- Email: [email protected]
The 2004 Uruguayan elections: A political earthquake foretold
Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191 www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud
Notes on Recent Elections
The 2004 Uruguayan elections: A political earthquake foretold David Altman a,, Rossana Castiglioni b,1 a
Instituto de Ciencia Polı´tica, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile, Campus San Joaquı´n, Avenida Vicun˜a Mackenna 4860, Santiago, Chile b Instituto de Ciencias Sociales ICSO, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 460, Santiago, Chile
The 2004 presidential election in Uruguay was a historic event: for the very first time in Uruguay’s 176 years as an independent state, neither of the two traditional parties won the presidency. Instead, the winner was the centre-left coalition Encuentro ProgresistaeFrente AmplioeNueva Mayorı´a (EP-FA-NM), composed of Socialists, former Tupamaro guerrillas, Communists, Christian Democrats, and other political groups. The traditional parties, Blanco and Colorado, have governed Uruguay for 168 years, military rule being exceptional in Uruguay’s history. Despite other recent regional experiencesdsuch as Ecuador and Venezueladwhere a change of the governing party brought with it a deep political crisis, the Uruguayan electoral ‘earthquake’ took place calmly, and the transition to the new governmentdon 1 March 2005dhas been exceptionally smooth.2 Nonetheless, the 2004 presidential election in Uruguay will have profound implications for the political life of the country. 1. Overview On 31 October 2004, 89.6% of Uruguay’s citizens (2.5 million) went to the polls to elect the president, vice-president, and the Congress for the 2005e2010 period. The Corresponding author. Tel.: C56 (2) 354 7819; fax: C56 (2) 354 7813. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Altman), [email protected] (R. Castiglioni). 1 Tel.: C56 (2) 676 8149; fax: C56 (2) 676 8146. 2 These comments reflect the evolution of events through January 4, 2005.
0261-3794/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
148
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
EP-FA-NM’s presidential candidate, Tabare´ Va´zquez, won 50.5% of the vote, defeating Jorge Larran˜aga, of the Blanco or National Party (PN), by almost 17 percentage points. The presidential candidate of the Colorado Party (PC), Guillermo Stirling, received 10.6% of the vote, the worst electoral result in the party’s history. A run-off election, which would have taken place in November, was unnecessary because the EP-FA-NM surpassed the 50% threshold. Also, given the strict proportional representation system used, the EP-FA-NM became the largest political coalition in the new Congress, holding 52.5% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 54.8% of the seats in the Senate. It is the first time since the 1966 elections that an elected president enjoys a majority in Congress.
2. Electoral system The 1996 constitution broke down the electoral process into four stages: mandatory party primaries, presidential and legislative elections, a second round or ballotage if no presidential candidate obtains at least 50% of the vote, and municipal elections. The new constitution left untouched some of the key features of the ‘classic’ Uruguayan electoral system, such as strict proportional representation, the number of seats in both chambers, the size of electoral districts, and compulsory voting. Other characteristics, however, underwent drastic modification: the plurality vote for the presidential election was substituted by a majority run-off system; the double simultaneous vote (DSV)3 was eliminated for the presidency, compelling parties to present only one presidential candidate; and the absolute concurrency of elections came to an end (Espı´ ndola, 2001; Finch, 1995). A significant change was also introduced to congressional elections: deputies were forbidden to build any ad hoc intra-party electoral alliance (‘electoral cooperatives’ in Uruguayan jargon) among diverse groups in order to win within the party. In other words, it is no longer possible for deputies from different fractions within the same party to ally in order to accumulate votes. Such alliances are still allowed for Senate elections. Strict proportionality has become one of the pillars of representation in Uruguay. For the distribution of seats among parties in both chambers of Congress, the whole country is treated as a single national district. Thus, if a given party obtains 10% of the vote, it will roughly receive 10% of the seats. Additionally, political parties are entitled to public resources to finance electoral campaigns.4 For the 2004 electoral cycle (Law No. 17.157, August 20, 1999), the state subsidised party campaigning through the state-owned bank, Banco Repu´blica; each party received approximately four US dollars (131 Uruguayan pesos) per valid vote. Parties also had the opportunity, before the election, to request a loan from the Banco Repu´blica of up to 3
For the presidential election, the DSV system that prevailed until 1996 permitted party tickets (lemas) to divide into competitive fractions (sub-lemas). The votes for these fractions were then cumulated according to a party ticket. Thus, Uruguayan presidents were the most voted for candidates from the most voted for party, and not necessarily the most voted for candidates at the national level. 4 Uruguay was the first Latin American country to introduce public political funding in 1928.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
149
50%, based on the votes received in the 1999 election. After 31 October, either the parties received additional resources, corresponding to the extra votes they obtained, or they had to return some if they won fewer votes than in 1999. Parties that did not compete in 1999 could receive support only after the election. Of this money, 20% went to the presidential candidates; 40% was distributed among all the party lists (lemas) contesting for Senate seats; and 40% for all lists contesting seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The money was reimbursed to the first candidate on each list.
3. Party primaries The first stage of the electoral cycle is mandatory primaries, held on the same day for all parties competing for the presidency and seats in Congress. Each party is required to elect one presidential candidate, and to elect its National and Regional Conventions.5 The National Convention is responsible for choosing the vicepresidential candidate; and the presidential candidate, too, if the winner of the primary fails to win at least half the valid votes, or does not win 40% of the vote with a lead of 10 points over the second-placed candidate. The results of the primaries are constrained by a ‘Sore Loser Law’: no one, whether elected or not, who stands for a party is allowed to change parties in the middle of the electoral cycle. In this instance, the electoral cycle went from June 2004 to May 2005. Voting in party primaries, however, is not mandatory. In the 2004 primaries, 45.7% of the electorate (1,129,322 citizens) participated, whereas 53.7% of the electorate participated in the 1999 primaries. The drop in participation was due to the lack of competition within the EP-FA-NM and the PC, as both decided to put up only one candidate for the presidential election. There was a contest within the PN, in which Jorge Larran˜aga defeated the former President of Uruguay, Luis Alberto Lacalle, by 65.9% versus 33.6%. All three presidential candidates were established politicians. The EP-FA-NM candidate, Tabare´ Va´zquezda well-known oncologistdwas mayor of Montevideo 1990e1995, and had led the coalition for the past 10 years. Jorge Larran˜aga, the PN’s candidate, was a former senator and mayor of Paysandu´, an industrial department of Uruguay. The incumbent PC’s candidate, Guillermo Stirling, had been Minister of the Interior during the last two administrations.
4. Electoral campaign Each party stressed different issues in their campaigning. One of the PCs leading political fractions, the Foro Batllista, endeavoured to portray EP-FA-NM as a populist party with a dubious commitment to democratic politics, and to link some key political figures from the left to the Tupamaro guerrillas who were active in the country during the 1960s and 1970s. The PC also stressed that the economic recovery 5
Named O´rgano Deliberativo Nacional and O´rgano Deliberativo Departamental, respectively.
150
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
the country was starting to experience could be undermined with an electoral victory by the left. These strategies proved fruitless in stemming the massive loss of votes suffered by the PC. Although Larran˜aga’s party, the PN, has been historically identified as centerright, Larran˜aga tried to frame his discourse in such a way as to gain the center-left votes that the PC was losing. Some Blancos even went so far as to claim that the EPFA-NM’s political programme was a copy of their own; and Larran˜aga criticised Va´zquez for visiting Washington to contact international financial institutions before the election. Indeed, a key leader and former PN presidential candidate, Juan Andre´s Ramı´ rez, even argued: ‘‘I feel I am left-wing, and I do not believe that only the EP-FA-NM represents the left.’’6 However effective this strategy may have been, it was not enough to gain the votes necessary to defeat the center-left coalition. By contrast, much like the campaigns conducted by Ricardo Lagos in Chile and Luis Ina´cio ‘Lula’ da Silva in Brazil, Va´zquez avoided confrontational issues and moderated his political rhetoric. In one key move, designed to calm the fears of the markets and to gain support from disillusioned center-left voters for the traditional parties, Va´zquez asked Enrique Iglesias (PN), President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to serve as Economics Minister. Although most observers believe that Va´zquez anticipated that Iglesias would not accept the offer, the proposal helped to convince entrepreneurs that Va´zquez was committed to marketoriented policies. Immediately after Iglesias declined, and months before the election, Va´zquez announced, during his visit to Washington that, if elected, he would appoint Danilo Astori as Economics Minister. Astori is an economist of moderate views, with a good reputation outside the EP-FA-NM who had been contesting Va´zquez’s leadership within the center-left coalition since 1995. Even so, all three parties had something in common; in particular, they all claimed they would bring about a true transformation of the country. The Colorados stressed that a new generation was in charge of their party; the Blancos’ slogan was that Larran˜aga was a president for a new Uruguay. The EP-FA-NM campaign took the idea of transformation to its limit, with the simple motto ‘let’s change’ (cambiemos). The center-left coalition even created an animated game on the Internet, where players were required to transform the outlook of the country in a positive, cooperative manner. The game gained international attention since, according to its creator, it was only the second time in world history that such a game had been created for a presidential campaign.7
5. The election The congressional and the presidential elections were the second stage of the electoral cycle, held on October 31. Based on the recent evolution of party support, 6
La Repu´blica (Montevideo), 2004, July 26, Ramı´ rez: ‘Yo me Siento de Iizquierda, y el Partido Nacional no es de Derecha’, No. 1544, p. 2. 7 BBC News, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3945661.stm; accessed 23 October, 2004.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
151
a key question was whether the EP-FA-NM would pass the 50% threshold, so avoid a second round runoff. This created an incentive for expatriates, generally supportive of the left, to travel to Uruguay to participate in the elections. An estimated 40,000 came from all over the globe to cast their vote. A high percentage came from neighbouring Argentina, where the largest Uruguayan diaspora resides. The President of Argentina, Ne´stor Kirchner, who explicitly supported Va´zquez’s candidacy, gave all Uruguayans administrative workers 2 days leave to travel to Uruguay, which contributed to the massive participation of Uruguayans living outside the country. Turnout reached 89.6%, showing again the strong historical bond between Uruguayans and the ballot box. Since the transitional elections of 1984, turnout in Uruguay’s elections has systematically reached 90% of the voting age population, giving Uruguay one of the highest turnout rates in the world. Even before the 1967 constitutional reform, when compulsory vote was introduced, turnout in Uruguay was higher than in the rest of Latin America.8 The victory of EP-FA-NM was overwhelming, particularly in the capital Montevideo, where it obtained 61.3% of the vote, and in the largest urban regions of the country, including Canelones and Maldonado. The poor performance of the PC, which was unable to win in a single department, was perhaps the most extraordinary outcome of this election (see Table 1). As surprising as the restructuring of the Uruguayan party system was the intra-party rearrangement of the PN and the EP-FA-NM. Within the PN, the Herrerismo, the governing fraction during the 1990e1995 period, was heavily punished at the ballot box, with the Alianza Nacional, hitherto a minor Blanco fraction, the clear winner. All the fractions within the EP-FA-NM either maintained or slightly reduced their pool of support, with the sole exception of the Movimiento de Participacio´n Popular, which, by itself, is able to explain the dramatic increase of the votes for the center-left coalition. In addition to the elections, Uruguayans concurrently voted on a constitutional reform following a popular initiative instigated by workers of the state-owned Water Company (OSE) together with the Inter-Union Workers Plenary-National Workers Convention (PIT-CNT), the Uruguayan labour federation. The objective of the initiative was to establish that access to drinkable water constitutes a basic human right; and that the state must have unique control of this resource, both in producing and selling it. Enjoying the support of the EP-FA-NM and half of the Blanco fractions, the reform was approved by 64.6% of the valid vote. Uruguayans, again, showed their confidence in the state as a provider of public services, as they did in a 1992 national referendum that prohibited privatisation of the largest state-owned companies (Altman, 2002). Four main explanations have been offered for the left winning the presidency. For some analysts, the victory is the result of a demographic trend; as younger, more progressive generations have been enfranchised, this has gradually increased the 8 Voting is compulsory in most Latin American polities but turnout in Uruguay has been, historically, the highest in Latin America.
152
Table 1 Results for congressional elections, Uruguay, 1994e2004 Share of valid votes (%)
Senate seats
1999
2004
Colorado Foro Batllista Lista 15 Cruzada 94 Unio´n Colorada y Batllista
32.3
32.8
Blanco Herrerismo Alianza Nacional Correntada Wilsonista Manos a la Obra Movimiento Nacional de Rocha
31.2
22.3
EP/FA Movimiento de Participacio´n Popular Partido Socialista Asamblea Uruguay Vertiente Artiguista Espacio Renovador Partido Comunista Independientes Nuevo Espacio
30.6
40.1
Nuevo Espacio Other Total
5.1 0.6 100
4.5 0.3 100
2.6 100
Valid votes Blank Null Total votes Registered voters Turnout (%)
2.029.281 75.037 26.300 2.130.618 2.330.154 91.4
2.147.149 42.574 21.469 2.204.662 2.402.160 91.8a
2.189.262 18.807 21.383 2.229.583 2.488.004 89.6
Chamber of Deputies seats
1995e1999
2000e2004
2005e2009
1995e1999
2000e2004
2005e2009
10.6
10 8 1 1 0
10 5 5 e e
3 1 2 e e
32 25 2 4 1
33 18 15 e e
10 7 3 e e
35.1
10 4 e e 5 1
7 5 2 e e e
11 3 6 2 e e
31 14 e
22 18 4
15 2
e e
36 7 19 10 e e
9 1 2 4 1 e 1 e e
12 2 4 2 2 1 1 e e
16 6 2 3 2 1 1 e 1
31 2 7 16 2 1 2 1 e
40 5 14 8 4 5 1 3 e
52 20 10 8 4 4 1 1 4
1 e 30
1 e 30
e e 30
5 e 99
4 e 99
e 1 99
51.7
e
Source: Corte Electoral: http://www.corteelectoral.gub.uy and authors’ data. a Turnout in the 1999 presidential runoff election.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
1994
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
153
number of adherents of the leftist coalition since its foundation in 1971 (Gonza´lez and Queirolo, 2000). For others, the victory reflects the disappointment of voters with the management of Uruguay’s economy by the traditional parties. Triggered by the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in January 1999, and exacerbated by the 2001 financial crisis in Argentina, Uruguay has been immersed in one of the deepest, if not the worst, economic and financial crisis ever confronted. The left would thus constitute a source of alternative economic policies that voters are seeking (Bayce, 2004). Yet other scholars point to the increasing moderation and pragmatism of the EP-FA-NM, mainly due to its experience in governing the country’s largest city, Montevideo, since 1990. This has enabled it to siphon off voters of a center-left orientation yet who have usually supported traditional parties (Garce´ and Yaffe´, 2004). A fourth argument is that this electoral shift is driven by a natural erosion of the traditional parties, due to the decreasing possibilities of using the state as the national employer and as a springboard for pork-barrel politics (Lanzaro, 2004). While each of these interpretations contains a kernel of truth, none provide a full explanation.
6. Post-election challenges Despite an extremely delicate economic situation, optimism reigns in the country so far. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the leftist coalition became the largest party in Congress, and that the prospects of a divided government are low, the political situation for the EP-FA-NM is far from easy. Problems could crop up if the traditional parties coordinate their opposition to the governing party, and if President Va´zquez is unable to instil discipline on his heterogeneous coalition. Although the EP-FA-NM has the votes in Congress needed to pass legislation by simple majority (50 deputies and 16 senators), it does not have the three-fifths majority necessary to nominate key figures in the administration. It is even further away from the two-thirds majority needed to pass any constitutional reform (66 deputies and 20 senators). Moreover, the defection of merely one or two legislators could undermine any attempt to pass legislation. Thus, party discipline will become a critical variable. In addition, the new government is likely to face enormous pressure from corporative interests (public and private unions, exporters, universities, and the like) seeking to improve their economic situation. These demands are hard to ignore, but could clash with the strict fiscal policy needed if Uruguay wishes to maintain good relations with international financial institutions, and to create an encouraging climate for domestic and international investors. While the ‘country-risk’ measuredused by financial institutions to assess the ability of a country to serve its foreign debtdand the price of government bonds improved in the days following the election, an increasing flow of demands from civil society organisations could create policy complications for the new government. In early December, 2004, Va´zquez announced a new cabinet, which does not reflect the relative share of votes of each member of the EP-FA-NM coalition.
154
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
Historically, ministerial posts in Uruguay have echoed the distribution of forces within the winning party (Altman, 2000), but Va´zquez did not follow this convention. The most obvious imbalance occurred in the case of MPP and AU, which secured only one minister each despite being the two EP-FA-NM fractions that won the most votes (see Table 1). This imbalance can be probably be maintained during the honeymoon period for the government. Over time, however, internal disputes and lack of discipline among EP-FA-NM’s members may challenge the cohesion of Va´zquez’s government. His decision to form a cabinet that includes the four leaders of the EP-FA-NM fractions that won the most votes (PS, AU, MPP, and VA) might help to counteract this possibility. In the context of a much changed Congress, where more than 60% of legislators are newcomers, this strategy may bestow on the new cabinet a key role in controlling the legislative process.
Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to Toma´s Chuaqui, Mark Jones, Juan Pablo Luna, and Gerardo Munck for their insightful suggestions. They also wish to thank the Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile and the Direccio´n General de Investigacio´n of the Universidad Andre´s Bello for their financial support. David Altman and Rossana Castiglioni are FONDECYT fellows (Projects #1040920 and #3040012, respectively).
References Altman, D., 2000. The politics of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential democracies: the case of Uruguay 1989e1999. Party Politics 6 (3), 259e283. Altman, D., 2002. Popular initiatives in Uruguay: confidence votes on government or political loyalties? Electoral Studies 21 (4), 617e630. Bayce, R., 2004. Un largo camino al e´xito. Caras y Caretas IV (168), 36e37. Espı´ ndola, R., 2001. No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections. Electoral Studies 20 (4), 649e657. Finch, H., 1995. The Uruguayan election of 1994. Electoral Studies 14 (2), 232e236. Garce´, A., Yaffe´, J., 2004. La Era Progresista. Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo. Gonza´lez, L.E., Queirolo, R., 2000. Las elecciones nacionales del 2004: Posibles escenarios. In: Caetano, G. (Ed.), Elecciones 1999/2000. Ediciones Banda Oriental-Instituto de Ciencia Polı´ tica, Montevideo. Lanzaro, J. (Ed.), 2004. La Izquierda Uruguaya: Entra la Oposicio´n y el Gobierno. Instituto de Ciencia Polı´ tica, Montevideo. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.005
Notes on Recent Elections
The 2004 Uruguayan elections: A political earthquake foretold David Altman a,, Rossana Castiglioni b,1 a
Instituto de Ciencia Polı´tica, Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile, Campus San Joaquı´n, Avenida Vicun˜a Mackenna 4860, Santiago, Chile b Instituto de Ciencias Sociales ICSO, Universidad Diego Portales, Vergara 460, Santiago, Chile
The 2004 presidential election in Uruguay was a historic event: for the very first time in Uruguay’s 176 years as an independent state, neither of the two traditional parties won the presidency. Instead, the winner was the centre-left coalition Encuentro ProgresistaeFrente AmplioeNueva Mayorı´a (EP-FA-NM), composed of Socialists, former Tupamaro guerrillas, Communists, Christian Democrats, and other political groups. The traditional parties, Blanco and Colorado, have governed Uruguay for 168 years, military rule being exceptional in Uruguay’s history. Despite other recent regional experiencesdsuch as Ecuador and Venezueladwhere a change of the governing party brought with it a deep political crisis, the Uruguayan electoral ‘earthquake’ took place calmly, and the transition to the new governmentdon 1 March 2005dhas been exceptionally smooth.2 Nonetheless, the 2004 presidential election in Uruguay will have profound implications for the political life of the country. 1. Overview On 31 October 2004, 89.6% of Uruguay’s citizens (2.5 million) went to the polls to elect the president, vice-president, and the Congress for the 2005e2010 period. The Corresponding author. Tel.: C56 (2) 354 7819; fax: C56 (2) 354 7813. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D. Altman), [email protected] (R. Castiglioni). 1 Tel.: C56 (2) 676 8149; fax: C56 (2) 676 8146. 2 These comments reflect the evolution of events through January 4, 2005.
0261-3794/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
148
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
EP-FA-NM’s presidential candidate, Tabare´ Va´zquez, won 50.5% of the vote, defeating Jorge Larran˜aga, of the Blanco or National Party (PN), by almost 17 percentage points. The presidential candidate of the Colorado Party (PC), Guillermo Stirling, received 10.6% of the vote, the worst electoral result in the party’s history. A run-off election, which would have taken place in November, was unnecessary because the EP-FA-NM surpassed the 50% threshold. Also, given the strict proportional representation system used, the EP-FA-NM became the largest political coalition in the new Congress, holding 52.5% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 54.8% of the seats in the Senate. It is the first time since the 1966 elections that an elected president enjoys a majority in Congress.
2. Electoral system The 1996 constitution broke down the electoral process into four stages: mandatory party primaries, presidential and legislative elections, a second round or ballotage if no presidential candidate obtains at least 50% of the vote, and municipal elections. The new constitution left untouched some of the key features of the ‘classic’ Uruguayan electoral system, such as strict proportional representation, the number of seats in both chambers, the size of electoral districts, and compulsory voting. Other characteristics, however, underwent drastic modification: the plurality vote for the presidential election was substituted by a majority run-off system; the double simultaneous vote (DSV)3 was eliminated for the presidency, compelling parties to present only one presidential candidate; and the absolute concurrency of elections came to an end (Espı´ ndola, 2001; Finch, 1995). A significant change was also introduced to congressional elections: deputies were forbidden to build any ad hoc intra-party electoral alliance (‘electoral cooperatives’ in Uruguayan jargon) among diverse groups in order to win within the party. In other words, it is no longer possible for deputies from different fractions within the same party to ally in order to accumulate votes. Such alliances are still allowed for Senate elections. Strict proportionality has become one of the pillars of representation in Uruguay. For the distribution of seats among parties in both chambers of Congress, the whole country is treated as a single national district. Thus, if a given party obtains 10% of the vote, it will roughly receive 10% of the seats. Additionally, political parties are entitled to public resources to finance electoral campaigns.4 For the 2004 electoral cycle (Law No. 17.157, August 20, 1999), the state subsidised party campaigning through the state-owned bank, Banco Repu´blica; each party received approximately four US dollars (131 Uruguayan pesos) per valid vote. Parties also had the opportunity, before the election, to request a loan from the Banco Repu´blica of up to 3
For the presidential election, the DSV system that prevailed until 1996 permitted party tickets (lemas) to divide into competitive fractions (sub-lemas). The votes for these fractions were then cumulated according to a party ticket. Thus, Uruguayan presidents were the most voted for candidates from the most voted for party, and not necessarily the most voted for candidates at the national level. 4 Uruguay was the first Latin American country to introduce public political funding in 1928.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
149
50%, based on the votes received in the 1999 election. After 31 October, either the parties received additional resources, corresponding to the extra votes they obtained, or they had to return some if they won fewer votes than in 1999. Parties that did not compete in 1999 could receive support only after the election. Of this money, 20% went to the presidential candidates; 40% was distributed among all the party lists (lemas) contesting for Senate seats; and 40% for all lists contesting seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The money was reimbursed to the first candidate on each list.
3. Party primaries The first stage of the electoral cycle is mandatory primaries, held on the same day for all parties competing for the presidency and seats in Congress. Each party is required to elect one presidential candidate, and to elect its National and Regional Conventions.5 The National Convention is responsible for choosing the vicepresidential candidate; and the presidential candidate, too, if the winner of the primary fails to win at least half the valid votes, or does not win 40% of the vote with a lead of 10 points over the second-placed candidate. The results of the primaries are constrained by a ‘Sore Loser Law’: no one, whether elected or not, who stands for a party is allowed to change parties in the middle of the electoral cycle. In this instance, the electoral cycle went from June 2004 to May 2005. Voting in party primaries, however, is not mandatory. In the 2004 primaries, 45.7% of the electorate (1,129,322 citizens) participated, whereas 53.7% of the electorate participated in the 1999 primaries. The drop in participation was due to the lack of competition within the EP-FA-NM and the PC, as both decided to put up only one candidate for the presidential election. There was a contest within the PN, in which Jorge Larran˜aga defeated the former President of Uruguay, Luis Alberto Lacalle, by 65.9% versus 33.6%. All three presidential candidates were established politicians. The EP-FA-NM candidate, Tabare´ Va´zquezda well-known oncologistdwas mayor of Montevideo 1990e1995, and had led the coalition for the past 10 years. Jorge Larran˜aga, the PN’s candidate, was a former senator and mayor of Paysandu´, an industrial department of Uruguay. The incumbent PC’s candidate, Guillermo Stirling, had been Minister of the Interior during the last two administrations.
4. Electoral campaign Each party stressed different issues in their campaigning. One of the PCs leading political fractions, the Foro Batllista, endeavoured to portray EP-FA-NM as a populist party with a dubious commitment to democratic politics, and to link some key political figures from the left to the Tupamaro guerrillas who were active in the country during the 1960s and 1970s. The PC also stressed that the economic recovery 5
Named O´rgano Deliberativo Nacional and O´rgano Deliberativo Departamental, respectively.
150
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
the country was starting to experience could be undermined with an electoral victory by the left. These strategies proved fruitless in stemming the massive loss of votes suffered by the PC. Although Larran˜aga’s party, the PN, has been historically identified as centerright, Larran˜aga tried to frame his discourse in such a way as to gain the center-left votes that the PC was losing. Some Blancos even went so far as to claim that the EPFA-NM’s political programme was a copy of their own; and Larran˜aga criticised Va´zquez for visiting Washington to contact international financial institutions before the election. Indeed, a key leader and former PN presidential candidate, Juan Andre´s Ramı´ rez, even argued: ‘‘I feel I am left-wing, and I do not believe that only the EP-FA-NM represents the left.’’6 However effective this strategy may have been, it was not enough to gain the votes necessary to defeat the center-left coalition. By contrast, much like the campaigns conducted by Ricardo Lagos in Chile and Luis Ina´cio ‘Lula’ da Silva in Brazil, Va´zquez avoided confrontational issues and moderated his political rhetoric. In one key move, designed to calm the fears of the markets and to gain support from disillusioned center-left voters for the traditional parties, Va´zquez asked Enrique Iglesias (PN), President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to serve as Economics Minister. Although most observers believe that Va´zquez anticipated that Iglesias would not accept the offer, the proposal helped to convince entrepreneurs that Va´zquez was committed to marketoriented policies. Immediately after Iglesias declined, and months before the election, Va´zquez announced, during his visit to Washington that, if elected, he would appoint Danilo Astori as Economics Minister. Astori is an economist of moderate views, with a good reputation outside the EP-FA-NM who had been contesting Va´zquez’s leadership within the center-left coalition since 1995. Even so, all three parties had something in common; in particular, they all claimed they would bring about a true transformation of the country. The Colorados stressed that a new generation was in charge of their party; the Blancos’ slogan was that Larran˜aga was a president for a new Uruguay. The EP-FA-NM campaign took the idea of transformation to its limit, with the simple motto ‘let’s change’ (cambiemos). The center-left coalition even created an animated game on the Internet, where players were required to transform the outlook of the country in a positive, cooperative manner. The game gained international attention since, according to its creator, it was only the second time in world history that such a game had been created for a presidential campaign.7
5. The election The congressional and the presidential elections were the second stage of the electoral cycle, held on October 31. Based on the recent evolution of party support, 6
La Repu´blica (Montevideo), 2004, July 26, Ramı´ rez: ‘Yo me Siento de Iizquierda, y el Partido Nacional no es de Derecha’, No. 1544, p. 2. 7 BBC News, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3945661.stm; accessed 23 October, 2004.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
151
a key question was whether the EP-FA-NM would pass the 50% threshold, so avoid a second round runoff. This created an incentive for expatriates, generally supportive of the left, to travel to Uruguay to participate in the elections. An estimated 40,000 came from all over the globe to cast their vote. A high percentage came from neighbouring Argentina, where the largest Uruguayan diaspora resides. The President of Argentina, Ne´stor Kirchner, who explicitly supported Va´zquez’s candidacy, gave all Uruguayans administrative workers 2 days leave to travel to Uruguay, which contributed to the massive participation of Uruguayans living outside the country. Turnout reached 89.6%, showing again the strong historical bond between Uruguayans and the ballot box. Since the transitional elections of 1984, turnout in Uruguay’s elections has systematically reached 90% of the voting age population, giving Uruguay one of the highest turnout rates in the world. Even before the 1967 constitutional reform, when compulsory vote was introduced, turnout in Uruguay was higher than in the rest of Latin America.8 The victory of EP-FA-NM was overwhelming, particularly in the capital Montevideo, where it obtained 61.3% of the vote, and in the largest urban regions of the country, including Canelones and Maldonado. The poor performance of the PC, which was unable to win in a single department, was perhaps the most extraordinary outcome of this election (see Table 1). As surprising as the restructuring of the Uruguayan party system was the intra-party rearrangement of the PN and the EP-FA-NM. Within the PN, the Herrerismo, the governing fraction during the 1990e1995 period, was heavily punished at the ballot box, with the Alianza Nacional, hitherto a minor Blanco fraction, the clear winner. All the fractions within the EP-FA-NM either maintained or slightly reduced their pool of support, with the sole exception of the Movimiento de Participacio´n Popular, which, by itself, is able to explain the dramatic increase of the votes for the center-left coalition. In addition to the elections, Uruguayans concurrently voted on a constitutional reform following a popular initiative instigated by workers of the state-owned Water Company (OSE) together with the Inter-Union Workers Plenary-National Workers Convention (PIT-CNT), the Uruguayan labour federation. The objective of the initiative was to establish that access to drinkable water constitutes a basic human right; and that the state must have unique control of this resource, both in producing and selling it. Enjoying the support of the EP-FA-NM and half of the Blanco fractions, the reform was approved by 64.6% of the valid vote. Uruguayans, again, showed their confidence in the state as a provider of public services, as they did in a 1992 national referendum that prohibited privatisation of the largest state-owned companies (Altman, 2002). Four main explanations have been offered for the left winning the presidency. For some analysts, the victory is the result of a demographic trend; as younger, more progressive generations have been enfranchised, this has gradually increased the 8 Voting is compulsory in most Latin American polities but turnout in Uruguay has been, historically, the highest in Latin America.
152
Table 1 Results for congressional elections, Uruguay, 1994e2004 Share of valid votes (%)
Senate seats
1999
2004
Colorado Foro Batllista Lista 15 Cruzada 94 Unio´n Colorada y Batllista
32.3
32.8
Blanco Herrerismo Alianza Nacional Correntada Wilsonista Manos a la Obra Movimiento Nacional de Rocha
31.2
22.3
EP/FA Movimiento de Participacio´n Popular Partido Socialista Asamblea Uruguay Vertiente Artiguista Espacio Renovador Partido Comunista Independientes Nuevo Espacio
30.6
40.1
Nuevo Espacio Other Total
5.1 0.6 100
4.5 0.3 100
2.6 100
Valid votes Blank Null Total votes Registered voters Turnout (%)
2.029.281 75.037 26.300 2.130.618 2.330.154 91.4
2.147.149 42.574 21.469 2.204.662 2.402.160 91.8a
2.189.262 18.807 21.383 2.229.583 2.488.004 89.6
Chamber of Deputies seats
1995e1999
2000e2004
2005e2009
1995e1999
2000e2004
2005e2009
10.6
10 8 1 1 0
10 5 5 e e
3 1 2 e e
32 25 2 4 1
33 18 15 e e
10 7 3 e e
35.1
10 4 e e 5 1
7 5 2 e e e
11 3 6 2 e e
31 14 e
22 18 4
15 2
e e
36 7 19 10 e e
9 1 2 4 1 e 1 e e
12 2 4 2 2 1 1 e e
16 6 2 3 2 1 1 e 1
31 2 7 16 2 1 2 1 e
40 5 14 8 4 5 1 3 e
52 20 10 8 4 4 1 1 4
1 e 30
1 e 30
e e 30
5 e 99
4 e 99
e 1 99
51.7
e
Source: Corte Electoral: http://www.corteelectoral.gub.uy and authors’ data. a Turnout in the 1999 presidential runoff election.
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
1994
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
153
number of adherents of the leftist coalition since its foundation in 1971 (Gonza´lez and Queirolo, 2000). For others, the victory reflects the disappointment of voters with the management of Uruguay’s economy by the traditional parties. Triggered by the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in January 1999, and exacerbated by the 2001 financial crisis in Argentina, Uruguay has been immersed in one of the deepest, if not the worst, economic and financial crisis ever confronted. The left would thus constitute a source of alternative economic policies that voters are seeking (Bayce, 2004). Yet other scholars point to the increasing moderation and pragmatism of the EP-FA-NM, mainly due to its experience in governing the country’s largest city, Montevideo, since 1990. This has enabled it to siphon off voters of a center-left orientation yet who have usually supported traditional parties (Garce´ and Yaffe´, 2004). A fourth argument is that this electoral shift is driven by a natural erosion of the traditional parties, due to the decreasing possibilities of using the state as the national employer and as a springboard for pork-barrel politics (Lanzaro, 2004). While each of these interpretations contains a kernel of truth, none provide a full explanation.
6. Post-election challenges Despite an extremely delicate economic situation, optimism reigns in the country so far. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the leftist coalition became the largest party in Congress, and that the prospects of a divided government are low, the political situation for the EP-FA-NM is far from easy. Problems could crop up if the traditional parties coordinate their opposition to the governing party, and if President Va´zquez is unable to instil discipline on his heterogeneous coalition. Although the EP-FA-NM has the votes in Congress needed to pass legislation by simple majority (50 deputies and 16 senators), it does not have the three-fifths majority necessary to nominate key figures in the administration. It is even further away from the two-thirds majority needed to pass any constitutional reform (66 deputies and 20 senators). Moreover, the defection of merely one or two legislators could undermine any attempt to pass legislation. Thus, party discipline will become a critical variable. In addition, the new government is likely to face enormous pressure from corporative interests (public and private unions, exporters, universities, and the like) seeking to improve their economic situation. These demands are hard to ignore, but could clash with the strict fiscal policy needed if Uruguay wishes to maintain good relations with international financial institutions, and to create an encouraging climate for domestic and international investors. While the ‘country-risk’ measuredused by financial institutions to assess the ability of a country to serve its foreign debtdand the price of government bonds improved in the days following the election, an increasing flow of demands from civil society organisations could create policy complications for the new government. In early December, 2004, Va´zquez announced a new cabinet, which does not reflect the relative share of votes of each member of the EP-FA-NM coalition.
154
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 147e191
Historically, ministerial posts in Uruguay have echoed the distribution of forces within the winning party (Altman, 2000), but Va´zquez did not follow this convention. The most obvious imbalance occurred in the case of MPP and AU, which secured only one minister each despite being the two EP-FA-NM fractions that won the most votes (see Table 1). This imbalance can be probably be maintained during the honeymoon period for the government. Over time, however, internal disputes and lack of discipline among EP-FA-NM’s members may challenge the cohesion of Va´zquez’s government. His decision to form a cabinet that includes the four leaders of the EP-FA-NM fractions that won the most votes (PS, AU, MPP, and VA) might help to counteract this possibility. In the context of a much changed Congress, where more than 60% of legislators are newcomers, this strategy may bestow on the new cabinet a key role in controlling the legislative process.
Acknowledgments The authors are grateful to Toma´s Chuaqui, Mark Jones, Juan Pablo Luna, and Gerardo Munck for their insightful suggestions. They also wish to thank the Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica de Chile and the Direccio´n General de Investigacio´n of the Universidad Andre´s Bello for their financial support. David Altman and Rossana Castiglioni are FONDECYT fellows (Projects #1040920 and #3040012, respectively).
References Altman, D., 2000. The politics of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential democracies: the case of Uruguay 1989e1999. Party Politics 6 (3), 259e283. Altman, D., 2002. Popular initiatives in Uruguay: confidence votes on government or political loyalties? Electoral Studies 21 (4), 617e630. Bayce, R., 2004. Un largo camino al e´xito. Caras y Caretas IV (168), 36e37. Espı´ ndola, R., 2001. No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections. Electoral Studies 20 (4), 649e657. Finch, H., 1995. The Uruguayan election of 1994. Electoral Studies 14 (2), 232e236. Garce´, A., Yaffe´, J., 2004. La Era Progresista. Editorial Fin de Siglo, Montevideo. Gonza´lez, L.E., Queirolo, R., 2000. Las elecciones nacionales del 2004: Posibles escenarios. In: Caetano, G. (Ed.), Elecciones 1999/2000. Ediciones Banda Oriental-Instituto de Ciencia Polı´ tica, Montevideo. Lanzaro, J. (Ed.), 2004. La Izquierda Uruguaya: Entra la Oposicio´n y el Gobierno. Instituto de Ciencia Polı´ tica, Montevideo. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2005.06.005