Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture Prabhu, R. K. and Rao, U. R. (1967). The mind of Mahatma Gandhi. Ahmedabad: Navjivan Publication House. Pretty, J. N., Brett, C., Gee, D., et al. (2000). As assessment of the total external costs of UK agriculture. Agricultural Systems 65, 113–136. Raina, V. (2002). Decentralization of education. In Govinda, R. (ed.) India education report: A profile of basic education, pp 111–120. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Redclift, M. and Sage, C. (1994). Strategies for sustainable development: Local agendas for the Southern Hemisphere. New York: Wiley. Sachs, W. (1992). The development dictionary. London: Zed Books. Sachs, W. (2000). Development – The rise and decline of an ideal. Wuppertal Papers. Sachs, W. (2002). The Jo’burg memo. Fairness in a fragile world. Heinrich Boll Foundation, World Summit Papers. Sainath, P. (2005). Chor Bt aur Bt chor. http://indiatogether.com/2005/ sep/psa-seeds.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Sainath, P. (2004). Seeds of suicide I. http://indiatogether.com/2004/ jul/psa-seeds1.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Sainath, P. (2004). When farmers die. http://indiatogether.com/2004/ jun/psa-farmdie.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Sainath, P. (2004). Death of a carpenter. http://indiatogether.com/ 2004/jun/psa-deathcarp.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Sainath, P. (2005). The swelling ‘register of deaths’. http:// indiatogether.com/2006/jan/psa-register.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Sainath, P. (2006). A scenario of post-mortems 24x7. http:// indiatogether.com/2006/feb/psa-postmort.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Sainath, P. (2006). India shining meets great depression. http:// indiatogether.com/2006/apr/psa-depress.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008). Schumacher, E. F. (1973). Small is beautiful: A study of economics as if people mattered. London: Blond and Briggs. Shapiro, I. and Greenstein, R. (1999). The widening income Gulf. http:// www.cbpp.org/9-4-99tax-rep.htm (accessed on Feb. 2008).

2027

Shiva, V. (1991). Biodiversity: Social and ecological perspectives. London: Zed Books. Shiva, V. (1992). Resources. In Sachs, W. (ed.) The development dictionary London: Zed Books. Shiva, V. (1993). Monocultures of the mind: Perspectives on biodiversity and biotechnology. London: Zed Books. Stiglitz (2002). Globalization and its discontents. New York: W.W. Norton. United Nations Earth Summit (1992). General information. http:// www.un.org/esa/earthsummit (accessed on Feb. 2008).

Relevant Websites http://www.answers.com – Biodiversity, Answers.com. http://www.auburn.edu – Externality, A Glossary of Political Economy Terms by Dr. Paul M Johnson, Auburn University. http://www.csa.com – Genetically Modified Foods: Harmful or Helpful? CSA. http://www.pbs.org – Jawaharlal Nehru, People, Commanding Heights, PBS. http://www.deepecology.org/platform.htm http://www.vshiva.net – The Enclosure of the Commons: Biodiversity, Indigenous Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights; IPRs, Community Rights and Biodiversity: A New Partnership for National Sovereignty; WTO, the Threat of the Removal of Quantitative Restriction and India’s Strategy for Food Security. http://www.harpercollege.edu – Three Overlapping Components, Harper College.

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture Luc Reychler, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Published by Elsevier Inc.

A Careful Analysis of Good News Impediments to Accelerated Peace Learning Competing Interests and Conflict Profiteering Elements of Sustainable Peace Building

Glossary Integrative Climate The creation of an integrative climate is an important peace-building block. It’s the software of peace building. Characteristic of an integrative climate are expectations of an attractive future as a consequence of cooperation, the development of a ‘we-ness’ feeling or multiple loyalties, reconciliation, trust, social capital, and the dismantlement of sentimental walls. Key Judgments in Peace-Building Process During the peace-building process a series of decisions,

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture Conclusions Further Reading

choices, and judgments have to be made about: (1) who is involved – the peace-building regime, (2) the peace to be established/ the end state, (3) the situation before the intervention/ the base line, (4) the context, (5) the peace-building process, and (6) the evaluation criteria for monitoring progress. Narrow and Broad Definition of Violence The narrow definition focuses solely at physical violence committed by arms: it monitors such things as: killing, maiming, destroying, or fleeing away. The broad definition looks at the big picture of violence; it defines violence as the

2028 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

shortening of the quantitative and qualitative life expectancies of certain groups of people and looks at a wide spectrum of possible means of violence: physical, structural, psychological, environmental, cultural and epistemic, bad governance, and extralegal transnational activities. Peace Architecture Peace architecture is the science and art of envisioning, designing, and implementing peace-building processes. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment System (P-CIAS) The term peace and conflict impact assessment system refers to the process of identifying the consequences of a current or proposed intervention on conflict dynamics and the peace-building process. It is a proactive approach. It can play a useful role, at both the individual project and policy levels, in strengthening the coherence of violence prevention and peacebuilding efforts and in raising the conflict and peace awareness sensitivity of other interventions (humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, democratization, and reconciliation). Peace-Quack Peace-quacks or paxzalvers (in Dutch) are influential people who pretend to, but do not, have

A Careful Analysis of Good News Recent reports have observed significant progress in conflict prevention and peace building. In its 2005 yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) counted 19 major conflicts. The ‘Peace and conflict 2005’ report of Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr showed a marked decrease in major armed conflicts in the Post-Cold War era. Mack attributes these improvements to the end of colonialism (colonial wars made up 60–100% of all international conflicts, depending on the year), the end of the Cold War (one-third of all conflicts were proxy wars), and to the upsurge of international activities designed to stop ongoing wars and to prevent new ones. Exemplary are: a sixfold increase in UN preventive diplomatic missions (with the aim of preventing wars), a fourfold increase in UN peacemaking missions (to end ongoing conflicts), a fourfold increase in UN peace operations (to reduce the risk of wars restarting), and an 11-fold increase in the number of states subject to UN sanctions (aimed at pressuring parties into peace negotiations). In addition to the UN, several other actors joined the effort: the World Bank, regional organizations, donor states, and thousands of NGOs. Despite the good news, the authors of the report make clear that there are no grounds for complacency. ‘‘The positive trends are no ground for unqualified optimism about the future of world peace.’’ This cautious

the skills knowledge to prevent violence and build peace. Sentimental Walls The term ‘sentimental walls’ refers to attitudes, concepts, theories, belief systems, doctrines, mindsets, perceptions, and feelings which inhibit effective, efficient, and satisfactory peace-building processes. Sustainable Peace Sustainable peace can be defined as a situation (1) where armed violence has stopped, (2) the other types of violence (structural, psychological, and cultural) are close to absent, (3) conflicts are handled in a constructive way, and (4) the peace achieved has a high level of internal and external legitimacy. The European Union is a good example. Sustainable peace results from the presence of a series of conditions which can be clustered into ‘five þ one’ groups : an effective system of communication, consultation, and negotiation, peace-enhancing political, economic, and security structures, and integrative climate, peace-support systems, a supportive international environment, and a critical mass of peace-building leadership. This could be called the ‘sustainabl peace-building pentagon’.

attitude is shared for several reasons. First, we must be careful because of inadequate violence data. The statistics are unreliable and incomplete. A great deal of physical violence never reaches the statistics. This is especially true for second and third-class victims. In addition, these reports use a narrow definition of violence, defined in terms of people killed or maimed by weapons. A more complete picture of violence (see Figure 1) defines violence as shortening the life expectancies of certain groups of people, not only with arms, but also by other means of violence, such as structural, psychological, cultural, epistemic, and ecological violence, bad governance (bad governance kills), and extralegal transnational activities that involve the trade of drugs, weapons, people, and other precious resources. To prevent violence and build peace more efficiently, we need to learn to listen actively to violence. There is too much denial.

Impediments to Accelerated Peace Learning Another reason for caution is the impediments to accelerated learning. The monitoring and evaluation of conflict prevention and peace-building efforts have produced a plethora of lessons learned and best practices. However, the learning process and the ability to actively

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

Psychological violence

Cultural violence

Structural violence: political, economic, and cultural exclusion.

VIOLENCE

= less visible indirect – intentional

is about shortening life or significant lower the quantitative and qualitative life expectancies of particular group(s)

-Maladministration -Corruption -Indifference and neglect -Greed and self interest -Religious and ideological inspired misgovernance -unintended negative impacts of wellintentioned interventions.

Physical violence: terrorism, guerilla, conventional warfare, and barbarism

Epistemic violence

2029

Bad governance

Extralegal economic activities and Organized crime

Environmental violence

Figure 1 The big picture or the texture of violence at the national and international levels.

use the lessons is inhibited by political, conceptual, and managerial factors. The ‘political impediments’ are a lack of perceived interest, competing definitions of peace, the business of violence marketing, political correctness, and other wellresearched reasons why societies choose to fail or survive. First, there is the problem of commitment to conflict prevention and peace building. The propensity to intervene is related to the perception of interests. When vital interests are at stake, donors will tend to make greater efforts than when the interests are perceived as marginal. Second, when there is no consensus on peace, it difficult to achieve it. Third, the marketing of violence has become big business. The aim of violence marketing is packaging one’s own violence as good and the other’s as evil. The war against terrorism, the regime change in Iraq, and the ‘planned’ war against Iran are facilitated by strategic communication the aim of which is to exaggerate the external threats and sell our own use of violence as just, defensive, and the only possible option. Fourth, there are the pressures of political correctness. Today, academic freedom is not only curtailed by limited and politically biased research funding, but also by political correctness. An example is the denial of civil war in Iraq. ‘‘If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.’’ The antiterrorism doctrine is also illustrative. This doctrine differs significantly from what peace research teaches us about

terrorism; how to stop and prevent it. The antiterrorism doctrine is characterized by the use of a narrow definition of violence, special attention to first-class victims, the expectation of exclusive loyalty to the dominant perspective, political marketing of violence, the lack of financial accounting and accountability regarding the costs and benefits of the antiterrorism war, the personalization of the conflict, lack of contextual sensitivity, the depiction of particular interests as national or international, and the preference for hard and military approaches. Finally, there are the other well-researched reasons why societies fail to make effective decisions to prevent conflict and build peace. Irving Janis, for example, draws attention to ‘groupthink’ or the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses dissent and any appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. Bush’s foreign policy in the Middle East could be attributed to ‘hardhearted actions by softheaded groups’. Robert Jervis focuses on the processes of perception, for example, of cognitive consistence – the assimilation of information to preexisting beliefs and how decision-makers learn from history. Among the common misperceptions he lists, for example, ‘centralization’ (seeing the behavior of others as more centralized, planned, and coordinated than it is) or overestimating one’s importance as an influence or target. Keith Murnighan and John Mowen shed light on tough calls or high-stake decisions that must be made when

2030 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

information is ambiguous, values conflict, and experts disagree. All peace-building processes are tough calls. The authors identify, in each of seven decision-making phases, factors which could lead to blunders or missed opportunities. For example, in the sixth phase, ‘Consider the time frame’, the authors focus on decision-myopia or the tendency to overweigh short-term outcomes and underestimate long-term outcomes of high-stakes decisions. In Collapse, Diamond identifies impediments on each of the stops of the roadmap to success or failure: the failure to anticipate a problem before it arrives; the perception of misperception of a problem that has arrived; the failure to attempt to solve the problem once it has been perceived; and the failure to solve the problem after it has been anticipated, perceived, and efforts have been undertaken to solve the problem. The ‘conceptual impediments’ are the limited understanding of peace-building architecture and the poor exchange of knowledge between the major parties involved: the decision-makers, the practitioners, the research community, and the citizens or recipients. First, there is the limited understanding of peace-building architecture. Peace building is about complex change; it involves concurrent activities by many people in different sectors, at several levels and layers, and in different time frames. It is a multi-level, multisector, multi-layer, and multi-time activity. One of the mindsets that inhibit one’s ability to see the big picture is the one-dimensional or one-disciplinary approach of sustainable development and peace building. This narrow mindset is reinforced by the faculty structure of the academic education system. Each faculty has scholars who want to contribute to a more peaceful world. But, for economists, development tends to be seen as the most important factor in the peace-building process; for lawyers, it is the rule of law; political scientists point out the importance of stable political institutions and democracy; for psychologists and educators, peace is all about building peace in the minds and hearts of people; theologians stress the importance of mercy, forgiveness, and reconciliation; medical doctors stress that a healthy mind resides in a healthy body; and artists believe in the esthetics of peace building. Another mindset that inhibits peace research is the assumption of the ‘realists’ that violence always has been and always will be a part and parcel of the world. We can try to control it, but in the end we will have to learn to live with it. This is an unacceptable assumption. Violence is an outrage, an outrage that we have simply gotten used to because we set the bar so shamefully low. Finally, there is the belief that more efforts for development and peace building will add-up to sustainable peace (the additive peace model). Without synergy, peace efforts (peace negotiations, democratization, development, security building, reconciliation, etc.) could end up in piles of peacebuilding blocks, instead of complete peace building. At the organizational–bureaucratic level there is the negative impact of intensive competition among decision-making

units and routine organizational procedures. Policy planning tends to be the result of bargaining among the components of a bureaucracy; it is not guided by a consistent plan, but rather by conflicting conceptions of national, bureaucratic, and personal goals. This finding is also true for the relations between NGOs. The competition for funding has increased and many NGOs have become competitive nongovernmental companies (NGCs). The problem of routine operational procedures is that they resist changes, except when a major disaster occurs. A second conceptual impediment is the weak exchange of knowledge between the decision-makers, practitioners, researchers, and people in general. The lack of an effective dialog and the weak connections between the decision-makers and the practitioners in the field (the operari) and the researchers (the speculari) results in serious knowledge waste. To improve peace-building architecture, the development of dialog and connections between these four sources of knowledge and know-how should be encouraged and rewarded. It is natural that theory and action are complementary, that they constitute harmonic aspects of one whole. In reality, however, there exists a ‘theory–practice gap’. This gap is caused by the incentive systems of politicians, of the practitioners in the field, and of the researchers (academics). Today’s academic incentive system is characterized by a publish or perish mentality, recognition for originality, the tendency for research methods to triumph over substance, the preference for fundamental over applied research, papers filled with jargon, and by the reinforcement of all this by academic faddishness. The incentive system of the policymakers is to find timely solutions for concrete problems. Officials have less time to read and reflect. Joseph Nye, one of the few people who have acted as both a scholar and a policymaker, was surprised at the ‘oral’ culture of top-level government service. One of the tasks of peace research is to facilitate dialog and connections between decision-makers, practitioners, and the research community. Peace researchers have a bridging role; they should not only provide policy-relevant knowledge (peace research can provide instrumental knowledge, e.g., How to prevent groupthink in a crisis situation?; contextual knowledge, e.g., specifying the necessary conditions for sustainable peace building, and consequential knowledge – anticipating the costs and consequences of policy options, but also effectively dialog with practitioners, especially in instances where they have common interests. The most productive exchanges might take place between researchers who have spent some time in government and in the field and practitioners who have had some academic training in violence prevention and peace-building research. All of the above does not imply that the Ivory Tower should be dismantled. It exists for good reasons: it provides academic freedom without which scientific research is impossible and it also allows intellectuals to reflect on the world from some distance and not simply do the work of policy commentators or journalists at a slower pace. A third obstacle to sustainable peace

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

building is the difficulty many researchers face in overcoming positional thinking. (The term ‘positional thinking’ refers to the impact on the worldview of the position from which one views the world. There are actors-observer, generational, cultural, gender, and social and power positions]. A good example is a set of two recent studies on suicide terrorists. Pape makes an excellent analysis of the strategic, social, and individual logic of suicide terrorism. Pedahzur gives an in-depth analysis of the motivation, recruitment, and socialization of suicide terrorists. However, when formulating responses to this challenge, both authors do not seem able to transcend their ‘positional thinking’. They identify with the victims of terrorism and not with the victims of occupation and antiterrorism. It is a pity that many analysts are unable to transcend their ethno and natio-centrisms. Despite Pedahzur’s claim to offer an integrative approach for responding to suicide terrorism, most of his attention goes to the short and long-term offensive responses (identification and elimination of terrorists and their organizations) and to short-term defensive measures (border and barrier controls, crisis management, and reconstruction). His long-term defensive responses are vague and do not address root causes. He recommends honest and fruitful negotiations with moderate leaders, some humanitarian aid to the population, and the creation of trust. The managerial impediments to accelerated learning relate to problems of supervision, planning and coordination, professionalism, and leadership. First, there are the well-known problems of supervision, planning, and coordination. We address this problem further under the heading ‘peace building regimes’. Second, there is the problem of professionalism and leadership in the field of conflict prevention and peace building. One of the most important factors of successful peace building is the peace-builder. He or she transforms conflicts by means of research, advocacy, education, decision making, and fieldwork. What kind of talents, qualities, and skills are needed? What does professionalism mean in the field of peace building? These questions evoke positive and negative responses. Positive reactions come from people (1) who are concerned with the identification of peacebuilding leadership and empowerment as a necessary condition for a sustainable peace process, (2) who are responsible for the selection of well-qualified people and for the sidetracking of amateurs and peace-quacks (peace-quacks or paxzalvers (in Dutch) are people who pretend, but do not have the skills knowledge to prevent violence and build peace). The latter are people who claim expertise they do not have, promise spectacular but unfounded results, stress the high-minded nature of their work, and request a lot a money for their cures, (3) who insist that each profession needs clear and widely supported criteria, and (4) from educators who develop peace education and training programs. The reservations are based on other concerns. First, peace building is

2031

considered a science and an art that cannot solely be taught, but it also requires talent, commitment, creativity, imagination, and courage. J. P. Lederach, for example, stresses the importance of serendipity or finding something useful while searching for something else. The underlying assumption is that MA or PhD programs in peace studies can deliver better peace builders, but also that academic certificates are not enough to perform proficiently. The second type of reservation comes from traditional professions: diplomats, lawyers, economists, and military personnel who consider their own training, practical experience, and contributions the core of peace building. Third, there are practitioners who trust their intuitions and their school of hard knocks more than theories and research. Finally, reservations come also from politicians who see peace as the result of power relations. They stress the importance of political empowerment and assume that most of these skills can be learned on the job. The last base of reservations toward the idea of professionalism is the meaning attached to ‘professionalism’ and ‘professional’. Webster’s dictionary associates the term professionalism with (1) a calling/vocation, (2) requiring specialized knowledge – and often long and intensive academic preparation and practical experience, (3) conforming to technical and moral standards, (4) exhibiting a courteous, conscientious, and generally businesslike manner in the workplace, and (5) engaged in by persons as a permanent career and receiving financial return. The latter does not exclude professional volunteers, for example, the doctors without boundaries. In this article, we are not addressing the skills needed for humanitarian aid, economic development, designing appropriate power-sharing systems, peacekeeping, or setting up a health system. Instead we are considering the qualities of people (teams) who do peace-building work or are engaged in activities to resolve or transform conflicts, such as tracks I, II, and field diplomacy, facilitating/ supervising the peace-building process (planning, implementation, and evaluation) at the macro, meso, and micro levels, peace-action research, peace education and journalism, reconciliation, etc. Some of these qualities are also useful for people (organizations) who are specialized in specific peace-building blocks. When working in war and conflict zones, they have to negotiate, mediate, reconcile competing interests, and show a great deal of leadership to make the peace-building process more successful.

Competing Interests and Conflict Profiteering If violent conflicts would be costly for all involved, they would have disappeared a long time ago. The current violence persists because some persons, groups, or countries profit from them. Today, one can get good statistics

2032 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

about almost everything, except about the profits of violent conflict. You do not find them in official publications and it is also very risky to gather data about the ‘shadows of war’. More research is needed to name the actors who pursue their self-interest in conflicts and contribute directly or indirectly to the escalation and the prolongation of conflicts. Four types of profits can be distinguished. First, there are political profits as war takes attention away from internal conflicts; it rallies people around the flag, the manipulation of fear helps to justify extremism and political repression, etc. Second, there are economic profits. War is good for promotion, for the testing and selling of weapons, it provides funds for reconstruction, and it facilitates shadow economies and politics in war zones and generates trillions of dollars. Third, there are moral profits. Framing a military intervention as a war on terrorism or regime change puts the warriors on moral high ground and makes them believe that they can circumvent international and humanitarian law; it raises moral permissiveness. Fourth, and finally, there are psychological profits. War can be a source of psychological pleasure and healing. It goes hand in hand with feelings of superiority, the joy of the fittest, hubris, messianic certitude, excitement, and affords people a chance to rise above their small stations in life. In the words of Chris Hedges it creates a bizarre universe that has a grotesque and dark beauty. A systematic analysis of the benefits of war should be a part of all conflict reporting. This demands more than academic armchair research; this requires fieldwork, courage, digging in all areas of power, and especially in those areas usually deemed ‘off limits’. We need to establish who are the Basil Zaharoffs (he was an arms dealer, fueling wars in the name of democracy at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century) – the merchants of war – who benefit from the conflict in the Middle East.

Elements of Sustainable Peace Building One of the greatest aspirations of mankind is to get rid of war and to build sustainable peace. Sustainable peace can be defined as a situation (1) where the armed violence has stopped, (2) the other types of violence (structural, psychological, and cultural) are close to absent, (3) conflicts are handled in a constructive way, and (4) the peace achieved has a high level of internal and external legitimacy. The European Union is a good example. Sustainable peace results from the presence of a series of conditions which can be clustered into ‘five þ one’ groups. This could be called the ‘sustainable peacebuilding pentagon’ (see Figure 2). The first building block focuses on the establishment of ‘an effective communication, consultation, and negotiation system at different levels’ between the conflicting parties or members. In

Effective system of communication, consultation, and negotiation Support systems: legal, educational, health, and humanitarian

Supportive international environment

Critical mass Of peacebuilding leadership

Peace-building structures: political, economic, and security

Integrative climate

Figure 2 Sustainable peace building pentagon.

contrast to the negotiation styles used in most international organizations, the negotiation style, for example, in the European Union is predominantly integrative. Ample time and creativity is invested in generating mutually beneficial agreements. Without win–win agreements the Union would disintegrate. The second building block consists of ‘peace-building structures’. In order to achieve a sustainable peace, (conflict) countries have to install political, economic, and security structures and institutions which sustain peace. The political reform process aims at the establishment of political structures with a high level of legitimacy. The legitimacy status is influenced by two factors (1) the effectiveness of a regime to deliver vital basic needs, such as security, health services, jobs, etc., and (2) the democratic nature of the decision-making process. Initially, an authoritarian regime with high-quality leaders and technocrats can obtain a high legitimacy score, but in the end consolidated democracies are the best supports of sustainable peace building. It is crucial to note that the transition from one state (e.g., nondemocratic structures) to another (e.g., consolidated democratic environment) is not without difficulties: the devil is in the transition. The economic reform process envisions the establishment of an economic environment which generates sustainable development, the elimination of gross vertical and horizontal inequalities, and develops positive expectations about the future. The security structure safeguards and/or increases the population’s objective and subjective security by effectively dealing with both internal and external threats. This implies (1) a cooperative security system producing a high level of human security, collective defense and security, and proactive conflict prevention efforts and (2) an effective and trusted police force. The third necessary building block for establishing a sustainable peace process is an ‘integrative climate’. This is the software of peace building. This building block stresses the importance of a favorable social–psychological environment. Although the climate is less tangible and observable than the other building blocks, it can be assessed

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

by looking at the consequences. An integrative or disintegrative climate can express itself in the form of attitudes, behavior, and institutions. Characteristic of an integrative climate are expectations of an attractive future as a consequence of cooperation, the development of a ‘we-ness’ feeling or multiple loyalties, reconciliation, trust, social capital, and the dismantlement of sentimental walls. The fourth building block is ‘a supportive regional and international environment’. The stability of a peace process is often dependent on the behavior and interests of neighboring countries or regional powers. These actors can have a positive influence on the peace process by providing political legitimacy or support, by assisting with the demobilization and demilitarization process, or by facilitating and stimulating regional trade and economic integration. However, these same actors can also inhibit the progress toward stability, for example, by supporting certain groups that do not subscribe to the peace process. Likewise, the larger international community plays a crucial role in most post-conflict countries. The international community by means of the UN agencies or other INGOs can provide crucial resources and funding or even take direct responsibility for a wide variety of tasks, such as the (physical) rebuilding process, political transformation, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, third-party security guarantor, etc. The fifth building block consists of ‘systems supporting the development and installation of the other peacebuilding blocks’: (1) an effective and legitimate legal system, (2) an empowering educational system, (3) peace-enhancing media, (4) a well-functioning health system, (5) an environment-friendly system, and (6) humanitarian aid in the immediate post-conflict phase. The installation of all the above-described buildings blocks requires the presence of ‘a critical mass of peacebuilding leadership’. There are leaders in different domains (politics, diplomacy, defense, economics, education, media, religion, health, etc.) and at different levels: the elite, middle, and grass roots level. High on the agenda of architectural research is study of the characteristics of successful peace-building leaders, such as Nelson Mandela, F. W. De Klerk, Mohandas Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, Vaclav Havel, Jean Monnet, Helmut Kohl, George Marshal, Martin Luther King, Jr., Jacques Delors, and many others. This research involves differentiating successful and unsuccessful peace builders and identifying the similarities and differences between successful and unsuccessful peace builders, and between peace builders and peace destroyers. Peace-building leadership distinguishes itself by the way it leads the conflict-transformation process. It envisions a shared, clear, and mutually attractive, peaceful future for all who want to cooperate; they do everything to identify and get a full understanding of the challenge with which they are confronted; they frame the conflict in a reflexive

2033

way; their change behavior is adaptive, integrative, and flexible; they are well acquainted with nonviolent methods; they use a mix of intentional and consequential ethics and objectives; and are courageous men or women with a high level of integrity. All of the peace-building blocks are necessary and mutually reinforcing. The lagging of one can seriously undermine the stability or effectiveness of the entire peace-building process.

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture Peace building is about complex change; it involves concurrent activities by many people in different sectors, at several levels, and in different time frames. It is a multilevel, multi sector, multi-layer, and multi-time activity. Peace building is a tough call. It involves high-stake decisions that must be made when information is ambiguous, values conflict, and experts disagree. During the peace-building process a series of decisions, choices, and judgments (see Figures 3 and 4) have to be made about: (1) who is involved – the peace-building regime, (2) the peace to be established (the end state), (3) the situation before the intervention (the base line), (4) the context, (5) the peace-building process, and (6) the evaluation criteria for monitoring progress. The End State What kind of peace does one want to achieve? Ideally, the definition of peace should be clear and compelling. In addition, the peace-builders should have a valid theory about the necessary conditions (building blocks) to build the peace desired. In many peace-building interventions, the end state is left vague and undefined. This is also the case in a great deal of research work. There are different types of peace: some are genuine and sustainable (e.g., the EU), others fuel crisis and war (e.g., Versailles and peace policies in the Middle East). One of the tasks of peace research is the development of a taxonomy of peaces. This is important, because different are peaces results of different conditions. Some peaces are imposed, exclusive, revengeful, repressive, pacifying, settling conflicts, containing armed violence, and fragile. Other peaces are democratically arrived at, inclusive, restorative, resolve or transform conflicts, get rid of violence in the broad sense of the word, and are sustainable. Most authors perceive peace building as the result of multi-level and multi-sector efforts. Some focus in their research on one of the peace-building blocks. S. Chesterman studies state building, but only as one part of many other activities needed for peace building. R. Paris focuses on two peace enhancing conditions: marketization and democratization. Most authors specify,

2034 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

MONITORING AND EVALUATION (f) selective–comprehensive, before/during/after, institutional learning, sentimental walls.

BASELINE (b) -analysis and anticipation of conflict/violence -assessment of peace-building deficiencies and potential

PEACE BUILDING REGIME (e) -internal–external (uni–multilateral) -coordination modalities -types of activities -decision making -leadership style -legitimacy -local ownership

PLANNING & PROCESS (d)

-Planning -scope (sectors, levels, layers)

END STATE (a) -operational definition of peace -theoretical assumptions

-time frame -pace -priority setting -synchronicity and sequencing -coherence/negative cross-impacts/synergies CONTEXT (c) Difficulty of conflict, risks, power relations, magnitude of change, diversity of stakeholders, available resources (time, will, human and material resources, preservation of existing practices, and assets). Figure 3 Key judgements in the peace-building process.

more or less, what conditions they consider necessary for peace building. E. Cousins et al., specify five objectives of peace building: a self-enforcing cease-fire (meaning that the armed conflict, just settled, will not recur), a selfenforcing peace (meaning that new armed conflicts will not occur), democracy, justice, and equity. R. Caplan divides the chief functions of the transition administrations into the establishment and maintenance of internal order and security, repatriation and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, performance of basic civil administrative functions, development of local institutions and the building of civil society, economic reconstruction, and development. M. Pugh defines peace building as a sustainable process having as its main purpose the prevention of threats, to human security, which cause protracted violent conflict. Human security implies the need for intervening in the domains of political security and governance, community security and societal stability, personal security and human rights, and, lastly, economic security. T. D. Mason et al., define peace as a combination of negative peace and positive peace. The latter involves a transformation of conflict by means of democratization efforts, establishment of truth commissions, establishment of security, and long-term economic and social development. Ho-Won Jeong focuses on four peace-building pillars: security and demilitarization, political transition, development, and reconciliation and social rehabilitation. One of the aims of peace-building research is to specify the kind of conditions that are necessary for building the specified kind of peace. Without clear operational definitions of peace, it is

difficult to develop a valid theory for identifying the preconditions and making a comprehensive assessment of the peace-building deficiencies and potential. The Base Line Any study or planning of peace building demands an analysis of the base line. This implies an analysis of the conflict and the violence, a prognosis of possible future developments, and an assessment of the peace-building deficiencies and potential. To assess the peace-building deficiencies, one compares the current conflict situation with the preferred peaceful situation and identifies areas that need to be remedied. This allows for choosing priority areas of intervention and selecting relevant concrete measures. Sometimes, especially when conflicts are lingering on, one tends to the peace potential and is gone and consequentially forget to look for it. Assessing the peace building potential implies looking for ‘capability’ – how capable or competent are the peace builders at managing the peace-building process? is the necessary expertise (internal and/or external) available? and is there enough expertise at the policy, management, and individual levels? – ‘capacity’ – how much cash or human resources is available for peace building? – and ‘readiness’ – are the external actors willing and motivated for peace building? how much support (domestic and international) is there for change? and are the internal actors ready for change? For the assessment of peace-building deficiencies and potential, many assessment tools and checklists are available.

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

Judgments and decisions

Evaluation criteria End state

Definition of peace

Do the interveners use a ‘clear and compelling’ definition of peace?

Underlying theoretical and epistemological assumptions about building peace

Has the underlying theory of peace been made ‘explicit’? How ‘valid’ is the theory?

Baseline Analysis of conflict + mapping the violence

Is the analysis ‘accurate’? Is the analysis of violence broad enough?

Anticipation of future developments

Is the anticipation of future developments ‘timely and reliable’?

Peace-building deficiency assessment

Is the peace-building deficiency and potential assessment ‘comprehensive’?

Assessment of peace-building potential?

Relevance of the peace-building measures/ interventions/efforts?

Are the peace-building potential and opportunities recognized?

Do the planned intervention(s) ‘satisfy’ one of the peacebuilding needs?

Context Conflict •

•

difficulty

Conflict risk

Is the assessment of the difficulty of the conflict ‘reliable’? Is the difficulty over- or underestimated? Has one made a ‘proactive’ assessment of the impact of the conflict environment on the planned or implemented intervention?

Power (a) symmetry

Has one studied the power relations and assessed its impact on the process?

Magnitude of change

Are the interveners aware of the magnitude of change and the necessary paradigm/mind-shift?

Diversity of stakeholders

Are the interveners aware of the diversity of the actors (interest, values, experiences, culture, etc) and of its impact on the peace-building process?

Available resources:

Has a proper assessment been made of the needed and available resources?

Figure 4 (Continued)

2035

2036 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

•

time

•

human and material

Is there enough time to intervene effectively? Is there a crisis? Are threats and opportunities assessed in time? Are there enough human and material resources for building the peace? Are the assets which should not be destroyed identified?

•

Assets to preserve

Planning & process Planning

Is there planning? Is there a plan or roadmap?

Scope of peace-building process

Have the policy objectives been well defined? Do the interventions respond the deficiencies? Which sectors, levels and layers do they tackle? Do they respond to some or all the deficiencies? Is it a partial or comprehensive peace-building policy?

The time frame of the peace-building process

Have appropriate judgments been made on the entry and exit, perceived phases in the process, the framing of the peace-building froma linear, circular, or procedural perspective?

The pace of the peace-building process

Is the pace of change appropriate? Changes can be implemented, either in an all at once, big-bang fashion, or in a more incremental, step-by-step, stage-by-stage fashion.

Priority setting

In the different phases of the conflict transformation, which tasks get priority (allocation of human and material resources and time)?

Synchronicity and sequencing

Are all the tasks implemented at the same time or is there a clear sequencing of the efforts? Are all the efforts made simultaneously and given a varied amount of attention (time and human and material resources) in different phases?

Negative and positive cross-impacts or synergies

How much attention is paid to the positive and negative cross-impacts of efforts in different sectors and at different levels? Have the impacts been assessed proactively?

Peace-building regime Who is involved in the peace-building process?

Who are the major players? (external–internal). Is it an externally or internally driven process?

Are the external activities coordinated?

Is the external action unilateral – multilateral? Are networks created? One or more? How are they coordinated? By means of formal organizations and/or informal networks? Map the networks. Are nongovernmental actors involved? Which network(s) has the lead? Is there competition within or between the networks?

Figure 4 (Continued)

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

What activities do the international networks or organizations undertake?

2037

Are there networks involved at different levels and in different sectors? Are there specialized networks? Is there one comprehensive network supervising all the work? Types of cooperative actions: exchange of information, coordination, consultation, planning, implementation, and evaluation? What level of cooperation and common policy is achieved with respect to the end state, baseline, context, process, peace-building regime, and evaluation? Proactive or reactive?

How are decisions made?

Democratic, inclusive, bottom–up versus undemocratic, exclusive, top–down? Elicitive prescriptive? Coercive peaceful? Gender balance? Command, symbolic, rational, transactive, and generative. Leadership

What type of leadership guides the peace-building process? Do the leading actors use peace-building leadership?

Impact of regime in coherence–synergy?

Effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction of coordination?

Legitimacy of the intervention?

What is the legitimacy status of the process? How accountable are the decision-makers for the consequences of their actions? Is the subsidiarity principle respected? Is the process transparent

Local ownership? Involvement of the civil society in How and to what extent are the needs of the civil society the conflict transformation and peace-building process? reflected in conflict transformation and peace-building process? What about empowerment and ownership?

Monitoring and evaluation Timing

Before/during/after? Have efforts been done to proactively assess possible negative cross impacts or opportunities to synergize the efforts?

Comprehensive or selective evaluation

Is there a macro-evaluation which monitors the overall peace-building process? Is the evaluation selective?

Institutional and personal learning

How well organized is the evaluation process? Is there a positive learning climate? Is the lessons-learned process effectively organized? Have individual and collective sentimental walls been identified and dismantled82?

Figure 4 Criteria for evaluating peace building.

The Context All the above-mentioned choices are constrained or enhanced by the features of the peace-building context. Successful peace building depends on the development of a context-sensitive approach. The lack of universal

formulae and the complexity of conflict necessitate a great deal of context sensitivity. This involves a deep appreciation of the impact of the context on the peacebuilding process and vice versa. Contextual judgment is more important than knowledge of the ten best

2038 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

peace-building practices in other situations. The contextual features are: the difficulty of the conflict, the readiness for change, scope, time, preservation, diversity, and power. Conflict

The difficulty of the conflict. Some conflicts are more difficult to transform than others. Difficult ones have been given a variety of names, such as deep-rooted conflicts and protracted, or intractable conflicts. Recently, more systematic comparative research has been undertaken to distinguish easy from difficult conflicts. According to S. J. Stedman, several factors are commonly associated with a difficult environment: spoilers (leaders or factions hostile to a peace agreement and willing to use violence to undermine it), neighboring states that are hostile to the agreement, a large number of soldiers, valuable natural resources, and secession-oriented conflict. J. Dobbins looks at prior democratic experience, the level of economic development, and national homogeneity. Among the controllable factors, the most important determinant seems to be the level of effort needed – measured in time, manpower, and money. R. Caplan correlates difficulty with the clarity and appeal of operational objectives. S. Chesterman links clarity of purpose with success. M. Doyle sees hostile or incoherent factions as obstacles for peace-building operations. L. Reychler and A. Langer use a checklist consisting of seven clusters of variables to assess the degree of difficulty: the parties involved in the issues, the conflict styles and the internal opportunity structure, the legacy of the conflict, the internal readiness for peace, and the external involvement and support of the peace process. The conflict risks. An important part of the planning and implementation of violence prevention and peacebuilding efforts is anticipating possible negative impacts of the conflict environment. This implies assessing (1) the impact of security risks, (2) the impact of political pressures ( corruption, intolerance, and instability), (3) the perception (internal legitimacy) of the intervention by the local civil society and the people, and (4) the relations with competing GOs, NGOs, IGOs, INGOs, and private business. Power symmetries and asymmetries. Who are the major stakeholders? How much power do they have? Who are the stakeholders whose support must be canvassed? This implies a good understanding of the power relations, especially of the power asymmetries, between the major stakeholders in the conflict and peace-building process. Magnitude of change. Radical change, reconstruction, or realignment. Does the peace one wants involve a radical transformation or a reconstruction or realignment of the situation. Transformation is a change which cannot be handled within the existing paradigms; it entails a change in the assumptions made and the ‘way of doing things as

usual’. It is a radical change in the end goal. Realignment, on the other hand, involves a change that does not involve a substantial reappraisal of the central assumptions and beliefs within the conflict zone. It may involve major changes structurally, such as a reduction of corruption or more privatization, but it does not radically change the previous system. It is more about reconstruction than building something totally different (like the European Union after 1945). The selection of the end state determines the magnitude of the change. Does the change affect the whole country as well as all sectors and levels, or does it only impact part of the country or a particular sector? Diversity of the stakeholders. Is the group of actors involved in the peace-building process diverse or relatively homogeneous in terms of its values, norms, and attitudes? Are there many cultures or subcultures within the country? Are there conflicting and common interests? Available resources: Time and human and material resources

How much time does the peace builder have to • Time: achieve peace? Is he/she operating in the middle of a

• •

crisis or is it perceived as a long-term peace-building process? Are the stakeholders expecting short-term results from the intervention? Human and material resources. Are there enough human and natural resources to achieve piece? Preservation of practices and assets: To what extent is it essential to maintain continuity in certain practices or preserve specific assets? Do these practices and/or assets constitute invaluable resources, or do they contribute toward a valued stability or identity within a country?

The Peace-Building Process The fourth part of peace-building architecture involves choices about the process or ‘how to build peace’. The following choices must be considered. The scope of the peace-building process: Which sectors (diplomatic, political, economic, security, social– psychological, etc.), levels (international, regional, national, regional, and local), and layers of the conflict (public behavior, perceptions, attitudes, and feelings) are handled in the peace-building process. Have the policy objectives been well defined? Do the interventions respond to the deficiencies? Do they respond to some or all of the deficiencies? Is it a partial or comprehensive peace-building policy? Are there adequate or inadequate resources? The time frame of the peace-building process: Entry and exit, perceived phases in the process, and the framing of the peace building from a linear, circular, or procedural perspective. People who take a linear perspective act as

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

though they have reified time: they plan to finish the peace building at a particular time. People with a circular time perspective tend to act when things have to be done; putting off as much as possible, but doing what has to be done. People with a procedural time perspective focus on completing the process no matter however long it takes. The element of entry–exit is dealt with by several authors. This issue has many facets, such as when to intervene, the expected exit, when and how to exit (instant vs. phased withdrawal), assessing the impacts of withdrawal, and the choice of follow-up arrangements. R. Caplan observes that ‘‘a good exit strategy depends on good entrance and intermediate strategies. An exit strategy cannot compensate, easily or at all, for major deficiencies in the design or implementation of a territorial administration, but by the same token, a poorly conceived exit strategy can jeopardize the achievements of the international administration and imperil the viability of the new state or territory.’’ S. Chesterman focuses on the timing of the elections. He criticizes the timing in the Dayton peace agreement which provided for elections to be held between 6 and 9 months after the conclusion of the peace, and he also critiques the perception that the troops would be home in a year. ‘‘After the elections, politics became the continuation of war by other means.’’ All the authors perceive peace building as a multi-stage process, each stage characterized by its own priorities. Often, peace building is simultaneously a synchronic and sequential operation with a mix of shortterm, mid-term, and long-term efforts. De Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Technische Zusammenarbeit makes a distinction between stabilization (1–3 years), reorganization (4–7 years), and consolidation (8–10 years). The Center for Strategic and International Studies works with three phases: ‘initial response’ (short-term), ‘transformation’ (mid-term), and ‘fostering sustainability’ (long-term); no exact timelines are given to each phase. The peacebuilding strategy of the US State Department uses the same peace-building phases. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) frames post-conflict reconstruction into three phases: emergency (90 days to 1 year), transition (1–3 years), and development (4–10 years). Lederach prefers a four-phased approach: the crisis and issues stage for a period of 2–6 months; then the people and relationships stage for 1–2 years; then the institutions or subsystem phase for 5–10 years; and finally the phase that needs work for generations – the vision of peace and the desired future that all hope for and move toward. Lederach opts for a nonlinear, procedural perspective; NEPAD uses a more linear perspective with clearly defined timetables. The pace of the peace-building process: Changes can be implemented, either in an all-at-once, big-bang fashion, or in a more incremental, step-by-step, stage-by-stage fashion. The interventions in Bosnia and the regime

2039

change war in Iraq were handled in a big-bang fashion, but each turned into ‘operation creep’. Most interventions tend to take time and are handled in incremental ways. Priority setting: In the different phases of the conflict transformation, which tasks get priority (allocation of human and material resources and time)? Although there is a consensus on the need for ‘complementarity’, several authors emphasize the shifting of one area of intervention to another in order to overcome identified post-conflict ‘deficits’. 1. Security approach: Without basic security, peace building goes nowhere. K. Maynard points out the need to address insecurity as key to successful postwar peace building. It is of vital importance that freedom of movement, the absence of personal or group threats, and safe access to resources is achieved for all in the postwar setting. A. Schnabel believes that military and police forces play a crucial role in the long-term success of political, economic, and cultural rebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies. Conflict prevention should therefore address the military/security deficit foremost so that internal security structures become an asset, not a liability, in the long-term peace-building process. 2. Development approach: Economic development is the key to success; it should be prioritized. Economic vulnerability should be tackled from the beginning. 3. Social–civil approach: Social welfare and civil society are of vital importance to regenerate societies and peace building. M. Pugh points to imbalance between short-term, hard, visible reconstruction measures and soft, long-term social–civil programs. The former are more easily audited. But the latter also tend to reflect hierarchical relationships that gear participation and accountability away from civil development based on host ownership of the peace-building process. 4. Political economy approach: P. Collier (but also D. Keen, M. Duffield and W. Reno) believes that the political economy of civil wars, which is considered to be a key source of ‘protractedness’ in many of today’s conflicts, remains unchallenged by current peacebuilding approaches. In the ‘greed over grievance’ debate, Collier sees the economic agendas of war as key sources of conflict. He recommends that good peace building must include disincentives for those benefiting from war in order to reduce their influence over the process. 5. Political approach: First, the political and institutional deficits must be remedied. Cousens and Kumar consider the ‘‘fragility or collapse of political processes and institutions’’ to be the main catalyst for war. They argue that post-conflict elections restore political institutions’ and processes’ loss of legitimacy, thus institutionalizing a conflict resolution mechanism into the body politic. Building political capacity must be the ultimate goal.

2040 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

6. Psychosocial approach: W. Lambourne argues that both justice and reconciliation are fundamentally significant goals that need to be addressed in the design of successful post-conflict peace-building processes and mechanisms, especially in the aftermath of genocide. R. L. Rothstein points out that ‘‘since there is obviously an important psychological or emotional component of protracted conflicts, there is [. . .] likely to be an equally important psychological or emotional component to their resolution.’’ M. Pugh believes that an emphasis on structural causes of conflict underplays the ‘‘. . .psychological and cultural determinants of violence,’’ and that ‘‘. . . reconciliation between social groups previously at war, requires more than money.’’ Synchronicity and sequencing: Are all the tasks implemented at the same time or is there a clear sequencing of the efforts? Are all the efforts made simultaneously and given a varied amount of attention (time and human and material resources) in different phases? This is one of the least systematically researched key components of the peacebuilding process. There are several approaches: (1) the free-for-all approach: the underlying assumption is that more peace-building interventions will add up to more peace; (2) the ideology-driven approach, based on a belief in the primacy of security, development, democracy, or other types of interventions in peace building; (3) the power-driven approach which claims that power makes or breaks peace; (4) the theory-driven approach, based on the research of successful and unsuccessful sequencing of different activities within and between different sectors. R. Paris claims that pushing war-shattered states into stable-market democracies too quickly can have damaging and destabilizing effects. A sensible approach would be to establish a system of domestic institutions capable of managing the disruptive effects of democratization and marketization in a first phase, and only then phase in political and economic reforms as conditions warrant. Mansfield and Snyder support Paris’ vision that fast democratization is susceptible to instability. In the short-term, economic measures can disturb political goals. Furthermore, economic gains in the medium and long-term can be created if in the short term macroeconomic policies are socially sensitive. Negative and positive cross-impacts or synergies: How much attention is paid to the positive and negative crossimpacts of efforts in different sectors and at different levels? Have the impacts been assessed proactively? What is being done to create synergies? This is becoming a major area of research. Peace building must be understood as a complex system, the dynamics of which do not obey hierarchical linearities. The assessment of crosssector and cross-level impact is not new. Everyone makes an implicit assessment of the impact of one’s efforts. These assessments are influenced by the analysts’

or decision-maker’s theories of war and peace. The assessment of peace and conflict impacts is not new. In December 1919, J. Keynes book, The economic consequences of peace appeared on the bookstalls. Keynes argued that the terms of the Versailles treaty would be disastrous both for Germany and its allies. At the end of the book he presented an alternative policy – something like a Marshall plan – providing Germany with resources that would enable it to pay a reasonable amount of restitution, but also to recover economically and socially. In the last 10 years, however, we have seen a serious effort to enhance the peace and conflict sensitivity of interventions in conflict zones. A good summary of the efforts can be found in T. Paffenholz and L. Reychler’s Aid for peace.

The Peace-Building Regime(s) Choices need also be made about the management of the peace-building process. The options are different regimes or sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which the expectations of the actors involved in the peace-building process converge. Peace-building regimes can be distinguished via different dimensions: 1. Who is involved in the peace-building process? Is the peace building an ‘externally and/or internally’ driven process? There is a broad consensus on the need to involve inside and outside actors in most peace settlements. F. Hampson assessed the impact of several factors based on the success or failure of peace-settlement negotiations and concluded that third-party intervention contributed greatly to successful post-settlement peace building. R. Caplan observes that a minimum of local ownership is needed in a transition regime. Without local ownership, it is difficult to develop political responsibility; the wrong lessons could be remembered by the local population and the legitimacy of the transition process falls. This is illustrated by the events in Bosnia–Herzegovina where the high representative (HR) could dismiss elected or appointed officials. The HR could remove anyone from office who, in his estimate, was obstructing the implementation of the Dayton accord. There was no need for evidence to support his action, no right to appeal. This has been called despotic or transnational authoritarianism. J. Large believes that the unique resources brought by local actors to the process make it imperative that meaningful participation takes place. 2. Are the external activities coordinated? Is the external action unilateral or multilateral? How is the action coordinated? By means of formal organizations and/or informal networks? One or more? Map the networks. Are nongovernmental actors involved? Which network(s) has the lead? Is there competition within or between the networks?

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

Some research deals with the pros and cons of multilateral and unilateral approaches. J. Dobbins observes that multiplicity tends to create a more complex and timeconsuming decision making than the unilateral approach. The activities could be highly atomized and the administration unwieldy. R. Caplan stresses that in a postcolonial age it has become politically unacceptable (and too expensive) to entrust responsibility for the administration of a territory to a single state, even if elaborate accountability mechanisms would be created. ‘‘Although the US drew in other states to share the responsibility of administering Iraq, precisely in an effort to confer legitimacy on the interim regime, the dominant role played by a major Western power is one reason why it encountered such fierce resistance.’’ M. Mullenbach saw some evidence that the risk of military hostilities is at least somewhat lower when the UN or a regional IGO coordinates a multidimensional peace-building mission. 3. What activities do the international networks or organizations undertake? Are there networks involved at different levels and in different sectors? Are there specialized networks? Is there one comprehensive network supervising all the work? Do they cooperate by exchanging information, consulting, joint planning, and/or coordinating the implementation? What level of cooperation and common policy is achieved with respect to the end state, baseline, context, process, peace-building regime, and evaluation? 4. How are decisions made? Proactive or reactive? Democratic, inclusive, bottom–up versus undemocratic, exclusive, top–down? Elicitive/prescriptive? Coercive/ peaceful? What strategy-formation process is used? How does one choose the courses of action to build peace and the objectives formulated in the previous phase? S. Hart identifies five modes of strategy formation processes. Hart’s framework is built around who is involved in the strategy formulation and in what manner. In the ‘command mode’, a strong leader controls the process. The strategy is a conscious, controlled process that is centralized at the top. The end state, the baseline, and alternatives are considered, and an appropriate course of action is decided upon and implemented. This strategy formation mode can vary from being directive to coercive (using power to impose change). The ‘symbolic mode’ involves the creation, by the actors who take the lead, of a clear and compelling vision and mission. The major task is to motivate and inspire and to provide the necessary focus to guide the creative actions of the actors involved. Education and communication are core activities. This mode requires a great deal of participation and commitment. The ‘rational mode’ is a theory-driven strategy formation. Strategy is developed through formal analysis (and information processing) and strategic planning. The ‘transactive mode’ is based on interaction and learning rather than on the execution of a predetermined plan.

2041

Strategy is crafted based upon an ongoing dialog with the key stakeholders. Cross-sector and cross-level communication among the actors involved is very important in this mode. The last mode of strategy formation is the ‘generative mode’. This mode depends on the autonomous initiatives of the actors involved in the peacebuilding process. The donor community selects and nurtures initiatives with high peace potential. These ‘ideal’ types are not exclusive. In many cases, one notices a combination of several of these modes. The choice is influenced by several factors: the power relations between the actors, the level of complexity of the peace-building plan, the heterogeneity of the conflict environment, the phase the conflict is in, etc. B. D. Jones addresses three types of coordination problems: (1) diffuse intervention efforts, (2) conflicting strategies, and (3) fragmented international responses. R. Caplan emphasizes that coordination is needed at different levels: the strategic level, the tactical level, and the field level. L. Minear identifies five factors which could inhibit effective and efficient coordination: a lead agency’s lack of power (sticks and carrots), a lack of visibility and an inability to mobilize resources, the high costs, the existence of ineffective structures (the multiplicity and autonomy of actors), and the lack of leadership. A. Donini distinguishes three types of strategy formulation and implementation: (1) coordination by command, (2) coordination by consensus, and (3) coordination by default. Some analysts, like L. Minear, argue in favor of the coordination by command approach; others, like M. Stephenson, prefer coordination by consensus. 5. What type of leadership guides the peace-building process? Do the leading actors use peace-building leadership? 6. Internal and external legitimacy of peace-building process? How and to what extent are the efforts morally supported by the people in the conflict region (internal legitimacy) and by the international community? 7. Local ownership? 8. Does the coordination lead to a more effective, efficient, and satisfactory peace-building process? How and to what extent does it reduce negative cross-impacts and generate synergies. Evaluation of the Peace-Building Process One of the aims of research is not only to assist the peacebuilding process, but also to learn to perform better in the future. It does this by developing better methodologies for anticipating the impacts of development and peace efforts on the conflict dynamics and peace-building process, and by monitoring and evaluating the peace-building process and results. It is very important to keep track of the big picture. It allows a better understanding of the complex dynamics of the peace-building process, and it is

2042 Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture

necessary to learn to prevent or reduce negative crossimpacts and generate the necessary synergies. This is only possible when enough resources are allocated to this kind of research and when a positive learning climate is created.This implies a great of reflective learning and the validation of the underlying normative, theoretical, and epistemological assumptions which shape the decisions making. It also involves a more systematic identification of the sentimental walls which stand in the way of conflict transformation and peace building. Sentimental walls are ways of thinking, beliefs, theories, perceptions, attitudes, and emotions which stand in the way of effective peace building. When challenged they tend to provoke resistance and emotional discomfort.

Conclusions The study of violence prevention and peace building is not without emotions and feelings. Some events are heartening, such as the creation and widening of the European Union, the relative peaceful implosion of the Soviet Union, or the reduction of the magnitude of violent conflicts. Other events are discouraging. The protracted conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the 40 episodes of genocide and politicide since 1955 are appalling. What have we learned from the Holocaust? Israel has become a gated country and what is leftover from Palestine, an open prison. Many people in today’s world live in despair. Hopelessness stands in the way of peace building. Hope and despair have the effect of selffulfilling prophecies. Despair leads to defeatism, cynicism, reconciling oneself to the facts, or to radical and desperate behavior. Raising hope is vital for peace building. The term hope, as used here, refers not to wishful thinking, false hope or the expectation of a better future. In contrast, it refers to an attitude that refuses to let the current situation or development have the last word, and that continues to search for solutions. It is hope that does not wait for probability assessments. It generates efforts to build peace more effectively. The peace-research community has a great responsibility to keep hope alive. In this article several areas have been highlighted that need more and better research. First, there is the architecture of sustainable peace building. This is the science, art, and practice of planning and building the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. A more systematic, cumulative, and comparative study of successes and failures is essential. The research community is scatterbrained; it does not function as a brain trust. We need to think about what professionalism means in the field of peace building. Secondly, we need to deconstruct the narrow discourse on violence. The marketing of violence has become a great business as is distorting the perception of violence in our contemporary world. Third, we want

better data on the costs and the benefits of violence, violence prevention, and peace building. Most data on violence (black statistics) cannot be found in official publications. This is brought to the fore in Carolyn Nordstrom’s Shadows of war. In the areas of poverty, lives and fortunes are forged and lost (illegal trade in arms, people, resources, drugs, etc.). A fourth area that urges study is ‘violence profiteering’ and the development of an effective accountability system. Finally, there is the question of ‘peace appeal’ or a lack of it. Something has to be done about the image of peace and peace building. Peace is a social construction that needs to be made more appealing; it could use the creativity of the best marketing strategists. ‘Waging peace’ is the greatest affair of the international community, the basis of life and death, and the way to survival or extinction. It must therefore be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.

See also: Human Rights; Peace Agreements; Peace Education, International Trends; Peace Organizations, Non-Governmental; Religion and Peace, Inner-Outer Dimensions of; Sustainable Development

Further Reading Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Boston, MA: Little Brown. Balogun, J. and Hailey, V. H. (1999). Exploring strategic change. Norfolk, VA: Prentice-Hall. Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2001). The globalisation of world politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bouwen, R., Haers, J., Lopez, E., and Reychler, L. (2006). Knowledge and peace building: The rhombus model, master conflict and peace building (MaCSP). Belgium: University Leuven. CSIS and AUSA (2002). Post-conflict reconstruction: Task framework. CSIS and AUSA. http://www.csis.org/images/stories/pcr/ framework.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed. New York: Viking. Dobbins, J., McGinn, J. G., Crane, K., et al. (2003). America’s role in nation-building: From Germany to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Dobbins, J., Jones, S. G., Crane, K., et al. (2005). UN’s role in nationbuilding: From the Congo to Iraq. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Donini, A. (1996). The policies of mercy: UN coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda. Institute for International Studies.http:// www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/OP22.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Hedges, C. (2003). War is a force that gives us meaning. New York: Anchor. Ingelstam, M. (2001). Motivation and qualifications. In Reychler, L. and Paffenholz, Y. (eds.) Peace building: A field guide, ch. 2.1, pp. 21–28. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Irving, J. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. Jones, B. D. (2001). The challenges of strategic coordination: Containing opposition and sutaining implementation of peace agreements in civil wars. IPA. http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/ Pdf_Report_Challenges.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Kehler, N. (2004). Coordinating humanitarian assistance: A comparative analysis of three cases. Virginia State University. http:// www.ipg.vt.edu/papers/Kehler%20-%20Aid%20Networks.pdf (accessed in March 2008).

Sustainable Peace-Building Architecture Lambourne, W. (2004). Post-conflict peacebuilding: Meeting human needs for justice and reconciliation. Peace Conflict and Development 4(4). http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/ PostConflictPeacebuilding.PDF (accessed in March 2008). Large, J. (1998). The war next door: A study of second-track intervention during the war in Ex-Yugoslavia. Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lederach, J. P. (2005). Moral imagination. New York: Oxford University Press. Legfold, J. and Nincic, M. (eds.) (2002). Beyond the ivory tower. Columbia: Columbia University Press. Llamazares, M. (2005). Post-war peacebuilding revisited: A critical exploration of generic approaches to post-war reconstruction. University of Bradford. http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/confres/ papers/pdfs/CCR14.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Mansfield, E. D. and Snyder, J. (2005). Democratization and the danger of war. International Security 20(1): 5–38. Marshall, M. and Gurr, T. D. (2005). Peace and conflict 2005. University of Maryland, MA: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Minear, L. (2002). The humanitarian enterprise: Dilemmas and discoveries. Bloomfield, NJ: Kumarian Press. Murnighan, J. K. and Mowen, J. C. (2002). The arts of high-stakes decision-making: Tough calls in a speed driven world. New York: Wiley. New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2005). African post-conflict reconstruction policy framework. New Partnership for Africa’s Development. http://www.nepad.org/2005/aprmforum/ PCRPolicyFramework_en.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Nichols, J. (2005). Tragedy and farce: How American media sells wars, spins elections and destroys democracy. New York: New Press. Nordstrom, C. (2004). Shadows of war: Violence, power, and international profiteering in the twenty-first century. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (2005). Post conflict reconstruction essentials tasks matrix. US State Department. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 53464.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Paffenholz, T. and Reychler, L. (2007). Aid for peace. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos-Verlag. Pape, R. (2005). Dying to win. New York: Random House. Paris, R. (2004). At war’s end: Building peace after civil conflict. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Peadhzur, A. (2005). Suicide terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Reychler, L. (1995). Hoop op duurzame vrede. In Patijn, B., Raymackers, B., Steel, C., et al. (eds.) Wegen van hoop ( Ways of hope), pp. 86–97. Leuven, Belgium: Universitaire Pers Leuven. Reychler, L. (1999). Democratic peace building: The devil is in the transition. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press.

2043

Reychler, L. (2000). The promotion of sustainable peace building. In Choue, Y. K. (ed.) Global governance in the 21st century, pp. 53–73. Seoul: Kyung Hee University. Reychler, L. (2003). Conflict impact assessment (CIAS). Cahiers of the Centre Peace Research and Strategic Studies (CPRS), vol. 67. University of Leuven. Reychler, L. (2006). Challenges of peace research. International Journal of Peace Studies 11, 1–16. Reychler, L. (2006). De waandacht voor zelfmoord terrorisme (Hyper attention for suicide terrorism). Karakter 14, 12–15. Reychler, L. (2005–06). Research findings of seminar international relations on ‘How to evaluate peace negotiations’. Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies. Leuven. Reychler, L. and Langer, A. (2002). The software of peace building, Cahiers of the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (CPRS), vol. 65. University of Leuven. Reychler, L. and Langer, A. (2003). The software of peace building. Canadian Journal of Peace Studies 35(2): 53–73. Reychler, L. and Langer, A. (2004). Researching peace building architecture. Paper Presented at the International Peace Research Association(IPRA). Sopron. Reychler, L. and Stellamans, A. (2002). Peace building leaders and spoilers. Paper Presented at IPRA Conference. Korea. Reychler, L. and Stellamans, A. (2005). Researching peace building leadership. Cahier of the Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (CPRS), 71. Shiva, V. (1990). Reductionist science as epistemological violence. In Nandy, A. (ed.) Science, hegemony and violence: A requiem for modernity, pp. 232–256. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. http:// www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu05se/uu05se0i.htm (accessed in March 2008). Stedman, S. J. (2001). International implementation of peace agreements in civil war: Findings from a study of sixteen cases. In Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., and Aall, P. (eds.) Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international, pp. 737–752. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Steinbruner, J. D. (1974). The cybernetic theory of decision: New dimensions of political analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Stephenson, M. (2004). Making humanitarian relief networks more effective: Exploring the relationships among coordination, trust and sense making. School of Public and International Affairs. http:// www.ipg.vt.edu/papers/MS_ARNOVA_Humanitarian_II_Final.pdf (accessed in March 2008). Stephenson, M. and Kehler, N. (2004). Rethinking humanitarian assistance coordination. School of Public and International Affairs. http://www.istr.org/conferences/toronto/workingpapers/ stephenson.max.pdf (accessed in March 2008) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2005). Yearbook 2005. Stockholm. Tzu, S. (1993). The art of warfare. New York: Ballantine. Verweire, K. and V an den Berghe, L. (2004). Integrated performance management. London: Sage Publications.