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Technological artifice and the object-subject relationship
Technology in Society 59 (2019) 101178
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Technology in Society journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc
Technological artifice and the object-subject relationship
T
Theodore John Rivers A R T I C LE I N FO
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Objectification Subjectification Technological artifice
Because we habitually project our potentialities upon technology, its response as a system leads to objectification, which is a logical consequence of technology's influence on being. This understanding is true not only for the beings that are evident as technological artifacts such as tools and machines, but also for ourselves. Since objectification describes the process by which something is rendered as an object, technology is acutely qualified as a system to achieve this result. It is by means of objects that a technological artifice has a bearing on being. Although it is commonly acknowledged that technology encumbers being and achieves this encumbrance by objectifying everything, it is less commonly acknowledged that it is by means of objectification that we have any hope of intensifying our subjectivity, which seems contradictory to technology's relationship to objectification. Nevertheless, there is no other opportunity for us to assert our being unless it is by means of objectification; that is, the presence and influence of objects reverts back to us thereby enabling us to define who we are and what we do. Because objects are meaningful due to their worldliness, the recognition and manipulation of this relationship indicates how they are meaningful to us.
Although it may be true to say that objects are key components of the world, it may also be true to say that the concept of object is problematic because its definition varies greatly. Whether an object is an entity that appears as perceived while lacking an objective existence (Protagoras), or is the embodiment of a transcendent form (Plato), or is a substance in reference to matter (Aristotle and Aquinas), or is merely a bundle of perceptions (Locke and Hume), or is an aggregate of sensible qualities (Berkeley), or is a confirmation of our knowledge about external phenomena (Kant), or is a being characterized by a unity that enters our consciousness (Hegel), or is the name of a concrete thing (Mill), or is the verification of truthfulness from an absolute mind (Royce), or is a phenomenon within our consciousness (Husserl), or is an objective of inquiry (Dewey), or is the result of perception affected by the laws of physics that verifies an event in space-time (Russell), or is a presence only in so far that its reality is buried within (Heidegger), or is an entity that is received by a subject in reference to an experience (Whitehead), or is a description of a thing with a proper name (Quine), or is the result of identification of particulars (Strawson), or is identified by its relationship to other things while remaining a bundle of qualities (Latour), or is indefinable because it is too simple (Frege and Wittgenstein), or by comparison the opposite: a description of every existing and non-existing thing (Meinong), it is essential that we understand objects in themselves and their relationship to the world. If the meaning of object eludes us, we will not understand its importance to the evolutionary process, the natural environment, or society. Nevertheless, it is one thing to explain an event, a condition, or a phenomenon, but quite another thing to describe what it signifies.
Before we begin our discussion, we will define three terms: object, subject, and technological artifice. We will also point out the relationship among them, and how these relationships differ depending upon where they originate; that is, from object to subject, subject to object, object to artifice, and artifice to both. Initially, of the many definitions associated with an object, we emphasize the meaning that refers to an individually perceived thing, that is, an entity of which an observation can be made resulting in recognition of what that thing is, which is a definition that directly relates to its meaning from its Latin roots. If an object is anything that presents itself, this definition agrees, in part, with the interpretations of Kant, Mill, Russell, Whitehead, and Quine. Since an object is something a cognitive being thinks about in relationship with oneself, this relationship signifies a causal or reciprocal relationship, even if it is vaguely applied to anything outside of itself. A subject who makes an effort to know what an object is experiences the externality of the object [1]. As entities, objects exist even if we do not, but their relationship in reference to us exists only if we do. This is to say that objects are appraised by their externality because they are external to a perceiving subject [2]. Because objects are conditioned by our consciousness in order to identify them as objects, this thought parallels the conclusion of Husserl, since consciousness implies that we accept objects as they present themselves to us without introducing theories about the reality for what allegedly lies within them. In this sense, an object is commonly defined as something material, either a physical body or a concrete entity. In reference to the difference between an object and a thing, we can say that an object may be a thing, such as anything that is present,
E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.101178 Received 4 March 2018; Received in revised form 13 July 2019; Accepted 5 August 2019 Available online 16 August 2019 0160-791X/ © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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pertains to people only, otherwise we would have to admit that anything may be a subject, and any subject may be perceived as an object. Since subjects reveal degrees of articulation that are indicative of integration with or alienation from other things, they demonstrate different levels of sophistication. Because it is essential for a subject to manifest an interdependence with something else, this interdependence reveals many things; for not only does it demonstrate that a subject's presence helps to place individuals in relationship with other entities, it also demonstrates that it helps to place individuals in relationship with the past, either with the long distant past of history, or with one's own past. If an object is a non-personal thing and a subject is a personal thing, then it should be easy to distinguish one from the other, with superiority normally given to the latter. However, if there are degrees of objectness, then there must also be degrees of subjectness, although it may be less apparent that the opposite is equally true [8]. Certainly with respect to subjects, a higher degree of authenticity indicates resistance to manipulation by external forces that may be equated with the capacity to persevere in the face of adversity. Within every being, authenticity contains an identity that is characterized by a unity with itself because identity, a metaphysical concept, is fundamental to being. The description of a subject is relevant to the subject itself, but when a subject encounters another subject, the latter becomes an object. A confrontation between two subjects renders each of them an object to the other. A loving wife to her husband becomes an object to her husband's affection, even when that husband knows that his wife is a person, that is, a subject. Any notion of self-alienation by women in reference to men or men in reference to women is supplemental to objectification discussed here. Once again, objects are external to a perceiving subject. The subjectivity of a subject revolves around itself. Although most people would deny the objectification of the closest people in their lives, be they family members or friends, objectification in itself is a natural result of the interaction of a subject with the world. It cannot be otherwise because each subject or each self is a world unto itself. The description of self-centeredness and other similar qualities originate from the same place: the promotion of a subject in its subjectivity over everything else. A subject is an individual, and the latter is the lowest common denominator of humanity. A community, society, or nation is an abstraction, any one of which is merely a totality of individuals. If we were to differentiate a subject from an object, we would have to emphasize some characteristic that supplements the mere material presence or substance of an object, and that supplement must be some cognitive quality. More than consciousness of a thing, a subject may be defined as consciousness of oneself; that is, self-consciousness, but this self-consciousness presupposes knowledge of the world. Subjects are relevant because they are thinking objects, material on the one hand, and reflective on the other. What is apparent about an object is how it connects to experience, and experience is the apprehension of an object through the mind or the senses, which is a conception agreeable with the interpretation of humanity in general and science in particular. When a subject is said to be dependent upon something, or is under the rule of another, or is the cause or basis for action, it means that a subject receives the attention of other agents even if that attention is negative or harmful. In grammar, the subject of a sentence is either the doer of an action, the recipient of an action, or an entity that is identified and described. As a result, all these meanings from its general use to grammar to philosophy signify that a subject is something that is distinguished from other entities, attributes, or agents. Such a term having so many meanings is still useful when its specific meaning is merely a rendering of a more general meaning. As commonly described, a subject may simply be identified as a self or a person. Because a subject is attentive of something else, its meaning parallels the meaning of a technological artifice that may be defined as a type of network in which something develops. Technological artifice is the third term we will discuss in this paper. Since it is representative of
but not everything is an object, such as the name for what is described, but is not present. Although it is much easier to define a physical object as a thing, a social object is a different thing altogether. Without adding to the ambiguity when defining object, we should note that the etymology of this term from the Latin participle obiectum (or objectum) from the verb obicere tells us much about the relationship between objects and subjects. This relationship indicates that a subject is someone who knows (or is aware) and the object is what is known because obicere means to throw or to put before in the way of [3]. If something is thrown or put in the way of something else, then at least the something else must be a knower, that is, a subject who is aware of what is thrown, and what is thrown is either an object or something that is objectified. Hence, obicere as the root for object manifests a relationship between at least two things. At the very least, an object is important because a subject is aware of it, but an object is more than the result of objectification. It is the result of subjective representation [4]. Therefore, an object-subject relationship is different from a subject-object relationship. Although objects do not need subjects in order to be, they need subjects in order to be perceived and known. This is to say that subjectivity verifies objectivity, but objectivity does not need subjectivity to verify anything. The burden, therefore, falls upon subjects for their perception of the world, even if subjects are objectified. Because objects appear first to which subjects are auxiliary (objectivity of objects), an object-subject relationship is the ground upon which human consciousness is derived. It is the ground upon which human reality originates. We say this even when we acknowledge that the subject comes into being because there is a world necessary for the development of the subject, and that the world comes into being when the subject recognizes and formulates it as a world [5]. Although the object-subject relationship is transformative of the object, this is not to say that the object recedes in the face of its relationship with the subject. Objects are present regardless how much they are used or abused, and regardless how much we think they remove us from reality [6]. The causal or reciprocal relationship between objects and subjects denotes a correlation because they share a mutual existence or complement, but the burden always remains with the subject. The desire to see in the dark, for example, varied by time and place, and was assisted by burning torches, lighted candles, electric or flash lights. These objects achieved their intended tasks, although they differed by composition and efficiency. The desire to see in the dark and the technologies that made it possible formed a correlation between people and objects. And a correlation implies interdependence, but an interdependence that is juxtaposed between objects and subjects; that is, a juxtaposition originates with subjects because the latter's consciousness is derived from objects. This juxtaposition indicates that the subject does not lose awareness of itself when dealing with objects. If anything, it becomes more aware of the object when making a call on a phone, using the remote for a television, or pulling the trigger of a gun. Therefore, both object and subject are relative terms, and have relative meanings. We need to keep in mind, however, that our main concern lies with the relationship between objects and subjects because they embody a metaphysical correlation. The second term we need to define is subject, and by subject we mean an entity that either acts or is acted upon in reference to something or someone else. In English, subject originates from the Latin participle subiectum (or subjectum) from the verb subicere which means not only to throw from below or to throw up, but it also means to lay before the eyes as a way of putting something into the mind [7]. Hence, subiectum signifies the receiving end of something, most likely a thought about a thing, either an object or an objectified entity. Because an object may also act or be acted upon, as when a tree falls upon a house during a storm, there seems to be little or no difference (apart from any changes in the meaning of linguistic forms) between objects and subjects. Given that a subject may be seen as an object, as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are known for stating, we offer a definition that 2
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that is thrown or put in the way of something or someone else, the use of technology cannot prevent humanity's objectification. A cursory look around us reveals the predominance of objects and their indispensable relationship to being, regardless of any presumed hidden reality within. Objects are categorically or conditionally placed. They are tied to the world because it is through the world that they are embodied [11]. We may expand this idea, and equate technology with a world constituted as an economic, political, societal, cultural, and ontological system put in place through our actions. It is history writ large. Nonetheless, these thoughts are merely preparatory to a discussion of the importance of a technological artifice with the object-subject relationship that attempts to avoid both negative and positive criticisms of technology, and instead tries to present an unbiased analysis. Although an object may be defined as something that is thrown in the way of something else, this definition is not the equivalent of the statement that subjects are creations of objects, since subjects must recognize objects and react to them as they are encountered. To bring something into being is not the same as recognizing what already is a being because we must first intuit that an object is an existent that is identifiable as an object. In order to identify anything, as described above, we must first relate that thing to ourselves, and we do this by making that thing into a distinct and separate entity. Otherwise, we would not be able to know what anything is. This experience goes back to our original perceptions of the world. It indicates that the identity of anything is based on self-identity, and it concludes that objects relate to subjects because subjects relate to objects. This process may be described as individuation [12], although we can individuate some things without relating them to other things, which occurs when we individuate ourselves. The recognition of an object by a subject is really a form of negation because the subject stands against the object as a way of identifying it. The result is that the object becomes the other. This process of objectification is coexistent with human evolution. It is even related to the evolutionary process in which objects are essential for the development of mathematics because everyone attains a basic understanding of simple numbers that is derived from the ability to count and identify objects [13]. In a universe made up of things from subatomic particles to galaxies, it is an understatement to say that objects are eminently present because presence is objectified. The opposite of this condition would describe a universe that is completely empty, without anything, even without light. But such is not the case; nevertheless, objectification needs to be explained. Although metaphysics is usually concerned with objectification as a way of describing being, it is rarely concerned with the opposite notion of objectlessness, which is a term that seems to avoid the obvious. Although objectlessness may be offered as a description for the alleged absence of being when confronted with its presence, even if this absence is falsely attributed to a perception, policy, or design, it is the presence of objects (objectness) that bears proof of being. Objectlessness (Gegenstandlose), a term associated with Heidegger's interpretation of the withdrawal of being, is a fiction [14]. The philosophical view that the reality of anything must reside within itself, even if by way of withdrawal, cannot and does not eliminate the presence of being. The concept of objectlessness, as proposed by Heidegger, originates from an object's utility. If objects are reduced merely to their presence in order to serve some purpose, then objects are relegated to the lowest level because they are important only for their usefulness. This interpretation does not remove the presence of objects nor eliminate the necessity of objects as a way of expressing being. Ironically, Heidegger does not blame humanity for its insatiable desire for objects, or their utility, or even technology's relationship with them; rather, he blames being. Since objects are present only to be used, Heidegger describes them as a potentiality, that is, as a “standing-reserve” (Bestand) because objects are things waiting to be consumed whenever and wherever they are needed. Standing-reserve is also descriptive of human beings who remain inactive until needed. Therefore, everything is reducible to an
a procedure that is organized according to a definite plan, an artifice contains its own rules. And the rules that are embodied indicate that it contains a method that approaches reality from a systematic point of view. In a general sense, artifice means artful or skillful craftsmanship that may lead to creativity. It denotes a plan of action brought into being individually that may be copied and imitated by others. Although there is no guarantee that any artifice will give a sense of order, it gives that impression. Because artifice is artful, by its nature it is artificial, like art itself, but the connection of art, artifice, and artificiality is indicative that they have something in common, which is their dependency upon ontological freedom as the fountain from which creativity springs forth. What we have just said about artifice in general is even more precise when discussing a technological artifice because the latter is acutely directed to its intended target. Therefore, a technological artifice is far more uniform, although more predictable than an artifice in general. Because of its uniformity, a technological artifice is nevertheless destructive, or at least transformative of the world it confronts, notably the world that was formed before a technological artifice came into being. It is a complex phenomenon, characterized by innumerable interlocking elements, each with reciprocal features that play back to the essence of its being as a system that is devised and formulated by choice. Since a technological artifice may be equated with the means in which needs are fulfilled, it is empowered by the imperatives of its own logic. It is concerned primarily with its impact on the world that might explain its deep and insatiable necessity, a necessity projected to continue indefinitely. And this necessity means an unending increase in its impact as a means. Although the goal of technology means more technique, nevertheless we remain the driving force and the responsible agent behind it. We are responsible for what technology and its artifice do. If this conclusion is true, then it is also true that we are responsible for its collateral effects. Once we apply a technical application, we become responsible for its results, as we also become responsible for any of its unforeseen consequences. Since the techniques of technology always presuppose an intention for some goal to be achieved, we cannot have an artifice without also having the means to apply it; that is, its means, derivable from trial and error, lie at the foundation of the artifice itself. Therein is humanity's role in the technological scheme of things. When associated with its methodology, technological artifice is often combined with rationality. And by rationality we mean the faculty of intentional deliberation in which the world is abstracted and therefore projected in a particular way. It is this rationality that lies at the focal point of an artifice that helps to explain why technology is always demanding. But rationality, often associated with technology, may not be comparable in every situation and at every time when technology is dominant, particularly when other tendencies in less rational guise are present. We should also acknowledge that modern technology and its rationality are different from premodern or nonWestern technology and that their forms of rationalization are also different [9]. There are also different types of rationality, especially when human rationality is contrasted with computer rationality. As a key component of its artifice, technological rationality penetrates wherever reason takes it, creating a recurring omnipresence. Since technological artifice has become most persistent, it has developed a most compelling efficiency, particularly for things that are not technical. Because this artifice is very well applied, it invades everywhere. Its pervasiveness persuades, entices, and cajoles everyone. As a result, the compulsion to use technology in all circumstances causes us ultimately to be subjected to a dominating construct that is socially or politically, but not individually, applicable [10]. If we ignore the fact that we have the capability to change what we have created, we will never be free from our own devices, but this statement is true for more than just technology. It is true for every human endeavor. Apart from the original understanding of an object as something 3
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because objects appear first to which subjects are auxiliary, any mechanism that emphasizes the object-subject relationship, even by circumventing means, must posit being. Objects acquire importance, not when they are disconnected from us, but when they form a relationship with us. Therein lies the relevance of technological artifice and its importance to humanity: technology increases not only the material meaning of objects, but it also increases its inherent techniques, that is, aspects or subdivisions of methods with which they are connected. Whether an artifice is helpful or harmful is irrelevant to the fact that it has an influence, an idea that brings to mind the non-neutrality of technology. Since an artifice is a type of network in which something develops, it would be meaningless in a world without objects and without a physical reality that has a bearing because there is a world. The game of soccer, for example, would not exist without the use of a ball, but it also would not exist without rules by which to play the game. Even more than this, the very nature of the game embraces technology because it presents an elaborately developed or formulated plan depicting a systematic approach to reality, and in this case, the playing of a sport. Because an artifice cannot exist without possessing the means to apply it, its means are expressed physically and procedurally in a world that revolves around both matter and energy. As previously indicated, an object is something that is thrown in the way of something or someone else; that is, an object is something that has the potentiality of satisfying human purposes regardless where they originate and irrespective of their necessity. Since the world is highly technologized by way of our deliberate efforts that constitute a process intensified over time, anything that we encounter becomes a manifestation of ourselves. We might say in a very general sense that if humanity is the measure of all things, then the technologization of the world is our way of anthropomorphizing everything. Even our gods are anthropomorphic, who apparently choose not to reside quietly in heaven, but appear in human form in order to descend to the earth. They are either said to be incarnated in the flesh or described in a book understood by humans, both of which are forms of anthropomorphism. Because we initially invent and later innovate whatever presents itself, we objectify all our creations, which then become the means by which we express ourselves. The objects we devise or encounter from tools and machines, handcrafted and manufactured products, devices and instruments of all kinds, and the procedures associated with them form part of technological artifice. Expanding these thoughts, we should say that since objects are elevated in status as a means of identifying ourselves, our importance becomes a reflection of the enhanced presence of objects; that is, it is through objects that we express being. Objects, natural and artificial, and the technological artifice that relates to them form the environment under which we live. We can no more remove ourselves from objects then we can remove ourselves from being. Because most objects that we encounter are human creations, it is predominantly through the efforts of humans that we encounter anything at all. This is also true for digital or computational objects that deal not only with the objectification of data, but also with the dataification of objects [19]. Objects constitute part of the phenomena of the world characterized by a plenitude of things and conditioned in relationship to the system that produced them. This world of objects is as much the result of a technological artifice as the latter is the result of our desire to objectify reality. Not only is the importance of subjects increased because of the importance of objects, but this relationship in itself is intensified because of the increased usefulness of objects in the present age. In all societies, the object-subject relationship exists because of the innate correlation between object and subject, but only in the present age has this relationship become more causal, more complementary, more reciprocal than at any time in the past. We live in a time of an intensified qualitative relationship between two comparable states of being: one that is thrown into our presence because that is the nature of the physical reality of the world, and one that is receptive of that presence. The result is an increased self-centeredness of life in a technological
entity waiting to be used, and valued only by its utility. The system in which all of this takes place Heidegger describes as “enframing” (Gestell), which is a framework that is self-serving and endless, and into which everything is consumed. Although Heidegger believes that Gestell is the essence of technology, it is not to be confused with technological artifice as discussed in this paper because an artifice is the direct and immediate effect of humanity's becoming of being that enables humans to invent and innovate. Technological artifice is the result of ontological freedom and the beneficiary of human choice. Heidegger's notion of objectlessness describes an unfortunate state of being for a world rendered indifferent to its own well-being. It portrays a misdirected emptiness. If being adapts itself to the objectness of objects and then withdraws, as presumed by Heidegger, this condition could not occur unless being takes objects with it. Heidegger's presumption of being's withdrawal (Entzug) is not the same as his conception of being's readinessto-hand (Zuhandenheit) because withdrawal means that objects are not completely present to us and must, therefore, be concealed to some extent [15]. Since being must reside within each individual or particular entity to make it individual or particular, Heidegger must be describing being metaphysically, not physically. We may infer that what Heidegger means is that for being to be authentic, it must withdraw [16]. But how can being's withdrawal be proven when it is acknowledged that the essence of being is not material? Using Heideggerian terminology, we may rephrase this statement by saying that withdrawal is the absence of the appearance of a fullness of a coming into presence. Therefore, withdrawal is the withholding of the fullness of being. Although there may be some basis to Heidegger's notion of withdrawal, it is unrelated to the world as it exists and to the technological artifice that serves as the mechanism giving meaning to the world. Nevertheless, a discussion of the reality of being may not be negatively affected by a discussion about withdrawal. As a result, Heideggerian philosophy might survive in a world that is appreciably temporal, although it is one thing to ponder a realm where being authentically resides and quite another thing to consider a realm where we reside. If we could assert that withdrawal is characterized by the consumption of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), even Heidegger questions this idea because he proclaims that Zuhandenheit may not be ontologically founded on Vorhandenheit [17]. This is a way of saying that the essence of anything could not be unless the being of that thing is revealed through its presence that assumes that there must be an essence of what that thing is. Apart from stating the obvious, such a thought is tautological because we arrive at the same place where we began, and it gives us little evidence to accept it. Without making a reference to Heidegger, it could be contested that the being of objects may disappear leaving only subjects. If this condition could be hypothesized, subjects would continue to objectify other subjects because they would use objectivity to promote subjectivity. If there is no subjectivity, humans would still be objects, which would redirect their presence back to the externality of objects as a way in which subjects (subjectified objects) perceive them. Objects, whether animate or inanimate, are essential for the objectification of other objects. Since objects cannot be separated from the presence of subjects if the latter remain subjects, we are presented with a paradox: objectivity impacts subjectivity, and subjectivity would not exist without objectivity. Both are intertwined in numerous ways. Even apart from the presumed loss of the self and apart from the expression of a subject's inauthenticity (commonly associated with existentialism), the presence of objects still remains the way in which subjects express their subjectivity. As already noted, the object-subject relationship reveals the immediate importance of objects on subjects, since objects help subjects determine who they are [18]. An object acquires meaning or intensifies meaning because it is important to us. Given that objects lie at the foundation for the function of subjects 4
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age. The subject becomes more a subject, and the object becomes subjectified. Although it is often acknowledged that being is threatened by technology, technology remains an embodiment of being. The objectness of being is the means of being's intensification. It may seem contradictory that being, apart from its primordial appearance in nature, now resides within a technological artifice, and this phenomenon seems truthful in every case within various degrees regardless of time and place. Although technology may become an obstacle to understanding being, it does not reduce the presence of being in the world. Nor can there be any withdrawal of being through objectlessness, as understood by Heidegger, if being is present in objects, and objects form a basis of human reality. Because objects and subjects are causally or reciprocally related, objects are fundamental to a subject's perception of the world. A technological artifice has a direct bearing on the object-subject relationship, but it does more than merely increase the material relevance of objects. It also promotes the process by which objects are applied, revealing their ubiquitous presence in the world and demonstrating their seemingly endless ability to attract our attention.
[9] [10] [11]
[12] [13]
[14]
References [1] This process of identification and its relationship to knowledge is denied by Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 40, who associates object identification with internality. [2] Since a shadow may be defined as an area that is not illuminated or is only partially illuminated by a source of light, a shadow is a thing. It is also the description of an image caused by an intervening object. Although not material, a shadow is still defined by its externality. [3] Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P.G.W. Glare, second ed., 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, vol. vol. II, pp. 1334-1335. [4] Subjective representation brings to mind the two terms in German that describe object as discussed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and these terms are Gegenstand, when describing things that are phenomenologically relevant, and Objekt, when describing things that are subjectively applicable. This differentiation in German is retained in English as one term: object. [5] The confusion concerning the independence of objects is not helped by Brian Cantwell Smith, On the Origin of Objects, Cambridge [MA]: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 97–104, who says that objects cannot exist on their own which seems to infer that their existence depends on something else. It may be true to say that objects must be perceived in order to be recognized as objects, but it may not be true to say that their existence is dependent on perception. Taking up the idea that the whole (the world) is not independent of its parts (objects) must not be confused with the idea that there are parts independent of the whole. The world lies in a relationship with objects, but it is not proof, nor is it necessary, for the existence of objects. Perhaps, at this point we should indicate an awareness of the eliminativist's theory that questions the existence of ordinary objects. However, for a defense of the existence of objects, see Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. [6] The latter view is proposed and defended by Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, trans. James Benedict, London: Verso, 1996, pp. 218–219 and 223–24. [7] Oxford Latin Dictionary, vol. vol. II, pp. 2027-2028. [8] What is the difference between objectness of objects and objectness in objects? Objectness of objects refers to the derivation of objects, and objectness in objects refers to what is within objects; that is, what is within is a description of the result of how objects came to be, which is another way of referring to their derivation. Hence, there is no difference between objectness of objects and objectness in objects when referring to objectness. What is within an object is the essence of the object; that is, the nature or structure to its objectness. Regardless of an object's derivation, objects are significant when they acquire relationships with people who use them,
[15]
[16] [17]
[18] [19]
5
but they are also significant when they are actualized. An object without a relationship to anything or anyone is merely a presence without significance. When an object is conceived, it is intended, and this relationship forms the objectification of an intended object that is manifested in the actual thing. See Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, trans. David F. Freeman et al., 4 vols., Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953–58, vol. III (1957), pp. 146–48. In general, see, Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: the Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995. Joseph C. Pitt, Thinking about Technology: Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology, Seven Bridges Press, New York, 2000, pp. 19–20. Vincent Descombes, Objects of All Sorts: A Philosophical Grammar, Trans. Lorna Scott-Fox & Jeremy Harding, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 116–117 (who describes an object as a predicamental term rather than a transcendental one). M. Roderick, Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, La Salle: Open Court, 1976, pp. 31–37. Lakoff George, E. Núñez Rafael, Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being, Basic Books, New York, 2000, pp. 77–81. Martin Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre, 3rd ed., Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1962, p. 18: “Wenn also der Mensch forschend, betrachtend der Natur als einem Bezirk seines Vorstellens nachstellt, dann ist er bereits von einer Weise der Entbergung beansprucht, die ihn herausfordert, die Natur als einen Gegenstand der Forschung anzugehen, bis auch der Gegenstand in das Gegenstandlose des Bestandes verschwindet.” Available in English translation in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. and with an introduction by William Lovitt, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 19. Objectlessness is also discussed in Heidegger's Der Satz vom Grund, 2nd ed., Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1957, pp. 65 and 99–100, and in English translation in The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 33 and 55. Heidegger's description of withdrawal is confusing, particularly in reference to utility. Although interpreted as a way of suppressing the significance of objects, utility signifies the opposite because utilitas in Latin means not only usefulness, it also means profitability, and the latter would be difficult without the use of objects that result from their actual application in the world. Utility signifies the usefulness of an actuality that benefits individuals or subjects by means of a practicality, and there can be no withdrawal of objects as assumed by Heidegger when practicality is affected. Utility presupposes continuity. It signifies a multitude of applications. Also Discussed in François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, Trans. David Pettigrew & Gregory Recco, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1998, p. 173. It is not our intention to resolve the controversy in Heideggerian philosophy between Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, nor is it to emphasize that objects are not present-at-hand at all, but must be viewed as some type of equipment or tool when derived from their use. Even if Zuhandenheit is ontologically founded on Vorhandenheit as presumed by Heidegger, it is Vorhandenheit that manifests an entity as something, and it is this something that is applicable to the world. See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 9th ed., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1960, p. 71. Also available in English translation in Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 101 [part I, sect. 15]. Vorhandenheit is rendered as “objective presence” in Joan Stambaugh's translation of Sein und Zeit. For her translation, see Being and Time: A Translation of ‘Sein und Zeit’, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 67. To accept both Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit as true would establish an equivalence, but if either concept is false or denied, the equivalence becomes a contradiction. Also see Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Chicago: Open Court, 2002, pp. 259 and 267, who states that Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit are descriptions of two different things because they concern two distinct beings. Apart from the negative criticism that Heidegger gives to metaphysics, his emphasis on only some aspects of being to the exclusion of its universal descriptions (contained in his term “metontology”) seems to be a deliberate attempt to ignore what does have a presence. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 60–62. Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2016, pp. 50–54.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Technology in Society journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc
Technological artifice and the object-subject relationship
T
Theodore John Rivers A R T I C LE I N FO
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Objectification Subjectification Technological artifice
Because we habitually project our potentialities upon technology, its response as a system leads to objectification, which is a logical consequence of technology's influence on being. This understanding is true not only for the beings that are evident as technological artifacts such as tools and machines, but also for ourselves. Since objectification describes the process by which something is rendered as an object, technology is acutely qualified as a system to achieve this result. It is by means of objects that a technological artifice has a bearing on being. Although it is commonly acknowledged that technology encumbers being and achieves this encumbrance by objectifying everything, it is less commonly acknowledged that it is by means of objectification that we have any hope of intensifying our subjectivity, which seems contradictory to technology's relationship to objectification. Nevertheless, there is no other opportunity for us to assert our being unless it is by means of objectification; that is, the presence and influence of objects reverts back to us thereby enabling us to define who we are and what we do. Because objects are meaningful due to their worldliness, the recognition and manipulation of this relationship indicates how they are meaningful to us.
Although it may be true to say that objects are key components of the world, it may also be true to say that the concept of object is problematic because its definition varies greatly. Whether an object is an entity that appears as perceived while lacking an objective existence (Protagoras), or is the embodiment of a transcendent form (Plato), or is a substance in reference to matter (Aristotle and Aquinas), or is merely a bundle of perceptions (Locke and Hume), or is an aggregate of sensible qualities (Berkeley), or is a confirmation of our knowledge about external phenomena (Kant), or is a being characterized by a unity that enters our consciousness (Hegel), or is the name of a concrete thing (Mill), or is the verification of truthfulness from an absolute mind (Royce), or is a phenomenon within our consciousness (Husserl), or is an objective of inquiry (Dewey), or is the result of perception affected by the laws of physics that verifies an event in space-time (Russell), or is a presence only in so far that its reality is buried within (Heidegger), or is an entity that is received by a subject in reference to an experience (Whitehead), or is a description of a thing with a proper name (Quine), or is the result of identification of particulars (Strawson), or is identified by its relationship to other things while remaining a bundle of qualities (Latour), or is indefinable because it is too simple (Frege and Wittgenstein), or by comparison the opposite: a description of every existing and non-existing thing (Meinong), it is essential that we understand objects in themselves and their relationship to the world. If the meaning of object eludes us, we will not understand its importance to the evolutionary process, the natural environment, or society. Nevertheless, it is one thing to explain an event, a condition, or a phenomenon, but quite another thing to describe what it signifies.
Before we begin our discussion, we will define three terms: object, subject, and technological artifice. We will also point out the relationship among them, and how these relationships differ depending upon where they originate; that is, from object to subject, subject to object, object to artifice, and artifice to both. Initially, of the many definitions associated with an object, we emphasize the meaning that refers to an individually perceived thing, that is, an entity of which an observation can be made resulting in recognition of what that thing is, which is a definition that directly relates to its meaning from its Latin roots. If an object is anything that presents itself, this definition agrees, in part, with the interpretations of Kant, Mill, Russell, Whitehead, and Quine. Since an object is something a cognitive being thinks about in relationship with oneself, this relationship signifies a causal or reciprocal relationship, even if it is vaguely applied to anything outside of itself. A subject who makes an effort to know what an object is experiences the externality of the object [1]. As entities, objects exist even if we do not, but their relationship in reference to us exists only if we do. This is to say that objects are appraised by their externality because they are external to a perceiving subject [2]. Because objects are conditioned by our consciousness in order to identify them as objects, this thought parallels the conclusion of Husserl, since consciousness implies that we accept objects as they present themselves to us without introducing theories about the reality for what allegedly lies within them. In this sense, an object is commonly defined as something material, either a physical body or a concrete entity. In reference to the difference between an object and a thing, we can say that an object may be a thing, such as anything that is present,
E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.101178 Received 4 March 2018; Received in revised form 13 July 2019; Accepted 5 August 2019 Available online 16 August 2019 0160-791X/ © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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pertains to people only, otherwise we would have to admit that anything may be a subject, and any subject may be perceived as an object. Since subjects reveal degrees of articulation that are indicative of integration with or alienation from other things, they demonstrate different levels of sophistication. Because it is essential for a subject to manifest an interdependence with something else, this interdependence reveals many things; for not only does it demonstrate that a subject's presence helps to place individuals in relationship with other entities, it also demonstrates that it helps to place individuals in relationship with the past, either with the long distant past of history, or with one's own past. If an object is a non-personal thing and a subject is a personal thing, then it should be easy to distinguish one from the other, with superiority normally given to the latter. However, if there are degrees of objectness, then there must also be degrees of subjectness, although it may be less apparent that the opposite is equally true [8]. Certainly with respect to subjects, a higher degree of authenticity indicates resistance to manipulation by external forces that may be equated with the capacity to persevere in the face of adversity. Within every being, authenticity contains an identity that is characterized by a unity with itself because identity, a metaphysical concept, is fundamental to being. The description of a subject is relevant to the subject itself, but when a subject encounters another subject, the latter becomes an object. A confrontation between two subjects renders each of them an object to the other. A loving wife to her husband becomes an object to her husband's affection, even when that husband knows that his wife is a person, that is, a subject. Any notion of self-alienation by women in reference to men or men in reference to women is supplemental to objectification discussed here. Once again, objects are external to a perceiving subject. The subjectivity of a subject revolves around itself. Although most people would deny the objectification of the closest people in their lives, be they family members or friends, objectification in itself is a natural result of the interaction of a subject with the world. It cannot be otherwise because each subject or each self is a world unto itself. The description of self-centeredness and other similar qualities originate from the same place: the promotion of a subject in its subjectivity over everything else. A subject is an individual, and the latter is the lowest common denominator of humanity. A community, society, or nation is an abstraction, any one of which is merely a totality of individuals. If we were to differentiate a subject from an object, we would have to emphasize some characteristic that supplements the mere material presence or substance of an object, and that supplement must be some cognitive quality. More than consciousness of a thing, a subject may be defined as consciousness of oneself; that is, self-consciousness, but this self-consciousness presupposes knowledge of the world. Subjects are relevant because they are thinking objects, material on the one hand, and reflective on the other. What is apparent about an object is how it connects to experience, and experience is the apprehension of an object through the mind or the senses, which is a conception agreeable with the interpretation of humanity in general and science in particular. When a subject is said to be dependent upon something, or is under the rule of another, or is the cause or basis for action, it means that a subject receives the attention of other agents even if that attention is negative or harmful. In grammar, the subject of a sentence is either the doer of an action, the recipient of an action, or an entity that is identified and described. As a result, all these meanings from its general use to grammar to philosophy signify that a subject is something that is distinguished from other entities, attributes, or agents. Such a term having so many meanings is still useful when its specific meaning is merely a rendering of a more general meaning. As commonly described, a subject may simply be identified as a self or a person. Because a subject is attentive of something else, its meaning parallels the meaning of a technological artifice that may be defined as a type of network in which something develops. Technological artifice is the third term we will discuss in this paper. Since it is representative of
but not everything is an object, such as the name for what is described, but is not present. Although it is much easier to define a physical object as a thing, a social object is a different thing altogether. Without adding to the ambiguity when defining object, we should note that the etymology of this term from the Latin participle obiectum (or objectum) from the verb obicere tells us much about the relationship between objects and subjects. This relationship indicates that a subject is someone who knows (or is aware) and the object is what is known because obicere means to throw or to put before in the way of [3]. If something is thrown or put in the way of something else, then at least the something else must be a knower, that is, a subject who is aware of what is thrown, and what is thrown is either an object or something that is objectified. Hence, obicere as the root for object manifests a relationship between at least two things. At the very least, an object is important because a subject is aware of it, but an object is more than the result of objectification. It is the result of subjective representation [4]. Therefore, an object-subject relationship is different from a subject-object relationship. Although objects do not need subjects in order to be, they need subjects in order to be perceived and known. This is to say that subjectivity verifies objectivity, but objectivity does not need subjectivity to verify anything. The burden, therefore, falls upon subjects for their perception of the world, even if subjects are objectified. Because objects appear first to which subjects are auxiliary (objectivity of objects), an object-subject relationship is the ground upon which human consciousness is derived. It is the ground upon which human reality originates. We say this even when we acknowledge that the subject comes into being because there is a world necessary for the development of the subject, and that the world comes into being when the subject recognizes and formulates it as a world [5]. Although the object-subject relationship is transformative of the object, this is not to say that the object recedes in the face of its relationship with the subject. Objects are present regardless how much they are used or abused, and regardless how much we think they remove us from reality [6]. The causal or reciprocal relationship between objects and subjects denotes a correlation because they share a mutual existence or complement, but the burden always remains with the subject. The desire to see in the dark, for example, varied by time and place, and was assisted by burning torches, lighted candles, electric or flash lights. These objects achieved their intended tasks, although they differed by composition and efficiency. The desire to see in the dark and the technologies that made it possible formed a correlation between people and objects. And a correlation implies interdependence, but an interdependence that is juxtaposed between objects and subjects; that is, a juxtaposition originates with subjects because the latter's consciousness is derived from objects. This juxtaposition indicates that the subject does not lose awareness of itself when dealing with objects. If anything, it becomes more aware of the object when making a call on a phone, using the remote for a television, or pulling the trigger of a gun. Therefore, both object and subject are relative terms, and have relative meanings. We need to keep in mind, however, that our main concern lies with the relationship between objects and subjects because they embody a metaphysical correlation. The second term we need to define is subject, and by subject we mean an entity that either acts or is acted upon in reference to something or someone else. In English, subject originates from the Latin participle subiectum (or subjectum) from the verb subicere which means not only to throw from below or to throw up, but it also means to lay before the eyes as a way of putting something into the mind [7]. Hence, subiectum signifies the receiving end of something, most likely a thought about a thing, either an object or an objectified entity. Because an object may also act or be acted upon, as when a tree falls upon a house during a storm, there seems to be little or no difference (apart from any changes in the meaning of linguistic forms) between objects and subjects. Given that a subject may be seen as an object, as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are known for stating, we offer a definition that 2
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that is thrown or put in the way of something or someone else, the use of technology cannot prevent humanity's objectification. A cursory look around us reveals the predominance of objects and their indispensable relationship to being, regardless of any presumed hidden reality within. Objects are categorically or conditionally placed. They are tied to the world because it is through the world that they are embodied [11]. We may expand this idea, and equate technology with a world constituted as an economic, political, societal, cultural, and ontological system put in place through our actions. It is history writ large. Nonetheless, these thoughts are merely preparatory to a discussion of the importance of a technological artifice with the object-subject relationship that attempts to avoid both negative and positive criticisms of technology, and instead tries to present an unbiased analysis. Although an object may be defined as something that is thrown in the way of something else, this definition is not the equivalent of the statement that subjects are creations of objects, since subjects must recognize objects and react to them as they are encountered. To bring something into being is not the same as recognizing what already is a being because we must first intuit that an object is an existent that is identifiable as an object. In order to identify anything, as described above, we must first relate that thing to ourselves, and we do this by making that thing into a distinct and separate entity. Otherwise, we would not be able to know what anything is. This experience goes back to our original perceptions of the world. It indicates that the identity of anything is based on self-identity, and it concludes that objects relate to subjects because subjects relate to objects. This process may be described as individuation [12], although we can individuate some things without relating them to other things, which occurs when we individuate ourselves. The recognition of an object by a subject is really a form of negation because the subject stands against the object as a way of identifying it. The result is that the object becomes the other. This process of objectification is coexistent with human evolution. It is even related to the evolutionary process in which objects are essential for the development of mathematics because everyone attains a basic understanding of simple numbers that is derived from the ability to count and identify objects [13]. In a universe made up of things from subatomic particles to galaxies, it is an understatement to say that objects are eminently present because presence is objectified. The opposite of this condition would describe a universe that is completely empty, without anything, even without light. But such is not the case; nevertheless, objectification needs to be explained. Although metaphysics is usually concerned with objectification as a way of describing being, it is rarely concerned with the opposite notion of objectlessness, which is a term that seems to avoid the obvious. Although objectlessness may be offered as a description for the alleged absence of being when confronted with its presence, even if this absence is falsely attributed to a perception, policy, or design, it is the presence of objects (objectness) that bears proof of being. Objectlessness (Gegenstandlose), a term associated with Heidegger's interpretation of the withdrawal of being, is a fiction [14]. The philosophical view that the reality of anything must reside within itself, even if by way of withdrawal, cannot and does not eliminate the presence of being. The concept of objectlessness, as proposed by Heidegger, originates from an object's utility. If objects are reduced merely to their presence in order to serve some purpose, then objects are relegated to the lowest level because they are important only for their usefulness. This interpretation does not remove the presence of objects nor eliminate the necessity of objects as a way of expressing being. Ironically, Heidegger does not blame humanity for its insatiable desire for objects, or their utility, or even technology's relationship with them; rather, he blames being. Since objects are present only to be used, Heidegger describes them as a potentiality, that is, as a “standing-reserve” (Bestand) because objects are things waiting to be consumed whenever and wherever they are needed. Standing-reserve is also descriptive of human beings who remain inactive until needed. Therefore, everything is reducible to an
a procedure that is organized according to a definite plan, an artifice contains its own rules. And the rules that are embodied indicate that it contains a method that approaches reality from a systematic point of view. In a general sense, artifice means artful or skillful craftsmanship that may lead to creativity. It denotes a plan of action brought into being individually that may be copied and imitated by others. Although there is no guarantee that any artifice will give a sense of order, it gives that impression. Because artifice is artful, by its nature it is artificial, like art itself, but the connection of art, artifice, and artificiality is indicative that they have something in common, which is their dependency upon ontological freedom as the fountain from which creativity springs forth. What we have just said about artifice in general is even more precise when discussing a technological artifice because the latter is acutely directed to its intended target. Therefore, a technological artifice is far more uniform, although more predictable than an artifice in general. Because of its uniformity, a technological artifice is nevertheless destructive, or at least transformative of the world it confronts, notably the world that was formed before a technological artifice came into being. It is a complex phenomenon, characterized by innumerable interlocking elements, each with reciprocal features that play back to the essence of its being as a system that is devised and formulated by choice. Since a technological artifice may be equated with the means in which needs are fulfilled, it is empowered by the imperatives of its own logic. It is concerned primarily with its impact on the world that might explain its deep and insatiable necessity, a necessity projected to continue indefinitely. And this necessity means an unending increase in its impact as a means. Although the goal of technology means more technique, nevertheless we remain the driving force and the responsible agent behind it. We are responsible for what technology and its artifice do. If this conclusion is true, then it is also true that we are responsible for its collateral effects. Once we apply a technical application, we become responsible for its results, as we also become responsible for any of its unforeseen consequences. Since the techniques of technology always presuppose an intention for some goal to be achieved, we cannot have an artifice without also having the means to apply it; that is, its means, derivable from trial and error, lie at the foundation of the artifice itself. Therein is humanity's role in the technological scheme of things. When associated with its methodology, technological artifice is often combined with rationality. And by rationality we mean the faculty of intentional deliberation in which the world is abstracted and therefore projected in a particular way. It is this rationality that lies at the focal point of an artifice that helps to explain why technology is always demanding. But rationality, often associated with technology, may not be comparable in every situation and at every time when technology is dominant, particularly when other tendencies in less rational guise are present. We should also acknowledge that modern technology and its rationality are different from premodern or nonWestern technology and that their forms of rationalization are also different [9]. There are also different types of rationality, especially when human rationality is contrasted with computer rationality. As a key component of its artifice, technological rationality penetrates wherever reason takes it, creating a recurring omnipresence. Since technological artifice has become most persistent, it has developed a most compelling efficiency, particularly for things that are not technical. Because this artifice is very well applied, it invades everywhere. Its pervasiveness persuades, entices, and cajoles everyone. As a result, the compulsion to use technology in all circumstances causes us ultimately to be subjected to a dominating construct that is socially or politically, but not individually, applicable [10]. If we ignore the fact that we have the capability to change what we have created, we will never be free from our own devices, but this statement is true for more than just technology. It is true for every human endeavor. Apart from the original understanding of an object as something 3
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because objects appear first to which subjects are auxiliary, any mechanism that emphasizes the object-subject relationship, even by circumventing means, must posit being. Objects acquire importance, not when they are disconnected from us, but when they form a relationship with us. Therein lies the relevance of technological artifice and its importance to humanity: technology increases not only the material meaning of objects, but it also increases its inherent techniques, that is, aspects or subdivisions of methods with which they are connected. Whether an artifice is helpful or harmful is irrelevant to the fact that it has an influence, an idea that brings to mind the non-neutrality of technology. Since an artifice is a type of network in which something develops, it would be meaningless in a world without objects and without a physical reality that has a bearing because there is a world. The game of soccer, for example, would not exist without the use of a ball, but it also would not exist without rules by which to play the game. Even more than this, the very nature of the game embraces technology because it presents an elaborately developed or formulated plan depicting a systematic approach to reality, and in this case, the playing of a sport. Because an artifice cannot exist without possessing the means to apply it, its means are expressed physically and procedurally in a world that revolves around both matter and energy. As previously indicated, an object is something that is thrown in the way of something or someone else; that is, an object is something that has the potentiality of satisfying human purposes regardless where they originate and irrespective of their necessity. Since the world is highly technologized by way of our deliberate efforts that constitute a process intensified over time, anything that we encounter becomes a manifestation of ourselves. We might say in a very general sense that if humanity is the measure of all things, then the technologization of the world is our way of anthropomorphizing everything. Even our gods are anthropomorphic, who apparently choose not to reside quietly in heaven, but appear in human form in order to descend to the earth. They are either said to be incarnated in the flesh or described in a book understood by humans, both of which are forms of anthropomorphism. Because we initially invent and later innovate whatever presents itself, we objectify all our creations, which then become the means by which we express ourselves. The objects we devise or encounter from tools and machines, handcrafted and manufactured products, devices and instruments of all kinds, and the procedures associated with them form part of technological artifice. Expanding these thoughts, we should say that since objects are elevated in status as a means of identifying ourselves, our importance becomes a reflection of the enhanced presence of objects; that is, it is through objects that we express being. Objects, natural and artificial, and the technological artifice that relates to them form the environment under which we live. We can no more remove ourselves from objects then we can remove ourselves from being. Because most objects that we encounter are human creations, it is predominantly through the efforts of humans that we encounter anything at all. This is also true for digital or computational objects that deal not only with the objectification of data, but also with the dataification of objects [19]. Objects constitute part of the phenomena of the world characterized by a plenitude of things and conditioned in relationship to the system that produced them. This world of objects is as much the result of a technological artifice as the latter is the result of our desire to objectify reality. Not only is the importance of subjects increased because of the importance of objects, but this relationship in itself is intensified because of the increased usefulness of objects in the present age. In all societies, the object-subject relationship exists because of the innate correlation between object and subject, but only in the present age has this relationship become more causal, more complementary, more reciprocal than at any time in the past. We live in a time of an intensified qualitative relationship between two comparable states of being: one that is thrown into our presence because that is the nature of the physical reality of the world, and one that is receptive of that presence. The result is an increased self-centeredness of life in a technological
entity waiting to be used, and valued only by its utility. The system in which all of this takes place Heidegger describes as “enframing” (Gestell), which is a framework that is self-serving and endless, and into which everything is consumed. Although Heidegger believes that Gestell is the essence of technology, it is not to be confused with technological artifice as discussed in this paper because an artifice is the direct and immediate effect of humanity's becoming of being that enables humans to invent and innovate. Technological artifice is the result of ontological freedom and the beneficiary of human choice. Heidegger's notion of objectlessness describes an unfortunate state of being for a world rendered indifferent to its own well-being. It portrays a misdirected emptiness. If being adapts itself to the objectness of objects and then withdraws, as presumed by Heidegger, this condition could not occur unless being takes objects with it. Heidegger's presumption of being's withdrawal (Entzug) is not the same as his conception of being's readinessto-hand (Zuhandenheit) because withdrawal means that objects are not completely present to us and must, therefore, be concealed to some extent [15]. Since being must reside within each individual or particular entity to make it individual or particular, Heidegger must be describing being metaphysically, not physically. We may infer that what Heidegger means is that for being to be authentic, it must withdraw [16]. But how can being's withdrawal be proven when it is acknowledged that the essence of being is not material? Using Heideggerian terminology, we may rephrase this statement by saying that withdrawal is the absence of the appearance of a fullness of a coming into presence. Therefore, withdrawal is the withholding of the fullness of being. Although there may be some basis to Heidegger's notion of withdrawal, it is unrelated to the world as it exists and to the technological artifice that serves as the mechanism giving meaning to the world. Nevertheless, a discussion of the reality of being may not be negatively affected by a discussion about withdrawal. As a result, Heideggerian philosophy might survive in a world that is appreciably temporal, although it is one thing to ponder a realm where being authentically resides and quite another thing to consider a realm where we reside. If we could assert that withdrawal is characterized by the consumption of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), even Heidegger questions this idea because he proclaims that Zuhandenheit may not be ontologically founded on Vorhandenheit [17]. This is a way of saying that the essence of anything could not be unless the being of that thing is revealed through its presence that assumes that there must be an essence of what that thing is. Apart from stating the obvious, such a thought is tautological because we arrive at the same place where we began, and it gives us little evidence to accept it. Without making a reference to Heidegger, it could be contested that the being of objects may disappear leaving only subjects. If this condition could be hypothesized, subjects would continue to objectify other subjects because they would use objectivity to promote subjectivity. If there is no subjectivity, humans would still be objects, which would redirect their presence back to the externality of objects as a way in which subjects (subjectified objects) perceive them. Objects, whether animate or inanimate, are essential for the objectification of other objects. Since objects cannot be separated from the presence of subjects if the latter remain subjects, we are presented with a paradox: objectivity impacts subjectivity, and subjectivity would not exist without objectivity. Both are intertwined in numerous ways. Even apart from the presumed loss of the self and apart from the expression of a subject's inauthenticity (commonly associated with existentialism), the presence of objects still remains the way in which subjects express their subjectivity. As already noted, the object-subject relationship reveals the immediate importance of objects on subjects, since objects help subjects determine who they are [18]. An object acquires meaning or intensifies meaning because it is important to us. Given that objects lie at the foundation for the function of subjects 4
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age. The subject becomes more a subject, and the object becomes subjectified. Although it is often acknowledged that being is threatened by technology, technology remains an embodiment of being. The objectness of being is the means of being's intensification. It may seem contradictory that being, apart from its primordial appearance in nature, now resides within a technological artifice, and this phenomenon seems truthful in every case within various degrees regardless of time and place. Although technology may become an obstacle to understanding being, it does not reduce the presence of being in the world. Nor can there be any withdrawal of being through objectlessness, as understood by Heidegger, if being is present in objects, and objects form a basis of human reality. Because objects and subjects are causally or reciprocally related, objects are fundamental to a subject's perception of the world. A technological artifice has a direct bearing on the object-subject relationship, but it does more than merely increase the material relevance of objects. It also promotes the process by which objects are applied, revealing their ubiquitous presence in the world and demonstrating their seemingly endless ability to attract our attention.
[9] [10] [11]
[12] [13]
[14]
References [1] This process of identification and its relationship to knowledge is denied by Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject, trans. Michael B. Smith, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 40, who associates object identification with internality. [2] Since a shadow may be defined as an area that is not illuminated or is only partially illuminated by a source of light, a shadow is a thing. It is also the description of an image caused by an intervening object. Although not material, a shadow is still defined by its externality. [3] Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P.G.W. Glare, second ed., 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, vol. vol. II, pp. 1334-1335. [4] Subjective representation brings to mind the two terms in German that describe object as discussed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and these terms are Gegenstand, when describing things that are phenomenologically relevant, and Objekt, when describing things that are subjectively applicable. This differentiation in German is retained in English as one term: object. [5] The confusion concerning the independence of objects is not helped by Brian Cantwell Smith, On the Origin of Objects, Cambridge [MA]: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 97–104, who says that objects cannot exist on their own which seems to infer that their existence depends on something else. It may be true to say that objects must be perceived in order to be recognized as objects, but it may not be true to say that their existence is dependent on perception. Taking up the idea that the whole (the world) is not independent of its parts (objects) must not be confused with the idea that there are parts independent of the whole. The world lies in a relationship with objects, but it is not proof, nor is it necessary, for the existence of objects. Perhaps, at this point we should indicate an awareness of the eliminativist's theory that questions the existence of ordinary objects. However, for a defense of the existence of objects, see Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. [6] The latter view is proposed and defended by Jean Baudrillard, The System of Objects, trans. James Benedict, London: Verso, 1996, pp. 218–219 and 223–24. [7] Oxford Latin Dictionary, vol. vol. II, pp. 2027-2028. [8] What is the difference between objectness of objects and objectness in objects? Objectness of objects refers to the derivation of objects, and objectness in objects refers to what is within objects; that is, what is within is a description of the result of how objects came to be, which is another way of referring to their derivation. Hence, there is no difference between objectness of objects and objectness in objects when referring to objectness. What is within an object is the essence of the object; that is, the nature or structure to its objectness. Regardless of an object's derivation, objects are significant when they acquire relationships with people who use them,
[15]
[16] [17]
[18] [19]
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but they are also significant when they are actualized. An object without a relationship to anything or anyone is merely a presence without significance. When an object is conceived, it is intended, and this relationship forms the objectification of an intended object that is manifested in the actual thing. See Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, trans. David F. Freeman et al., 4 vols., Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953–58, vol. III (1957), pp. 146–48. In general, see, Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: the Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995. Joseph C. Pitt, Thinking about Technology: Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology, Seven Bridges Press, New York, 2000, pp. 19–20. Vincent Descombes, Objects of All Sorts: A Philosophical Grammar, Trans. Lorna Scott-Fox & Jeremy Harding, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 116–117 (who describes an object as a predicamental term rather than a transcendental one). M. Roderick, Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, La Salle: Open Court, 1976, pp. 31–37. Lakoff George, E. Núñez Rafael, Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being, Basic Books, New York, 2000, pp. 77–81. Martin Heidegger, Die Technik und die Kehre, 3rd ed., Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1962, p. 18: “Wenn also der Mensch forschend, betrachtend der Natur als einem Bezirk seines Vorstellens nachstellt, dann ist er bereits von einer Weise der Entbergung beansprucht, die ihn herausfordert, die Natur als einen Gegenstand der Forschung anzugehen, bis auch der Gegenstand in das Gegenstandlose des Bestandes verschwindet.” Available in English translation in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. and with an introduction by William Lovitt, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 19. Objectlessness is also discussed in Heidegger's Der Satz vom Grund, 2nd ed., Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1957, pp. 65 and 99–100, and in English translation in The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 33 and 55. Heidegger's description of withdrawal is confusing, particularly in reference to utility. Although interpreted as a way of suppressing the significance of objects, utility signifies the opposite because utilitas in Latin means not only usefulness, it also means profitability, and the latter would be difficult without the use of objects that result from their actual application in the world. Utility signifies the usefulness of an actuality that benefits individuals or subjects by means of a practicality, and there can be no withdrawal of objects as assumed by Heidegger when practicality is affected. Utility presupposes continuity. It signifies a multitude of applications. Also Discussed in François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, Trans. David Pettigrew & Gregory Recco, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1998, p. 173. It is not our intention to resolve the controversy in Heideggerian philosophy between Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit, nor is it to emphasize that objects are not present-at-hand at all, but must be viewed as some type of equipment or tool when derived from their use. Even if Zuhandenheit is ontologically founded on Vorhandenheit as presumed by Heidegger, it is Vorhandenheit that manifests an entity as something, and it is this something that is applicable to the world. See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 9th ed., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1960, p. 71. Also available in English translation in Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, New York: Harper & Row, 1962, p. 101 [part I, sect. 15]. Vorhandenheit is rendered as “objective presence” in Joan Stambaugh's translation of Sein und Zeit. For her translation, see Being and Time: A Translation of ‘Sein und Zeit’, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 67. To accept both Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit as true would establish an equivalence, but if either concept is false or denied, the equivalence becomes a contradiction. Also see Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, Chicago: Open Court, 2002, pp. 259 and 267, who states that Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit are descriptions of two different things because they concern two distinct beings. Apart from the negative criticism that Heidegger gives to metaphysics, his emphasis on only some aspects of being to the exclusion of its universal descriptions (contained in his term “metontology”) seems to be a deliberate attempt to ignore what does have a presence. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, pp. 60–62. Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2016, pp. 50–54.