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Terrorism: cloning the enemy
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International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31 (2003) 23–34
International Journal of the Sociology of Law www.elsevier.com/locate/ijsl
Terrorism: cloning the enemy Vincenzo Ruggiero* School of Social Science, Middlesex University, Queensway Enfield, Middlesex EN3 4SF London, UK Accepted 31 January 2003
1. Introduction Recent attacks by political-religious armed groups prompt questions as to how new similar violent, indiscriminate, events are. ‘What is staggeringly novel in the events of the 11th September?’ (Hall, 2002, p. 9). Answers to this question vary. On the one hand, some social elements underlying such explosions of violence are not deemed unfamiliar, in particular the growing polarisation of wealth and resources, along with the punitive attitude towards those questioning the distribution of both. Recent episodes of international terrorism are, therefore, regarded as the ‘unveiling of some of the huge consequences of long-running processes that were always— already in place’ (Hall, 2002, p. 9). On the other hand, such episodes are interpreted as the effect of the demise of secular ideologies, which is said to have left ‘a void increasingly occupied by politicised religious discourses’ (Mouffe, 2002, p. 16). It is argued that when politics ceases to perform its role as mediator of conflicts, and opposition is denied opportunities for purposeful expression, conflicts may take on other forms, including extremely violent forms. This paper attempts to identify what is new in the recent attacks and, at the same time, suggest that, far from being the outcome of the demise of politics, they are a relatively novel product of political developments themselves. The paper, first, offers a critical review of criminological analysis of political violence and terrorism and, second, draws on aspects of such analysis in order to better identify the contemporary features of the phenomenon.
*Tel.: +44-181-362-5477; fax: +44-181-805-0702. E-mail address: [email protected] (V. Ruggiero). 0194-6595/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0194-6595(03)00022-4
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2. Epileptics and neophiles To start the present review with the founding father of ‘La Scuola Positiva’ needs not sound provocative, as many aspects of his analysis, though appropriately remodelled, may still be found in contemporary contributions on terrorism. Lombroso (1876, p. 258) describes political offenders as individuals in need of suffering for something grand, a need produced by ‘an excess of passionate concentration in one single idea’. As if hypnotised, these monomaniacs display the typical ‘sublime imprudence of nihilists and Christian martyrs’, and turn rebellious because oversensitive. He describes how someone became an anarchist after seeing that a young apprentice had an arm broken by his employer, and how Italian anarchist Caserio was seen crying when discussing the poverty of workers in Lombardy. In his view, political offenders suffer from hysteria, which frequently manifest itself through excessive altruism coupled with excessive egotism, proving that ‘this is only a variant of moral insanity’ (Lombroso, 1876, p. 259). This formulation, antiquated though it may sound, returns in contemporary descriptions of leaders of developing countries and armed organisations, who are also connoted with variants of moral insanity. Members of the Positivist School would also argue that political violence is caused by extreme egotism hysterically combined with dreams of equality. Such dreams appear as the ultimate justification of a mediocre pursuit of individual aims. Anarchists, Lombroso (1894) claims, are neophiles, and while embracing all new ideas, they only attempt to mask their lack of intellectual independence; they call for collective regeneration because they fear their own individuality. Finally, he stresses that his theory of ‘criminal atavism’ finds validation when crime is associated with moral insanity and epilepsy. ‘With a defective cerebral nutrition, and a failing nervous system induced by epilepsy, morbidity couples with monstrosity’ (Lombroso, 1876, p. 237). Anarchists and terrorists, thus, suffer from ‘cranium sclerosis’, brain haemorrhage, pigmentosis of nervous cells, with the inevitable ‘fusion of the frontal lobes’.
3. Definitional relativism Whether based on the examination of the human cranium or derived from a monopoly in the definition of behaviour, the belief that a set of human acts can be described as terrorism seems today to find exclusive currency in the official political arena. Students of terrorism distancing themselves from early Positivism, instead, would agree on the crucial premise that definitions of human behaviour, including terrorism, are embedded in social and institutional processes, tentatively exemplified by Ferracuti (1982, p. 130) in the following words: Cynically, but perhaps truly, terrorism could be defined as ‘‘what the other person does’’. What we, or the state, do is ‘‘anti- or counter-terrorism’’, but obviously the positions can be reversed by shifting sides, or simply by the flow of history.
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It has also been noted that violent attempts to overthrow governments have been more common than national elections, and that ‘political violence has sometimes led to the creation of new and more satisfying political communities’ (Gurr, 1970, p. 3). Therefore, a thematic content analysis of definitions found in the international literature may lead to the conclusion that terrorism can only become a criminological or sociological object of study when filtered through the discourses of politics and the media. In this sense, it is argued, the very concept of terrorism is hollow and unworthy of specialist analytical effort (Kuhn, 2002). Conversely, if it is posited that all definitions of crime, not only of terrorism, are the result of political and media action, it may well be important to study the circumstances and the modalities in which that action takes place. While bearing a relativistic premise in mind, some authors identify a terrorist act as any action carried out during the course of political struggle, aimed at influencing, conquering, or defending the state power, implying the use of extreme violence against innocent, non-combatant persons (Pontara, 1979). It should be noted that this definition includes both terrorism ‘from below’ and terrorism ‘from above’ namely acts of terror carried out by a state against its internal or external enemies. Other authors, instead, regard this definition as charged with excessive subjectivity extending into partisanship: the distinction between terror from below and terror from above is deemed ‘more verbal than real’. ‘To nearly everyone, terrorism connotes violence against, not by or on behalf of, governments and other establishments’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 120). Laqueur (1977) observes that consensus on a definition of terrorism is most difficult to be achieved, as the word is used more as an ideological weapon than as an analytical tool. At best, the author argues, terrorism serves the purpose of alluding to some mode or intensity of politically consequential violence other than spontaneous uprisings or rioting. This argument obscures the fact that some groups engaged in politically, thoroughly planned, consequential violence may contest the perception by others of their action as terrorism. In spite, or perhaps because, of this prevailing definitional relativism, however, some authors advocate the necessity ‘to find a more specific, less subjective, and non-partisan way of defining the object of inquiry’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 120). In this, they appear to echo institutional agencies, which in the face of the evasiveness of the concept, strive to design viable definitions for mere operational purposes. For example, while in the USA no federal crime called ‘terrorism’ exists, the FBI defines it as ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals’ (Smith, 1994, p. 6).
4. Controversial characteristics Political criminality and terrorism are said to possess contradictory facets: they are forms of unorthodox crime or forms of unorthodox politics; they may be the manifestation of domestic conflict or international warfare; they may be described ‘as a tool of communication and as a life style, as a deliberate programme for reform
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and as a pathological campaign of hate and destruction’ (Kittrie, 2000, p. 18). Among the common elements believed to characterise different forms of terrorism, however, are the urge to embrace a cause, a leader, or an ideology, and the commitment to engage in violence, which requires operational flexibility, in contrast to the rigidity of the political or religious credo. Flexibility on the one hand, and rigidity on the other, are said to lead terrorists to the conviction that they are experiencing a war situation, and that they are therefore legitimised to kill and prepared to be killed. As self-appointed soldiers, they can engage in murder, because the war declared by and against them puts life and death in a different light. The terrorist is therefore like a soldier outside of time and space, living in a reality of war that exists only in his or her fantasy. This is widely reflected in terrorists’ writings and in their posture, when captured, of claiming ‘‘prisoner of war’’ status (Ferracuti, 1982, p. 136). Acts of terror are assumed to involve a high degree of calculation, a careful weighing of means and ends, and to be inspired by both expressive and instrumental goals. The former goals aim at strengthening resolve and group cohesion, and at conveying an image of determination and potency. In this sense, the exercise of violence is meant to have an effect on both those performing it and the individuals or groups targeted, as well as on ‘spectators’. Terrorism, indeed, involves an element of spectacular propaganda making it attractive to potential recruits and menacing to chosen enemies. At the same time, ‘successful’ violent acts may boost self-esteem and foster sentiments of glory among those who carry them out. Instrumental goals are geared to the political effort of neutralising official agents and deterring opposition through fear of victimisation. Lethal or non-lethal, terrorist violence is intended to discourage opponents by maximising fear. One way to increase the fear of victimisation is to randomise targeting. Ultimately, terrorism implies random violence. ‘The defining element of terror is the randomness, not the horror, of the violence’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 122). Whatever the intensity of terrorist acts, those performing such acts assume that their violence is politically consequential, in that it aims to destroy, replace or modify the dominant structure of authority, namely the way in which power and resources are allocated. The belief that a mixture of persuasion, deception, and violence is employed to promote acceptance of the dominant structure of authority leads terrorists to utilise similar tools to try and destroy or change it. Their search for legitimacy mirrors that of the institutions, which rely on trust, opportunism, as well as apathy on the part of the public to reproduce themselves and their acceptance.
5. Plethoric causes Variables harking back to Lombrosian formulations return today when terrorism is equated to shapeless resentment, to a form of self-intoxication, a poisonous secretion of authoritarianism and impotence. They also return when political violence in general is deemed the result of a maniacally developed consciousness or
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of a visionary analysis of social and political relationships (Ferracuti, 1982). Despite the rejection of terrorist violence by classical Marxism, this type of violence is also, though partly, regarded as the outcome of analyses centred on social and economic developments leading to revolution, and of beliefs that ‘class consciousness’ is bound to turn into ‘revolutionary consciousness’. Anomie theories are also mobilised, whereby the existential vacuum experienced by countries in transition is said to elicit violent responses as a way of facing value conflicts. Terrorism is, therefore, associated with the breakdown of traditional systems and with efforts to create modern ones. Changes resulting from internal dynamics and external pressures— especially modernisation in all forms—are said to destroy mechanisms regulating social interaction. ‘Modernisation tends to weaken established accommodations inhibiting inter-groups violence and to promote consciousness and resentment of unequal life chances’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 127). Similarly, frustration due to discrepancies between expectations and reality is also given a central causal role, as is subcultural theory, which stresses the learning processes underpinning violent behaviour and its rationalisation. Finally, a ‘blockade hypothesis’ is put forward, according to which terrorists feel that the only instruments left to them (and to the groups they purport to represent) to overcome institutional obstacles to their social and political development are of a violent nature (Bonanate, 1979). Explanations of terrorism, and of political violence in general, reflect differing notions around the nature of social order. When societies are seen as the constant formation of organic links among individuals and groups, and when solidarity and cooperation among them is emphasised, violence is described as an aberration. Consensus and peaceful ways of resolving disputes are viewed as the backbone of interactions, while change is said to occur by slow evolution. On the contrary, when societies are seen as composed of antagonistic needs and claims, and interactions are assumed to be perpetually frictional and exploitative, violence is associated with one among the other tools that can be utilised to achieve individual and group goals. Oppositional, illegitimate, violence, in this view, unveils the true character of societies and their elites, whose perpetuation is based on hidden, legitimate, forms of violence. Scholars rejecting these two extreme positions in the analytical spectrum hold differing views reflecting the emphasis they place on the variable conflict. Here, Simmel’s (1971, p. 70) contribution should be born in mind, particularly his argument that conflict is one of most vivid interactions which ‘cannot possibly be carried out by one individual alone’. Even apparent social disintegration caused by conflict, in his view, may help resolve divergent dualisms and lead to some form of unity. Just as the universe needs ‘love and hate’, that is, attractive and repulsive forces, in other to have any form at all, so society, too, in order to attain a determinate shape, needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and disharmony, of association and competition, of favourable and unfavourable tendencies (Simmel, 1971, p. 72). How conflict evolves into behaviour commonly described as terrorist, and how it prompts definitions such as those listed above, remains to be examined. In this respect, students of the phenomenon are advised to avoid seeking discrete ‘causes’ of
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terrorism but to concentrate on ‘causation’, namely on processes and relationships shaping conflict and violence into acts definable as terrorism. ‘Differences in the propensity to adopt terrorism are associated with variation in the dynamics of such relationships’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 123). A casual sequence in political violence has been suggested in which: first, discontent develops; second, discontent becomes politicised; third, it translates into violent action. ‘Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence’ (Gurr, 1970, p. 13). Variations in political violence in general, and terrorism in particular are also associated with the respective prevalence of functional and interactive relationships in a given society. The former set of relationships alludes to interdependency and organic solidarity among groups, while the latter refers to direct contact among them, in a way describing the degree of social mobility in a given context. It is controversial whether terrorism is higher where functional interdependency and social mobility are both high, as interdependency and proximity may make injustice more visible and thus exacerbate conflict, or whether terrorism is higher where they are both low, as fragmentation and isolation among groups may increase hostility. Scholars developing Simmel’s suggestions mentioned above can be included among conflict theorists. According to these theorists official institutions do not represent the values and interests of society at large, but of limited groups with sufficient power to control their operations and practices. Norms of conduct are not mirrored in the law, which only reflects the norms of the dominant culture (Sellin, 1938). Political violence and terrorism, in this perspective, could be read as manifestations, if extreme, of two sets of conduct norms violently clashing. The members of armed groups are self-appointed representatives of social sectors, or countries, whose interests diverge from those of the dominant sectors and countries. The belief that people are fundamentally group-involved beings leads conflict theorists to describe social life as permanent confrontation. Individuals are said to produce associations on the basis of common interests and to pursue them through collective action. These associations or groups are said to engage in a permanent struggle to maintain, or to improve, the place they occupy in the interaction with other groups. Conflict is therefore regarded as one of the principal and essential processes in the continuous and ongoing functioning of society. The conflict between groups seeking their own interests is particularly visible in legislative politics, where definitions of acceptable and unacceptable conducts are forged. Thus the whole process of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law enforcement directly reflects deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between group interests and the more general struggles among groups for control of the police power of the state. To that extent, criminal behaviour is the behaviour of minority power groups, in that these groups do not have sufficient power to promote and defend their interests and purposes in the legislative process (Vold et al., 1998, p. 235–237). Similarly, conflict theorists posit that the definition of political activity as criminal results from the challenge to authority through dissent, disobedience or violence, a challenge which is deemed intolerable by the establishment (Turk, 1982b).
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It is inherently difficult to specify the meaning of political criminal acts, but ‘it is generally in the interest of authorities to leave themselves as much discretion as possible in dealing with intolerable political opposition’ (Turk, 1982b, p. 62). Terrorists may pay with the extreme expression of such discretion, namely execution, and this may be indicative of their serious intention (or chance) of bringing radical transformation to the structure of power. Their activity, however, may not be an immanent form of that transformation, the targets they hit being, usually, replaceable icons of that structure of power, which remains intact. They perform what Turk (1982b) terms ‘the propaganda of the deed’, that is to say those acts that may be committed as more or less reasoned tactical moves which justify the occasional destruction of property or lives. Their ‘propaganda’ is a revolutionary spark aimed at starting the fire of widespread opposition. ‘This type of opposition is calculated, organised and may lead to either a full-blown revolution or annihilation. In the first instance, the former criminals become the rulers of the new order’ (Turk, 1982b, p. 107). It is exactly on the capacity of the former terrorists to become the rulers of the new order that armed groups harbour contrasting feelings. Some may observe that the new order must also be a moral order if it is not to turn into a new type of tyranny. In sum, even when revolutionary violence is the only remaining alternative (Roebuck and Weeber, 1978), there is a danger that it will intensify the very inhumanity, which it seeks to overcome.
6. Relational dynamics If we assume that the crucial factor characterising terrorism is ‘random violence’, the process whereby conflict and, for that matter, political violence are ‘randomised’ remains to be unravelled. Scattered hints in the literature examined so far appear to suggest that terrorism is generated through systemic, relational processes. These hints may lead to the conclusion, for example, that terrorism is prevalent in contexts where control efforts eschew negotiation or accommodation, and are themselves characterised by terror. In this sense, terrorism is not to be solely understood as violence against the establishment, but also as one of the effects of violence perpetrated by the establishment. In other words, ‘terrorism from below’ and ‘terrorism from above’ interact and engage in a process of mutual promotion. Some of the analytical tools offered by symbolic interactionism, in this respect, may be helpful. All forms of deviance, including violence, are shaped by the reaction they elicit, a reaction which generates defence or attack strategies in the recipients. Such strategies are termed secondary deviation, and modify the behaviour of ‘primary’ deviants who adapt to the responses they receive (Lemert, 1951). This process is riddled with institutional ceremonies and embedded in formal or informal rhetoric offering deviants a range of roles and identities they are expected to adopt. Becoming deviant is itself described dialectically as series of phases which supersede one another, each phase reworking the significance of what has gone
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before. In turn, each phase is held to be casually important in its own right. It is not enough to describe the initial condition of rule breaking, it is also necessary to appreciate the evolving character of the deviant career as it emerges in time (Downes and Rock, 1988, p. 183). Events, in their turn, do not just happen, but rather occur in a series of steps, ‘which we social scientists are inclined to call ‘‘processes’’, but which could just as well be called ‘‘stories’’. A well-structured story can satisfy us as an explanation of an event’ (Becker, 1998, p. 31). I will now attempt to describe the ‘processes’, or recount the ‘stories’, which appear to turn political violence into terrorism. In order to do so, the following, tentative, classification will be utilised: armed struggle, armed unionism, armed propaganda, and terrorism. Episodes of armed struggle are exemplified by political violent action occurring in countries such as Italy and Germany during the 1970s and early 1980s. There, political violence was an extension of extremely harsh social conflict, and mirrored forms of counter-power being established by traditionally powerless groups. The use of violence, in a certain phase, was not dissonant with the objectives and practices of social movements, who did make recourse to violence as one of other means for the defence of material gains and the protection of conquered political space. Millenarian ideologies were kept at bay by ‘concrete utopias’, namely the precise acquisition and enjoyment of social and political goals. The very phrase armed struggle hinted at a rupture point in a continuum where the pre-existing social conflicts were boosted and brought to a superior level. Targets, be they property or persons, were immediately recognisable symbols, as they were related to specific arenas in which counter-power was being exercised. In a second phase, while ‘concrete utopias’ were relentlessly dismantled and political space narrowed, political violence took a relatively independent trajectory. Institutional responses accompanying this process included targeted violence against the opposition as well as ‘terrorism from above’, namely random violence against citizens. Conflict was channelled into the pursuit of a limited range of objectives whose achievement, under normal circumstances, does not require the use of high degrees of violence. In other words, perfectly legitimate goals slowly came to be pursued through illegitimate means. Armed struggle became armed unionism, while the creation and growth of groups, their recruitment among activists, as well as their accumulation of armed power, began to appear independent of the social issues they addressed. Institutional responses, again, contributed to the evolution of the former type of political violence into armed propaganda. Violent political action became completely disconnected from the social objectives allegedly inspiring it, as resistance groups and armed formations devoted most of their energies to the accumulation of military, clandestine, strength. Violent acts, in this way, began to simply allude to the possibility of questioning the state monopoly in the use of force, and to claim the necessity of breaking away from legally accepted forms of struggle. Military episodes, in most cases, were no longer decodable as moments of wider social conflicts, but as products of this or that military group seeking self-promotion.
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Social dynamics, as points of reference for political action, slowly became redundant, and armed groups simply pursued their own reproduction in terms of new members and stronger structures. In most armed events, targets were chosen not on the basis of their significance to precise contested issues, but for their symbolic capacity to illustrate the military power of the group: it was, indeed, armed propaganda, conveying recruitment messages to uncertain activists. This shift, it has to be noted, was produced by a severe limitation of roles and identities offered by the institutions in the relational dynamic established with armed groups. But again, such limitation ran parallel with numerous episodes of ‘terrorism from above’. Terrorism is the result of a radical, ultimate, shift in this relational dynamic. When even the accumulation of military force, though significant, appears to be insufficient to match that possessed by the institutions, even armed propaganda becomes unrealistic. Political activists and social groups in general cannot be offered competitive structures and practices leading to a different social order. Defeat is most likely and social and political gains are replaced with gains in other, less palpable, spheres. The choice of targets can no longer be justified by the specific social goal pursued, but is given a transcendental justification that Camus (1965) termed historical. According to Camus, there are some political conflicts emphasising history, and others emphasising humanity. The emphasis on history destroys all limits to human action, because history itself becomes the supreme judge of the morality of that action. Revolutions inspired by a sense of historical inevitability inherit the ‘right to punish’ that they take away from the defeated, and after dressing it with a religious mantle, put punishment at the centre of the universe. They adopt a doctrine of culpability for the humans and one of innocence for history. The sense of historical inevitability goes hand in hand with the process whereby violence becomes randomised: history will vindicate the legitimacy of that violence. This process seems to have completed its course with the recent terrorist events, a process whose aspects can be broadly identified as follows.
7. Animus belli The phenomenon of terrorism, in the official rhetoric, became increasingly merged with other forms of dissent and protest. The assumption took shape that legal political action may move to illegal action and escalate into random violence, while a range of political groups were included in the list of ‘potentially politically subversive groups’ (Smith, 1994). An important step in this process was the treatment of armed groups members by the judicial system. Between 1980 and 1998, for example, the US government periodically tried accused domestic and international terrorists through the use of traditional criminal courts. Political violence was associated with ‘common criminality’, and ‘explicitly politicising the trials of terrorists was generally avoided, although federal prosecutors occasionally ‘‘experimented’’ with this line of reasoning’ (Smith et al., 2002). Trials, however, were increasingly ‘politicised’ when courts were dealing with international armed groups, whose members were punished more severely than members of domestic groups. If the political element was
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apparently ignored at the stage of conviction, it became crucial at the stage of sentencing (Turk, 1994). The institution of military tribunals for foreign armed groups, recently, completed and irretrievably shaped the official interaction with political violence originating abroad. The definition of terrorism advocated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was embraced, leaving the power to designate defendants as terrorists to political officials. Meanwhile, the emphasis on national security encouraged a more severe response than that incurred by ordinary offenders. Suggestions that strong links exist between international terrorism and conventional transnational crime, and that, for example, drug traffickers and distributors support terrorists, makes increased severity all the more justifiable. Moreover, the use of military tribunals undercuts the adage that it is better to let one guilty person go free than to have an innocent person incarcerated. ‘The military tribunals introduce a more lax regime that might be more likely to incarcerate an innocent person. But, the argument runs, the risk is justified’ (Donohue, 2002, p. 341). These tribunals are designed to increase convictions, therefore their very existence assumes that individuals are guilty until proven innocent. Parallel with the assumption of guilt is a shift in the identification of causes, whereby the terrorist-enemy is depicted as an individual devoid of free choice and subjectivity. The focus on religious motivation rather than broad political motivation, for example, encourages the return of theories attributing to armed group members diminished mental capacity. Think how, more popularly, brainwashing was singled out as characterising groups as diverse as militia networks, Christian Identity enclaves, and the Symbionese Liberation Army, with explanations and theories deriving to a great extent from studies of Korean War prisoners. Attempts were made to legally ‘de-programme’ converts, or ‘free’ them from their religious creed, a euphemism for kidnapping and intensive psychological pressure. After becoming out of favour by the late 1980s, ‘several important academic students of the religious movements in the 1990s began to re-examine the brainwashing theory, and argued that there were, indeed, some elements of truth in it’ (Kaplan, 2002, p. 7). Brainwashing is also assumed to be at the origin of suicide terrorism, regarded as something unprecedented characterising contemporary fanaticism and political violence. On the contrary, it could be argued that most terrorism is and has been suicidal, from the tyrannicides in ancient Greece to the regicides in the Middle Ages, through to the anarchists of the twentieth century: ‘The kings and queens, the ministers and generals were well guarded, most of the assailants did not even try to escape’ (Laqueur, 2002, p. 3). Diminished mental capacity, however, does not hamper, but rather accelerate, the development of what is described as an animus belli among terrorists, namely the will to wage war against an enemy whose response may determine a shift from fantasy war to real war. Only when acknowledged as war contenders, in effect, armed groups can intensify terror, thus increasingly randomising their violent action. Particularly when political-religious violence is depicted as mere religious fanaticism, terror and anti-terror produce reciprocal escalation forcing each other into symmetrical forms of totalism. Both contenders, in brief, embrace a rigidly dualistic division of
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humanity into categories such as saved/damned, godly/demonic, civilised/barbarian, and so on. Totalism begets totalism, and interactions between anti-terror and totalistic movements may take itself a totalistic form (Anthony et al., 2002). ‘Lastly, fantasy war, as real war, is carried out by executing projects of destruction’, and in a chain reaction, violence ‘must be self-sustained through an escalation of terror that does not permit the participants to abstain from action or even to lower the level of conflict’ (Ferracuti, 1982, p. 138).
8. Conclusion We can now return to the initial question about the novelty of recent violent attacks. Observers may argue that unequal distribution of wealth, which has increased over the last decades, makes international political violence the outcome of both old and new conditions, and that the particularly devastating forms of attack mirror the unprecedented intensification of inequality. While it is true that 20 per cent of the world population consumes 86 per cent of available goods and that 20 per cent of the world poorest only consumes 1.3 per cent of available commodities and services, poverty or relative deprivation are not sufficient to explain the explosion of international political violence (Zolo, 2002). ‘There is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed as the poorest and least developed by the United Nations’ (Laqueur, 2002, p. 3). This paper, taking inequality as a permanent given or even assuming its constant exacerbation, has suggested that only some forms of political violence evolve in what is termed terrorism. The paper has centred on social and institutional reactions to political violence, a crucial perspective which has proven fruitful in the study of all crimes. The shift from armed struggle to armed unionism, from this to armed propaganda and finally to terrorism, has been viewed as a Janus composed of acts and differential reactions to them (Queloz, 2002). This evolution is fostered by interactions of armed groups with institutions and the relational dynamics forcing some such groups to take on a limited set of roles and identities. ‘Terrorism from above’ is part of this relational dynamic. Terrorists, namely armed groups engaged in random violence, are located in the inescapable position of waging a war when their fantasy war is acknowledged as real, therefore when they take on the bellicose features of those waging a real war on them. In this sense, only when modelled, shaped, or even cloned from those interacting with them can terrorists become terrorists. It is this interactive process that allows the establishment of a double normative standard, an old device found in the United Nations chart as well as in the Westfalia pact, whereby there always is a bellum justus, and there always are civilised nations defending themselves from barbarians.
References Anthony, D., Robbins, T., Barrie-Anthony, S., 2002. Cult and anticult totalism: reciprocal escalation and violence. Terrorism and Political Violence 14 (1), 34–57.
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Becker, H., 1998. Tricks of the Trade. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Bonanate, L., 1979. Dimensioni del terrorismo politico. Franco Angeli, Milan. Camus, A., 1965. L’homme r!evolt!e. In: Essais. Gallimard, Paris. Donohue, L.K., 2002. Bias, National security and military tribunals. Criminology & Public Policy 1 (3), 339–344. Downes, D., Rock, P., 1988. Understanding Deviance. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Ferracuti, F., 1982. A sociopsychiatric interpretation of terrorism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 463, 129–140. Gurr, T.R., 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Hall, S., 2002. Out of a clear blue sky. Soundings 19, 9–15. Kaplan, J., 2002. Introduction’ to the special issue ‘Millennial Violence: past, present and future’. Terrorism and Political Violence 14 (1), 1–24. Kittrie, N., 2000. Rebels with a Cause: The Minds and Morality of Political Offenders. Westview Press, New York. Kuhn, A., 2002. Terrorisme scientifique. Revue Suisse de Criminologie 1, 23–25. Laqueur, W., 1977. Terrorism. Little, Brown, Boston. Laqueur, W., 2002. Life as a Weapon. Times Literary Supplement 6, 3–4. Lemert, E., 1951. Social Pathology. Prentice-Hall, New York. Lombroso, C., 1876. L’uomo delinquente. Bocca, Turin. Lombroso, C., 1894. Gli anarchici. Bocca, Turin. Mouffe, C., 2002. The disappearance of politics. Soundings 19, 15–18. Pontara, G., 1979. Violenza e terrorismo: il problema della definizione e della giustificazione. In: Bonanate, L. (Ed.), Dimensioni del terrorismo politico. Franco Angeli, Milan. Queloz, N., 2002. Terrorismes et reactions sociales en tous genres: des th"emes dignes d’int!er#et pour les criminologues. Revue Suisse de Criminologie 1, 27–28. Roebuck, J., Weeber, S.C., 1978. Political Crime in the United States: Analysing Crime by and Against Government. Praeger, New york. Sellin, T., 1938. Culture Conflict and Crime. Social Science Research Council, New York. Simmel, G., 1971. Individuality and Social Forms. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Smith, B.L., 1994. Terrorism in America. State University of New York Press, Albany. Smith, B.L., Damphousse, K.R., Jackson, F., Sellers, A., 2002. The prosecution and punishment of international terrorists in federal courts: 1980–1998. Criminology & Public Policy 1 (3), 311–338. Turk, A.T., 1982a. Social dynamics of terrorism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 463, 119–128. Turk, A.T., 1982b. Political Criminality: The Defiance and Defence of Authority. Sage, London. Turk, A.T., 1994. Foreword. In: Smith, B.L. (Ed.), Terrorism in America. State University of New York Press, Albany. Vold, G.B., Bernard, T.J., Snipes, J.B., 1998. Theoretical Criminology. Oxford University Press, New York. Zolo, D., 2002. Secessione per la pace. La Rivista del Manifesto 32, 47–52.
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International Journal of the Sociology of Law www.elsevier.com/locate/ijsl
Terrorism: cloning the enemy Vincenzo Ruggiero* School of Social Science, Middlesex University, Queensway Enfield, Middlesex EN3 4SF London, UK Accepted 31 January 2003
1. Introduction Recent attacks by political-religious armed groups prompt questions as to how new similar violent, indiscriminate, events are. ‘What is staggeringly novel in the events of the 11th September?’ (Hall, 2002, p. 9). Answers to this question vary. On the one hand, some social elements underlying such explosions of violence are not deemed unfamiliar, in particular the growing polarisation of wealth and resources, along with the punitive attitude towards those questioning the distribution of both. Recent episodes of international terrorism are, therefore, regarded as the ‘unveiling of some of the huge consequences of long-running processes that were always— already in place’ (Hall, 2002, p. 9). On the other hand, such episodes are interpreted as the effect of the demise of secular ideologies, which is said to have left ‘a void increasingly occupied by politicised religious discourses’ (Mouffe, 2002, p. 16). It is argued that when politics ceases to perform its role as mediator of conflicts, and opposition is denied opportunities for purposeful expression, conflicts may take on other forms, including extremely violent forms. This paper attempts to identify what is new in the recent attacks and, at the same time, suggest that, far from being the outcome of the demise of politics, they are a relatively novel product of political developments themselves. The paper, first, offers a critical review of criminological analysis of political violence and terrorism and, second, draws on aspects of such analysis in order to better identify the contemporary features of the phenomenon.
*Tel.: +44-181-362-5477; fax: +44-181-805-0702. E-mail address: [email protected] (V. Ruggiero). 0194-6595/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0194-6595(03)00022-4
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2. Epileptics and neophiles To start the present review with the founding father of ‘La Scuola Positiva’ needs not sound provocative, as many aspects of his analysis, though appropriately remodelled, may still be found in contemporary contributions on terrorism. Lombroso (1876, p. 258) describes political offenders as individuals in need of suffering for something grand, a need produced by ‘an excess of passionate concentration in one single idea’. As if hypnotised, these monomaniacs display the typical ‘sublime imprudence of nihilists and Christian martyrs’, and turn rebellious because oversensitive. He describes how someone became an anarchist after seeing that a young apprentice had an arm broken by his employer, and how Italian anarchist Caserio was seen crying when discussing the poverty of workers in Lombardy. In his view, political offenders suffer from hysteria, which frequently manifest itself through excessive altruism coupled with excessive egotism, proving that ‘this is only a variant of moral insanity’ (Lombroso, 1876, p. 259). This formulation, antiquated though it may sound, returns in contemporary descriptions of leaders of developing countries and armed organisations, who are also connoted with variants of moral insanity. Members of the Positivist School would also argue that political violence is caused by extreme egotism hysterically combined with dreams of equality. Such dreams appear as the ultimate justification of a mediocre pursuit of individual aims. Anarchists, Lombroso (1894) claims, are neophiles, and while embracing all new ideas, they only attempt to mask their lack of intellectual independence; they call for collective regeneration because they fear their own individuality. Finally, he stresses that his theory of ‘criminal atavism’ finds validation when crime is associated with moral insanity and epilepsy. ‘With a defective cerebral nutrition, and a failing nervous system induced by epilepsy, morbidity couples with monstrosity’ (Lombroso, 1876, p. 237). Anarchists and terrorists, thus, suffer from ‘cranium sclerosis’, brain haemorrhage, pigmentosis of nervous cells, with the inevitable ‘fusion of the frontal lobes’.
3. Definitional relativism Whether based on the examination of the human cranium or derived from a monopoly in the definition of behaviour, the belief that a set of human acts can be described as terrorism seems today to find exclusive currency in the official political arena. Students of terrorism distancing themselves from early Positivism, instead, would agree on the crucial premise that definitions of human behaviour, including terrorism, are embedded in social and institutional processes, tentatively exemplified by Ferracuti (1982, p. 130) in the following words: Cynically, but perhaps truly, terrorism could be defined as ‘‘what the other person does’’. What we, or the state, do is ‘‘anti- or counter-terrorism’’, but obviously the positions can be reversed by shifting sides, or simply by the flow of history.
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It has also been noted that violent attempts to overthrow governments have been more common than national elections, and that ‘political violence has sometimes led to the creation of new and more satisfying political communities’ (Gurr, 1970, p. 3). Therefore, a thematic content analysis of definitions found in the international literature may lead to the conclusion that terrorism can only become a criminological or sociological object of study when filtered through the discourses of politics and the media. In this sense, it is argued, the very concept of terrorism is hollow and unworthy of specialist analytical effort (Kuhn, 2002). Conversely, if it is posited that all definitions of crime, not only of terrorism, are the result of political and media action, it may well be important to study the circumstances and the modalities in which that action takes place. While bearing a relativistic premise in mind, some authors identify a terrorist act as any action carried out during the course of political struggle, aimed at influencing, conquering, or defending the state power, implying the use of extreme violence against innocent, non-combatant persons (Pontara, 1979). It should be noted that this definition includes both terrorism ‘from below’ and terrorism ‘from above’ namely acts of terror carried out by a state against its internal or external enemies. Other authors, instead, regard this definition as charged with excessive subjectivity extending into partisanship: the distinction between terror from below and terror from above is deemed ‘more verbal than real’. ‘To nearly everyone, terrorism connotes violence against, not by or on behalf of, governments and other establishments’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 120). Laqueur (1977) observes that consensus on a definition of terrorism is most difficult to be achieved, as the word is used more as an ideological weapon than as an analytical tool. At best, the author argues, terrorism serves the purpose of alluding to some mode or intensity of politically consequential violence other than spontaneous uprisings or rioting. This argument obscures the fact that some groups engaged in politically, thoroughly planned, consequential violence may contest the perception by others of their action as terrorism. In spite, or perhaps because, of this prevailing definitional relativism, however, some authors advocate the necessity ‘to find a more specific, less subjective, and non-partisan way of defining the object of inquiry’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 120). In this, they appear to echo institutional agencies, which in the face of the evasiveness of the concept, strive to design viable definitions for mere operational purposes. For example, while in the USA no federal crime called ‘terrorism’ exists, the FBI defines it as ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals’ (Smith, 1994, p. 6).
4. Controversial characteristics Political criminality and terrorism are said to possess contradictory facets: they are forms of unorthodox crime or forms of unorthodox politics; they may be the manifestation of domestic conflict or international warfare; they may be described ‘as a tool of communication and as a life style, as a deliberate programme for reform
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and as a pathological campaign of hate and destruction’ (Kittrie, 2000, p. 18). Among the common elements believed to characterise different forms of terrorism, however, are the urge to embrace a cause, a leader, or an ideology, and the commitment to engage in violence, which requires operational flexibility, in contrast to the rigidity of the political or religious credo. Flexibility on the one hand, and rigidity on the other, are said to lead terrorists to the conviction that they are experiencing a war situation, and that they are therefore legitimised to kill and prepared to be killed. As self-appointed soldiers, they can engage in murder, because the war declared by and against them puts life and death in a different light. The terrorist is therefore like a soldier outside of time and space, living in a reality of war that exists only in his or her fantasy. This is widely reflected in terrorists’ writings and in their posture, when captured, of claiming ‘‘prisoner of war’’ status (Ferracuti, 1982, p. 136). Acts of terror are assumed to involve a high degree of calculation, a careful weighing of means and ends, and to be inspired by both expressive and instrumental goals. The former goals aim at strengthening resolve and group cohesion, and at conveying an image of determination and potency. In this sense, the exercise of violence is meant to have an effect on both those performing it and the individuals or groups targeted, as well as on ‘spectators’. Terrorism, indeed, involves an element of spectacular propaganda making it attractive to potential recruits and menacing to chosen enemies. At the same time, ‘successful’ violent acts may boost self-esteem and foster sentiments of glory among those who carry them out. Instrumental goals are geared to the political effort of neutralising official agents and deterring opposition through fear of victimisation. Lethal or non-lethal, terrorist violence is intended to discourage opponents by maximising fear. One way to increase the fear of victimisation is to randomise targeting. Ultimately, terrorism implies random violence. ‘The defining element of terror is the randomness, not the horror, of the violence’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 122). Whatever the intensity of terrorist acts, those performing such acts assume that their violence is politically consequential, in that it aims to destroy, replace or modify the dominant structure of authority, namely the way in which power and resources are allocated. The belief that a mixture of persuasion, deception, and violence is employed to promote acceptance of the dominant structure of authority leads terrorists to utilise similar tools to try and destroy or change it. Their search for legitimacy mirrors that of the institutions, which rely on trust, opportunism, as well as apathy on the part of the public to reproduce themselves and their acceptance.
5. Plethoric causes Variables harking back to Lombrosian formulations return today when terrorism is equated to shapeless resentment, to a form of self-intoxication, a poisonous secretion of authoritarianism and impotence. They also return when political violence in general is deemed the result of a maniacally developed consciousness or
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of a visionary analysis of social and political relationships (Ferracuti, 1982). Despite the rejection of terrorist violence by classical Marxism, this type of violence is also, though partly, regarded as the outcome of analyses centred on social and economic developments leading to revolution, and of beliefs that ‘class consciousness’ is bound to turn into ‘revolutionary consciousness’. Anomie theories are also mobilised, whereby the existential vacuum experienced by countries in transition is said to elicit violent responses as a way of facing value conflicts. Terrorism is, therefore, associated with the breakdown of traditional systems and with efforts to create modern ones. Changes resulting from internal dynamics and external pressures— especially modernisation in all forms—are said to destroy mechanisms regulating social interaction. ‘Modernisation tends to weaken established accommodations inhibiting inter-groups violence and to promote consciousness and resentment of unequal life chances’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 127). Similarly, frustration due to discrepancies between expectations and reality is also given a central causal role, as is subcultural theory, which stresses the learning processes underpinning violent behaviour and its rationalisation. Finally, a ‘blockade hypothesis’ is put forward, according to which terrorists feel that the only instruments left to them (and to the groups they purport to represent) to overcome institutional obstacles to their social and political development are of a violent nature (Bonanate, 1979). Explanations of terrorism, and of political violence in general, reflect differing notions around the nature of social order. When societies are seen as the constant formation of organic links among individuals and groups, and when solidarity and cooperation among them is emphasised, violence is described as an aberration. Consensus and peaceful ways of resolving disputes are viewed as the backbone of interactions, while change is said to occur by slow evolution. On the contrary, when societies are seen as composed of antagonistic needs and claims, and interactions are assumed to be perpetually frictional and exploitative, violence is associated with one among the other tools that can be utilised to achieve individual and group goals. Oppositional, illegitimate, violence, in this view, unveils the true character of societies and their elites, whose perpetuation is based on hidden, legitimate, forms of violence. Scholars rejecting these two extreme positions in the analytical spectrum hold differing views reflecting the emphasis they place on the variable conflict. Here, Simmel’s (1971, p. 70) contribution should be born in mind, particularly his argument that conflict is one of most vivid interactions which ‘cannot possibly be carried out by one individual alone’. Even apparent social disintegration caused by conflict, in his view, may help resolve divergent dualisms and lead to some form of unity. Just as the universe needs ‘love and hate’, that is, attractive and repulsive forces, in other to have any form at all, so society, too, in order to attain a determinate shape, needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and disharmony, of association and competition, of favourable and unfavourable tendencies (Simmel, 1971, p. 72). How conflict evolves into behaviour commonly described as terrorist, and how it prompts definitions such as those listed above, remains to be examined. In this respect, students of the phenomenon are advised to avoid seeking discrete ‘causes’ of
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terrorism but to concentrate on ‘causation’, namely on processes and relationships shaping conflict and violence into acts definable as terrorism. ‘Differences in the propensity to adopt terrorism are associated with variation in the dynamics of such relationships’ (Turk, 1982a, p. 123). A casual sequence in political violence has been suggested in which: first, discontent develops; second, discontent becomes politicised; third, it translates into violent action. ‘Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence’ (Gurr, 1970, p. 13). Variations in political violence in general, and terrorism in particular are also associated with the respective prevalence of functional and interactive relationships in a given society. The former set of relationships alludes to interdependency and organic solidarity among groups, while the latter refers to direct contact among them, in a way describing the degree of social mobility in a given context. It is controversial whether terrorism is higher where functional interdependency and social mobility are both high, as interdependency and proximity may make injustice more visible and thus exacerbate conflict, or whether terrorism is higher where they are both low, as fragmentation and isolation among groups may increase hostility. Scholars developing Simmel’s suggestions mentioned above can be included among conflict theorists. According to these theorists official institutions do not represent the values and interests of society at large, but of limited groups with sufficient power to control their operations and practices. Norms of conduct are not mirrored in the law, which only reflects the norms of the dominant culture (Sellin, 1938). Political violence and terrorism, in this perspective, could be read as manifestations, if extreme, of two sets of conduct norms violently clashing. The members of armed groups are self-appointed representatives of social sectors, or countries, whose interests diverge from those of the dominant sectors and countries. The belief that people are fundamentally group-involved beings leads conflict theorists to describe social life as permanent confrontation. Individuals are said to produce associations on the basis of common interests and to pursue them through collective action. These associations or groups are said to engage in a permanent struggle to maintain, or to improve, the place they occupy in the interaction with other groups. Conflict is therefore regarded as one of the principal and essential processes in the continuous and ongoing functioning of society. The conflict between groups seeking their own interests is particularly visible in legislative politics, where definitions of acceptable and unacceptable conducts are forged. Thus the whole process of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law enforcement directly reflects deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between group interests and the more general struggles among groups for control of the police power of the state. To that extent, criminal behaviour is the behaviour of minority power groups, in that these groups do not have sufficient power to promote and defend their interests and purposes in the legislative process (Vold et al., 1998, p. 235–237). Similarly, conflict theorists posit that the definition of political activity as criminal results from the challenge to authority through dissent, disobedience or violence, a challenge which is deemed intolerable by the establishment (Turk, 1982b).
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It is inherently difficult to specify the meaning of political criminal acts, but ‘it is generally in the interest of authorities to leave themselves as much discretion as possible in dealing with intolerable political opposition’ (Turk, 1982b, p. 62). Terrorists may pay with the extreme expression of such discretion, namely execution, and this may be indicative of their serious intention (or chance) of bringing radical transformation to the structure of power. Their activity, however, may not be an immanent form of that transformation, the targets they hit being, usually, replaceable icons of that structure of power, which remains intact. They perform what Turk (1982b) terms ‘the propaganda of the deed’, that is to say those acts that may be committed as more or less reasoned tactical moves which justify the occasional destruction of property or lives. Their ‘propaganda’ is a revolutionary spark aimed at starting the fire of widespread opposition. ‘This type of opposition is calculated, organised and may lead to either a full-blown revolution or annihilation. In the first instance, the former criminals become the rulers of the new order’ (Turk, 1982b, p. 107). It is exactly on the capacity of the former terrorists to become the rulers of the new order that armed groups harbour contrasting feelings. Some may observe that the new order must also be a moral order if it is not to turn into a new type of tyranny. In sum, even when revolutionary violence is the only remaining alternative (Roebuck and Weeber, 1978), there is a danger that it will intensify the very inhumanity, which it seeks to overcome.
6. Relational dynamics If we assume that the crucial factor characterising terrorism is ‘random violence’, the process whereby conflict and, for that matter, political violence are ‘randomised’ remains to be unravelled. Scattered hints in the literature examined so far appear to suggest that terrorism is generated through systemic, relational processes. These hints may lead to the conclusion, for example, that terrorism is prevalent in contexts where control efforts eschew negotiation or accommodation, and are themselves characterised by terror. In this sense, terrorism is not to be solely understood as violence against the establishment, but also as one of the effects of violence perpetrated by the establishment. In other words, ‘terrorism from below’ and ‘terrorism from above’ interact and engage in a process of mutual promotion. Some of the analytical tools offered by symbolic interactionism, in this respect, may be helpful. All forms of deviance, including violence, are shaped by the reaction they elicit, a reaction which generates defence or attack strategies in the recipients. Such strategies are termed secondary deviation, and modify the behaviour of ‘primary’ deviants who adapt to the responses they receive (Lemert, 1951). This process is riddled with institutional ceremonies and embedded in formal or informal rhetoric offering deviants a range of roles and identities they are expected to adopt. Becoming deviant is itself described dialectically as series of phases which supersede one another, each phase reworking the significance of what has gone
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before. In turn, each phase is held to be casually important in its own right. It is not enough to describe the initial condition of rule breaking, it is also necessary to appreciate the evolving character of the deviant career as it emerges in time (Downes and Rock, 1988, p. 183). Events, in their turn, do not just happen, but rather occur in a series of steps, ‘which we social scientists are inclined to call ‘‘processes’’, but which could just as well be called ‘‘stories’’. A well-structured story can satisfy us as an explanation of an event’ (Becker, 1998, p. 31). I will now attempt to describe the ‘processes’, or recount the ‘stories’, which appear to turn political violence into terrorism. In order to do so, the following, tentative, classification will be utilised: armed struggle, armed unionism, armed propaganda, and terrorism. Episodes of armed struggle are exemplified by political violent action occurring in countries such as Italy and Germany during the 1970s and early 1980s. There, political violence was an extension of extremely harsh social conflict, and mirrored forms of counter-power being established by traditionally powerless groups. The use of violence, in a certain phase, was not dissonant with the objectives and practices of social movements, who did make recourse to violence as one of other means for the defence of material gains and the protection of conquered political space. Millenarian ideologies were kept at bay by ‘concrete utopias’, namely the precise acquisition and enjoyment of social and political goals. The very phrase armed struggle hinted at a rupture point in a continuum where the pre-existing social conflicts were boosted and brought to a superior level. Targets, be they property or persons, were immediately recognisable symbols, as they were related to specific arenas in which counter-power was being exercised. In a second phase, while ‘concrete utopias’ were relentlessly dismantled and political space narrowed, political violence took a relatively independent trajectory. Institutional responses accompanying this process included targeted violence against the opposition as well as ‘terrorism from above’, namely random violence against citizens. Conflict was channelled into the pursuit of a limited range of objectives whose achievement, under normal circumstances, does not require the use of high degrees of violence. In other words, perfectly legitimate goals slowly came to be pursued through illegitimate means. Armed struggle became armed unionism, while the creation and growth of groups, their recruitment among activists, as well as their accumulation of armed power, began to appear independent of the social issues they addressed. Institutional responses, again, contributed to the evolution of the former type of political violence into armed propaganda. Violent political action became completely disconnected from the social objectives allegedly inspiring it, as resistance groups and armed formations devoted most of their energies to the accumulation of military, clandestine, strength. Violent acts, in this way, began to simply allude to the possibility of questioning the state monopoly in the use of force, and to claim the necessity of breaking away from legally accepted forms of struggle. Military episodes, in most cases, were no longer decodable as moments of wider social conflicts, but as products of this or that military group seeking self-promotion.
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Social dynamics, as points of reference for political action, slowly became redundant, and armed groups simply pursued their own reproduction in terms of new members and stronger structures. In most armed events, targets were chosen not on the basis of their significance to precise contested issues, but for their symbolic capacity to illustrate the military power of the group: it was, indeed, armed propaganda, conveying recruitment messages to uncertain activists. This shift, it has to be noted, was produced by a severe limitation of roles and identities offered by the institutions in the relational dynamic established with armed groups. But again, such limitation ran parallel with numerous episodes of ‘terrorism from above’. Terrorism is the result of a radical, ultimate, shift in this relational dynamic. When even the accumulation of military force, though significant, appears to be insufficient to match that possessed by the institutions, even armed propaganda becomes unrealistic. Political activists and social groups in general cannot be offered competitive structures and practices leading to a different social order. Defeat is most likely and social and political gains are replaced with gains in other, less palpable, spheres. The choice of targets can no longer be justified by the specific social goal pursued, but is given a transcendental justification that Camus (1965) termed historical. According to Camus, there are some political conflicts emphasising history, and others emphasising humanity. The emphasis on history destroys all limits to human action, because history itself becomes the supreme judge of the morality of that action. Revolutions inspired by a sense of historical inevitability inherit the ‘right to punish’ that they take away from the defeated, and after dressing it with a religious mantle, put punishment at the centre of the universe. They adopt a doctrine of culpability for the humans and one of innocence for history. The sense of historical inevitability goes hand in hand with the process whereby violence becomes randomised: history will vindicate the legitimacy of that violence. This process seems to have completed its course with the recent terrorist events, a process whose aspects can be broadly identified as follows.
7. Animus belli The phenomenon of terrorism, in the official rhetoric, became increasingly merged with other forms of dissent and protest. The assumption took shape that legal political action may move to illegal action and escalate into random violence, while a range of political groups were included in the list of ‘potentially politically subversive groups’ (Smith, 1994). An important step in this process was the treatment of armed groups members by the judicial system. Between 1980 and 1998, for example, the US government periodically tried accused domestic and international terrorists through the use of traditional criminal courts. Political violence was associated with ‘common criminality’, and ‘explicitly politicising the trials of terrorists was generally avoided, although federal prosecutors occasionally ‘‘experimented’’ with this line of reasoning’ (Smith et al., 2002). Trials, however, were increasingly ‘politicised’ when courts were dealing with international armed groups, whose members were punished more severely than members of domestic groups. If the political element was
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apparently ignored at the stage of conviction, it became crucial at the stage of sentencing (Turk, 1994). The institution of military tribunals for foreign armed groups, recently, completed and irretrievably shaped the official interaction with political violence originating abroad. The definition of terrorism advocated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation was embraced, leaving the power to designate defendants as terrorists to political officials. Meanwhile, the emphasis on national security encouraged a more severe response than that incurred by ordinary offenders. Suggestions that strong links exist between international terrorism and conventional transnational crime, and that, for example, drug traffickers and distributors support terrorists, makes increased severity all the more justifiable. Moreover, the use of military tribunals undercuts the adage that it is better to let one guilty person go free than to have an innocent person incarcerated. ‘The military tribunals introduce a more lax regime that might be more likely to incarcerate an innocent person. But, the argument runs, the risk is justified’ (Donohue, 2002, p. 341). These tribunals are designed to increase convictions, therefore their very existence assumes that individuals are guilty until proven innocent. Parallel with the assumption of guilt is a shift in the identification of causes, whereby the terrorist-enemy is depicted as an individual devoid of free choice and subjectivity. The focus on religious motivation rather than broad political motivation, for example, encourages the return of theories attributing to armed group members diminished mental capacity. Think how, more popularly, brainwashing was singled out as characterising groups as diverse as militia networks, Christian Identity enclaves, and the Symbionese Liberation Army, with explanations and theories deriving to a great extent from studies of Korean War prisoners. Attempts were made to legally ‘de-programme’ converts, or ‘free’ them from their religious creed, a euphemism for kidnapping and intensive psychological pressure. After becoming out of favour by the late 1980s, ‘several important academic students of the religious movements in the 1990s began to re-examine the brainwashing theory, and argued that there were, indeed, some elements of truth in it’ (Kaplan, 2002, p. 7). Brainwashing is also assumed to be at the origin of suicide terrorism, regarded as something unprecedented characterising contemporary fanaticism and political violence. On the contrary, it could be argued that most terrorism is and has been suicidal, from the tyrannicides in ancient Greece to the regicides in the Middle Ages, through to the anarchists of the twentieth century: ‘The kings and queens, the ministers and generals were well guarded, most of the assailants did not even try to escape’ (Laqueur, 2002, p. 3). Diminished mental capacity, however, does not hamper, but rather accelerate, the development of what is described as an animus belli among terrorists, namely the will to wage war against an enemy whose response may determine a shift from fantasy war to real war. Only when acknowledged as war contenders, in effect, armed groups can intensify terror, thus increasingly randomising their violent action. Particularly when political-religious violence is depicted as mere religious fanaticism, terror and anti-terror produce reciprocal escalation forcing each other into symmetrical forms of totalism. Both contenders, in brief, embrace a rigidly dualistic division of
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humanity into categories such as saved/damned, godly/demonic, civilised/barbarian, and so on. Totalism begets totalism, and interactions between anti-terror and totalistic movements may take itself a totalistic form (Anthony et al., 2002). ‘Lastly, fantasy war, as real war, is carried out by executing projects of destruction’, and in a chain reaction, violence ‘must be self-sustained through an escalation of terror that does not permit the participants to abstain from action or even to lower the level of conflict’ (Ferracuti, 1982, p. 138).
8. Conclusion We can now return to the initial question about the novelty of recent violent attacks. Observers may argue that unequal distribution of wealth, which has increased over the last decades, makes international political violence the outcome of both old and new conditions, and that the particularly devastating forms of attack mirror the unprecedented intensification of inequality. While it is true that 20 per cent of the world population consumes 86 per cent of available goods and that 20 per cent of the world poorest only consumes 1.3 per cent of available commodities and services, poverty or relative deprivation are not sufficient to explain the explosion of international political violence (Zolo, 2002). ‘There is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed as the poorest and least developed by the United Nations’ (Laqueur, 2002, p. 3). This paper, taking inequality as a permanent given or even assuming its constant exacerbation, has suggested that only some forms of political violence evolve in what is termed terrorism. The paper has centred on social and institutional reactions to political violence, a crucial perspective which has proven fruitful in the study of all crimes. The shift from armed struggle to armed unionism, from this to armed propaganda and finally to terrorism, has been viewed as a Janus composed of acts and differential reactions to them (Queloz, 2002). This evolution is fostered by interactions of armed groups with institutions and the relational dynamics forcing some such groups to take on a limited set of roles and identities. ‘Terrorism from above’ is part of this relational dynamic. Terrorists, namely armed groups engaged in random violence, are located in the inescapable position of waging a war when their fantasy war is acknowledged as real, therefore when they take on the bellicose features of those waging a real war on them. In this sense, only when modelled, shaped, or even cloned from those interacting with them can terrorists become terrorists. It is this interactive process that allows the establishment of a double normative standard, an old device found in the United Nations chart as well as in the Westfalia pact, whereby there always is a bellum justus, and there always are civilised nations defending themselves from barbarians.
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