SWOT analysis for safer carriage of bulk liquid chemicals in tankers

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Journal of Hazardous Materials 154 (2008) 901–913

SWOT analysis for safer carriage of bulk liquid chemicals in tankers Ozcan Arslan a,∗ , Ismail Deha Er b a

Maritime Transportation and Management Engineering Department, ITU Maritime Faculty, 34940 Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey b Marine Engineering Department, ITU Maritime Faculty, 34940 Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey

Received 26 June 2007; received in revised form 31 October 2007; accepted 31 October 2007 Available online 21 February 2008

Abstract The application of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis to formulation of strategy concerned with the safe carriage of bulk liquid chemicals in maritime tankers was examined in this study. A qualitative investigation using SWOT analysis has been implemented successfully for ships that are designed to carry liquid chemicals in bulk. The originality of this study lies in the use of SWOT analysis as a management tool to formulate strategic action plans for ship management companies, ship masters and officers for the carriage of dangerous goods in bulk. With this transportation-based SWOT analysis, efforts were made to explore the ways and means of converting possible threats into opportunities, and changing weaknesses into strengths; and strategic plans of action were developed for safer tanker operation. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: SWOT analysis; AHP; Maritime; Chemical tankers; Safety

1. Introduction Many sections of the worldwide chemical industry depend on the transport of large quantities of liquid chemicals by maritime tankers. Chemical cargoes have different properties, and many of them represent health and safety hazards, which is a critical issue for the tanker industry [1]. Ocean shipping is the dominant transport mode in chemical logistics, as large volumes of liquid chemicals require transportation between continents. At present, 65–85% of international trade is via sea transport, and this is expected to increase with the growing world economy [2]. The present rate of construction of chemical tankers exceeds the rate of demolition and, thus, the world chemical fleet is growing, as illustrated by Fig. 1 [3]. Chemical tankers are complex vessels that are designed to carry different types of chemical cargo. Some cargoes need heating, some need refrigerating/freezing, some must be kept under inert conditions, some need to be carried in stainless steel tanks, and some are flammable, explosive or give off

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Corresponding author. Tel.: +90 5057134754; fax: +90 2163954500. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (O. Arslan), [email protected] (I.D. Er).

0304-3894/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2007.10.113

noxious vapor [4], and these properties require careful consideration during the planning process and loading. Checks need to be made regarding the chemical ship type, tank coating compatibility, compatibility with other cargo, and the environmental controls required during transport. In addition, the venting requirements, monitoring equipment, vapor detection, compatible fire protection medium, and density limitations of the product in relation to the holding tank construction, and pumping requirements are important considerations [3]. Every type of chemical liquid that is carried by chemical tankers needs specific carriage and loading/discharging conditions, and specific operational and safety-related precautions. This study used strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis to identify and develop safer carriage of liquid chemicals. Section 2 describes the hazards; Section 3 describes the SWOT analysis used in this study; and Section 4 is a discussion of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the carriage of liquid chemicals in bulk. Section 5 describes the strategies suggested for safer carriage of bulk chemicals in tankers and in Section 6, an incident investigation case study has done by utilizing analytic hierarchy process (AHP) with SWOT analysis method.

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3. Method

Fig. 1. Chemical tanker deliveries and demolition per year (>5000 DWT).

2. Hazards associated with the transport of bulk chemicals 2.1. Fire hazards Flashpoint, boiling point, flammability limit and autoignition temperature vary between different liquid chemicals, which therefore have different fire characteristics. For example, methanol, which is carried commonly by chemical tankers, has a flashpoint of 16 ◦ C, is extremely flammable when mixed with air, and may be explosive when such mixtures are in a confined space [5]. 2.2. Health hazards Many chemicals have an irritant or toxic effect on the skin or on the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs in the gas or vapor state. Acrylonitrile, which is carried in bulk by chemical tankers, is highly flammable and toxic, and it undergoes explosive polymerization. The burning material releases fumes of hydrogen cyanide and oxides of nitrogen, and acrylonitrile is classified as a possible human carcinogen. The carriage of acrylonitrile needs special precautions for personnel safety [6]. 2.3. Pollution hazards Water pollution hazards are defined in terms of human toxicity, water solubility, volatility, odor or taste, and relative density. The air pollution hazards of chemicals are defined by the emergency exposure limit (EEL); vapor pressure; solubility in water; relative density of liquid and vapor density. The reactivity hazard of a chemical is defined by reactivity with other products including water; and with the product itself (including polymerization). Marine pollution hazards are defined by bioaccumulation with attendant risk to aquatic life, tainting of seafood, damage to living resources and hazard to human health [7].

The SWOT analysis method was used in this study to analyze the current situation concerning the carriage of chemical liquids in maritime tankers, and to formulate strategy for reducing human error and, thus, maritime casualties. SWOT is an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. SWOT analysis, is a strategic planning tool used to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats involved in a project or in a business venture. It involves specifying the objective of the business venture or project and identifying the internal and external factors that are favorable and unfavorable to achieving that objective. The technique is credited to Albert Humphrey, who led a research project at Stanford University in the 1960s and 1970s using data from Fortune 500 companies. Every program, including the operational process, the management plan and development characteristics, has its strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Consideration of the processes involved in the carriage of chemicals in tankers can lead to improved safety. SWOT analysis is intended to maximize strengths and opportunities, minimize external threats, transform weaknesses into strengths, and to take advantage of opportunities along with minimizing both internal weaknesses and external threats [8]. SWOT analysis is designed to be used in the preliminary stages of decision-making on one hand, and as a precursor to strategic management planning on the other, and should be performed by individual users and by groups. Groupwise analysis is particularly effective in providing clarity, and identifying factors and major objectives and, therefore, focuses discussions about strategy formulation regarding any proposed organization aboard chemical tankers to improve safety [9]. In the SWOT analysis, available resources and their potential utilization are studied from the viewpoints of economic, ecological and social sustainability. However, its main purpose in the planning process is to obtain decision support that is to be utilized in the choice of strategy to be followed. In a decisiontheoretic study, a decision is considered as a choice between two or more alternative measures. Generally, rational decision makers choose the alternative that maximizes the utility, determined on the basis of information available on the decision alternatives. In decision support, information is produced on the decision situation, and on alternative choices of action and the consequences. A complete decision model constitutes the basis for the decision support. The alternatives available, information about the consequences associated with these alternatives and the preferences among these consequences are the three criteria to be considered in making the decision [10]. Each aspect of the information must be sound, so that the best alternative can be selected. SWOT can be used for the analysis of internal and external environments in order to attain a systematic approach and support for decisionmaking and, if used correctly, it can provide a good basis for successful strategy formulation. It was intended that the SWOT analysis would provide: a framework for analyzing a situation and developing suitable strategies and tactics; a basis for assessing core capabilities and competences; and the evidence for and the key to change and success; and a stimulus to participate in a group experience [11].

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The further utilization of SWOT is usually based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of internal and external factors, as well as on capabilities. A SWOT analysis needs to be flexible; situations change with time and an updated analysis should be made frequently. Further, SWOT analysis is neither cumbersome nor time-consuming and is effective largely because of its simplicity [12]. The present investigation was designed to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the carriage of chemical liquids by tankers, as well as the opportunities and threats in the external environment for chemical tankers and the crew in charge of loading/discharging operations and navigation. The intention of this study was to develop strategy action plans for safer cargo and navigational operations. 3.1. Brief evaluation of hazard analyses methods and SWOT approach There are several hazard analyzing methods available such as hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis, What/if checklists, failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA). The brief description and limitations of these methods are listed below. 3.1.1. What/if analyses What/if analysis is an efficient and easy method to discuss hazard analyses which can be applicable to process and nonprocess issues. It can be easily focused on specific events such as a fire, explosion, spill, etc. What/if analysis encourages an analysis team to think of questions that begin with ‘What If’. Through this questioning process, analysis team identifies possible accident situations, their consequences, and existing safeguards, then produce risk reducing alternatives. The What/if analysis method may simply generate a list of questions and answers about the processes. The What/if analysis has nine steps: defining the objective; selecting team to examine topics; formulating questions; developing answers and alternatives; documenting study and action items; presenting results; documenting disposition of action items and implementing accepted action items. The method is highly dependent on analysis team’s experiences [13,14]. 3.1.2. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis The HAZOP is a systematic hazard identification approach which is a team-based method and it allows the team members for brainstorming. The methodology is structured to ensure a thorough and consistent coverage of any system design. HAZOP examines the components of the system, and explores the deviations from design and if available, explores possible effects to the system. Structured guide words such as ‘none’, ‘more’, ‘less’ are used to explore deviations on system. Guide words such as none, more, and less are applied to the facility and process parameters. Consequently, the HAZOP team determines the possible deviations, causes, effects, consequences, controls, and any suggested actions to reduce risks which are recorded in a HAZOP table. HAZOP is a timeconsuming method and it needs well-trained team members that

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generally focuses on one-event causes of faults or deviations [14,16]. 3.1.3. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) FMEA method is a simple, efficient, cost effective and quantitative hazard analysis method which is used for identifying possible system failures and these failures’ effects on system. FMEA method is consisting of six steps: selecting a component of system; identifying its functions; identifying its possible failure modes; identifying unmitigated local effects of failure; identifying unmitigated system effects of failure and identifying protection methods from the failure’s effects. The method has limited capability to address multiple failures and also it is poor for human error investigation [14,15]. 3.1.4. Fault tree analysis (FTA) FTA is a hazard analyses method which is used to analyze top-level hazards with its sub, and lower order events. When structuring FTA, ‘and’ and ‘or’ logic gates are used for tree structure. The method has seven steps: defining the system; defining the top event/system failure, defining the boundaries; defining the tree-top structure; developing the path of failures for each branch to the logical initiating failure; performing quantitative analysis and using the results in decision-making and risk mitigation. FTA method needs skilled analysts; it provides easily understandable graphic models; it can be used for multiple failures and it allows analysts to quantify risk associated with failure [14,17]. 3.1.5. Event tree analysis (ETA) ETA is complement of FTA. Domino effect of events can easily be modeled by utilizing ETA. ETA starts with a hazard, but instead of working backwards as in the FTA, it works forward to describe all the possible subsequent events and so identify the event sequences that could lead to a variety of possible consequences. ETA needs experienced analysts and it is limited to one initiating event [14,18]. 3.1.6. SWOT approach The SWOT approach involves systematic thinking and comprehensive diagnosis of factors relating to a new product, technology, management, or planning [19]. It is used extensively in strategic planning, where all factors influencing the operational environment are diagnosed in great detail [20]. Specifically, SWOT allows analysts to categorize factors into internal (strengths, weaknesses) or external (opportunities, threats) as they relate to a decision, enabling comparison of opportunities and threats with strengths and weaknesses, respectively. One of the main limitations of this approach, however, is that the importance of each factor in decision-making cannot be measured quantitatively, and it is difficult to assess which factor has the greatest influence on the strategic decision [21]. When used in combination with an analytic hierarchy process (AHP), however, the SWOT approach can provide a quantitative measure of the importance of each factor in decision-making [22]. AHP enables decision makers to assign a relative priority

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Table 1 Hazard analysis methods evaluation table

Compatibility for multiple events/process analysis Compatibility for single event/error analysis Taking into account external factors (positive/negative) Taking into account internal factors (positive/negative) Compatibility for real-life application Needs brain storming/team work Needs expert contribution Availability of management–operation intersection Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis Considers previous data/events Considers expectation data/events Checklist compatibility for end-users Compatibility for on-the job training Suggests risk mitigation actions and produces strategies Includes human factor

SWOT

SWOT-AHP

HAZOP

What/if

FMEA

FTA

ETA

+ + + + + − + + − + + + + + + +

+ + + + + − + + + + + + + + + +

− + − + + + + + − + − + + + + −

+ + − + + + + + − + − + + + + −

− + − + + + + + + + − + + + + −

− + − + + − + + + + + − + + + +

− + − + + − + + + + − + + + + −

to each factor through pairwise comparison. The main difference between SWOT analysis and other hazard analysis methods seems that it can easily be used for both organizational issues and safety issues. The power of SWOT analyses reveals itself when constructing strategy for overall safety aspects rather than sole events, faults or incidents by compromising both internal and external factors of processes. Limitations and specifications of hazard analysis methods are illustrated in Table 1.

•

3.2. Methodology for SWOT analysis We used a SWOT analysis to examine the safety of the carriage of liquid chemicals by tankers. We identified the relevant factors in terms of the four SWOT groups: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. We used pairwise comparisons to increase the speed of decision-making in a situation with multi-variable parameters that have transient characteristics in shipboard operations [23]. Firstly, an activity work-sheet was used to categorize the activities involved in the carriage of bulk liquid chemicals in terms of SWOT groups. The activity worksheet concentrates mainly on the purpose of the SWOT analysis with its four quadrants of coordinates according to their categories as shown in Fig. 2. We used the activity work-sheet approach to develop strategic action plans for safer cargo and navigational operations on tankers. 4. Proposed application of SWOT analysis for the carriage of liquid chemicals in bulk by tankers 4.1. Probable strengths • Lectures and training provided by Maritime Training and Education (MET) Institutions about tanker and chemical tanker operations: Training in the operation of tankers in general and chemical tankers in particular is widely available. The training includes information about the properties of chemical cargoes, hazards of transporting chemicals, precautions that need to be taken, rules and regulations about

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chemical transportation, ship design and cargo containment, cargo-handling systems, safety, pollution prevention, ballast operations, tank cleaning operations, ship/shore interface and emergency operations [24]. High standards for chemical tankers: The carriage of chemicals and the requirements concerning ship arrangements, survival capability, cargo-handling systems, tank materials, tanks and venting systems, pumps and unloading systems, heating, stripping, inert conditions, and tank washing systems are determined by International Maritime Organization rules (IMO) in the SOLAS convention, the STCW convention and other international codes and resolutions [25]. Equipping chemical tankers with high-technology loading/discharging systems and automated systems: New technologies that are used in chemical tankers such as automatic control of loading/discharging systems reduce the number of officers and the workloads of ratings have been developed to lighten the port operation workload and reduce human error. Increasing team awareness and contribution: Team culture has become more important recently, and all officers and ratings in charge of chemical operations share their knowledge. Increasing safety culture on board: Safety on board has become a critical issue in the last few decades. In light of a safety culture philosophy, changes of shipboard operations depend directly on the actions of the ship management company and resources that are supplied to the vessel. Continuous internal/external inspections: Chemical tankers are subject to inspection by port and flag state controls, and by the major oil companies, and this level of accountability helps to maintain high levels of safety.

4.2. Probable weaknesses • Fire hazards, health hazards, pollution hazards, reactivity hazards, toxicity hazards, corrosive hazards, and explosive hazards: These factors are general specifications for chemical liquids. The carriage of liquid chemicals in bulk by tankers

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Fig. 2. Activity work-sheet for SWOT analysis.

requires additional precautions and skills when compared with other types of ship. The explosion of two cargo ships carrying ammonium nitrate and sulfur in Texas City, Texas in 1947 destroyed the port, killed nearly 600 people and injured another 3500 [26]. Due to improved safety practices and vessel construction, a marine accident as destructive as this did not occur in the ensuing 60 years. However, serious incidents involving chemical shipments have forced the evacuation of threatened coastal populations. These major incidents include a fire in 1985 aboard the Ariadne, which was carrying 100 containers of toxic chemicals, in the port of Mogadishu, Somalia [27]; a ship accident in 1987 aboard the Cason, which was carrying 1200 tons of flammable, toxic, and corrosive chemicals, near Cape Finisterre, Spain [28]; and a fire in 1999 aboard the Multitank Ascania, which was carrying a cargo of vinyl acetate, off the coast of Scotland, UK [29]. There was a major accident on 31 January 2006 when the chemical tanker M/T Ece flying the Marshall Island flag collided in the English Channel with the general cargo ship M/V General Grot Rowecki flying the Maltese flag, and the M/T Ece sunk with her 10,000 DWT cargo of phosphoric acid (see Fig. 3). These incidents did not result in serious casualties among neighboring communities, but there was a high level of concern for public safety, as indicated by the associated evacuations. • Commercial pressures imposed by ship management companies: There have been commercial pressures on ship masters, such as cleaning cargo tanks faster, arriving at the next port faster, as well as pressure to use the shortest rather than the safest sea passages. • Fatigue: The workloads of employees on chemical tankers are greater than those on other types of ship. Attention failure,

memory failure and human error are related directly to fatigue. Fatigue has two main aspects: physical and psychological. Physical fatigue is related to working hours, rest times and the quality of rest times on board, and psychological fatigue is related to welfare aspects [30]. • New technology needs new skills and education: Every new technology that has been introduced to increase the safety of port operations has required the acquisition of new skills via appropriate training. • New procedures bring more paperwork: New procedures that have been introduced to increase ship safety, such as ISM and

Fig. 3. Sinking of the M/T Ece in the English Channel (source: http:// www.bbc.co.uk).

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Fig. 4. Tank configuration.

ISPS procedures represent an extra workload for navigation officers [31]. • Low quality of crew resources: According to a recent manpower survey, crew resources are changing from traditional maritime countries to Eastern Europe and the Far East Countries [32]. • Low-level satisfaction of crew with their occupation and their comfort on board: Crew members who display care and loyalty are less likely to produce claims. Ship owners and operators can achieve a high level of continuity and competence by providing crew with secure employment and taking factors such as recruitment, health, training and general awareness of shipboard best practice into account, and by monitoring satisfaction in terms of monitoring expectation of crew members [33].

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• 4.3. Probable opportunities for carriage of chemical liquids by tankers • Improvements in maritime education, especially simulatorbased tanker training: Standardized and efficient education programs are developed by maritime education and training institutions such as the IMO Model Course 1.04. Userfriendly tanker simulators have been used in maritime education and training institutions in the last decade. • High-quality measurement devices and safety equipment: Measurement devices and safety equipment on tankers are better and more user-friendly than before. The correct use of safety equipment reduces onboard incidents. The installation of remote-controlled, fully automated loading/discharging

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equipment and measuring systems on chemical tankers has reduced the workload of officers and ratings in the deck and cargo areas. Shortening of crew’s contracts: The shortening of crew’s contracts, especially in the tanker fleet, has increased the rest time/leave period, thus addressing the fatigue clause of the STCW Code [34]. Ergonomic design of new ships: Ergonomic issues have become very important in ship-building. Ergonomic bridge design produces a safe look-out and reduces the workload of masters and navigation officers. Ergonomic design of the deck, pump-room, loading/discharging equipment and other work-spaces reduces accidents. Ergonomic design of accommodation increases crew’s satisfaction by providing acceptable living conditions [35]. Internal and external inspections: The compliance with rules and procedures are inspected frequently by port officers and flag state officers. These inspections and internal audits have produced an improvement in the safety aspect of navigation. As a further desirable result of these inspections, the frequency of detention for failure to adhere to the relevant rules and regulations is lower for tankers than for other types of ship [3]. Improvements in technology: New technology for improving navigation, ship construction and loading/discharging systems reduce the crew’s workload by providing tools for efficient sea and terminal operations. Revision of MARPOL Annex II: MARPOL (international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships) Annex II, which contains regulations for the control of pollution by

Table 2 Re-classification of chemicals in MARPOL Annex II Type of change

Re-classified from to

Products

Re-categorization of veg oils, soft oils and fats Other products with no previous requirement to IMO ship type

D to IMO type 2 (or IMO type 3 with DH meeting operational requirements) IBC ch18 to IMO type IMO 3

Change of ship type requirements

IMO type 2 to 3

Palm oil, soybean oil, sunflower seed, other veg oils, tallow, fatty acids, paraffin wax Methanol, MTBE, UAN, MEG/TEG/DEG, ethyl acetate, methyl, ethyl ketone Xylenes, acrylonitrile

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noxious liquid substances in bulk and unified interpretations, came into force on 1st January 2007. In Annex II, pollution categories of chemical liquids and tank types for the carriage of potentially pollutant chemicals are re-classified, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Discharging and stripping requirements are defined in the new MARPOL Annex II [36]. As illustrated in Table 2, several kinds of chemical goods have been re-classified. Consequently, the new criteria for the carriage of several chemicals should reduce the incidence of pollution caused by chemical tankers [3].

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• 4.4. Probable threats for carriage of chemical liquids by tankers • Terror threats and ISPS application: Terrorist attacks on ships have increased in the last decade, and the potential threat is greater for chemical tankers than for other types of ship, because the consequence of an attack would be more catastrophic. Terror threats for ships and related ISPS application tasks restrict the crew’s social life during stays in port. Marine shipments of hazardous chemicals are potentially attractive terrorist targets when the chemicals are acutely toxic or highly combustible, and shipped in large volumes. This represents a serious threat to human life and physical infrastructure if released intentionally near populated areas [37]. Terrorists have targeted marine vessels directly, mainly with the intention to destroy the vessel, the cargo, or both. In June 2002, Moroccan authorities foiled an Al-Qaeda plot to attack North American and British warships, and possibly commercial vessels, in the Straits of Gibraltar [38]. In October 2002, the oil tanker Limburg was attacked off the Yemeni coast by a bomb-laden fishing boat [39]. The governments of several countries have reportedly expressed concern about terrorist groups commandeering a vessel carrying a hazardous chemical and “crashing it into a port.” [40]. • Worldwide officer shortage: According to updated surveys conducted by various seafarers’ unions, there is a worldwide shortage of officers. Seafarers need to be employed in the shore side of maritime industry [32]. A shortage of qualified crew reduces the quality of the maritime workforce. • Intensive ship traffic: There are around 48,500 ships in service at sea, and the number is increasing by 1%/annum. Increasing both the number of ships and the number of newly built faster ships increases the risk of collision. The density of vessel traffic causes increase of human error as a contributing factor for collision, particularly in narrow waterways and shallow waters such as straits, channels and port entrances where searoom is limited [41]. • Trend of decreasing number of crew members on board: Another commercial pressure is manifest as decreasing the number of crew members to minimum standards, as mentioned in the minimum safe manning certificate of a ship. This factor increases the workload and fatigue of the crew. • Extra workloads for navigation officers: New procedures, such as the ISM and ISPS procedures, increase ship safety but

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their record-keeping element represents an increased workload for navigation officers. Port stay days and continual inspections on restricted port days: The length of stays in port for ships has decreased due to the development of cargo-handling facilities. Also, port and flag State inspections are increased during port stays, both of which contribute to fatigue of crew members. Construction of new ports and terminals far away from city centers: Largely for safety reasons, chemical terminals are generally constructed far away from city centers, which restrict the crew’s access to leisure facilities. Bad weather: Bad weather conditions such as gales and dense fog increase the workload of navigation officers and the master. Also, seasickness is a factor that increases mental and physical fatigue and directly reduces job satisfaction. Currents, tides, and darkness: Currents and darkness are the two dominant factors causing marine accidents, especially in areas of coastal traffic and narrow channels [41]. As a direct result, the passage of chemical tankers through the Istanbul Strait is permitted only in daylight [42].

5. Strategies derived from the SWOT profile Taking into account the SWOT factors mentioned in Section 4, the following strategies are proposed in terms of onboard decision-making (see Fig. 5). Diagnosis of each process on the basis of whether it is a threat or a weakness, and determining if it is an opportunity or strength, is the key issue for a SWOT analysis of the carriage of liquid bulk chemicals. The risk assessment of each process is straightforward if the threats and weaknesses are identified correctly. When the overall contribution of SWOT analysis is examined, the following points emerge as important for the safe transportation of bulk liquid chemicals in tankers. Officers and crew should take the necessary actions and monitor cargo loading/unloading and storage, maneuvering and navigation continuously to minimize human error. Communication between the crew and the terminal should be maintained at all times. All available resources should be used in any emergency situation. All crew members should act together during all stages of cargo-handling. Situational awareness is the key to breaking an error chain, and all crew members should share their knowledge, skill and awareness. Efficient workload management is extremely important on chemical tankers, because fatigue is responsible for many human errors. Ship management companies should take precautions that will increase crew satisfaction. New rules should be introduced and implemented for reducing fatigue. Social facilities for crew members should be developed within easy reach of terminals. The design of pipelines, pumps, pump-rooms, loading/discharging units and onboard accommodation should take ergonomic aspects into account. The capacity for maritime training and education institutions should be increased, and detailed training specifically for tankers should be developed. Automated cargo-handling systems should be installed on chemical tankers. Pilotage services should be maintained in narrow channels for all ships and especially for chemical tankers.

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Fig. 5. Flowchart of decision-making process for safe carriage of chemicals by tankers.

6. An incident investigation case study with SWOT-AHP application 6.1. Brief description of incident While Turkish flag chemical tanker M/T Ozden-S, after discharged 4052 mton cyclohexane, was waiting for a pilot at Antwerp port in Belgium at about 5:30 on 12.07.2007, chief officer entered into the Cargo Hold No. 3 for controlling purpose under the supervision of pumpman of the ship. When pumpman saw chief officer had felt faint in the cargo hold, he had informed other able seaman on board and immediately entered into the hold to rescue second officer. Subsequently pumpman had black-

out of consciousness and remained in the hold. Able seaman who was witness of the incident informed the master and other crew. The shipwrecked crews were taken from the hold. After the master’s claim for medical aid, terminal intervention crew intervened the shipwrecked crew and ensured that the shipwrecked crew’s respiration and pulsation were normal. Subsequently the shipwrecked crews were removed to different hospitals. Eventually chief officer died in Antwerp on 20.07.2007 and pumpman died in Turkey on 05.08.2007. The incidents’ chronological order is as follows: • On 04.07.2007–05.07.2007 the vessel loaded cargo of 4,052,199 mton cyclohexane at Huelva port in Spain

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• • • •

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• • • • • • • •

and left for Antwerp port in Belgium on 5.07.2007 at 11.00 h. On 10. 07.2007 at 12:00 h the vessel was anchored at Antwerp port and on 11.07.2007 at 14:20 h the vessel drew alongside Basf terminal, Berth numbered 751. On 11.07.2007 at 15:00 h the vessel-coast safety control list had been prepared, discharge protocol had been agreed and hose was fixed at 15.30 h. On 11.07.2007 at 18:25 h the discharge begun and completed on 12.07.2007 at 02:50 h. On 12.07.2007 at 03:10 h the hose was disconnected and empty tank control was made at 03:20 h a claim for pilot was made at 03:00 h after documents had reached the vessel. On 12.07.2007 at 05:30 h chief officer had entered into starboard tank no. 3 and had blackout of consciousness and was held in the tank, pumpman had entered into the tank to take chief officer out from the tank but he had blackout of consciousness and was held in the tank. Between 05:30 and 05:35 h, able seaman informed the master and other crew that chief officer and pumpman were held in the tank. At 05:33 h medical aid was asked from terminal and the company/DPA was informed. At 05:34 h the pumpman was taken out from the tank, representer of the terminal was on board. At 05:35 h chief officer was taken out from the tank/Terminal Medical Service was on board. At 05:40 h the pumpman’s respiration and pulsation were checked, was taken to hospital by ambulance. At 06:15 h the second officer’s respiration and pulsation were checked and was taken to hospital by ambulance. On 20.07.2007 at 16:30 h the information regarding chief officer’s death received. On 05.08.2007, pumpman died in the morning.

The specification of carried cargo is as follows: • • • • • • • • • •

Chemical family: cyclic hyrocarbon. Chemical formula: C6–H12. Physical state: liquid. Color: colorless. Odor: irritant. Boiling point: 80.56 ◦ C. Flash point: −20 ◦ C. Explosion limit: 1.3–8%. Vapor pressure: 3.26 psi (37.8 ◦ C) = 25 kPa @ 20◦ . Viscosity: 0.963 cst (37.8 ◦ C). (a) Stability and reactivity: • Stability: the product is stable. • Conditions and materials to avoid: reactive or incompatible with the oxidizing materials. (b) Toxicological information: • Inhalation: harmful by inhalation. • Odor threshold: 300 ppm PEL/TWA 300 ppm TLV/TWA 300 ppm.

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(c) • • • • •

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• General effects: undesirable effects may occur from the inhalation of excessive of cyclohexane vapor, prolonged or repeated skin contact with liquid, and from liquid contamination of eyes. • Symptoms: dizziness, nausea, vomiting, unconsciousness. • Short time exposure tolerance: no chronic effects have been observed to occur in workers exposed to vapor concentrations in the range of 600–700 ppm. • Ingestion: aspiration hazard if swallowed. Can enter lungs and cause damage. • Skin contact: irritating to skin. • Eye contact: no known significant effects or critical hazards. • Acute toxicity: (i) Oral LD50 (rat): 12,705 mg/kg. (ii) Oral LD50 (mouse): 813 mg/kg. (iii) Skin LD50 (rabbit): 5500 mg/kg. Potential chronic effects: (i) Carcinogenicity: no known significant effects or critical hazards. (ii) Mutagenicity: no known significant effects or critical hazards. (iii) Reproductive toxicity: no known significant effects or critical hazards. EU regulation regularity information: R11: highly flammable. R65: may cause lung damage if swallowed. R38: irritant to skin. R67: vapors may cause drowsiness and dizziness. R50/53: very toxic to aquatic organism, may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic environment.

6.2. Basic findings of incident (1) Vapor return line was connected at loading operation. There was not any explanation about details of that vapor return line was to be connected and the return vapor would be cyclohexane or any other gas (such as nitrogen). The discharging protocol was agreed and completed on a fixed form prepared by the vessel. Regarding the discharging of cargo, only manifold connection, rate, communication methods were determined. The instructions of charterer regarding to cargo of cyclohexane were on board and stated that vapor return line was to be connected. However the mentioned nitrogen return was not included in the instructions. Not assessing potential risks and not making working plans even though it was known that vapor return line was to be connected at discharging port. It was stated in the manual of safety management that vapor return line was to be connected at the discharging port and it was found that possible risks were not assessed and working plan was not. (2) Chief officer entered into the tank by wearing only filter mask and torch without informing the master and other crew at 05:30. Pumpman with VHF and able seaman without VHF stayed out of the tank as watchman. Meanwhile

910

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

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hatch covers of other tanks were open. There was no entry permit issued before entry into enclosed space, atmosphere test was not made and proper PPE was not used. It was found that chief officer acted in his own initiative and did not make working plan of the activity he thought necessary to do. The vessel was monitored by a camera system by terminal but was not received any warning from terminal even all the tank hatches were open until the vessel left the port and so long as the interface between ship and shore continued. It is found that all crew who were ready on board for the manoeuvring preparation did not observe that all the hatch covers of tanks were open and nobody was given warning about it. It is understood that chief officer fell down from the third staircase in the tank in result of unconsciousness while he was trying to come out of the tank immediately after he entered into it. It is understood that pumpman who wore only a face mask and able seaman without a mask entered into the tank in order to rescue chief officer. Moreover when able seaman was in the middle of the stairs he was affected from the gas (he had a pain in his throat) and turned back immediately. However pumpman continued in order to rescue chief officer. The pumpman instantly collapsed and was held in the tank. Subsequently it was understood from the results of atmosphere test that concentration of oxygen stage in the starboard tank no. 3 was 2.1%. It is found that unconsciousness was observed on victims without any symptom. It is found that the nitrogen in tank no. 3 was come from vapor return line connected with the vessel and remained in the tanks as blanketing. The doctor who examined the victims diagnosed that the victims did not realised that they breathed nitrogen. The vessel was not informed in the protocols made before unloading that nitrogen in the tanks would be transferred to the vessel from vapor return line or such a situation may have occurred. The nitrogen is vapor which is odorless, colorless, unascertainable and heavier than air. In case of existence of such gas in space or estimated oxygen concentration rate is 8–10% or under that rate, the person who breathes nitrogen gas instantly collapses and loses his consciousness and it may cause sudden deaths. The findings of the incident show that chief officer and pumpman suffered acute affects those mentioned above without any symptoms. It is found that able seaman saw chief officer falling down; pumpman, in respect of “Inform everybody” instruction, went to cargo control room and firstly informed the engine room then bridge; the master was informed. Medical aid was requested from the terminal; initially an authorized person from the terminal came on board and then all the crew attended to the rescuing operation; a seaman who wore proper PPE entered into the tank and brought pumpman first out and then chief officer to the board; medical aid team of the Terminal came on board vessel when the chief officer brought on deck.

(8) It is found that respiration and pulse of pumpman and chief officer were not exist so that in first 5 min pumpman’s pulse and respiration were re-obtained, in the subsequent 25–30 min chief officer’s pulse and respiration were re-obtained. They immediately were taken to separate hospitals. 6.3. Analyzing method for incident Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) which is a decision analysis tool is used in this study with SWOT analysis method, is a mathematical method for analyzing complex decision problems with multiple criteria [43]. Basically, AHP is a general theory of measurement based on some mathematical and psychological foundations. AHP can deal with qualitative attributes as well as quantitative ones. It has been found to be a useful decision analysis technique and it has been applied in cases dealing with strategic planning. In this study, AHP in SWOT analysis is presented as application of utilizing pairwise comparisons. The pairwise comparisons are carried out within SWOT groups in the form of the matrix shown in Eq. (2). In the matrix shown, the matrix entities pij can be approximated by the ratio of the unknown weights wi /wj . The value of wi may vary from 1 to 9; 1/1 indicates equal intensity, while 9/1 indicates extreme or absolute intensity. wi 1 = wj pji ⎡ w1 /w1 ⎢ . ⎢ . ⎢ . ⎢ ⎢ P = [pij ] = ⎢ ... ⎢ ⎢ . ⎢ . ⎣ . pij =

wn /w1

(1) ⎤ w1 /wn .. ⎥ ⎥ . ⎥ ⎥ .. ⎥ .. .. .. . . . . ⎥ ⎥ .. ⎥ .. .. .. ⎥ . . . . ⎦ · · · · · · · · · wn /wn ··· ··· ··· .. .. .. . . .

(2)

In the pairwise comparisons, the estimated intensities or priorities can be obtained using the pairwise comparison matrix as the input of the principal eigenvalue method: (P − λmax I)q = 0

(3)

In this study, negative factors as weaknesses and threats which caused this incident observed then the factors are clustered. The weighting of factors is calculated with AHP technique in SWOT analyzing method [44]. 6.4. Quantified results of SWOT-AHP application Root factors of incident is classified and clustered as shown in Fig. 6. When the incident is analyzed; human related factors such as continuous fatigue on board, poor judgment about work environment, extreme boredom of crew, improper supervisory of master, inadequate skill; operational factors such as inadequate rules, policies, standards, inadequate work planning, inadequate vertical and horizontal communication, inadequate identification of worksite, inadequate performance measure-

O. Arslan, I.D. Er / Journal of Hazardous Materials 154 (2008) 901–913

911

Fig. 6. Classification of root factors.

ment and inadequate risk assessment; job related factors such as inadequate leadership, inadequate safety and team culture and availability of chemical hazards is observed. External negative factors can be summarized as inadequate technical design of cargo tank, inadequate equipment history and continues commercial pressures on ships. The distribution of weighting factors was calculated with AHP. Priorities of negative factors are shown in Table 3. When the weighting factors are examined, internal factors (weaknesses) have more importance than external factors (threats). Job related factors such as availability of chemical hazards at working environment and inadequate safety culture of seafarer’s have more effect on this incident. 6.5. Strategies to prevent similar incidents According to above-mentioned negative factors, the following preventive actions should be taken: • Permit to work and entry enclosed spaces procedures should be followed. • Pipelines and connections to neighbouring tank, leakage lines and connections should be controlled regularly. • Unsafe atmosphere in tanks should be ventilated as described in the procedure, the atmosphere of space should be tested, and results of atmosphere test should be at normal stage to enter space.

• Ventilation should be maintained during working timecontinuous of ventilation should be carried out otherwise entry into space should be avoided. • Work activities should be arranged in daylight conditions. • Communication methods for emergency escape should be identified, lighting and rescuing equipment should be ready, a watchman should be appointed, and all personnel should be informed about work activity. • All equipment used for entry into tank should be controlled, certified and calibrated, lighting equipment should be explosive-proof type. • Communication equipment, frequency and method of communication should be discussed in advance. • The crew, who will enter into tank and watchman should be nominated, how long work activity will take should be foreseeable; in case of work activity extends more than 2 h, permit should be re-issued and procedure should be followed. • Alarm test, low pressure test, leakage test, full pressure test for breathing apparatus (BA) tubes should be performed in advance, BA tubes should be ready to use, chemical dresses should be controlled. • Adequate safety belt and life line should be used, proper personal protective equipment (PPE) should be used, acting in panic should be avoided, entry of inexperienced personnel into tank should be prevented.

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Table 3 Priorities of negative factors

nesses into strengths are applied to chemical tankers, the safety of the working environment will be improved.

Group

Priority

1Weaknesses 11Human related factors 111Fatigue 112Poor judgement 113Extreme boredom 114Improper supervisory 115Inadequate skill

0.85714 0.25453 0.03553 0.11069 0.04437 0.08201 0.02436

12Operational factors 121Inadequate rules, policies, standards 122Inadequate work planning 123Inadequate vertical and horizontal communication 124Inadequate identification of worksite 125Inadequate performance measurement and assessment 126Inadequate risk assessment

0.14007 0.00684 0.02976 0.01549 0.07317 0.00645 0.03171

13Job related factors 131Inadequate leadership 132Inadequate safety culture 133Inadequate team culture 134Availibility of chemical hazards

0.46254 0.05255 0.13245 0.03639 0.31825

2Threats 21Inadequate technical design 22Inadequate equipment history 23Commercial pressures

0.14286 0.01362 0.03569 0.09355

7. Conclusion Accidents and incidents occur in the maritime industry, in spite of the latest navigational technologies. The operation of chemical tankers causes more incidents and accidents when compared to other types of ships as a direct result of the behavior of the chemicals being carried. The aim of this study was to use SWOT analysis to identify the positive and negative factors affecting the carriage of liquid chemicals by tankers, and the performance of the crew. We propose practical solutions for reducing the frequency of human error, accidents and incidents on chemical tankers during cargo operations and navigation, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses, and the opportunities and threats related to the carriage of liquid chemicals by tankers. It is clear that the hazards associated with the carriage of liquid chemicals in tankers are more complex and dangerous when compared to other types of ships. We propose that the use of SWOT analysis is an acceptable basis for formulating strategy designed to minimize human error, accidents and incidents, and defects of shipboard operations. The main aim of this study was to identify an appropriate management tool to increase the level of safety for chemical tankers during cargo and navigation operations. Although the operation of tankers is more complex than that of other types of ship, and working on a tanker needs extra knowledge and skills, according to the INTERTANKO report, the percentage of detained tanker ships is 4%, while that of other types of ships is 6%. Well-operated ships are safer and more profitable, and it is clear that when strategies that are suggested to convert possible threats into opportunities and possible weak-

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Glossary Accommodation spaces: Spaces that are used for public spaces, corridors, lavatories, cabins, offices, hospitals, cinemas, games and hobbies rooms, barber shops, pantries containing no cooking appliances and similar spaces. Boiling point: Boiling point is the temperature at which a product exhibits a vapor pressure equal to the atmospheric pressure. Cargo area: Cargo area is that part of the ship that contains cargo tanks, slop tanks, cargo pump-rooms, cofferdams, ballast or void spaces adjacent to cargo tanks or slop tanks, and deck areas throughout the entire length and breadth of the part of the ship over the above-mentioned spaces. Where independent tanks are installed in hold spaces, cofferdams, ballast or void spaces at the after end of the aftermost hold space or at the forward end of the forward most hold space are excluded from the cargo area. Cargo pump-room: Cargo pump-room is a space containing pumps and their accessories for the handling of the products covered by the IBC Code. Cargo tank: Cargo tank is the envelope designed to contain the cargo. Chemical tanker: Chemical tanker is a cargo ship constructed or adapted and used for the carriage in bulk of any liquid product. DWT: Deadweight tonnage. Flammability limits: Flammability limits are the conditions defining the state of fuel–oxidant mixture at which application of an adequately strong external ignition source is only just capable of producing flammability in a given test apparatus. Flashpoint: Flashpoint is the temperature (in ◦ C) at which a product will give off enough flammable vapor to be ignited. Values given in the IBC Code are those of the “closed-cup test” determined by an approved flashpoint apparatus. Hazardous: Any particular quantity or form of material that may pose an unreasonable risk to health, safety and property when transported in commerce. IMO: International Maritime Organization. INTERTANKO: International Association of Independent Tanker Owners. ISM: International Safety Management Code. MARPOL 73/78: International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto. Public spaces: Those portions of the accommodation spaces that are used for halls, dining rooms, lounges and similar permanently enclosed spaces. Ppm: Parts per million. SOLAS Convention: International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974. STCW: International convention on standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for seafarers.