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Task experience and attitudes towards decision making
oaGA~IZATmNALBEHAWOaAND ~VMA~ WaFOR~ANCS 3, 202--216 (1968)
Task Experience and Attitudes Towards Decision Making P. GOOD~A~¢ A~CDN. B~OF~
Graduate School o/Business, University o] Chicago This study attempts to extend the work by Breer and Locke (1965) on the effect of task experience on the development of attitudes. Subjects w e r e assigned either to a task where rational problem solving approaches were instrumental to task success, or where rational approaches were less instrumental. The hypothesis that different task experience (rational vs. irrational) would lead to differential attitude change received some support. The relationship between this experiment and the work of Breer and Locke, and of the relationship between task experience and other attitude-change theories, were discussed. The effect of task experience on the development of attitudes has been theoretically and empirically supported in a recent work by Breer and Locke. T h e y have argued that: In any task situation certain patterns of behavior will have greater reward values than others. B y virtue of the reinforcing quality of task outcomes these particular forms of behavior will have a better chance of being emitted than others. At the same time, individuals working on the task can be expected to respond cognitively (though apprehending the instrumental nature of these acts), eathectically (by developing a positive attachment to this behavior), and evaluatively (by defining such behavior as legitimate and morally desirable) (Breer and Locke, 1965, p. 15). Breer and Locke also hypothesize that, through a process of induction, the beliefs, preferences, and values are generalized laterally to other similar tasks, and vertically in terms of level of abstraction. Lateral generalization m a y be illustrated in the following way: an individual performs a task (t:) in which collective (vs. individual) behavior provides the greatest instrumental value. I f he perceives collective behavior as instrumental to task success and adopts this behavior, the above theory suggests he should develop positive affective orientations toward collective behavior with respect to t h a t task (tl). Since the individual is confronted with m a n y tasks in his life, some quite similar to the one (tl) he has successfully completed, Breer and Locke have hypothesized t h a t 2o2
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the orientation developed from this task experience will be generalized to other tasks following a simulus generalization gradient. That is, if an individual likes collective behavior in formal work tasks, he will develop this orientation towards similar tasks at home. Vertical generalization proceeds from a specific to a more abstract referent following the same generalization principle. That is, if an individual develops a positive orientation towards collective behavior in a variety of specific tasks, it is hypothesized he will generalize these orientations to a more abstract level. Collective behavior is desirable not just in work but in life in general. Their findings, derived from seven different experiments, give some support to the effect of differential task experiences on attitude change, and to the subprocesses of lateral and vertical generalization (Breer and Locke, 1965, Chaps. 3-9). The significance of this theory and its associated experiments is that it offers an important alternative explanation for attitude change, namely task experience. It differs sharply from many current attitude change theories which are either based on or tested by some means of communication and persuasion (cf. ttovland, 1953). The task-experience theory differs from dissonance theory in that verification of the latter often involves some form of a communication-persuasion induction, and commitment is a necessary condition for attitude change. In task-experience theory no communication-persuasion induction is necessary, and not commitment alone, but commitment and experience are necessary for change. Another approach in the attitude change literature which is probably closest to the task-experience theory is one which relates the degree of affect toward an object as a function of how that object facilitates the individual's goal fulfillment (cf. Peak, 1960). The similarity between this approach and the Breer and Locke theory is that both are based on an instrumental-reward model. They differ in several important respects. First, the Breer and Locke theory is concerned only with how variations in task experience lead to individual differences in attitudes. The fact that a boy adopts a favorable attitude toward a political figure to please his father (instrumentality) has nothing to do with task experience as a source of attitudes. Second, the task-experience theory is more concerned with the process in which a behavior will become perceived as instrumental, as opposed to just whether an attitude toward an object will reflect the degree of need satisfaction provided by the object (cf. Breer and Locke, 1965, Chap. 2, for more detailed contrasts with other theories such as balance theory, learning theory, etc.). Some of the distinguishing features, then, of the Breer and Locke
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theory are: (a) it only focuses on task experience as a source of attitude change. Although other experiments in the attitude change literature have included tasks, the changed attitude dimension does not reflect a specific behavior instrumental to task completion. For example, in an experiment by Yaryan and Festinger (1961), subjects performed a task (memorization) but the change in the dependent variable was not related to any specific instrumental behavior required to complete the task; (b) it is not based on any form of communication and persuasion; (c) it postur lares behavioral change before attitude change; and (d) it is more concerned with sources of attitude development rather than attitude change. The significance of the theory at a more practical level rests with its application in such areas as job design, career planning, and social action programs. If we accept the fact that task experience affects attitude, one strategy would be to develop a set of tasks to create a certain attitude profile. For example, if we felt that a positive value orientation toward search activities was an important attribute of a high-level manager, we might systematically create task experiences to bring about the orientation. This study attempts to extend the generalizability of the theory by focusing on a different task and attitude dimension--preferences for rational vs. irrational (impulse) approaches to decision making. The most conclusive experiments used to validate the Breer-Locke theory have been designed around the individualism vs. collectivism dimension: By introducing a new dimension, one which concerns individual problem solving rather than interpersonal relations (i.e., individualism vs. collectivism) we can better assess the theory's generalizability. The second aim of this study is to add some methodological refinements for testing the theory. In the previous Breer-Locke experiments, items for the attitude scales were sometimes selected from the experimental group; thus no cross validation was possible. Also, the same form was used in the before and after measurement which might have introduced a bias in the change score. In this study, an attitude scale--with alternate forms measuring preferences for rational vs. impulse approaches to decision making--was developed in one group, cross validated in a second holdout group, and then applied to the two experimental groups (rational and irrational). Another problem in the previous experiments has been the use of counter-control groups. By using the experimental groups as countercontrol groups, it is possible to observe significant differences, but these may result from changes in only one of the experimental conditions. Hence, the use of an independent control in this study should provide greater sensitivity in interpreting any attitude change data. Two hypotheses will be tested: (a) When an individual participates in
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a task where rational analysis vs. guessing (irrational) leads to more successful task completion, the individual will adopt rational decision rules to solve the task and will develop affective and evaluative orientations to approaching decision-making tasks rationally. (b) When an individual participates in a task where guessing vs. rational analysis leads to more successful task completion, the individual will not adopt rational decision rules and will develop affective and evaluative orientation to approaching decision-making tasks in a guessing, more irrational manner. In testing these two hypotheses the concepts of vertical and lateral generalization will be examined. In their theory, Breer and Locke have argued that as the individual shifts from cognitively to affectively apprehending the instrumental behavior in the task two kinds of generalizations occur: lateral generalization, which proceeds from one specific setting to another similar setting (e.g., rational approaches are perceived as desirable in business and therefore should be desirable in family decision making); and vertical generalization, which proceeds from the specific to the abstract (e.g., rational approaches are perceived as desirable in business decision making but also as a way of approaching life in general). Three attitude regions concerning decision making in business, in general, and in the family are included in the attitude questionnaire (the measure of the dependent variable) to assess the generalization process. Since the task experience (independent variable) in this experimen~ is a business game, we predict most attitude change in the business region. The process of vertical generalization can be assessed by examining attitude change scores in the general region and the process of lateral generalization by examining the family region. METHODOLOGY SAMPLE
One hundred and seventy-seven students, both male and female, at the University of Chicago participated in this study. They were divided into the following groups: (a) an item selection group, n----58; (b) a control group which also serves as a holdout group for cross validation, n = 49; (c) an experimental group--rational condition, n = 2 8 ; and (d) an experimental group--irrational condition, n ~ 42.1 1 Of the original 28 people in the rational group, four recognized the connection between the before and after instrument and the purpose of the experiment, and therefore were excluded. Of the 42 irrational subiects, eight were excluded for the same reason, and one for his total disinterest in the experiment. I t is possible subiects unconsciously recognized the purpose of the experiment, b u t this type of measurement problem is clearly not within the scope of this experim e n t and most of the literature a b o u t " d e m a n d characteristics" concerns conscious recognition of the experimental variables.
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INSTRUMENT
Since the attitude questionnaire was developed specifically for this study, a discussion of its design and reliability is necessary. The questionnaire, of which there are two alternate forms--a before and after-is a Likert-type questionnaire divided into three sections--Business Decisions, General Decisions, and Family Decisions. Each section conrains a set of items which can be endorsed on a 9-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. A high score represents preference for rational decision making. The item stems offer the choice between the desirability of approaching decisions in a rational, logical manner or in a more impulsive, emotional, intuitive way. The items in the Business section have a specific reference to the business world. For example: "Logic rather than feelings is the best guide to follow in making business decisions." The General section includes items which refer to decision making in general, and therefore provide a means to test the vertical generalization hypothesis. For example: "People would make fewer mistakes in life if they took time to think each problem through carefully instead of acting on impulse." The last sectionRFamily--includes items which refer to topics such as family expenditures and child raising. This section provides a test of the lateral generalization hypothesis, that is, attitudes developed in one task experience (business) will be generalized to another (family). An example question is: "When you bring up children, feelings rather than logic are your best guide." Nine items are included in both the Business before and after forms, eight in the General before, nine in the after, eight in the Family before, and ten in the after form. To reduce problems of response set, the direction of the item stem, the response categories to be used to endorse the attitude, and item order were varied. Buffer items were included in each section. Also~ the section order was varied in the alternate forms. Reliability data for both forms are presented in Table 1. The re-test time for Groups 1 and 2 was 2.5 hours, the approximate time of the experiment. The instrument's reliability seems fairly stable across both groups. The Business section exhibits the strongest reliability, with the Family and General sections following in order. THE TASK Both experimental manipulations involved essentially the same task, the simulated operation of a concession at a major league baseball park. Subjects were given the following instructions:
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The business game you are about to play simulates a concession business at a major league baseball park. Two products are sold by your firm: hot dogs and beer. Your problem is to estimate the demand for each product and decide how much of each to buy. The demand for your products is affected by the attendance at the ball game and whether the game is a day or night game. Attendance is affected by: (a) the difference in standing between your club (which leads the league all season) and the visiting team, and (b) the day of the week. The capacity of your business is such that no more than 100,000 cups of beer and 75,000 hot dogs can be sold. In order to play the game, you begin by estimating the attendance. Based on your estimate of attendance, you will estimate the amount of beer and hot dogs you think will be sold. You will have 3 minutes in each game in which to estimate the demand for beer and hot dogs and decide on the amount of each product you will purchase. After you make your estimates, you will be told the actual attendance, the maximum amount of each product which could have been sold, and the maximum profit that you could have made. You will then be given 5 minutes in which to calculate your profit (or loss) and what percentage of the possible maximum profit you achieved. Your task is to maximize net profit. I t is entirely possible to achieve 100% of potential profits repetitively once you have some experience with the game, and a number of students have done so in the past. The objective of the game is to work hard and score as high as you can. The game is designed so that you do not need a business background to be successful in playing it. TABLE 1 RELIABILITY DATt ON ATTITUDE INSTRUMENT
Group 1
Group 2
Item-selection group Cross-validatlongroup (n = 58) (n -- 42) Alternate form Retest reliability Business General Family
.76 .67 .72
~:
.80 .67 • : .75
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Following a careful reading of these instructions, the experimenter went through a hypothetical example (which was printed up and distributed to all subjects), making certain that all subjeets understood completely the task requirements and the calculations that were necessary for them to determine their profits. Finally, subjects were cautioned to play the game individually without communicating in any way with other subjects. In both manipulations, subjects played through 12 trials of the game. The conditions of the trials are shown in Table 2, which also gives attendance and demand data for both the rational and irrational manipulations. In the rational manipulation, the attendance and demand figures for hot dogs and beer were simple linear functions of the variables mentioned in the instructionsY Consequently, it was possible for subjects to develop a systematic and total "solution" to the game. In the irrational condition, however, the attendance and demand figures were not related to the variables in any systematic, determinable or "rational" way. Instead, the attendance and demand figures shown in Table 2 were selected, in all but three trials, to avoid any consistent relationship between the game variables. In trials 4, 10, and 11 (Table 2), the "actual" attendance and demand figures were adjusted in such a way that the subject would receive a eertain predetermined percentage of profit, regardless of which demand figures he had estimated. That is, these trials were seleeted for subiect reinforcement. The irrational game was designed to provide a diffuse feeling of success, but one not based on any systematic decision rules. The game was administered in the following way: on each trial, the experimenter wrote on the board the day of the week, difference in standing, and whether it was a day or night game. Subjects were then given 3 minutes to estimate attendance and their purchases of hot dogs and beer. At the end of 3 minutes, but not before, the subiects were asked to write down their attendance and demand estimates on special cards that were provided by the experimenter. The experimenter collected these cards, returned to his desk, and wrote on each card the "actual" attendance for the game and the "actual" (maximum) amount of hot dogs and beer that could have been sold. Based on these actual figures, he also indicated the maximum profit that eould have been achieved if exactly the right number of hot dogs and beers had been purchased. Upon receiv2A = 20,000 -[- 7,000 (D)--3,000 (S), where A = a t t e n d a n c e , D : d a y of week ( M o n d a y = 1, T u e s d a y = 2 . . . . . S u n d a y = 7), S = difference in s t a n d i n g (1, 2, • . . , 9). B ~ 1 . S A - - . 5 ( A ) ( N ) , where B = d e m a n d for beer, A - ~ a t t e n d a n c e , and N: 1 for n i g h t games, 0 for d a y games. H : . 2 5 ( A ) + . 5 0 ( A ) ( N ) , where H ~ d e m a n d for h o t dogs a n d A a n d N are defined ~bove.
Mon Tues Wed Thurs
FH Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed
Thurs
FH
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11
12
Night
Day
Day Night Day Night Day Night
Day Night Day Night
8
7
6 6 1 6 6 7
5 5 4 4
Day or Diff. in night stand.
31,000
27,000
37,000 44,000 66,000 9,000 16,000 20,000
12,000 19,000 29,000 36,000
23,250
6,750
9,250 33,000 16,500 6,750 4,000 15,000
3,000 14,250 7,250 27,000
31,000
40,500
55,500 44,000 99,000 9,000 24,000 20,000
18,000 19,000 43,500 36,000
$5,425
$4,725
$6,475 $7,700 $11,500 $1,575 $2,800 $3,500
$2,100 $3,325 $5,075 $6,300
Max. hot Max. beer Attendance dog sales sales Max. profit
Irrational condition
15,000 7,000 38,000 approx,
70% 2,500 7,500 10,000 12,000 10,000 approx,
90% approx,
70% 11,000
20,000 29,000 44,000 approx,
8o% 4,000 63,0O0 60,000 40,000 15,000 approx,
80% approx,
70% 13,000
4,000
80%
approx.
80%
approx.
25,000 10,000 7,000 6,000
8o% 2,700
approx.
18,000 4,000 15,000
$1,500
--
- -
$3,250 $2,000 $1,900 $1,600
$520
- -
$3,300 $1,100 $5,300
Max. hot Max. beer Attendance dog sales sales Max. profit
DATA
Note.--Cost-price data: Hot dogs and beer both cost $.10, sell for $.20 and give a $.10 profit margin per unit.
Day
Game no.
:Rational condition
A N D
TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF TASK VARIABLES
b~
>
c~
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ing these cards, each subject calculated his profit for the trial (using the cost and sales figures shown in Table 2) and the percentage of the maximum profit he had achieved for the trial. After the subjects had made these calculations, the experimenter calculated the average percentage of profit that had been achieved by the subjects and announced this prior to beginning the next trial. In the three reinforcement trials of the irrational game, the experimenter used a specially constructed slide-rule calculator to determine the appropriate attendance and demand figures to report to each subject so as to achieve the predetermined percentage of profit for that trial. The experimenter's actions at these times were in no way different from those used in the other trials. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The procedures in the two experimental manipulations were essentially identical. Subjects were scheduled for experimentation in groups of from five to seven. Once they had assembled, Experimenter 1 introduced himself and the general purpose of the experiment (as being vaguely concerned with "thinking processes"). Then, stating that he was not quite prepared to begin the experiment, Experimented 1 asked the subjects if they would be willing to spend 5 minutes in assisting a graduate student in his research project. The subjects (all of whom agreed to this request) were then sent to the second experimental room, where Experimenter 2 introduced himself and confirmed his interest in developing a questionnaire as part of his thesis research. He told subjects that the questionnaire was divided into three parts, and that he would administer the three in sequence. In actuality, Parts 1 and 2 were the before instrument, Part 3 the after. After approximately 10 minutes had passed (a period of time sufficiently long for most subjects to have begun Part 2 of the questionnaire) Experimenter 1 showed up, announced that he was ready to begin the experiment and asked whether the subjects had yet completed the questionnaires. Experimenter 2 explained that the subjects were not finished, but that he would send them along as soon as they had finished the second part of the questionnaire. He then explained to the subjects that completion of all three parts of the questionnaire was vital for his research purposes and asked them if they would be willing to return after the experiment to complete the third part. In addition to stressing the importance of completion, he also promised them a nominal payment of 50 cents from his "limited research funds." Upon completing the before instrument, subjects returned to the first experimentdl room and performed the experimental task for a period of approximately 2 hours. Administration of the after instrument was conducted immediately after completion of the task experience. The subjects
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returned to the second experimental room, completed Part 3 of the questionnaire and received the promised remuneration. The final step in the experimental procedure was the administration of a post-experimental inquiry by Experimenter 1. Each subject was asked to fill out an openended questionnaire asking them: (a) how they felt at the end of the game, (b) in what manner they had played the game, (c) whether they had the game figured out (and if so, how), (d) how successful they thought they were in playing the game, (e) what they thought the total experiment was about, and (f) any other comments. In addition, Experimenter 1, with the help of assistants, personally interviewed each subject and carefully probed, using a predetermined set of questions, to ascertain whether the subject had perceived any relationship between the instrument administration and the task. If a subject perceived a relationship, he was then asked what the nature of the relationship was. After this interview, subjects were paid, asked to maintain the confidentiality of the experiment, and told they would be informed by mail of the results of the experiment. RESULTS
Table 3 presents a check on the task manipulation. To support the hypotheses it is necessary to show that in both the rational and irrational tasks different behaviors are instrumental in task success. That is, in the rational task, more subjects should adopt rational decision rules, while in the irrational task, rational decision rules should be less preferred. The subject's approach was measured by three open-end postexperimental questions: how did you feel at the end of the game; how did you play the games; and when you finished playing the game, did you think you had figured it out? How? An individual was classified as rational if he reported a set of operative decision rules employed by the end of the game. An individual was classified as irrational if no operative decision rules were employed at the end of the game. The results seem to indicate that the task manipulation had its desired effect. The association between the experimental conditions and percepTABLE 3 ANALYSIS OF THE TASK MANIPULATION
Subject perception Experimental designation Rational Irrational N o t e . - - p < .001.
Rational
17 1
Irrational
7 32
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t i o n of the e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s is s i g n i f i c a n t b e y o n d the p ~ .001 level (X2 ~ 26.2, d] = 1). T a b l e 4 presents the a v e r a g e change score for b o t h e x p e r i m e n t a l condit i o n s i n each a t t i t u d e section. T h e change score was derived in the following w a y : t h e before score a n d a f t e r score for each i n d i v i d u a l in each a t t i t u d e section was calculated, s u m m e d a n d a v e r a g e d 2 T h e a v e r a g e TABLE 4 ATTITIIDE-CttANGE SCORES FOR DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Rational conditional
Attitude area Business General Family
Experimental Control (n = 17) (n = 49) Average mean Average mean difference difference q-.381 q-. 118 q-. 174
Difference
--.047 --. 252 --. 085
.428 .370 .259
t value t = 1.89" t = 1.79* t = 1.14
Irrational condition
Attitude area Business General Family
Experimental Control (n = 32) (n = 49) Average mean Average mean difference difference - . 427 --. 104 q-. 120
-.047 --.252 --.085
Difference
t value
- . 380 q-. 148 -{-.205
t = 2.17"* t = . 77 t = 1.12
* p < .05.
** p < .025. before score was t h e n s u b t r a c t e d from the a f t e r score. Since a high score (9) r e p r e s e n t s r a t i o n a l i t y vs. i m p u l s e on t h e 9 - p o i n t scale, a positive m e a n r e p r e s e n t s a shift t o w a r d r a t i o n a l i t y , while a n e g a t i v e score represents a shift t o w a r d i r r a t i o n a l i t y . T h e r e s u l t s seem to be ordered i n the p r e d i c t e d direction. All the r a t i o n a l sections shifted t o w a r d g r e a t e r r a t i o n a l i t y , whereas the i r r a t i o n a l sections, w i t h the exception of F a m i l y , shifted i n £he opposite Since we used an alternate form and the number of items varied within the same attitude section of the different forms, it was necessary to determine an individual's average score for the before measure and subtract it from the after measure. Therefore, the score presented in Table 3 is really an average of the difference between average scores for each region. This fact accounts for the relatively small numerical unit appearing in this table.
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direction. I t is very difficult to speculate on the meaning of this contrary shift given the relatively small degree of change, and problems of instrument error. A comparison of means indicates significant shifts in the Business and General areas for the rational group and a significant shift in the opposite direction for the Business area in the irrational condition. The failure of significant shifts in the Family rational and General irrational may be explained by the concepts of lateral and vertical generalization. Since the task was a business game we would expect greater shifts in that area, which indeed is what occurred, and less in the other two areas. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that in our culture it would be easier to move people in the direction of rationality than in the direction of irrationality. This might account for the shift in the General area in the rational, but not in the irrational condition. However, it is important to cautiously interpret the Rational-General shift because of the size of the negative shift in the control group. The size of this control mean value probably can be attributed to the low reliability of the items for this region. (See Table 1.) To determine whether the above shifts can be interpreted within the framework of the task experience theory two other data analyses are necessary. First, if the subjects in the rational condition who did not adopt rational decision rules also shifted in the rational (positive) direction, the bases of the theory might be criticized (see Table 3). However, if we look at the means for the subjects in rational condition who did not perceive the task as rational, we find they moved in an opposite direction to the subjects in the rational condition who perceived the task as rational. Means for the former group are: Business X ~ --.560, General = --.167, and Family 2~ = - - . 3 0 0 . Since there was only one rational perceiver in the irrational group, this type of analysis is not possible for the irrational group. A second issue concerns the relationship between success and attitude change. I t might be argued, for example, that the irrational people shift towards irrationality because they are frustrated--that some concept of frustration or devaluated self-esteem accounts for the shift toward irrationality, rather than task experience. To resolve this issue, subjects were classified as relatively successful or unsuccessful. Success was operationalized by looking at their game score (percent of maximum profit) over the last five trials. 4 The relatively high-success (average above 50%) *A question about perceived success was included in the exit interview. But the referents for success were so variable among subjects that the question did not discriminate. Therefore, the behavioral measure of their success, percent of profit, was utilized.
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people in rational condition exhibited greater change (X = +.44) than the low-success people (i~ = ~.23). In the irrational, relatively highsuccess people (average above 50%) also show greater change (.~Y= --.61) than low-success people (.X : - - . 2 3 ) in the predicted direction2 If the relationships for the Low-Success Group had been higher than for the High-Success Group, it might be inferred that the change toward irrationality was a function of frustration. The data were also analyzed for sex differences and for differences between groups that were run at different times for each condition. Although no differences seem to occur, the small sample size precludes any definitive comment. DISCUSSION The results give some support to the differential effect of task experience on attitudes. Analysis of the data suggests the task experiences were indeed different, and that differential task experience--rather than a self-esteem-frustration reaction--accounts for the attitude shifts. However, it is necessary to consider some alternative explanations. First, it might be argued that our results could be attributed to subject reaction to the "demand characteristics" of the experiment, that is, the subject understood the purpose of the experiment and tried to give the experimenter what he wanted. Our analysis of the exit interviews, however, suggests that very few people recognized the relationship between the questionnaire and the experiment. Moreover, of those who did, a smaller percent approximated our hypothesis. These individuals were excluded from our data analysis. The fact that more of these individuals appeared in the irrational condition may be accounted for by the fact that the higher probability for initial failure in this group probably stimulated greater search activity, which included being concerned about the questionnaire. Second, it might be that some communication from the experimenter or from the subjects induced changes concerning the relative desirability of rational vs. irrational approaches to decision making. However, since we have suggested that the distinguishing aspect of task experience theory was its nonreliance on communication, every effort was made to remove any biasing experimenter cues from the task instructions. Also, although subjects did sit together, they were advised not to talk with each other and any comments were usually of a process-oriented nature. ~Data are presented only for the Business area. In the other area--General Rational where a predicted hypothesis was confirmed (see Table 4) the mean changes for the high-success vs. low-success group were X ~ ~-.303 and X = Jr .022, respectively.
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Lastly, the one significant instance of vertical generalization in the General area--rational condition--may be accounted for by "order effect," that is, the subject develops a set in one item or set and carries it over to other items. However, the fact that the items were randomly assigned, that the area predicted to change the most (Business) was not first, and that the order of attitude areas was different between the forms suggests an order effect was not a critical variable. Although the results seem to offer support for the task-experience theory, it might be asked why they were not stronger. Four factors seem to be important: the instrument, the nature of the attitude dimension, the lack of an incentive to complete the task, and the characteristics of the population. The instrument was developed especially for this experiment. Although it exhibited fairly stable alternate form retest reliability between the item selection group and the hold-out group, the reliabilities were lower in the two attitude areas (i.e., General and Family) where the least change occurred. Also, too many different topics were covered in the Family area. If we would have written more general items about the Family area, or written about fewer subtopics (items in this area focused on family expenditures, child raising, selection of friends and school) perhaps the results would have been stronger. The nature of the attitude dimension we selected also lowered the probability of confirming our hypotheses in the three attitude areas. In a student culture where logical and quantitative analysis is emphasized it is difficult to move people in a counter direction. That is, we are suggesting there is more resistance to attitude change towards favoring irrationality than towards rationality. Although the theory requires an orientation to complete a task, this experiment did not include a provision for "forcing" task performance such as relating pay to output. Therfore, if some subjects performed the task for its own sake rather than to complete it successfully, a smaller attitude change would be expected. Lastly, the rather select and sophisticated nature of the population probably restricted some of the results. Some of the students tended to ponder and perhaps "over-intellectualize" items in the questionnaire. For others, the game, with its beer and hot dogs, was probably somewhat removed from their intellectual orientations and accordingly less important to them. We may conclude our discussion with the following observations: the findings in this experiment are compatible with those reported by Breer and Locke and they offer some support for the theory of task experience and the development of attitudes. The shifts in the Business region are
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fairly clear, and more important it is this region that had to change more than the others given the concepts of lateral and vertical generalization. By introducing a new task and attitude dimension the generalizability of the theory has been extended. Also, by introducing several methodological refinements (e.g., alternate forms and control groups vs. counter control groups) criticism that could be assigned to some of the earlier experiments has been avoided. In the present state of attitude research this theory has received very little attention, although it offers an important alternative explanation for attitude change. It is not just a restatement of or a derivation from a currently accepted attitude change theory. In our earlier discussion we have shown how it is distinct from other approaches to attitude change (e.g., dissonance theory). On an applied level we have suggested this theory may provide a useful approach for training. If a desired attitude profile can be specified, a set of task experiences could be designed to achieve this profile. For example, if the goal of a training program for underprivileged children was to develop a set of values (e.g., interpersonal trust), perhaps an important alternative to a communication persuasion approach would be a carefully designed set of tasks. Since the task experience theory is relatively new there are m a n y uncharted avenues for research. I t would be interesting to introduce new task and attitude dimensions in order to identify the scope of the theory. Also, the concepts of lateral and vertical generalization need further investigation. For example, it would be useful to determine if different task-attitude dimensions had different generalization gradients. Another important type of research activity would be to move to different populations (e.g., an adult working population). At a different level of analysis, one might investigate the relationship between differences in aggregate task distributions among organizations and the corollary attitudes. REFERENCES BREER, P., A:N'D LOCKE, E. Task experience as a source o] attitudes. Homewood,
Illinois: Dorsey, 1965. KOWnND, C. I., JANIS, I. L., AND KE~Z~EV, It. H. Communication and persuasion. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953. BEA~:, It. The effect of aroused motivation on attitudes. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 463-468. YARYAN, R., AND FESTINGER,L. Preparatory action and belief in the probable occurrence of :future events. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63~ 603-606. RECEIVED: August 11, 1967
Task Experience and Attitudes Towards Decision Making P. GOOD~A~¢ A~CDN. B~OF~
Graduate School o/Business, University o] Chicago This study attempts to extend the work by Breer and Locke (1965) on the effect of task experience on the development of attitudes. Subjects w e r e assigned either to a task where rational problem solving approaches were instrumental to task success, or where rational approaches were less instrumental. The hypothesis that different task experience (rational vs. irrational) would lead to differential attitude change received some support. The relationship between this experiment and the work of Breer and Locke, and of the relationship between task experience and other attitude-change theories, were discussed. The effect of task experience on the development of attitudes has been theoretically and empirically supported in a recent work by Breer and Locke. T h e y have argued that: In any task situation certain patterns of behavior will have greater reward values than others. B y virtue of the reinforcing quality of task outcomes these particular forms of behavior will have a better chance of being emitted than others. At the same time, individuals working on the task can be expected to respond cognitively (though apprehending the instrumental nature of these acts), eathectically (by developing a positive attachment to this behavior), and evaluatively (by defining such behavior as legitimate and morally desirable) (Breer and Locke, 1965, p. 15). Breer and Locke also hypothesize that, through a process of induction, the beliefs, preferences, and values are generalized laterally to other similar tasks, and vertically in terms of level of abstraction. Lateral generalization m a y be illustrated in the following way: an individual performs a task (t:) in which collective (vs. individual) behavior provides the greatest instrumental value. I f he perceives collective behavior as instrumental to task success and adopts this behavior, the above theory suggests he should develop positive affective orientations toward collective behavior with respect to t h a t task (tl). Since the individual is confronted with m a n y tasks in his life, some quite similar to the one (tl) he has successfully completed, Breer and Locke have hypothesized t h a t 2o2
TASK EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES
203
the orientation developed from this task experience will be generalized to other tasks following a simulus generalization gradient. That is, if an individual likes collective behavior in formal work tasks, he will develop this orientation towards similar tasks at home. Vertical generalization proceeds from a specific to a more abstract referent following the same generalization principle. That is, if an individual develops a positive orientation towards collective behavior in a variety of specific tasks, it is hypothesized he will generalize these orientations to a more abstract level. Collective behavior is desirable not just in work but in life in general. Their findings, derived from seven different experiments, give some support to the effect of differential task experiences on attitude change, and to the subprocesses of lateral and vertical generalization (Breer and Locke, 1965, Chaps. 3-9). The significance of this theory and its associated experiments is that it offers an important alternative explanation for attitude change, namely task experience. It differs sharply from many current attitude change theories which are either based on or tested by some means of communication and persuasion (cf. ttovland, 1953). The task-experience theory differs from dissonance theory in that verification of the latter often involves some form of a communication-persuasion induction, and commitment is a necessary condition for attitude change. In task-experience theory no communication-persuasion induction is necessary, and not commitment alone, but commitment and experience are necessary for change. Another approach in the attitude change literature which is probably closest to the task-experience theory is one which relates the degree of affect toward an object as a function of how that object facilitates the individual's goal fulfillment (cf. Peak, 1960). The similarity between this approach and the Breer and Locke theory is that both are based on an instrumental-reward model. They differ in several important respects. First, the Breer and Locke theory is concerned only with how variations in task experience lead to individual differences in attitudes. The fact that a boy adopts a favorable attitude toward a political figure to please his father (instrumentality) has nothing to do with task experience as a source of attitudes. Second, the task-experience theory is more concerned with the process in which a behavior will become perceived as instrumental, as opposed to just whether an attitude toward an object will reflect the degree of need satisfaction provided by the object (cf. Breer and Locke, 1965, Chap. 2, for more detailed contrasts with other theories such as balance theory, learning theory, etc.). Some of the distinguishing features, then, of the Breer and Locke
~0~
GOODMAIN" AND BALOFF
theory are: (a) it only focuses on task experience as a source of attitude change. Although other experiments in the attitude change literature have included tasks, the changed attitude dimension does not reflect a specific behavior instrumental to task completion. For example, in an experiment by Yaryan and Festinger (1961), subjects performed a task (memorization) but the change in the dependent variable was not related to any specific instrumental behavior required to complete the task; (b) it is not based on any form of communication and persuasion; (c) it postur lares behavioral change before attitude change; and (d) it is more concerned with sources of attitude development rather than attitude change. The significance of the theory at a more practical level rests with its application in such areas as job design, career planning, and social action programs. If we accept the fact that task experience affects attitude, one strategy would be to develop a set of tasks to create a certain attitude profile. For example, if we felt that a positive value orientation toward search activities was an important attribute of a high-level manager, we might systematically create task experiences to bring about the orientation. This study attempts to extend the generalizability of the theory by focusing on a different task and attitude dimension--preferences for rational vs. irrational (impulse) approaches to decision making. The most conclusive experiments used to validate the Breer-Locke theory have been designed around the individualism vs. collectivism dimension: By introducing a new dimension, one which concerns individual problem solving rather than interpersonal relations (i.e., individualism vs. collectivism) we can better assess the theory's generalizability. The second aim of this study is to add some methodological refinements for testing the theory. In the previous Breer-Locke experiments, items for the attitude scales were sometimes selected from the experimental group; thus no cross validation was possible. Also, the same form was used in the before and after measurement which might have introduced a bias in the change score. In this study, an attitude scale--with alternate forms measuring preferences for rational vs. impulse approaches to decision making--was developed in one group, cross validated in a second holdout group, and then applied to the two experimental groups (rational and irrational). Another problem in the previous experiments has been the use of counter-control groups. By using the experimental groups as countercontrol groups, it is possible to observe significant differences, but these may result from changes in only one of the experimental conditions. Hence, the use of an independent control in this study should provide greater sensitivity in interpreting any attitude change data. Two hypotheses will be tested: (a) When an individual participates in
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205
a task where rational analysis vs. guessing (irrational) leads to more successful task completion, the individual will adopt rational decision rules to solve the task and will develop affective and evaluative orientations to approaching decision-making tasks rationally. (b) When an individual participates in a task where guessing vs. rational analysis leads to more successful task completion, the individual will not adopt rational decision rules and will develop affective and evaluative orientation to approaching decision-making tasks in a guessing, more irrational manner. In testing these two hypotheses the concepts of vertical and lateral generalization will be examined. In their theory, Breer and Locke have argued that as the individual shifts from cognitively to affectively apprehending the instrumental behavior in the task two kinds of generalizations occur: lateral generalization, which proceeds from one specific setting to another similar setting (e.g., rational approaches are perceived as desirable in business and therefore should be desirable in family decision making); and vertical generalization, which proceeds from the specific to the abstract (e.g., rational approaches are perceived as desirable in business decision making but also as a way of approaching life in general). Three attitude regions concerning decision making in business, in general, and in the family are included in the attitude questionnaire (the measure of the dependent variable) to assess the generalization process. Since the task experience (independent variable) in this experimen~ is a business game, we predict most attitude change in the business region. The process of vertical generalization can be assessed by examining attitude change scores in the general region and the process of lateral generalization by examining the family region. METHODOLOGY SAMPLE
One hundred and seventy-seven students, both male and female, at the University of Chicago participated in this study. They were divided into the following groups: (a) an item selection group, n----58; (b) a control group which also serves as a holdout group for cross validation, n = 49; (c) an experimental group--rational condition, n = 2 8 ; and (d) an experimental group--irrational condition, n ~ 42.1 1 Of the original 28 people in the rational group, four recognized the connection between the before and after instrument and the purpose of the experiment, and therefore were excluded. Of the 42 irrational subiects, eight were excluded for the same reason, and one for his total disinterest in the experiment. I t is possible subiects unconsciously recognized the purpose of the experiment, b u t this type of measurement problem is clearly not within the scope of this experim e n t and most of the literature a b o u t " d e m a n d characteristics" concerns conscious recognition of the experimental variables.
206
GOODMAN
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BALOFF
INSTRUMENT
Since the attitude questionnaire was developed specifically for this study, a discussion of its design and reliability is necessary. The questionnaire, of which there are two alternate forms--a before and after-is a Likert-type questionnaire divided into three sections--Business Decisions, General Decisions, and Family Decisions. Each section conrains a set of items which can be endorsed on a 9-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. A high score represents preference for rational decision making. The item stems offer the choice between the desirability of approaching decisions in a rational, logical manner or in a more impulsive, emotional, intuitive way. The items in the Business section have a specific reference to the business world. For example: "Logic rather than feelings is the best guide to follow in making business decisions." The General section includes items which refer to decision making in general, and therefore provide a means to test the vertical generalization hypothesis. For example: "People would make fewer mistakes in life if they took time to think each problem through carefully instead of acting on impulse." The last sectionRFamily--includes items which refer to topics such as family expenditures and child raising. This section provides a test of the lateral generalization hypothesis, that is, attitudes developed in one task experience (business) will be generalized to another (family). An example question is: "When you bring up children, feelings rather than logic are your best guide." Nine items are included in both the Business before and after forms, eight in the General before, nine in the after, eight in the Family before, and ten in the after form. To reduce problems of response set, the direction of the item stem, the response categories to be used to endorse the attitude, and item order were varied. Buffer items were included in each section. Also~ the section order was varied in the alternate forms. Reliability data for both forms are presented in Table 1. The re-test time for Groups 1 and 2 was 2.5 hours, the approximate time of the experiment. The instrument's reliability seems fairly stable across both groups. The Business section exhibits the strongest reliability, with the Family and General sections following in order. THE TASK Both experimental manipulations involved essentially the same task, the simulated operation of a concession at a major league baseball park. Subjects were given the following instructions:
TASK EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES
207
The business game you are about to play simulates a concession business at a major league baseball park. Two products are sold by your firm: hot dogs and beer. Your problem is to estimate the demand for each product and decide how much of each to buy. The demand for your products is affected by the attendance at the ball game and whether the game is a day or night game. Attendance is affected by: (a) the difference in standing between your club (which leads the league all season) and the visiting team, and (b) the day of the week. The capacity of your business is such that no more than 100,000 cups of beer and 75,000 hot dogs can be sold. In order to play the game, you begin by estimating the attendance. Based on your estimate of attendance, you will estimate the amount of beer and hot dogs you think will be sold. You will have 3 minutes in each game in which to estimate the demand for beer and hot dogs and decide on the amount of each product you will purchase. After you make your estimates, you will be told the actual attendance, the maximum amount of each product which could have been sold, and the maximum profit that you could have made. You will then be given 5 minutes in which to calculate your profit (or loss) and what percentage of the possible maximum profit you achieved. Your task is to maximize net profit. I t is entirely possible to achieve 100% of potential profits repetitively once you have some experience with the game, and a number of students have done so in the past. The objective of the game is to work hard and score as high as you can. The game is designed so that you do not need a business background to be successful in playing it. TABLE 1 RELIABILITY DATt ON ATTITUDE INSTRUMENT
Group 1
Group 2
Item-selection group Cross-validatlongroup (n = 58) (n -- 42) Alternate form Retest reliability Business General Family
.76 .67 .72
~:
.80 .67 • : .75
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GOODMAN
A N D BALOFF
Following a careful reading of these instructions, the experimenter went through a hypothetical example (which was printed up and distributed to all subjects), making certain that all subjeets understood completely the task requirements and the calculations that were necessary for them to determine their profits. Finally, subjects were cautioned to play the game individually without communicating in any way with other subjects. In both manipulations, subjects played through 12 trials of the game. The conditions of the trials are shown in Table 2, which also gives attendance and demand data for both the rational and irrational manipulations. In the rational manipulation, the attendance and demand figures for hot dogs and beer were simple linear functions of the variables mentioned in the instructionsY Consequently, it was possible for subjects to develop a systematic and total "solution" to the game. In the irrational condition, however, the attendance and demand figures were not related to the variables in any systematic, determinable or "rational" way. Instead, the attendance and demand figures shown in Table 2 were selected, in all but three trials, to avoid any consistent relationship between the game variables. In trials 4, 10, and 11 (Table 2), the "actual" attendance and demand figures were adjusted in such a way that the subject would receive a eertain predetermined percentage of profit, regardless of which demand figures he had estimated. That is, these trials were seleeted for subiect reinforcement. The irrational game was designed to provide a diffuse feeling of success, but one not based on any systematic decision rules. The game was administered in the following way: on each trial, the experimenter wrote on the board the day of the week, difference in standing, and whether it was a day or night game. Subjects were then given 3 minutes to estimate attendance and their purchases of hot dogs and beer. At the end of 3 minutes, but not before, the subiects were asked to write down their attendance and demand estimates on special cards that were provided by the experimenter. The experimenter collected these cards, returned to his desk, and wrote on each card the "actual" attendance for the game and the "actual" (maximum) amount of hot dogs and beer that could have been sold. Based on these actual figures, he also indicated the maximum profit that eould have been achieved if exactly the right number of hot dogs and beers had been purchased. Upon receiv2A = 20,000 -[- 7,000 (D)--3,000 (S), where A = a t t e n d a n c e , D : d a y of week ( M o n d a y = 1, T u e s d a y = 2 . . . . . S u n d a y = 7), S = difference in s t a n d i n g (1, 2, • . . , 9). B ~ 1 . S A - - . 5 ( A ) ( N ) , where B = d e m a n d for beer, A - ~ a t t e n d a n c e , and N: 1 for n i g h t games, 0 for d a y games. H : . 2 5 ( A ) + . 5 0 ( A ) ( N ) , where H ~ d e m a n d for h o t dogs a n d A a n d N are defined ~bove.
Mon Tues Wed Thurs
FH Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed
Thurs
FH
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10
11
12
Night
Day
Day Night Day Night Day Night
Day Night Day Night
8
7
6 6 1 6 6 7
5 5 4 4
Day or Diff. in night stand.
31,000
27,000
37,000 44,000 66,000 9,000 16,000 20,000
12,000 19,000 29,000 36,000
23,250
6,750
9,250 33,000 16,500 6,750 4,000 15,000
3,000 14,250 7,250 27,000
31,000
40,500
55,500 44,000 99,000 9,000 24,000 20,000
18,000 19,000 43,500 36,000
$5,425
$4,725
$6,475 $7,700 $11,500 $1,575 $2,800 $3,500
$2,100 $3,325 $5,075 $6,300
Max. hot Max. beer Attendance dog sales sales Max. profit
Irrational condition
15,000 7,000 38,000 approx,
70% 2,500 7,500 10,000 12,000 10,000 approx,
90% approx,
70% 11,000
20,000 29,000 44,000 approx,
8o% 4,000 63,0O0 60,000 40,000 15,000 approx,
80% approx,
70% 13,000
4,000
80%
approx.
80%
approx.
25,000 10,000 7,000 6,000
8o% 2,700
approx.
18,000 4,000 15,000
$1,500
--
- -
$3,250 $2,000 $1,900 $1,600
$520
- -
$3,300 $1,100 $5,300
Max. hot Max. beer Attendance dog sales sales Max. profit
DATA
Note.--Cost-price data: Hot dogs and beer both cost $.10, sell for $.20 and give a $.10 profit margin per unit.
Day
Game no.
:Rational condition
A N D
TABLE 2 SUMMARY OF TASK VARIABLES
b~
>
c~
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GOODMAN AND BALOFF
ing these cards, each subject calculated his profit for the trial (using the cost and sales figures shown in Table 2) and the percentage of the maximum profit he had achieved for the trial. After the subjects had made these calculations, the experimenter calculated the average percentage of profit that had been achieved by the subjects and announced this prior to beginning the next trial. In the three reinforcement trials of the irrational game, the experimenter used a specially constructed slide-rule calculator to determine the appropriate attendance and demand figures to report to each subject so as to achieve the predetermined percentage of profit for that trial. The experimenter's actions at these times were in no way different from those used in the other trials. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The procedures in the two experimental manipulations were essentially identical. Subjects were scheduled for experimentation in groups of from five to seven. Once they had assembled, Experimenter 1 introduced himself and the general purpose of the experiment (as being vaguely concerned with "thinking processes"). Then, stating that he was not quite prepared to begin the experiment, Experimented 1 asked the subjects if they would be willing to spend 5 minutes in assisting a graduate student in his research project. The subjects (all of whom agreed to this request) were then sent to the second experimental room, where Experimenter 2 introduced himself and confirmed his interest in developing a questionnaire as part of his thesis research. He told subjects that the questionnaire was divided into three parts, and that he would administer the three in sequence. In actuality, Parts 1 and 2 were the before instrument, Part 3 the after. After approximately 10 minutes had passed (a period of time sufficiently long for most subjects to have begun Part 2 of the questionnaire) Experimenter 1 showed up, announced that he was ready to begin the experiment and asked whether the subjects had yet completed the questionnaires. Experimenter 2 explained that the subjects were not finished, but that he would send them along as soon as they had finished the second part of the questionnaire. He then explained to the subjects that completion of all three parts of the questionnaire was vital for his research purposes and asked them if they would be willing to return after the experiment to complete the third part. In addition to stressing the importance of completion, he also promised them a nominal payment of 50 cents from his "limited research funds." Upon completing the before instrument, subjects returned to the first experimentdl room and performed the experimental task for a period of approximately 2 hours. Administration of the after instrument was conducted immediately after completion of the task experience. The subjects
TASK EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES
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returned to the second experimental room, completed Part 3 of the questionnaire and received the promised remuneration. The final step in the experimental procedure was the administration of a post-experimental inquiry by Experimenter 1. Each subject was asked to fill out an openended questionnaire asking them: (a) how they felt at the end of the game, (b) in what manner they had played the game, (c) whether they had the game figured out (and if so, how), (d) how successful they thought they were in playing the game, (e) what they thought the total experiment was about, and (f) any other comments. In addition, Experimenter 1, with the help of assistants, personally interviewed each subject and carefully probed, using a predetermined set of questions, to ascertain whether the subject had perceived any relationship between the instrument administration and the task. If a subject perceived a relationship, he was then asked what the nature of the relationship was. After this interview, subjects were paid, asked to maintain the confidentiality of the experiment, and told they would be informed by mail of the results of the experiment. RESULTS
Table 3 presents a check on the task manipulation. To support the hypotheses it is necessary to show that in both the rational and irrational tasks different behaviors are instrumental in task success. That is, in the rational task, more subjects should adopt rational decision rules, while in the irrational task, rational decision rules should be less preferred. The subject's approach was measured by three open-end postexperimental questions: how did you feel at the end of the game; how did you play the games; and when you finished playing the game, did you think you had figured it out? How? An individual was classified as rational if he reported a set of operative decision rules employed by the end of the game. An individual was classified as irrational if no operative decision rules were employed at the end of the game. The results seem to indicate that the task manipulation had its desired effect. The association between the experimental conditions and percepTABLE 3 ANALYSIS OF THE TASK MANIPULATION
Subject perception Experimental designation Rational Irrational N o t e . - - p < .001.
Rational
17 1
Irrational
7 32
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GOODI~AN A N D BALOFF
t i o n of the e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s is s i g n i f i c a n t b e y o n d the p ~ .001 level (X2 ~ 26.2, d] = 1). T a b l e 4 presents the a v e r a g e change score for b o t h e x p e r i m e n t a l condit i o n s i n each a t t i t u d e section. T h e change score was derived in the following w a y : t h e before score a n d a f t e r score for each i n d i v i d u a l in each a t t i t u d e section was calculated, s u m m e d a n d a v e r a g e d 2 T h e a v e r a g e TABLE 4 ATTITIIDE-CttANGE SCORES FOR DIFFERENT EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Rational conditional
Attitude area Business General Family
Experimental Control (n = 17) (n = 49) Average mean Average mean difference difference q-.381 q-. 118 q-. 174
Difference
--.047 --. 252 --. 085
.428 .370 .259
t value t = 1.89" t = 1.79* t = 1.14
Irrational condition
Attitude area Business General Family
Experimental Control (n = 32) (n = 49) Average mean Average mean difference difference - . 427 --. 104 q-. 120
-.047 --.252 --.085
Difference
t value
- . 380 q-. 148 -{-.205
t = 2.17"* t = . 77 t = 1.12
* p < .05.
** p < .025. before score was t h e n s u b t r a c t e d from the a f t e r score. Since a high score (9) r e p r e s e n t s r a t i o n a l i t y vs. i m p u l s e on t h e 9 - p o i n t scale, a positive m e a n r e p r e s e n t s a shift t o w a r d r a t i o n a l i t y , while a n e g a t i v e score represents a shift t o w a r d i r r a t i o n a l i t y . T h e r e s u l t s seem to be ordered i n the p r e d i c t e d direction. All the r a t i o n a l sections shifted t o w a r d g r e a t e r r a t i o n a l i t y , whereas the i r r a t i o n a l sections, w i t h the exception of F a m i l y , shifted i n £he opposite Since we used an alternate form and the number of items varied within the same attitude section of the different forms, it was necessary to determine an individual's average score for the before measure and subtract it from the after measure. Therefore, the score presented in Table 3 is really an average of the difference between average scores for each region. This fact accounts for the relatively small numerical unit appearing in this table.
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direction. I t is very difficult to speculate on the meaning of this contrary shift given the relatively small degree of change, and problems of instrument error. A comparison of means indicates significant shifts in the Business and General areas for the rational group and a significant shift in the opposite direction for the Business area in the irrational condition. The failure of significant shifts in the Family rational and General irrational may be explained by the concepts of lateral and vertical generalization. Since the task was a business game we would expect greater shifts in that area, which indeed is what occurred, and less in the other two areas. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that in our culture it would be easier to move people in the direction of rationality than in the direction of irrationality. This might account for the shift in the General area in the rational, but not in the irrational condition. However, it is important to cautiously interpret the Rational-General shift because of the size of the negative shift in the control group. The size of this control mean value probably can be attributed to the low reliability of the items for this region. (See Table 1.) To determine whether the above shifts can be interpreted within the framework of the task experience theory two other data analyses are necessary. First, if the subjects in the rational condition who did not adopt rational decision rules also shifted in the rational (positive) direction, the bases of the theory might be criticized (see Table 3). However, if we look at the means for the subjects in rational condition who did not perceive the task as rational, we find they moved in an opposite direction to the subjects in the rational condition who perceived the task as rational. Means for the former group are: Business X ~ --.560, General = --.167, and Family 2~ = - - . 3 0 0 . Since there was only one rational perceiver in the irrational group, this type of analysis is not possible for the irrational group. A second issue concerns the relationship between success and attitude change. I t might be argued, for example, that the irrational people shift towards irrationality because they are frustrated--that some concept of frustration or devaluated self-esteem accounts for the shift toward irrationality, rather than task experience. To resolve this issue, subjects were classified as relatively successful or unsuccessful. Success was operationalized by looking at their game score (percent of maximum profit) over the last five trials. 4 The relatively high-success (average above 50%) *A question about perceived success was included in the exit interview. But the referents for success were so variable among subjects that the question did not discriminate. Therefore, the behavioral measure of their success, percent of profit, was utilized.
214
GOODMAN A N D B A L O F F
people in rational condition exhibited greater change (X = +.44) than the low-success people (i~ = ~.23). In the irrational, relatively highsuccess people (average above 50%) also show greater change (.~Y= --.61) than low-success people (.X : - - . 2 3 ) in the predicted direction2 If the relationships for the Low-Success Group had been higher than for the High-Success Group, it might be inferred that the change toward irrationality was a function of frustration. The data were also analyzed for sex differences and for differences between groups that were run at different times for each condition. Although no differences seem to occur, the small sample size precludes any definitive comment. DISCUSSION The results give some support to the differential effect of task experience on attitudes. Analysis of the data suggests the task experiences were indeed different, and that differential task experience--rather than a self-esteem-frustration reaction--accounts for the attitude shifts. However, it is necessary to consider some alternative explanations. First, it might be argued that our results could be attributed to subject reaction to the "demand characteristics" of the experiment, that is, the subject understood the purpose of the experiment and tried to give the experimenter what he wanted. Our analysis of the exit interviews, however, suggests that very few people recognized the relationship between the questionnaire and the experiment. Moreover, of those who did, a smaller percent approximated our hypothesis. These individuals were excluded from our data analysis. The fact that more of these individuals appeared in the irrational condition may be accounted for by the fact that the higher probability for initial failure in this group probably stimulated greater search activity, which included being concerned about the questionnaire. Second, it might be that some communication from the experimenter or from the subjects induced changes concerning the relative desirability of rational vs. irrational approaches to decision making. However, since we have suggested that the distinguishing aspect of task experience theory was its nonreliance on communication, every effort was made to remove any biasing experimenter cues from the task instructions. Also, although subjects did sit together, they were advised not to talk with each other and any comments were usually of a process-oriented nature. ~Data are presented only for the Business area. In the other area--General Rational where a predicted hypothesis was confirmed (see Table 4) the mean changes for the high-success vs. low-success group were X ~ ~-.303 and X = Jr .022, respectively.
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Lastly, the one significant instance of vertical generalization in the General area--rational condition--may be accounted for by "order effect," that is, the subject develops a set in one item or set and carries it over to other items. However, the fact that the items were randomly assigned, that the area predicted to change the most (Business) was not first, and that the order of attitude areas was different between the forms suggests an order effect was not a critical variable. Although the results seem to offer support for the task-experience theory, it might be asked why they were not stronger. Four factors seem to be important: the instrument, the nature of the attitude dimension, the lack of an incentive to complete the task, and the characteristics of the population. The instrument was developed especially for this experiment. Although it exhibited fairly stable alternate form retest reliability between the item selection group and the hold-out group, the reliabilities were lower in the two attitude areas (i.e., General and Family) where the least change occurred. Also, too many different topics were covered in the Family area. If we would have written more general items about the Family area, or written about fewer subtopics (items in this area focused on family expenditures, child raising, selection of friends and school) perhaps the results would have been stronger. The nature of the attitude dimension we selected also lowered the probability of confirming our hypotheses in the three attitude areas. In a student culture where logical and quantitative analysis is emphasized it is difficult to move people in a counter direction. That is, we are suggesting there is more resistance to attitude change towards favoring irrationality than towards rationality. Although the theory requires an orientation to complete a task, this experiment did not include a provision for "forcing" task performance such as relating pay to output. Therfore, if some subjects performed the task for its own sake rather than to complete it successfully, a smaller attitude change would be expected. Lastly, the rather select and sophisticated nature of the population probably restricted some of the results. Some of the students tended to ponder and perhaps "over-intellectualize" items in the questionnaire. For others, the game, with its beer and hot dogs, was probably somewhat removed from their intellectual orientations and accordingly less important to them. We may conclude our discussion with the following observations: the findings in this experiment are compatible with those reported by Breer and Locke and they offer some support for the theory of task experience and the development of attitudes. The shifts in the Business region are
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fairly clear, and more important it is this region that had to change more than the others given the concepts of lateral and vertical generalization. By introducing a new task and attitude dimension the generalizability of the theory has been extended. Also, by introducing several methodological refinements (e.g., alternate forms and control groups vs. counter control groups) criticism that could be assigned to some of the earlier experiments has been avoided. In the present state of attitude research this theory has received very little attention, although it offers an important alternative explanation for attitude change. It is not just a restatement of or a derivation from a currently accepted attitude change theory. In our earlier discussion we have shown how it is distinct from other approaches to attitude change (e.g., dissonance theory). On an applied level we have suggested this theory may provide a useful approach for training. If a desired attitude profile can be specified, a set of task experiences could be designed to achieve this profile. For example, if the goal of a training program for underprivileged children was to develop a set of values (e.g., interpersonal trust), perhaps an important alternative to a communication persuasion approach would be a carefully designed set of tasks. Since the task experience theory is relatively new there are m a n y uncharted avenues for research. I t would be interesting to introduce new task and attitude dimensions in order to identify the scope of the theory. Also, the concepts of lateral and vertical generalization need further investigation. For example, it would be useful to determine if different task-attitude dimensions had different generalization gradients. Another important type of research activity would be to move to different populations (e.g., an adult working population). At a different level of analysis, one might investigate the relationship between differences in aggregate task distributions among organizations and the corollary attitudes. REFERENCES BREER, P., A:N'D LOCKE, E. Task experience as a source o] attitudes. Homewood,
Illinois: Dorsey, 1965. KOWnND, C. I., JANIS, I. L., AND KE~Z~EV, It. H. Communication and persuasion. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953. BEA~:, It. The effect of aroused motivation on attitudes. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 463-468. YARYAN, R., AND FESTINGER,L. Preparatory action and belief in the probable occurrence of :future events. Journal o] Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63~ 603-606. RECEIVED: August 11, 1967