Sustainable development of fragile lands: The case of extensive livestock production in Africa

Agric. Admin. & Extension 24 (1987) 3-32

Sustainable Development of Fragile Lands: The Case of Extensive Livestock Production in Africa

David D. Gow Development

Alternatives, (Received

Inc., 624 Ninth 30 January

Street, NW. Washington,

1986; accepted

17 April

DC 20001, USA

1986)

SUMMARY The problems associated with the long-term sustainable development of fragile lands in the Third World can be viewed from several dtfering perspectives, ranging from the strictly technical to the critically despairing. Nevertheless, there is increasing evidence that complex problems require complex solutions, where complexity is demonstrated in the use of such key terms as fragile lands, difsering agendas, institution building, and even sustainability itself. The point of departure is international donor assistance to the extensive livestock sector in the semi-arid tropics of Africa. Have such efforts floundered because the original project designs were,fluwed and the assumptions on which they were based simply wrong, or rather have they %oundered because the problems encountered are too complex for (rational solution’? This article favors the former perspective, and proposes a holistic approach to project design that will address the following key issues: policy dialogue andpolicy changes: land tenure; the difsering agendas of the various actors involved,. the role and participation of the local population; and, finally, the role of technology.

INTRODUCTION The problems associated with the long-term sustainable development of fragile lands in the Third World can be viewed from several differing perspectives, ranging from the strictly technical to the critically despairing. While such differences may at first sight appear to be contradictory and Agric. Admin. & Extension 0269-7475/87/$03.50 England, 1987. Printed in Great Britain

0 Elsevier Applied

Science Publishers

Ltd,

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David D. Gow

evenmutually exclusive, there is increasing evidencethat complex problems require complex solutions-where complexity is seenas a viable alternative to simplistic monocausality rather than asa shotgun approach to counteract ignorance. This complexity is mirrored in the use of such key words and phrases as fragile lands, differing agendas, institution building, and sustainability itself. With the exception of institution building, these terms have only come into vogue relatively recently. Becausethey are broad enough to encompass a wide spectrum of meanings, it is important to define what they mean: for example, what does sustainability refer to-services provided, benefits achieved,institutions created?Hence, the first part of this paper will discuss and define these key terms and the issuesthat they raise. This will be followed by a section describing the survival strategies of herders and farmers in the semi-arid tropics of Africa. In order to survive historically, both groups developed extensiverather than intensive strategiesto deal with the environmental uncertainty characteristic of such fragile lands. The drought and subsequent famine of the 1970sindicated that, to a certain extent, such strategies were becoming redundant-a lesson reinforced by the more recent experiencesof severalcountries, both North African and sub-Saharan. These strategies will be viewed in the context of the development interventions pursued in extensive livestock production projects. As a result of the famine, in which both herders and farmers were often directly blamed for degrading the immediate environment, various development efforts were mounted. One of the objectives of such efforts was to protect these fragile lands. Ten years later these efforts appear to have had little lasting impact. The factors contributing to this ineffectivenesswill be examined. The final section of this paper will examine what donors, governments, and local populations have learned from theseexperiencesand what steps, if any, have beentaken to ameliorate the situation. Recommendations will be made in terms of policy implications and strategiesfor implementation. KEY TERMS Sustainable

development

For the uninitiated it must come as a rude shock to discover that the rural landscape of the Third World is often littered with the ghosts of development projects gone by: projects designed and financed by the international donor community which may (or may not) have flourished for a year or two before their allotted time span ran out, at which point

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5

lands

it was assumed that the host governments in question would continue to support them-albeit on a somewhat reduced scale. Often such continuing support did not materialize and these projects experienced a quick and wasteful demise. At first sight such activities may appear completely irrational but, when viewed within the context in which they occur, a certain ‘situational rationality’ emerges that often has little to do with rural development as it is conventionally understood. The context in question is that of American foreign policy. In broad terms this policy has the following distinct, conceptually interdependent, but potentially conflicting sets of goals in the Third World: Diplomatic/strategic goals: the advancement of donors’ short-term political and long-term strategic interests; and Development/humanitarian goals: long-term promotion of economic growth and political stability, and the short-term alleviation of suffering (p. 5).42 Seen in this light, development assistance becomes an important tool of American foreign policy and, generally speaking, plays second fiddle to the political imperatives of that. policy. As a result the impact of such assistance may be much less important than the simple fact that such assistance was provided at all. Fortunately, this situation has changed slightly for the better and there is now increasing interest in the long-term perspective-the sustainability of the development effort once external donor support has been phased down and terminated. In theory, the over-riding objective of development assistance should be to generate self-sustaining improvements in human capability and well-being. If this is the case, then two initial, projectspecific questions must be answered; (1) (2)

have the proposed benefits from the project materialized? what activities must be continued after the termination of development assistance to sustain benefit flows?

Factors which present potential impediments can be grouped into three categories: (1)

(2)

to benefit

sustainability

political and economic issues, including the macroeconomic policy environment in which the project is set and the degree of political support that the project receives; financial issues, including the use of excessively costly technologies and service delivery systems and the lack of revenue to cover future financial needs; and

David D. Cow

(3) institutional issues,including inadequateinstitutional and individual capacity to carry on project activities without outside assistance,a lack of incentivesto produce sustainablebenefits,and the insufficient duration of projects3’ This latter category usually falls under the general rubric of institution building, a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving sustainability. Institution building, while highly laudable and worthwhile, is somewhat nebulous and difficult to measure. A simple straightforward definition would state that the bottom line is to create institutions with the capacity to do their work more effectively-as gauged by results, not merely by potential. But such capacity building cannot be an end in itself: Give a man a fish and he can eat that day; Teach a man to fish and he can eat for the rest of his life. But, Who owns the fish?26 In the case of extensive livestock production in Africa, one of the key questions concerning sustainabledevelopment of fragile lands is: who owns the rangelands? Fragile lands A recent report defines fragile lands as: ‘. . . lands that are highly subject to deterioration under common agricultural, silvicultural, and pastoral use systems and management practices, as demonstrated by one or more of the following: Declining short-term production; Loss of the long-term potential productivity of the resource base; Serious off-site impacts from environmental degradation of the site; and Slow recovery of the soil, water, plant, and animal resourcesafter being disturbed by human beings or nature’ (p. 4).8 Fragile lands do not pose a problem in and of themselves:it is only when destructive patterns of land use are combined with a natural resourcebase subject to deterioration that the problem arises.

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In the case of the arid and semi-arid tropics, the fragility of the natural resource base is manifested in what some observers regard as increasing ‘desertification’, an African version of Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’. Like the word ‘deforestation’, desertification has a stong emotional and visual appeal. A recent report from Mauritania graphically describes the process: ‘The Sahel is a dry and ecologically fragile grassy plain. The nomadic herders greatly increased their numbers of livestock during the relatively wet 1950’s. They tried to maintain the herds after the drought set in between 1968 and 1971 by overgrazing in even more marginal grasslands, helping turn the lands into sands. Desertification dates back at least 2,500 years, when the Sahara itself was mostly grass, and Carthage in Tunisia was the bread basket of the Roman Empire. . . . Efforts to fight back-the desert is moving south at about four miles a year-have shown little success.. . .’ (p. 5).45 While the impression is given that deserts advance on a broad front, not just ‘moving’ but sometimes actually ‘marching’, nothing could be more at odds with the facts. That such environments are fragile and have been subjected to detrimental climatic and land use patterns is generally accepted. But whether such patterns result in long-term environmental degradation, which is the end result of desertification, is another matter altogether. The term itself is riddled with misconceptions, the most serious of which have been identified by the population ecologist William Murdoch (pp. 2879).40 First, there are very few facts concerning either the extent or the seriousness of desertification. For example, a 1977 United Nations report on the Sahel concluded that: ‘The evidence for desertification is diffuse and almost impossible to quantify. There can be little reasonable doubt that many environments have suffered serious damage, and this mostly by cultural practices, but thepersistence of the effects is much more debatable. In particular, the losses that followed the recent droughts in the Sahel and elsewhere, cannot be classed as desertification until clear evidence emerges that the yield of useful crops in the ensuing good years has been depressed beneath that of the preceding wet period, and that the losses are due to environmental causes’ (p. 19).52 Second, there is a good deal of rubbish written about the ‘carrying capacity’ of such areas-with the underlying assumption that such capacity remains relatively constant, irrespective of the technology and land

David D. Gow

8

management practices utilized (pp. 2434).4’ For the non-specialist, it is unclear whether carrying capacity refers to the human population, the livestock population, or both. For the specialist in range management, however, its meaning is clear since it includes more than simply the maximum number of animals that can survive the greatest period of stress each year on a given land area. As such, it should not be confused with such key terms as ‘grazing capacity’ and ‘stocking rate’: ‘Grazing capacity is the number of animals that produces the greatest return without damage to the physical resources and in concert with other values receivedfrom the land. Optimum carrying capacity suggests

the most profitable stocking rate’ (p. 11.5).23 While stocking rate refers to the number of animals on a given pasture for a stated time period, grazing capacity refers to the number of animals over a long time period. In the arid and semi-arid tropics, there is increasingevidencethat grazing capacity can realistically be approximated only over time, and that climatic condition, stocking rate, management strategy, vegetative condition, and other variables must be constantly monitored, given the dynamic nature of the changesthat occur in such environments.4 (This also holds for the semi-arid rangelands of the US.)’ Since there are radical fluctuations from year to year, it is much more realistic to talk of stocking rates for particular years. For example, the measurements shown in Table 1 from the International Biological Program research site in the area of northern Senegal, where annual rainfall habitually fluctuates between 200 and 300mm, indicate the relationship between rainfall, plant production, and stocking rate. In the table, rainfall is more accurately expressedas ‘period of useful rainfall’Aefined as the period of active growth of annual grasses, rather than as a simple rainfall total. The stocking capacity is calculated assuming animals of 250 kg liveweight, eating one-third of the above ground primary production.

Variation

in Plant Production

TABLE 1 and Stocking Rate for Cattle in Northern

Period of useful rainfall (days) ‘Normal’ ‘Normal’ 1972

good year bad year

Source: SwifL4’

110 50 0

Above ground plant production (kg dry matter/ha) 1300 590 0

Senegal Stocking rate for cattle (per 1000 ha) 187 87 0

Sustainable

Livestock

Cattle Sheep Goats Camels Rainfall

(mm)

development

Variation

of fragile

TABLE 2 in Safi, Morocco,

lands

1979-85

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

145 191 890 506 88 255 15590 345.5

150 799 977 785 91926 18000 268.5

139 625 845 541 73 844 17000 196.8

79 779 383 837 30 838 15000 262.2

77391 543 999 41887 12 362 173.0

80731 541604 49 466 12071 239.8

111000 723 500 78 000 10200 364.6

Source: Direction de l’Elevage, L’Elevage dam la Province de Sctf;. Safi, Morocco, Provinciale de I’Agriculture, 1985, p. 3.

Direction

What such variations in rainfall mean in practice is demonstrated by the time series data for the province of Safi in Morocco, a country severely affected by widespread drought in the early 1980s (Table 2). Finally, desertification is not the result of deserts ‘marching’. Rather, it occurs in and around areas of intense activity, such as overcropped areas around wells where livestock have cleared the vegetation: ‘ . . . there is no particular tendency for desertification to occur at the edge of the real desert, and in fact it tends to occur mainly this edge at the margin of cultivated land’ (p. 288).40 Differing

away from

agendas

The principal actors in rural development projects, whether institutional or individual, try to achieve different and sometimes contradictory ends. When these agendas differ, project success and benefit sustainability will rarely receive priority attention. As a result, differing agendas have been a recurring problem in project implementation. In theory, each group involved in the design and implementation process may have differing objectives which can severely affect the outcome of the project. Such groups may range from the donor agency and the central bank of the host country, through local-level politicians and expatriate technicians, to project staff, intended project beneficiaries, and other members of the local population.39 The potentially disastrous consequences of such differences are exemplified in a recent livestock project financed by the Agency for International Development (AID) in northern Senegal. In this case, AID sought to fund the expansion of an existing livestock project, although concern was expressed about both the economic and social viability of the project, particularly its potential impact on the Fulbe herders who were to be

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sedentarized around water points and encouraged to participate in a program of vertically integrated livestock production. But these concerns were not shared by the Senegalese project director and his staff, most of whom had training in the veterinary sciences. As a result their approach to development was technocratic and their working relationships with the herders, the ostensible beneficiaries of this project, were distant and sometimes adversarial. The expatriate technicians, whose scopes of work had been prepared by AID, saw themselves as responsible for dealing with the questions of range management, provision of services to herders, and the monitoring of socioeconomic aspects of the herders’ quality of life. In contrast, their Senegalese counterparts were much more concerned about the production of beef for the urban market. When all four technicians were either fired or resigned, AID decided not to renew funding for a second phase.6 While the specific objectives of the various actors involved in a project may vary considerably, their whole modus operandi may also differ significantly, what some commentators have called their ‘organizational cultures’. Contemporary organizational theory assumes commitment to collective, formal, organizational goals. Within AID these goals are fourfold: policy dialogue, institutional development, utilization of the private sector, and technology research, development, and transfer.’ Such goals are achieved through the implementation of specific programs. Nevertheless, the development bureaucrats are rewarded for ‘pushing money’, that is, achieving the overall disbursement targets for their particular country’s programs. Ten years ago Tendler could write: ‘In AID, for example, one hears talk about “moving money”: how urgent it is to “move” a certain amount of funds within a limited time, how jubilant one is after obtaining a loan authorization, at having “moved” so much money, how adept an administrator is at “moving” millions of dollars. At a farewell dinner for an AID administrator, the speaker praised the guest of honor for the major accomplishment of having “moved millions of dollars” during his stewardship at AID’ (p. 88).50 There is little indication that this attitude has changed significantly during the intervening decade, although, as mentioned earlier, there is increasing interest expressed in how these moneys are spent and how sustainable the programs financed actually are.’ 5 In Africa, this assumed commitment to collective, formal, organizational goals often falls flat on its face since government organizations are often used to pursue the informal, personal goals of their managers. To call this corruption would be misplaced since African bureaucrats have strong

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commitments to their families and villages of origin. In this respect, African elites may be somewhat unusual in the extent of their patronage obligations to the poor and the strength of the moral pressures which they feel to fulfil them.33 Drawing on the ‘moral economy’ approach of James Scott and others, Goran Hyden has termed this the ‘economy of affection’, which he defines as follows: ‘ . . . it denotes a network of support, communications and interaction among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community, or other affinities, for example religion. It links together in a systematic fashion a variety of discrete economic and social units which in other regards may be autonomous’ (pp. 8-9).3o

FARMER,

HERDER,

AND

DONOR

STRATEGIES

Farmer strategies There is mounting evidence that populations living in fragile lands which are subject to dramatic changes-either natural, man-made, or a combination of both-respond with a high degree of flexibility and an escalating set of strategies, according to the gravity of the situation.51 For example, in the case of the semi-arid tropics of Northern Nigeria, farmers have developed a hierarchy of coping mechanisms for dealing with lack of rainfall. These include intercropping, water conservation, the exploitation of several microenvironments and, in cases where early rains are followed by drought, the replacing of their millet and sorghum with different, quick-maturing cereals. After a poor harvest villagers know that cereal prices will increase exponentially. Accordingly, they try to generate cash income to buy grain through wage labor and craft activity. If this is insufficient, then they will seek support from extended kin through the ‘economy’ of affection. Should this in turn prove insufficient, then they will begin to dispose of their productive assets, such as smallstock, or seek a loan from a local merchant. In extreme conditions, villagers will sell their farm land and migrate permanently to another location. These steps are illustrated in Fig. 1.53 Herder strategies In the case of herders, the strategies for dealing with uncertaintyspecifically the availability of the necessary resources, particularly water and pasture, to sustain the herds-have been more complex. Extensive

12

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Permanent

o”tmigrotlo”

Lou Sale

of

Pledglng

Sole

of

of

farmlund

farmland / asse+s

damerti: /

Borrow from

grotn

(boshm

merc)ants/money

ruwal

or

money

lenders

High / Time Poor (Sept.

Harvest - Oct.)

-

Re-Horvest Hunger

New

Harvest

(Sept

-Oct.)

(May-A~gl

Fig. 1. Graduated response to food shortage in Northern Nigeria. Source:Watts (p. 255).53

livestock production has been shown to be well-adapted to the semi-arid conditions prevailing in many African countries since the fragile lands in question are marginal for any other type of productive activity-at least with present levels of technology. Notwithstanding these limitations, however, the last two decades have seen the advent of what Little has termed the ‘encroaching farmer’ and the ‘cultivating herder’-whereby the better pasture lands are brought under cultivation, with short-term gains for individuals and medium-term environmental consequences for society as a whole.34 When the delicate balance between people, livestock and resources is in flux, the herder, like his more sedentary counterpart, has a series of graduated responses he can bring into play. The first is movement-both short and long distance. Although herders may move for social or political motives, the most usual reasons are economic and ecological: to respond to a new opportunity or to escape from some threat. The second response is herd diversification. Since herds may include various species of livestock-such as cattle, sheep, goats, and camels-with differing feeding and watering requirements, differing periods of lactation, differing labor requirements, and differing capacities to withstand environmental stress, the experienced herder can change his herd mix accordingly.48 Equally important for long-term survival is herd structure. In some respects extensive cattle production is a form of dairying, since milk is a staple food which is divided between people and young stock. In order to ensure both a steady supply of milk as well as the reproduction of the

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herd, a significant proportion of the cattle possessed by herders are mature females (including heifers). As a result, once conditions of stress have passed, a rapid reconstitution of herds and resumption of the milk supply are possible.21 A fourth strategy is to increase herd size, when conditions are propitious, as a form of insurance against the inevitable downswing. Such herd accumulation, sometimes wrongly attributed to an irrational desire for prestige animals, is a form of risk aversion and guards against uncertainty. Labelled ‘opportunistic’, this strategy has been defined as: ‘ . . . one which varies the number of livestock in accordance with the current availability of forage. Such a strategy enables the extra forage available in good years to be converted directly into economic output (milk, meat) or into productive capital in the form of a bigger breeding herd.. . . In most cases where an opportunistic strategy is actually attempted livestock numbers in bad times are reduced too little and too late and as a consequence ecological degradation may occur (p. 62).43 Hence, in a situation where communal pastures prevail, this strategy makes sense for the individual herder in the short run, though both he and his neighbors may well suffer in the long run. Even if he increases his offtake, it does not mean that his remaining animals will be any better off-unless other herders using communal resources do likewise. If they do not, then what Hardin has termed ‘the tragedy of the commons’ will ensue-a process which, in his opinion, can only be reversed through privatization of the pastures in question.22 Under stress conditions, herders hold onto their animals in the hope of their surviving until the rains fall again. During a drought meat prices fall, discouraging livestock sales. Owners hold off selling because capital turned to cash can disappear quickly, especially in a drought when a wide circle of relatives need money. The economy of affection creates reciprocal obligations. In many societies, herders either loan or give animals to friends and kinsmen-as a form of insurance policy. This process of redistribution creates a network of obligations which a herder can call upon in case of need, particularly if he is known to have been generous to others (pp. 756).4* After a drought herders find themselves short of cash to rebuild their herds, so they hold onto their animals in the hope that they will survive until the next rain. Moreover, this process is often exacerbated by the fact that communal pasture, and often fallow and stubble, are costless to the producer (p, 5).‘* Recent research in West Africa has shown that as range conditions deteriorate, mortality rates for cattle will rise and fertility rates will fall. As

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the situation worsens, there are more deaths and fewer births and, ultimately, an earlier sale of females. This in turn lowers births since females have fewer years for reproduction, When range conditions improve, these mechanisms work in reverse, allowing for more rapid herd reconstitution than might otherwise be the case.2 A fifth strategy is to control population growth. Data from several African countries with important herding populations-including Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Somalia, and the Sudan-indicate that such populations have low rates of natural increase compared to neighboring agricultural peoples; that these low rates of increase are a combination of low birth and death rates; that herders have low rates of completed fertility, high rates of female sterility, and high ratios of men to women. The most probable explanation for this difference is that the labor requirements of herding are less intense than those of agriculture per unit of output. Production of milk depends primarily on the size and structure of the herd as well as the amount and availability of forage, and cannot be increased from year to year simply by increasing labor inputs-as can agricultural production. Since labor requirements are low and food supply unpredictable, a small, slowly growing population can be expected to have an advantage over a large or rapidly growing one (pp. 468-9),4g (p. 207).21 A further strategy designed to deal with uncertainty is economic diversification, which was widespread historically and still plays an important role today. When herd numbers are low, active members of a herding family may temporarily leave and seek work elsewhere in the economy. In the case of Somalia (a predominantly pastoral society like that of Mauritania) herding families maintain urban connections through marketing their livestock and occasionally engaging in wage labor, including migration to the Gulf States (pp. 1567).lg The herder’s final strategy-and the most drastic-is identical to that of the farmer: to sell his productive assets. In the early 1970s during the last Sahelian drought, livestock prices collapsed as markets were flooded. In the Mossi region of Burkina Faso, since millet yields were disastrously low in both 1972 and 1973, grain prices increased seven-fold. Although farmers reduced consumption, they still had to purchase grain. As the situation became desperate, herders were forced to sell their livestock. Since the market was flooded with skinny animals, the terms of trade plummeted accordingly: an ox which would trade for 1500 kg of millet in normal times would now fetch a mere 250 kg.36 The ways in which these various strategies are utilized is demonstrated by the differing responses to drought by farmers and herders in southern Kenya during the 1970s.’ In the particular area in question three groups were involved: pastoral Maasai, sedentary Maasai who both farmed and

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kept livestock, and non-Maasai farmers-recent migrants to the areawho kept no livestock. Although this drought was not so severe as that which affected the Sahel, the area in question had undergone certain important changes which had reduced the extension of common rangelands available for grazing. First, the area under cultivation by both Maasai and settlers had increased. Second, a process of land adjudication was underway, establishing group ranches for some of the Maasai. In theory, they should have been opposed to such artificial delimitation of their pastoral boundaries. In practice, however, the Maasai were quite pragmatic-realizing that such an arrangement at least guaranteed them permanent access to, and control over, some land against the encroachments of outsiders.14 Third, the central government had designated certain customary pasture areas as national parks and reserves. As a result of these changes, the extension of dry season water and grazing resources available to herders was reduced. With the rainfall deficiencies of the early 1970s the population as a whole became more vulnerable, indicating that the fragility of the lands in question is often as much a function of political, economic and social conditions as it is of environmental ones. In the case of the herders, those families that started the drought with larger herds had proportionately fewer losses than those with smaller ones. Hence, larger herds afforded greater opportunities for recovery. In the case of those Maasai farmers who practised a mixed economy, this combination of livestock and crop production was more successful in overcoming drought-related shortages than either activity practised alone since it allowed them more flexibility in responding to changing conditions. The non-Maasai farmers suffered the most: partly because they were relatively new to the area and had not developed strategies for dealing with drought and partly because they were heavily dependent on the production of corn, which cannot tolerate much variation in rainfall. The differing responses of the three groups are summarized in Table 3. For Maasai herders in the area, it is not surprising that increasing herd size is the most frequently cited precaution against future drought. But this perspective is not totally shared by the younger Maasai, particularly those under 30 years of age: ‘The younger respondents tend to believe that reduced livestock numbers, increased cash savings, and cultivation will reduce the negative effects of drought. Should these views be maintained and become more widely accepted, a reduced emphasis on herding relative to cultivation may lead to the emergence of a mixed pastoral economy in Maasailand’ (p. 55).9

David D. Cow

Responses to Drought

TABLE 3 by Kenyan Herders

and Farmers

Herders

Maasai farmers

Non-Maasai ,farmers

Movement of herds and people

Yes

Yes

NA

Reciprocal arrangements for sharing livestock

Yes

Yes

NA

Sale of livestock

Yes

No

NA

Assistance sources Prayer

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Off-farm

from other

activities

Source: Compiled

from Campbell.’

Donor strategies No precise figures are available to document the degree of suffering caused by the Sahelian famine of 1968 to 1974. Observers estimate that upwards of 250 000 people died and that perhaps 25 per cent of the livestock in the six Sahelian countries was wiped out. What is clear, however, is that herders fared much worse than farmers further south and that old people and children were particularly vulnerable. Various explanations have been put forward for what some observers termed ‘the tragedy of the commons’. The more important will be discussed briefly here since they set the scene for the ensuing development efforts that followed. Franke and Chasin list the following factors that may have contributed: Climatic

factors

and the encroaching

desert;

The irrationality of herders and their mismanagement of resources; Increasing population on a limited resource base; The national elites and their indifference to the plight of herders; The international donor area; and The legacy of colonialism

community

and their benign neglect of the

and continuing

dependency

(pp. 11 l-32).r3

The first three explanations fall under the rubric of what Chambers has called the physical ecology or ‘technical fix’ school of thought: those who believe that many of the more complex developmental problems in the

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Third World and elsewhere do, in fact, have a technical solution. According to this school, famine results from natural disasters, civil disorders, adverse weather, refugees, bureaucratic problems in food distribution, man’s overloading of semi-arid environments, and failure to produce more food (pp. 28-46)” The emphasis is on the physical dimensions of natural and man-made disasters and no mention is made of power, property, social relations, or income distribution. (For the important distinction between famine and drought, see Lofchie.35) From this perspective, uncontrolled population growth together with uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources combine in a vicious circle: the more people there are, the more they destroy the long-term potential of fragile lands and the poorer this makes both them and their descendants. The latter three explanations fall into what Chambers has termed the political economy or ‘structural fix’ point of view. Its practitioners believe that environmental degradation and rural poverty result from historical processes which concentrate wealth and power. As a result, these processes are to be understood primarily in terms of economic forces, social relations, and property rights. (For an eloquent, but forceful elaboration of this perspective, see Lappe and Collins (pp. 79-1 17).31 As might be expected in such a complex situation, elements of both perspectives have some explanatory power. In the case of the Sahel, historical, political, climatic and demographic factors have all played a role. Nevertheless, the causal roots of the famine of the seventies and its repetition in the eighties are to be found in the colonial history of the region and the ensuing development efforts. With colonial rule came the colonial ideology of man controlling nature in contrast to the pastoral ideology of man adapting to the vicissitudes of nature. As a result, certain changes were introduced over which herders had no control: ‘. . . for example, the colonial introduction of cash crop schemes, veterinary medicine, deep wells and international borders arbitrarily drawn, and the curbing of such events as cattle raids by one ethnic group against another. The introduction of these and other factors was not accompanied by attempts of the colonial powers to compensate for the social, economic, and environmental disruptions that such factors might have caused. Yet, the pastoralists themselves were (and for that matter still are) ultimately blamed for having degraded their arid ecosystems’ (p. 84).i5 It was against this background that the international donor community became involved in providing assistance to various types of development programs in the extensive livestock sector-whether resource-based or people-based. The former proceeds on the premise that pastoral resources

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are national resources to be developed in relationship to alternative investment possibilities and in accordance with national perceptions of utility. The latter approach consists of solving people’s perceived problems and enabling them to achieve their own goals more rapidly and with fewer constraints than previously.3 The various development programs implemented during the seventies proceeded on the basis of certain key assumptions, particularly the herders’ alleged relationship to and exploitation of their natural resource base. Based on a review of the available project documentation, Horowitz concluded that the apparent logic underlying this assumption runs as follows: The environment

is being degraded

and turned

into desert;

Desertification is caused by overgrazing; Overgrazing results from the following: common access to pasture; an unwillingness to limit the number of livestock; and a lack of constraints on pastoral mobility (p. 40).2g But these causes of overgrazing, and few reasonable observers would deny that overgrazing has occurred, are proximate and not primal. The historical legacy has already been referred to, a legacy that has persisted in post-colonial Africa where there has been a consistent bias on the part of both statesmen and international donors against herders. In only two countries with significant pastoral populations, Mauritania and Somalia, have the elites been drawn from such groups. Traditionally, elites have regarded pastoral peoples with ambivalence and sometimes outright hostility.’ Overgrazing occurs when there is overpopulation-both animal and human-a response to climatic variation on one hand and encroaching cultivators on the other. In fact, Horowitz concludes that herders may prove to be less perpetrators of environmental degradation than victims of the joint actions of climate and government (p, 35).2g Those who subscribe to this interpretation believe that herders’ behavior is rational and that, if development efforts are to have any lasting positive effect, much more must be learned from the herders themselves about how they manage their resources. Those who see the herders as the direct perpetrators of environmental degradation have proposed a variety of development initiatives-ranging from environmental alteration to changes in the land tenure system-none of which has met with much success. The former has included provision of water points, clearing of brush for tsetse control, control of grass burning practices, stock reduction, and block systems of grazing. The latter type of initiative has included various forms of sedentarization,

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lands

19

particularly the introduction of ranching on both an individual and a group level. Ranching, of course, virtually eliminates the pastoralists’ most effective defense in a fragile but resilient environment-their mobility-since the land tenure system is based on fee-simple title held by individuals or groups. Reviewing the ranching experience in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Uganda, Angola, Kenya, and Tanzania, Goldschmidt concluded that: ‘Ranching schemes constitute both the most extensive and the most creative efforts at altering pastoral economies, but each of the instances cited indicates their essential failure. Where individual ranches are created, they inevitably disenfranchise and pauperize the major sector of the population, and, as the Maasai instance indicates, dissociate the ranchers themselves from their own communities. The most ambitious scheme, that of the group ranches in Kenya, has succeeded only by Maasai creativity in circumventing the established regulations and even then has resulted in bloodshed’ (p. 114). l6 The reasons for introducing modern fenced ranching are three-fold: to increase the volume of marketable offtake, to improve the cash income of livestock owners, and to address ‘the tragedy of the commons’ by providing a built-in check against overgrazing. If nothing else, experience has shown that there are no ‘quick fixes’ in the extensive livestock sector. Ranching is no exception, since, for most African herders, the choice does not lie between open range and fenced ranching. Rather, it lies between openrange subsistence and open-range commercial production, 5

SUSTAINABLE Disillusion

DEVELOPMENT

OF FRAGILE

LANDS

and pessimism?

There is an increasing air of pessimism surrounding attempts to achieve sustainable development of fragile lands within the extensive livestock regions of Africa. Citing many of the reasons discussed earlier, a recent review of pastoral development in East Africa states that: ‘While the determination of success or failure is straightforward, efforts to develop semi-arid and arid pastoral areas have been disappointing when judged by the criteria of increased market production, economic rate of return and-of greater importance-improving the welfare of pastoralists while preserving environmental resources (p. 199)?

David

20

D.

Gow

Ongoing dialogue within AID tends to substantiate this-particularly the growing disillusionment with conventional range management technology which includes grazing blocks, stocking rates, group ranches,and individual or group land management institutions. Unaddressed,however, is the issue of whether this disappointing record to date has been due to poor project design, the complexity of the problems, or a combination of both. If one accepts the latter view, then the following five issuesmust be addressedin the design of a viable program to achieve sustainable development of fragile lands in extensive livestock regions: Policy dialogue and policy changes; Land tenure; Differing agendasof the various actors involved; The role and participation of the proposed beneficiaries; and The role of technology. Each of these will be discussedbelow. Policy dialogue

and policy changes

There is a growing consensusthat if such programs are to have any chance of success,then there has to be a commitment on the part of national governmentsto developing the extensivelivestock sector. Such commitment must be demonstrated through the enactment of relevant policies and development strategies,as well as the provision of the necessaryresources to implement them (pp. 95-6;i5 p. 215;21pp. 69-78;33pp. 255-6;44pp. 596055).This does not mean, however, that a donor agency has the right to force a national government to incorporate an extensivelivestock program into its development priorities. Nor does it imply that policy changesare the panacea for resolving many of the problems and constraints discussed above. They are, nevertheless,a necessarycondition for achieving sustainable development of fragile lands. For better or for worse, policy dialogue has become one of the developmental goals of official AID policy. Unfortunately, as both the literature and personal experience indicate, AID as an institution is poorly equipped to engagein intelligent discussion with host governments concerning policy changes.As a result, policy dialogue can degenerateinto the financial equivalent of the ‘big stick’ approach, that is, the ‘purse strings approach’ in which the major incentive for policy changeis moneydonor money. There are three major flaws to this approach: first, it shows little respect or understanding for host country perspectives on national

Sustainable

development

of,fragile

lands

21

policies; second, an offended government can seek assistance elsewhere; finally, and perhaps most importantly, AID often has little control over how its moneys are actually spent, policy dialogue and conditions precedent notwithstanding. This is particularly true of funds provided through the PL 480 program and the Economic Support Fund.46 What is required is a somewhat more sophisticated approach on the part of donor agencies, particularly AID. By this is meant a thorough grasp of the issues at hand, a genuine commitment to certain policy changes together with a well thought out justification for these changes, and a well-established professional rapport with host country counterparts. In addition, it should be recognized that policy dialogue can occur at many different levels: it is not just macroeconomic policy. In fact, it can be argued that policy is much too important to be left to the economists and politicians. Policy dialogue may focus on local, state, regional, national, or international levels and cover a wide range of topics related to extensive livestock production, fragile lands, and sustainable development. In essence, such policy dialogue should help decision makers set guidelines for action.54 The role of these various levels for policy analysis-and the linkages between them-is demonstrated in the case of the Land Conservation and Range Development Project in Lesotho where policy reform was an issue. While some national leaders agreed with the need for change, they also feared its possible political repercussions. What they needed was a success story to justify the policy change while at the same time needing a policy change to generate a success story. To deal with this double bind, three elements were incorporated into the intervention strategy: some elements that co-opted potential opposition; a highly visible project which could serve as a scapegoat, if necessary; and, finally, the use of informal mechanisms for policy analysis, thereby keeping the policy evolution process out of the limelight (p. 42).27 Land tenure Many would argue that the issue of land tenure and the control of stocking rates on communal rangelands are primordial in addressing extensive livestock production on fragile lands (p. 34).1s,32 Yet, as we have seen, governmental attempts to alter the existing system have been fraught with failure, primarily because it is not simply a technical process requiring changes in the way herders manage their animals and their land. Rather, it is an eminently political process involving changes in the distribution and control of vital productive resources (p. 279).5 Much of the rationale for such changes has been provided by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ model

22

David D. Gow

which has been applied cookbook-style to extensive livestock systems in the Third World. Yet profound questions concerning its relevance have been raised. For example, is it true that herders are such self-serving maximizers as this model predicts they are? The ‘economy of affection’ postulated by Hyden would argue against its universal application. Even if they are, do herders always have the necessaryresourcesavailable to increaseherd size in the manner predicted? The availability of additional labor may be a major constraint, though the evidence here is conflicting-given the capacity of herds (depending on their size and structure) to ‘bounce back’ when pasture conditions improve. Third, the fact that contemporary herding groups often do not have any control over stocking rates does not mean they are unaware of the problem. It may well mean that external forces work against such controls as, for example, in the caseof traditional authorities who are also salaried, government employees. In serving two masters the more unscrupulous can play the government off against their local constituency (pp. 15-19).4 Finally, the assumption is made that privatization of communal pastures will lead to better range management and reversal of the process of environmental degradation. Neither the historical nor the contemporary record substantiatesthis claim. What they do substantiate is that privatization of communal lands favors the larger farmers. In the caseof eighteenth century England the enclosuremovement meant that innumerable peasants lost their rights on the commons to the larger landlords (p. 23).38 In the US, accessto public grazing lands came under government control in 1934with the passingof the Taylor Grazing Act, the federal government’s version of enclosure. Since accesswas restricted to property owners, many long-standing rangeusers,primarily sheep-herdersand part-time cattlemen, were excluded from the public range (p. 1722).12Prior to 1934 these publicly owned rangelands were open to uncontrolled communal use by graziers. Their enclosure did not necessarilychange this. While it reduced the number of users, it did not necessarily reduce the stocking rate (p. 122).44The effects of such a policy on the condition of the range have remained controversial until the present time: with the environmentalists arguing that the range is steadily deteriorating and informed opinion arguing that, on the basis of available data, range conditions in general are improving (p. 1756);12(p. 248).7 On privately owned land the situation may be little different though somewhat more complex since, as discussed above, it is difficult to the point of being impossible to calculate the influence of different factors in determining stocking rates. Privatization also eliminates the herders’ principal defence against sudden changes in resource availability: their

Sustainable

development

of fragile

lands

23

mobility-which will remain de facto an essential component of most tenure systems, if not de jure (p. 248).32 Finally, the fact that the land is private does not necessarily mean that the owner will be highly motivated to invest in long-term improvements. For example, in the US, where private owners have installed land and grazing improvements on a substantial scale on their own ranches, it has often been by using public funds in the form of grants or loans on very favorable conditions (p. 127).44 Hence, privatization of communal lands is no panacea: in fact, it may be a veritable Pandora’s Box of potential problems-both environmental and social. But this does not mean that land tenure is not an issue-rather that changes in the land tenure system should be determined by local conditions. The indications are that some communal, perhaps exclusive, form of tenure may be the most acceptable route to take. Such changes can ultimately be effected only through policy dialogue: ‘Communal tenure is an essential aspect of this sector’s production environment. Policy development must accept communal tenure as a given, and undertake to develop rules and promote institutions capable of making livestock production on common range work in the interests of producer welfare and environmental conservation. Policy emphases to date have not given sufficient direct attention to the problems of communal tenure’ (p. 255).32 Dealing

with differing

agendas

At the very least it is important to get people to recognize clearly that differing agendas produce serious problems that can divert a project from its goals. This initial appreciation of the potential problems can be followed by explicit discussions of how to alleviate them (p. 205).39 Simply achieving this initial appreciation can be a major achievement-particularly the recognition that much development work has strong political implications at both macro and micro levels: ‘What is striking is that their political sensitivities are so trivial and superficial. They tend to see themselves as apolitical in spite of the political forces which affect their decisions. They evince a belief that their professional concepts are value free, based in science which serves no interest but the public good, and which is fettered, interfered with, and constrained by political strife which could be and ought to be avoided’ (p. 1717).12 These words were addressed to personnel attached to the Bureau of Land Management, the government agency responsible for managing America’s

24

David D. Gow

rangelands. They could just as easily be applied to many expatriates working in Third World development: donor community bureaucrats, technicians, contractors, and that much maligned group--consultants. In recent years, however, this situation has been improving-thanks to the fact that the political agendasof AID are much more out in the open and a legitimate topic for discussion and consideration. Another way in which to alleviate the problems caused by differing agendasis to have the key actors agreeto a common set of objectives.Verbal agreement is one thing, but practical realities are often another matter entirely. This has beenthe casewith the AID-financed Range Management Improvement Project in Morocco, which originally focused on range extension and training. A mid-term evaluation was conducted in early 1984 and the resulting Project Paper Amendment upgraded institution building as the principal objective of the project. When this recommendation was made, a five-year time frame in which to implement it was proposed. This was unacceptable to AID since the performance of the technical assistance team had been poor and AID could not, in good conscience, award them with an extension and an increase in funding. Hence, by the time the amendment was signed, the team had two years in which to act. Since you cannot build an institution in two years, the contractor’s response was to increase the size of the technical assistance team, which included senior technicians, junior technicians, and Peace Corps volunteers, in order to achieve some tangible results within the allotted time frame. A legitimate question was: who was assisting whomparticularly when there were 15 Americans on the team of varying skills, background, and experience?In this way the contractor’s agenda differed significantly from that of both AID and the host government (p. 3).17 But differences of this type could be at least partially resolved by more direct involvement in the process of implementation by the funding agencies.Unfortunately, as discussedabove, there are few strong incentives to do so, given the bureaucratic imperatives to push money on one hand and to preserve an aura of ‘business as usual’ on the other. What is required, then, is an acceptanceby the funding agenciesthat more active involvement in the politics of implementation is both necessary and feasible: to a much greater extent than in the industrialized nations, the process of implementing development policies is a focus of political participation and competition in the Third World (p. 15);30(pp. 59-66).24 The role of the proposed beneficiaries

While there is a general consensusthat the creation of local organizations, or the reinforcement of existing ones,can increaseparticipation by intended

Sustainable

development

beneficiaries, they can also play positive by acting as vehicles for: Adapting technical Marshaling

project activities interventions;

of fragile

lands

25

roles in development

to local conditions,

particularly

programs proposed

local resources;

Achieving greater political and economic leverage for local people by exercising influence over local administrators and asserting claims on government; and Sustaining

project

benefits (p. 53).28

In the case of sustainable development of communal rangelands in fragile environments, herder organizations have a crucial role to play in their management. There is a growing consensus that if Africa’s communal rangelands are to be sustained, then some degree of exclusiveness, in the form of an association between a defined group of people and a particular piece of land, must be introduced into the process. Closely allied with this idea of exclusion, which will confer special rights and responsibilities on some people, is that of quotas-the establishment of stocking rates for a given pasture for a specified period of time. In theory, the herders themselves are best situated to make these decisions. In implementing range management projects, this is what governments have often done-with the predictable results. Those consulted have often been the better-off herders, those who will benefit most from a reduction in the number of existing right-holders. The allocation of grazing quotas is also likely to be similarly skewed. For example, in the case of Morocco the government, with the co-operation of local herders, has established (on a very limited scale) enclosed grazing perimeters within communal rangelands. While the state agency responsible for their creation and management establishes the stocking rate each year, it is the local population that decides who gets to pasture their livestock within the perimeter and how many head they can pasture. The technicians could not care less about the equity issue. In one particular case in 1985, 200 people-approximately 10 per cent of those so entitled-had the right to pasture 10 000 sheep and herd sizes ranged from five to 200 (p. 29). ’ 7 Nevertheless, there is an important role here for the government, in close co-operation with herder organizations, not only in establishing the criteria for exclusion where necessary and the allocation of grazing permits, but also in ensuring that such activities are implemented in a manner that is acceptable to the majority of the people in question. Enforcement of agreed-upon regulations is perhaps best left in the hands of a representative local organization which sets its own rules and has its own inspector and

David

26

D.

Cow

penalties to enforce these rules (Sanford, pp. 167-8).44 As discussed above, traditional systems of enforcing such rules have often broken down. Hence, it should be the government’s responsibility to reactivate these systems where feasible. In other situations it may be necessary to create new institutions. The role of western technology The standard transfer OF western technology to address the problems of sustainable development of Africa’s fragile rangelands has been roundly criticized on several counts and the impression is sometimes given that, with the exception of a few incremental changes, such technology has virtually nothing to offer. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify what western technology thinks it has to offer. A recent review article has identified the following five types of technical intervention that have been used for the improvement of public rangelands in the US: Adjusting

animal numbers

through

the introduction

of stocking

rates;

Controlling animal use through the introduction of planned grazing systems such as rotation grazing, deferred grazing, and deferred rotation grazing; Controlling noxious plants; Controlling noxious animals; and Reseeding

and rehabilitation

(p. 1405).7

These interventions are not universally applicable even within the continental US. Each is site specific and must be adapted to each range in question. Thus, there is no standard technical package that can be extended willy-nilly. It must be adapted to local environmental conditions which may, in fact, share much in common with those prevailing on American rangelands. Where the differences occur is in the prevailing social and political conditions, differences which are fully recognized by the key players. While many acknowledge the need for a holistic approach in solving the problems of Africa’s common rangelands, one really wonders how often the social scientists, the range specialists, and the livestock specialists talk to each other rather than at or past each other. (A pleasant exception to this generalization is ‘veterinary anthropology’-a farming systems approach to extensive livestock production.)47 If there are no technical interventions to adapt and extend, then the donors have no business funding range improvement programs for extensive livestock production. Yet there are indications that, given the appropriate political and social conditions, certain interventions can be effective-

Sustainable

development

of .fragile lands

21

albeit on a small scale. For example, the following technical interventions have already proved their worth on communal rangelands in Morocco: The building Reseeding

of benchettes in appropriate

and contour

furrows;

areas;

The planting of shrubs; The introduction of water catchment systems; The introduction of water retention techniques; Deferment

and rotation THE

FRAGILE

of communal LANDS

and

grazing lands (p. 34).18 CHALLENGE

Such lands only pose a problem when destructive patterns of land use are combined with a natural resource base subject to deterioration. Both human and physical factors, particularly population growth and rainfall variability, can contribute to this process of deterioration. How permanent the environmental degradation resulting from these factors actually is has not yet been resolved. Traditionally, both herders and farmers developed a hierarchy of coping mechanisms for dealing with the physical factorsranging from mobility to sale of productive assets. Coping with the human factors has resulted in what some have termed a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation whereby the communal rangelands are sacrificed to selfish selfinterest at the expense of their long-term sustainability. The famine that hit the Sahel and Ethiopia in the early seventies and the drought that hit East Africa in the mid-seventies, North Africa in the early eighties, and which has been repeated more recently in various African countries, exacerbated certain dynamic processes already well under way. These droughts were no more responsible for the ensuing environmental degradation than was the cultivation of peanuts, maize, and millet. What these droughts demonstrated (and what they continue to demonstrate) is that the people living in such areas are like the lands themselves-fragile, marginal, and misunderstood. This generalization can equally well be applied to other indigenous populations living in radically different but equally fragile environments, for example the Amazon Basin. In both, external factors have severely jeopardized the long-term viability of the societies involved and the physical environments concerned. International development efforts in the extensive livestock sector have floundered for a variety of well-documented reasons: social, political, and technical. With little to show after more than a decade of effort, there is a strong temptation for those of a Malthusian bent to perhaps let events take their ‘natural course’ and thereby avoid addressing the key question.

28

David D. Gow

Have such efforts floundered because the original designs were flawed and the assumptions on which they were based simply wrong or have they floundered because the problems are too complex for ‘rational solution’? This paper favors the former perspective, while fully realizing the complexity of the issues involved. Sustainable development of fragile lands, like the creation of institutions to support such development, is by definition a long-term proposition. Fragile lands are often marginal lands which implies that, as a result of their very marginality, few sustainable types of development assistance have been offered. By washing our hands and walking away, however, we abandon an important segment of the world’s population to its own devices. The international donor community does have something to offer, though, as we have seen, it is most certainly not a ‘quick fix’ that will resolve the problems overnight. For example, range technicians know that control of stocking rates is the sine qua yloyl for sustainable development of common rangelands. Without a decrease in stocking rates in an environment where mobility is of the essence for survival, the effect of any developmental efforts will be temporary. To achieve this decrease requires the cooperation of the local population, the insights of the social scientist, and ultimately the support of the central government: their differing agendas must be consolidated and pointed towards a common objective. In spite of earlier flounderings, the donor community has learned several things from these development experiences-the most important of which is that addressing the problems of sustainable development of fragile lands requires a holistic approach which includes political constraints, social realities, technical possibilities, and environmental implications. These can only be realistically addressed by sharing the insights of the social sciences, the life sciences, and the production sciences-an undertaking which has not been too successful in the past but the inevitability of which those who accept the challenge of working in fragile environments are coming increasingly to accept.

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35. Lofchie, M. J. Political and economic origins of African hunger. Journal of Modern African Studies, 13(4) (1975) 551-67. 36. McCown, R. L., Haaland, R. and de Haan, C. ‘The interaction between cultivation and livestock production in semi-arid Africa. Ecological Studies, 34(1979), 297-331. 37. Morss, E. R., Crawford,

38. 39. 40. 41.

P. R. and Honadle, G. H. Toward self-reliant development: A guide for evaluating the sustainability of project benefits.Washington, DC, Development Alternatives Inc., 1982. Moore, B. Jr. Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord andpeasant in the making of the modern world. Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 1967. Morss, E. R. and Honadle, G. H. Differing agendas. In: Implementing rural development projects: Lessons from AID and World Bank experiences (Morss, E. R. and Gow, D. D. (Eds)). Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985, 196216. Murdoch, W. M. The poverty of nations: The political economy of hunger and population. Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. Orlove, B. S. Ecological anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 9

(1980), 235-73. 42. Rossiter, C. The bureaucratic struggle for control of U.S. foreign aid: diplomacy

vs. development in Southern Africa. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985. 43. Sanford, S. Pastoral strategies and desertification: Opportunism and conservatism in dry lands. In: DesertiJication and development: Drylands ecology in social perspective (Spooner, B. F. and Mann, A. F. (Eds)). New York, Academic Press, 1982, 61-80. 44. Sanford, S. Management ofpastoral development in the Third World.Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1983. 45. Schumacher, E. Drought turns nomads’ world upside down. New York Times, March 3, 1985. 46. Sewell, J. W and Contee, Christine E. U.S. foreign aid in the 1980s: Reordering priorities. In: U.S. foreign policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86 (Sewell, J. W., Feinberg, R. E. and Kallab, Valeriana (Eds)). Washington, DC, Overseas Development Council, 1985, 95-l 18. 47. Sollod, A., Wolfgang, Katherine and Knight, J. A. Veterinary anthropology: Interdisciplinary methods in pastoral systems research. In: Livestock development in subsaharan Africa: Constraints, prospects, policy (Simpson, J. R. and Evangelou, P. (Eds)). Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, 285-302. 48. Swift, J. Disaster and a Sahelian nomad economy. In: Drought in Africa (Dalby, D. and Harrison, R. J. (Eds)). London, U.K.: University of London, Centre for African Studies and School of Oriental and African Studies, 1973, 71-8. 49. Swift, J. Sahelian pastoralists: Underdevelopment, desertification, and famine. Annual Review of Anthropology, 6 (1977) 457-78. 50. Tendler, Judith. Inside foreign aid. Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 51. Waddell, E. Coping with frosts, governments and disaster experts: Some reflections based on a New Guinea experience and a perusal of the relevant literature. In: Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology (Hewitt, K. (Ed.)). Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1983, 3343. 52. Warren, A. and Maizels, J. K. Ecological change and deserttjication. UN Document A/Conf. 7417. New York, NY, United Nations, 1977.

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53. Watts, M. On the poverty of theory: Natural hazards research in context. In: Interpretations of calamity from the viewpoint of human ecology (Hewitt, K. (Ed.)). Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1983, 231-62. 54. Weaver, T. Anthropology as a policy science: Part I, A critique. Human Organization, 44(2) (1985), 97-105. 55. Wolgin, J. Development management amid economic crisis. In: Developmentmanagement in Africa. Report of a Workshop in Preparation for the Development Management Impact Evaluation Series on Agricultural Projects in Africa (Agency for International Development (Ed.)). Washington, DC: Development Alternatives Inc., 1985, 49-60.