bush was not considered adequate. Some disgruntled locals accused the company of taking their land forcefully without “our desired compensation.” (Fofana, 2012). Compounding the discord, a woman who was participating in bondo customary modes of protest against desecration of sacred bush in the lease area was shot by government police (Awareness Times, 2012a). Such conflicts preclude sustainable community development in mining regions and exacerbate mining policy problems for national politicians who participate in devising inequitable policies and laws. The politicians use rhetoric about strangers in mining to try to manage these conflict situations and to their own political ends. 3.5. Strangers and political rhetoric Throughout its history, Sierra Leone leaders routinely use the stranger dilemma in their political maneuverings. In 1959, for example, Colonial Governor Maurice Dorman went on a special tour to diamond areas to explain newly passed anti-stranger ordinances to the Kono people, warn potential violators against harboring strangers, and forbid illicit mining within the mining lease (Sierra Leone Govt. 1960b). In his post-colonial 1967 electoral campaign, Siaka Stevens pledged “free-for-all” mining for indigenes if elected prime minister (Davies, 2000, 353). As president, however, he later used Lebanese “strangers” as pawns in political and economic manipulations to marginalize or co-opt Kono landlords in diamond areas. Stevens gave Lebanese priority in the disbursement of diamond mining licenses and had a Lebanese business partner (Peters, 2011). At the same time he was supporting these Lebanese, he told a 1982 gathering of Kono in the diamond mining area: Government.will not permit the transformation of Sierra Leone into a free for all state where illegal aliens and immigrants roam around and do as they please.. the unbridled freedom that would allow strangers to plunder the country’s mining fields and to smuggle produce and mineral wealth out of the country is inimical to the interest of Sierra Leone (FBIS, 1982). Stevens urged chiefs to rid their chiefdoms of “lawless and undesirable elements” but did not define who they were. For the landlords in diamond rich chiefdoms, Lebanese and Marakas certainly qualified as undesirable (Sierra Leone Govt. 1958b). More recently in 2003, President Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah acknowledged the landlordestranger relationship in the customary sense when he stated that effective supervision by Kono landlords might have deterred illicit diamond miners (strangers) who turned rebels in the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL’s) blood diamond war in 1991e2001. Kabbah considered the stranger problem a matter of national security (Sierra Leone Govt. 2003). Despite these proclamations by national government officials about the importance and value of the customary landlordestranger institution, de facto activities continue to suggest otherwise. An ambiguous, uneasy relationship clearly exists between this traditional institution and the state mining agenda influenced by global policies via the ICMM and EITI. 3.6. The murky waters of greeting kola, transparency and CSR Sierra Leone Paramount chiefs in mining host communities do rail against multinationals’ activities while profiting the most from mining benefits (Conteh, 1979; Wilson, 2011). For example, Kono chiefs and landlords have, since the onset of diamond mining,

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insisted on tribute for use of their lands from companies and other miners, according to traditional landlordestranger reciprocities (Dorjahn and Fyfe, 1962). President Ahmed Tejan-Kabbah’s call in 2003 for re-instatement of the landlordestranger institution as it existed in pre-colonial Sierra Leone proposed that “. the Chiefs may wish, in this day and age consider dropping the ‘greeting kola’ tradition from the custom” (Sierra Leone Govt. 2003). This proposal was problematic because of the expectation of tribute as well as surface rent payments for land leased to, or occupied by, strangers. In a modern economy, tribute is lucrative and may include shares in mining ventures and other material benefits. Increasingly, the line between tribute and CSR is blurring. In 2011, for instance, African Minerals, an iron ore multinational, covered the overseas medical expenses, worth some $20,000, for the Paramount Chief from the host community. National government officials attended the chiefs’ welcome home reception held in his chiefdom (Awareness Times, 2012b), illustrating state support for the company’s gesture. Such expensive “customary gifts,” of course, complicate the relationship between chiefs and their subjects who do not get to benefit from the company in such ways. More general forms of CSR by multinationals reported in local newspapers vary from covering educational expenses for students (Awoko, 2013) to extinguishing a raging fire in the central business district of a major iron ore mining town (Samba, 2012). These two examples raise the question of where government versus company responsibility lies in providing basic services such as education and water supply. Multinationals in Sierra Leone complain that their CSR efforts in community development go largely unappreciated or are taken for granted (Wilson, 2013). I contend that host communities view CSR as a routine part of landlordestranger etiquette. The landlord is entitled to annual customary gifts and a portion of profits for stranger rights to land use and trade. Mining involves both land use and trade in minerals. In fact, following a recent donation of assorted Ramadan gifts by a Chinese company as part of CSR to some mining communities, the Paramount Chief declared: “China Kingho is a responsible company that has respect for people. the relationship between Kingho and the people [is] great in terms of respect for culture and traditions” (SEM, 2013). Yet, Sierra Leone had its membership in the EITI suspended in March 2013 because multinationals had made extra payments to chiefs that were unaccounted for in the required records, a transparency violation (Remoe, 2013). From a customary perspective these payments were merely tribute. Indeed, as Ferme (2001, 118) underscored “.in Sierra Leone [greeting] kola encompasses and extends the flexibility of the money form, by signifying the elusive boundaries between payments and gifts.” Ironically, the EITI rules and mining in general challenge a fundamental aspect of cultural heritage, the landlordestranger institution. Such challenges in the mining industry are symptomatic of the larger problem of a poorly conceived cultural heritage policy starting with the nation’s constitution. Despite such external pressures like EITI within the global mining agenda, Fanthorpe (2007) maintained that political modernity in postcolonial Sierra Leone has been strongly intertwined with such customary institutions that are considered the repositories of local culture and political identification. In fact, at the 2012 launching of the Chiefdom and Traditional Administration Policy, the national government affirmed its commitment to the institution of chieftaincy (UNDP, 2012). 3.7. Cultural policy ambiguities and implications for sustainable community development The current Sierra Leone Constitution drafted in 1991 explicitly states that the Sierra Leone Government recognizes only “traditional Sierra Leonean institutions compatible with national

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development” (Sierra Leone Govt. 1991). This language is a deliberate modification of the preceding constitution of 1978 that recognized the importance and relevance of customary law and that development and use of natural resources should benefit all Sierra Leoneans (Sierra Leone Govt. 1978). The 1991 Constitution is clearly a step backwards in the cultural heritage agenda. In line with the constitution, the Chieftaincy Act 2009 and the Chiefdom and Traditional Administration Policy of 2012 require Paramount Chiefs to preserve or promote culture as appropriate [italics added] in the view of the state and serve as custodians of customs and traditions. At the same time, chiefs must be agents of modern development (Sierra Leone Govt. 2009b) and “strive to become modern chiefs of the 21st century” (UNDP, 2012). These legal reforms to supposedly devolve power and strengthen traditional governance institutions still retain the colonial vestige of statutory law superseding customary law with the state deciding what customary laws are acceptable. While an oppressive gerontocracy and class structures are realities of traditional governance needing reform, Paramount Chiefs are, nevertheless, caught between balancing their traditional versus modern roles. Although statutory laws such as the Mines and Minerals Act claim to recognize and respect custom, culture and tradition, the statutes simultaneously erode the socio-cultural foundations from which they are deriveddthe landlordestranger institution, power associations and sacred bush. Understanding Abraham’s 1978 call for a wellarticulated cultural policy in Sierra Leone, a former Minister of Tourism and Cultural Affairs underscored in 2013 that investment in cultural heritage is not simply to attract investors and tourists, but culture is a decisive element for the peace and stability necessary for sustainable development (My Sierra Leone Online, 2013). 4. Conclusion The Sierra Leone state has promoted a national development agenda largely based on mineral extraction that challenges customary land governance through the landlordestranger institution and poro power associations. The mining multinational corporation, supported by the national government, became a hegemonic stranger institution appropriating land by statute from host landlord-communities and creating a hierarchy of new strangers within mining communities. Power imbalances embedded in state land and mining policies and laws supersede traditional legal systems. Community demands for benefits from mineral wealth, community development, and respect for the landlordestranger relationship and sacred places as cultural heritage are as old as the Sierra Leone mining industry. Claims to indigeneity by landlord-communities in mining regions and conflict are a result of three principal factors: (1) spiritual connections to ancestral lands and sacred places; (2) response to compulsory land acquisition with loss of livelihoods, and political manipulations by the state; and (3) indigenes quest for access to the new avenues of wealth and power that their minerals bring. Conflict persists, although companies and government have been forced to respond with voluntary initiatives, corporate social responsibility, political rhetoric, evolving policies and legal reforms. Sierra Leone has made efforts with recent regulatory reform to try to integrate tradition and “modernity” around land governance and mining. However, colonial vestiges in the constitution and laws continue to empower the state, which still needs to effectively address power differentials in statutory and customary laws and develop clear and equitable cultural heritage policies that incorporate economic, cultural, spiritual, and social aspects of land use. Such power imbalances and lack of equitable cultural heritage policies are the root causes for the local fervor in defending the

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