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Targeting social protection and agricultural interventions: The potential for synergies
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Targeting social protection and agricultural interventions: The potential for synergies Cristina Cirilloa, Mario Györia, Fabio Veras Soaresa,b, a b
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International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), Brazil Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea), Brazil
A R T I C L E I N F O
A BS T RAC T
Keywords: Social protection Agriculture Synergies Targeting Impact evaluation
Social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers tend to operate in isolation from each other. This paper shows how coherent targeting mechanisms can help to coordinate both policy areas and create synergies. We argue that target groups and targeting methods used in both areas are often very similar or potentially complementary, which constitutes a promising basis for better coordination. Moreover, the paper describes relevant cases to illustrate how targeting is already being used to foster synergies between the two areas. We conclude based on these case studies that targeting coordination and overall coherence are indispensable tools to generate positive synergies between social protection and agricultural interventions – a potential basis for addressing food security more effectively in the future.
1. Introduction There is a growing consensus that the joint implementation of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions, particularly for family farmers, in a coordinated and coherent manner can potentially lead to the emergence of positive synergies (Gavrilovic et al., 2016). The latter implies that the impact of the joint implementation can be larger than the sum of the impacts of each individual sectoral intervention. Well-designed and coherent targeting mechanisms play a crucial role for the promotion of synergies. In particular, the conscious creation of an overlap between different sectoral interventions at the individual/household level or at least at the geographical level are necessary requirements for synergies to emerge. The discussion around targeting and synergies can be understood as part of the general efforts to foster ‘coherence’ between social protection and agriculture. Following the definition laid out in the FAO's “Framework for Analysis and Action for strengthening coherence between social protection and agriculture”, coherence is understood as “a systematic promotion of complementary and consistent policies and programmes across sectors, thereby creating synergies to combat rural poverty and food insecurity more effectively” (Gavrilovic et al., 2016, p.1). Coherence between social protection and agricultural interventions is considered desirable for a number of reasons:
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Although often having similar objectives, the activities of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions targeted at
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family farmers can potentially affect each other negatively (e.g. public work programmes could divert efforts from agricultural activities, social protection programmes might increase reservation wages in the agricultural sector and make it harder for the better-off smallholders to find wage labourers). (See Veras Soares et al., 2016 for more detailed examples) Nevertheless, social protection and agricultural support programmes do have the potential to mutually reinforce each other: social protection programmes can for example alleviate credit constraints and thereby facilitate productive investments into agricultural production or help farmers to protect themselves against external shocks. Moreover, agriculture interventions can have a social protection function when fostering incomes of family farmers either directly or indirectly, by tackling structural factors that prevents their access to credit, insurance, technology, markets, among other factors (see e.g. Tirivayi et al. (2013) and SabatesWheeler et al. (2009)).
Targeting is a crucial tool in order to coordinate the implementation and promote the coherence between social protection programmes and agricultural interventions. Coordinated targeting shall be defined as a conscious effort to select the beneficiaries of agricultural interventions and social protection programmes in a way to increase the joint impact of both programmes. It is important to bear in mind that targeting is only one of many means to coordinate social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers. Other key elements
Correspondence to: Setor Bancário Sul Quadra 1, Bloco J, Ed. BNDES, 13º andarUNDP/IPC-IG Brasilia-DF, Brazil, 70076-900. E-mail address: [email protected] (F. Veras Soares).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2016.08.006 Received 30 March 2016; Received in revised form 1 July 2016; Accepted 25 August 2016 Available online xxxx 2211-9124/ © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Please cite this article as: Cirillo, C., Global Food Security (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2016.08.006
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hold incomes, increased consumption and food security (Tirivayi et al., 2013). One could also expect that the increased income of smallholder farmers might lead to better nutritional outcomes, to facilitate access to health care and increase the demand for education, which, in the long term can foster the levels of human capital of current and future generations, further reducing risks and vulnerabilities, and thus contributing to the ultimate social protection objectives in a virtuous cycle. Despite, a large body of evidence of the short- to medium-term effects, the available evidence on the long term impacts is rather limited (Tirivayi et al., 2013). At the local-economy level, synergies can be created through spillover effects between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households of social protection programmes or agricultural interventions. Cash transfers can, for example, increase the purchasing power of their beneficiaries, thereby also creating demand for the agricultural products of better-off households which do not directly benefit from social protection programmes. Food aid programmes or food for education programmes are also in a position to generate spillover effects if food is procured at the local level, thereby increasing the demand and boosting the prices of agricultural products. Lastly, Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) point out that synergies may also occur at a macroeconomic level, for example if agricultural interventions promote economic growth thereby increasing the fiscal base for the expansion of social protection programmes. Despite the great potential for synergies between both policy areas, it should be noted that the joint implementation of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions is rare and can also lead to conflicts. At the macro-level, social protection programmes and agricultural interventions might compete for fiscal resources. At the local-economy level, food aid programmes can help local farmers if the foodstuff is purchased locally, but also may have a detrimental effect, as the private demand for local food would decrease. At the micro-level, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes might change the incentives for smallholder farmers and lead them to divert efforts from agricultural activities to the fulfilment of conditionalities (for a more comprehensive discussion on the potential conflicts between social protection and agricultural interventions see Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009; Tirivayi et al., 2013). These arguments underline the importance of coordinating the implementation modalities of social protection and agricultural interventions carefully and to go beyond the intentional creation of a pure overlap between beneficiaries.
are the coordination of the implementation details and timing of agricultural and social programmes in order to avoid any conflicting interests (e.g. avoid that public work programmes coincide in their timing with agricultural peak seasons), and the alignment of the overall objectives of policies from both areas. This paper will exclusively focus on targeting as a means of coordination – an overview of other dimensions of coordination between social protection and agriculture can be found in Gavrilovic et al. (2016). Benefits from coherent targeting of agricultural interventions and social protection programmes can be expected to emerge in different ways which will be further explored in the subsequent sections, particularly in the case studies. Here we briefly highlight two different ways. First, the joint and/or coordinated collection and use of data on potential beneficiaries could generate an overall reduction of the targeting and operational costs and ensure that targeting objectives of overlapping geographical areas and/or individual/households are smoothly reached. Similarly, efforts to integrate databases from the two sectors can reach a similar purpose without compromising sector specific information and data needs that may require specific databases. Second, the coordinated selection of beneficiaries, particularly the identification of who should benefit from more than one intervention (or which areas) could positively affect people's living standards, their productive choices and their food security, leading to the emergence of synergies. This paper illustrates based on a few case studies how targeting can be used to intentionally seek synergies between the two policy areas. Our paper builds on the work of Gavrilovic et al. (2016); Tirivayi et al. (2013) and Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) who provided an overview on how social protection and agricultural programmes can mutually reinforce their impacts in a virtuous manner. However, while most case studies discussed in these three papers refer to synergies that emerged ‘by chance’, this paper puts an emphasis on how synergies between both policy areas can be consciously triggered through coordinated targeting mechanisms. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 includes a brief literature review on the evidence around the interaction between social protection policies and agricultural interventions. Section 3 puts forward a simple conceptual framework on how targeting can be used to foster synergies between these two areas. Section 4 presents a number of case studies and illustrates how some countries have already made conscious efforts to trigger synergies between social protection and agriculture.
3. Targeting to create synergies between agriculture and social protection – a conceptual framework
2. Synergies between agricultural interventions and social protection
Building on the points summarised in the last section, this section puts forward a simple conceptual framework on how targeting coherence between social protection and agricultural interventions can be intentionally sought with a view to promote synergies that would improve the socioeconomic situation and the food security of vulnerable populations in rural areas. In practice, there are two different approaches to trigger synergies by means of targeting: Two different sectoral interventions can be jointly implemented (i) using the same database and/or targeting strategy with a view to reaching the same households/individuals, alternatively integrated databases could be used for the same purpose or (ii) selecting the same intervention areas, without necessarily targeting the same households within those areas. In order to decide which of both approaches to take, it is important to be clear whether synergies are expected to arise mostly at the household level, at the local economy level or at the macroeconomic level, as this has implications on the role of targeting in promoting synergies. Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between the level of synergies, target groups and targeting methods. If the synergies are expected to arise at the individual/household level, an agricultural intervention should be targeted to the same individuals/households who are also benefiting from a social protection programme, possibly the same targeting tools
Synergies between social protection and agricultural interventions can potentially emerge at three different levels, namely, individual/ household, local economy, and macroeconomic (Tirivayi et al. 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009). At the household level, social protection can alleviate liquidity constraints thereby allowing credit constrained farmers to invest in more inputs and in the adoption of new production technologies (Gertler et al., 2012; Harvey, 2007). Besides, social protection can protect against negative shocks related to agricultural seasonalities (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009). Social protection can also act as an insurance mechanism against agricultural risks, thereby stimulating risk-taking behaviour among smallholder farmers and consequently increasing the expected returns on their agricultural activities (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999; Dercon, 2002). Agricultural interventions can reduce the vulnerabilities of poor households, thereby directly contributing to the main objective of social protection, namely, to reduce risk and vulnerabilities of poor households. It can also address structural factors, particularly when targeted and adapted to family farmers, so that to ensure their access to credit, insurance, technology and markers. Agricultural interventions usually aim at increasing agricultural productivity which implies higher house2
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Target Groups
Targeting Methods
Expected Level of Synergies
Examples for expected synergies
SP and AI target same individuals and households
Any target group
SP and AI target same geographical areas
Means test, proxy-means test, community-based targeting, categorical targeting, self-targeting
Geographical targeting
Any targeting method, but policy alignment required - timing and scale of interventions
LocalEconomy level
Individual / Household level
Social Protection may alleviate credit constraints, thereby promoting investments in more productive agricultural technologies.
Cash transfer programmes have positive spillover effects on nonbeneficiary households (e.g. higher demand for locally produced agricultural products).
Agricultural interventions increase the income from agricultural activities thereby also improving health and education and reducing vulnerabilities of its beneficiaries (one of the primary objectives of social protection).
Agricultural interventions increase agricultural productivity which may lead to lower food prices and therefore higher welfare in poor households.
Macro-level
Agricultural interventions increase smallholder farmers’ incomes and can increase the fiscal base to expand social protection to cover other risks and vulnerabilities.
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Fig. 1. Targeting and synergies between social protection (SP) and agricultural interventions (AI) – a conceptual framework. Source: Author's elaboration. The examples for the synergies are based on Tirivayi et al. (2013) and Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009).
the so-called “double dipping” (access to two or more programmes) are seen as morally not acceptable when similar vulnerable households may not be considered eligible for neither of the programmes. Thus, it is important to clearly communicate the “overlapping” nature of the combined interventions and make sure that other alternatives are used to minimise “programme” exclusion among marginally non-eligible households.
(e.g. registry forms, targeting approach/variables with possible different cut-off points in case not all beneficiaries from one sector programme are meant to be eligible for the other sector programme), should be used or at least the integration of potential beneficiary database should be sought. In cases where the synergies are likely to emerge at the local-economy level, it would be sufficient to implement agricultural interventions and social protection programmes in the same geographical areas without necessarily targeting the same households.. Different elements of the targeting process (e.g. definition of eligibility criteria; targeting methods; registries) play different roles in the coordination of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions and should ideally be aligned with each other in order to maximise the potential for synergies. The eligibility criteria are at the very basis of the coordination process – for synergies to emerge at the individual/household level, eligibility criteria need to create an overlap of households being eligible for both programmes. To trigger synergies at the local economy level, an overlap in the geographic areas which are eligible is required. The targeting methods (e.g. proxy-means test, community based targeting, means test) can be considered as tools to put the eligibility criteria into practice. The targeting methods of an agricultural programme and a social protection intervention do not necessarily need be identical for synergies to emerge – if the eligibility criteria are aligned and the targeting methods are implemented duly, an overlap of beneficiaries can even emerge based on different targeting methods. The use of a single or unified registry can facilitate the creation of synergies substantially as it allows for an easy identification of households/individuals which are eligible for both programmes and can be a basis to monitor how many of these households indeed benefit from both interventions. A special concern with the joint implementation of community based targeting approaches or approaches that use final community validation of beneficiary lists is related to the notion of “fairness” that may prevent programme overlapping to take place. In some contexts
4. Case studies This section presents five case studies in which synergies between the policy areas of social protection and agriculture have been intentionally promoted by targeting the same beneficiaries or the same intervention areas. In Latin America there are several examples of single or unified data registries such as the Cadastro Único in Brazil and the Padrón General de Hogares in Peru or unified targeting systems (integrated database) such as the Social Information System in Chile, which are an ideal basis for exploiting targeting synergies involving social protection programmes. Single or unified data registries can be a basis for promoting synergies first and foremost at the individual/household level as they allow selecting the same individuals for participation in both a social protection programme and an agricultural support scheme. However, as illustrated below, they can also be a tool for facilitating synergies at the local economy level, e.g. if agricultural interventions are targeted to a geographic area with a high percentage of social protection beneficiaries, as indicated in the (unified) registries. Single or unified registries usually contain basic information on potential beneficiaries of social protection programmes, demographic composition as well as their monthly income/expenditure (or alternatively easily verifiable proxies for these variables, e.g. household characteristics such as materials of the walls/roof, possession of assets such as a TV, etc.), and possibly their beneficiary status. A single or unified registry can therefore serve as an initial basis to create a 3
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mented by the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS), the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), the Ministry of National Integration (MI) and the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) (See Table 1). One important basis for this inter-ministerial coordination has been the consequent use of Brazil's unified database Cadastro Único for the targeting of BSM beneficiaries – in combination with the DAP database for productive inclusion programmes (see below). For the targeting of BSM's rural productive inclusion component, the Cadastro Único has been merged with the main targeting tool of the agricultural credit line for family farmers, PRONAF (the database of the Declaração de Aptidão da Agricultura Familiar form (DAP)). The PRONAF database, which has been working since 1996, predating both Bolsa Familia and the Cadastro Único, does not rely on the Cadastro Único and uses its own data collection and targeting strategy. Although one should expect that PRONAF's coverage overlaps with Bolsa Familia, it should be noted that its target group, unlike BSM, does not consist exclusively of the extremely poor. Farmers with a family income of up to USD 140,000 (BRL360,000) can apply for the programme. However, for the rural microcredit line of PRONAF the eligible line is much lower, the maximum annual income is approximately USD7500 (BRL20,000). The rural productive inclusion strategy of Brasil sem Miseria relies on merging both databases to implement a structured selection of the beneficiaries that can benefit from a “package” of coordinated interventions. However, many challenges are faced during this process due to the lack of common variables to link both databases and the differences in background and work protocols between social workers and providers of extension services in the field. In fact, most of the Rural Productive Inclusion Programmes were able to create the intended overlap with the coverage of Bolsa Familia beneficiaries. For instance, among the Água para Todos beneficiaries, 82% are registered in Cadastro Único, 71% are also Bolsa Familia beneficiaries, and 68% are extremely poor. In addition, between 2010 and 2013, the total amount of produce purchased by the PAA from family farmers registered in the Cadastro Único increased from 32% to 50% (Mello et al., 2014). Overall this illustrates a substantial potential for synergies at the individual and/or household level as large parts of these agricultural development programmes also are enroled in the country's major social protection database, benefitting from Bolsa Familia or other social protection initiatives. In Ethiopia, conscious efforts have been made in order to create synergies on the individual/household level and the local economy level between the country's main social protection initiative, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and a major agricultural development initiative, the ‘Other Food Security Programme (OFSP)’. The PSNP is a social protection programme which provides cash or food-based public work programmes to food insecure households with able-bodied members, or cash transfers for food insecure households without able-bodied members. The selection of beneficiaries has been based on a mix of geographical targeting and community-based targeting and largely relied on the targeting of former food aid programmes. A woreda (an administrative division in Ethiopia, below the level of region and zone) was eligible for the PSNP if it had been a recipient of food aid for at least each of the last 3 years, while the households were selected if they received food assistance in the last three years and complied with administrative and community guidelines (GoE, Government of Ethiopia, 2004). After the second year of the PSNP implementation, the government decided to intentionally foster access of PSNP beneficiary to ‘Other Food Security Programme’ (OFSP). (Slater et al., 2006; Hoddinot et al., 2015). However, Gilligan et al. (2009) report that just 32.7% of the PNSP beneficiaries had also received OFSP transfers or services in 2006. The common geographical targeting was important but not sufficient to generate targeting synergies. Understaffing of extension services at local level and delinking credit and extension services have
conscious overlap between the beneficiaries of a social protection programme and an agricultural support programme. These registries, however, would need to have information on agricultural livelihoods, or be integrated with similar databases containing this information, which requires close collaboration across the two sectors The paragraphs below will describe how both Peru and Brazil have already used their national registries to coordinate the targeting of agricultural and social programmes. The case of Peru and its general household registry (Padrón General de Hogares) provides an example of promoting synergies through targeting, not only between the policy areas of agriculture and social protection, but also across different programmes within these areas. The Padrón General de Hogares is the tool for targeting the country's main social protection programme, the CCT programme Juntos, as well as other social programmes such as the nutrition and food security programmes Vaso de Leche, Comedores Populares, and the Programa Integral de Nutrición, but also the free health insurance scheme, Seguro Integral de Salud. Moreover, the Government of Peru has sought to build common targeting strategies between social protection and agriculture interventions. The rural development programme Haku Wiñay, which provides extension services as well as productive assets, training and financial inclusion services to extremely poor farmers, is targeted at villages where a sufficiently large share of the inhabitants are beneficiaries of the CCT Juntos (Escobal and Ponce, 2015). Haku Wiñay can therefore be considered as an example where targeting is creating the basis for synergies at the local economy level. Since Haku Wiñay aims at reaching the poor population, the percentage of Juntos recipients (who are by design, poor households) serves as a proxy for the prevalence of poverty in the respective geographical areas. It is worth underlining that Haku Wiñay just used the ‘targeting’ of Juntos, but did not directly draw on Peru's unified database Padrón General de Hogares.. In Brazil, the rural productive inclusion component of the Brasil sem Miseria (BSM) strategy (Brazil without Extreme Poverty) has been targeted with a view to fostering the emergence of synergies between rural development and food security interventions and the country's CCT programme Bolsa Familia in rural areas – first and foremost at the individual/household level. The BSM strategy aims to ensure that those Bolsa Familia beneficiaries whose income is below the extreme poverty line (70 BRL per month, corresponding to the World Bank's 1.25 USD poverty line at purchasing power parity), have access to a set of rural development interventions. This includes tailor-made extension services coupled with investment grants (disbursed after approval of an investment plan), distribution of improved seeds, access to water for consumption and production, as well as access to the food procurement programme for smallholder farmers (Programa Aquisição de Alimentos Provenientes da Agricultura Familiar – PAA) and to the Bolsa Verde (Green grant) programme (See Table 1). The “Rural Productive Inclusion” programmes are impleTable 1 Rural Productive Inclusion Programmes in Brazil and their implementing ministries. Source: Author’s elaboration based on Paes Souza (2013). Rural Productive Inclusion programme
Implementing Ministry
PAA
Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger/Ministry of Agrarian Development Ministry of Agrarian Development Ministry of Agrarian Development Ministry of National Integration / Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger
Technical Assistance Improved Seeds Water for Everyone (Programa Água para Todos) Programa Bolsa Verde (Green grant)
Ministry of the Environment
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made agricultural intervention is developed with the profile of the beneficiaries of a social cash transfer. This latter feature, however, may generate conflict, especially if the local communities perceive this “double dipping” as unfair. The following section gives a short summary of the good practices that can be retained based on the case studies presented in this section.
successfully increased the access to the Household Asset Building Programme (HASB), a revised version of the OFSP in 2008. The delinking of credit and extension services was particularly important. Devereux et al. (2008) report how some PSNP beneficiaries have lost their eligibility to the PSNP programme after receiving credits from the OFSP to buy goats, despite the fact that the assets were not yet productive (they were not generating a flow of income yet) and the loan had not yet been paid. This type of fast-track graduation would prevent the building up of the synergies that the common geographical targeting was meant to produce as there would be no time for the benefits of both programmes to reinforce each other. Thus, the Ethiopian example also illustrates some challenges that may emerge when social protection programmes and agricultural development interventions are targeted to the same households based on the geographical targeting only. In addition, this example shows that it does not suffice to align the targeting of the programmes, their overall coherence and coordination should also be strengthened in order to generate sustainable synergies. Largely inspired by the Brazilian PAA programme mentioned above, the PAA Africa programme, seeks to coordinate and even integrate agricultural support policies – food procurement and rural extension service and support to family farmers – with a social protection and food security programme – school feeding. PAA Africa is a joint initiative of the FAO and the WFP involving national governments and is currently being piloted in five African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. The programme consists of two components. A productive support component and a school feeding component: Under the productive support component, the beneficiary farmers receive productive support (inputs and extension) and are guaranteed a stable demand for their products through the school-feeding programme. Under the school-feeding component of the intervention, school-children receive regular school meals based on the locally produced products. In this sense, the second component fulfils a social protection function, providing an in-kind transfer targeted at school children in poor and food insecure areas. In most of the intervention countries both programme components are targeted to the same geographical areas and in some cases even to the same beneficiary households. The geographical targeting aims precisely to identify areas which are at the same time suitable for the agricultural support activities and the school feeding component leading to the potential of synergies at the local economy level. In some implementation countries, the targeting of small vulnerable communities implies that synergies can also emerge at the household level: An adult household member can for example benefit from the productive support component of PAA Africa while her children participate in the school-feeding programme. As a consequence, both the real income of the household, its productive capacity and food security would increase, potentially leading to a mutually reinforcing effect of both components. In Lesotho, the Child Grants Programme (CGP) is complemented by a kitchen gardening intervention plus other livelihood interventions by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The CGP is an unconditional social cash transfer programme that began in 2009. The primary objective of the programme was to improve the living standards of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), improve health status, and increase school enrolment among OVC. The transfer itself is provided to eligible households on a quarterly basis and typically ranges between M350 and M750 (depending on the number of children in the household). The idea to link the CGP to a kitchen gardening and other livelihood interventions was based on the evaluation findings that highlighted a number of constraints for the cash transfer to be able to also transform livelihoods and increase productivity among beneficiary households. The complementary programme uses the National Information System for Social Assistance (NISSA), a repository of household and individual socioeconomic information, to identify the beneficiaries that would benefit from the livelihood interventions. This a case in which a tailor-
5. Targeting as a tool to build synergies – good practices and limitations The case studies discussed in this paper have illustrated different pathways which can be used to coordinate social protection and agricultural interventions through targeting thereby promoting coherence between these policy areas. The following paragraphs will identify some good practices and approaches of how coherent targeting can be used to promote the emergence of synergies:
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Geographical targeting: One possibility to trigger synergies is to target two programmes at the same geographical areas, without necessarily targeting the same beneficiaries. The PAA Africa is an example of this case. Alternatively, the geographical targeting may seek to ensure some (but not total) overlapping as in the case of Haku Wiñay and Juntos in Peru and of the PSNP and OFSP/HASP in Ethiopia. Use of unified or integrated databases for identifying beneficiaries: Unified or integrated databases can also be a basis for the promotion of synergies, as they allow to systematically identify the same beneficiary households for a social protection programme and an agricultural intervention. An example for such an approach is the rural productive inclusion component within the Brazil sem miseria strategy in Brazil. This intervention draw on the integration of the single registry and of the DAP – the official database for family farmers policy –, thereby creating a considerable overlap in coverage between the programmes. Use the beneficiary lists of an existing programme: A third possibility to create an overlap in coverage is to target a new programme based on the beneficiary lists of an already existing programme. This approach has the advantage that it is easy to achieve a complete overlap in coverage, this was implemented in Lesotho in the case of the livelihood programmes that complement the CGP.
Depending on the objectives and expected outcomes of the policies' coordination, policy makers can identify the corresponding synergy levels and, in turn, the targeting strategies to produce them. If synergies emerge at the local economy level, the geographical targeting of identical intervention areas may be necessary. If one expects synergies to arise at the household or individual level, one would rather have to target the same households/individuals, possibly based on a unified database or integrated database and similar targeting methods. Overall, it needs to be underlined that targeting is only one element of a successful coordination strategy between agricultural interventions for family farmers and social protection programmes. Targeting can be a tool to assure that programmes from both policy areas benefit the same households and/or geographical areas and thereby create the basis for synergies at the individual level, the household level and the local economy level. In order to be effective, targeting needs to be accompanied by other measures to increase coherence, most importantly the coordination of the programme's implementation details and their overall objectives. 6. Conclusion This paper has analysed how targeting can contribute to a more successful coordination between agricultural interventions and social 5
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Terri Raney, Andre Croppenstedt and Sarah Lowder. Special thanks for the detailed comments and suggestions received from Juan Carlos García y Cebolla and from the FAO/PtoP team members, Ana Paula de la O Campos, Pamela Pozarny and, in particular Marco Knowles who has also provided valuable comments on a second version of the paper. All remaining errors are our responsibility.
protection programmes and promote the creation of synergies between both policy areas thereby more effectively promoting the food security and social inclusion of vulnerable households. The following points should be retained: First, our review of the existing literature suggests that social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers can indeed positively influence each other's impact, provided that they are implemented in the same geographical areas and/or reach the same households. By extension, targeting should be considered an important tool for coordinating these policy areas and for fostering synergies. Second, the fact that in some cases of the case studies the target groups and targeting methods of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers were similar can be seen as a promising basis for a stronger coordination of both in the future. However, it should also be noted that if interventions which target the same households are not well coordinated in terms of their implementation details, conflicts can arise which may even negatively affect the programmes' impacts. Third, although social protection programmes and agricultural interventions often still operate in isolation from each other, there are a number of cases in which targeting is already used to coordinate both policy areas. Good practices identified in this paper include the use of geographical targeting – in order to promote synergies at the local economy level – and the use of single/unified databases for assuring that one household can benefit from both agricultural and social protection programmes, thereby triggering synergies at the individual/household level. If targeting is intended to create synergies between social protection programmes and agricultural interventions, the targeting process should take into account whether synergies are expected at the individual/household level or rather at the local economy level, as illustrated in the conceptual framework in Section 3 of this paper. Little evidence is available on the impact of the joint targeting of agricultural interventions and social protection programmes and further studies in this field should be considered an important and policy-relevant avenue for future research.
References Dercon, S., 2002. Income risk, coping strategies and safety netsí. World Bank Res. Obs. 17 (2), 141–166. Devereux, S., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Slater, R., Tefera, M., Brown, T., Teshome, A., 2008. Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP): 2008 Assessment Report. IDS, Sussex Escobal, J., Ponce, C., 2015. Combining Social Protection with Economic Opportunities in Rural Peru: Haku Wiñay. Policy in Focus. Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 22–25. 〈http://www. ipc-undp.org/pub/eng/PIF32_Social_Protection_Entrepreneurship_and_Labour_ Market_Activation.pdf〉 (accessed 30.03.16) Gavrilovic, M., Knowles, M., Davis, B., Pozarny, P., Calcagnini, G., Sabates-Wheeler, R., 2016. Strengthening Coherence between Agriculture and Social Protection to Combat Poverty and Hunger in Africa: Framework for Analysis and Action, FAO, Rome. 〈http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5386e.pdf〉 (accessed 30.03.16) Gertler, P., Martinez, S., Rubio-Codina, M., 2012. Investing cash transfers to raise longterm living standards. Am. Econ. J.: Appl. Econ. 4 (1), 164–192. Gilligan, D.O., Hoddinott, J., Tafesse, A.S., 2009. The impact of Ethiopia's productive safety net programme and its linkages. J. Dev. Stud. 45 (10), 1684–1706. GoE, Government of Ethiopia, 2004. Productive Safety Net Programme: Programme Implementation Manual. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ethiopia. Harvey, P., 2007. Cash-Based Responses in Emergencies, HPG Report, 24, ODI, London Hoddinot, J., Berhane, G., O’Giligan, D., Kumar, N., Seyoum Taffesse, A., 2015. Linking Social Protection to Agriculture: Evidence from Ethiopia. Policy in Focus, Vol. 11, Issue 1. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Brasilia Holzmann, R., Jorgensen, S., 1999. Social Protection as Social Risk Management: Conceptual Underpinnings for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series, 9904, World Bank, Washington Mello, J., Teixeira Andrade, B., Melchiori, E.C., Rodrigues de Oliveira, Y., 2014. A inclusão produtiva rural do Brasil sem Miséria: estratégias e primeiros resultados. In: Falçao, T., Campello, T. (eds): O Brasil sem miséria Paes Souza, R., 2013. New Strategy for Poverty Eradication in Brazil: the Emergence of the Brasil Sem Miséria Plan. IPC One Pager No. 214, August 2013. 〈http://www.ipcundp.org/pub/IPCOnePager214.pdf〉 (accessed 30.03.16) Sabates-Wheeler, R., Devereux, S., Guenther, B., 2009. Building Synergies between Social Protection and Smallholder Agricultural Policies Rachel. Future Agricultures Working Paper No. 6. 〈http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/futureagriculture/ FAC_Working_Paper_No6.pdf〉 (accessed 30.03.16) Slater, R., Ashley, S., Tefera, M., Buta, M., Esubalew, D., 2006. PSNP Policy, Programme and Institutional Linkages: Final Report. Overseas Development Institute, The IDL Group, Indak International Tirivayi, N., Knowles, M., Davis, B., 2013. The Interaction between Social Protection and Agriculture: a Review of Evidence. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 〈http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3563e.pdf〉 (accessed 30.03.16) Veras Soares, F., Knowles, M., Daidone, S., Tirivayi, N., 2016. Combined Effects and Synergies Between Agricultural and Social Protection Interventions: What is the Evidence So Far. FAO, Mimeo, Rome.
Acknowledgement This paper is based on one section of the background paper produced by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) for the FAO's 2015 State of Food and Agriculture. We are grateful to FAO for the funding of this research project and for the comments and suggestions made by the FAO SOFA team, including,
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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Food Security journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gfs
Targeting social protection and agricultural interventions: The potential for synergies Cristina Cirilloa, Mario Györia, Fabio Veras Soaresa,b, a b
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International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), Brazil Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea), Brazil
A R T I C L E I N F O
A BS T RAC T
Keywords: Social protection Agriculture Synergies Targeting Impact evaluation
Social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers tend to operate in isolation from each other. This paper shows how coherent targeting mechanisms can help to coordinate both policy areas and create synergies. We argue that target groups and targeting methods used in both areas are often very similar or potentially complementary, which constitutes a promising basis for better coordination. Moreover, the paper describes relevant cases to illustrate how targeting is already being used to foster synergies between the two areas. We conclude based on these case studies that targeting coordination and overall coherence are indispensable tools to generate positive synergies between social protection and agricultural interventions – a potential basis for addressing food security more effectively in the future.
1. Introduction There is a growing consensus that the joint implementation of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions, particularly for family farmers, in a coordinated and coherent manner can potentially lead to the emergence of positive synergies (Gavrilovic et al., 2016). The latter implies that the impact of the joint implementation can be larger than the sum of the impacts of each individual sectoral intervention. Well-designed and coherent targeting mechanisms play a crucial role for the promotion of synergies. In particular, the conscious creation of an overlap between different sectoral interventions at the individual/household level or at least at the geographical level are necessary requirements for synergies to emerge. The discussion around targeting and synergies can be understood as part of the general efforts to foster ‘coherence’ between social protection and agriculture. Following the definition laid out in the FAO's “Framework for Analysis and Action for strengthening coherence between social protection and agriculture”, coherence is understood as “a systematic promotion of complementary and consistent policies and programmes across sectors, thereby creating synergies to combat rural poverty and food insecurity more effectively” (Gavrilovic et al., 2016, p.1). Coherence between social protection and agricultural interventions is considered desirable for a number of reasons:
•
Although often having similar objectives, the activities of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions targeted at
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family farmers can potentially affect each other negatively (e.g. public work programmes could divert efforts from agricultural activities, social protection programmes might increase reservation wages in the agricultural sector and make it harder for the better-off smallholders to find wage labourers). (See Veras Soares et al., 2016 for more detailed examples) Nevertheless, social protection and agricultural support programmes do have the potential to mutually reinforce each other: social protection programmes can for example alleviate credit constraints and thereby facilitate productive investments into agricultural production or help farmers to protect themselves against external shocks. Moreover, agriculture interventions can have a social protection function when fostering incomes of family farmers either directly or indirectly, by tackling structural factors that prevents their access to credit, insurance, technology, markets, among other factors (see e.g. Tirivayi et al. (2013) and SabatesWheeler et al. (2009)).
Targeting is a crucial tool in order to coordinate the implementation and promote the coherence between social protection programmes and agricultural interventions. Coordinated targeting shall be defined as a conscious effort to select the beneficiaries of agricultural interventions and social protection programmes in a way to increase the joint impact of both programmes. It is important to bear in mind that targeting is only one of many means to coordinate social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers. Other key elements
Correspondence to: Setor Bancário Sul Quadra 1, Bloco J, Ed. BNDES, 13º andarUNDP/IPC-IG Brasilia-DF, Brazil, 70076-900. E-mail address: [email protected] (F. Veras Soares).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2016.08.006 Received 30 March 2016; Received in revised form 1 July 2016; Accepted 25 August 2016 Available online xxxx 2211-9124/ © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Please cite this article as: Cirillo, C., Global Food Security (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2016.08.006
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hold incomes, increased consumption and food security (Tirivayi et al., 2013). One could also expect that the increased income of smallholder farmers might lead to better nutritional outcomes, to facilitate access to health care and increase the demand for education, which, in the long term can foster the levels of human capital of current and future generations, further reducing risks and vulnerabilities, and thus contributing to the ultimate social protection objectives in a virtuous cycle. Despite, a large body of evidence of the short- to medium-term effects, the available evidence on the long term impacts is rather limited (Tirivayi et al., 2013). At the local-economy level, synergies can be created through spillover effects between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households of social protection programmes or agricultural interventions. Cash transfers can, for example, increase the purchasing power of their beneficiaries, thereby also creating demand for the agricultural products of better-off households which do not directly benefit from social protection programmes. Food aid programmes or food for education programmes are also in a position to generate spillover effects if food is procured at the local level, thereby increasing the demand and boosting the prices of agricultural products. Lastly, Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) point out that synergies may also occur at a macroeconomic level, for example if agricultural interventions promote economic growth thereby increasing the fiscal base for the expansion of social protection programmes. Despite the great potential for synergies between both policy areas, it should be noted that the joint implementation of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions is rare and can also lead to conflicts. At the macro-level, social protection programmes and agricultural interventions might compete for fiscal resources. At the local-economy level, food aid programmes can help local farmers if the foodstuff is purchased locally, but also may have a detrimental effect, as the private demand for local food would decrease. At the micro-level, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes might change the incentives for smallholder farmers and lead them to divert efforts from agricultural activities to the fulfilment of conditionalities (for a more comprehensive discussion on the potential conflicts between social protection and agricultural interventions see Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009; Tirivayi et al., 2013). These arguments underline the importance of coordinating the implementation modalities of social protection and agricultural interventions carefully and to go beyond the intentional creation of a pure overlap between beneficiaries.
are the coordination of the implementation details and timing of agricultural and social programmes in order to avoid any conflicting interests (e.g. avoid that public work programmes coincide in their timing with agricultural peak seasons), and the alignment of the overall objectives of policies from both areas. This paper will exclusively focus on targeting as a means of coordination – an overview of other dimensions of coordination between social protection and agriculture can be found in Gavrilovic et al. (2016). Benefits from coherent targeting of agricultural interventions and social protection programmes can be expected to emerge in different ways which will be further explored in the subsequent sections, particularly in the case studies. Here we briefly highlight two different ways. First, the joint and/or coordinated collection and use of data on potential beneficiaries could generate an overall reduction of the targeting and operational costs and ensure that targeting objectives of overlapping geographical areas and/or individual/households are smoothly reached. Similarly, efforts to integrate databases from the two sectors can reach a similar purpose without compromising sector specific information and data needs that may require specific databases. Second, the coordinated selection of beneficiaries, particularly the identification of who should benefit from more than one intervention (or which areas) could positively affect people's living standards, their productive choices and their food security, leading to the emergence of synergies. This paper illustrates based on a few case studies how targeting can be used to intentionally seek synergies between the two policy areas. Our paper builds on the work of Gavrilovic et al. (2016); Tirivayi et al. (2013) and Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009) who provided an overview on how social protection and agricultural programmes can mutually reinforce their impacts in a virtuous manner. However, while most case studies discussed in these three papers refer to synergies that emerged ‘by chance’, this paper puts an emphasis on how synergies between both policy areas can be consciously triggered through coordinated targeting mechanisms. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 includes a brief literature review on the evidence around the interaction between social protection policies and agricultural interventions. Section 3 puts forward a simple conceptual framework on how targeting can be used to foster synergies between these two areas. Section 4 presents a number of case studies and illustrates how some countries have already made conscious efforts to trigger synergies between social protection and agriculture.
3. Targeting to create synergies between agriculture and social protection – a conceptual framework
2. Synergies between agricultural interventions and social protection
Building on the points summarised in the last section, this section puts forward a simple conceptual framework on how targeting coherence between social protection and agricultural interventions can be intentionally sought with a view to promote synergies that would improve the socioeconomic situation and the food security of vulnerable populations in rural areas. In practice, there are two different approaches to trigger synergies by means of targeting: Two different sectoral interventions can be jointly implemented (i) using the same database and/or targeting strategy with a view to reaching the same households/individuals, alternatively integrated databases could be used for the same purpose or (ii) selecting the same intervention areas, without necessarily targeting the same households within those areas. In order to decide which of both approaches to take, it is important to be clear whether synergies are expected to arise mostly at the household level, at the local economy level or at the macroeconomic level, as this has implications on the role of targeting in promoting synergies. Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between the level of synergies, target groups and targeting methods. If the synergies are expected to arise at the individual/household level, an agricultural intervention should be targeted to the same individuals/households who are also benefiting from a social protection programme, possibly the same targeting tools
Synergies between social protection and agricultural interventions can potentially emerge at three different levels, namely, individual/ household, local economy, and macroeconomic (Tirivayi et al. 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009). At the household level, social protection can alleviate liquidity constraints thereby allowing credit constrained farmers to invest in more inputs and in the adoption of new production technologies (Gertler et al., 2012; Harvey, 2007). Besides, social protection can protect against negative shocks related to agricultural seasonalities (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009). Social protection can also act as an insurance mechanism against agricultural risks, thereby stimulating risk-taking behaviour among smallholder farmers and consequently increasing the expected returns on their agricultural activities (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999; Dercon, 2002). Agricultural interventions can reduce the vulnerabilities of poor households, thereby directly contributing to the main objective of social protection, namely, to reduce risk and vulnerabilities of poor households. It can also address structural factors, particularly when targeted and adapted to family farmers, so that to ensure their access to credit, insurance, technology and markers. Agricultural interventions usually aim at increasing agricultural productivity which implies higher house2
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Target Groups
Targeting Methods
Expected Level of Synergies
Examples for expected synergies
SP and AI target same individuals and households
Any target group
SP and AI target same geographical areas
Means test, proxy-means test, community-based targeting, categorical targeting, self-targeting
Geographical targeting
Any targeting method, but policy alignment required - timing and scale of interventions
LocalEconomy level
Individual / Household level
Social Protection may alleviate credit constraints, thereby promoting investments in more productive agricultural technologies.
Cash transfer programmes have positive spillover effects on nonbeneficiary households (e.g. higher demand for locally produced agricultural products).
Agricultural interventions increase the income from agricultural activities thereby also improving health and education and reducing vulnerabilities of its beneficiaries (one of the primary objectives of social protection).
Agricultural interventions increase agricultural productivity which may lead to lower food prices and therefore higher welfare in poor households.
Macro-level
Agricultural interventions increase smallholder farmers’ incomes and can increase the fiscal base to expand social protection to cover other risks and vulnerabilities.
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Fig. 1. Targeting and synergies between social protection (SP) and agricultural interventions (AI) – a conceptual framework. Source: Author's elaboration. The examples for the synergies are based on Tirivayi et al. (2013) and Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2009).
the so-called “double dipping” (access to two or more programmes) are seen as morally not acceptable when similar vulnerable households may not be considered eligible for neither of the programmes. Thus, it is important to clearly communicate the “overlapping” nature of the combined interventions and make sure that other alternatives are used to minimise “programme” exclusion among marginally non-eligible households.
(e.g. registry forms, targeting approach/variables with possible different cut-off points in case not all beneficiaries from one sector programme are meant to be eligible for the other sector programme), should be used or at least the integration of potential beneficiary database should be sought. In cases where the synergies are likely to emerge at the local-economy level, it would be sufficient to implement agricultural interventions and social protection programmes in the same geographical areas without necessarily targeting the same households.. Different elements of the targeting process (e.g. definition of eligibility criteria; targeting methods; registries) play different roles in the coordination of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions and should ideally be aligned with each other in order to maximise the potential for synergies. The eligibility criteria are at the very basis of the coordination process – for synergies to emerge at the individual/household level, eligibility criteria need to create an overlap of households being eligible for both programmes. To trigger synergies at the local economy level, an overlap in the geographic areas which are eligible is required. The targeting methods (e.g. proxy-means test, community based targeting, means test) can be considered as tools to put the eligibility criteria into practice. The targeting methods of an agricultural programme and a social protection intervention do not necessarily need be identical for synergies to emerge – if the eligibility criteria are aligned and the targeting methods are implemented duly, an overlap of beneficiaries can even emerge based on different targeting methods. The use of a single or unified registry can facilitate the creation of synergies substantially as it allows for an easy identification of households/individuals which are eligible for both programmes and can be a basis to monitor how many of these households indeed benefit from both interventions. A special concern with the joint implementation of community based targeting approaches or approaches that use final community validation of beneficiary lists is related to the notion of “fairness” that may prevent programme overlapping to take place. In some contexts
4. Case studies This section presents five case studies in which synergies between the policy areas of social protection and agriculture have been intentionally promoted by targeting the same beneficiaries or the same intervention areas. In Latin America there are several examples of single or unified data registries such as the Cadastro Único in Brazil and the Padrón General de Hogares in Peru or unified targeting systems (integrated database) such as the Social Information System in Chile, which are an ideal basis for exploiting targeting synergies involving social protection programmes. Single or unified data registries can be a basis for promoting synergies first and foremost at the individual/household level as they allow selecting the same individuals for participation in both a social protection programme and an agricultural support scheme. However, as illustrated below, they can also be a tool for facilitating synergies at the local economy level, e.g. if agricultural interventions are targeted to a geographic area with a high percentage of social protection beneficiaries, as indicated in the (unified) registries. Single or unified registries usually contain basic information on potential beneficiaries of social protection programmes, demographic composition as well as their monthly income/expenditure (or alternatively easily verifiable proxies for these variables, e.g. household characteristics such as materials of the walls/roof, possession of assets such as a TV, etc.), and possibly their beneficiary status. A single or unified registry can therefore serve as an initial basis to create a 3
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mented by the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS), the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), the Ministry of National Integration (MI) and the Ministry of the Environment (MMA) (See Table 1). One important basis for this inter-ministerial coordination has been the consequent use of Brazil's unified database Cadastro Único for the targeting of BSM beneficiaries – in combination with the DAP database for productive inclusion programmes (see below). For the targeting of BSM's rural productive inclusion component, the Cadastro Único has been merged with the main targeting tool of the agricultural credit line for family farmers, PRONAF (the database of the Declaração de Aptidão da Agricultura Familiar form (DAP)). The PRONAF database, which has been working since 1996, predating both Bolsa Familia and the Cadastro Único, does not rely on the Cadastro Único and uses its own data collection and targeting strategy. Although one should expect that PRONAF's coverage overlaps with Bolsa Familia, it should be noted that its target group, unlike BSM, does not consist exclusively of the extremely poor. Farmers with a family income of up to USD 140,000 (BRL360,000) can apply for the programme. However, for the rural microcredit line of PRONAF the eligible line is much lower, the maximum annual income is approximately USD7500 (BRL20,000). The rural productive inclusion strategy of Brasil sem Miseria relies on merging both databases to implement a structured selection of the beneficiaries that can benefit from a “package” of coordinated interventions. However, many challenges are faced during this process due to the lack of common variables to link both databases and the differences in background and work protocols between social workers and providers of extension services in the field. In fact, most of the Rural Productive Inclusion Programmes were able to create the intended overlap with the coverage of Bolsa Familia beneficiaries. For instance, among the Água para Todos beneficiaries, 82% are registered in Cadastro Único, 71% are also Bolsa Familia beneficiaries, and 68% are extremely poor. In addition, between 2010 and 2013, the total amount of produce purchased by the PAA from family farmers registered in the Cadastro Único increased from 32% to 50% (Mello et al., 2014). Overall this illustrates a substantial potential for synergies at the individual and/or household level as large parts of these agricultural development programmes also are enroled in the country's major social protection database, benefitting from Bolsa Familia or other social protection initiatives. In Ethiopia, conscious efforts have been made in order to create synergies on the individual/household level and the local economy level between the country's main social protection initiative, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and a major agricultural development initiative, the ‘Other Food Security Programme (OFSP)’. The PSNP is a social protection programme which provides cash or food-based public work programmes to food insecure households with able-bodied members, or cash transfers for food insecure households without able-bodied members. The selection of beneficiaries has been based on a mix of geographical targeting and community-based targeting and largely relied on the targeting of former food aid programmes. A woreda (an administrative division in Ethiopia, below the level of region and zone) was eligible for the PSNP if it had been a recipient of food aid for at least each of the last 3 years, while the households were selected if they received food assistance in the last three years and complied with administrative and community guidelines (GoE, Government of Ethiopia, 2004). After the second year of the PSNP implementation, the government decided to intentionally foster access of PSNP beneficiary to ‘Other Food Security Programme’ (OFSP). (Slater et al., 2006; Hoddinot et al., 2015). However, Gilligan et al. (2009) report that just 32.7% of the PNSP beneficiaries had also received OFSP transfers or services in 2006. The common geographical targeting was important but not sufficient to generate targeting synergies. Understaffing of extension services at local level and delinking credit and extension services have
conscious overlap between the beneficiaries of a social protection programme and an agricultural support programme. These registries, however, would need to have information on agricultural livelihoods, or be integrated with similar databases containing this information, which requires close collaboration across the two sectors The paragraphs below will describe how both Peru and Brazil have already used their national registries to coordinate the targeting of agricultural and social programmes. The case of Peru and its general household registry (Padrón General de Hogares) provides an example of promoting synergies through targeting, not only between the policy areas of agriculture and social protection, but also across different programmes within these areas. The Padrón General de Hogares is the tool for targeting the country's main social protection programme, the CCT programme Juntos, as well as other social programmes such as the nutrition and food security programmes Vaso de Leche, Comedores Populares, and the Programa Integral de Nutrición, but also the free health insurance scheme, Seguro Integral de Salud. Moreover, the Government of Peru has sought to build common targeting strategies between social protection and agriculture interventions. The rural development programme Haku Wiñay, which provides extension services as well as productive assets, training and financial inclusion services to extremely poor farmers, is targeted at villages where a sufficiently large share of the inhabitants are beneficiaries of the CCT Juntos (Escobal and Ponce, 2015). Haku Wiñay can therefore be considered as an example where targeting is creating the basis for synergies at the local economy level. Since Haku Wiñay aims at reaching the poor population, the percentage of Juntos recipients (who are by design, poor households) serves as a proxy for the prevalence of poverty in the respective geographical areas. It is worth underlining that Haku Wiñay just used the ‘targeting’ of Juntos, but did not directly draw on Peru's unified database Padrón General de Hogares.. In Brazil, the rural productive inclusion component of the Brasil sem Miseria (BSM) strategy (Brazil without Extreme Poverty) has been targeted with a view to fostering the emergence of synergies between rural development and food security interventions and the country's CCT programme Bolsa Familia in rural areas – first and foremost at the individual/household level. The BSM strategy aims to ensure that those Bolsa Familia beneficiaries whose income is below the extreme poverty line (70 BRL per month, corresponding to the World Bank's 1.25 USD poverty line at purchasing power parity), have access to a set of rural development interventions. This includes tailor-made extension services coupled with investment grants (disbursed after approval of an investment plan), distribution of improved seeds, access to water for consumption and production, as well as access to the food procurement programme for smallholder farmers (Programa Aquisição de Alimentos Provenientes da Agricultura Familiar – PAA) and to the Bolsa Verde (Green grant) programme (See Table 1). The “Rural Productive Inclusion” programmes are impleTable 1 Rural Productive Inclusion Programmes in Brazil and their implementing ministries. Source: Author’s elaboration based on Paes Souza (2013). Rural Productive Inclusion programme
Implementing Ministry
PAA
Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger/Ministry of Agrarian Development Ministry of Agrarian Development Ministry of Agrarian Development Ministry of National Integration / Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger
Technical Assistance Improved Seeds Water for Everyone (Programa Água para Todos) Programa Bolsa Verde (Green grant)
Ministry of the Environment
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made agricultural intervention is developed with the profile of the beneficiaries of a social cash transfer. This latter feature, however, may generate conflict, especially if the local communities perceive this “double dipping” as unfair. The following section gives a short summary of the good practices that can be retained based on the case studies presented in this section.
successfully increased the access to the Household Asset Building Programme (HASB), a revised version of the OFSP in 2008. The delinking of credit and extension services was particularly important. Devereux et al. (2008) report how some PSNP beneficiaries have lost their eligibility to the PSNP programme after receiving credits from the OFSP to buy goats, despite the fact that the assets were not yet productive (they were not generating a flow of income yet) and the loan had not yet been paid. This type of fast-track graduation would prevent the building up of the synergies that the common geographical targeting was meant to produce as there would be no time for the benefits of both programmes to reinforce each other. Thus, the Ethiopian example also illustrates some challenges that may emerge when social protection programmes and agricultural development interventions are targeted to the same households based on the geographical targeting only. In addition, this example shows that it does not suffice to align the targeting of the programmes, their overall coherence and coordination should also be strengthened in order to generate sustainable synergies. Largely inspired by the Brazilian PAA programme mentioned above, the PAA Africa programme, seeks to coordinate and even integrate agricultural support policies – food procurement and rural extension service and support to family farmers – with a social protection and food security programme – school feeding. PAA Africa is a joint initiative of the FAO and the WFP involving national governments and is currently being piloted in five African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. The programme consists of two components. A productive support component and a school feeding component: Under the productive support component, the beneficiary farmers receive productive support (inputs and extension) and are guaranteed a stable demand for their products through the school-feeding programme. Under the school-feeding component of the intervention, school-children receive regular school meals based on the locally produced products. In this sense, the second component fulfils a social protection function, providing an in-kind transfer targeted at school children in poor and food insecure areas. In most of the intervention countries both programme components are targeted to the same geographical areas and in some cases even to the same beneficiary households. The geographical targeting aims precisely to identify areas which are at the same time suitable for the agricultural support activities and the school feeding component leading to the potential of synergies at the local economy level. In some implementation countries, the targeting of small vulnerable communities implies that synergies can also emerge at the household level: An adult household member can for example benefit from the productive support component of PAA Africa while her children participate in the school-feeding programme. As a consequence, both the real income of the household, its productive capacity and food security would increase, potentially leading to a mutually reinforcing effect of both components. In Lesotho, the Child Grants Programme (CGP) is complemented by a kitchen gardening intervention plus other livelihood interventions by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The CGP is an unconditional social cash transfer programme that began in 2009. The primary objective of the programme was to improve the living standards of Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), improve health status, and increase school enrolment among OVC. The transfer itself is provided to eligible households on a quarterly basis and typically ranges between M350 and M750 (depending on the number of children in the household). The idea to link the CGP to a kitchen gardening and other livelihood interventions was based on the evaluation findings that highlighted a number of constraints for the cash transfer to be able to also transform livelihoods and increase productivity among beneficiary households. The complementary programme uses the National Information System for Social Assistance (NISSA), a repository of household and individual socioeconomic information, to identify the beneficiaries that would benefit from the livelihood interventions. This a case in which a tailor-
5. Targeting as a tool to build synergies – good practices and limitations The case studies discussed in this paper have illustrated different pathways which can be used to coordinate social protection and agricultural interventions through targeting thereby promoting coherence between these policy areas. The following paragraphs will identify some good practices and approaches of how coherent targeting can be used to promote the emergence of synergies:
•
•
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Geographical targeting: One possibility to trigger synergies is to target two programmes at the same geographical areas, without necessarily targeting the same beneficiaries. The PAA Africa is an example of this case. Alternatively, the geographical targeting may seek to ensure some (but not total) overlapping as in the case of Haku Wiñay and Juntos in Peru and of the PSNP and OFSP/HASP in Ethiopia. Use of unified or integrated databases for identifying beneficiaries: Unified or integrated databases can also be a basis for the promotion of synergies, as they allow to systematically identify the same beneficiary households for a social protection programme and an agricultural intervention. An example for such an approach is the rural productive inclusion component within the Brazil sem miseria strategy in Brazil. This intervention draw on the integration of the single registry and of the DAP – the official database for family farmers policy –, thereby creating a considerable overlap in coverage between the programmes. Use the beneficiary lists of an existing programme: A third possibility to create an overlap in coverage is to target a new programme based on the beneficiary lists of an already existing programme. This approach has the advantage that it is easy to achieve a complete overlap in coverage, this was implemented in Lesotho in the case of the livelihood programmes that complement the CGP.
Depending on the objectives and expected outcomes of the policies' coordination, policy makers can identify the corresponding synergy levels and, in turn, the targeting strategies to produce them. If synergies emerge at the local economy level, the geographical targeting of identical intervention areas may be necessary. If one expects synergies to arise at the household or individual level, one would rather have to target the same households/individuals, possibly based on a unified database or integrated database and similar targeting methods. Overall, it needs to be underlined that targeting is only one element of a successful coordination strategy between agricultural interventions for family farmers and social protection programmes. Targeting can be a tool to assure that programmes from both policy areas benefit the same households and/or geographical areas and thereby create the basis for synergies at the individual level, the household level and the local economy level. In order to be effective, targeting needs to be accompanied by other measures to increase coherence, most importantly the coordination of the programme's implementation details and their overall objectives. 6. Conclusion This paper has analysed how targeting can contribute to a more successful coordination between agricultural interventions and social 5
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Terri Raney, Andre Croppenstedt and Sarah Lowder. Special thanks for the detailed comments and suggestions received from Juan Carlos García y Cebolla and from the FAO/PtoP team members, Ana Paula de la O Campos, Pamela Pozarny and, in particular Marco Knowles who has also provided valuable comments on a second version of the paper. All remaining errors are our responsibility.
protection programmes and promote the creation of synergies between both policy areas thereby more effectively promoting the food security and social inclusion of vulnerable households. The following points should be retained: First, our review of the existing literature suggests that social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers can indeed positively influence each other's impact, provided that they are implemented in the same geographical areas and/or reach the same households. By extension, targeting should be considered an important tool for coordinating these policy areas and for fostering synergies. Second, the fact that in some cases of the case studies the target groups and targeting methods of social protection programmes and agricultural interventions for family farmers were similar can be seen as a promising basis for a stronger coordination of both in the future. However, it should also be noted that if interventions which target the same households are not well coordinated in terms of their implementation details, conflicts can arise which may even negatively affect the programmes' impacts. Third, although social protection programmes and agricultural interventions often still operate in isolation from each other, there are a number of cases in which targeting is already used to coordinate both policy areas. Good practices identified in this paper include the use of geographical targeting – in order to promote synergies at the local economy level – and the use of single/unified databases for assuring that one household can benefit from both agricultural and social protection programmes, thereby triggering synergies at the individual/household level. If targeting is intended to create synergies between social protection programmes and agricultural interventions, the targeting process should take into account whether synergies are expected at the individual/household level or rather at the local economy level, as illustrated in the conceptual framework in Section 3 of this paper. Little evidence is available on the impact of the joint targeting of agricultural interventions and social protection programmes and further studies in this field should be considered an important and policy-relevant avenue for future research.
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Acknowledgement This paper is based on one section of the background paper produced by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) for the FAO's 2015 State of Food and Agriculture. We are grateful to FAO for the funding of this research project and for the comments and suggestions made by the FAO SOFA team, including,
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