The changing character of European communism

Book Reviews KENNETH

T.

JOWITT

The Changing Character of European Communism The purpose of this volume1 is "to assemble the elements of a forecast on the future of Communism in Europe," " . . . to prepare an estimate of future developments so that provision can be made for their likely consequences" (p. 12). However, any estimate of the future is greatly shaped by the conception of what factors have brought about the present state of affairs and by the analytical definition of the range of future alternatives. The way in which these two considerations are handled can make the difference between forecast and predetermination. Western Europe

Kevin Devlin's reading of the future development of communism in Western Europe is more an example of predetermining than forecasting. Devlin's argument is analytically sparse. He suggests that the year 1956 brought a crisis of authority into the communist movement which stimulated "some revisionist rethinking." " . . . the fact was that the old levers of organizational control had gone; it was therefore inevitable that the minor parties in Western Europe and elsewhere should increasingly give primacy to their own interests, adapting themselves more fully and flexibly to local conditions." The Sino-Soviet conflict "accelerated these already inevitable processes of revisionist change" (p. 26). An obvious question arises about the nature of this inevitability. In Devlin's opinion this inevitability stems from the environmental reality of Western Europe, a reality comprised of peace and prosperity. In his view Western Europe is beyond ideology at the present time, and his implicit projection is that it will remain in that condition. It is hard to believe that "end of ideology" notions stated in this form can still be seriously argued. La Palombara's point that ideology may be redefined rather than ended, Lijphart's analysis of the real cleavages which exist in "fragmented" France and Italy as well as"consociational" Austria, Holland and Belgium, and Almond and Verba's data on the instrumental attachment of West Germans to their government, all cast doubt on the assumption that there is an environmental reality 1The Future of Communism In Europe, The Franklin Memorial Lectures, Vol. XVII. Compiled and edited by R. V. Burks (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968, 283 pp.)

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which West European communist parties face or that this reality is "beyond ideology" and not likely to change3 Given the "reality" to which West European communist parties must adapt, one legitimate question for the analyst is the character of that adaptation, i.e., what types of adaptation are likely to occur. Devlin's conceptualization of the alternative patterns of adaptation is unnecessarily restrictive in that it recognizes only one response as adaptive: communist parties are either revolutionary (which means utopian and oriented toward conspiratorial violence as well as "certain eschatological absolutes") or pragmatically opportunistic (pp. ~3, 46, 62). These are not ideal types but caricatures. Communists are categorized as either political fanatics or muddling through, log-rolling gradualists. If they do not become the latter--a political identity which is seen as congruent with the "environmental reality"--then they are to be cast aside by the "tide of history" (p. 65) or at least its West European "wave". That there is some basic incompatibility between the notions of ideologically and pragmatically ruled parties is, of course, a fashionable assumption in American social science today? I would argue that it is generally a misleading conceptual dichotomy; too often (though not necessarily) it facilitates the introduction of one's own political preferences and prematurely forecloses an appreciation of the diversity which exists and which may develop, in this case, in West European communism. A more useful distinction would differentiate between parties that emulate the policies and stances of others and those which create their own character and initiate their own policies. This sort of conceptualization steers one away from considering parties such as the French Communist Party as having been "revolutionary" during the fifties and "pragmatic" today. The concepts of emulation and initiation also allow for a greater number of alternative developments. Parties that reject the emulative pattern may become pragmatically opportunistic, but may also initiate a political redefinition which involves a new synthesis of radical and reformist elements. Devlin's conceptualization denies the potential variety of future developments. Communist parties in Western Europe must either adapt or be swept into irrelevance, and if it is to be politically successful, adaptation can only move toward pragmatic opportunism; the choices are either/or. The "road of revisionist adaptation to local realities" involves "shifting emphasis from the dream of revolution to the pragmatic compromises of political pluralism, from solidarity with the Soviet Union to a more convincing commitment to national interests" SJoseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," The American Political Science Review. LX, 1 (March 1966), pp. 5-16; Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, n (April 1968), pp. 3--44; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, 1963), pp. 428-29. ISee Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966), introductory article.

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(pp. 45, 46). Devlin does not allow for fresh alternatives in the nature of solidarity with the Soviet Union or for the possibility of a convincing commitment to national interests combined with a radical if not always revolutionary stance. For Devlin, pragmatic opportunism also seems to be the measure for gauging the "progress" of the West European communist parties. Thus, although the French party is emerging from its ideological sclerosis, in 1965 it was "still far from the eclectic freedom of contemporary Swedish Communism" (p. 38). One might well ask if the French party will copy the Swedish model and then seriously ponder whether it ever could or should. Devlin's analysis runs the risk of Zhdanovism in reverse in which the good world is comprised of a basically homogeneous set of social democrats who are pragmatic opportunists. 4 Another demonstration of the rather circumscribed set of alternatives that are built into Devlin's forecast has to do with the impact of conflict on the development of the West European communist parties. Conflict is a natural condition for political organizations and may create crisis and/or opportunity. However, for Devlin conflict results in crisis, i.e., in ideological erosion and political concessions by the communists. I am not denying that such a development may be the principal result of the political adjustment of the West European parties but I do not see any justification for assuming that this has to be the only outcome (apart from the parties' being swept away by the "tide of history"). Another example of the restrictiveness of Devlin's analysis may be found in his remarks about the French party. Whatever that organization does, it always receives a negative mark from Devlin; he states that "a polarization of political forces has made it the largest, but not necessarily the dominant component of a left-wing alliance" (p. 62). However, couldn't one say with equal justice that while the French Communist Party is not the dominant component of the left-wing alliance, it is the largest component? Stated in this way, would that not be a significant piece of information? Similarly, he says that "not to be overlooked are the doctrinal and political concessions it has had to make to reach that position" (p. 62). But the question is whether those changes are concessions leading to erosion, or redefinitions of the Party's stance and character which might enable it to increase its political role as a radical organization. After all, as Devlin himself notes, as many as forty percent of those questioned now favor communist participation in the government, forty-two percent now see the role of the French Communist Party since the liberation as having ~ o n v e r s e l y , there is little evidence that Devlin appreciates diversity within the Soviet bloc. At one point he notes that there is "the Communist viewpoint" on the question of American military presence ~n Europe and on the desirability of"leaving the Soviet Union as the dominant power on the continent." I doubt that the Rumanian, Czechoslovak Yugoslav (or Italian) parties find themselves in the same position on this issue as the Bu garian, Polish, East German or Soviet party.

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been "rather useful," and forty-four percent see a gain for the communists in the coming decade, while only sixteen percent see them losing ground (p. 40). As he mentions, no other party scored so well on this set of questions. Again, while it is undoubtedly true that the French party will have to make concessions to continue or create an alliance of the left, so will the other partners to this alliance. As for ideological erosion, when Devlin notes that "the process of adaptation brings with it an erosion of ideological and political position," one of his main examples refers to the loosening of discipline within parties and the new freedom of debate and dissent. Again his alternatives are too limited. Increased debate and dissent may result in erosion and political incoherence, or they may result in and possibly reflect a new political/ideological synthesis which is different from the emulative stance of the past and the pragmatic opportunism which is supposedly demanded by the "environmental reality." A major analytic task is to ascertain what factors are playing a role in shaping the outcomes of the change already initiated, i.e., are communist elites in power more likely to avoid the danger of erosion and more capable of and likely to effect a new, and viable political-ideological synthesis than those which are in opposition? Can elites which are out of power do this? Which ones and how? A major reason for Devlin's narrowing of the alternative outcomes, or in Burks' words "future developments," is his mistaken identification of political interests with opportunism: "What is important and encouraging, it seems, is that both the Eastern regimes and the Western Communist parties are now operating primarily on the level of political interests, not on that of revolutionary teleology" (p. 68). An appreciation of political interests by a communist party need not necessarily be founded on purely instrumental concerns. Rather, it may be based on an elite's concern with the party's political and ideological character, the type of leadership it offers, the situational relevance of its ideology, and the degree and nature of the reciprocity existing between the elite and the rank and file of the party. For Devlin, however, a concern with political interests is always instrumental. Thus, Carl Hermansson, who has contributed to "the growing esteem the party enjoys among the non-Communist left-wing public, particularly students . . . . " (p. 31) is seen as an opportunistically revisionist leader (p. 33). What does opportunism mean here? Does it mean that Hermansson is simply concerned with votes and electoral strength? It seems to me that Hermansson is basically concerned with redefining the character of the Swedish party; this is both a goal in itself and an effort to increase the party's electoral strength, stature, relations with the population and legitimacy as a national party. As with the Swedish party, Devlin views the increasingly autonomous

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and initiating posture of the French party entirely in terms of expediency. The French party is believed to be engaged in a "general process of revisionist image-building." However, the burden of this argument is that developing a new image is something that "environmental reality" has forced on the French party. There is little examination of the role that choice or political considerations other than immediate electoral gains have played in the party's "new-found commitment to political pluralism." The stress on the instrumental character of the political change which has occurred within West European communism comes out again when Devlin notes that the criticism of the Soviet Union's behavior by the West European parties "generally" occurs at times "when the attention of Western public opinion has been drawn to it" (p. 54), and when such behavior threatens the new public images of the West European parties. One might suggest that their criticism of the Soviet Union reflects considerations of value and policy as well as those of mere utility and expedience. Certainly the criticism which the Italian party directs against the Soviet Union concerns general considerations of communist unity and the character of party leadership, as well as the party's disapproval of specific actions by the Soviet elite. It is to be regretted that Devlin did not address himself to an analysis of those conditions that help to decide whether a party's reorientation will result primarily in refurbishing its image or in the institutionalization or re-institutionalization of the party's character. In attempting to forecast the future development of West European communism it is not only necessary to recognize the current limits on the strength of these parties but also to appreciate that strength and its distinctive character in countries like Italy, Sweden, France, and Finland. It is equally important to understand that future developments will emerge from the interaction of a changing (rather than static) European environment--an environment that in Devlin's words is currently attracted to national-leftist tendencies--with a changing universe of communist parties. The outcomes of this interaction may be revolutionary fanaticism or pragmatic opportunism, but they may also be new political, ideological, and organizational amalgams, some of which will be more incoherent, more eclectic, more opportunistic, or more capable of synthesis than others. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union In his analysis of Yugoslavia, Michael Petrovich explicitly addresses himself to a question which is topically relevant and very interesting analytically: "To what degree is Yugoslavia offering an effective answer to an important question in the twentieth century; namely, can a society be both collectivist and democratic?" (p. 74). Petrovich argues that "Yugoslavia's importance today lies not so much in the schism which led to polycentrism as it does in the changes which took place

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in Yugoslavia as a result of the schism" (p. 72). In relating these changes to the schism, it is unfortunate that Petrovich does not ask a set of more general and basic questions that would give us a fuller understanding of the relationship between a schism with the Soviet Union and the adoption of a separate national course. For instance, if opting for political autonomy always results in a national course for the "dissenting party," what factors are influential in shaping the distinctive character of that course, what conditions have to be met by the individual party to avoid military confrontation with the Soviet Union, what factors operate to determine the period of time which it takes an autonomously inclined party to realize the impossibility of healing the schism, what factors shape the decision to incur the costs involved in "breaking" with the Soviet Union? Questions of this kind must be asked in order to take analytic advantage of the relevance of the Yugoslav experience for future developments within Eastern Europe. Although Petrovich does not do this, he does analyze the Yugoslav case with profound insight. In discussing the opposition of conservative and liberal elements, he shows that each tendency or faction bases its policy preferences on a combination of ideal and material considerations. For Petrovich the "conservatives" are not "simply fearful for their own native regions; rather they may be presumed to have genuine fears and doubts concerning not only the ideological or political premises but also the economic premises of the reform" (p. 92). The "liberals" are not simply "narrow provincialists but internationalminded men who realize that one of the main purposes of the reform is to integrate Yugoslavia more fully into the world economy" (pp. 91, 92). In short, Petrovich appreciates the fact that the premises behind the decisions and preferences of opposing factions are not simply subservient to considerations of expediency and power. Another example of Petrovich's analytic sophistication is his observation that the Yugoslav elite is faced with an acute dilemma. Yugoslavia, he notes, "must integrate itself with this modern world on whose techniques and markets it depends yet without losing its features as an independent nation and a Socialist society. There is the problem" (p. 81). He recognizes that although this dilemma presents the Yugoslav elite with a basic problem concerning the political character of the party, regime, and national community, it does not necessarily limit the elite's alternatives to either ideological erosion and political concessions, or to a two-party social democracy. Rather, Petrovich has framed his analysis by describing the components of this problem as it exists in Yugoslavia. He is fully aware of the Yugoslav elite's multiple concerns, e.g., with economic performance but also with sovereignty, with the party's role but also with its character, with the viability of the socio-economic system but also with its intellectual as well as material base. Petrovich's analysis would be more useful still if he had

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attempted to define more specifically what alternative courses are open to the Yugoslav elite. Arnold Horelick's analysis of the Soviet Union is also based on a formula which does not predetermine or unnecessarily limit his options. "In the postrevolutionary phase in which the USSR now finds itself". he writes, "the tensions between the totalitarian, modernizing, and millennialist impulses of Soviet Communism are stronger than their mutually supportive force" (p. 151). One can easily relate this problem to the current structure and operating style of the Soviet leadership. Horelick does so by noting that "the Soviet leadership's failure or incapacity to make authoritative decisions about basic priorities comes at a time when the necessity to make such choices is particularly acute" (p. 151). It is possible to argue that this "incapacity" is directly related to the antagonistic conflict among the impulses noted by Horelick. It is a conflict based on the social, political and economic consequences --intended and unintended--of the policies and orientation of the Soviet elite, and it is expressed organizationally in the structural and personal fragmentation of power within the Soviet elite. More specifically, in examining that group's capacity for leadership, one must recognize that "an oligarchy such as the one that now rules the Soviet Union must necessarily make compromises on major decisions that vitally affect the interests of its members and of the bureaucratic hierarchies they lead" (p. 166). One must also appreciate that oligarchical leadership should n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be equated with indecisive, paralyzed leadership. For example, in the Soviet case Lowenthal has perceptively argued that oligarchical leadership has not demonstrated "indecision and paralysis, but moderate, if still insecure progress. ''5 Nevertheless, in order to forecast developments in the Soviet Union and other Leninist regimes, we must look for analytically more refined categories to help us to form an estimate of the capabilities and limitations of collegiate rule.S Horelick specifies three models of the Soviet system; totalitarian, industrial, and millennialist-ideological, and he correctly points out that the model one employs (and at times "believes in") tends to "determine which new.information pertaining to the Soviet Union men attend to, and how hypotheses explaining this new information are formed and incorporated into the larger set of interrelated hypotheses that is the model of the system" (p. 149). However, it is fascinating that while the first two models belong to Western analysts, Horelick describes the third as the Soviet elite's own conception of the Soviet system, that of a "society building communism." One serious problem 'Richara Lowenthal."TheSovietUnionin the Post-RevolutlonaryEra; An Overview"in Alexander DallinandThomasB.Larson(eds.),Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J. :PrenticeHall, 1968), p. 10. IFor analysesof collegiateleadershipsee Max Weber'scommentsin The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (NewYork, 1947),pp. 392-407:and The Study of Coalitions (Holt,Rinehart Winston),editedby MichaelLeiserson,to be publishedin 1970.

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for Western analysts is their lack of a model which appreciates the community-building element in Leninist ideology and behavior. I would not suggest that we uncritically adopt this Soviet emphasis, but it is an unnecessary and unwise sacrifice to limit this type of model to Soviet hands, and to write it off as a model of the "millennialist ideology." Horelick notes that "perhaps Western scholars can no longer agree on an appropriate model of the Soviet system because the Soviet leaders themselves can no longer agree on one" (p. 151). This may be true; however, there is also another explanation. It may be that both the Soviet elite and Western political analysts are comfortable only with high-certainty models. They seem reluctant to adopt models which incorporate conflicts and contradictions as integral components of the model. What is perhaps most unfortunate is that in so many important cases the political insight, flexibility, and imagination of the men studied, e.g., Tito, Dubcek, Ceausescu, often exceed the analytic insight, flexibility, and imagination of those who study them. Another important feature of Horelick's treatment of the Soviet Union is his careful avoidance of any determinism by hindsight; a clear example is his appreciation of the fact that "the ultimate victory of the party machine in the struggle for institutional supremacy was by no means assured" (p. 154). Avoiding the temptation to endow the party with mystical powers, and fully recognizing both its critical functions and the value the Soviet elite places on them, Horelick is able to point to the potentially critical role which the state (not the economic) bureaucracy might play if some segment of the elite decided to circumvent the party machine. Here again is an area which is for the most part analytically barren: under what circumstances might the state bureaucracy increase its role? More specifically, what types of party leaders are likely to place more emphasis on the state as opposed to the party apparatus, and for what reasons ? Are they guided by considerations of power, considerations of efficiency, considerations related to the attempt to increase the level and equality of integration between elite and public? Horelick refuses to categorize in an either/or fashion. Thus, in his discussion of Khrushchev, he notes that Khrushchev was "certainly... production-oriented, though hardly technocratic. And he was ideologically goal-oriented, even if his Communist millennium looked very much like a slightly updated version of Lenin's GOELRO formula" (p. 164) (my italics). This type of analysis does full justice to the existence of distinct stances. Khrushchev's orientation toward production is not confused with a "technocratic orientation"; similarly, Khrushchev's ideological redefinitions are not automatically seen as a de-radicalization or moves toward pragmatism. However, sometimes Horelick is insufficiently aware of complexity--

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complexity of the concepts he uses and of the political outcomes which are possible in the Soviet Union. First, there is the argument that "if the process of rationalization [economic] is not arbitrarily cut off at some point it must inevitably impinge on the realm of political values" (p. 170). This is followed by the argument that in view of Soviet reformers such as A. Birman, the remedy for arbitrariness is, in Horelick's words, "inevitably political and pluralist in nature" (p. 170). However, the argument that major economic reforms impinge on political values is a truism applicable to all types of political systems. To argue that the logic of rationalization leads to pluralism is to say too little if pluralism simply refers to an increasing differentiation of the system, too much if pluralism means democratic pluralism, and/or not enough if it is legitimate to consider an oligarchy (as Horelick correctly defines the Soviet elite) as a pluralist elite. Pluralism is, at best, a term that demands some specification. Horelick argues that: "if in the coming years there is to be a fundamental change in the Soviet political system in the direction of pluralism, it will be the unintended consequence of a series of decisions taken by the Soviet leaders for other reasons" (p. 176). Again, if by pluralism Horelick means a multiparty system with relatively autonomous interest groups, his argument is in certain respects well founded. However, even if there is a fundamental change toward democratic pluralism, I think it important to allow for the appearance of a new amalgam of Leninist and democratic components rather than a simple approximation to a Western type of pluralism (which by no means provides a clear-cut model since it ranges from hierarchical Britain, through cleavage-ridden France and Italy, to America with its stress on egalitarianism). Furthermore, we should expect that if this amalgam becomes a reality (as it did in Czechoslovakia), it will be the upshot both of the unintended consequences of decisions taken with different aims in mind and of purposive leadership. Only if one posits some notion of Western pluralism can one make the argument that unintended consequences may play the primary role. If one allows for the possibility of a future development within the Soviet Union (or elsewhere in the bloc) involving a new mixture of democratic and Leninist components, the role of purposive leadership (such as has been provided by Dubcek, Tito, and Ceausescu) must be weighted significantly. The rather restricted view which occasionally enters Horelick's analysis is also apparent in this statement: "The dilemma facing the Soviet leaders is that new efforts to secure large improvements in the performance of the system compel them to choose from among alternatives that lie closer and closer to the system's political and ideological outer limits" (p. 177). " . . . Thus, any substantial political transformation of the Soviet system that may occur in the coming years will

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be the consequence of a series of boundary redefinitions by reformminded leaders, imperceptibly changing the shape and character of the system while all the time ostensibly 'building Communism' in accordance with new conditions" (19. 177). Such a process and scenario are, of course, possible and even probable. However, their probability depends on a number of factors remaining constant such as the type of leadership, the distribution of power, the character of demands presented by sub-elites or even a mass public, the international environment, bloc developments, and economic performance. If the probability of alternative developments cannot be quantitatively predicted, it can at least be spelled out, taken into consideration, and an attempt made to ascertain what conditions are likely to favor one alternative over another. Thus, I feel it is quite possible that the "substantial political transformation of the Soviet s y s t e m . . , in coming years" will be the result of a rather deliberate, purposive, and (at least in terms of aspiration) comprehensive redefinition of the party's character and role by some section of the party elite itself. Whether this possibility becomes reality and to what extent depends, among other things, on the degree to which sections of the elite are successful in re-drawing (rather than simply eroding) the "outer limits." However, the existence of such a capacity should not be automatically dismissed, especially when we have such examples before us as Khrushchev, Dubcek, Tito, Mat, and Ceausescu. To argue that these leaders have been only partly successful in imparting a new character to their political systems and communities, or to argue that they have conceived of their tasks in a different light, is simply to say that all change is partial 7 and that all change and visions of change tend to favor specific sets of policy to the exclusion of others. If, then, we attempt to answer the question of how the Soviet system will change, and if we base this question on some notion of the static character of the Soviet Union's political and ideological "outer limits," we may be misled into neglecting the role which purposive leadership may play. We may also fail to "foresee" or appreciate the possibility of decisions aimed at creating a political/ideological synthesis (within the Soviet Union) which is neither social-democratic, nor liberaldemocratic, nor Stalinist (which of course is not to suggest that supporters of such a synthesis will necessarily succeed) but pursues alternate courses.

The Economy The issue of economic reform is a concrete component in any attempt to forecast the future of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; indeed, it is within the context of such reform that a 'For an elaboration of the point that all development is partial see Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, 1964), pp. 1-33.

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good deal of the interest in forecasting has arisen. Gregory Grossman provides a well stated analysis of the similarities and contrasts which exist among the various reforms instituted in the area; however, his comments on the sources of reform, the dilemmas of reform, and the philosophical implications of reform are of even greater interest. As for the source of reform, Grossman suggests that "the movement for reform . . . first of all, derives from the system's persistent and ever growing defects" (p. 111), but that the "case for or against economic reforms does not rest on economic grounds alone" (p. 112); rather it is influenced by political and moral aspirations and, perhaps most important of all, by political shocks. I am not sure if my subsequent suggestion is in disagreement with Grossman's analysis or simply a different way of formulating his point. The question is not whether economic reform involves the "interplay of economics and politics," but rather the character of that interplay. In defining the interplay and relating it to the question of political change, the argument can be made that the "system's persistent and ever growing [economic] defects" provide the setting within which political and system-wide change may occur. If that is the case, the problem is to ascertain when persistent and growing economic defects become associated with the appearance of significant political change. At least three hypotheses concerning the interplay of economics and political change can be suggested: (a) that without serious economic problems, an appropriate setting for political change is absent, (b) that the presence of persistent and growing economic defects provides the opportunity for elements within the party to question and challenge the way in which the party's political character, leadership, and approach to its national constituency are defined, and (c) that it is the elite's concern with the definition of political life which is the direct and active agent of significant change in all domains, including the economic. As for the dilemma of reform, Grossman's argument is widely accepted. Reform of the economic mechanism may well be so improved as "to eliminate in large measure the very defects on which the party's role rests" (p. 133). "Ila large measure" is the critical term here. However, one can argue that the party performs a number of crucial functions which do not rest on the current defects of the economic mechanism. The party is a general information mechanism, an agent of political mobilization and integration, a check on the implementation of state decisions, and above all the policy coordinator at all levels and with respect to all domains (not simply the economic). However, Grossman frames the dilemma openly, noting the possibility of a reluctant but nevertheless decisive and (possibly successful?) redefinition of the party's relation to the economy d la Yugoslavia. One of the most incisive sections of Grossman's essay deals with the

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philosophical implications of reform. He characterizes the philosophic concept which supports the "edifice of central planning, the command economy, and social mobilization" as that of a solidary society. In other words, Soviet ideology sees the whole of Soviet society as "essentially a solidary unit, motivated by a common set of values, striving toward a single general g o a l . . , and a single set of intermediate objectives, devoid of inner conflict and cross-purposes, and led by a single political party" (p. 122). In many respects this notion of a "solidary society" resembles Kassof's "administered society" and Rigby's "organizational society." However, Grossman's discussion of the individual citizen's place in such a society is a significant addition to this conceptual area, particularly his discussion of the contradiction between the ideological conception of the citizen's role and the character of economic incentives employed by the Soviet elite. Nevertheless, it is one thing to accept the value of this concept and another to agree with Grossman's conclusion about how economic reform and the Soviet elite's idea of solidarity relate to each other. "The reformist position," he writes, "is therefore, first and foremost, a radically revised philosophical conception of society: a denial (though not always explicit) of the solidary conception, a rejection of the mysticism implicit in it, an open recognition of the existence of particular interests that diverge from those of the collectivity and, in its programmatic aspects, a concerted attempt to restructure economic institutions so as to harness particular interests to the good of society" (pp. 124, 125). May be so, but Grossman's conception of a "solidary society" demands refinement if it is to realize its analytic promise. As it stands, it covers too much. For example, an argument could be made that American liberal ideology tends to view American society as one built on a concept of solidarity,s The notion of the "Great Society" is merely the latest expression of an image of society based on "nonantagonistic" contradictions. The relative homogeneity of American political culture is reinforced by the political socialization of the population, a process which stresses the value of a common set of (liberal) premises and orientations. In America, as in the Soviet Union, these (different) values are practiced imperfectly by both elites and the public. In both countries intermediate objectives exist (e.g., national defense and raising the standard of living) which are supposedly congruent rather than contradictory, and in both countries critics attempt to point out the incongruence (n.b. in the Soviet Union the criticism of the "metal-eaters" by those emphasizing consumer goods, light industry and agriculture). Finally, the actual response of American political elites to conflict, the increasing scope of nonpartisan positions, SFor a brilliant discussion o f the character of American liberalism and its solidary aspects see Louis Hartz's The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), passim; and the same author's edited work, The Founding of New Societies (New York, 1964), pp. 1-123.

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and the attempts at "coalition government" (i.e., bringing in members of the opposition party) are comparable, though obviously not identical, with the existence of a single party. I am not arguing that the United States and the Soviet Union are substantively identical and differ only in form. There are levels at which this may well be true, and it is only in the corresponding areas that discussion of the hypothesis of convergence can make sense. Grossman argues that the reformist position is a denial of the concept of solidarity. I would suggest that the reformist position is a denial of only that concept of solidarity which possesses a good deal of mysticism. This subtype is congruent with what has been referred to in the literature as totalitarianism, with its stress on terror, atomization, and uncertainty. However, it is unnecessarily restrictive to see this subtype as comprising the entire range of "solidary [i.e., Leninist] societies," thereby analytically limiting the results of a confrontation between the reformist position and the adherence to a concept of society based on solidarity. In summarizing his argument, Grossman touches on what may be considered the basic problem of any elite oriented to a solidary concept of political and social life. According to Grossman, the economic reform movement derives from a powerful realization of innumerable contrasts; one contrast is that between the "vast investment in human capital and the little initiative and responsibility accorded to it" (p. 137). In my opinion it is precisely the political issues of initiative and responsibility--who is to exercise initiative and responsibility, within what domains (political, economic, cultural), and how are initiative and responsibility to be valued and rewarded--that are the most critical for Leninist elites today. Very little analytic elaboration has been attempted with the concepts of initiation and responsibility in the field of communist studies. Grossman notes that the "movement for reform also arises from a realization that society is not a monolith. The solution to this problem [of diversity], it is now being stressed by many in the East as it has been long maintained in the West, lies in the creative resolution of conflict rather than in the suppression of all spontaneity in favor of an imposed and constraining order" (p. 138). It is obvious that despite what the West has "maintained," it has deviated from its ideal simply because practical effort always falls short of the ideal. There is also another consideration. Elites operating with limited resources and concerned with a rapid revolutionary transformation of their societies may be correct in concluding that to permit "spontaneity" may be to allow the defeat of the revolution. Instead of arguing that the West has had the correct view of conflict resolution all along, one that the East is now beginning to appreciate, it might be of greater value to understand why at certain points Leninist elites talk of the creative

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resolution of conflict in terms quite different from those offered by reform-oriented liberal elites. This perspective might well contribute to a more profound understanding of why and in what particular ways these elites may change their attitudes to conflicts as they arise in the future.

European Communism The final essay in this volume is by its editor R. V. Burks. It is a survey of communism in all parts of Europe and its object is to "hold up for examination causal forces which apply across-the-board, or nearly so" (p. 187). Burks points to four such causal or "elementary forces": (a) the United States' policy of containment, (b) the Sino-Soviet schism, (c) the emergence of the Common Market, and (d) the decline in the use of terror "by the parties ruling the geographic eastern two-thirds of Europe" (p. 188). Within this set of factors, Burks correctly places particular stress on the decline of terror in "explaining the changes European Communism is now undergoing" (p. 221). He elaborates on the consequences of this decline for the future of communism in Eastern Europe by pointing to the disturbances which have occurred within the East European elites and between these elites and their respective publics. Burks then addresses himself to the problem which the East European parties face in defining and establishing a new equilibrium at these two levels. He conceptualizes this problem in terms of three processes: stabilization (involving a shift from a mobilization regime to a more orthodox or normal one), the interiorization of power (involving the "transition from primary dependence on the Soviet Union to primary reliance on domestic sources of support") and the legitimation of power (involving "convincing the masses of the governed that they ought to cooperate with the existing government, because it is the rightful government and represents their interests in some abiding fashion" (p. 229). Burks's ability to relate this set of considerations (i.e., the distinction between interiorization and legitimation, the central role played by the decline of terror, the relationship of this development to the problems of equilibrium and the loss of it) to a general analysis of communism in Europe with a focus on the four factors already mentioned, makes this essay the most stimulating and sophisticated in the volume. No doubt Burks has the advantage of dealing with "it all"; nevertheless, at the conceptual level he handles it very satisfactorily. But at a lower level of analysis, where he specifies the operation of his causal factors and delimits possible outcomes, many of his statements demand critical attention. Despite Burks's disclaimer that the policy of containment "favored the coming to the surface of certain trends and forces; b u t . . , did not create or control them" (p. 207), his argument about the effect of U.S.

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involvement in the Greek civil war on (a) the Yugoslav heresy and the split with the Soviet Union, and (b) on later Yugoslav revisionism, seems to ascribe too much emphasis to that specific policy and is too reductionist despite the various qualifying remarks of "in good part," "strongly influenced," etc. Another instance of the inordinate influence attributed to the policy of containment concerns the question of whether "extremists" or "moderates" hold power in the Soviet elite. According to Burks, "the effect of containment was also to prove the Zhdanovites wrong and the Malenkovites right" (p. 200). But if containment demonstrated the irrationality of "extremism" to the Soviet elite, how does one explain Khrushchev's successful removal of Malenkov? After all, as Burks notes, Khrushchev, like Zhdanov, was willing to "hasten history along" (p. 202). Three points can be made; first, Burks's discussion of containment creates the impression that it exercised a decisive influence both in the locus of power within the Soviet elite, i.e., on the moderates (Malenkov and Brezhnev/Kosygin over Zhadnov and Khrushchev) and at least a near-decisive influence on the Yugoslav heresy and later on revisionism in Eastern Europe. It is partly the imprecise terminology which Burks employs that makes it difficult to gauge just how much influence containment did have. Secondly, containment can also act in just the opposite fashion, i.e., helping the "extremists" against the "moderates." Leonhard, for example, argues persuasively that it was the escalation of the American policy of containment in Vietnam through the bombing of the North that stimulated and allowed for the reversal of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union: "With the escalation of the Vietnam war (most importantly, the bombing of North Vietnam by the United States) and the accompanying sharpening of international tensions, the conservatives saw a chance to make a breakthrough. ''~ Thirdly, Burks's use of the terms "moderate" and "extremist" does not take us very far. His difficulty with differentiating Khrushchev from Zhdanov makes this apparent, as does the problem of seeing the Brezhnev leadership as simply cautious and conservative (p. 206). A terminological problem is also encountered with the use of "ideological" vs. "pragmatic"; the question is always in what respect ideological and what respect pragmatic. The inadequacy of the distinction between the two comes out clearly when Burks concludes that because the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism "appears less and less to accord with the reality of the second half of the twentieth century," even to its adherents, "there is a decline in dogmatism, a growing pragmatism of approach" (pp. 235, 237). It may be suggested that for some "adherents" the nature of the change that is taking place involves something more than, and/or different from ~Wolfgang Leonhard, "Politics and Ideology in the Post-Khrushchev Era," in Dallin and Larson,

op. cit. p. 70; see also p. 44.

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pragmatism replacing dogmatism. What may well be occurring in certain parties and party members is a process of ideological rethinking, a more or less conscious attempt to create a "practical ideology,''1° something which cannot be automatically subsumed under the restrictive and value-laden dichotomy: dogmatic/pragmatic. Burks specifies two positive reasons for the decline of terror: (a) instrumental--"labor employed to operate complex machinery responds more effectively to positive inducements," and (b) power-security"the resolve of the ruling elements in the Soviet Union to do away with t e r r o r . . , because of its d e v a s t a t i n g . . , effect on their private lives" (p. 222). I think it fair to say that these reasons are representative of the explanations usually offered by analysts of the communist world. However, two other explanations should be added; the first involves the concern of the party elite and membership to establish conditions which facilitate the maintenance and development of the party's identity as an institution, as a corporate body valued in and for itself. The second concerns the appearance of social strata within these societies which are indigenous to the period of communist rule, expect to be treated as trustworthy, and whose expectations are viewed as legitimate by certain segments within the party elite. If one accepts the validity of these additional explanations of the reduction or elimination of terror, one may wonder how much truth there is in the assertion that "the typical East European party is faced with the prospect of sharing power" (p. 238). Seeing only the instrumental factors operating for the removal of terror, Burks (like many others) opts for an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of how these parties will relate to the "prospect." In Burks's view these p a r t i e s . . . "will have to turn over the daily management of industry to the managerial c l a s s . . , will have to share power with the intelligentsia" (p. 238) (my italics). One may argue that the elites will only reluctantly respond to the problem of sharing power, or initiate a policy of sharing, depending on whether the reduction of terror appears to them to have been a matter of political expediency or a deliberate act of long-range policy. A major problem with part of Burks's analysis is the presentation of a conclusion where a question should be asked. This is particularly apparent in his discussion of East Germany. "The basic weakness of the GDR," he writes, "was not its size or its backwardness, but rather the fact that there is no such thing as an East German nation. The population ruled by Pankow is part of a larger whole and its fundamental interests, whether economic or political, are best served by reunification" (p. 230). With an interest in forecasting, I would think that a major question to ask would be to what extent has East Germany become a nation, t°See Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organizatmn In Communist China (Berkeley, 1966), Section I.

2c

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and in what respects ? To what extent is it still true that the East German population is part of a larger whole? In what respects is there a basic German culture--language, religion, commitment to political forms, policies? Are all of East Germany's fundamental interests best served by reunification? According to what and whose definition? Considerations of this type seem to be absolutely essential if one wishes to forecast and not simply to assert or wish. 11 The question of ascertaining under what conditions client states of the Soviet Union (such as Bulgaria and Poland) are likely to "assume an independent role" is part of the same problem. In Burks's view this "probably depends on whether, if ever, a fundamental divergence of national interest develops between them and Moscow" (p. 232). However, relying on the concept of national interest is a very doubtful course. It is easily used in post factum explanations, but its utility for forecasting is open to serious doubt, if for no other reason than for the obvious reason that the content of national interest is a highly subjective and elusive matter. 12 National interest is not simply or even mainly some objective, unchanging set of elements which can be readily identified; it is a skein of political and ideological conceptions related to considerations of a nation's idea of itself, its material welfare and power, la Obviously, the character of these considerations can change when the elites that hold them change (i.e., Dubcek's and Ceausescu's conceptions of national interest differ significantly from those held by Novotny and Gheorghiu-Dej). In certain respects, Burks's forecast suffers from the same defects as Devlin's in that the problems he presents are too narrowly circumscribed and hence the solutions offered too restricted. Thus, the "general line of evolution" in Eastern Europe "is away from ideological totalitarianism and toward traditional authoritarianism." Where is this true? More important, how is it possible to see this as a general pattern with the exception of Yugoslavia, Rumania and (Dubcek's) Czechoslovakia? In Western Europe it may be true that "as each year passes, the number of true believers in Europe must be smaller, and the caliber of those who continue to believe, less" (p. 237). However, I would suggest that the ideas and values communists believe in can be reoriented without their automatically becoming Christian Democrats. Reducing the jamming of Western broadcasts may signify a decline in dogmatism in Eastern Europe, and it may be an index of pragmatism or ideological erosion, but it may also signify a new confidence, a greater desire and capacity to initiate a new political, ideological and XXFor a penetrating analysis of the East German case, see Jean Edward Smith, Germany Beyond the Wall (Boston, 1969), passim. ~lSee Ernst Haas, Tangle of Hopes: American Commitments and World Order (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. forthcoming), 3-13 and passim. ~aFor the same reason Burks's analysis of the different stances taken by the Poles and Czechoslovaks $ unconvincing.

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economic synthesis which, while still Leninist, is not a simple copy of some other model. As for the speed of "revisionist evolution" in European communism, I would also disagree that there are three "different rates", with that of the West European parties being the most rapid, the imposed East European regimes coming second, and the Soviet Union third (p. 240). Khrushchev's political and ideological rethinking was the initiating point of change, and it occurred within the Soviet Union. Dubcek's reforms were more extensive than the French party's and politically more significant than those of any of the parties that do not hold power. Again, Khrushchev's redefinitions were more significant than Novotny's or Ulbricht's and the Rumanian party's international posture has been more unorthodox than that of parties such as the French. In many respects Burks's article is a microcosm of the special qualities of the volume as a whole. It is not diversity that leaves an abiding impression with the reader of this volume, for that characterizes all compilations; it is rather the nature of the diversity, the sharp contrasts within and among the various articles; the presence, juxtaposition, and fusion of normative and analytic premises; the presentation of well-defined and valuable insights together with unquestioned (and possibly unconscious) assumptions about the future evolution of communism in Europe. At one and the same time it is irritating as well as stimulating and deserves to be read, digested, and challenged.

Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969.) (Translated by Joel Carmichael.) Ernst Majonica, East-West Relations: A German View, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.) There are several reasons for drawing American attention to these two manifestos of West Germany's foreign policy. At a time when we are subjecting our own commitments in the world to intense scrutiny, the experiences and attitudes of the Federal Republic of Germany in its third decade of life repays study. For West Germany, commitment to international affairs is not a choice but an all-embracing imperative. Indeed West Germany is probably less able to draw a demarcation line between its internal and external affairs than any noncommunist state. Despite its acceptance in the western community, the Federal Republic suffers from a long-standing moral and political trauma. It faces nearly insuperable obstacles in the quest for national fulfillment