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That-clauses and other complements
Lingua
83 (1991) 133-153.
133
North-Holland
That-clauses and other complements Zygmunt
Frajzyngier of Linguistics,
Department
Received
The
and Robert University
July 1990; revised version
fundamental
communicative
assumption
function. /hat marks
which
is made
reference
Gerundive
December
a number
the following
to the philosophical
sentences
containing
of opacity
is that
distinction
clause as belonging of speech
complementizers
to the semantic
rather
about
that
the problem
The hypothesis
than
domain
de re. We provide
and transparent
in this paper
de ditto in of reality. evidence for
Our analysis
unexplained
specific
in English.
to the elements
remained
of opaque
advanced
have
of complementizers
of the de dicro and de re expressions. of that-clauses
debates
/hat-clauses.
paper
clauses belong to the domain
of properties
attendant
1990
a tripartite
to the elements
based on several properties
us to explain
Boulder, CO 80309, USA
of the present
-ing clauses and infinitival
the analysis
nature
of Colorado,
We propose
Complementizer
Jasperson
enables
so far. Long contexts
helps to articulate
are the
from the point of view of linguistics.
1. Aim and scope of the paper In English, as in a number of other languages, there exist the options of introducing an embedded clause with a complementizer derived from a demonstrative pronoun, viz. that, e.g. : (1) That she is still alive is a consolation. (Quirk and Greenbaum 1975 : 3 16) and through
two types of nominalized
(2) Telling
lies is wrong.
(Quirk
clause to + VERB,
and the infinitival
clauses:
the gerundive
and Greenbaum
-ing e.g.:
1975 : 321)
e.g. :
* We would like to thank anonymous referees for Lingua and Teun A. Hoekstra for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. All errors and infelicities that remain are our sole responsibility. The work on this paper was partially supported by a grant from the National Endowment
for the Humanities
0024-3841/91/$03.50
0
1991 -
to Zygmunt
Frajzyngier.
Elsevier Science Publishers
B.V. (North-Holland)
134
2. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson / That-clauses
(3) To tell lies is wrong. For all three types of structures in English there exist ample descriptions dealing with their formal properties. However, the question why one or the other form of the complement clause is used has traditionally lain outside the scope of most formalist approaches (cf. Chomsky 1970, 1982, 1986). Semantics did enter the formalist picture in the guise of the lexicon. Bresnan (1970, 1972) hypothesized that the lexicon contains subcategorization information as to which complementizer a particular (main clause) verb could have. Grimshaw (1979) elaborated this hypothesis by arguing that the lexical entries of relevant verbs must also contain semantic selection rules which take into account the semantic type of the complement. Thus complement selection was attributed to the semantic component of a formalist grammar. In spite of these semantic considerations, the question why remains inadequately addressed. Most of the approaches to the aspects of complementation that were sensitive to the role of meaning or function in the choice of complementizers concentrated on properties of the main clause verbs (complement taking predicates, CTPs) and consequently attributed most of the constraints on complementation to the properties of CTPs. Such are the studies of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) who divide predicates into factive and non-factive, and Hooper (1976), who classifies predicates with respect to semantic features with assertive and factive. Postal (1974) who does not deal specifically functions of that-clauses1 seems to attribute the behavior of complementizers to the properties of main clause verbs. Bolinger (1968) was one of the first to attribute semantic properties to the complementizers used: ‘the complementizers are chosen for their own sake, not as a mechanical result of choosing something else’ (Bolinger 1968: 122). He then described the semantic distinction between nominal -ing-clauses and infinitival clauses, explaining the semantic differences between the two complementizers by associating -ing with reification and infinitival constructions with hypothesis or potentiality (Bolinger 1968: 124). Bresnan also recognized that complementizers have independent semantic content (1970, 1972 : 60) associating the complementizer that with definiteness, and,for-to with subjectivity, intention, and motivation. More recent is work by Ransom (1986). However, for Ransom (1986) complementizers are ‘semi-lexical’ items that, though clearly related to full lexical items (COMP that being related to the anaphor that), 1 The terms ‘r/tat-clauses’ and ‘nominal Quirk and Greenbaum (1975: 321-322).
-ing-clauses’
long used in the literature
can be found
in
Z. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson I That-clauses
‘no longer
carry any lexical content’,
though
135
they can ‘be seen as compatible
with the modality meanings they signal, like the definiteness of that (p. 47, cf. also pp. 17, 177ff.). It would seem then that for Ransom complementizer choice is essentially ‘the mechanical result of choosing something else’, to quote Bolinger. Semantic differences between the two types of constructions and thatclauses have not been satisfactorily described despite the existence of an abundant literature on the subject, such as the recent Halliday (1985), Ransom (1986) Noonan (1985), Dixon (1984), Borkin (1984) and earlier literature such as Bolinger (1968, 1972) Bresnan (1970, 1972), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) Stockwell et al. (1973) Kirsner and Thompson (1973) Hooper (1976) Grosu and Thompson (1977), and Grimshaw (1979). What is missing in the linguistic literature is an explicit description of the semantic function of the complementizer that. The question of the function of that was relevant for Davidson (1984) when he tried to provide a logical form for indirect discourse. He describes ‘that’ as a ‘demonstrative referring to an utterance’ (Davidson 1984: 106, cf. also Higginbotham 1986). The aim of the present paper is to provide a description of the function of complementizer ‘that’. We believe that our explanation will enable us to account for a number of phenomena unaccounted for before and also to provide one explanation for phenomena that heretofore required a number of distinct explanations. Our explanation should be of interest to linguists and philosophers alike. The paper constitutes an application and expansion of the theoretical notions developed in Frajzyngier, in press.
2. Background In Frajzyngier, in press, it is proposed that in many languages there exists a fundamental distinction in semantic structure between the domain of speech (de ditto) and the domain of reality (de re). The term de ditto refers to a semantic domain in which reference is made to the elements of speech rather than to the elements of reality. The notion de ditto includes those elements that in the literature are sometimes referred to as ‘linguistic’ where linguistic does not mean a field of science. In Carnap’s terms the domain de re would refer to the ‘world of things’, while the domain de ditto would refer only to a very restricted ‘thing language’ (Carnap 1955: 206-207). Vendler’s ‘events’ (Vendler 1967, cf. also Freed 1979) belong to the domain de re but the domain de re is not exhausted by the ‘events’. In some languages the
distinction is encoded, and utterances or fragments of utterances are marked as being in the domain of speech rather than in the domain of reality. Moreover, in a number of languages forms used in reference to the domain of speech differ from deictics, i.e. expressions used in pointing to some elements in the domain of reality. This semantic distinction is reflected in several areas of language structure, the most obvious being the system of reference and the system of complementation. Within the system of reference deictic pronouns are elements that refer to the domain of reality, and anaphoric pronouns, in the classical understanding of the term, are those that refer to the domain of speech. Since the literature on deictics and anaphoras is quite abundant, we will not discuss the distinction between the two categories here. The relevant points for our discussion, however, are the following: all anaphoras belong to the domain de ditto by definition (cf. Dubois et al. 1973: 33) because they refer to an element that was mentioned before in speech or that is going to be mentioned in speech (cataphora). In many languages the same form may refer to elements in either the domain de re or the domain de ditto. In most languages pronouns referring to the domain de ditto derive from pronouns referring to the domain de re. There are, however, pronouns that are deictic only. i.e. those that cannot refer to an element of speech, but rather refer exclusively to an element in the domain de re. Such elements are described in Frajzyngier (1989a). There are also pronouns that are anaphoric only. For a description of such pronouns cf. Frajzyngier (1989b). In the case of clauses, the domain de ditto requires a more elaborate explanation. A clause is in the domain de ditto only when it is presented to the hearer as such, i.e., not as a direct description of an event but rather as a fragment of speech, or a fragment of linguistic representation which may contain a description of an event. Thus a proposition is in the domain de ditto when it has a metalinguistic function, viz., when it is presented as an object of discourse (cf. Dubois et al. 1973). Examples of typical de ditto elements are some, but not all. speech fragments enclosed in inverted commas in the written form of contemporary languages. (For some early linguistic approaches to the functions of such expressions, cf. Mayenowa 1970, Morawski 1970. Wierzbicka 1970, and Shvartskopf 1970. For philosophic approaches to the problems of quotations cf. Davidson 1984 and the refercnces there.) Vendler’s (1967) ‘propositions’ as opposed to ‘events’ belong within the domain of speech. One of the differences, and perhaps the fundamental one, between de ditto propositions and other propositions is that the former are overtly introduced
Z. Frajzyngier,
R. Jasperson
/ That-clauses
137
into speech or writing as propositions, whereas the latter are not. Figure 1 is an illustration of the relationship between events in reality and de ditto propositions, which are incorporated in other propositions. At the first stage CLAUSE 1 is not de ditto. But at the second stage, when it is incorporated into another proposition (CLAUSE 2) it is.
I I
CLAUSE
I
EVENT
CLAUSE
1
2
I
CLAUSE
COMPLEX
I
SENTENCE Fig. 1.
Cross-linguistically, complementizers derived from demonstratives originated with their primary2 function to mark the following clause as belonging to the domain de ditto rather than to the domain de re (Frajzyngier, in press). There are several arguments in support of the hypothesis that that-clauses and their equivalents in other languages originated as markers of the domain de ditto. The first one is the fact that if a language has a complementizer derived from a demonstrative, such a complementizer will always mark the non-deontic complements of verbs of saying, while it may or may not mark complements of other verbs. The second argument is that if reference is made to a proposition only (rather than to an event or a state of reality), the same demonstrative that serves as complementizer is used. Thus in English I don’t believe that, that refers to a statement made earlier in the discourse, whereas in I don’t believe this, this refers to an event or a state of reality. The third 2
We use the term primaryfunction
primary,function
is understood
in synchronic
and diachronic
in the sense that Kurykowicz
sense. Synchronically
(1964 and other writings)
the term has given it,
viz., the function of the element within the grammatical system of language as opposed to its function in a given fragment of discourse, or as opposed to its function resulting from an implicature. In the diachronic sense, the term primary function refers to the function that at one time was primary
but that is not anymore
in the synchronic
approach.
138
Z. Frujzyngier,
R. Ju.vprrson / That-ciuuses
argument is that in many languages the complementizer after verba dicendi, which performs the same function as English that, is derived not from a demonstrative but rather from a verb of saying.
3. Hypothesis Our main hypothesis is that that as a complementizer in English also originated as a marker of the domain de ditto. and as such constitutes one component of the larger system of complementation. The other components of this system are the -ing and infinitival clauses. We will show that nominal -ing-clauses in the same position represent an element that must be interpreted as de re, providing thus further support for Bolinger (1968). In addition, we will show that infinitival clauses also belong to the domain de re, albeit with different entailments from those represented by -z’ng-clauses. Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the relevant portion of the system of complementation in English. Complementation
De re
De ditto
that-S
Actuality
Potentiality
-ing
to -VP Fig. 2.
Within the above system only that-clauses contain a proposition within another proposition. Complex sentences with to- and -ing-clauses do not contain an embedded proposition. We will show that an essentially semantic function of the complementizer can account for a number of syntactic phenomena involving that-clauses in English, phenomena that have received a number of distinct explanations. In the process of discourse, upon hearing an element from the domain de ditto, we may draw conclusions about the events or states. Such a shift in
2. Frajzyngier. R. Jasperson / That-clauses
139
interpretation is one of the factors responsible for the functional spread whereby what used to be only a de ditto domain becomes a generalized form of the complementizer. Therefore there are a number of clauses that may receive a de re interpretation. But all that-clauses have the property of being interpreted as being in the de ditto domain. The distinction between the domains de ditto and de re cuts across the category factive/non-factive. Some de re elements are factive, others nonfactive. We accept Bolinger’s analysis of nominal -ing-clauses as indicating reification, and infinitival to-clauses as marking potentiality. We will therefore not provide much additional evidence for the two analyses, except as byproducts of our arguments in support of the hypothesis about that-clauses. We will first provide language internal evidence that indeed that-clauses are in the domain de ditto, and then show how this hypothesis enables us to explain a number of syntactic phenomena in English.
4. Evidence 4.1.
The notion of truth
There are several arguments in support of our hypothesis. The first one, which was already used in Vendler (1967) has to do with the notion of truth. One can confirm the truth or deny the truth only of a statement, i.e., only of elements belonging to the domain de ditto. One cannot ask about the truth of elements belonging to the domain de re. Although in English and presumably many other languages one can ask, e.g., Is this a true diamond? this question of course is not about the truth of the diamond but rather about how genuine an article it is. Consider the following sentences: (4) He wants to eat apples. (5) He was caught eating apples. (6) He said that he likes apples. If we were now to follow each of the above sentences with the statement That’s not true, we would obtain the following interpretations: for sentences (4) and (5) there is only one interpretation for each: what is negated is the whole proposition, viz., It is not true that he wants to eat apples, etc. But for sentence (6) we have two interpretations: It is not true that he said S or It is not true that he likes apples. Thus the embedded clauses in (4) and (5) are not
140
2. Frajzyngier,
R. Jasperson
: That-clausm
produced as speech fragments. The embedded proposition in (6) is offered as a proposition, and therefore is available for exactly the same operations - of negation and assertion ~ as any other proposition. In what follows we will make use of this property of the domain de ditto in applying it as a test for category identity. 4.2. Distinction
between that-clauses
and gerundive-ing-clauses
The evidence for the distinction is based on two elements: one is the cooccurrence of that-clauses with various CTPs. The other is the functional interpretations of the co-occurrence restrictions. For purposes of discussion we divide CTPs into three classes. The first class consists of verbs of thinking and saying, viz., de ditto predicates. The second class consists of verbs that pertain only to actions and events that exclude speech, viz. de re predicates. The third class consists of verbs that could be interpreted as belonging either to the domain de ditto or to the domain de re. The first piece of evidence for the hypothesis is based on co-occurrence restrictions between elements belonging to the domain de ditto and to the domain de re. The domain de ditto of a complement clause may often admit only a de ditto predicate, while the domain de re will not even yield a grammatical sentence, e.g. : (7a) (7b) (8a) (8b) (9a) (9b)
Phil thought that the Broncos prevailed. *Phil thought the Broncos prevailing. He mentioned that several months of pay had been laid down. *He mentioned several months of pay having been laid down. Harold claimed that the apartment wasn’t clean. *Harold claimed the apartment’s not being clean.
While de ditto subject clauses may not be used unproblematically with certain de re predicates, de re subjects may be used with such predicates freely, e.g. : (10a) (lob) (1 la) (1 lb)
*That he will cry will cost the court a lot of facial tissue. His crying will cost the court a lot of facial tissue. *That he will eat broccoli will make a dent in the family budget. His eating broccoli will make a dent in the family budget.
In the type of sentence
in which a clausal
subject
takes an equational
or
141
Z. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson 1 That-clauses
adjectival predicate, one can use nouns such as truth, lie, etc., or adjectives true, false - expressions that refer to propositions - with that-clauses, but one may not use such predicates unproblematically with -ing-clauses, i.e., with direct representations of events, e.g. : (12a) (12b) (13a) (13b)
That ?His That ?His
he eats broccoli is true. eating broccoli is true. he eats broccoli is an unshakable truth. eating broccoli is an unshakable truth.
Note here that sentences marked with ? may be grammatical but would have meanings different from their that-clause counterparts. The truth of the (b) sentences does not relate to the statement made in the subject position but rather to how genuine the act described in the subject clause is. Our explanation also accounts for the ungrammaticality of sentences of the type : (14) *John’s
being ill is true.
(Kiparsky
and Kiparsky
1970: 148)
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) claim that the above sentence is ungrammatical because the speaker is not presupposing (but asserting) the truth of the proposition expressed in the subject clause. According to our theory the sentence is ungrammatical because the subject is an element in the domain de ditto. Truth cannot be predicated of elements from the domain de re. The second piece of evidence is based on entailments produced by thatclauses when they occur with predicates that could be interpreted either as verbs within the domain de ditto or as verbs within the domain de re. When such predicates are used with subject that-clauses, they are interpreted as belonging to the domain de ditto. When such predicates are used with nominal -ing-clauses, they are interpreted as belonging to the domain de re. Compare the following examples : (Isa)
That he broke all his fingers was repeated by his followers. (The only interpretation: his followers repeated a piece of information approximating ‘he broke all his fingers’) (15b) His breaking all his fingers was repeated by his followers. (His followers broke their fingers or His followers broke his fingers) (16a) That the surgeon had neglected to check my chart left me speechless. (16b) The surgeon’s having neglected to check my chart left me speechless.
Z. Frajqmgicv,
142
R.
Jasper.~n i That-c/uu.w\
(17a) That our beloved leader embezzled millions affected us all. (Emotionally) (17b) Our beloved leader’s embezzling millions affected us all. (Economically) (18a) That God lives in the heavens above came from the most ardent atheist. (De ditto, the atheist said so) (18b) God’s living in the heavens above came from the most ardent atheist. (De re, with interesting ontological repercussions) The verb report can take either de ditto or de re complements. If it takes a de re complement, then the interpretation is factive in the sense of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) : (19) His eating broccoli was reported by the campus press. (20) God’s living in the heavens above was reported by the campus press. (21) Our beloved leader’s embezzling millions was reported by the campus press. If report takes a de ditto complement, then the interpretation of the whole sentence involves a report about the event rather than the event itself. e.g.: (22) That he eats broccoli was reported by the campus press. (23) That God lives in the heavens above was reported by the campus press. (24) That our beloved leader embezzled millions was reported by the campus
press.
The importance
of the semantic
differences
available
with the verb report
rests on the fact that the different interpretations are not the result of having different verbs, but rather the result of having different forms of the complement clause. Hence we have one more piece of evidence that the complementizer that indicates that the clause following it is in the domain de ditto. 4.3. Distinction
between that-clauses
and injiniinitivul&uses
One of the advantages of our theory is that we can explain the difference between that-clauses and infinitival clauses by claiming that infinitival clauses
Z. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson / That-clauses
143
introduce elements from the domain de re and that that-clauses introduce elements from the domain de ditto. Consider the following sentences: (25) He believes Bacon to be the real author. (26) He believes that Bacon is the real author. (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970) Our interpretation of the differences between the two sentences is the following: Sentence (25) describes the subject’s belief stated with respect to a certain state of affairs. Sentence (26) describes the subject’s belief with respect to a certain proposition. It so happens that the proposition in the embedded clause of (26) describes the state of affairs of the sentence (25). The evidence for our interpretation is again based on the co-occurrence restrictions between the domain de ditto and the domain de re, and on the fact that in the system of reference in English the remote demonstrative that is used to refer to elements from the domain de ditto, while the deictic it is used in reference to elements from the domain de re (cf. Channon 1980, Frajzyngier in press). We will follow each of the above sentences with a sentence containing an object referring to the domain de ditto first. The usage of such a sentence after (25) would produce an infelicitous sentence if it were to be interpreted as referring to the embedded clause, e.g. (25) reproduced here for illustration. (25) He believes Bacon to be the real author. (27) I do not deny that. (28) He does not deny that. The that in (27) and (28) can only be interpreted as referring to the whole of (25), not to the complement clause. Let us now consider the interpretation that would obtain if we were to follow (25) and (26) with a sentence whose object refers to the domain de re rather than de ditto. (25) He believes Bacon to be the real author. (29) I do not deny it. (30) He does not deny it. In (29) and (30) it felicitously refers to the state of the subject’s belief, as described in the complement clause of (25). The use of (29) and (30) after (26) would result in somewhat infelicitous
144
Z. Frajzyngirr. R. Jasperson
; That-c1au.w.s
expressions, as there is no clear de re object in (26) to which the it of (29) and (30) could refer (apart from the whole of (26): (26) He believes that Bacon is the real author. (29) I do not deny it. (30) He does not deny it. Additional evidence for this interpretation comes from the following discourse constraints: the sentence (25) cannot be given as an answer to the question: What does he believe? The sentence (26) can be given as an answer to such a question. The what in the question is requesting the identity of an object of the verb believe, a belief, which would be a proposition. We can’t give (25) as a felicitous response to this particular question because Bacon to be the real author semantically could not be the object of a belief in the sense of believe used here (viz., not the sense of believe as in I believe Hurry,, which means Z believe what Harry said). Hence Bacon to be the red uuthor is not a proposition. The clauses introduced by that, such as in (26) can be interpreted as meaning that they have been previously produced or otherwise entertained by the matrix subject. The following sentences provide evidence for this claim: (31a)
Peter has agreed to take the blame, whether he realizes it or not. (31b) Peter has agreed that he will take the blame, ?whether he realizes it or not. Sentence (31 b) is strange because whereas in the first two clauses the speaker intends that the subject said, might have said, or mentally entertained the contents indirectly reported in the that-clause, the second clause denies this possibility. Sentence (31a) is acceptable because the use of the infinitive makes no claims as to the subject’s having said, etc., the content expressed in the complement clause. Rather, it is used to describe the relationship between the matrix subject and a state of affairs. Similarly: (32a) He believes a gnome to inhabit his cellar, though I’m sure it’s never occurred to him as such. (32b) He believes that a gnome inhabits his cellar, *though I’m sure it’s never occurred to him as such.
Z. Frajzyngier. R. Jasperson / That-clauses
It is interesting
to note that a nominalization
145
will not work in the situations
described in (33). The reason for this differs from that present in (31))(32), but it illustrates the two modes of the domain de re, potentiality versus actuality (cf. figure 2). (33) Peter has agreed to his taking the blame, ?whether he realizes it or not. In this case, the nominalization refers to the domain de re but with an interpretation of actuality, in contrast to potentiality. The predicate agree is such that when one agrees to the content of such an expression, he acknowledges its actuality. Thus the adverbial whether-clause is anomalous because it denies that this requirement of acknowledgment was met. One more piece of evidence for our hypothesis, and a litmus paper to show the domain de ditto of that-clauses as opposed to the domain de re of infinitival clauses, is offered by the application of the future tense to the sentences in (32): (34a) ?He will believe a gnome to inhabit his cellar. (34b) He will believe that a gnome inhabits his cellar. Sentence (34a) is incomplete or gives the impression of being incomplete because it refers to the potential state of a participant which does not yet or may never exist, hence to a non-actual state. Sentence (34a) would be much more acceptable if it were to be followed by a temporal when or conditional if clause, or if it were to be preceded by a clause stating a condition or time, such as: (35) With proper
inducement,
he will believe a gnome
Sentence (34b) involves belief in a statement, statement has just been made in the sentence
rather itself.
to inhabit
his cellar.
than in a state. And the
5. Pleonastic it One of the advantages or our analysis is that it can explain a fact that we believe has remained unexplained so far. Kiparsky (1970: 165) claim that it is a reduced form of the fact in sentences such as:
146
2. Frujzyngier,
(36) Bill resents
R. Jasperson
1 That-cluusrs
it that people are always comparing
him to Mozart.
That explanation does not amount to anything but a paraphrase of it. According to K. and K.‘s analysis a large number of sentences would have to have an identical phrase, the fuct. We would like to propose that behind the explanation that K. and K. provide lies an important intuition, which K. and K. expressed through the metaphor the fact. We would like to propose that it in sentences like (36) is a grammatical morpheme whose role is to convert a clause from the domain de ditto into the domain de re. The argument for our hypothesis will again use the referential properties of that as opposed to it. If we were to follow (36). repeated here, (36) Bill resents with clauses
it that people are always comparing
him to Mozart
such as:
(37) though though
he acknowledges he denies it
it, or
the reference of it would be the embedded (36) with expressions such as:
clause of (36). If we were to follow
(38) and he acknowledges that, or though he denies that the reference of that would be the main clause of (36) because this is the de ditto element, i.e., what has been said, or written (as it has been in (36)). If we were to have a variant of (36) without it (which may not be acceptable to all speakers), viz: (39) Bill resents
that people are always comparing
and we were to follow it with (37) varied (37) and he acknowledges though he denies it
slightly
him to Mozart
here:
it, or
there would be no proper antecedent for it (though of course by implication we could imagine it to refer to something like his resentment). If on the other hand, we were to follow (39) with (38) viz.:
2. Frajzyngier. R. Jasperson / That-clauses
147
(38) and he acknowledges that, or though he denies that that will have two possible antecedents, namely the main clause or the embedded clause. It would be interesting to know whether the pleonastic it in the subject position as in sentence (40) below is also a reifying morpheme, as opposed to the de ditto only interpretation of sentences beginning with that-clauses as in (41): (40) It bothers him that Mary is a good skier. (41) That Mary is a good skier bothers him. We would like to postulate the existence of two types of expressions, distinguished only by the functional characteristics of the predicate following the pleonastic subject it. In one type, such as is illustrated in (40), the verb does not carry a modal function. The pleonastic it in such expressions has a reifying function. The evidence, once again, is provided by the reference constraints. If one were to follow (40) with the expression: (42) though
he denies it
it would refer to the fact that he is bothered. (43) though
If one were to follow (40) with:
he denies that
that would at best refer to the embedded (41) with (42):
clause of (40). If one were to follow
(41) That Mary is such a good skier bothers (42) though he denies it
him
it would again refer to the fact that he is bothered. with (43): (41) That Mary is such a good skier bothers (43) though he denies that that would
refer to the embedded
clause,
Mary
If one were to follow (41)
him
is such a good skier.
148
Z. Frajzwgier,
R. Jqwson
I That-clauses
The following expressions share the properties of it bothers X that as in (40): it grieves X that, it saddens X that, it took place that, it matters thut. They all seem to involve a reifying it, Matrix clauses with modal predicates, verbal or adjectival, such as it seems that, it is doubtful that, it is possible that, it is expected that, it is believed that, etc., do not have a reifying it. The evidence is as follows: if we were to follow a sentence containing a modal predicate such as seem, is possible, is doub?ful with a sentence having it or that as its object, the sentence with object it would produce a grammatical but infelicitous expression, whereas the sentence with the object that would produce a grammatical and felicitous expression, e.g. : (44) It seems that Mary is a good skier. (45) ?I don’t deny it. (46) I don’t deny that. Were it in (44) a reifying morpheme, (45) would be felicitous. The anaphoric that in (46) refers either to the main clause or to the embedded clause of (44).
6. The problem of opaque contexts Long attendant to the philosophical debates about the problem of opaque and transparent contexts are sentences containing that-clauses. The hypothesis advanced in this paper helps to articulate the nature of opacity from the point of view of linguistics. That-clauses are termed ‘opaque’ because certain logical operations fail within such contexts when applied from outside such contexts. By way of illustration, compare the pairs of single-premise arguments in (47))(48) below. These arguments employ two logical operations that would appear to be sensitive to the de ditto/de re distinction: sentential exportation (SE) and existential generalization (EG). The (b) version of each pair contains both a valid inference and an invalid inference (indicated by the pound symbol ‘#‘). (47a) A man said something, therefore, a man said something
(SE)
2. Frajzyngier,
R. Jasperson
149
/ That-clauses
(47b) A man said that Orcutt is a spy, therefore, a man said that Orcutt is a spy #therefore, Orcutt is a spy (48a) A man said something. therefore, there exists someone such that he said something (48b) A man said that Orcutt is a spy, therefore, there exists someone such that he said that Orcutt is a spy #therefore, there exists someone (Orcutt) such that a man said that he is a spy
(SE) (SE)
(EG)
(EG) (EG)
The (a) versions of (47)-(48) employ impeccable if not mundane logical argumentation. The premises of the (a) versions are entirely ‘transparent’ because the operations of SE and EC apply without restriction. The premises of the (b) versions, however, contain embedded opaque contexts, viz. those realized by the that-clauses. The application of either SE or EG fails to produce a valid inference when these operations cross from the transparent contexts in order to apply within the opaque contexts, as is illustrated in the impounded inferences. Related discussion of opaque and transparent contexts may be found in Quine (19.56, 1960), Searle (1979: 157 ff.), and Jackendoff (1985). We suggest that the above failure of SE and EG follows from the fact that elements in that-clauses belong to the domain de ditto rather than to the domain de re. Existential generalization fails because it infers from the domain de ditto about the elements in the domain de re. As evidence, we cite two sets of arguments that illustrate the application of SE and EG with respect to -ing-clauses. If in fact &g-clauses belong to the domain de re, we would predict that in environments where there is a choice between a thatclause and a nominal -ing-clause, the application of these operations would not fail when applied to nominal -ing-clauses. This prediction is borne out below. When SE operates on premises with that-clauses in subject position, the resulting inference is invalid : (49) That Jones broke all his fingers was repeated #therefore, Jones broke all his fingers. The that-clause
of the premise
in (49) realizes
by his followers, (SE)
an opaque
context
with the
150
Z. Frqjzyngier,
I That-c1uu.ve.r
R. Ja.tprson
(non-factive) predicate ‘be repeated’. 3 But since the t/rut-clause does not refer to the domain de re, the argument is invalid. However, when SE operates on premises with -ing-clauses, the resulting inference is valid: (50) Jones’s breaking all his fingers was repeated therefore, Jones broke all his fingers.
by his followers, (SE)
This inference succeeds where (49) fails because both the conclusion and the complement clause of the premise refer to the domain de re. The reader may check that EG operates similarly on the premises in (49) and (50) as well. With many predicates, that-clauses in object position disallow EG. The inference in (47) above provides an obvious example, although in the case of the predicate say, there is no choice between complement type, and we are confined to opaque contexts and de ditto reference. With predicates that allow a choice between -ing and that-clauses, EG out of -ing-clauses is more acceptable as a valid inference than EG out of that-clauses: (51) Ralph finally #therefore, that she made (52) Ralph finally
convinced Les that a woman made off with his VW. there exists a woman such that Ralph convinced Les off with his VW. (EG) convinced Les of a woman’s having made off with his
VW, therefore, there exists a woman such that Ralph her having made off with his VW. (EG)
convinced
Les of
That (52), and arguments with similar predicates, e.g. agree to, may not be completely acceptable as valid inferences is explained by overriding considerations stemming from our understanding of situations of convincing and agreeing.4 Nonetheless, the fact that inferences from sentences containing ing-clauses are more acceptable as valid than those from sentences containing that-clauses provides further evidence for our hypothesis. The reader may check that SE operates similarly on the premises in (51) and (52) as well. 3 Note predicates,
that
SE and
e.g. regrer.
factive predicates. 4 It is interesting situations strongly air; the discourse to the domain
EG
do
validly
The present
apply
discussion
in pseudo-opaque applies
contexts
only to opaque
created
contexts
created
by factive by non-
to note that believe generally cannot take an -&-clause complement, for belief resist de re commitment. Situations in which hrlie~ in is used have a religious is usually
occurring
de re is arguably
between
complex.
‘believers’
and ‘non-believers’.
and thus reference
151
Z. Frajzyngier. R. Jaspetwn / That-clauses
We hypothesized that infinitival clauses also belong to the domain de re. However, arguments with premises containing this complement type would seem to behave differently from those with sentences containing kg- clauses. This is because, as stated above, infinitival clauses belong to the potential mode of the domain de re, and thus refer to potential, not actual. states of affairs. Thus, to the extent that SE and EC are excluded from successful operation on elements of merely potential existence, SE or EG out of infinitival clauses is just as invalid as SE or EC out of fhat-clauses. In this final section we have considered examples which evidence the relationship between (i) the de ditto/de re distinction as realized by part of the complementation system of English and (ii) the logical operations of SE and EG, thus articulating the nature of the logical notion of opacity from a linguistic perspective. It was shown that SE and EG are sensitive to the de ditto/de re distinction. These operations are sensitive to the distinction in that they appear to be more acceptably valid when applied to expressions whose referents are objects or states-of-affairs which are interpreted as real entities in the universe of discourse, which is to say that they belong in the domain de re. Finally, we note that we have presented the issue only in its most basic form. For instance, not all that-clauses would seem to disallow successful application of SE or EG, e.g., factive predicates such as hr regwttuhle or regret. We believe that this has to do with complications extraneous to our present purposes.
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(na of
83 (1991) 133-153.
133
North-Holland
That-clauses and other complements Zygmunt
Frajzyngier of Linguistics,
Department
Received
The
and Robert University
July 1990; revised version
fundamental
communicative
assumption
function. /hat marks
which
is made
reference
Gerundive
December
a number
the following
to the philosophical
sentences
containing
of opacity
is that
distinction
clause as belonging of speech
complementizers
to the semantic
rather
about
that
the problem
The hypothesis
than
domain
de re. We provide
and transparent
in this paper
de ditto in of reality. evidence for
Our analysis
unexplained
specific
in English.
to the elements
remained
of opaque
advanced
have
of complementizers
of the de dicro and de re expressions. of that-clauses
debates
/hat-clauses.
paper
clauses belong to the domain
of properties
attendant
1990
a tripartite
to the elements
based on several properties
us to explain
Boulder, CO 80309, USA
of the present
-ing clauses and infinitival
the analysis
nature
of Colorado,
We propose
Complementizer
Jasperson
enables
so far. Long contexts
helps to articulate
are the
from the point of view of linguistics.
1. Aim and scope of the paper In English, as in a number of other languages, there exist the options of introducing an embedded clause with a complementizer derived from a demonstrative pronoun, viz. that, e.g. : (1) That she is still alive is a consolation. (Quirk and Greenbaum 1975 : 3 16) and through
two types of nominalized
(2) Telling
lies is wrong.
(Quirk
clause to + VERB,
and the infinitival
clauses:
the gerundive
and Greenbaum
-ing e.g.:
1975 : 321)
e.g. :
* We would like to thank anonymous referees for Lingua and Teun A. Hoekstra for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. All errors and infelicities that remain are our sole responsibility. The work on this paper was partially supported by a grant from the National Endowment
for the Humanities
0024-3841/91/$03.50
0
1991 -
to Zygmunt
Frajzyngier.
Elsevier Science Publishers
B.V. (North-Holland)
134
2. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson / That-clauses
(3) To tell lies is wrong. For all three types of structures in English there exist ample descriptions dealing with their formal properties. However, the question why one or the other form of the complement clause is used has traditionally lain outside the scope of most formalist approaches (cf. Chomsky 1970, 1982, 1986). Semantics did enter the formalist picture in the guise of the lexicon. Bresnan (1970, 1972) hypothesized that the lexicon contains subcategorization information as to which complementizer a particular (main clause) verb could have. Grimshaw (1979) elaborated this hypothesis by arguing that the lexical entries of relevant verbs must also contain semantic selection rules which take into account the semantic type of the complement. Thus complement selection was attributed to the semantic component of a formalist grammar. In spite of these semantic considerations, the question why remains inadequately addressed. Most of the approaches to the aspects of complementation that were sensitive to the role of meaning or function in the choice of complementizers concentrated on properties of the main clause verbs (complement taking predicates, CTPs) and consequently attributed most of the constraints on complementation to the properties of CTPs. Such are the studies of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) who divide predicates into factive and non-factive, and Hooper (1976), who classifies predicates with respect to semantic features with assertive and factive. Postal (1974) who does not deal specifically functions of that-clauses1 seems to attribute the behavior of complementizers to the properties of main clause verbs. Bolinger (1968) was one of the first to attribute semantic properties to the complementizers used: ‘the complementizers are chosen for their own sake, not as a mechanical result of choosing something else’ (Bolinger 1968: 122). He then described the semantic distinction between nominal -ing-clauses and infinitival clauses, explaining the semantic differences between the two complementizers by associating -ing with reification and infinitival constructions with hypothesis or potentiality (Bolinger 1968: 124). Bresnan also recognized that complementizers have independent semantic content (1970, 1972 : 60) associating the complementizer that with definiteness, and,for-to with subjectivity, intention, and motivation. More recent is work by Ransom (1986). However, for Ransom (1986) complementizers are ‘semi-lexical’ items that, though clearly related to full lexical items (COMP that being related to the anaphor that), 1 The terms ‘r/tat-clauses’ and ‘nominal Quirk and Greenbaum (1975: 321-322).
-ing-clauses’
long used in the literature
can be found
in
Z. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson I That-clauses
‘no longer
carry any lexical content’,
though
135
they can ‘be seen as compatible
with the modality meanings they signal, like the definiteness of that (p. 47, cf. also pp. 17, 177ff.). It would seem then that for Ransom complementizer choice is essentially ‘the mechanical result of choosing something else’, to quote Bolinger. Semantic differences between the two types of constructions and thatclauses have not been satisfactorily described despite the existence of an abundant literature on the subject, such as the recent Halliday (1985), Ransom (1986) Noonan (1985), Dixon (1984), Borkin (1984) and earlier literature such as Bolinger (1968, 1972) Bresnan (1970, 1972), Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) Stockwell et al. (1973) Kirsner and Thompson (1973) Hooper (1976) Grosu and Thompson (1977), and Grimshaw (1979). What is missing in the linguistic literature is an explicit description of the semantic function of the complementizer that. The question of the function of that was relevant for Davidson (1984) when he tried to provide a logical form for indirect discourse. He describes ‘that’ as a ‘demonstrative referring to an utterance’ (Davidson 1984: 106, cf. also Higginbotham 1986). The aim of the present paper is to provide a description of the function of complementizer ‘that’. We believe that our explanation will enable us to account for a number of phenomena unaccounted for before and also to provide one explanation for phenomena that heretofore required a number of distinct explanations. Our explanation should be of interest to linguists and philosophers alike. The paper constitutes an application and expansion of the theoretical notions developed in Frajzyngier, in press.
2. Background In Frajzyngier, in press, it is proposed that in many languages there exists a fundamental distinction in semantic structure between the domain of speech (de ditto) and the domain of reality (de re). The term de ditto refers to a semantic domain in which reference is made to the elements of speech rather than to the elements of reality. The notion de ditto includes those elements that in the literature are sometimes referred to as ‘linguistic’ where linguistic does not mean a field of science. In Carnap’s terms the domain de re would refer to the ‘world of things’, while the domain de ditto would refer only to a very restricted ‘thing language’ (Carnap 1955: 206-207). Vendler’s ‘events’ (Vendler 1967, cf. also Freed 1979) belong to the domain de re but the domain de re is not exhausted by the ‘events’. In some languages the
distinction is encoded, and utterances or fragments of utterances are marked as being in the domain of speech rather than in the domain of reality. Moreover, in a number of languages forms used in reference to the domain of speech differ from deictics, i.e. expressions used in pointing to some elements in the domain of reality. This semantic distinction is reflected in several areas of language structure, the most obvious being the system of reference and the system of complementation. Within the system of reference deictic pronouns are elements that refer to the domain of reality, and anaphoric pronouns, in the classical understanding of the term, are those that refer to the domain of speech. Since the literature on deictics and anaphoras is quite abundant, we will not discuss the distinction between the two categories here. The relevant points for our discussion, however, are the following: all anaphoras belong to the domain de ditto by definition (cf. Dubois et al. 1973: 33) because they refer to an element that was mentioned before in speech or that is going to be mentioned in speech (cataphora). In many languages the same form may refer to elements in either the domain de re or the domain de ditto. In most languages pronouns referring to the domain de ditto derive from pronouns referring to the domain de re. There are, however, pronouns that are deictic only. i.e. those that cannot refer to an element of speech, but rather refer exclusively to an element in the domain de re. Such elements are described in Frajzyngier (1989a). There are also pronouns that are anaphoric only. For a description of such pronouns cf. Frajzyngier (1989b). In the case of clauses, the domain de ditto requires a more elaborate explanation. A clause is in the domain de ditto only when it is presented to the hearer as such, i.e., not as a direct description of an event but rather as a fragment of speech, or a fragment of linguistic representation which may contain a description of an event. Thus a proposition is in the domain de ditto when it has a metalinguistic function, viz., when it is presented as an object of discourse (cf. Dubois et al. 1973). Examples of typical de ditto elements are some, but not all. speech fragments enclosed in inverted commas in the written form of contemporary languages. (For some early linguistic approaches to the functions of such expressions, cf. Mayenowa 1970, Morawski 1970. Wierzbicka 1970, and Shvartskopf 1970. For philosophic approaches to the problems of quotations cf. Davidson 1984 and the refercnces there.) Vendler’s (1967) ‘propositions’ as opposed to ‘events’ belong within the domain of speech. One of the differences, and perhaps the fundamental one, between de ditto propositions and other propositions is that the former are overtly introduced
Z. Frajzyngier,
R. Jasperson
/ That-clauses
137
into speech or writing as propositions, whereas the latter are not. Figure 1 is an illustration of the relationship between events in reality and de ditto propositions, which are incorporated in other propositions. At the first stage CLAUSE 1 is not de ditto. But at the second stage, when it is incorporated into another proposition (CLAUSE 2) it is.
I I
CLAUSE
I
EVENT
CLAUSE
1
2
I
CLAUSE
COMPLEX
I
SENTENCE Fig. 1.
Cross-linguistically, complementizers derived from demonstratives originated with their primary2 function to mark the following clause as belonging to the domain de ditto rather than to the domain de re (Frajzyngier, in press). There are several arguments in support of the hypothesis that that-clauses and their equivalents in other languages originated as markers of the domain de ditto. The first one is the fact that if a language has a complementizer derived from a demonstrative, such a complementizer will always mark the non-deontic complements of verbs of saying, while it may or may not mark complements of other verbs. The second argument is that if reference is made to a proposition only (rather than to an event or a state of reality), the same demonstrative that serves as complementizer is used. Thus in English I don’t believe that, that refers to a statement made earlier in the discourse, whereas in I don’t believe this, this refers to an event or a state of reality. The third 2
We use the term primaryfunction
primary,function
is understood
in synchronic
and diachronic
in the sense that Kurykowicz
sense. Synchronically
(1964 and other writings)
the term has given it,
viz., the function of the element within the grammatical system of language as opposed to its function in a given fragment of discourse, or as opposed to its function resulting from an implicature. In the diachronic sense, the term primary function refers to the function that at one time was primary
but that is not anymore
in the synchronic
approach.
138
Z. Frujzyngier,
R. Ju.vprrson / That-ciuuses
argument is that in many languages the complementizer after verba dicendi, which performs the same function as English that, is derived not from a demonstrative but rather from a verb of saying.
3. Hypothesis Our main hypothesis is that that as a complementizer in English also originated as a marker of the domain de ditto. and as such constitutes one component of the larger system of complementation. The other components of this system are the -ing and infinitival clauses. We will show that nominal -ing-clauses in the same position represent an element that must be interpreted as de re, providing thus further support for Bolinger (1968). In addition, we will show that infinitival clauses also belong to the domain de re, albeit with different entailments from those represented by -z’ng-clauses. Figure 2 is a graphic representation of the relevant portion of the system of complementation in English. Complementation
De re
De ditto
that-S
Actuality
Potentiality
-ing
to -VP Fig. 2.
Within the above system only that-clauses contain a proposition within another proposition. Complex sentences with to- and -ing-clauses do not contain an embedded proposition. We will show that an essentially semantic function of the complementizer can account for a number of syntactic phenomena involving that-clauses in English, phenomena that have received a number of distinct explanations. In the process of discourse, upon hearing an element from the domain de ditto, we may draw conclusions about the events or states. Such a shift in
2. Frajzyngier. R. Jasperson / That-clauses
139
interpretation is one of the factors responsible for the functional spread whereby what used to be only a de ditto domain becomes a generalized form of the complementizer. Therefore there are a number of clauses that may receive a de re interpretation. But all that-clauses have the property of being interpreted as being in the de ditto domain. The distinction between the domains de ditto and de re cuts across the category factive/non-factive. Some de re elements are factive, others nonfactive. We accept Bolinger’s analysis of nominal -ing-clauses as indicating reification, and infinitival to-clauses as marking potentiality. We will therefore not provide much additional evidence for the two analyses, except as byproducts of our arguments in support of the hypothesis about that-clauses. We will first provide language internal evidence that indeed that-clauses are in the domain de ditto, and then show how this hypothesis enables us to explain a number of syntactic phenomena in English.
4. Evidence 4.1.
The notion of truth
There are several arguments in support of our hypothesis. The first one, which was already used in Vendler (1967) has to do with the notion of truth. One can confirm the truth or deny the truth only of a statement, i.e., only of elements belonging to the domain de ditto. One cannot ask about the truth of elements belonging to the domain de re. Although in English and presumably many other languages one can ask, e.g., Is this a true diamond? this question of course is not about the truth of the diamond but rather about how genuine an article it is. Consider the following sentences: (4) He wants to eat apples. (5) He was caught eating apples. (6) He said that he likes apples. If we were now to follow each of the above sentences with the statement That’s not true, we would obtain the following interpretations: for sentences (4) and (5) there is only one interpretation for each: what is negated is the whole proposition, viz., It is not true that he wants to eat apples, etc. But for sentence (6) we have two interpretations: It is not true that he said S or It is not true that he likes apples. Thus the embedded clauses in (4) and (5) are not
140
2. Frajzyngier,
R. Jasperson
: That-clausm
produced as speech fragments. The embedded proposition in (6) is offered as a proposition, and therefore is available for exactly the same operations - of negation and assertion ~ as any other proposition. In what follows we will make use of this property of the domain de ditto in applying it as a test for category identity. 4.2. Distinction
between that-clauses
and gerundive-ing-clauses
The evidence for the distinction is based on two elements: one is the cooccurrence of that-clauses with various CTPs. The other is the functional interpretations of the co-occurrence restrictions. For purposes of discussion we divide CTPs into three classes. The first class consists of verbs of thinking and saying, viz., de ditto predicates. The second class consists of verbs that pertain only to actions and events that exclude speech, viz. de re predicates. The third class consists of verbs that could be interpreted as belonging either to the domain de ditto or to the domain de re. The first piece of evidence for the hypothesis is based on co-occurrence restrictions between elements belonging to the domain de ditto and to the domain de re. The domain de ditto of a complement clause may often admit only a de ditto predicate, while the domain de re will not even yield a grammatical sentence, e.g. : (7a) (7b) (8a) (8b) (9a) (9b)
Phil thought that the Broncos prevailed. *Phil thought the Broncos prevailing. He mentioned that several months of pay had been laid down. *He mentioned several months of pay having been laid down. Harold claimed that the apartment wasn’t clean. *Harold claimed the apartment’s not being clean.
While de ditto subject clauses may not be used unproblematically with certain de re predicates, de re subjects may be used with such predicates freely, e.g. : (10a) (lob) (1 la) (1 lb)
*That he will cry will cost the court a lot of facial tissue. His crying will cost the court a lot of facial tissue. *That he will eat broccoli will make a dent in the family budget. His eating broccoli will make a dent in the family budget.
In the type of sentence
in which a clausal
subject
takes an equational
or
141
Z. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson 1 That-clauses
adjectival predicate, one can use nouns such as truth, lie, etc., or adjectives true, false - expressions that refer to propositions - with that-clauses, but one may not use such predicates unproblematically with -ing-clauses, i.e., with direct representations of events, e.g. : (12a) (12b) (13a) (13b)
That ?His That ?His
he eats broccoli is true. eating broccoli is true. he eats broccoli is an unshakable truth. eating broccoli is an unshakable truth.
Note here that sentences marked with ? may be grammatical but would have meanings different from their that-clause counterparts. The truth of the (b) sentences does not relate to the statement made in the subject position but rather to how genuine the act described in the subject clause is. Our explanation also accounts for the ungrammaticality of sentences of the type : (14) *John’s
being ill is true.
(Kiparsky
and Kiparsky
1970: 148)
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) claim that the above sentence is ungrammatical because the speaker is not presupposing (but asserting) the truth of the proposition expressed in the subject clause. According to our theory the sentence is ungrammatical because the subject is an element in the domain de ditto. Truth cannot be predicated of elements from the domain de re. The second piece of evidence is based on entailments produced by thatclauses when they occur with predicates that could be interpreted either as verbs within the domain de ditto or as verbs within the domain de re. When such predicates are used with subject that-clauses, they are interpreted as belonging to the domain de ditto. When such predicates are used with nominal -ing-clauses, they are interpreted as belonging to the domain de re. Compare the following examples : (Isa)
That he broke all his fingers was repeated by his followers. (The only interpretation: his followers repeated a piece of information approximating ‘he broke all his fingers’) (15b) His breaking all his fingers was repeated by his followers. (His followers broke their fingers or His followers broke his fingers) (16a) That the surgeon had neglected to check my chart left me speechless. (16b) The surgeon’s having neglected to check my chart left me speechless.
Z. Frajqmgicv,
142
R.
Jasper.~n i That-c/uu.w\
(17a) That our beloved leader embezzled millions affected us all. (Emotionally) (17b) Our beloved leader’s embezzling millions affected us all. (Economically) (18a) That God lives in the heavens above came from the most ardent atheist. (De ditto, the atheist said so) (18b) God’s living in the heavens above came from the most ardent atheist. (De re, with interesting ontological repercussions) The verb report can take either de ditto or de re complements. If it takes a de re complement, then the interpretation is factive in the sense of Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970) : (19) His eating broccoli was reported by the campus press. (20) God’s living in the heavens above was reported by the campus press. (21) Our beloved leader’s embezzling millions was reported by the campus press. If report takes a de ditto complement, then the interpretation of the whole sentence involves a report about the event rather than the event itself. e.g.: (22) That he eats broccoli was reported by the campus press. (23) That God lives in the heavens above was reported by the campus press. (24) That our beloved leader embezzled millions was reported by the campus
press.
The importance
of the semantic
differences
available
with the verb report
rests on the fact that the different interpretations are not the result of having different verbs, but rather the result of having different forms of the complement clause. Hence we have one more piece of evidence that the complementizer that indicates that the clause following it is in the domain de ditto. 4.3. Distinction
between that-clauses
and injiniinitivul&uses
One of the advantages of our theory is that we can explain the difference between that-clauses and infinitival clauses by claiming that infinitival clauses
Z. Frajzyngier, R. Jasperson / That-clauses
143
introduce elements from the domain de re and that that-clauses introduce elements from the domain de ditto. Consider the following sentences: (25) He believes Bacon to be the real author. (26) He believes that Bacon is the real author. (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970) Our interpretation of the differences between the two sentences is the following: Sentence (25) describes the subject’s belief stated with respect to a certain state of affairs. Sentence (26) describes the subject’s belief with respect to a certain proposition. It so happens that the proposition in the embedded clause of (26) describes the state of affairs of the sentence (25). The evidence for our interpretation is again based on the co-occurrence restrictions between the domain de ditto and the domain de re, and on the fact that in the system of reference in English the remote demonstrative that is used to refer to elements from the domain de ditto, while the deictic it is used in reference to elements from the domain de re (cf. Channon 1980, Frajzyngier in press). We will follow each of the above sentences with a sentence containing an object referring to the domain de ditto first. The usage of such a sentence after (25) would produce an infelicitous sentence if it were to be interpreted as referring to the embedded clause, e.g. (25) reproduced here for illustration. (25) He believes Bacon to be the real author. (27) I do not deny that. (28) He does not deny that. The that in (27) and (28) can only be interpreted as referring to the whole of (25), not to the complement clause. Let us now consider the interpretation that would obtain if we were to follow (25) and (26) with a sentence whose object refers to the domain de re rather than de ditto. (25) He believes Bacon to be the real author. (29) I do not deny it. (30) He does not deny it. In (29) and (30) it felicitously refers to the state of the subject’s belief, as described in the complement clause of (25). The use of (29) and (30) after (26) would result in somewhat infelicitous
144
Z. Frajzyngirr. R. Jasperson
; That-c1au.w.s
expressions, as there is no clear de re object in (26) to which the it of (29) and (30) could refer (apart from the whole of (26): (26) He believes that Bacon is the real author. (29) I do not deny it. (30) He does not deny it. Additional evidence for this interpretation comes from the following discourse constraints: the sentence (25) cannot be given as an answer to the question: What does he believe? The sentence (26) can be given as an answer to such a question. The what in the question is requesting the identity of an object of the verb believe, a belief, which would be a proposition. We can’t give (25) as a felicitous response to this particular question because Bacon to be the real author semantically could not be the object of a belief in the sense of believe used here (viz., not the sense of believe as in I believe Hurry,, which means Z believe what Harry said). Hence Bacon to be the red uuthor is not a proposition. The clauses introduced by that, such as in (26) can be interpreted as meaning that they have been previously produced or otherwise entertained by the matrix subject. The following sentences provide evidence for this claim: (31a)
Peter has agreed to take the blame, whether he realizes it or not. (31b) Peter has agreed that he will take the blame, ?whether he realizes it or not. Sentence (31 b) is strange because whereas in the first two clauses the speaker intends that the subject said, might have said, or mentally entertained the contents indirectly reported in the that-clause, the second clause denies this possibility. Sentence (31a) is acceptable because the use of the infinitive makes no claims as to the subject’s having said, etc., the content expressed in the complement clause. Rather, it is used to describe the relationship between the matrix subject and a state of affairs. Similarly: (32a) He believes a gnome to inhabit his cellar, though I’m sure it’s never occurred to him as such. (32b) He believes that a gnome inhabits his cellar, *though I’m sure it’s never occurred to him as such.
Z. Frajzyngier. R. Jasperson / That-clauses
It is interesting
to note that a nominalization
145
will not work in the situations
described in (33). The reason for this differs from that present in (31))(32), but it illustrates the two modes of the domain de re, potentiality versus actuality (cf. figure 2). (33) Peter has agreed to his taking the blame, ?whether he realizes it or not. In this case, the nominalization refers to the domain de re but with an interpretation of actuality, in contrast to potentiality. The predicate agree is such that when one agrees to the content of such an expression, he acknowledges its actuality. Thus the adverbial whether-clause is anomalous because it denies that this requirement of acknowledgment was met. One more piece of evidence for our hypothesis, and a litmus paper to show the domain de ditto of that-clauses as opposed to the domain de re of infinitival clauses, is offered by the application of the future tense to the sentences in (32): (34a) ?He will believe a gnome to inhabit his cellar. (34b) He will believe that a gnome inhabits his cellar. Sentence (34a) is incomplete or gives the impression of being incomplete because it refers to the potential state of a participant which does not yet or may never exist, hence to a non-actual state. Sentence (34a) would be much more acceptable if it were to be followed by a temporal when or conditional if clause, or if it were to be preceded by a clause stating a condition or time, such as: (35) With proper
inducement,
he will believe a gnome
Sentence (34b) involves belief in a statement, statement has just been made in the sentence
rather itself.
to inhabit
his cellar.
than in a state. And the
5. Pleonastic it One of the advantages or our analysis is that it can explain a fact that we believe has remained unexplained so far. Kiparsky (1970: 165) claim that it is a reduced form of the fact in sentences such as:
146
2. Frujzyngier,
(36) Bill resents
R. Jasperson
1 That-cluusrs
it that people are always comparing
him to Mozart.
That explanation does not amount to anything but a paraphrase of it. According to K. and K.‘s analysis a large number of sentences would have to have an identical phrase, the fuct. We would like to propose that behind the explanation that K. and K. provide lies an important intuition, which K. and K. expressed through the metaphor the fact. We would like to propose that it in sentences like (36) is a grammatical morpheme whose role is to convert a clause from the domain de ditto into the domain de re. The argument for our hypothesis will again use the referential properties of that as opposed to it. If we were to follow (36). repeated here, (36) Bill resents with clauses
it that people are always comparing
him to Mozart
such as:
(37) though though
he acknowledges he denies it
it, or
the reference of it would be the embedded (36) with expressions such as:
clause of (36). If we were to follow
(38) and he acknowledges that, or though he denies that the reference of that would be the main clause of (36) because this is the de ditto element, i.e., what has been said, or written (as it has been in (36)). If we were to have a variant of (36) without it (which may not be acceptable to all speakers), viz: (39) Bill resents
that people are always comparing
and we were to follow it with (37) varied (37) and he acknowledges though he denies it
slightly
him to Mozart
here:
it, or
there would be no proper antecedent for it (though of course by implication we could imagine it to refer to something like his resentment). If on the other hand, we were to follow (39) with (38) viz.:
2. Frajzyngier. R. Jasperson / That-clauses
147
(38) and he acknowledges that, or though he denies that that will have two possible antecedents, namely the main clause or the embedded clause. It would be interesting to know whether the pleonastic it in the subject position as in sentence (40) below is also a reifying morpheme, as opposed to the de ditto only interpretation of sentences beginning with that-clauses as in (41): (40) It bothers him that Mary is a good skier. (41) That Mary is a good skier bothers him. We would like to postulate the existence of two types of expressions, distinguished only by the functional characteristics of the predicate following the pleonastic subject it. In one type, such as is illustrated in (40), the verb does not carry a modal function. The pleonastic it in such expressions has a reifying function. The evidence, once again, is provided by the reference constraints. If one were to follow (40) with the expression: (42) though
he denies it
it would refer to the fact that he is bothered. (43) though
If one were to follow (40) with:
he denies that
that would at best refer to the embedded (41) with (42):
clause of (40). If one were to follow
(41) That Mary is such a good skier bothers (42) though he denies it
him
it would again refer to the fact that he is bothered. with (43): (41) That Mary is such a good skier bothers (43) though he denies that that would
refer to the embedded
clause,
Mary
If one were to follow (41)
him
is such a good skier.
148
Z. Frajzwgier,
R. Jqwson
I That-clauses
The following expressions share the properties of it bothers X that as in (40): it grieves X that, it saddens X that, it took place that, it matters thut. They all seem to involve a reifying it, Matrix clauses with modal predicates, verbal or adjectival, such as it seems that, it is doubtful that, it is possible that, it is expected that, it is believed that, etc., do not have a reifying it. The evidence is as follows: if we were to follow a sentence containing a modal predicate such as seem, is possible, is doub?ful with a sentence having it or that as its object, the sentence with object it would produce a grammatical but infelicitous expression, whereas the sentence with the object that would produce a grammatical and felicitous expression, e.g. : (44) It seems that Mary is a good skier. (45) ?I don’t deny it. (46) I don’t deny that. Were it in (44) a reifying morpheme, (45) would be felicitous. The anaphoric that in (46) refers either to the main clause or to the embedded clause of (44).
6. The problem of opaque contexts Long attendant to the philosophical debates about the problem of opaque and transparent contexts are sentences containing that-clauses. The hypothesis advanced in this paper helps to articulate the nature of opacity from the point of view of linguistics. That-clauses are termed ‘opaque’ because certain logical operations fail within such contexts when applied from outside such contexts. By way of illustration, compare the pairs of single-premise arguments in (47))(48) below. These arguments employ two logical operations that would appear to be sensitive to the de ditto/de re distinction: sentential exportation (SE) and existential generalization (EG). The (b) version of each pair contains both a valid inference and an invalid inference (indicated by the pound symbol ‘#‘). (47a) A man said something, therefore, a man said something
(SE)
2. Frajzyngier,
R. Jasperson
149
/ That-clauses
(47b) A man said that Orcutt is a spy, therefore, a man said that Orcutt is a spy #therefore, Orcutt is a spy (48a) A man said something. therefore, there exists someone such that he said something (48b) A man said that Orcutt is a spy, therefore, there exists someone such that he said that Orcutt is a spy #therefore, there exists someone (Orcutt) such that a man said that he is a spy
(SE) (SE)
(EG)
(EG) (EG)
The (a) versions of (47)-(48) employ impeccable if not mundane logical argumentation. The premises of the (a) versions are entirely ‘transparent’ because the operations of SE and EC apply without restriction. The premises of the (b) versions, however, contain embedded opaque contexts, viz. those realized by the that-clauses. The application of either SE or EG fails to produce a valid inference when these operations cross from the transparent contexts in order to apply within the opaque contexts, as is illustrated in the impounded inferences. Related discussion of opaque and transparent contexts may be found in Quine (19.56, 1960), Searle (1979: 157 ff.), and Jackendoff (1985). We suggest that the above failure of SE and EG follows from the fact that elements in that-clauses belong to the domain de ditto rather than to the domain de re. Existential generalization fails because it infers from the domain de ditto about the elements in the domain de re. As evidence, we cite two sets of arguments that illustrate the application of SE and EG with respect to -ing-clauses. If in fact &g-clauses belong to the domain de re, we would predict that in environments where there is a choice between a thatclause and a nominal -ing-clause, the application of these operations would not fail when applied to nominal -ing-clauses. This prediction is borne out below. When SE operates on premises with that-clauses in subject position, the resulting inference is invalid : (49) That Jones broke all his fingers was repeated #therefore, Jones broke all his fingers. The that-clause
of the premise
in (49) realizes
by his followers, (SE)
an opaque
context
with the
150
Z. Frqjzyngier,
I That-c1uu.ve.r
R. Ja.tprson
(non-factive) predicate ‘be repeated’. 3 But since the t/rut-clause does not refer to the domain de re, the argument is invalid. However, when SE operates on premises with -ing-clauses, the resulting inference is valid: (50) Jones’s breaking all his fingers was repeated therefore, Jones broke all his fingers.
by his followers, (SE)
This inference succeeds where (49) fails because both the conclusion and the complement clause of the premise refer to the domain de re. The reader may check that EG operates similarly on the premises in (49) and (50) as well. With many predicates, that-clauses in object position disallow EG. The inference in (47) above provides an obvious example, although in the case of the predicate say, there is no choice between complement type, and we are confined to opaque contexts and de ditto reference. With predicates that allow a choice between -ing and that-clauses, EG out of -ing-clauses is more acceptable as a valid inference than EG out of that-clauses: (51) Ralph finally #therefore, that she made (52) Ralph finally
convinced Les that a woman made off with his VW. there exists a woman such that Ralph convinced Les off with his VW. (EG) convinced Les of a woman’s having made off with his
VW, therefore, there exists a woman such that Ralph her having made off with his VW. (EG)
convinced
Les of
That (52), and arguments with similar predicates, e.g. agree to, may not be completely acceptable as valid inferences is explained by overriding considerations stemming from our understanding of situations of convincing and agreeing.4 Nonetheless, the fact that inferences from sentences containing ing-clauses are more acceptable as valid than those from sentences containing that-clauses provides further evidence for our hypothesis. The reader may check that SE operates similarly on the premises in (51) and (52) as well. 3 Note predicates,
that
SE and
e.g. regrer.
factive predicates. 4 It is interesting situations strongly air; the discourse to the domain
EG
do
validly
The present
apply
discussion
in pseudo-opaque applies
contexts
only to opaque
created
contexts
created
by factive by non-
to note that believe generally cannot take an -&-clause complement, for belief resist de re commitment. Situations in which hrlie~ in is used have a religious is usually
occurring
de re is arguably
between
complex.
‘believers’
and ‘non-believers’.
and thus reference
151
Z. Frajzyngier. R. Jaspetwn / That-clauses
We hypothesized that infinitival clauses also belong to the domain de re. However, arguments with premises containing this complement type would seem to behave differently from those with sentences containing kg- clauses. This is because, as stated above, infinitival clauses belong to the potential mode of the domain de re, and thus refer to potential, not actual. states of affairs. Thus, to the extent that SE and EC are excluded from successful operation on elements of merely potential existence, SE or EG out of infinitival clauses is just as invalid as SE or EC out of fhat-clauses. In this final section we have considered examples which evidence the relationship between (i) the de ditto/de re distinction as realized by part of the complementation system of English and (ii) the logical operations of SE and EG, thus articulating the nature of the logical notion of opacity from a linguistic perspective. It was shown that SE and EG are sensitive to the de ditto/de re distinction. These operations are sensitive to the distinction in that they appear to be more acceptably valid when applied to expressions whose referents are objects or states-of-affairs which are interpreted as real entities in the universe of discourse, which is to say that they belong in the domain de re. Finally, we note that we have presented the issue only in its most basic form. For instance, not all that-clauses would seem to disallow successful application of SE or EG, e.g., factive predicates such as hr regwttuhle or regret. We believe that this has to do with complications extraneous to our present purposes.
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