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The Bhopal gas tragedy—A perspective
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212 www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp
The Bhopal gas tragedy—A perspective R.K. Bisaryaa, Swaraj Purib,* a Ex-Mayor, Bhopal, MP, India Director General (Police), Bhopal, MP, India
b
Abstract We, the then Mayor and Chief of Police of Bhopal, were the two people on whom the responsibility of handling the world’s worst industrial disaster fell unceremoniously on the cold night of December 2–3, 1984 when 41 tons of MIC gas was released from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal. With the company initially in denial mode about the release and then calling it a ‘tear-gas’ type and providing no information on antidote, and with the limited means of evacuation, handling of medical emergency affecting hundreds of thousand, identification and disposal of the thousands of dead, it was probably the most challenging task faced by a duo in peace time. The local people, the medical community, the railway staff, the NGOs, were all very helpful. We narrate the happening and the handling of the consequences and the spot decisions that had to be made with the hope that no such accident happens anywhere. q 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Keywords: Bhopal gas tragedy; Handling of emergency; Union carbide response; Methyl isocyanate; MIC
1. Introduction As mankind has progressed and civilizations have advanced, growth in science and technology has improved our quality of life. In many countries including India, development has been tedious and painstaking. The gains of development are often lost when a disaster strikes, causing loss of lives, property and livelihood, leading to economic and social stresses. Disasters, whether natural or man-made, can strike at any time and at any place, but the Bhopal Gas Tragedy remains a catastrophe with no parallel. It is, till date, the worst industrial disaster in the history of mankind. The authors of this paper were actively involved in the management of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy in consonance with their responsibilities of the day. Dr Bisarya was the Mayor of Bhopal and Mr Swaraj Puri the Chief of Bhopal Police. The authors had to take many leadership decisions and related actions, at the spur of the moment, putting their own lives in grave danger. * Corresponding author. Tel.: C91 755 2443500/9826061016; fax: C91 755 2443501. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R.K. Bisarya), [email protected] (S. Puri).
0950-4230/$ - see front matter q 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2005.07.006
With their personal experience in perspective, the authors look at this disaster broadly under the following heads: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
What happened Personal experiences Lessons learned The future Conclusions
2. What happened What really happened that fateful night is an enigma and is a matter of many a debate. But the accepted fact is that in the early hours of December 3, 1984, an estimated 41 tons of deadly Methyl-Isocynate (MIC) Gas leaked out of tank No. 610C of the Union Carbide plant and escaped into the atmosphere. The immediate cause was the building up of pressure in the tank, due to an exothermic reaction caused by water in the tank. This pressure caused the safety valve to rupture and the gas to escape. Such leakage of gas into the atmosphere was a contingency for which the plant should have been prepared. This catastrophe happened because the essential safety systems either failed or were inoperable and the safety procedures were not strictly complied with. The Union Carbide plant was set up in 1968. It started the manufacture of ‘Carbaryl’, a pesticide, in 1979. MIC was
210
R.K. Bisarya, S. Puri / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212
an intermediate compound required for the manufacture of Carbaryl. However, the plant had no long-term permission for the storage of MIC. The safety record of the unit had suffered due to: 1. December 1981—a worker killed while handling phosgene. 2. February 1982—25 workers hospitalized following leaks in pipes carrying chlorine, MIC and hydrochloric acid. 3. December 1982—a massive leak of chlorine affecting 16 workers. Neighboring shanties of Jaiprakash Nagar affected. The issue of danger to Bhopal from this pesticide plant was raised in the Legislative Assembly of the State. An accident investigation committee examined the issue and concluded that the plant was safe and opined that there was no danger to Bhopal nor will there ever be! Mr J. Mukund, Union Carbide’s works manager exhibited a rather chilling overconfidence. He is believed to have expressed that the gas could not have leaked from his plant as the plant was shut down. Once the leak was confirmed, the Company’s Medical Officer opined that the gas was not fatal but was just a minor irritant. And yet people choked to death on the streets of Bhopal!
3. Personal experiences The personal experiences of Mr Swaraj Puri and Dr Bisarya are enumerated below.
Around 1.30 a.m. I started vomiting. I could see outside the green–yellow–greyish cloud of the gas like a column from the ground towards the sky. Suddenly in my mind flashed the thought of my two small children and my wife. To my utter dismay I found that the telephone at my residence was still dead. That is where my immediate efforts to search my family ended and I proceeded to deal with the more important job at my hand—the job of providing relief, comfort, care and solace to the effected citizens of Bhopal. As a Police Officer this has been the most challenging and difficult situation of my professional career. I could see how reason and logic crumble before panic and uncertainty. For the whole night I was trying to organize resources and facilities, to raise the confidence of the people and to minimize the loss of life. I was physically exhausted, emotionally disturbed, medically in a bad condition but my sense of duty plodded me on so that my team did not get demoralized. It was early in the morning of 3rd December the city of Bhopal seemed to have converted into a ‘Poisoned City’ with human beings and animals either lying dead or seeking medical relief. The entire city had been stunned into silence and despair. For us, in the administration, the major task seemed to be to organize medical relief, provide succor, and manage as quickly and amicably as possible the legal and other formalities. A colossal task under the circumstances. The number of dead bodies seemed to be endless. My mental determination kept me going and helped me in saving human lives. The crises continued. During this time, as a Police Officer, I had to arrest Warren Anderson, the Chief of Union Carbide. 3.2. Dr R.K. Bisarya
3.1. Mr Swaraj Puri I was posted as Superintendent of Police, i.e. the Police Chief of District of Bhopal at the time of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. I returned home around mid-night, on December 2/3, 1984. It was around 12.15 a.m. that I received the message from the Police Control Room that there was a leakage of some gas from the Union Carbide plant. I assumed that it was some leakage similar to what had happened earlier from this plant. I drove towards the Union Carbide plant. As I passed through adjoining areas like Kaichi Chola and Jay Prakash Nagar, I realized that the situation was much worse than I had expected. There was a choking sensation in my throat and burning in my eyes. I could see people running around in panic. I returned to the Police Control Room to monitor the situation. I put on alert the doctors, hospitals, and senior Government functionaries, the Fire Brigade and the Home Minister. My physical condition started deteriorating but at the same time my reason and conscience were telling me not to panic. By now it was amply clear that a toxic gas in large quantities was continuously leaking out from the Union Carbide factory.
As the Mayor of the City of Bhopal I had heard many of my acquaintances talk of the possibility of such a calamity. It was in the first week of December itself that we, as a political party, were preparing for the forthcoming elections to the Indian parliament. It was in this context that a meeting had been organized at my residence, when I heard of this tragedy. I immediately contacted my officers and put them on the task of providing help to the local administration. I contacted Dr Loya, the head of medical department of Union Carbide. He did not know any antidote. He said that the gas was a minor irritant. I visited the Hamedia Hospital along with the Minister of Health for the State of Madhya Pradesh and also visited the temporary morgue located there. I apprised the Chief Minister of the State about the extent of the tragedy. The tragedy caused panic in the city and many of my staff fell ill. We had to arrange staff from neighboring districts to handle the basic work of the corporation. As time passed by, the problem of disposal of the dead cattle loomed large. As the process of the disposal of the bodies, their identification and photography was going on, we had the ‘ambulance chasers’ descending on Bhopal from the US.
R.K. Bisarya, S. Puri / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212
The environment of the city of Bhopal was so badly damaged that the trees in the vicinity of the Union Carbide plant and on the path of the gas became totally leafless. The administration was aware that there was still residual MIC gas in the Union Carbide plant and that had to be neutralized, hence ‘Operation Faith’ was launched. 3.3. Operation faith This involved the disposing off of the left over MIC in the Union Carbide Plant. After consultations with scientists and experts of National and International repute, it was decided that the safest course would be to convert this MIC into the pesticide produced by Union Carbide. This process was code named ‘Operation Faith’ and was started on the morning of 16th December 1984. The most remarkable yet worrying factor during this operation was the fact that the Chief Political Executive of our state (Chief Minister) decided to and stayed within the Carbide plant till the entire process completed. To some it was politics, but to most of the citizens it was a confidence building effort. To us it was a cause of concern for the security of the Chief Minister. 3.4. Shortcomings One of the first things that struck us when the gas leak took place was our total lack of preparedness and ignorance about how to deal with such a situation. The immediate medical fraternity seemed unaware about the effects of the gas on humans and also the treatment. Since the experts considered the leaking gas as being of the cyanide family, sodium thiosulphate was administered as a probable antidote. Some other factors that seemed to be contributing to this catastrophe were: † The information about the storage and handling of hazardous and dangerous materials was not adequately available. † Effects of the gas on humans and the treatment were not known. † There was a lack of co-ordination between the factory management and the emergency services. † There was an inadequacy of warning systems and related mock drills for such contingencies. † Union Carbide probably had never anticipated the ‘worst case scenario’. † The plant maintenance practices seemed inadequate and inventory of vital spares had depleted. † The exodus of some of the experienced engineers and operating personnel from the plant had affected safety. † Economy measures, overriding safety concerns, implemented at the plant contributed to the disaster. Apart from these, we noticed some other difficulties, all inextricably linked to the developmental process in the country.
211
† Densely populated areas around the plant. † Absence of a proper road network. Rescue workers had to move on foot through densely populated areas. † Poor communications. † Lack of effective emergency medical facilities. † Inadequate transport for emergency evacuation. † People sleeping on pavements/railway platforms. † Unidentified dead bodies. Creating difficulties in identification of religion (Hindu/Muslim) and also creating medico-legal problems. † Along with humans a large number of animals, mostly cattle, perished in the disaster. Their disposal became a serious health problem. † Relief operations became difficult as the disaster caused enervation.
3.5. Successes Not every thing was a failure; the Police and the Medical Department with whatever meager resources at their disposal put up a tremendous immediate response. NGOs and social service organizations moved in immediately to help in the relief efforts. Local media was extremely helpful in scotching rumors and in disseminating essential information. International media cooperated. At the Bhopal Railway Station, the Station Master perished from the effects of the gas while alerting and regulating the movement of trains saving hundreds of lives. After all that we lived through we could easily conclude that psychological preparedness of the leaders, cooperation and team work by their fellowmen, material and technical support, participation of people and integration of efforts of all kinds could minimize the loss of life and property due to man made disasters, if not eliminate it completely. 3.6. It still lingers The harrowing experience of this tragedy shall never be over for the citizens of Bhopal. The uncertainties and insecurities that may be physical, emotional, medical or social are still writ large on the faces and livelihoods of the Bhopalis (residents of Bhopal). We can understand that merely reading and discussing about the continued suffering of these people may be one aspect of our social commitment, but the sufferings are manifold. The medical fraternity did not believe in chemical asthma, but after the tragedy they have started believing and realizing that chemicals can cause asthma. Similarly, nowhere else in the world are there more people with the disease called pulmonary fibrosis leading to pulmonary cripples. Thousands of Bhopalies have pulmonary fibrosis and live with capacity to just lie down. Young mothers even today are giving birth to still born or deformed fetuses, cancer cases are multiplying, mental retardation is getting more manifest,
212
R.K. Bisarya, S. Puri / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212
yet life in Bhopal goes on with the hope that some day they will live as normally as they would have—had December 1984 not happened.
4. The future The Administration and other essential services must know the location and exact nature of any hazardous chemicals that are stored by any industrial establishment. The procedure to be followed in case of exposure and the antidotal treatment should be known to the aforesaid. Adequate quantity of antidote should be available with the industry, which stores such hazardous chemical. † The people living in the vicinity should be made aware of: (i) The chemicals being stored. (ii) The likely symptoms and antidote. (iii) Emergency procedures, which should be rehearsed. (iv) Nearest medical facilities. (v) System of contacting the factory management. (vi) Sources of transportation/ambulances for emergency evacuation. (vii) How to treat patients suffering from exposure to these chemicals.
(viii) Make a chart of simple Dos and Don’ts in the event of a chemical disaster. † Rumors and unfounded fears should be countered by local Radio and TV. † NGOs and other Voluntary Organizations capable of providing help should be involved in the disaster management process and be listed and known to the administration as well as the residents of the vicinity. † Residents living in the vicinity should also train with the emergency services.
5. Conclusions Many years have since passed. Our world has faced various disasters like cyclones, earthquakes and lands slides, but the memories of Bhopal as a tragedy of unknown dimensions continues to linger on in our society. The growth of technology and skills may have improved our capacity to handle such disasters, but we still live in a state of uncertainty as there are no fool proof methods that have evolved to offset similar occurrences in the future. It is time we train our citizens and generate awareness amongst them about all disasters so that they know exactly what to do. Sharing of real life experiences and the lessons learnt should stand out as the principal mode of generating such awareness and thereby better preparedness.
The Bhopal gas tragedy—A perspective R.K. Bisaryaa, Swaraj Purib,* a Ex-Mayor, Bhopal, MP, India Director General (Police), Bhopal, MP, India
b
Abstract We, the then Mayor and Chief of Police of Bhopal, were the two people on whom the responsibility of handling the world’s worst industrial disaster fell unceremoniously on the cold night of December 2–3, 1984 when 41 tons of MIC gas was released from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal. With the company initially in denial mode about the release and then calling it a ‘tear-gas’ type and providing no information on antidote, and with the limited means of evacuation, handling of medical emergency affecting hundreds of thousand, identification and disposal of the thousands of dead, it was probably the most challenging task faced by a duo in peace time. The local people, the medical community, the railway staff, the NGOs, were all very helpful. We narrate the happening and the handling of the consequences and the spot decisions that had to be made with the hope that no such accident happens anywhere. q 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Keywords: Bhopal gas tragedy; Handling of emergency; Union carbide response; Methyl isocyanate; MIC
1. Introduction As mankind has progressed and civilizations have advanced, growth in science and technology has improved our quality of life. In many countries including India, development has been tedious and painstaking. The gains of development are often lost when a disaster strikes, causing loss of lives, property and livelihood, leading to economic and social stresses. Disasters, whether natural or man-made, can strike at any time and at any place, but the Bhopal Gas Tragedy remains a catastrophe with no parallel. It is, till date, the worst industrial disaster in the history of mankind. The authors of this paper were actively involved in the management of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy in consonance with their responsibilities of the day. Dr Bisarya was the Mayor of Bhopal and Mr Swaraj Puri the Chief of Bhopal Police. The authors had to take many leadership decisions and related actions, at the spur of the moment, putting their own lives in grave danger. * Corresponding author. Tel.: C91 755 2443500/9826061016; fax: C91 755 2443501. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R.K. Bisarya), [email protected] (S. Puri).
0950-4230/$ - see front matter q 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2005.07.006
With their personal experience in perspective, the authors look at this disaster broadly under the following heads: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
What happened Personal experiences Lessons learned The future Conclusions
2. What happened What really happened that fateful night is an enigma and is a matter of many a debate. But the accepted fact is that in the early hours of December 3, 1984, an estimated 41 tons of deadly Methyl-Isocynate (MIC) Gas leaked out of tank No. 610C of the Union Carbide plant and escaped into the atmosphere. The immediate cause was the building up of pressure in the tank, due to an exothermic reaction caused by water in the tank. This pressure caused the safety valve to rupture and the gas to escape. Such leakage of gas into the atmosphere was a contingency for which the plant should have been prepared. This catastrophe happened because the essential safety systems either failed or were inoperable and the safety procedures were not strictly complied with. The Union Carbide plant was set up in 1968. It started the manufacture of ‘Carbaryl’, a pesticide, in 1979. MIC was
210
R.K. Bisarya, S. Puri / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212
an intermediate compound required for the manufacture of Carbaryl. However, the plant had no long-term permission for the storage of MIC. The safety record of the unit had suffered due to: 1. December 1981—a worker killed while handling phosgene. 2. February 1982—25 workers hospitalized following leaks in pipes carrying chlorine, MIC and hydrochloric acid. 3. December 1982—a massive leak of chlorine affecting 16 workers. Neighboring shanties of Jaiprakash Nagar affected. The issue of danger to Bhopal from this pesticide plant was raised in the Legislative Assembly of the State. An accident investigation committee examined the issue and concluded that the plant was safe and opined that there was no danger to Bhopal nor will there ever be! Mr J. Mukund, Union Carbide’s works manager exhibited a rather chilling overconfidence. He is believed to have expressed that the gas could not have leaked from his plant as the plant was shut down. Once the leak was confirmed, the Company’s Medical Officer opined that the gas was not fatal but was just a minor irritant. And yet people choked to death on the streets of Bhopal!
3. Personal experiences The personal experiences of Mr Swaraj Puri and Dr Bisarya are enumerated below.
Around 1.30 a.m. I started vomiting. I could see outside the green–yellow–greyish cloud of the gas like a column from the ground towards the sky. Suddenly in my mind flashed the thought of my two small children and my wife. To my utter dismay I found that the telephone at my residence was still dead. That is where my immediate efforts to search my family ended and I proceeded to deal with the more important job at my hand—the job of providing relief, comfort, care and solace to the effected citizens of Bhopal. As a Police Officer this has been the most challenging and difficult situation of my professional career. I could see how reason and logic crumble before panic and uncertainty. For the whole night I was trying to organize resources and facilities, to raise the confidence of the people and to minimize the loss of life. I was physically exhausted, emotionally disturbed, medically in a bad condition but my sense of duty plodded me on so that my team did not get demoralized. It was early in the morning of 3rd December the city of Bhopal seemed to have converted into a ‘Poisoned City’ with human beings and animals either lying dead or seeking medical relief. The entire city had been stunned into silence and despair. For us, in the administration, the major task seemed to be to organize medical relief, provide succor, and manage as quickly and amicably as possible the legal and other formalities. A colossal task under the circumstances. The number of dead bodies seemed to be endless. My mental determination kept me going and helped me in saving human lives. The crises continued. During this time, as a Police Officer, I had to arrest Warren Anderson, the Chief of Union Carbide. 3.2. Dr R.K. Bisarya
3.1. Mr Swaraj Puri I was posted as Superintendent of Police, i.e. the Police Chief of District of Bhopal at the time of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy. I returned home around mid-night, on December 2/3, 1984. It was around 12.15 a.m. that I received the message from the Police Control Room that there was a leakage of some gas from the Union Carbide plant. I assumed that it was some leakage similar to what had happened earlier from this plant. I drove towards the Union Carbide plant. As I passed through adjoining areas like Kaichi Chola and Jay Prakash Nagar, I realized that the situation was much worse than I had expected. There was a choking sensation in my throat and burning in my eyes. I could see people running around in panic. I returned to the Police Control Room to monitor the situation. I put on alert the doctors, hospitals, and senior Government functionaries, the Fire Brigade and the Home Minister. My physical condition started deteriorating but at the same time my reason and conscience were telling me not to panic. By now it was amply clear that a toxic gas in large quantities was continuously leaking out from the Union Carbide factory.
As the Mayor of the City of Bhopal I had heard many of my acquaintances talk of the possibility of such a calamity. It was in the first week of December itself that we, as a political party, were preparing for the forthcoming elections to the Indian parliament. It was in this context that a meeting had been organized at my residence, when I heard of this tragedy. I immediately contacted my officers and put them on the task of providing help to the local administration. I contacted Dr Loya, the head of medical department of Union Carbide. He did not know any antidote. He said that the gas was a minor irritant. I visited the Hamedia Hospital along with the Minister of Health for the State of Madhya Pradesh and also visited the temporary morgue located there. I apprised the Chief Minister of the State about the extent of the tragedy. The tragedy caused panic in the city and many of my staff fell ill. We had to arrange staff from neighboring districts to handle the basic work of the corporation. As time passed by, the problem of disposal of the dead cattle loomed large. As the process of the disposal of the bodies, their identification and photography was going on, we had the ‘ambulance chasers’ descending on Bhopal from the US.
R.K. Bisarya, S. Puri / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212
The environment of the city of Bhopal was so badly damaged that the trees in the vicinity of the Union Carbide plant and on the path of the gas became totally leafless. The administration was aware that there was still residual MIC gas in the Union Carbide plant and that had to be neutralized, hence ‘Operation Faith’ was launched. 3.3. Operation faith This involved the disposing off of the left over MIC in the Union Carbide Plant. After consultations with scientists and experts of National and International repute, it was decided that the safest course would be to convert this MIC into the pesticide produced by Union Carbide. This process was code named ‘Operation Faith’ and was started on the morning of 16th December 1984. The most remarkable yet worrying factor during this operation was the fact that the Chief Political Executive of our state (Chief Minister) decided to and stayed within the Carbide plant till the entire process completed. To some it was politics, but to most of the citizens it was a confidence building effort. To us it was a cause of concern for the security of the Chief Minister. 3.4. Shortcomings One of the first things that struck us when the gas leak took place was our total lack of preparedness and ignorance about how to deal with such a situation. The immediate medical fraternity seemed unaware about the effects of the gas on humans and also the treatment. Since the experts considered the leaking gas as being of the cyanide family, sodium thiosulphate was administered as a probable antidote. Some other factors that seemed to be contributing to this catastrophe were: † The information about the storage and handling of hazardous and dangerous materials was not adequately available. † Effects of the gas on humans and the treatment were not known. † There was a lack of co-ordination between the factory management and the emergency services. † There was an inadequacy of warning systems and related mock drills for such contingencies. † Union Carbide probably had never anticipated the ‘worst case scenario’. † The plant maintenance practices seemed inadequate and inventory of vital spares had depleted. † The exodus of some of the experienced engineers and operating personnel from the plant had affected safety. † Economy measures, overriding safety concerns, implemented at the plant contributed to the disaster. Apart from these, we noticed some other difficulties, all inextricably linked to the developmental process in the country.
211
† Densely populated areas around the plant. † Absence of a proper road network. Rescue workers had to move on foot through densely populated areas. † Poor communications. † Lack of effective emergency medical facilities. † Inadequate transport for emergency evacuation. † People sleeping on pavements/railway platforms. † Unidentified dead bodies. Creating difficulties in identification of religion (Hindu/Muslim) and also creating medico-legal problems. † Along with humans a large number of animals, mostly cattle, perished in the disaster. Their disposal became a serious health problem. † Relief operations became difficult as the disaster caused enervation.
3.5. Successes Not every thing was a failure; the Police and the Medical Department with whatever meager resources at their disposal put up a tremendous immediate response. NGOs and social service organizations moved in immediately to help in the relief efforts. Local media was extremely helpful in scotching rumors and in disseminating essential information. International media cooperated. At the Bhopal Railway Station, the Station Master perished from the effects of the gas while alerting and regulating the movement of trains saving hundreds of lives. After all that we lived through we could easily conclude that psychological preparedness of the leaders, cooperation and team work by their fellowmen, material and technical support, participation of people and integration of efforts of all kinds could minimize the loss of life and property due to man made disasters, if not eliminate it completely. 3.6. It still lingers The harrowing experience of this tragedy shall never be over for the citizens of Bhopal. The uncertainties and insecurities that may be physical, emotional, medical or social are still writ large on the faces and livelihoods of the Bhopalis (residents of Bhopal). We can understand that merely reading and discussing about the continued suffering of these people may be one aspect of our social commitment, but the sufferings are manifold. The medical fraternity did not believe in chemical asthma, but after the tragedy they have started believing and realizing that chemicals can cause asthma. Similarly, nowhere else in the world are there more people with the disease called pulmonary fibrosis leading to pulmonary cripples. Thousands of Bhopalies have pulmonary fibrosis and live with capacity to just lie down. Young mothers even today are giving birth to still born or deformed fetuses, cancer cases are multiplying, mental retardation is getting more manifest,
212
R.K. Bisarya, S. Puri / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 18 (2005) 209–212
yet life in Bhopal goes on with the hope that some day they will live as normally as they would have—had December 1984 not happened.
4. The future The Administration and other essential services must know the location and exact nature of any hazardous chemicals that are stored by any industrial establishment. The procedure to be followed in case of exposure and the antidotal treatment should be known to the aforesaid. Adequate quantity of antidote should be available with the industry, which stores such hazardous chemical. † The people living in the vicinity should be made aware of: (i) The chemicals being stored. (ii) The likely symptoms and antidote. (iii) Emergency procedures, which should be rehearsed. (iv) Nearest medical facilities. (v) System of contacting the factory management. (vi) Sources of transportation/ambulances for emergency evacuation. (vii) How to treat patients suffering from exposure to these chemicals.
(viii) Make a chart of simple Dos and Don’ts in the event of a chemical disaster. † Rumors and unfounded fears should be countered by local Radio and TV. † NGOs and other Voluntary Organizations capable of providing help should be involved in the disaster management process and be listed and known to the administration as well as the residents of the vicinity. † Residents living in the vicinity should also train with the emergency services.
5. Conclusions Many years have since passed. Our world has faced various disasters like cyclones, earthquakes and lands slides, but the memories of Bhopal as a tragedy of unknown dimensions continues to linger on in our society. The growth of technology and skills may have improved our capacity to handle such disasters, but we still live in a state of uncertainty as there are no fool proof methods that have evolved to offset similar occurrences in the future. It is time we train our citizens and generate awareness amongst them about all disasters so that they know exactly what to do. Sharing of real life experiences and the lessons learnt should stand out as the principal mode of generating such awareness and thereby better preparedness.