- Email: [email protected]
Terra Incognita: mapping the causes of geopolitical realities
Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47 www.politicalgeography.com
Terra Incognita: mapping the causes of geopolitical realities Darren Purcell ∗ Florida A&M University, School of Business and Industry, 32307 Tallahassee, FL, USA
The terms realms, shatterbelts, and gateways conjure up images of places of finance, trade, and war, dominated by hegemonic powers. This is the vision offered by Dr. Cohen’s paper, one that is intended to shape the decisions of geopolitical actors at the formal and popular geopolitical levels. The title of my response reflects what I see as unknown territory, the creation of maps and text incorporating the consequences of US political and economic policy, other views of these efforts, and how we might improve it. Unfortunately, Dr. Cohen’s paper does little to explore this realm while updating his own schema for guiding US foreign policy. While I understand the effort and applaud the desire to shape policies, the maps and the descriptions of new regions and realms leave me unsettled. Much is missing from the maps — the rich description and the reasoned analysis — enough to wonder if the maps and descriptions should not have dragons, sea serpents, and labels such as ‘terra incognita’ on them. This plenary address is a document in search of an audience besides academics; a paper wishing to serve the state, defining trends, and reflecting Dr. Cohen’s own ideologies, which sound somewhat like a Thomas Friedman op-ed, extolling the virtues of economic exchange, free and open borders, and the hopes that a magnanimous United States will remember that morality, sensitivity, and humanitarian concern should be part and parcel of our foreign policy (Cohen, 1992). I will not debate the accuracy of Dr. Cohen’s description of the situations in the regions he proposes. These are individual assessments of spaces he defines, and given the past work in developing the analytical constructs, it is clear they carry a legacy of disciplinary respect (Cohen, 1963, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992). In fact, I agree with many of the assessments as defined here, especially if from the US foreign policy establishment’s point of view. The issues highlighted below are more structural in nature, aimed at the effort to map a specific worldview. ∗
Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Purcell).
0962-6298/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00068-9
44
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
If geographers are to participate actively in the formulation of foreign policy, we should, in that role, provide maps and texts that illuminate other’s worldviews, as well as the part played by spatial relations and their differential effects in creating the world we wish to represent. Our ‘mappings’ should acknowledge connections between US ‘interests’ and the creation of conditions that are contrary to other’s ‘interests,’ conditions that in turn become objects of US foreign policy. Regions are problematic for all geographers, as we delineate them daily, propagate them through our sub-disciplines, our specialty groups, in our text-books, and our discussions of places. However, we do debate, argue, and critique the range of inventions. Despite the illustrated dangers of metaregions and their construction, scholars continue to map them and deploy them, explaining their rationale from perspectives ranging from realist to postmodern (Lewis and Wigen, 1997; Agnew, 1999). Thus, geographers should have little problem with regions, realms, gateways, and other creations. Yet I fear much of the readership will take issue with these. The basis for the realms seen in Cohen’s analysis is unclear and inconsistent. For example, a trade-dependent maritime realm makes intuitive sense until one considers that the spaces included are not equally bound into the realm, with a general trade relationship arguably characterized as neo-colonial. Do we rename it the NAFTA– EU-dominated realm to more accurately reflect the nature of the relationship? Taking another example, the present-day relegation of South Asia to the status of region, only to elevate it to the status of Indian Ocean realm in the near future, appears based solely on India’s potential rise in power. What keeps it from being at this stage now? A country which at present possesses the size, economic strength, key role in the high-tech global economy, and nuclear weapons, as does India, would seem to be a realm now. The paper assesses the relative power levels, but ignores the global linkages binding places. The categorization of gateway regions is also problematic. Cohen conceptualized these in previous work as conduit regions, allowing for the transfer of goods, services, and ideas across realms with their specific worldviews. Now, we see them proposed in the Caribbean, and East Asian Coastal Seas, with others having the dual identity of potential gateway or shatterbelt. In a more optimistic view Eastern Europe and Central Asia become potential gateways; pessimistically viewed, they appear as shatterbelts pregnant with potential quasi-states. A potential gateway closer to the US is the Caribbean. As proposed, the Caribbean gateway is a weak one, with the most interaction coming from tourists seeing to ‘experience’ the region, or capital flows fleeing tax responsibilities via offshore banking regulations. The tenuous and fleeting nature of these flows, tourism receipts declining in the 9-11 aftermath, and offshore banking predicted to be under assault as hegemonic powers begin to close off loopholes in global financial regulatory regimes indicate future instability (Hampton and Christensen, 2002). The frailty of the proposed gateway begs the question of what separates it from possible shatterbelt status? As constructed, it appears to be a gateway reliant on primary commodities and processed ones such as narcotics, neither a stable base for a prosperous gateway. More importantly, these classifications detail the challenges to US policy makers, without actively incorporating the non-hegemonic geopolitical views held by inhabi-
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
45
tants of the spaces defined. The classification of Eastern Europe as a potential shatterbelt ignores the aspirations of the states, the nations, and peoples within these arbitrary boundaries, denying them their own geopolitical vision. Three states included in the region are NATO members. It is very likely that NATO will admit as many as seven new members in late 2002. Several will be European Union members within five years. These developments indicate a desire at least by the leadership of the states, if not the full citizenry, to be neither gateway nor shatterbelt, but part of the core, in hopes that economic and political flows may be redirected to detour into their own countries at least for a while. Additionally, Cohen’s own definition of shatterbelt — an area caught between the conflicts of two realms, the maritime and continental, meeting on equal terms — will not be seen any time soon (Cohen, 1991, p. 567). In fact, with recent NATO efforts to accommodate Russia vis-a`-vis NATO expansion and the establishment of special role for Russia, the rationale for conceptualizing the region as a shatterbelt is undercut. I hazard to only guess where leaders of states, dependencies, and stateless nations in the other shatterbelt/gateway regions might inscribe themselves on this map, but I am willing to wager that the maps differ from Dr. Cohen’s. The lack of prominence of Africa is puzzling as well. President Clinton traveled to Africa in an attempt to strengthen US ties with the continent, the Bush administration sent Colin Powell to Africa in May, 2001, President Bush proposed a series of aid packages (no matter how inadequate) in June, 2002 to Sub-Saharan Africa, and the AIDS epidemic is shortening average life spans across the continent, with concomitant economic and political impacts expected. So how does this region garner so little attention in the vision of US foreign policy proposed? Resource rich, and heavily dependent on the West for aid, capital and arms to fuel development and feed the civil wars, one can only wonder what differentiates it from the other shatterbelts defined elsewhere in the paper? Is it the lack of US or, more generally, developed world investment? Or is it the shift in priorities the Bush administration made clear in changing the definitions of what were threats to the United States pre9-11? Are disease and mass migration not a threat to the Euro–Atlantic relationship as Europe becomes darker in skin tone? Clearly, Africa cannot remain a marginal area much longer, and cannot be ignored. The effort to identify ‘hotspots’ produced by the coalescence of many global-level processes and their interaction with the local is to be praised if only the United States would heed the analysis. However, it is not merely enough to identify these places as sources of conflict as the regionalizations and maps do in this paper. Geographers and other social scientists must clearly indict the causes, processes, and the bases of these operations; in other words, map where the decisions shaping the global political economy spring forth from and trace the tendrils linking the spaces via processes such as neo-liberal trade policies, WTO agreements, IMF dictated restructuring, and NATO expansion. These are the regions that need to be more clearly delineated in Cohen’s schema. The compression zone of Central Africa is not solely the media-simplified tribal animosities, but an outlet for countries heavily dependent on arms production, the location of assets held by many lending banks nervous about default, and the source of lucrative profits from gems and minerals for Western
46
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
consumers, whose demand drives the market for misery we witness in much of the region. It is uncomfortable for much of the US citizenry, much less policymakers, to imagine this map redrawn with clear lines linking Western resource consumption to the shatterbelts, compression areas and implosions zones highlighted here, but it is necessary. Dr. Cohen’s maps can and should go further to illustrate these spatial relations. As with any mapping such as this, the function of the accompanying text is important. The power of this particular mapping of the world depends on whether it appears in the hands of low-level staffers in Foggy Bottom, or in the new portions of the Pentagon. Still, whether gazed upon by a summer intern or the Secretary of Defense, the paper, and perhaps more importantly, the maps are weakened by the fact that we only consider the US role in the regions. I see suggestions for US state support of particular ideologies favoring free trade, open flows of goods, services, and ideas. There is no space delineated for resistance to greater liberalization, which, given its existence in the developed and underdeveloped world, needs to be acknowledged if this is to serve as a useful policy document. If the maps were redrawn, I would hope for maps incorporating more of Agnew and Corbridge’s vision of the post-Cold War reality, with core institutions and states being given similar power, and only portions of realms, gateways, shatterbelts, and states being incorporated fully. Indeed, I would hope for a process of mapmaking that is cognizant of the fact that residents of Los Angeles, Tallahassee, and Ramallah see the world very differently, and that the boundaries we draw have utility to only portions of the global populace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). Finally, I want to ask the readership, as well as the author, to consider alternative mappings. If an Arab were drawing the map, would today’s BosWash megalopolis be a global fault zone and a source of instability, spewing out policies and edicts from Harvard economists on restructuring, Wall Street analysts on capital flow and Washington, DC-based officials on military intervention? Would the spaces of 9-11 be commemorated as battle zones and explosion markers drawn on New York City and Washington? Would Israel be represented as a gateway, or a destabilizer and colonizer? How would Hollywood, the source of much of the cultural onslaught the rest of the world receives, be marked by French filmmakers or those in Bollywood? Would Indonesia map its millions of ethnic Chinese differently during the next currency free-fall? I believe they would, and the map would be a blending of Dr Cohen’s schema and the Agnew and Corbridge model referred to above. To conclude, I critique the paper not for what the author wants to accomplish. No geographer would deny the desire to shape foreign policy, from whichever part of the political spectrum we hail. What I wish to see are maps and textual descriptions addressing the root causes of much of the world’s misery, the networked instabilities we see and others experience, the developed world’s role in that process, and then normative guidelines for action based on greater understanding of the other’s point of view and the perception of US foreign policy abroad.
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
47
Acknowledgments My thanks to Jeff Ueland and Andy Walter for comments on the response manuscript and John O’Loughlin for the invitation to participate in the plenary session.
References Agnew, J. (1999). Regions on the mind does not equal regions of the mind. Progress in Human Geography, 23, 91–96. Agnew, J., & Corbridge, S. (1995). Mastering space: hegemony, territory and international political economy. New York: Routledge. Cohen, S. (1963). Geography and politics in a divided world. New York: Random House. Cohen, S. (1973). Geography and politics in a divided world. (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. (1990). The World geopolitical system in retrospect and prospect. The Journal of Geography, 89, 2–14. Cohen, S. (1991). Global geopolitical change in the Post-Cold War era. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81, 551–580. Cohen, S. (1992). Policy prescriptions for the post Cold War World. The Professional Geographer, 44, 13–15. Hampton, M., & Christensen, J. (2002). Provocative dependence? Offshore finance centers in the global economy. Paper presented to the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, CA. Lewis, M., & Wigen, K. (1997). The myth of continents: a critique of metageography. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Terra Incognita: mapping the causes of geopolitical realities Darren Purcell ∗ Florida A&M University, School of Business and Industry, 32307 Tallahassee, FL, USA
The terms realms, shatterbelts, and gateways conjure up images of places of finance, trade, and war, dominated by hegemonic powers. This is the vision offered by Dr. Cohen’s paper, one that is intended to shape the decisions of geopolitical actors at the formal and popular geopolitical levels. The title of my response reflects what I see as unknown territory, the creation of maps and text incorporating the consequences of US political and economic policy, other views of these efforts, and how we might improve it. Unfortunately, Dr. Cohen’s paper does little to explore this realm while updating his own schema for guiding US foreign policy. While I understand the effort and applaud the desire to shape policies, the maps and the descriptions of new regions and realms leave me unsettled. Much is missing from the maps — the rich description and the reasoned analysis — enough to wonder if the maps and descriptions should not have dragons, sea serpents, and labels such as ‘terra incognita’ on them. This plenary address is a document in search of an audience besides academics; a paper wishing to serve the state, defining trends, and reflecting Dr. Cohen’s own ideologies, which sound somewhat like a Thomas Friedman op-ed, extolling the virtues of economic exchange, free and open borders, and the hopes that a magnanimous United States will remember that morality, sensitivity, and humanitarian concern should be part and parcel of our foreign policy (Cohen, 1992). I will not debate the accuracy of Dr. Cohen’s description of the situations in the regions he proposes. These are individual assessments of spaces he defines, and given the past work in developing the analytical constructs, it is clear they carry a legacy of disciplinary respect (Cohen, 1963, 1973, 1990, 1991, 1992). In fact, I agree with many of the assessments as defined here, especially if from the US foreign policy establishment’s point of view. The issues highlighted below are more structural in nature, aimed at the effort to map a specific worldview. ∗
Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Purcell).
0962-6298/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0962-6298(02)00068-9
44
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
If geographers are to participate actively in the formulation of foreign policy, we should, in that role, provide maps and texts that illuminate other’s worldviews, as well as the part played by spatial relations and their differential effects in creating the world we wish to represent. Our ‘mappings’ should acknowledge connections between US ‘interests’ and the creation of conditions that are contrary to other’s ‘interests,’ conditions that in turn become objects of US foreign policy. Regions are problematic for all geographers, as we delineate them daily, propagate them through our sub-disciplines, our specialty groups, in our text-books, and our discussions of places. However, we do debate, argue, and critique the range of inventions. Despite the illustrated dangers of metaregions and their construction, scholars continue to map them and deploy them, explaining their rationale from perspectives ranging from realist to postmodern (Lewis and Wigen, 1997; Agnew, 1999). Thus, geographers should have little problem with regions, realms, gateways, and other creations. Yet I fear much of the readership will take issue with these. The basis for the realms seen in Cohen’s analysis is unclear and inconsistent. For example, a trade-dependent maritime realm makes intuitive sense until one considers that the spaces included are not equally bound into the realm, with a general trade relationship arguably characterized as neo-colonial. Do we rename it the NAFTA– EU-dominated realm to more accurately reflect the nature of the relationship? Taking another example, the present-day relegation of South Asia to the status of region, only to elevate it to the status of Indian Ocean realm in the near future, appears based solely on India’s potential rise in power. What keeps it from being at this stage now? A country which at present possesses the size, economic strength, key role in the high-tech global economy, and nuclear weapons, as does India, would seem to be a realm now. The paper assesses the relative power levels, but ignores the global linkages binding places. The categorization of gateway regions is also problematic. Cohen conceptualized these in previous work as conduit regions, allowing for the transfer of goods, services, and ideas across realms with their specific worldviews. Now, we see them proposed in the Caribbean, and East Asian Coastal Seas, with others having the dual identity of potential gateway or shatterbelt. In a more optimistic view Eastern Europe and Central Asia become potential gateways; pessimistically viewed, they appear as shatterbelts pregnant with potential quasi-states. A potential gateway closer to the US is the Caribbean. As proposed, the Caribbean gateway is a weak one, with the most interaction coming from tourists seeing to ‘experience’ the region, or capital flows fleeing tax responsibilities via offshore banking regulations. The tenuous and fleeting nature of these flows, tourism receipts declining in the 9-11 aftermath, and offshore banking predicted to be under assault as hegemonic powers begin to close off loopholes in global financial regulatory regimes indicate future instability (Hampton and Christensen, 2002). The frailty of the proposed gateway begs the question of what separates it from possible shatterbelt status? As constructed, it appears to be a gateway reliant on primary commodities and processed ones such as narcotics, neither a stable base for a prosperous gateway. More importantly, these classifications detail the challenges to US policy makers, without actively incorporating the non-hegemonic geopolitical views held by inhabi-
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
45
tants of the spaces defined. The classification of Eastern Europe as a potential shatterbelt ignores the aspirations of the states, the nations, and peoples within these arbitrary boundaries, denying them their own geopolitical vision. Three states included in the region are NATO members. It is very likely that NATO will admit as many as seven new members in late 2002. Several will be European Union members within five years. These developments indicate a desire at least by the leadership of the states, if not the full citizenry, to be neither gateway nor shatterbelt, but part of the core, in hopes that economic and political flows may be redirected to detour into their own countries at least for a while. Additionally, Cohen’s own definition of shatterbelt — an area caught between the conflicts of two realms, the maritime and continental, meeting on equal terms — will not be seen any time soon (Cohen, 1991, p. 567). In fact, with recent NATO efforts to accommodate Russia vis-a`-vis NATO expansion and the establishment of special role for Russia, the rationale for conceptualizing the region as a shatterbelt is undercut. I hazard to only guess where leaders of states, dependencies, and stateless nations in the other shatterbelt/gateway regions might inscribe themselves on this map, but I am willing to wager that the maps differ from Dr. Cohen’s. The lack of prominence of Africa is puzzling as well. President Clinton traveled to Africa in an attempt to strengthen US ties with the continent, the Bush administration sent Colin Powell to Africa in May, 2001, President Bush proposed a series of aid packages (no matter how inadequate) in June, 2002 to Sub-Saharan Africa, and the AIDS epidemic is shortening average life spans across the continent, with concomitant economic and political impacts expected. So how does this region garner so little attention in the vision of US foreign policy proposed? Resource rich, and heavily dependent on the West for aid, capital and arms to fuel development and feed the civil wars, one can only wonder what differentiates it from the other shatterbelts defined elsewhere in the paper? Is it the lack of US or, more generally, developed world investment? Or is it the shift in priorities the Bush administration made clear in changing the definitions of what were threats to the United States pre9-11? Are disease and mass migration not a threat to the Euro–Atlantic relationship as Europe becomes darker in skin tone? Clearly, Africa cannot remain a marginal area much longer, and cannot be ignored. The effort to identify ‘hotspots’ produced by the coalescence of many global-level processes and their interaction with the local is to be praised if only the United States would heed the analysis. However, it is not merely enough to identify these places as sources of conflict as the regionalizations and maps do in this paper. Geographers and other social scientists must clearly indict the causes, processes, and the bases of these operations; in other words, map where the decisions shaping the global political economy spring forth from and trace the tendrils linking the spaces via processes such as neo-liberal trade policies, WTO agreements, IMF dictated restructuring, and NATO expansion. These are the regions that need to be more clearly delineated in Cohen’s schema. The compression zone of Central Africa is not solely the media-simplified tribal animosities, but an outlet for countries heavily dependent on arms production, the location of assets held by many lending banks nervous about default, and the source of lucrative profits from gems and minerals for Western
46
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
consumers, whose demand drives the market for misery we witness in much of the region. It is uncomfortable for much of the US citizenry, much less policymakers, to imagine this map redrawn with clear lines linking Western resource consumption to the shatterbelts, compression areas and implosions zones highlighted here, but it is necessary. Dr. Cohen’s maps can and should go further to illustrate these spatial relations. As with any mapping such as this, the function of the accompanying text is important. The power of this particular mapping of the world depends on whether it appears in the hands of low-level staffers in Foggy Bottom, or in the new portions of the Pentagon. Still, whether gazed upon by a summer intern or the Secretary of Defense, the paper, and perhaps more importantly, the maps are weakened by the fact that we only consider the US role in the regions. I see suggestions for US state support of particular ideologies favoring free trade, open flows of goods, services, and ideas. There is no space delineated for resistance to greater liberalization, which, given its existence in the developed and underdeveloped world, needs to be acknowledged if this is to serve as a useful policy document. If the maps were redrawn, I would hope for maps incorporating more of Agnew and Corbridge’s vision of the post-Cold War reality, with core institutions and states being given similar power, and only portions of realms, gateways, shatterbelts, and states being incorporated fully. Indeed, I would hope for a process of mapmaking that is cognizant of the fact that residents of Los Angeles, Tallahassee, and Ramallah see the world very differently, and that the boundaries we draw have utility to only portions of the global populace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995). Finally, I want to ask the readership, as well as the author, to consider alternative mappings. If an Arab were drawing the map, would today’s BosWash megalopolis be a global fault zone and a source of instability, spewing out policies and edicts from Harvard economists on restructuring, Wall Street analysts on capital flow and Washington, DC-based officials on military intervention? Would the spaces of 9-11 be commemorated as battle zones and explosion markers drawn on New York City and Washington? Would Israel be represented as a gateway, or a destabilizer and colonizer? How would Hollywood, the source of much of the cultural onslaught the rest of the world receives, be marked by French filmmakers or those in Bollywood? Would Indonesia map its millions of ethnic Chinese differently during the next currency free-fall? I believe they would, and the map would be a blending of Dr Cohen’s schema and the Agnew and Corbridge model referred to above. To conclude, I critique the paper not for what the author wants to accomplish. No geographer would deny the desire to shape foreign policy, from whichever part of the political spectrum we hail. What I wish to see are maps and textual descriptions addressing the root causes of much of the world’s misery, the networked instabilities we see and others experience, the developed world’s role in that process, and then normative guidelines for action based on greater understanding of the other’s point of view and the perception of US foreign policy abroad.
D. Purcell / Political Geography 22 (2003) 43–47
47
Acknowledgments My thanks to Jeff Ueland and Andy Walter for comments on the response manuscript and John O’Loughlin for the invitation to participate in the plenary session.
References Agnew, J. (1999). Regions on the mind does not equal regions of the mind. Progress in Human Geography, 23, 91–96. Agnew, J., & Corbridge, S. (1995). Mastering space: hegemony, territory and international political economy. New York: Routledge. Cohen, S. (1963). Geography and politics in a divided world. New York: Random House. Cohen, S. (1973). Geography and politics in a divided world. (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. (1990). The World geopolitical system in retrospect and prospect. The Journal of Geography, 89, 2–14. Cohen, S. (1991). Global geopolitical change in the Post-Cold War era. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81, 551–580. Cohen, S. (1992). Policy prescriptions for the post Cold War World. The Professional Geographer, 44, 13–15. Hampton, M., & Christensen, J. (2002). Provocative dependence? Offshore finance centers in the global economy. Paper presented to the Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, CA. Lewis, M., & Wigen, K. (1997). The myth of continents: a critique of metageography. Berkeley: University of California Press.