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The Bantu concept of time
THE BANTU CONCEPT OF TIME Francis Gillies
The impetus for the present interest in the traditional African concept of time is the work of Professor John Mbiti, whose writings cover African religion and Christian theology (1) . Mbiti's main assertion - one which has many socio-economic, political and theological implications is that the traditional African 'has virtually no concept of the future' (2) . My aim in this article is to argue that, by situating the discussion about 'time in traditional African thought' (3) within a wider philosophical, theological and anthropological framework, it is possible, using Mbiti's evidence, to reach conclusions about the nature of traditional African time-consciousness different from his ; namely that the time-consciousness of the traditional African is fundamentally future-oriented .
GENERAL CRITIQUE OF MBITI'S APPROACH Before considering Mbiti's detailed analysis of African time-consciousness, it may be useful to situate his method against a wider background of concepts of time . First, Mbiti is a member of the Kenyan Akamba tribe, which is Bantu (4) . His detailed research into the nature of African time has been confined to the Bantu . For this reason, it is more accurate to describe his research findings as pertaining to Bantu concepts of time . Secondly, Mbiti is primarily an Anglican theologian . It is this characteristic - that of Christian theologian © RKP 1980 0048-721X/80/1001-0016 $1 .50/1 16
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which makes his writings of interest and application to a wider audience than those engaged in the field of religion, because as a good theologian, he does not restrict himself to a purely descriptive approach to traditional religion, but attempts to analyse and interpret the interaction of traditional religion with developmental forces (in this case Christianity) showing the implications of this interaction for political, economic and social development in Africa . However, on the question of Bantu timeconsciousness, his approach of juxtaposing traditional Bantu time with a too narrow concept of Western time leads him to conclusions which require some modification . Notice here that this is not a criticism of Mbiti's method - the juxtaposition of two concepts of time from two cultural traditions to both of which he belongs - but rather the contents of his method, namely restricted assumptions about the nature of Western time-consciousness and the future, contained within one theological tradition . Thirdly, Mbiti presupposes that there is unanimity (a) amongst Western philosophers about the nature of time and future, and (b) amongst Christian theologians about the nature of time and future as expressed in eschatological theology . (a) Time in western consciousness is described by Mbiti as 'an ontological reality', which is experienced by Western consciousness as an entity, as a form of existence in its own right (5) . Western time is said by Mbiti to be linear, possessing a past, present and future(6) . Again, Mbiti asserts that in Western time-consciousness the future exists ; few, if any, Western philosophers would agree with that, because it requires the identification of the ontological world with the existential one ; yet Mbiti's argument about the lack of a future concept in Bantu time is based on the assertion that future events have not yet occurred, therefore there is no future (7) . To this linear, ontological, Western time is opposed traditional Bantu time, which has 'virtually no future' (8), which is 'simply a composition of events' (9), and which is 'not an ontological reality in its own right but is composed of actual events which are experienced' (10) . Such a description of Bantu time is one which could equally as well have come from the pen of a Western phenomenologist trying to describe Western time-consciousness . From Augustine to Husserl we find constantly reiterated the complaint that it is impossible to define time . Husserl tells us that 'as soon as we make the attempt
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to account for time-consciousness, to put Objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the right relation . . . we are involved in the most extraordinary difficulties, contradictions and entanglements . . .one may still say with St Augustine : "if nobody asks me what time is, I know, but And it if I am asked to explain it, I don't know"' (11) . was Augustine who insisted that the word 'time' can be used only in relation to past and future (otherwise it is not 'time' we are speaking of but something else), but who also declares that it is incorrect to say, 'there be three times, past, present and future', but correct to say, 'there be three times : a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future' (12) . Neither Augustine nor Husserl are proponents of linear time, nor of time as an ontological reality in the way in which Mbiti understands it, but both of them are central to the Western philosophical discussion on time-consciousness . Indeed, the perennial problem in Western philosophy between, on the one hand, the relationship between the objective world and our consciousness of it, and, on the other, between objective time and internal time-consciousness, is not different from that encountered by Mbiti but is mirrored in his research into Bantu concepts of time . (b) Eschatology in Christian time-consciousness is, similarly, reflected in the way in which the Bantu understood eschatology . Mbiti identifies himself with that school of Christian theology which he describes as 'intensely eschatological'(13) . His work and writings demonstrate his desire, and rightly so, to develop a socio-critical theology within Africa, based on the acquisition of eschatological consciousness by African Christians . However, by adopting an unhistorical approach to the interpretation of Christian theology, he makes correct assertions about the way the Bantu understood eschatology but draws the wrong conclusions from this about the nature of Bantu time . One of Mbiti's test cases, for example, for the nature of Bantu time, is the way in which the Akamba of Kenya, upon conversion to Christianity, understood the According to Mbiti, Christian eschatological message (14) . the Akamba, because of their lack of future-consciousness, turn the future dimension of Christianity and its relationship with the present, into a 'pie-in-the-sky', futuristic type of religion (15) . But were the Akamba not, in fact, presented with an eschatology which could only be understood in this way? Mbiti's understanding of eschatological
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consciousness was not readily available to English or Scottish missionaries at the turn of the century . On top of this, if the Bantu peoples have virtually no concept of the future, how else could they have understood the Christian eschatological message except as futuristic Indeed, if Mbiti's conclusions are correct, then the conversion of the Bantu to Christianity would be an insuperable task, contradicting the theological motto that 'grace perfects nature', because, in this case, Christian eschatological grace would do violence to Bantu nature . Now, clearly, the conversion of the Bantu, together with the work carried out amongst them by Christian missionaries, seems to indicate a future perspective both on the part of the missionaries and of the Bantu . Without Christian initiatives, motivated by the concept of a 'better future', particularly in the field of education, the development of East and Central Africa is unthinkable . Perhaps early missionaries, with their concept of an 'ethical Jesus', preached and practised a Christianity which was both this-worldly and other-worldly, and this would account, at the level of eschatology, for the type of futuristic eschatology which Mbiti finds among the Akamba . In other words, at one level of Bantu time, there is an indication of 'future-consciousness' upon which missionaries actively built, otherwise no development could have taken place ; at another level Christianity is transformed into an other-worldly religion . Is not this a reflection of the theological position and its interaction with society in Europe at the turn of the century In addition, Mbiti overlooks certain interpretations of eschatology which offer a different concept of the nature of the future . For example, in the theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, for whom also 'all theology is eschatology' (16), and in that of Johannes Metz, for whom 'every eschatological theology must become a political theology, that is a socio-critical theology' (17), the concept 'future' is not treated as a part of linear time, in which human history unfolds, but as a category separated from time exercising an influence on the whole of human development . Rahner, indeed, calls God the 'Absolute Future' (18) . Nor is the future, within this form of eschatologizing, considered as part of time as an ontological reality, which is gradually being topped up by natural and social history, but as the nerve of history . Perhaps if Mbiti had considered the concept of 'future' within eschatology as neither linear nor ontological, but as the reality which penetrates and influences every
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present (19), he would have interpreted his research findings differently . Against this wider background of concepts of time and future in Western philosophy and Christian eschatology, it is time to look more closely at Mbiti's detailed research . From Mbiti's writings it is possible to distinguish three characteristics of traditional Bantu concepts of time : (i) Traditional Bantu time has virtually no concept of the future . (ii) Traditional Bantu time is simply a composition of events . (iii) Traditional Bantu time moves backwards into the past . (i) Traditional Bantu time has virtually no concept of the future Mbiti has two arguments for the virtual absence of a future dimension . The first is that verb tenses in the Kikamba language have no future tense apart from a tense describing the near future : 'there is no concrete verb tense to express something happening beyond two years from now' . This statement is qualified by Mbiti : 'there are roundabout ways of speaking about events beyond that 'Two years from now' could be understood as period' (20) . contradicting the statement that traditional time has 'virtually no future', and the existence of roundabout ways of saying things ought to make us careful about . basing an interpretation on linguistic evidence alone . The second argument advanced by Mbiti is that within traditional religion, 'African myths are directed to the past and deal with items like creation, the first men, the separation of God from men and the coming of death . There The coming are no African myths about the future' (21) . of death, however, does suggest a myth about the personal future . In these two arguments, the concepts of time and future are used at different levels, and it is necessary to distinguish in them the difference between the chronological future and the imagined future . The first argument, the linguistic one, is based on the Bantu's consciousness of chronological time, 'old Father Time', inseparable from the rhythm of nature, the basis in the Western world of calendrical .and clock-time . This time as Chronos, characteristic of Greek thought, is generally regarded as cyclical, that is without a future, but this view has often been strongly criticized (22)_ Opposed to the Greek concept of time is the Jewish concept,
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which has been called linear . Such a juxtaposition of Greek and Hebrew concepts of time has also come in for heavy criticism (23), yet Mbiti's argument for the virtual absence of the future in Bantu time relies on the Western model . Chronological time-consciousness has its basis in the inevitability of the rhythm of nature, but it has to be experienced to become a reality : ' . . .time must be experienced in order to make sense, to have a meaning and become a reality . . .since the future cannot be felt it has no meaning' (24) . Again, 'since what is in the future has not been experienced, it cannot make sense, and cannot therefore constitute a part of time . . .unless, of course it falls within the rhythm of natural phenomena' (25) . This form of time is in the category of 'inevitable or potential time' (26) . The unit of measurement of this inevitable-chronological time is the annual cycle, which, in its repetition is infinite : 'People expect the years to come and go in an endless rhythm, like that of day and night . . . .They expect the events of the rain season, planting, harvesting . . . dry season, rain season again, planting and so on, to continue for ever' (27) . (My emphasis .) This clearly is an affirmation of the future, but, in Mbiti's understanding, it is not an affirmation about future time . Obviously the category 'future' here needs to be separated from 'time' . Now, this category 'future', discernible in Bantu time is essentially the same as the concept of an 'infinite future' in Western time . The concept of the infinite future in Western time is founded upon chronological time, not, as Mbiti argues on ontologically linear time . It is a fundamental biological category, dictated by hunger (28) . It is a universal category in man . Certainly, at this level of the meaning of time, the traditional African has an identical concept to Western man . He plans, he plants seeds, he harvests, he has a large family which, in the future, will co-operate with inexorable nature to provide for him in old age and so on . The foundation of this future-directed consciousness is biological hunger . It is this fundamental anthropological category which directs consciousness, in its interaction with the empirical, objective world, to the chronological future . Every society possesses it . The fact that African societies did not develop numerical calendars, for instance (29), is not an indication that they did not possess this type of future consciousness but only that they had no need to systematize the category, future, in more detail . Calendars reflect cyclical, not linear time .
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It is this identical category, future, which exercises the primacy in Western society . Although the West has 'socialized' nature, my personal planning of the future, as well as society's planning of the future, are based on the concept, future, mediated to consciousness through the experience of chronological inevitability . My present pension contributions, Mr Brezhnev's five-year plans, my next year's holiday arrangements, are all based, despite the numerical time differences between them, on the concept of the chronological future . There is a difference in the contents of planning between traditional Africa and the Western societies, but the source of planning, the biological necessity of providing for the future, is identical . The time span is irrelevant, and Mbiti's analysis demonstrates this, because a future which is 'two years' hence remains a static category impinging on every present . What Mbiti judges to be an essential difference is, in fact, only a difference of degree . Understood in this way, since the traditional Bantu still lives at subsistence level, the future probably exercises him more than it does his Western counterpart, and is possibly the overriding factor in his daily consciousness . This leads to Mbiti's second argument that there are no myths about the future in traditional Bantu religion . It is possible to argue that there are no myths, in any religion, concerning the future . The myths within Judaism for example the creation story - are similar to the myths within traditional African religion . They are the products of a people's imagination introduced to explain something which cannot be explained empirically . However, the myths about the future in Judaism - 'a land flowing with milk and honey' - are not strictly myths in the way that the creation story is a myth . Myths about the future, certainly within Judaism and Christianity, are closely connected with historical events in the past . The concept of the future introduced here, however, needs to be distinguished from the concept of the chronological future . The imagined future occurs within chronological nature, but it comes to birth as the result of the attempt to break or transform the inevitability of the world of natural time, and accompanying social structures . The Exodus events are good examples of this . It is within the experience of slavery and exploitation, taking place within chronological time, that the imagination creates 'an alternative future' . This imagined future, which leads
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to action, creates within the objective possibilities of chronological time, and indeed under the influence of the category future of chronological time, historical time . Now the 'myths' of alternative futures contained within the Jewish and Christian religions are products of the imagination working under the constraints of the future, but they are inseparable from historical events, the Exodus and the resurrection of Christ, which are incorporated within the religion . Now, Mbiti's writings show that the Bantu did not incorporate any historical events within his religion which would give rise to myths about the future, but that does not mean that there were no historical events motivated by an imagined future different from that inevitable future of chronological time . The imagined future need not be Utopic, and need not be incorporated within traditional religion, but simply activated in response to the alienating nature of the present and the immediate future . However, Mbiti argues that even at the level of the daydream, the simplest form of the imagined future, the Bantu have no concept of a better, or happier personal future : 'traditional Africans do not build castles in the air', that is they have no daydreams ; again, 'there is no belief in progress . . .the future cannot be expected to usher in a radically different state of affairs' (30) . There are two ways to approach Mbiti's assertions here . The first is to contradict him by arguing that there are myths about the future in traditional Bantu religion, which are well researched and documented (31) . However, all such myths either are fairly late developments or there is disagreement about whether they are 'pure' or contain an admixture of the Christian myth of the parousia (32) . Besides, Mbiti is not concerned with 'other-worldly' myths but with how the messianic kingdom influences human behaviour in the present, and it seems to me he is correct to argue that there is no hint of this form of messianism incorporated within traditional religion . On the other hand, Mbiti himself has argued for a 'theology of dreams . . . in the light of the seriousness with which Africans take some of their dreams' (33) . Here Mbiti is speaking of night dreams, not daydreams, but they are dreams which influence the way in which people plan for the future : Amin's expulsion of the Asians, for example, was based on a dream he had from God (34) . The second approach involves denying Mbiti's assertion that all of traditional life is religious - 'To be is to be
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religious in a religious universe' - (35) and to argue that traditional Bantu existence is both religious and secular . Does not the history of traditional Africa reveal a secular history, with a concept of historical time-consciousness generated not by Utopian optimism or Messianic hope, but simply by the hope of something better in the future? How was Ethiopia possible, or the kingdom of Ghana, or Zimbabwe? The imagined future, which expresses itself through historical time, reveals itself within traditional Bantu time-consciousness, although not within traditional religion . To deny the imagined future is to deny the basis of hope, and to assert that Bantu consciousness is hope-less .
(ii) Traditional African time as a composition of events What do we mean when we say that time is a composition of events? Presumably it can be taken to mean something like, 'no event, no time', because time is inseparable from event . This suggests that time in traditional Bantu thought is not an ontological reality . Alexis Kagame, writing on the concept of Bantu time, disagrees with Mbiti . Although Kagame argues that the ontologizing of time is more defined in the West, he maintains that Bantu time is ontological : 'In traditional Bantu culture, time is a colourless, neutral entity, as long as it is not marked or stamped by some specific event . . . .As soon as the action or the event impinges on time, the latter is marked, stamped, individualized, drawn out of its anonymity' (36) . This seems analogous to the concept of 'materia prima' as the basis for existential individuation : time here is individuated by being 'stamped' with the event or action . Now Mbiti describes Bantu time as 'something which has to be experienced in order to be real' (37) . Does not this suggest, that, because it is capable of being experienced, time is an ontological reality? On the other hand, it is experienced only along with event . Perhaps, as Kagame suggests, 'the metaphysical justification for merging place and time into a single category' (38) rests upon a form of perception which, in terms of descriptive psychology, operates with an interacting form of potential time as well as potential matter . This is precisely the way in which Husserl understands the relationship between the objective world (including objective time) and our perception of it : it requires consciousness to objectify it but it can be objectified only because it is potentially objectifiable (39) . However, Mbiti also argues that time is not only experienced, but is also produced or 'created' by Bantu
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consciousness (40) . Therefore, it would seem that time is created along with perception of, 'creation' of the event . The objective world becomes the phenomenal world in the event-time structure, that is the objective world takes on meaning only when it is understood as being in motion (an event caused by somebody other than the observer), or when it is conceived as the result of human praxis (when the creator of the event and the observer are the same) . No consciousness of an event, no human praxis, is equated with the absence of internal time-consciousness, and time, which is composed by events, seems to interact with event in order to make the event meaningful . This indicates that the traditional Bantu's theory of knowledge is not passive but active, that is his knowledge arises from his creation of event . Mbiti gives a daily timetable to illustrate the inseparability of time and event (41) . Sunrise is the time for milking cattle : the cattle (objective world) and sunrise (objective-chronological time) are given meaning only through the human activity of milking . Therefore the traditional Bantu's internal time-consciousness arises from his experience of transforming and unifying the separateness of objects and chronological time in the natural world . This indicates that Bantu consciousness operates 'intentionaliter', that is his knowledge of the time-event structure depends upon his creation of that structure through human praxis, through the dialectic between consciousness and the objective world (and objective time) . Knowledge in this context is neither exclusively empirical, nor exclusively rational, but is both produced by, and mediated to, consciousness through the interaction of consciousness with the objective world . This is the way in which Husserl, Merleau-Ponty (42) and the later Sartre (43) understand the relationship between consciousness and being . One must agree with Mbiti's statement that in 'Western or technological society . . .time . . .is a commodity which must be utilised, sold and bought' (44) . Witness also Kagame's agreement with this (45) . The implication, of course, is that in traditional society time is not bought and sold . Time, obviously, is being used again at a different level of meaning here . It is not time that is being bought and sold, but human labour (praxis) and commodities (the continuation of praxis), and this certainly is part of traditional African society just as much as it is part of Western society, even although the economic structures are totally different .
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Time, therefore, does seem to be an ontological reality, the objective possibility for the event-time structure, in traditional Bantu time-consciousness, and the fact that it is an ontological reality does not contradict the fact that it is experienced only along with event . (iii) The time-consciousness of the Bantu moves into the past There are two concepts of time within traditional Bantu thought . The present time (the Swahili sasa) or the 'now period' encompasses the present, the immediate future and my own experiential past . The sasa period extending backwards beyond my own experience is absorbed within the zamani period (Swahili), which stretches backwards infinitely . The zamani is transmitted to the sasa period through remembrance and communication of the events which occurred in the zamani period : 'a person experiences time partly in his own individual life and partly through the society which goes back many generations before his birth' (46) . My individual sasa does not end at my death, but continues as long as I am remembered by the living . When I finally disappear from living memory, then I enter the zamani period . The chronological course of the world 'each year comes and goes, adding only adds to the past : to the time dimension of the past . Endlessness or "eternity" is something that lies only in the region of the past' (47) . Moreover, the zamani period is 'not extinct, but is a period full of activities and happenings . . .the "golden age" lies in the zamani and not in some infinite future' (48) . Certainly, the activities and happenings of the zamani are extremely important in traditional Bantu thought and practice . The zamani is the seat of the ancestors and exercises great control over the present : Bantu children still obtain leave from their boarding schools to return, for short periods, to their villages, because they are troubled by the ancestral spirits . The zamani is often invoked by the chief as a means of social control . On the other hand, even at this deeply religious level, the spirits of the zamani are called upon to protect, or even to interfere with the future, for example to protect crops and family, and even to restore life to a dying child . This surely indicates that although the primacy certainly belongs to the zamani, the future is not absent from the Bantu's time dimension even within this religious area . What is of interest here is the interaction of the religious world of ancestral expiation with the secular world of the material future, although it is an immediate
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future only . This seems to indicate again that traditional African consciousness is both religious and secular . Joshua Kudadjie rejects Mbiti's contention that the African world is almost completely a religious world : it is both sacred and secular (49) . In this context too, Mbiti's research findings can be given a modified interpretation from that given by him .
CONCLUSION My motivation for writing this article is a shared feeling with Mbiti that African Christian theology should become a critical theology, and the African Christian Church a critical Church . If my interpretation of Mbiti's research is correct, then it is possible to discover a future dimension in Bantu time-consciousness within the three characteristics of Bantu time given by Mbiti . This future dimension, present in Bantu daily consciousness and in Bantu time as an ontological reality, would seem to make the task of constructing a critical theology more compatible with traditional time-consciousness, because it confirms rather than contradicts eschatological consciousness which is the basis of a critical theology . Moreover, the form of my argumentation should make less difficult the task of African theologians whose purpose is to incorporate the fundamental elements of traditional religion within Christian theology, because the natural primacy of the future in practical Bantu timeconsciousness would be a 'natural' foundation for Christian eschatology . If the future as I have described it is a major constituent of Bantu time-consciousness, then it has wide implications for our understanding of traditional religions, for our understanding of historical consciousness within Africa, for the relationship between economic base and ideological superstructure within traditional Africa ; more importantly, it has wide implications for the way in which we understand cross-cultural interaction, because if the future is the fundamental anthropological category which is subject simply to differing forms of conditioning, then what we at present, within the fields of anthropology and the study of religions, decipher as essential differences would, in fact, be only differences of degree . However, I am only pointing directions, not making analyses, and it could immediately be objected that both Mbiti and myself are making use of a form of Christian
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consciousness, which is itself conditioned, against which to measure Bantu time-consciousness . For this latter reason, I have confined myself within the limits of the interaction of Bantu time-consciousness with Christian eschatological consciousness, and leave to others the task of analysing any wider implications .
NOTES 1 J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, London 1969 ; 'The African Concept of Time', in Africa, Vol . 8, 1967 ; 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', in D . Barrett (ed .), African Initiatives in Religion, Nairobi 1971 . 2 J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 17 . 3 The phrase is taken from an article title : J . Parratt, Religion, Vol . 7, Autumn 1977 . 4 J . S . Nbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 18 . 5 J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 17 . 6 J . S . Mbiti, ibid . 7 J . S . Mbiti, ibid . 8 J . S . Nmiti, ibid . 9 J . S . Mbiti, ibid . 10 J . Parratt, op . cit ., p . 117 . 11 E . Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, The Hague 1964, p . 21 . 12 St Augustine, The Confessions of St Augustine, London 1961, p . 198 . 13 J . S . Mbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 17 . 14 J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., passim . 15 J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 21 . 16 J . Moltmann, Theology of Hope, London 1967, p . 16 . 17 J . B . Metz, Theology of the World, London 1966, p . 115 . 18 K . Rahner, Gegenwart des Christentums, Herder 1963, p . 9, 'Gott ist die absolute Zukunft' . 19 E . Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, passim . 20 J . S . Mbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 18 . 21 J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 19 . 22 G . E . R . Lloyd, 'Views on Time in Greek Thought', in P . Ricoeur (ed .), Cultures and Time, Paris 1976, p . 117 . 23 J . Barr, Biblical Words for Time, London 1962, passim .
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32 33
34 35 36
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
J . S . Mbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 19 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 17 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 21 . E . Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, op . cit ., pp . 124-33 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 21 . See, for example, J . J . Williams, Hebrewisms of West West Africa, NewYork193 ; G . Parrinder, African Mythology, London 1967 ; R . F . Gray, The Sonjo of Tanganyika, London 1963 . R . F . Gray, op . cit ., passim . The Sonjo, a small tribe in northern Tanzania, expect a parousia . J . S . Mbiti, 'God, Dreams and African Militancy', in J . S . Pobee (ed .), Religion in a Pluralistic Society, p . 38 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 41 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy,, op . cit ., p . 262 . A . Kagame, 'The Empirical Apperception of Time and the Conception of History in Bantu Thought', in Cultures and Time, op . cit ., p . 99 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 19 . A . Kagame, op . cit ., p . 92 . E . Husserl, op . cit ., p . 21 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 19 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 20 . M .Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, London 1969 . J-P . Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, London 1975 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 19 . A . Kagame, op . cit ., p . 99 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 23 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 21 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 23 . J . Kudadjie, 'Does Religion Determine Morality in African Societies ', in Religion in a Pluralistic Society, op . cit ., pp . 60-77 .
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FRANCIS GILLIES is a Senior Lecturer in Education and Religious Studies at the College of St Mark & St John, Plymouth His doctoral thesis (University of Sussex) concerned, 'The Eschatological Structures of Christianity and Marxism' . At present he is on secondment to the department of education, University of Malawi . Dr F . Gillies, Department of Education, University of Malawi, PO Box 280, Zomba, Malawi (until July 1980) .
The impetus for the present interest in the traditional African concept of time is the work of Professor John Mbiti, whose writings cover African religion and Christian theology (1) . Mbiti's main assertion - one which has many socio-economic, political and theological implications is that the traditional African 'has virtually no concept of the future' (2) . My aim in this article is to argue that, by situating the discussion about 'time in traditional African thought' (3) within a wider philosophical, theological and anthropological framework, it is possible, using Mbiti's evidence, to reach conclusions about the nature of traditional African time-consciousness different from his ; namely that the time-consciousness of the traditional African is fundamentally future-oriented .
GENERAL CRITIQUE OF MBITI'S APPROACH Before considering Mbiti's detailed analysis of African time-consciousness, it may be useful to situate his method against a wider background of concepts of time . First, Mbiti is a member of the Kenyan Akamba tribe, which is Bantu (4) . His detailed research into the nature of African time has been confined to the Bantu . For this reason, it is more accurate to describe his research findings as pertaining to Bantu concepts of time . Secondly, Mbiti is primarily an Anglican theologian . It is this characteristic - that of Christian theologian © RKP 1980 0048-721X/80/1001-0016 $1 .50/1 16
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which makes his writings of interest and application to a wider audience than those engaged in the field of religion, because as a good theologian, he does not restrict himself to a purely descriptive approach to traditional religion, but attempts to analyse and interpret the interaction of traditional religion with developmental forces (in this case Christianity) showing the implications of this interaction for political, economic and social development in Africa . However, on the question of Bantu timeconsciousness, his approach of juxtaposing traditional Bantu time with a too narrow concept of Western time leads him to conclusions which require some modification . Notice here that this is not a criticism of Mbiti's method - the juxtaposition of two concepts of time from two cultural traditions to both of which he belongs - but rather the contents of his method, namely restricted assumptions about the nature of Western time-consciousness and the future, contained within one theological tradition . Thirdly, Mbiti presupposes that there is unanimity (a) amongst Western philosophers about the nature of time and future, and (b) amongst Christian theologians about the nature of time and future as expressed in eschatological theology . (a) Time in western consciousness is described by Mbiti as 'an ontological reality', which is experienced by Western consciousness as an entity, as a form of existence in its own right (5) . Western time is said by Mbiti to be linear, possessing a past, present and future(6) . Again, Mbiti asserts that in Western time-consciousness the future exists ; few, if any, Western philosophers would agree with that, because it requires the identification of the ontological world with the existential one ; yet Mbiti's argument about the lack of a future concept in Bantu time is based on the assertion that future events have not yet occurred, therefore there is no future (7) . To this linear, ontological, Western time is opposed traditional Bantu time, which has 'virtually no future' (8), which is 'simply a composition of events' (9), and which is 'not an ontological reality in its own right but is composed of actual events which are experienced' (10) . Such a description of Bantu time is one which could equally as well have come from the pen of a Western phenomenologist trying to describe Western time-consciousness . From Augustine to Husserl we find constantly reiterated the complaint that it is impossible to define time . Husserl tells us that 'as soon as we make the attempt
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to account for time-consciousness, to put Objective time and subjective time-consciousness into the right relation . . . we are involved in the most extraordinary difficulties, contradictions and entanglements . . .one may still say with St Augustine : "if nobody asks me what time is, I know, but And it if I am asked to explain it, I don't know"' (11) . was Augustine who insisted that the word 'time' can be used only in relation to past and future (otherwise it is not 'time' we are speaking of but something else), but who also declares that it is incorrect to say, 'there be three times, past, present and future', but correct to say, 'there be three times : a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future' (12) . Neither Augustine nor Husserl are proponents of linear time, nor of time as an ontological reality in the way in which Mbiti understands it, but both of them are central to the Western philosophical discussion on time-consciousness . Indeed, the perennial problem in Western philosophy between, on the one hand, the relationship between the objective world and our consciousness of it, and, on the other, between objective time and internal time-consciousness, is not different from that encountered by Mbiti but is mirrored in his research into Bantu concepts of time . (b) Eschatology in Christian time-consciousness is, similarly, reflected in the way in which the Bantu understood eschatology . Mbiti identifies himself with that school of Christian theology which he describes as 'intensely eschatological'(13) . His work and writings demonstrate his desire, and rightly so, to develop a socio-critical theology within Africa, based on the acquisition of eschatological consciousness by African Christians . However, by adopting an unhistorical approach to the interpretation of Christian theology, he makes correct assertions about the way the Bantu understood eschatology but draws the wrong conclusions from this about the nature of Bantu time . One of Mbiti's test cases, for example, for the nature of Bantu time, is the way in which the Akamba of Kenya, upon conversion to Christianity, understood the According to Mbiti, Christian eschatological message (14) . the Akamba, because of their lack of future-consciousness, turn the future dimension of Christianity and its relationship with the present, into a 'pie-in-the-sky', futuristic type of religion (15) . But were the Akamba not, in fact, presented with an eschatology which could only be understood in this way? Mbiti's understanding of eschatological
The Bantu concept of time
consciousness was not readily available to English or Scottish missionaries at the turn of the century . On top of this, if the Bantu peoples have virtually no concept of the future, how else could they have understood the Christian eschatological message except as futuristic Indeed, if Mbiti's conclusions are correct, then the conversion of the Bantu to Christianity would be an insuperable task, contradicting the theological motto that 'grace perfects nature', because, in this case, Christian eschatological grace would do violence to Bantu nature . Now, clearly, the conversion of the Bantu, together with the work carried out amongst them by Christian missionaries, seems to indicate a future perspective both on the part of the missionaries and of the Bantu . Without Christian initiatives, motivated by the concept of a 'better future', particularly in the field of education, the development of East and Central Africa is unthinkable . Perhaps early missionaries, with their concept of an 'ethical Jesus', preached and practised a Christianity which was both this-worldly and other-worldly, and this would account, at the level of eschatology, for the type of futuristic eschatology which Mbiti finds among the Akamba . In other words, at one level of Bantu time, there is an indication of 'future-consciousness' upon which missionaries actively built, otherwise no development could have taken place ; at another level Christianity is transformed into an other-worldly religion . Is not this a reflection of the theological position and its interaction with society in Europe at the turn of the century In addition, Mbiti overlooks certain interpretations of eschatology which offer a different concept of the nature of the future . For example, in the theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, for whom also 'all theology is eschatology' (16), and in that of Johannes Metz, for whom 'every eschatological theology must become a political theology, that is a socio-critical theology' (17), the concept 'future' is not treated as a part of linear time, in which human history unfolds, but as a category separated from time exercising an influence on the whole of human development . Rahner, indeed, calls God the 'Absolute Future' (18) . Nor is the future, within this form of eschatologizing, considered as part of time as an ontological reality, which is gradually being topped up by natural and social history, but as the nerve of history . Perhaps if Mbiti had considered the concept of 'future' within eschatology as neither linear nor ontological, but as the reality which penetrates and influences every
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present (19), he would have interpreted his research findings differently . Against this wider background of concepts of time and future in Western philosophy and Christian eschatology, it is time to look more closely at Mbiti's detailed research . From Mbiti's writings it is possible to distinguish three characteristics of traditional Bantu concepts of time : (i) Traditional Bantu time has virtually no concept of the future . (ii) Traditional Bantu time is simply a composition of events . (iii) Traditional Bantu time moves backwards into the past . (i) Traditional Bantu time has virtually no concept of the future Mbiti has two arguments for the virtual absence of a future dimension . The first is that verb tenses in the Kikamba language have no future tense apart from a tense describing the near future : 'there is no concrete verb tense to express something happening beyond two years from now' . This statement is qualified by Mbiti : 'there are roundabout ways of speaking about events beyond that 'Two years from now' could be understood as period' (20) . contradicting the statement that traditional time has 'virtually no future', and the existence of roundabout ways of saying things ought to make us careful about . basing an interpretation on linguistic evidence alone . The second argument advanced by Mbiti is that within traditional religion, 'African myths are directed to the past and deal with items like creation, the first men, the separation of God from men and the coming of death . There The coming are no African myths about the future' (21) . of death, however, does suggest a myth about the personal future . In these two arguments, the concepts of time and future are used at different levels, and it is necessary to distinguish in them the difference between the chronological future and the imagined future . The first argument, the linguistic one, is based on the Bantu's consciousness of chronological time, 'old Father Time', inseparable from the rhythm of nature, the basis in the Western world of calendrical .and clock-time . This time as Chronos, characteristic of Greek thought, is generally regarded as cyclical, that is without a future, but this view has often been strongly criticized (22)_ Opposed to the Greek concept of time is the Jewish concept,
The Bantu concept of time
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which has been called linear . Such a juxtaposition of Greek and Hebrew concepts of time has also come in for heavy criticism (23), yet Mbiti's argument for the virtual absence of the future in Bantu time relies on the Western model . Chronological time-consciousness has its basis in the inevitability of the rhythm of nature, but it has to be experienced to become a reality : ' . . .time must be experienced in order to make sense, to have a meaning and become a reality . . .since the future cannot be felt it has no meaning' (24) . Again, 'since what is in the future has not been experienced, it cannot make sense, and cannot therefore constitute a part of time . . .unless, of course it falls within the rhythm of natural phenomena' (25) . This form of time is in the category of 'inevitable or potential time' (26) . The unit of measurement of this inevitable-chronological time is the annual cycle, which, in its repetition is infinite : 'People expect the years to come and go in an endless rhythm, like that of day and night . . . .They expect the events of the rain season, planting, harvesting . . . dry season, rain season again, planting and so on, to continue for ever' (27) . (My emphasis .) This clearly is an affirmation of the future, but, in Mbiti's understanding, it is not an affirmation about future time . Obviously the category 'future' here needs to be separated from 'time' . Now, this category 'future', discernible in Bantu time is essentially the same as the concept of an 'infinite future' in Western time . The concept of the infinite future in Western time is founded upon chronological time, not, as Mbiti argues on ontologically linear time . It is a fundamental biological category, dictated by hunger (28) . It is a universal category in man . Certainly, at this level of the meaning of time, the traditional African has an identical concept to Western man . He plans, he plants seeds, he harvests, he has a large family which, in the future, will co-operate with inexorable nature to provide for him in old age and so on . The foundation of this future-directed consciousness is biological hunger . It is this fundamental anthropological category which directs consciousness, in its interaction with the empirical, objective world, to the chronological future . Every society possesses it . The fact that African societies did not develop numerical calendars, for instance (29), is not an indication that they did not possess this type of future consciousness but only that they had no need to systematize the category, future, in more detail . Calendars reflect cyclical, not linear time .
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It is this identical category, future, which exercises the primacy in Western society . Although the West has 'socialized' nature, my personal planning of the future, as well as society's planning of the future, are based on the concept, future, mediated to consciousness through the experience of chronological inevitability . My present pension contributions, Mr Brezhnev's five-year plans, my next year's holiday arrangements, are all based, despite the numerical time differences between them, on the concept of the chronological future . There is a difference in the contents of planning between traditional Africa and the Western societies, but the source of planning, the biological necessity of providing for the future, is identical . The time span is irrelevant, and Mbiti's analysis demonstrates this, because a future which is 'two years' hence remains a static category impinging on every present . What Mbiti judges to be an essential difference is, in fact, only a difference of degree . Understood in this way, since the traditional Bantu still lives at subsistence level, the future probably exercises him more than it does his Western counterpart, and is possibly the overriding factor in his daily consciousness . This leads to Mbiti's second argument that there are no myths about the future in traditional Bantu religion . It is possible to argue that there are no myths, in any religion, concerning the future . The myths within Judaism for example the creation story - are similar to the myths within traditional African religion . They are the products of a people's imagination introduced to explain something which cannot be explained empirically . However, the myths about the future in Judaism - 'a land flowing with milk and honey' - are not strictly myths in the way that the creation story is a myth . Myths about the future, certainly within Judaism and Christianity, are closely connected with historical events in the past . The concept of the future introduced here, however, needs to be distinguished from the concept of the chronological future . The imagined future occurs within chronological nature, but it comes to birth as the result of the attempt to break or transform the inevitability of the world of natural time, and accompanying social structures . The Exodus events are good examples of this . It is within the experience of slavery and exploitation, taking place within chronological time, that the imagination creates 'an alternative future' . This imagined future, which leads
The Bantu concept of time
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to action, creates within the objective possibilities of chronological time, and indeed under the influence of the category future of chronological time, historical time . Now the 'myths' of alternative futures contained within the Jewish and Christian religions are products of the imagination working under the constraints of the future, but they are inseparable from historical events, the Exodus and the resurrection of Christ, which are incorporated within the religion . Now, Mbiti's writings show that the Bantu did not incorporate any historical events within his religion which would give rise to myths about the future, but that does not mean that there were no historical events motivated by an imagined future different from that inevitable future of chronological time . The imagined future need not be Utopic, and need not be incorporated within traditional religion, but simply activated in response to the alienating nature of the present and the immediate future . However, Mbiti argues that even at the level of the daydream, the simplest form of the imagined future, the Bantu have no concept of a better, or happier personal future : 'traditional Africans do not build castles in the air', that is they have no daydreams ; again, 'there is no belief in progress . . .the future cannot be expected to usher in a radically different state of affairs' (30) . There are two ways to approach Mbiti's assertions here . The first is to contradict him by arguing that there are myths about the future in traditional Bantu religion, which are well researched and documented (31) . However, all such myths either are fairly late developments or there is disagreement about whether they are 'pure' or contain an admixture of the Christian myth of the parousia (32) . Besides, Mbiti is not concerned with 'other-worldly' myths but with how the messianic kingdom influences human behaviour in the present, and it seems to me he is correct to argue that there is no hint of this form of messianism incorporated within traditional religion . On the other hand, Mbiti himself has argued for a 'theology of dreams . . . in the light of the seriousness with which Africans take some of their dreams' (33) . Here Mbiti is speaking of night dreams, not daydreams, but they are dreams which influence the way in which people plan for the future : Amin's expulsion of the Asians, for example, was based on a dream he had from God (34) . The second approach involves denying Mbiti's assertion that all of traditional life is religious - 'To be is to be
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religious in a religious universe' - (35) and to argue that traditional Bantu existence is both religious and secular . Does not the history of traditional Africa reveal a secular history, with a concept of historical time-consciousness generated not by Utopian optimism or Messianic hope, but simply by the hope of something better in the future? How was Ethiopia possible, or the kingdom of Ghana, or Zimbabwe? The imagined future, which expresses itself through historical time, reveals itself within traditional Bantu time-consciousness, although not within traditional religion . To deny the imagined future is to deny the basis of hope, and to assert that Bantu consciousness is hope-less .
(ii) Traditional African time as a composition of events What do we mean when we say that time is a composition of events? Presumably it can be taken to mean something like, 'no event, no time', because time is inseparable from event . This suggests that time in traditional Bantu thought is not an ontological reality . Alexis Kagame, writing on the concept of Bantu time, disagrees with Mbiti . Although Kagame argues that the ontologizing of time is more defined in the West, he maintains that Bantu time is ontological : 'In traditional Bantu culture, time is a colourless, neutral entity, as long as it is not marked or stamped by some specific event . . . .As soon as the action or the event impinges on time, the latter is marked, stamped, individualized, drawn out of its anonymity' (36) . This seems analogous to the concept of 'materia prima' as the basis for existential individuation : time here is individuated by being 'stamped' with the event or action . Now Mbiti describes Bantu time as 'something which has to be experienced in order to be real' (37) . Does not this suggest, that, because it is capable of being experienced, time is an ontological reality? On the other hand, it is experienced only along with event . Perhaps, as Kagame suggests, 'the metaphysical justification for merging place and time into a single category' (38) rests upon a form of perception which, in terms of descriptive psychology, operates with an interacting form of potential time as well as potential matter . This is precisely the way in which Husserl understands the relationship between the objective world (including objective time) and our perception of it : it requires consciousness to objectify it but it can be objectified only because it is potentially objectifiable (39) . However, Mbiti also argues that time is not only experienced, but is also produced or 'created' by Bantu
The Bantu concept of time
consciousness (40) . Therefore, it would seem that time is created along with perception of, 'creation' of the event . The objective world becomes the phenomenal world in the event-time structure, that is the objective world takes on meaning only when it is understood as being in motion (an event caused by somebody other than the observer), or when it is conceived as the result of human praxis (when the creator of the event and the observer are the same) . No consciousness of an event, no human praxis, is equated with the absence of internal time-consciousness, and time, which is composed by events, seems to interact with event in order to make the event meaningful . This indicates that the traditional Bantu's theory of knowledge is not passive but active, that is his knowledge arises from his creation of event . Mbiti gives a daily timetable to illustrate the inseparability of time and event (41) . Sunrise is the time for milking cattle : the cattle (objective world) and sunrise (objective-chronological time) are given meaning only through the human activity of milking . Therefore the traditional Bantu's internal time-consciousness arises from his experience of transforming and unifying the separateness of objects and chronological time in the natural world . This indicates that Bantu consciousness operates 'intentionaliter', that is his knowledge of the time-event structure depends upon his creation of that structure through human praxis, through the dialectic between consciousness and the objective world (and objective time) . Knowledge in this context is neither exclusively empirical, nor exclusively rational, but is both produced by, and mediated to, consciousness through the interaction of consciousness with the objective world . This is the way in which Husserl, Merleau-Ponty (42) and the later Sartre (43) understand the relationship between consciousness and being . One must agree with Mbiti's statement that in 'Western or technological society . . .time . . .is a commodity which must be utilised, sold and bought' (44) . Witness also Kagame's agreement with this (45) . The implication, of course, is that in traditional society time is not bought and sold . Time, obviously, is being used again at a different level of meaning here . It is not time that is being bought and sold, but human labour (praxis) and commodities (the continuation of praxis), and this certainly is part of traditional African society just as much as it is part of Western society, even although the economic structures are totally different .
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Time, therefore, does seem to be an ontological reality, the objective possibility for the event-time structure, in traditional Bantu time-consciousness, and the fact that it is an ontological reality does not contradict the fact that it is experienced only along with event . (iii) The time-consciousness of the Bantu moves into the past There are two concepts of time within traditional Bantu thought . The present time (the Swahili sasa) or the 'now period' encompasses the present, the immediate future and my own experiential past . The sasa period extending backwards beyond my own experience is absorbed within the zamani period (Swahili), which stretches backwards infinitely . The zamani is transmitted to the sasa period through remembrance and communication of the events which occurred in the zamani period : 'a person experiences time partly in his own individual life and partly through the society which goes back many generations before his birth' (46) . My individual sasa does not end at my death, but continues as long as I am remembered by the living . When I finally disappear from living memory, then I enter the zamani period . The chronological course of the world 'each year comes and goes, adding only adds to the past : to the time dimension of the past . Endlessness or "eternity" is something that lies only in the region of the past' (47) . Moreover, the zamani period is 'not extinct, but is a period full of activities and happenings . . .the "golden age" lies in the zamani and not in some infinite future' (48) . Certainly, the activities and happenings of the zamani are extremely important in traditional Bantu thought and practice . The zamani is the seat of the ancestors and exercises great control over the present : Bantu children still obtain leave from their boarding schools to return, for short periods, to their villages, because they are troubled by the ancestral spirits . The zamani is often invoked by the chief as a means of social control . On the other hand, even at this deeply religious level, the spirits of the zamani are called upon to protect, or even to interfere with the future, for example to protect crops and family, and even to restore life to a dying child . This surely indicates that although the primacy certainly belongs to the zamani, the future is not absent from the Bantu's time dimension even within this religious area . What is of interest here is the interaction of the religious world of ancestral expiation with the secular world of the material future, although it is an immediate
The Bantu concept of time
future only . This seems to indicate again that traditional African consciousness is both religious and secular . Joshua Kudadjie rejects Mbiti's contention that the African world is almost completely a religious world : it is both sacred and secular (49) . In this context too, Mbiti's research findings can be given a modified interpretation from that given by him .
CONCLUSION My motivation for writing this article is a shared feeling with Mbiti that African Christian theology should become a critical theology, and the African Christian Church a critical Church . If my interpretation of Mbiti's research is correct, then it is possible to discover a future dimension in Bantu time-consciousness within the three characteristics of Bantu time given by Mbiti . This future dimension, present in Bantu daily consciousness and in Bantu time as an ontological reality, would seem to make the task of constructing a critical theology more compatible with traditional time-consciousness, because it confirms rather than contradicts eschatological consciousness which is the basis of a critical theology . Moreover, the form of my argumentation should make less difficult the task of African theologians whose purpose is to incorporate the fundamental elements of traditional religion within Christian theology, because the natural primacy of the future in practical Bantu timeconsciousness would be a 'natural' foundation for Christian eschatology . If the future as I have described it is a major constituent of Bantu time-consciousness, then it has wide implications for our understanding of traditional religions, for our understanding of historical consciousness within Africa, for the relationship between economic base and ideological superstructure within traditional Africa ; more importantly, it has wide implications for the way in which we understand cross-cultural interaction, because if the future is the fundamental anthropological category which is subject simply to differing forms of conditioning, then what we at present, within the fields of anthropology and the study of religions, decipher as essential differences would, in fact, be only differences of degree . However, I am only pointing directions, not making analyses, and it could immediately be objected that both Mbiti and myself are making use of a form of Christian
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consciousness, which is itself conditioned, against which to measure Bantu time-consciousness . For this latter reason, I have confined myself within the limits of the interaction of Bantu time-consciousness with Christian eschatological consciousness, and leave to others the task of analysing any wider implications .
NOTES 1 J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, London 1969 ; 'The African Concept of Time', in Africa, Vol . 8, 1967 ; 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', in D . Barrett (ed .), African Initiatives in Religion, Nairobi 1971 . 2 J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 17 . 3 The phrase is taken from an article title : J . Parratt, Religion, Vol . 7, Autumn 1977 . 4 J . S . Nbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 18 . 5 J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 17 . 6 J . S . Mbiti, ibid . 7 J . S . Mbiti, ibid . 8 J . S . Nmiti, ibid . 9 J . S . Mbiti, ibid . 10 J . Parratt, op . cit ., p . 117 . 11 E . Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, The Hague 1964, p . 21 . 12 St Augustine, The Confessions of St Augustine, London 1961, p . 198 . 13 J . S . Mbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 17 . 14 J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., passim . 15 J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 21 . 16 J . Moltmann, Theology of Hope, London 1967, p . 16 . 17 J . B . Metz, Theology of the World, London 1966, p . 115 . 18 K . Rahner, Gegenwart des Christentums, Herder 1963, p . 9, 'Gott ist die absolute Zukunft' . 19 E . Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, passim . 20 J . S . Mbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 18 . 21 J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 19 . 22 G . E . R . Lloyd, 'Views on Time in Greek Thought', in P . Ricoeur (ed .), Cultures and Time, Paris 1976, p . 117 . 23 J . Barr, Biblical Words for Time, London 1962, passim .
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24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
32 33
34 35 36
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
J . S . Mbiti, 'New Testament Eschatology and the Akamba of Kenya', op . cit ., p . 19 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 17 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 21 . E . Bloch, A Philosophy of the Future, op . cit ., pp . 124-33 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 21 . See, for example, J . J . Williams, Hebrewisms of West West Africa, NewYork193 ; G . Parrinder, African Mythology, London 1967 ; R . F . Gray, The Sonjo of Tanganyika, London 1963 . R . F . Gray, op . cit ., passim . The Sonjo, a small tribe in northern Tanzania, expect a parousia . J . S . Mbiti, 'God, Dreams and African Militancy', in J . S . Pobee (ed .), Religion in a Pluralistic Society, p . 38 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 41 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy,, op . cit ., p . 262 . A . Kagame, 'The Empirical Apperception of Time and the Conception of History in Bantu Thought', in Cultures and Time, op . cit ., p . 99 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 19 . A . Kagame, op . cit ., p . 92 . E . Husserl, op . cit ., p . 21 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 19 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 20 . M .Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, London 1969 . J-P . Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, London 1975 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 19 . A . Kagame, op . cit ., p . 99 . J . S . Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, op . cit ., p . 23 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 21 . J . S . Mbiti, ibid ., p . 23 . J . Kudadjie, 'Does Religion Determine Morality in African Societies ', in Religion in a Pluralistic Society, op . cit ., pp . 60-77 .
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FRANCIS GILLIES is a Senior Lecturer in Education and Religious Studies at the College of St Mark & St John, Plymouth His doctoral thesis (University of Sussex) concerned, 'The Eschatological Structures of Christianity and Marxism' . At present he is on secondment to the department of education, University of Malawi . Dr F . Gillies, Department of Education, University of Malawi, PO Box 280, Zomba, Malawi (until July 1980) .