Sustainable Bus Rapid Transit initiatives in India: The role of decisive leadership and strong institutions

Transport Policy 18 (2011) 269–275

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Sustainable Bus Rapid Transit initiatives in India: The role of decisive leadership and strong institutions Raj V. Ponnaluri n,1 Operations Management, Administrative Staff College of India, Bella Vista, Raj Bhavan Road, Khairatabad, Hyderabad 500 082, Andhra Pradesh, India

a r t i c l e in fo

abstract

Available online 28 September 2010

The Government of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission is instrumental in providing policy, financial, and institutional support to meet the growing needs of urban agglomerations (UAs). In addition to discussing the recently implemented Delhi Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system and the Indore Busway project, which served to renew the nation’s interest in public transport, this work presents a case brief from three UAs for which the author prepared detailed project reports on the BRT systems. This paper highlights the role of leadership and institutions in the successful completion of feasibility studies (Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada), the process delays (Hyderabad), planned implementation (Visakhapatnam), full-scale operationalization (Indore), and the problems caused by quick deployment (Delhi), the last of which has led to a national debate on BRT viability in India. In conclusion, this work brings to the fore the felt need for a decisive leadership and strong institutions in evolving sustainable public transport solutions. & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: BRT Public transport Urban infrastructure Leadership and institutions Sustainability JnNURM

1. Introduction The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) was introduced by the Government of India in 2005. The Mission, through project funding, gives an impetus to sustainable service improvements in urban agglomerations (UAs) with a population of one million-plus, and aims to encourage reforms, improve infrastructure, and roll out fastpaced urban transport initiatives including Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems. The mission is led by the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD, 2006). It interfaces with state and local governments that are eligible for project funding. JnNURM draws mainly from the National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP, 2008), which promotes investments in infrastructure and reformation of state transport units (STUs). India’s UAs are witnessing a rapid growth in population because of heavy rural–urban migration brought about by economic expansion. During 1951–2001, the population in the UAs increased from 17.3% to 27.8% (NIUAAR, 2000). While the population grew at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.1% during this half century, the passenger-kilometers traveled increased at 9.4% CAGR (IRC, 1996), mostly in the UAs. In 2001,

some UAs had more than 10 000 persons per square kilometer (Demographia, 2008). Also, in the period 1995–2005, the number of motor vehicles more than doubled (30.3–66.3 million) (MoHA, 2007). Population growth is testing the government’s ability to meet the growing demand for quality road infrastructure and public service delivery systems. The central government and some state governments are now actively working to address problems in the UAs. This paper presents the Indore Busway project, the Delhi BRT system, and brief cases from the cities of Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh (AP) (ASCI, 2007a, 2007b; ASCI and IIT Delhi, 2008).2 Its purpose is to illustrate the role played by strong institutions and a decisive leadership in successfully initiating public transportation projects. Section 1 begins with the general policy on public transport while Section 2 presents a perspective on the need for system improvements. Section 3 provides a brief on the uniqueness of the studies presented here. Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 present the Indore busway project, the three case cities in Andhra Pradesh, and the Delhi BRT system, respectively. Section 4, containing the main theme of this work, discusses political involvement (Section 4.1), public administration (Section 4.2), special purpose vehicles (Section 4.3), socio-economic assessments (Section 4.4), capacitybuilding (Section 4.5), and leadership roles (Section 4.6). Section 5 illustrates the challenges faced by the cities and briefly discusses

n

Tel.: + 91 040 27957019/9440887100; fax: + 91 040 66496600. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 1 Present/permanent address: Balaji Enclave, Mallikarjuna Colony, Old Bowenpally, 8-7-105/37; Road No. 1, Secunderabad 500 011, Andhra Pradesh, India. 0967-070X/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2010.08.010

2 The author prepared the BRT detailed project reports (DPR) for Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, and Hyderabad, and interacted with political representatives, senior bureaucrats, city administrators, and technical staff.

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the timely interventions of leaders and supporting institutions. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks on developing sustainable transportation solutions in India.

2. India’s public transport: a perspective The pervasiveness of public transport in UAs is demonstrated by the data that the bus share among all the modes is 1.1% nationwide but 9.9% in the top 23 UAs (Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways, 2007). Recent literature highlights some of the concerns in UAs such as increasing traffic congestion, increasing air pollution, and poor transit quality. While Badami and Haider (2007) pointed to decreased transit ridership and higher operating costs, Pucher et al. (2004, 2005), Schipper and Fulton (2002), and Singh (2005) discussed the need for quality transportation systems in India. It is clear that providing high quality services should be the core theme of India’s transport systems development strategy. The case studies presented here illustrate the possibility of accomplishing this objective.

3. Case studies Indore’s bus procurement and special purpose vehicle (SPV) framework has served as a model for the DPRs of Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, and Hyderabad. These three projects are distinct in that the first moved swiftly to implementation, the second is under design, and the third is linked to the city’s rail transit project. The recently implemented Delhi BRT system offers important lessons on leadership involvement. This work presents cases that are unique in some respects. First, these projects began as initiatives of the District Collectorate (Indore), Municipal Commissionerates (Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, and Hyderabad), and state administration/academic professionals (Delhi). Initially, the projects faced opposition but the drive for change led to their acceptance. Second, these projects faced obstacles because land was either not available or was not provisioned through regulation. Third, the current data systems proved inadequate to quantify or justify project expenditures, i.e., there was a general lack of information regarding project benefits and costs and system outputs of earlier city projects. This work presents models that hope to build sustainable transportation solutions for the future. 3.1. Indore busway system Headed by the District Collector (DC) and with a seed capital of INR 2.5 million, the project SPV, Indore City Transport Services Limited (ICTSL, 2010), was incorporated in 2005 to create, operate, manage and maintain high quality intra-city bus services in the public private partnership (PPP) mode. Pre-ICTSL, the city had

 high travel demand; an unregulated and inadequate public transport system;

 informal public transport comprising private mini-buses and vans;

 poor bus infrastructure, amenities, and time schedules;  few public transport options for women, children, and senior citizens. Broadly, the SPV has three components with the following functions: (1) ICTSL is responsible for infrastructure provisions, the passenger information system (PIS), data management, dispute

resolution, public relations, security services, management of ticketing facilities, and facilitation of revenue sharing among operators. (2) The planning, management, control, and maintaining unit fixes the fares and tariffs, maintains high quality services, determines and monitors standards, ensures environmental compliance, franchises services, and monitors project contracts. (3) Vendors are responsible for bus operations, employee supervision, fare collection, fleet maintenance, and PIS management using GIS and GPS tools. The financing structure comprises revenue generation through daily fare collections, operator premium, and advertising at bus stations/buses/PIS. To ensure the viability of the PPP, 60% of the advertising revenue, 80% of the season ticket sales, and 100% of the daily fare collections are provided to the operators. ICTSL functions as an independent corporation and is a self-financing and revenue-generating model. ICTSL procures modern 40-seater, fuel-efficient, low-floor vehicles with wide doors for easy entry and exit. Bus stations, built 600 m apart, have been constructed on a build-operatetransfer model, and were contextually designed to add aesthetic value to the city. Ticket vending is fully automated with appropriate monitoring and controlling processes in place. The system is now migrating to intelligent smart cards. The bus fleet and the routes are appropriately color-coded for branding purposes. As of 2009, there were 84 buses in operation with an average passenger load of 75 000 per day. The bus fare structure was designed after considering the local low-fare competition from vans, affordability for the poor, and incentives for middleincome families to persuade them to opt for public transport rather than personal automobiles. To improve customer service, ICTSL facilitated capacity-building training programmes for the operating staff. For boosting employee morale, the company also instituted communication protocols, a uniform salary structure, and a dress code for all operators as also the standard preventive and routine maintenance practices including vehicle cleaning. That the system was a success became clear within a year of its inception with the share of public transport growing from 16.4% to 21%. 3.2. The three case cities in AP Visakhapatnam, a fast developing port city on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, is witnessing rapid industrialization. Vijayawada is on the banks of the river Krishna and is known for agricultural production. Hyderabad, the political and commercial capital of AP, is one of the nation’s fastest growing cities and has pioneered India’s global entry into the information technology sector. Table 1 shows the demographic profile and traffic characteristics of the three cities. The per capita trip rates, peak hour peak direction trips (PHPDT) and vehicle operating speeds were similar in Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada. The PHPDTs in Hyderabad were higher due to greater travel demand. Also, the mode shares varied largely among the three cities. In Visakhapatnam, 90% of the 0.45 million registered vehicles are cars and motorized two-wheel vehicles. The current travel demand of 1.2 million person trips per day is estimated to grow to 1.6 and 2.8 million trips per day by 2011 and 2021, respectively. In Vijayawada, the demand is expected to grow from the present 1.26 million person trips per day to 1.5 and 2.3 million person trips per day by 2011 and 2021, respectively. The Visakhapatnam BRT project comprises 20 and 18.5 km long corridors with 38 traffic junctions and 48 bus stations. The recommended concept

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Table 1 City demography, characteristics, and features. Characteristic Population 1991 (Million) 2001 (Million) Decadal growth (%) Area in 2001 (sq. km) Population density (persons/sq. km) City Structure Road and traffic characteristics Per capita trip rate PHPDT (range) Operating speeds (kmph) Avg. Trip Length All modes (incl. walk) Motorized vehicles Mode Share Public (%) Private (%) IPT (%)

2.00 m 2.25 m Foot NMV Lane Path

6.50 m

7.50 m

6.50 m

Carriageway

BRT Corridor

Carriageway

Visakhapatnam

Vijayawada

Hyderabad

1.06 1.33 25.47 515 2582 Ring-Radial

0.845 1.010 19.52 110 9181

4.3 5.53 28.60 778 7107

1.35 5040–5970 14–25

1.04 4250–5100 14–28

1.45 9000–27 000 15.5–27.5

3.57 5.06

4.21 5.88

4.60 7.10

20 65 15

17 38 45

32 56 12

2.25 m 2.00 m NMV Lane Foot Path

2 m 2.25 m Foot NMV Path Lane

6.50 m Carriageway

3.40 m Bus Shelter

3.00 m Bus Bay

7.50 m BRT Corridor with passing lane

6.50 m Carriageway

2.25 m 2 m NMV Foot Lane Path

30.00 m

36 00 m 36.00

Fig. 1. Concept design at mid-block.

Fig. 2. Concept design at bus station.

designs for the three cities include 30- and 36-m cross-sections at mid-blocks (Fig. 1) and bus stations (Fig. 2), respectively. The dedicated 3.5-m BRT lanes will be along the median-side with 3-m wide passenger platforms. Passing lanes are also provided at bus stations. The design includes two lanes for motorized vehicles, one lane for non-motorized vehicles and a 2-m sidewalk. Construction cost estimates, fleet requirement, and operations plan were also developed. The Vijayawada and Hyderabad plans are similar in many respects. Vijayawada began with six routes of which the longest (15.5 km) was approved for implementation. In Hyderabad, the proposal was to build six corridors totaling 74.1 km. Visakhapatnam’s SPV, the Greater Visakhapatnam Public Transport Services (Fig. 3), was proposed to be initiated with seed capital from the city’s tax base. Identical SPVs were proposed for Vijayawada and Hyderabad. The SPV structure comprises the city’s transportation unit, the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC); an authority to set the bus fares; a unit for bus operations; and a division for managing traffic. The Vijayawada SPV was named the Vijayawada Public Transport Services; the Hyderabad SPV is not yet formalized. The proposed multimodal strategy for Visakhapatnam includes the provision of park-and-ride lots at corridor termini and space allocation for intermediate public transport (IPT) modes such as non-motorized vehicles and three-wheel autorickshaws for transfers to/from the BRT system. At major traffic junctions, foot overbridges and skywalks have been proposed for pedestrian movement. For improving efficiencies, several traffic junctions have been proposed for redesign and reconstruction. Technology provisions for loop detection and transit signal priority have also been planned though the feasibility of implementing the latter is subject to signal controller capability. A detailed financial plan has

also been developed and includes the sustainability prospects of the PPP partners. Broadly, the implementation plan includes the following:

 Work allocation among agencies and the appointment of a project management consultant;

 Registration of the SPV and formalizing of revenue streams;  Fixing of the tariff structure and formulation of operational guidelines and standards;

 Procurement of roads, infrastructure, signal control systems, and rolling stock;

 Shifting of utilities, road widening, and construction of bus stations. In Visakhapatnam, stakeholder consultations, media coverage, and social impact assessments are helping to expedite land acquisition because the citizens have understood the project mission and the leadership has accepted the study’s recommendation of paying real market compensation rather than government rates (the latter are about a third of the former). In Vijayawada and Hyderabad, media coverage evoked mixed public response. It is worth noting that unlike in Delhi, all the other four projects presented here include road widening. 3.3. Delhi BRT system With a population density of over 10 000 persons per square kilometer and 5.4 million registered motor vehicles, there is little space for Delhi to expand beyond the current 28 000 km of roads. During 2000–2008, the bus ridership decreased by 17% but the person trips per day increased by 22% (RITES, 2008). Similar

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Greater Visakhapatnam Public Transport Services Ltd.

Greater Visakhapatnam Transportation Division

Transport Operations

Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC)

Fare Regularity Authority

City Engineering Wing

System Vendors

Traffic Engineering and Unit

APSRTC

Traffic Management Group

Traffic Police

Multimodal interests,, NGOs

Fig. 3. Visakhapatnam SPV organizational chart.

studies discussed the need to arrest the increasing trend of personal vehicle use and to improve public transport systems. In 2005, the Delhi government observed that corridors with PHPDTs of less than 5000 may continue using the existing bus services while those with over 5000 PHPDT should be studied for BRT and rail-based transport systems. Similar to the three case cities discussed earlier, the Delhi BRT is also a median-running system with dedicated lanes and provisions for IPT and pedestrians. In addition to foot overbridges and half-subways for better pedestrian access, sidewalks and landscaping are a part of the road infrastructure improvements. System design also considered road safety by separating nonmotorized modes, especially bicycles and pedestrians, from regular traffic. Buses have good ambience and low floors with better access for the handicapped. They are fuelled by compressed natural gas. GIS/GPS-enabled PIS is available at bus stations and in all vehicles. Signal systems were originally planned to operate in the ‘intelligent’ mode. Other features such as automated fare collection and regular vehicle maintenance have also been incorporated. Public awareness campaigns were actively carried out and the political leadership, administrative machinery, and technical experts participated in informing the public through the news media about the features of the project. The initial 6-km BRT stretch was later expanded to 14.5 km.

4. Leadership and institutions Indore’s success in creating a viable busway project is attributable to the strong leadership and political will of the state and local governments. These views find support in Miller and Buckley (2001) who noted that political championing is important to initiate public transportation projects. India’s think tank, while reading the Latin American experiences, is reviewing recent literature on the need for dynamic adaptation to the changing environment (Ardila, 2007). Hossain (2006) observed that the varying geo-political conditions in Asia may make it difficult to achieve results similar to those in Latin America. Further, Hidalgo and Graftieaux (2008) made note of the institutional and financial constraints in 11 BRT projects across Latin America and Asia. Being a large democracy with pluralism in every sphere, India faces challenges in gaining political traction to initiate infrastructure projects. The political establishment is fully answerable to the people and therefore, acceptance of the BRT

projects is often a challenge, especially when land acquisition is involved. Fig. 4 illustrates a storyline of the cities, each of which demonstrates the problems that led to the BRT projects being conceived. In Indore, the initial bus procurement exercise was eventually transformed into a full-scale, integrated multimodal BRT project. In Visakhapatnam, the disappointment of not obtaining funds for road widening provided the idea for the project. In each case, the expected benefits are to improve the public transport systems, reduce traffic congestion, and make transit affordable. 4.1. Direct political involvement The BRT implementation in New Delhi has important lessons to offer to other cities contemplating BRT projects. A 6-km stretch was planned, designed, and deployed with high-end rolling stock, dedicated BRT lanes, improved bus stations, pedestrianization, and provision for motorized, IPT and non-motorized modes. Initially, the news media characterized the BRT as a burden on the city (The Times of India, 2008). However, the Delhi government, supported by the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, took steps to rectify field problems and to make the system people-friendly and transit-worthy. The initiative was spearheaded by the Chief Minister (CM) of the National Capital Territory of Delhi who took an interest in addressing the deteriorating traffic conditions and environmental sustainability problems. By favoring the transit riders, the Delhi government risked the resentment of private vehicle owners, even though it was just before the elections to the local body. In a vibrant democracy such as India’s, it is a challenge to move from a burgeoning private mode market to public transport in UAs where road space and land acquisition are major hurdles. The Delhi project generated a national dialogue regarding the viability of the BRT system with implications for similar projects. For example, it is now accepted that even a 10-km stretch is too short a distance to implement a BRT system. Further, given the several long-distance routes created by the Delhi Metro, the BRT system appears to be just a small experiment and not a fullfledged commitment. The system lacks, as is the case with most other cities across India, the capability to incorporate transit signal priority. This is mainly due to technologically inferior signal controllers and the involvement of the traffic police in randomly manipulating traffic junction operations. During the public uproar that immediately followed the BRT implementation in Delhi, an

R.V. Ponnaluri / Transport Policy 18 (2011) 269–275

273

Indore Busway System

Delhi BRTS

Unregulated PTS; Access inequities

Traffic congestion; Fewer multimodal options

Traffic congestion; Unplanned growth

Create a quality PPP/ state-subsidized PTS

Add BRTS to Delhi Metro; Develop multimodal system

Create mass transit systems including BRTS

Pursue JnNURM-funded multimodal system

Pursue JnNURM-funded multimodal system

Idea pursuit

ICTSL formation; Bus procurement

DPR preparation; Project implementation

Add BRTS to railbased mass mobility

DPR preparation; Funding approval

DPR preparation; Funding approval

Next steps

Fleet operations; DPR preparation; Funding approval

Quick implementation; Possible system expansion; Lessons learned

DPR finalization upon rail-transit system completion

Detailed design; Contractor selection; SPV formation

Bus procurement; Detailed design; SPV formation

Moving forward

Improve bus operations; Deploy dedicated BRTS

Make BRTS peoplefriendly; Add to Metro

Improve bus operations; Deploy dedicated BRTS

Dedicated BRTS under construction (3 corridors)

Dedicated BRTS under construction (1 corridor)

Anticipated outcomes

Fully integrated multimodal BRTS

Fully integrated mass transit system

Fully integrated multimodal BRTS

Fully integrated multimodal BRTS

Fully integrated multimodal BRTS

Final output

PT access to all; System integration; Plan for growth

Cater to the transport needs of a metropolis

Improved PTS; Preparing for growth; Increased PT share

Improved PTS; Preparing for growth; Increased PT share

Problem Idea generation

Hyderabad Busway System

A full-fledged multimodal mass transit system for all people

Visakhapatnam BRTS Traffic congestion; Road widening

Vijayawada BRTS Fast growing city; Traffic congestion

Notation: DPR – Detailed Project Report ; BRTS – Bus Rapid Transit System JnNURM – Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission PTS – Public Transport System; PPP – Public Private Partnership ICTSL – Indore City Transport Services Limited Fig. 4. Projects evolution: The storyline.

undocumented study3 on signal operations showed that the traffic police had, based on visual observations, permitted/ prevented vehicle movement without adhering to basic traffic management principles. This, in itself, created greater resentment because the general public thought that the BRT system was to blame for their having to wait 12–15 min at each traffic junction. However, this problem was later addressed. That the BRT system continues to operate while new routes are being planned is in large part due to the determination of the Delhi government to move ahead rather than surrender the initiative. This effort has, however, shown up two flaws: the inability to estimate public response and, possibly, a desire to implement the project too quickly. Some comfort is to be derived from the fact that a 1500-respondent survey (CSE, 2008) showed acceptance of the BRT system by 83% and surprisingly widespread support (73%) from car owners who also endorsed route expansion.

acceptance of their proposals would not have met the intent of providing demand-responsive systems for transit riders. In general, it is worth noting that successive city commissioners were open to suggestions and recommendations which yielded planning-based project development. Another issue was about formal political buy-in. All government-funded projects require local acceptance. The MoUD emphasizes authorization by the city councils before the Central Sanctioning and Monitoring Committee considers the allocation of JnNURM funds. In Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada, the proposals were discussed by the local bodies. However, in Vijayawada, after the approval, a dispute arose over the authenticity of project acceptance by the council members. This led to a debate on the ability of the corporation staff to move the project forward. The issue was later resolved but it resulted in uncertainty and caused delays.

4.3. SPV formation 4.2. Role of the public administration During the initiation phase, the project feasibility analyses were undertaken. The studies, to some extent, corroborated the corporations’ views about project corridors4 but other important issues such as the need for feeder routes and transit terminals also emerged. While the opinions of the administrators generally reflected the current scenarios, it was concluded that a blind 3 Based on discussions with the Consultant who performed post-implementation signal/junction operation studies 4 In Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada, the municipal authorities wanted to implement BRT along specific corridors. This suggestion was primarily based on perceived notions about city needs rather than on technical considerations.

Given that the BRT experiment was new, another seriously debated issue was with regard to the creation of SPVs in AP. In the three case cities, under an inter-departmental agreement, the APSRTC and the local body concerned were provided with a 51% and 49% stake, respectively. The APSRTC is the STU in AP and has been plying public transport services for more than half a century. With the MoUD stressing upgraded systems and not a typical STU operation, the decision to appoint the APSRTC as a major stakeholder became a matter of debate. This is because trade unions impose their own conditions and constraints on STUs; the question then was whether the MoUD’s intention of creating an efficient, reliable, superior, and PPP-friendly BRT system was realizable. Discussions, debates, meetings, and interim decisions

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that were held between the state and local governments and the APSRTC to arrive at the definition, implementation mechanism, ownership rights, and organizational structure are a testament to the challenge of breaking through institutional barriers to initiate and develop good PPP transportation solutions in India. 4.4. Support for socio-economic assessments In a serious effort to engage the citizens and seek public opinion on the BRT projects, the government consulted about 450 business owners and 1200 households in Visakhapatnam. This process was immensely successful as the people were convinced that the government and their elected representatives were taking their views into consideration. These efforts also helped modify the proposed compensation structure for facilitating land acquisition. The Vijayawada project also had the public component but suffered initially mainly because the political representatives disagreed with the BRT philosophy. In Hyderabad, people submitted petitions through their elected representative and sought major modifications, especially on corridors and alignments. In all, people’s involvement was integral to initiating the projects in all the three cities. In retrospect, however, it can be stated that the process could have been better and that future assignments should actively consider public involvement during the project initiation phase. 4.5. Need for strengthening middle-management The Visakhapatnam project moved to full deployment mainly because successive city administrators decisively authorized the project implementation processes. Successive Municipal Commissioners, Chief Engineers, and participating staff worked diligently with consultants to ensure that these fast-paced projects pursued a planned strategy and did not suffer from undue setbacks. In Vijayawada, the focus was more on rolling stock procurement than on design or deployment. This is markedly different from Visakhapatnam which has completed the corridor design and has begun road construction; bus fleet procurement will later follow under the leadership of the SPV. In Hyderabad, due to the focus on developing a rail-based mass transit system, the BRT project is on hold. During the initial stages, however, the project made significant progress mainly due to the active involvement of senior managers at the time. Given the other urban governance needs in the areas of public health, water and sanitation, law enforcement, poverty alleviation, and environment, most UAs cannot afford the time commitment of senior managers to public transport projects alone; hence the need to dedicate middle management to these endeavors. Providentially, in all the cities and especially in Visakhapatnam, a top-down approach was institutionalized wherein the leaders at the helm to the staff at the middle were visible and participatory.

be the key factors in successfully initiating BRT projects across India. 5. Timely interventions and actions Soon after the ICTSL called for bids to run the bus system, a few prospective operators were keen but they did not participate for two reasons: fear of intimidation from the local IPT operators and the uncertainty of obtaining bank loans5 for procuring buses. The DC of Indore showed leadership by providing government backing and confidence to the State Bank of Indore, thereby facilitating the offering of loans to the prospective operators. However, soon after the buses started plying, the local unregulated operators indulged in anti-social activities and intimidated the Indore Busway riders. The DC then used his prerogative as the administrative head and acted swiftly to curb the law and order problem. In Delhi, the CM actively supported the project after administrative consultations and technical deliberations. When the project was being criticized, the CM supported the effort, interacted with the media, explained the remedial action plans to the people and risked personal reputation that had been built over four decades of public service. The CM’s decision to use compressed natural gas in all public transport and IPT vehicles, and addressing seemingly minor issues such as signal system problems during BRT implementation were bold and unusual steps. In Visakhapatnam, successive Commissioners adhered to technical norms, followed a planned process, supported the socio-economic efforts, and actively considered paying real market compensation for land acquisition. In Vijayawada, despite the post-approval political fallout, the administrators took part in extensive deliberations and proceeded to procure buses. The AP state government also acted swiftly in crafting the SPVs and in facilitating the BRT deployment. In each project, a political leader (CM), a leader of administration (DC), or heads of urban local bodies (Commissioners) addressed specific problems and moved the projects forward. In Indore, in addition to enforcing the rule of law and acting in public interest, the DC participated in all phases of project design, corridor selection, DPR preparation, bus procurement, and the funding approvals. In Delhi, the CM not only positively led the successful rail-based Delhi Metro project but also took the help of academicians in developing the multimodal BRT system. In Visakhapatnam, when the funding request for road widening was declined, the Commissionerate shifted its strategy and conceptualized the BRT system, thereby visualizing a more holistic multimodal solution to address the traffic congestion and transit ridership problems. In Vijayawada, the land scarcity problem was quickly resolved by a minor re-routing through an abandoned rail corridor. Such outside-the-box ideas could be converted into real opportunities because the leaders and administrators used their powers judiciously.

6. Conclusion 4.6. Leadership roles Leadership issues are discussed in the management literature. Using a simplistic framework (12 leadership skills, 2010), it is reasonable to state that the five projects presented here demonstrated various degrees of involvement and achievement with regard to vision creation, empowerment, and team-building. Thus far, the active involvement of politicians, city managers, and staff was significant in moving the projects forward. As noted in several sections of this work, the roles and responsibilities of the political institutions and administrative structures appear to

There is an urgent need to develop sustainable transportation solutions in India. The Indore Busway system, the Delhi BRT effort, and case briefs from Visakhapatnam, Vijayawada, and Hyderabad show that leadership and institutions play a crucial role in successfully initiating the multimodal projects. Despite national expertise in conceptualizing, planning, designing, and deploying the projects, the challenges in converting policies to reality, 5 As told by the Indore District Collector during the ‘Prime Minister’s Award’ audit interaction.

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translating studies to field deployment, and obtaining institutional and leadership commitment demand attention. This inference is consistent with Matsumoto (2007) who suggested the need for political will to accelerate BRT projects. India’s experiment takes into consideration international experiences from the Americas, Europe, and Asia (TCRP, 2007; Ponnaluri et al., 2008) but these require regional adaptation. In developing economies, the necessary factors for creating sustainable transportation solutions include accountability, commitment, strong political will, structured institutions, and fundamentally, a decisive leadership.

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