The 1976 European communist parties conference

JAMESP. MCGRJWR

The 197.6European Communist Parties Conference*

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On June 29, 1976, the .long-awaited European Communist Parties Conference (BCPC) op.ened in East Berlin, +fter fourteen preparatory meetings (sixteen by some counts), twenty months of delibkmtion and debate, and, at least six drafts of the final document,, delegations from twenty-nine Buropean Commtmist &d workers’ &n-ties ,gathered in the, fortieth floor conference. room of the hotel “gtadt Berhri ” for the huges--arid perhaps last-convocation .of its kirid in the history ,of the European Communist movement, This articIe has several purposes : first, to trace the .events leading ‘up to the conference from the May 4 to 6, 1976,. meeting of the Editorial Board of the ECPC; second, to review the speeches and commentary of the June 29-30 plenary sessions; third, to outline the conference documents and to compare’it withits predecessors from the 1967 Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties‘atld the ‘1969 Moscow world meeting of ‘Comm~~st parties; fourth; to summarize the commentary on the ECPC in the months following the l I would like to acknowledge my, debt to Royal D. Bisbee, James Qitchlow,. Gunther Eyck,..,Gregory Guroff, and Eric willenz for their. valuable subitatitiire’-and ‘styhstic advici. ‘The opinions and gews expressed ln this article:are the ,&thor’s and do not necessarily’reflect those of ihe,ir.S: govern; merit: or the International Communication Agency. :

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meeting; and, fifth, to assess the gains and losses of various participants in the enterprise. In the course of the analysis, a clearer picture will emerge of the significance of the ECPC for the future of the Communist movement in Europe and perhaps the world. Final Preparatory

Meetings

The May 6 meeting in East Berlin of the Editorial Board charged with responsibility for drafting the ECPC document proved to be very significant in the chain of events leading up to the conference. Until that meeting, at least the Yugoslav Party was expressing doubts as to whether or not the ECPC would be held at all, or, if held, whether they would attend, given the difficulties encountered in establishing satisfactory “ ground rules ” for the meeting and in formulating the final document. Among the problems impeding progress were whether or not the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) should be mentioned by name in the final document (as it had been in past documents of this nature), whether the term “ proletarian internationalism ” should be used, and the insistence by the Communist Party of France (PCF) that imperialism and capitalism be attacked in stronger terms. Following the May 4-6 Editorial Board meeting, however, Aleksandar Grlickov, head of the international section of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central Committee, was able to characterize the meeting as having resulted ” in a satisfactory formulation for a number of questions,” although some problems ” of a principled and essential nature ” remained ‘-apparently a refer: ence to the question, supposedly settled, of whether the conference was to be conducted under a consensus rule, i.e., only unanimous decisions could be taken, or whether ,some form of majority rule woul$ prevail. In addition, there were indications that the, issue of the status of proletarian 4ntemationalism had been raised in spite of earlier ageements not to bring it up. In any event, according to Grlickov, the LCY would make no decision on participation in the conference until the text of the final document was available for examination by the LCY Central Committee. Despite the advances made at the May Editorial Board meeting, acknowledged even by the Yugoslavs, the timing of the conference was still in doubt. The Yugoslavs charged that efforts were being 1. Yugodav

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made to deviate from the “ original agreement ” under which they had agreed to participate in the ECPC,P and that some Communist parties were trying “ to work in the old way.” J The British Party reaffirmed its position that it, for one, would sign nothing until its Executive had looked over the f&ml document after the conference.+ Representatives of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) maintained that the date of the conference could not’ possibly be set until an acceptable draft of the final document was available,s and; in any event, no meeting could be held until after the .Italian hational elections of June 20-21, and perhaps not even that summer.6 Faced with these problems and others, a series of hurried meetings took place between officials of various parties, Eastern and Western. Konstantin Katushev, the CPSU. ofEcial responsible for relations with fraternal parties, visited Romania (May 28-30, 1976) and Yugoslavia (June 5-7, 1976). Todo Kurtovic, LCY secretary in charge of ideological and propaganda work, journeyed to Romania (June 7) where he talked with Stefan Andrei, head of: the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) Central Committee foreign affairs section. Andrei had already (June 5-6) been in Italy consulting with PC1 officials. Stane Dolanc, de facto head of the Executive Committee of the LCY, then visited Italy (June 9) where he talked with Enrico Berlinguer, PC1 Secretary General. Apparently these efforts met with some success because on June 10, 1976 (described as “D-Day ” by one Yugoslav source), the first session ’ of the tlnal meeting of the Editorial Commission * took place in East Berlin. On the following day, the meeting1 was interI< 2. Miliia Sundic commentary on 3. Nedeljne Znformotivne Novine .4. Mornina Star. May 11. 1976. 5. Report of Ekicd Beilimguer, ference. on Belgrade domestic radio,

Zagreb domestic radio, &y (NZN); May 16, 1976. PCI. Secretary

General,

26, 1976.’ * ’

Rome press con-

May. 28. 1976. 6. Report of-Gian&rlo Pajetta, head of .the PCI Central Committee international section, Turin election speech, on Zzi@-eb’domestic’ radio, Miiy 6,

,: -_. . . 1976. 7. The “ tinal ” meeting of the Editorial Commission was divided into twdi sessions, apparently because of the need to save face when it became necessary for the delegations to consult with their respective central committees. Having publicly announced that the June 10 meeting would be the let, ‘khni fiction was preserved by splitting the’meeting into two sessions; 8. The shift in terminology from Editorial I‘ Board ” .to Editorial’ ‘!Commission ” is significant. First established at the December ‘1975 consulta&e meeting, the Editorial Commission created an Editorial Boar&timp&ed at first of eight members-four loyalist and foti oppositionist-which ks later

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rupted in order “to enable all participants to inform the Central Committees of their parties about the work that had been done.” 9 Two possibilities present themselves as to why the Editorial Commission meeting was adjourned. First, consensus might have been reached on the document and ratification was necessary by the respective central committees before final procedural matters could be settled. Second, the meeting could have been deadlocked and incapable of proceeding without further consultation by the delegatei with. their Party leaders. Given that the LCY’s Grlickov stated that when the meeting resumed “efforts will be made to achieve consensus on the document” and that other questions would be discussed, such as the rules of procedure,‘O the latter explanation is the more likely. There is, however, evidence that progress was made on some matters, notably on the issue of the consensus rule: according to a report of the British Communist Party’s (CPGB) representative at the meeting, that rule was finally adopted as the basis for the conference.” On June 24, 1976, the Editorial Commission held its second and final session. The ECPC document was approved, procedural questions were settled, and the date of the conference was set for June 29-30, 1976. The Conference Setting The delegations began to arrive in East Berlin two days before the conference opened. A round of receptions ensued, the most publicized of which was the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Josip Broz-Vito. Pictures of this meeting were displayed prominently in Western. and> Eastern newspapers, giving rise to speculation about a major turn in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The conference itself opened early on the morning of June 29 in the fortieth floor conference room of the hotel “ Stadt Berlin.” The delegates were seated ‘around a large table, 32 meters by 9 meters, according to .the German alphabet. Facilities were available for simultaneous translation of speeches into all the languages of the participants, and .the documents were to be published in Ger_’ &tided. The terminological shift from “ board ” to “ commission ” thera fore represented a move to a higher +I of ratiikation for the conference +xmcllt. : ,9. East Genpap A& news agency, June 12, 1976. 19. Belgrade domestic radio, June 12,1976. i Il. Mew-n& S&r, June 14, 1976..

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man, English, French, Spanish, Italian, and Russian. Press facilities were the most elaborate for any such conference; in addition to a press center in the hotel itself, a large cent& was opened in the new Kongress Halle on the Alexanderplatx where reporters were able to follow all proceedings on closedcircuit television. The conference was covered by more than 800 journalists, including representatives from eighteen news agencies and twenty-two radio stations. The opening of the conference was carried live by G,D.R. television and broadcast throughout Eastern Europe ,via Intervision. Subsequent proceedings were closely followed by G.D.R. radio. The rules of procedure for the conference contained few surprises. All business was to be conducted at plenary sessions; the timetable was to be agreed upon at the start of the. sessions;. the chair was to change at .every break and pass among the delegations according to the German alphabet; and press releases were to be issued at the end of every conference day. Che precaution was taken, however, that appeared to indicate that some difficulties were anticipated: a new editorial commission was set up to meet, if necessary, to resolve. last minute differences concerning the conference document. The only procedural development of the conference was-in contrast to earlier indications-that the document was not to be signed or voted on in the course of the meeting. Twenty-nine Communist and workers’ parties were represented at the ECPC, thus making it the best-attended conference of its kind to date. All of the delegations were led by the top man in the respective parties with the exception of the Party of Labor of Switxerland (which has a rotating Directorate similar to the. Swiss presidency) and the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus which sent one Christos Petras, who was identified only as a member of the Politburo. The Albanian and Icelandic parties were absent, as they had been at the 1967 and 1969 European and world conferences, respectively. The one surprise among the participants was the eleventh hour decision to attend by the Communist Party of. the Netherlands, which had also missed the previous conferences. .

Speeches Each of the ECPC delegations was allocated approximately .on& half hour to address the assembly, although some speakers, notably Uonid Brezhnev,. held forth for up to twice the permitted> time: The speeches were for the most part brief and a reiteration of positions set out long before in other. contexts. :Four :general areas

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iwere covered-the implementation of the Final Act of the Con‘ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), inter-Party relations, internal domestic affairs, and European and world affairs ‘-although not all of the speakers necessarily touched on every subject, ,: - Some of the “+ules~’ of the conference were violated by certain speakers through attempts to link the ECPC with the 1967 Karlovy .Vary meeting, condemnations of Maoism, calls for a world conference, ‘and what were interpreted by the Yugoslavs as attempts to regain ideological ground lost by the loyalist parties during the negotiations over the conference document? The tone of the loyalists’ speeches-those. of Brezhnev (U.S.S.R.), Gierek (Poland), .Honecker (East Germany), Husak (Czechoslovakia), Kadar, (Hun‘gary), Zliivkov (Bulgaria), ‘Bilen (Turkey), and Mies (West Gerniany)-was .clearlyz defensive, while that of the ” opposition ” ‘speakers-Ceausescu (Romania), Tito (Yugoslavia), Berlinguei (Italy),~~Carrillo (Spain),. Marchais (France), and McLennan (Great Britainewas just as clearly on the attack. .‘The sections ‘of the speeches ‘dealing with CSCE themes were generally organized around the three “baskets ” of the Helsinki ‘Final’ Act. As .is the ‘norm in _Communist treatments of CSCE, “ first’ basket ?’ (disarmament and confidence-building) issues were stressed, while “ third basket ” (cultural and personal contacts) themes were muted.’ No new proposals or approaches were evident inthe speeches on disarmament. Progress toward detente and peace in:,Europe was attributed mainly to the socialist countries, although some small’ credit ‘was also given to the workers’ movement in the ‘capitalist. states. NiA.T.0. -was condemned as purely aggressive, while the Warsaw Treaty Organization was portrayed as defensive ‘and the bulwark.of peace in Europe. Proposals for mutual balanced force .reductions (MBFR), disarmament, an end to the arms .race, reductions in military budgets, and the like differed little ,from previous statements. On “ second basket ” (relations among states) matters, the value of ties with the West in the areas of trade, cooperation, and technology was pointed out. Obstacles to better relations between Eastern and Western states were attributed to the latter, and complaints about discrimination in trade and other areas were common “ Third ,basket ” comments dwelt on attempts by the West to exploit the Helsinki accords for subversive purposes and on the .nonfulfillment by the Western states of the provisions of the I : . ; 12: Politika (Belgrade); July 4, 1976. .

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Final Act. This was contrasted to the efforts of the socialist states to meet all obligations. Finally, in all areas of relations .among states, it was stressed that peaceful coexistence and detente do not mean acceptance of the political and ideological status quo:. Rather, peaceful coexistence was said to create the conditions for a more intensive class struggle, one free of the danger of nuclear disaster. In the sections of the speeches dealing with inter-Party relations, the question of the existence of a the issues were familiar: ‘t center ” or “ leading ” Party for the European Jand world Communist movements, the meaning of “ proletarian ~iiitdrnationalism,” autonomy and equality of parties, noninterference in the internal affairs of other parties, the existence and application. of general “ laws ” of Marxism-Leninism, the role; of the CPSU, anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, the status of ideological tenets such. as the “ dictatorship of the proletariat,” the right of parties to criticize one another, and so on. The division of opinion was-the ‘same as that revealed during negotiation overthe conference document, and it was clear that no Party had changed its private opinion no matter what was stated in the official documents. The loyalist parties, as noted above, were somewhat defensive in their statements about inter-Party relations. They denied the exisi tence of or the desire to establish a formal or informal “ center ” for the movement. They ‘further claimed that conditions of equality, and autonomy among parties already existed:The loyalists charged that the imperialists were attempting to undermine the unity of the Communist movement! and that only by fulf?lling internationalist duties on the basis of proletarian internationalism could these attempts be resisted. Finally, the role of the CPSUwas Ytressed in the loyalists’ speeches ,to a degree that contrasted sharply ,with.‘the *. main document. The opposition parties, for their part, were divided.~on some specifics but united on the central issues of equality, autonomy; and the “ new era ” in inter-Party relations. .They reiterated their positions with such- force and to an extent. that:must have been embarrassing for the loyalists, given the latter’s claim that t&se conditions already existed. In addition, certain of’ the opposition speakers-Tit0 and Ceausescu specifically-went .so far as to suggest that even under socialism there-are problems, and that socialistsand Communists are ,not miracle men, a .position that clashed ~slilirpl~ with, for example, Zhivkov’s assertion that. the future ofthe.world is seen in today’s Soviet society. 1 1” ..‘::..lN,?.. I d ;-,i, ___ ia::,: .I Several of the speakers went into .domestic affairs and used some

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of their time to describe internal and foreign policy, internal conditions, andso on: These themes are too specific to be dealt with in any general ‘manner here, and the reader is referred to the speeches themselves for details. Other delegates delivered assessments of the political situation outside ‘of Europe and condemned or praised as they felt was warranted by the situation in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America A number of the speakers congratulated the Westem.parties-notably the PC1 and PCF-for their electoral successes, while others urged alliances between Communists, socialists, ‘social democrats, Christians, and other “democratic and progressive” parties. Mention was also made of the significance of the nonaligned movemenK. The address by Leonid Brezhnev was the fnst and longest of the conference Brezhnev’s speech set the tone for the loyalist parties, although the hardest line was set out by others, notably the BCP’s Zhivkov. Brezhnev’s remarks on CSCE matters were fairly standard, and he restrained himself from claiming for the CPSU credit for whatever progress had been made, leaving that. task for other members of the loyalist camp. His comments on inter-Party relations were also .-relatively low key: conceding that every Communist Party .is responsible for its actions fist of all to the workers and people-of its own country, Brezhnev nonetheless stressed the duality of responsibility-national and international-implicit in his definition of proletarian internationalism. He denied that any attempt was being made to recreate a formal organizational structure or center .for the Communist movement but emphasized the need for unity in ,the face of what he considered to be the organization of the international bourgeoisie. Brez&nev noted the need for multilateral meetings on Marxist-Leninist theory and practice and hinted at the desirability of a world conference. Finally, Brezhnev declared that, for:‘the CPSU at least, the conference document was thNiing. : . East: Europeaq loyalist speakers discussed many of the same themes, albeit. sometimes with less restraint; Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Socialist. Unity Party of (East) Germany (SED), touted-the mighty achievements of the Soviet Union; the demands of ~proletarian internationalism;-and. the need .for vigilance; Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the -Hungarian Socialist ‘Workers -Party (MSZMPh also noted. the role of: the Soviet Union, declared that d&ente~was: increasing in spite of violations of parts of. the CSCE Final Act by capitalist countries, and offered a definition of -proletarian: internationalism that .was remarkably similar. ,t~ that of

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Brezhnev.- Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), cited socialism as the main force in achieving detente and pointed out the role of the Soviet: Union and the socialist countries in its attainment. Gustav Husak, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia &PCS), attributed the decisive role in achieving detente to the Soviet Union, asserted that the balance of forces was shifting toward socialism,. accused the West of trying to subvert the results of CSCE, and called for unity and fealty to the principles of proletarian internationalism. Finally, Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), lavishly praised the Soviet Union, declared that the &an& tion to detente was largely due to the efforts of the socialist. countries, criticized the Maoists, supported proletarian internationalism; and proclaimed the Soviet Union as “ the model of the .future of mankind.” The “ opposition,” in turn, managed to give as well as it was forced to take. Tito began by stating that the ECPC was only a forum for an exchange of views, thereby reasserting the oppositionist position that any kind of action program or binding document had not been, and could not be, formulated at the conference. Largely ignoring CSCE, the main theme of the conference, Tito stressed instead nonaligned issues such as the call for a revised economic and political order. He declared that the .struggle for emancipation was best expressed by the nonaligned movement. and emphasized the existence of roads to socialism other than that of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In his abbreviated discussion of CSCE, Tito maintained that little real progress had been ‘made, that the only genuine attempts to implement the CSCE. Final .Act bad been on the part of Italy and Yugoslavia, West Germany and Poland. Finally, Tito reiterated the standard list of principles that the Yugoslavs have always held to govern inter-Party relations: autonomy, equality, sovereignty, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other parties. Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Co& munist Party (RCP), echoed Tito’s characterization of ,the J?CPC as only an exchange of views. He expressed the opinion that the ‘transition from capitalism to socialism was occurring at -a rapid pace but tempered this assessment by warning that Communists are not miracle workers, that even. under socialism problems ‘will- persist He agreed with Tito that the expectations of CSCE.had.not been fulf2led thus far. Ceausescu then touched on a number of issues important to the nonaligned countries, evidently I laying : fur&her

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groundwork for the ultimately abortive effort to achieve observer status at the Colombo nonaligned countries’ conference later in the year. Stressing essentially the same principles of inter-Party relations as Tito, Ceausescu went even further in his praise of national Communism and the primary duty of each Party to its own people. The Western European oppositionist speakers were, if anything, even more militant than Tito and Ceausescu. Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary General of the PCI, declared the ECPC to be a meeting of autonomous parties. He emphasized the need of certain unnamed parties to “ abandon obsolete methods ” and noted that solidarity is based on autonomy and equality even though internationalism is an essential characteristic of inter-Party relations. Differing with the loyalists, Berlinguer asserted that the transition from cold war to peaceful coexistence was due to realists in the West as well as to the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Berlinguer pointed out that errors had been made in building socialism in some countries, that socialism and democracy would not be the same everywhere, and in fact, that Eastern European models of socialist development were not appropriate to the Western European context. Berlinguer then went on to review the situation in Italy.*3 Georges Marchais, Secretary General of the PCF, devoted most of his speech to the situation in France, repeating his famous slogan of “socialism with French colors.” Noting that the Communist parties of Western Europe face similar problems and propose similar solutions, Marchais came close to acknowledging that Eurocommunism is more than a phrase used by bourgeois journalists, a position that presaged later developments in the European Communist movement. Obliquely criticizing Soviet overtures to the French Government at the expense of the PCF, Marchais somewhat defiantly declared that the PCF could not permit any development in state-to-state relations to affect the struggle of the Party, and openly attacked proletarian internationalism as practiced by the Soviet Party. Almost as an afterthought, Marchais added that all of this does not, of course, have any eflect on the PCF’s intemationalist solidarity. Of all the speeches at the ECPC, that of the Secretary General of the then clandestine Communist Party of Spain (PCE), Santiago Carrillo, was the most colorful. Likening the Communist movement to the early Christian Church, Carrillo drew parallels between the persecution endured and the perseverance shown by members of 13.

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both movements. Characterizing Moscow as a kind of Rome and the anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution as “ our Christmas,” Carrillo pointed out the danger of the scientific content of socialism being reduced to dogma. Carrillo declared that the Communist parties of Europe had “ grown up ” and that there was no returning to past theories of the proper relationship among parties. He blessed alliances with non-Communist forces and emphasized the freedoms outlined in the ECPC document. According to Carrillo, the PCE “ cannot accept the disappearance of freedoms even under a socialist regime,” although he did concede the possibility of a resort to force in the event of a reactionary coup attempt. Other Western European parties echoed many of these themes, both loyalist and oppositionist. Gordon McLennan, General Secretary of the CPGB, cited the differing conditions in which Communist parties find themselves and reaffirmed the validity of the “ British road to socialism.” He maintained that “ the cause of internationalism goes beyond the working class ” and stressed democratic rights. Alvaro Cunhal, General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), asserted that revolution could not be copied and that broad alliances were needed. At the same time, he placed a foot firmly in both camps by declaring that Western imperialists were attempting to disrupt the movement and that antiSoviet slander was one of their principal tools. Speaking for the Communist Party of Austria (KPOe), Franz Muhri praised the U.S.S.R. for being the strongest socialist country and a major force for peace. Finally, I. Bilen, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Turkey (CPT). lauded the Soviet Union in stronger terms than any speaker except Zhivkov, and called for strict adherence to the norms of proletarian internationalism. The Conference Document

The final document of the ECPC, the main object of contention during the many months of preparation for the conference, turned out to be a gutted formulation containing no surprises, no controversy, and-apart from its existence and the process involved in creating it-nothing of substantive significance.‘4 The document was the result of compromise, although it cannot be determined who sacrificed the most. The loyalist parties certainly gave up much when they permitted the hallowed term “ proletarian internationalism ” 14.

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to be omitted from the text, although “international unity ” and !‘ international solidarity ” were used freely in its stead. >In stark contrast to previous documents, there was only a single reference to the Soviet Union, and this in the context of anti-Communist campaigns conducted by the imperialists. Even here, however, the reference was muted, because anti-Sovietism was not, as it had been elsewhere, declared to be the worst form of anti-Communism. Also in contrast to the documents of other meetings, there was absolutely no mention of the United States, which in previous formulations had been declared ad nauseum to be the leader and the worst example of imperialism, The holy trinity of Marx, Lenin, and Engels was invoked only once in the document, this in the context of an appeal for unity. A single short paragraph dealt with interParty relations-a much less prominent treatment than this theme had had in the speeches of the delegation leaders-although other, more general passages on interstate relations could be interpreted as pertaining also to relations among parties. Presumably in deference to the Yugoslavs, the nonaligned movement was recognized by the document as one of the most important forces for progress, a formulation far stronger than that of the 1969 document of the Moscow world conference. The Documents of 1%7,1969,

and 1976 Compared

When compared with past conference documents, that of the ECPC is relatively mild and noncontroversial. It is less strongly worded, for example, than the statement of the Karlovy Vary conference of European parties in 1967, and far less abrasive than the document of the 1969 world conference. To be sure, a principal irritant had been removed-the Vietnam War-but the relative gentleness with which, say, the United States ‘was treated in the ECPC document is extraordinary for a conference of this nature. In the past, the United States was castigated as the chief imperialist; in the ECPC document all reference ,to the United States was missing. By the same token, in.past documents the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) was portrayed at great length as an unreconstructed fascist state; ready for war; in the ECPC document the F.R.G. was treated rather mildly, albeit ‘criticized for denying Communist access to certain government jobs. On the .other hand, in the 1967 and 1969 statements the Soviet Union had been treated as ‘a. hero; in 1976 all but a single reference to the Soviet Union was gone. The ECPC final document was less ‘overtly ideological than the

THE 1976 BUROPBANCOMMUNIST PARTIESCONFERENCE 35l 1969 Moscow declaration. It was organized around CSCE and tauched on points not included in either the 1967 or 1969 state merits. The ECPC document included elements of both, the 1967 and 1969 declarations, however-in fact, the whole of the Karlovy Vary statement was folded into the ECPC, and Chapter IV could have been constructed from various elements of the Moscow ,docui ment. The section on. inter-Party relations was similarly brief in 1967 and 1976, but contrasted with the 1969 document in that the latter addressed the problem in major discussions. In its treatment of the national role of Communist parties, however, the ECPC statement went beyond its predecessors in admitting that the parties’ primary responsibility is to their own people. Finally, there was no mention of a “leading center ” in either the Karlovy Vary or the East Berlin documents; in the Moscow declaration the concept was denied. , In sum, the ECPC document cannot be considered to be .a significant advance over the past in the sense that it set down in writing what was obvious from the speeches of the oppositionist delegations, i.e.. that a new spirit had arisen within the European Communist movement and that a return to the old modes of operation was impossible. The compromises necessary to achieve a “lowest common denominator” document and to bring off the ECPC itself resulted in watered-down formulations that lacked the sharp edge of the 1%7 and 1969 documents and pleased neither the opposi: tionist nor the loyalist camp. Moreover, the world political situation had changed significantly since the last large meeting of European Communist parties-the Vietnam war had ended, the- CSCE had taken place, many of the national liberation movements had succeeded, the reactionary regimes of Portugal, Spain, and Greece had been replaced, the Cuban blockade had failed-thus depriving the authors of the ECPC document of many old,. reliable axes to grind. The significance of the ECPC document therefore. lies not so much in what was said .but rather in the fact of its very ,existence. In ,a ” medium is the message ” fashion, it was communicated that the European Communist movement was not yet so fragmented that the parties could no longer agree on some common platform. By the same token, however, the relatively weak language of :the.docu‘ment served as an indication of the strength of the. opposition Communist parties, the growing weakness of the loyalists,, and the extent to which the Soviets wanted the ECPC.. The fact. ‘remains, in any case, that the conference document ivas not. ?the most. important

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:part of the ECPC. It does not reflect, except in the most oblique .way, the infighting during the negotiations leading up to the conference, nor does it include the sometimes open polemics. found in the speeches at the conference sessions. The real significance of the BCPC lies in what was said in the speeches. and commentary about Party relations, not in what was left unsaid in a conference document that was not even signed by the participants.’ Postconference

Commentary

As is so often the case, the texts of the document and speeches are less important ‘than what people read into them. Perhaps reflecting the relative unimportance of the ECPC document, the postconference commentary was mostly concerned with the delegates’ speeches. The Soviet and loyalist parties began immediately to extol Berlin as a great example of proletarian internationalism at work,” pointing out the extraordinary impact, in their opinion, of Brezhnev’s “ profound Marxian analysis ” of. the European situation.ls According to the loyalists, never before had such ‘unity been attained among Communist and workers’ parties in Europe., The commentary of the opposition parties offered a completely different picture. In their view, a wholly new era of relations among Communist and workers’ parties had been ratified in East Berlin, one based on sovereignty, equality, autonomy, and other familiar principles so dear to the hearts of the reformers?’ One Yugoslav commentator even went so far as to compare ECPC to CSCE: “What Helsinki did for interstate relations, Berlin did for interParty relations.” I6 Some sour notes were’ struck, however, by various, parties in their assessments of the ECPC. Berlinguer, for example, noted that there were continuing differences to the end among the participants in the conference,1B and the Yugoslavs criticized what they called Zhivkov’s ” one-sided ” approach to the questions under discussion.‘O Other postconference commentary indicated that few questions had been finally settled by the ECPC. An article in the Prague 15. See Zzvedju, July 1, 1976. 16. Seei Pruvh, July 5, 1976. 17. See, for example, Marchais’ statement ,in I’Unito, Scinteia, July 3, 1976. 18. Vjesnik, Jdy 1, ‘1976. 19. Italian ANSA news agency, July 2, 1976. 20. Politiku, July 1,‘ 1976.

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Tribuna:l for example, carried the hard-line statement that “the giving in to nationalist opportunism.opens up the. road to the bourgeoisie and to reaction,” and an article in the BCP daily,. Rabotnichesko Dt?lo,la resurrected the dictum that “ the attitude, toward the Soviet Union is the most important and essential criterion of internationalism.” Articles in the CPSU theoretical monthly, Kommunist,as by Boris Ponomarev’ and the Soviet army daily, Krasnaya Zvezdq,?4 by one V. Yegorov strikingly aiXrmed the Soviet position on proletarian, intematjonalism. The latter piece also, asserted that the Soviet ‘Union is blazing the path toward Communism, “ marching ahead of other countries,” thereby @rplying that others would do well to follow this example. (The Yegorov article prompted a complaint from the PC1 daily, l’Unita,a5 that it “takes no account of the most recent developments in the debate within the world Communist movement. . . .“) Win, Lose, or Draw? Who were the wmners and losers at the ECPC? What issues were fought to a stalemate? Clearly assessments of these matters depend on one’s point of view., ‘ECPC was a victory for the CPSU and. its allies in that the conference was held, a document vias agreed upon with the section on ,Party relations limited in scope, .and at ‘least a fa9ade of Communist unity was mai$a+ed. At the same .tirne, the conference may be considered a defeat for the,loyalists’m that they were unable to get. their formulations into the document, specifically affirmations of proletarian internationalism and the role of the CPSU. For the:opposition parties, ECPC could be viewed as a success by virtue of their victory in getting, to some extent, their own positions titten intq’ tbe document’ and on the public ‘record in an official context via their.! speeches. 0,n the other hand, the opposition, parties were forced to concede’ on many specific points2 iq part because of their own lack of, unity-and. it’ ‘is becom’mg increasingly apparent that. their successes are to some extent ephemeral: the old formulations soon reappeared in .the. loyalist media.l’ On many issues no compromise, could’ ,be reached, and 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 1976.

July 21, 1976. July 8, 1976. August 1976. ~ August 5, 1976. August 6, ,1976. See kilika Suhdic’ cbmmenta,ry; . Zagreb; dbmestic

radio, ‘Aug&

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they were simply -omitted from consideration under the consensus rule. Given this, it is impossible to name any clear winners or losers without reference to specigc issues. This in itself says a great deal about the state of affairs that has come to pass in the European Communist movement. The ECPC and the European Communist Movement The ‘signilicance of the European Communist Parties Conference is not found in the obvious lack of tmity displayed by the parties attending the event-although that, too, is important-but rather in the formalization of a new spirit governing relations among parties in Europe. Here the word “formalization ” is not meant to convey agreement or even acquiescence by all Western and Eastern European parties, but rather a declaration in an official multi-Party forum that the old style was gone. The nature of the new spirit is open to question, as will be discussed below, but at the very least it means that the European Communist movement will never again enjoy unity in the monolithic sense again, if, indeed, such unity ever existed. In a sense, the ECPC marked a return to normalcy in the European Communist movement after decades of artificial unity. If the history of the movement is traced from the time of Marx, it is apparent that ideological ferment and organizational upheavals were the norm prior to the formation of the Comint!em or perhaps even up to the consolidation of Stalin’s power in the CPSU. Indeed, the CPSU itself was the result of just such activity. Stalin, however, through the Cornintern, imposed rigid restraints on the creativity and diversity that had marked the movement prior to 1929. Stalin cannot be blamed for all that affected the European move ment prior to the ECPC. Almost all of the European parties contributed to their own straitjacketing through their willingness to regard &Soviet Union as the Rome of the movement owing to its status as the “first l.and of socialism ” and the tremendous prestige that accrued, to it as a result of its role in the defeat of the Axis powers in World’ War II. Moreover, the successful rise to power of the Communist parties of Eastern Europe-in most cases ‘under the direct sponsorship of the Soviet Union and Party-and the recasting of these societies and states in the image of the Soviet .Union served to reinforce the notion that the Sqviet model should be regarded as the standard of comparison. - Changes in these attitudes were slow. in ,coming, in, part because the unquestioned dominance of the European Communist move-

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ment by the Soviet Party and the genuine respect with which the Soviet Union and the CPSU were regarded allowed Stalin to place his own men in the leading posts of the European parties. If the statements of a number of present and former Eastern and ‘Western, European Party leaders are to be believed, however.. disillusionment with the Soviet model and the techniques used to force the model on other parties began early, even though it was not until much later that these doubts came into the open. The fist major public manifestation of discontent within the European Communist movement was the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948. Although other parties were unwilling or unable to follow the Yugoslav example at the time, the split was the, first evidence that a Party leadership could resist the CPSU and Stalin and survive. The second event that altered attitudes toward .the CPSU was Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956. In his speech Khrushchev stripped away the aura of CPSU infallibility, which Stalin had carefully cultivated, and in the prccess undercut the authority of the CPSU to control without question the Communist movement in Europe. In the ten to fifteen years that followed the Twentieth Congress, a number of event& further weakened Soviet authority, among them the Soviet-Warsaw Treaty Organization interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Sine-Soviet split; the Albanian realignment, and the gradual separation of Romania from the influence of the Soviet Union, especially in the realm of foreign policy. Each of these events served to underm!ine the prestige of the Soviet -party and tb present both the’ motivation and the opportunity for those European leaders, especially in the West, who were so inclined~ to set out on paths that at times put them at odds with the CPSU. In Eastern Europe similar forces could be seen at’ work, particularly in Hungary and Poland, but they were restricted by several factors, the most obvious of which were the groups of Soviet forces stationed on their . sOil or nearby. At the same time as events were serving to diminish, the authority of the Soviet !Party,“developments in Western Europe were forcing -a reconsideration on the part of, Western Party- leaders as to ‘the wisdom of following the example of .the Sovie Union. Perhaps the most important of these developments was the’failure of the revolu-3 tionary strategy, especially as it applies to armed revolution; particularly through -the example of Greece; When it became apparent that armed revolution was .unlikely to succeed, much of MarxistL;en,inisf doctrine became irrelevant ,because neither Marx h&~Le&

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had ever seriously considered a circumstance where force of arms was not an available resort. Thus deprived of substantial ideologic@ guidance, Western Party leaders faced conditions where they were forced to develop doctrines more applicable to their .particular situations. The main impetus to declaring independence from the Soviet Union was therefore the need to develop a believable electoral strategy. To do this, it was necessary for Western leaders to rid themselves of the stigma of Soviet control and to shed a number of Marxist-Leninist ideological tenets that would reflect poorly on parties seeking to gain power through the ballot box. Among such tenets were the dictatorship of the proletariat and the class struggle, both central to Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. ‘. The ECPC did not mark the culmination of these trends: the critical junctures in their development had been reached long before, in many cases well in ,advance of Stalin’s death. In the past; individual parties had struck out on their own in defiance of the CPSU and had been read out of the movement (eg., Yugoslavia) or brought to heel by force of arms (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia). In other cases (e.g., Romania), troublesome parties that caused few problems on the ideological front were simply ignored. At the ECPC, however, a new factor-that of Eurocommunism-made its appearance. The existence of Eurocommunism rendered impossible the techniques used in the past to deal with troublemakers. As a result, stands were taken at the ECPC that bordered on the heretical, yet no ,Party was denounced or anathematized, and a document was endorsed that reduced the role of the CPSU to something less than primus infer pares, at least for the West Europeans. As noted earlier, there has been some postizonference grumbling directed at the Eurocommunists, but not until the publication of PCE Secretary General Santiago Carrillo’s “ Eurocommunism ” and the State was any attempt made by the Soviet Party and its allies to resort to older methods of condemnation and accusation, a resort that, significantly enough,. has fallen far short of success even within Pastern Europe (the Polish, Hungarian, and East German parties resistid being brought into the controversy over Carrillo’s book). Although the speeches at the ECPC glossed over many of the differences among the so-called loyalist East European parties, here t!oo factors can be observed. that, may cause problems for those parties vith a more orthodox bent. In some respects these factors resemble those encountered by the Western parties, at least in the sense of eventually requiring a reassessment of the applicability of

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traditional Marxism-Leninism to their domestic situations. The most sign&ant of these factors is the maturing of the socialist system after some thirty years of Communist rule. In those countries where the industrial base is most advanced, i.e., East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the time is rapidly approaching when there is no longer any need for Leninist doctrines designed for the seizure and consolidation of power. As individual countries and eventually the movement as a whole progress into areas less charted by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and as local situations differ increasingly from that of the Soviet Union and each other, it can be expected that solutions will be sought that will diverge significantly from the Soviet model. Already one example. of this process is available-Czechoslovakia in 196&and certain tendencies in this direction can be seen in Hungary and Poland VituZity or Decay?

With these developments in Eastern and Western Europe, does the lack of unity exhibited by the participants of the ECPC signify decay or vitality in the European movement? The argument for decay is familiar and assumes that any lessening of unity is a sign of weakness. In one sense the disunity argument is correct, but only if the unity so weakened existed in the tit place. As argued above, however, the unity of the European Communist movement was an artificial phenomenon and as such was in itself more a source of weakness than of strength. The argument for vitality is Iess often made and, indeed, is harder to make. -In keeping with the argument developed above, the cracks in the fa9ade of European Communist unity may be seen as signs of the maturation of individual parties and the reconciliation to the unique conditions in which each operates. The breaking away from dogmatic modes of thought and the rejection of attempts to impose a model of development that was designed for different conditions and merent times are both symptoms and effects of the new spirit sanctioned by the ECPC. None of tbis means that the European Communist parties have changed their eventual goals, but what is important is that they have changed their means of. attaining them. In so doing, these parties claim to have adopted, the standards of conduct of other parties in the West. If this turns out to be the’case, therrrather thti’marking the death ‘of the European Communist movement, the ECPC may have been the end of a difhcult labor and the birth ,of a new, revitalized movement,

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The Future of the ECPC

What is the future of conferences such as the ECPC? Already calls have been heard for a world convocation of Communist and workers’ parties similar t!o the 1960 and 1969 Moscow meetings. It is doubtful, however, that such a meeting could be brought off, especially in light of comments such as Marchais’ to the effect that “ future,conferences like [OECPCI will no longer meet the needs of the time,” *I or Ceausescu’s remark in an interview with the Frankfurter Rundschau that “the question of a future conference is not topical now.” 28 or repeated Yugoslav objections to such conferences. In fact, it is doubtful that even another ECPC can be repeated on the scale of June 1976. ‘Instead, regional and bilateral meetings will probably be the norm. This is not to rule out categorically the possibility of either another European or world meeting, but present developments seem to militate against the possibility, at least in the foreseeable future. First, the successes of the opposition parties were eroded at an alarming rate, thus furthering the basic distrust between the two Communist camps. Second, given the doctrinal assertion on the part of many opposition parties that local and specific conditions are more important than general and common ones, some question can be raised as to whether the oppositionists would be willing to repeat the long and exhausting process of arranging for either a European or world meeting if the result is to be only vague generalities. Third-and smacking more of realpolitik-is the danger that a convocation on a world scale would allow the Soviet Party and its allies to bring more pressure to bear on the oppositionists than it could in a limited European context. It is unlikely that many of the opposition parties would submit willingly to such conditions. Still, the odds .against the ECPC were great and yet it was convened. Even at the present, more than two years after the ECPC!, it’is still too early to make any Gnal judgment on the state of the European or world Communist movements in the post-ECPC era. , Appendix:

The Conference Document

The conference document, “ For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe,” is composed of a long prefatory section and four chapters. Most of the themes covered in the speeches .of the various delegation heads, at ieast with regard to, .CSCE, are ‘. .: 27. L’Huinanifd,

J&i 2, 1976.

28. Romanian Agerpress news agency, July 27, i976:

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contained in the ECPC document. The preface begins with a standard pledge to struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress. A policy of peaceful coexistence between states tith different social and political systems is declared,, but this does not mean.- the document points out, an acceptance of the political and social status quo. On the contrary, peaceful coexistence’ creates optimal conditions for further struggle. The positive changes in the European situation are viewed as being caused by the forces of “peace; democracy, national liberation, independence and socialism “; relaxation of tension’ is said to be due to the outstanding role of the socialist countries. CSCE is credited with working out the prin: ciples of coexistence and with bringing about a new situation ,in Europe in whioh many problems have been solved and new relations among states prevail. Communist and workers’ parties are portrayed as victors over fascism in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. The recognition of the G.D.R. is acknowledged as a major success. Victories in other areas of the world-Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Angola-are hailed. The situation in Europe and the world is not viewed by ‘the document as being completely without problems, however. Obstacles to detente still exist, concentrations of strong military forces are present in Europe, the arms race- continues, stockpiles of weapons remain, foreign military bases are maintained, imperialist pressures and interference in the internal affairs of other countries continue to constitute dangers. The main threat, according to the document, remains imperialism, neocolonialism, and all forces of ,oppression and exploitation. The document calls for an end to the arms race, ,for an end to the division of Europe into military blocs, and for, disarmament. Cooperation and solidarity are urged on the basis of the ideas of Marx, Engels, .and Lenin. The need 1is recognized for continued dialogue among Communists and also for cooperation with broad social forces including socialists, ‘social democrats, Catholic~groups, and “ all working’ ,people regardless of political and religious belief.” While anti-Communism is recognized by. the document -as a danger, not all who hold a ” critWl attitude ” toward the act%: ties of Communist parties are considered to be anti-Communist. But the forces of .reaction are conducting a campaign against the forces of socialism and progress, “ first of all against the Soviet Union,” thedoci&nF +r$: ’ ‘Chapt.er I of the hocumer& t! For Strengthening..the..Prqcess”;~~

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Detente by Taking Effective Measures Towards Disarmament and Towards Strengthening Security in Europe,” calls first for strict observance of the CSCE accords. Proposals for .an end to the arms race, for disarmament, for dismantling foreign military bases, reducing military budgets, renouncing the use or threat of force, reducing the number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, ending nuclear tests, ‘and for the ratification of the ban on bacteriological weapons are,offered. It.is also proposed that the development of new weapons of mass destruction be banned and that the United Nations be used for disarmament conferences. Security problems in the Mediterranean are discussed.2g Finally, the simultaneous dissolution of N.A.T.0. and W.T.0: is suggested. Chapter II of the ECPC document, “ For Extirpating Fascism, Defending Democracy and National Independence,” is largely an assessment of the situation in Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Greece, Northern Irela.nd,.Turkey, and the F.R.G. Chapter III, “For the Development of Mutually Beneficial Cooperation, For Better Understanding Among Peoples,” calls for the right of all peoples to develop their own social, political, and economic systems free from outside interference. The chapter also urges the expansion of relations among states on the basis of CSCE. -Chapter IV, “ For Peace, Security, Cooperation; National Independence and Social ,Progress in the Whole of the World.“‘ is a wide-ranging assessment -of the situation in many world ‘regions. The struggle :of peoples in newly independent countries against imperialism and for the transfonnation of the world is noted. In the Middle East, the withdrawal of Israel from the territories taken in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state are demanded. Support is declared for the peoples of Angola, Cambodia, Laos, and: Vietnam. The Chilean regime is condemned, and an end is demanded to the persecution of Communists and democrats in many .parts of Latin America. North Korea is supported in its goal of unifying the North.and South. The cause’ of ,the Arab people is .atlirmed, as are the efforts of the peoples of South Africai Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Finally,, the’ elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism is called for, and a new world order is proposed in which countries would have .control over their own resources and over prices for raw materials. ,. ,:, ; -. ./

29; As ati appar& c&cession to the Y&osla&‘ani iialiani, & &cumeht calls for the withdrawal of all fleets from t+ Mediterianean, tiot j&t 8 : -’ : : riuclear-ariiiedlvesselsnor solely N.A.T.O. forces.