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The changing pattern of futures research in the USA
THE CHANGING PATTERN FUTURES
RESEARCH
OF
IN THE
USA John ~cHaIe
Although mainly confined to ‘formal’ work in the field, a recent survey of futures research in the United States does show that a considerable number of changes have occurred. There have been major shifts in the orientation and focus of work being done, in the range of disciplines involved, and in the overall relationship of the field to the larger society. However, the earlier assessment1 and its critical evaluation of the range and content of futures research remains valid in broad outline. The specific differences which emerge from this second study are discussed from several viewpoints. From dbciplinary
enclave
to social
movement
The number of people engaged full time with futures research has not expanded significantly” in comparison with the vast increase in the number of people now involved with the future in many more different ways. The wider involvement has two related aspects. The first is the concern with the longer range effects and potential consequences of science and technology which has emerged more strongly in the past few years within the scientific community itself Beginning, perhaps, with the earlier set of question9 regarding the social responsibilities of science with specific reference to the development of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological warfare, biological and behavioural engineering, this has been cross-impacted with the increased visibility of environmental problems, with the “‘quality of life” issue, and latterly, as in the “Blueprint for Survival” 4 manifesto, has linked up with the growth/no growth debate. It is noteworthy that the widening of scientific concern has also lead to increased interaction between the physical and social sciences and the humanities This article is based on a paper “A intonation of the Typological Survey of FuturesResearch, U.S.” sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health. Principal investigator, John M&ale, is Director of the Center for Integrative Studies, School of Advanced Technology, State University of New York at Binghampton; his research associate was Magda Cordell. The period of study was from June 1971 to June 1972.
FUTURES June lS73
-in SOfar as these divisions retain their stricter meaning today. The gap between the two cultures is being bridged by a set of common anxieties which transcends their differences through a more holistic concern for the survival of human society and its earth environment. The Spaceship Earth6 metaphor has come to provide a flag of mutual convenience for many different groups. It is becoming acceptable, in academic circles, to talk about the future. (Before now it seemed unscholarly, unscientific, even ‘unserious’.) Some of the new energies are spilling over into and influencing the social sciences, the humanities, and other disciplines, forcing them again and again to ask, “what are the hidden side effects, the long-range consequences of any action ?” or “what are the value implications of our behaviour ?” _ . .g
On the surface this may be viewed as an important, and overdue, development. However, a closer look at the traffic over “the bridge”, and the implications of many of the more shrilil statements being broadcast may temper one’s enthusiasm. In some cases, the rush to protect the future from the consequences of an improvident present looks less like concern with the future than with a nostalgic return to past, and even pastoral, simp~cities. Both ~~~~~~n~for ~ur~~~~~ and 7% Limits to Growth, despite the sophistication and rigour of their arguments, share, in varying degree, an intrinsically conservative set of implicit premises. We have gone too far, too fast, perhaps even too comfortably. The dream of (potential) affluence and abundance is over, and the iron law of the exponentials will punish our MrZs by forcing us back upon simpler and more straitened circu~tances. Obviously, there is much that one may agree with in their detailed assessment of possible catastrophe if many of our current malpractices are not corrected. On the other hand, the too ready acceptance by the various ‘official’ establishments, of the n~~~a~thusia~ constraints and l~ita~ons on further material improvement, is in itself somewhat suspicious. Urdway, in his f953, rfraoly af the L&z&~~~~~w~~, was, if Iess sophisticated, at least more candid in his assertion that: The arguments used to support the theory are not based on technical, economic, social or scientific doctrine. This is reasoning influenced by a predilection for the old fashioned luxuries of simplicity (like candlelight) as distinguished from modem engineering achievements (like neon), and synthetics. In the matter of timing, the book submits that “within foreseeable time”’ increasing consumption of resources can produce scarcities serious enough to destroy OUTAmerican Dream of an everhigher level of living and with it our present culture. 7 The extent to which the wider diffusion of scientific and socio-economic concern with longer range futures has so swiftly become part of a larger **social movement” is an important and recent development. It also makes for strange bedfellows! We may note, for example, how the spirit of ‘Woodstock’ interpenetrated the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment with the counter-conference’s Tent City being catered by the Hog Farm commune. Within the more formal sector of the “futures movement” our survey shows an increase in the number of religious groups, voluntary associations,* consumer
oriented work, etc, which have become directly involved. We can gauge also the much larger general audience which has been created by bestsellers like FUTURES
June 1#73
T7teChanging PatternofFutures Research inthe USA
Toffler’s Future Shock, Drucker’s The Age of Dticontin+-and the futures perspective spin-off from the range of ‘eco-crisis’ texts such as The Po~Zut~o~ Bomb, Science and Survival, Famine Nineteen Seventyjive, and many others. Impacting closely one upon the other, these works have created a vast potential audience in the general public. They have also circulated a new range of public metaphors and images which enable more people to address and formulate questions about the future in ways within which they can identify their own experiences, and, importantly, become aware of their personal value preferences for various alternatives. Whilst this widening of participation in future oriented activity is encouraging, there are also some possibly negative connotations which may emerge as it develops a more “mass movement” profile. One can distinguish the following socio-physical types of movements according to the prevailing motivation of their members. (1) The value-rational ‘spiritual community’ or ‘fellowship’ of believers in the truth of constitutive ideas and in the practical aims of a movement. (2) The emotional-affectual ‘following’ of a charismatic leader. (3) The purposive-rationa or utilitarian association fox the pursuit of individual interests. Combinations of these types are frequent, and transition from one type to another may occur during the life cycle of a movement as a community of believe=, in a ‘cause’ may develop into a ‘bandwagon’ attracting socially or politically ambitious opportunists.0 The ccfutures movement” has already attracted many people who have come to it through successive involvement with other issue-oriented movements with the above motivational profiIes, eg civil rights, anti-war, ecology, intentional communities, consumerism, etc. Though the latter movements are still strong, one can observe a high turnover of membership as participants become disenchanted with the lack of more immediate results, and move on successively to other active issues. Such shifts also occur where such movements are co-opted officially, or where their further development lies with less directly active modes of professional participation. It may well be, of course, that this rapid shift of attention from issue to issue and the increase of temporarily active groups and coalitions is an indicator of the future in itself Its other and more negative aspects lie with the dilution and fragmentation of more long term ideas and goals which occurs, and with the fringe effects of cultism, faddism, instant celebrity, etc, as the issues grow and decline in public interest. Some of these side effects may be observable in the futures area. There is, on the one hand, a drive for professional respectability and methodological rigour through more formal organisation and the adoption of what Henshel has called a new “subject imperialism”.l0 A balancing “middle ground” trend here is the development of specific future orientations ~~~~~nthe existing disciplines. The case for this has been best outlined by Maruyama in the pre-conference volume, Towards a Cultural
FuturoZogy,ll for the 1970 American Anthropological Association Cultural Futurology Symposium. Harkins, describing this symposium, also draws attention to : FUTURES
June 1973
259
260
2% Changing Pattern
of Futures Research
in the USA
. - . . (the) skepticism, sadness and even bostiiity expressed by some members of the audience towards apparent elitism-an alleged tendency of the symposium part& pants to &m&ate ihe third world, sisterhood, ethnic, raciaf, social class and other interests from serious treatment . . +The safari to the distant future was to be managed by the corporate, academic, military and other elites, and would mean little for the
currentfy under-classed,unconvinced, and out-classed, whosefutures held more of the same injustice. Or so the argument seemed to go.18
This polarisation within the field was evident as early as the first Oslo Congress in which the present author made a plea against the possible professionalisation of the future “out of all possible interest”“, ie “Our central problem is to keep futures research ‘open-ended’ . . . . We should avoid its division into a number of intellectual provinces cultivated only by their respective expert e&es.” EIise Boufding expresses this decent even more clearly: The pro&ssionai futuristsare too tied to present spatiaf distribution of social, economic and pditicaf. resources, and too wedded to thirty-year projections based on an artificial isolation of a Hellenic-European stream of history from the total stream of history, to be able to conceive of the breaches in time and space that history in its planet-wide dimension should lead us to expect. Their man-computer symbiosis allows for no sense af the totally other, transcendent or otherwise. The paradoxical thought arises that it may be precisely the most prafessionalised of the professional futurists who will be in for the most violent “future shock”“.Xs Some professional futurists have sought to avoid this dilemma by engaging in attempts to involve a wider range of non-professional participant in the ‘?ittures creative” process through continuous interactive “network” dialogues. TheobaId’s work is the most sustained effort in this direction. One of the problems here is that the volume of messages per person increases in direct proportion as the interactive network grows. Attention and available time spans become progressively attenuated as ‘noise” increases on the channel. There is also the tendency for those least engaged in substantive work in the area to be the most active in such organised network interaction. This is not to denigrate such modes for, obviously, they are also “substantive” work albeit of a different nature, The phenomena may also be observed in the growth of documentation, bibliographical services and academic programmes and courses. These are essential to field development and extremely important areas in themselves. However, where they are often accompanied by pressures for closer and more efficient organisation of the field they raise a question which in itself may be questionable. Would more efficiency in or~n~sation~ at this point, be more effective and/or desirabIe? No matter how these internal, field debates may come out, it seems unlikely that the professional&d futurist will be the only, or perhaps even the major, source for the provision of viable projections and firture images through which public policies and other forms of social navigation will be guided. As underlined in our earlier report, the potential contribution of futures research per se is very great. Many areas of its specific functions of alerting the society, exploring new goal and value orientations, etc, are, however, being pre-empted by other
lb
groups, or subsumed above. From predictions
Changing Pattern of Futures Research in t& USA
within the more generalised
social movement
mentioned
to alternatives
This is another shift within our present survey which tends to confirm the above comment. The earlier emphasis, within futures research itself, on ‘forecasting’ and ‘prediction’ seems to have shifted more towards the normative mode of exploring the overall costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, alternative goal orientations and options. Obviously, technological, economic, social, and other forecasting and predictive modes will continue as a central activity and will probably increase in use and degree of sophistication in the areas of technology assessment, social accounting, etc. It is also possible that the use of the term alternatives may simply be a ‘buzzword’ phenomenon-like ‘systems’, ‘eco-crisis’, ‘participatory’, ‘consciousness raising’, and so on. Futures research and social change In our earlier survey of the field we put forward many of these topics in the form of questions. l
l
l
For example, how is futures research related to other institutions and groups affecting change in the present? What is its actual relationship to long-range planning as undertaken in various sectors of society? What z&e effects do the images and projections of future human conditions have upon present perceptions of reality?
To a certain extent, parts of these questions have been answered above. However rational and desirable it may seem that futures exploration should be institutionalised as a “look-out function” for the society, the wider linkage may remain somewhat more indirect and non-linear-even though many such agencies and centres are being developed along these lines. This has been particularly demonstrated in the past three years. Public attention to, and pressure upon, legislative and corporate policies have been spurred on less by the acceptance of coherent and logical future plans and scenarios emanating directly from futures research, than by the profusion of images and metaphors circulating in the mass media, ie in the broadest sense, including paperbacks and other communications. Interestingly enough, many of the more popular images have been negative and dystopian. The book titles themselves sound like a drumroll for the coming Apocalypse, eg The Doonwday Book, Terracide, Our Plundered Planet, The Chasm Ahead, The Hungry Planet, etc. One might speculate on the relationship of this range of imagery to the parallel revival of the gothic novel, the horror movie, and the widespread renewal of interest in the occult and other forms of mystical and transcendental experience. Also, in the rhetorical metaphors which accompany this recent wave of social movements, there is more than a hint of the milleniarist tradition. Anti-
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The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
scientific and anti-technological attitudes combined with an attraction towards romantic irrational&m, exaltation of the immediacy of personal revelation through changes in the levels of ‘group consciousness’, have much in common with the$n de sikcle movements during the latter part of the 19th century, and even with the medieval waves of mrllenarianism. It is characteristic of this type of movement that its aims and premises are boundless. A social struggle is seen not as a struggle for specific limited objectives, but as an event of unique importance, different in kind from all other struggles known to history, a cataclysm from which the world is to emerge totally transformed and redeemed.14 These elements aside, we should note one work, Future Shock, which is somewhat in a class by itself as being neither wholly negative nor dystopian. Whether one may agree with its central thesis or not, it has become a household wordwith over three million copies sold and possibly five or six times that number in multiple readership and translations. The extent to which a single work of this nature may have influenced even larger numbers of people is certainly a strong indicator of widening concern with the future. It is also further evidence of the increased speed and global diffusion of ideas and images in the communications media as playing a major role in changing perceptions of current reality, redefining and reformulating popular attitudes to the future.15 Distilled catchphrases describing the responses of futures research attract popular attention in much the same way as do Old Moore’s predictions. And they begin to assume enormous importance in the public imagination. Population explosion, pollution crisis, post-industrial society, future shock . . . explain conditions and future conditions and are repeated with earnest shakes of the head with scarcely a pause to estimate their validity as generalisations. On the odd occasion some pundit, known or unknown, created or oblivious to the fact that he is being created by the ‘futuristfollowers’, will identify the genesis of a likely future -a future-bearing fact; or he might put into new words with new metaphors, ideas about the future. Quick as a flash the word is abroad, and before you know where you are, another ‘futurist’ is created and a new catchphrase is accepted currency for the ‘futurists’ ledger.16 Future(s)--‘cism”,
ecology” or ccistics”
This is another area of the internal debate in futures research which shows little sign of resolution. It is probably not very important except where it may convey inaccuracies and ambiguities regarding the nature of the field itself. One interesting point may be the unconscious ahistorical use of the term “futurism”. In general, however, the arts in present futures research are a particularly weak area. The 1st World Future Society Congress in Washington did, at least, attempt to include art and design within its exhibition. The result, unfortunately, was certainly less than future oriented-geodesics and inflatables have been around for nearly a quarter of a century. The “art of the future” looked rather more like the Ghost of Christmas Past ! For 1971, it seemed to present an early forerunner to the This is Tomorrow17 exhibition which was held in London in 1956. A quotation from the catalogue notes of the latter event may provide an appropriate closure to these comments:
FUTURES
June 1373
The Changtng Pattern of Futures Research in th USA
men are equal as to nose eyes ears mouth hands feet less so as to language
marrying
brunettes
saying dont know 9 per cent having heard of cybernetics much less so as to having heard of jackson coppi oberth abarth RTP
TNP
IBM
providence
IBV
pollock annette
klooger
dirty dick godot nkruma PM1 PLM
tex
PSI ESP EEG
ARB
IQJ
NPL ZDA
rhode island or divine
never mind how you rate the fact is you do rate contexts
are made of you your likes and dislikes semblables and freres no need to stick to squares
master your context symbols and channels
and the rest shall be added unto
You cult object You culture hero You end product
APPENDIX: Summary
of data obtained from the surveys
Results of the first survey are summarised in Table 1. For the second survey a list of 527 individuals, organisations and institutional units concerned with futures research was used: 260 responded with information. This information was sought and classified under the following headings : (1) Personnel characteristics -overall work force -age range -academic field -level of formal education (2) Orientation of work -forecasting, research, -specific focus
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The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
TABLE
1. SUMMARY/OF,FIRST,PHASE
SURVEY.l96Q-70
1. Objectives of work. Two-thirds reported major economic and technological focus to their work. Others ranked social, political and environmental foci in that order, with concern for the individual occurring very low in the scale. 2. Range of forecasting. Major concentration on short range (next decade), medium concentration on next thirty years, about 1% on long range, ie beyond next thirty years. (‘Forecasting’ is used here to indicate general range of concern or interest rather than as prediction per se.) 3. Funding support. Was inversely related to length of forecasting-most, for very short term: least, for long term. Allocation by sectors was approximately as follows: Government (in house and contractual) Corporate (mainly internal) Academic Foundations and other agencies
50%
Major support allocated focused objectives.
work in short
to client
;;q 1oy:
defined
4. Disciplinary profile of workers. Dominated chemistry and political science.
by engineering,
range with specifically economics,
physics,
5. Age profile. Showed concentration between 36 and 45 years, suggesting professionals whose major work had been accomplished in their defined fields before moving into the futures research area. 6. Sex. Almost
90% male, with remainder
including
non-professional
‘support’
staff.
7. Generalised conclusions a) Apart from few established institutions, most of significant work in the field done by individuals-not necessarily tied to their institutional setting. b) Major emphasis and funding allocated to short range economic and technological forecasting. c) Lack of adequately supported work in terms of “whole system(s)” and multi_ . variate approaches to national and world problems. d) Little systematic research on values and other areas of socio-cultural change. e) Weak linkage of futures reserch to actual policy planning process and to action.
(3) Funding support and time allocation -amount of time spent -range of annual funding -factors most influencing the direction of futures work (4) Methodologies being used -range of forecasting (5) Communications/information -media used in disseminating information -major sources of information in the field (6) Educational involvement (7) Future directions Academic
background
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the academic backgrounds of respondents to the first and second surveys. Some of the shifts between surveys may be explained as follows: l
Decline in numbers in engineering may be mainly due to reduction in aerospace. Many technological forecasting, and similarly oriented groups, have been disbanded or cut back.
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June 1973
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in th USA
TABLE Second 19714ne
survey (period 1972)
l
FIELD OF RESPONDENT
June First
Social/Behav. sciences Physical sciences Engineering Humanities Education Mathematics Design Arts Life sciences Law Journalism ~~e;salTV
l
2. ACADEMIC
;;;E$ 8.5y; 6.8% 6.2%
survey
(period
19694970)
Engineering Economics Physics Political science Chemistry Psychology Mathematics Business admin. Education Philosophy Business Social science Architecture International relations Urban planning Athropology
36 ;: 12 11 11 9
(in number Finance History Law Statistics E;;ps;ter
of responses) 4 4” science
Geography Medicine Humanities Journalism Landscape architecture Management science Pharmacy Psychiatry Regional planning Theology
f 3 3 ; 2 2 2 : f
Increase in social sciences, behavioural sciences, education, arts, etc., due to: (1) growing interest in these subjects; (2) more futures courses being taught; (3) fashionability. A number of individual workers listed in the first survey in areas of physical science, etc, have moved out of field, eg no longer consider ‘futures’ as a usable definition of their activities-though the activities may remain the same.
Information obtained about the length of time spent by individuals or organisations in futures research shows that the response “more than 10 years” still has the highest percentage (32.8% of individuals and 22.4% of organisations), although a considerable proportion, about half of the individual respondents, have been working in this area less than five years; 29.2% entered within the last three years. Similarly, over half of the organisations (58.6%) entered the field within the last five years, and most of these (37.6%) in the last three years. Orientation
of work
An analysis of the orientation of work, split between individual and organisational responses is set out in Table 3. In forecasting, though the individual and organisational response profiles rank social forecasting high, it should be noted that when this and other categories are regrouped the balance is somewhat different, eg Percent Social Cultural Educational Ecological Population
17.4 89:; 3”:;
G
Percent Technological Economic Market Resources Military Scientific
13.3 10.2 7-O 3’:; 7.0 ZI
In research, however, there is a shift towards Alternative Futures, Social Impacts, Priorities and Value Systems, etc, in both individual and organisational profiles. This difference is, of course, explicable in terms of the general change of social climate in the past two years towards consideration of the social and environmental consequences of technologies. It also indicates an internal divergence which suggests that
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Th.e Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
TABLE Forecasting
3. ORIENTATION
OF WORK (GENERAL)
Research
Planning
individuals Social Technological Economic Cultural Educational Resources Market Scientific Ecological Manpower Military Population Other
!gi$ 9.82
3.9%
Alternative futures Social impacts/technology Value systems Futures-methodology Social oriorities Policy research Individual in future Environmental Resource utilisation Family in future Manpower Population Consumer affairs Other
14.4% 12.0% 10.9% 10.2% 9.7% 8.8% 7.5% 6.4% 4.5% 4.20/, 3.6% 2.9% 2.1% 2.8%
Social Technological Educational Corporate Urban Scientific Political Resources Regional Ecological Architecture/Design Military Labour Other
11.9% 10.9% 10.6% 10.6% 9.8% 9.3% 8.5O 7.1 4/o 5.3% 4.4% 4.1% 3.9% 2.8% 0.8%
Educational Social Corporate Technological Urban Regional Resources Scientific Ecological Political Architecture/Design: Military Labour Other
8.87 8.59 7*50/, 6.8%
55r 4$ 1.3y: 2.8%
Organisations
Scientific Resouces Ecological Manpower Population h%&ry
7.0% 7.0% 5.9%
2.80/,
Alternative futures Social impacts/technology Social priorites Policy research Value systems Environmental Futures methodology Resources utilisation Individual In future Population Manpower Family in future Consumer affairs Other
12.0% 11.8% 11.1% 16:6? ;I;$ 7.27: 58% 5.6% 3.2%
though the research objectives may be directed towards socio-cultural dimensions the forecasting methodologies tend to be biased towards technological, economic and other measures as more objectively determinable. The planning dimension lies somewhere between the two other areas. More specifically the field of planning itself is an area which tends to be more directly related to social policy and decision making, eg, by inclusion of educational, urban and regional planning, etc, at various levels. This area of response also underlines the degree to which planning in general has become aware of, and more directly linked to futures research. In terms of specific work focus, that is within the general orientation of work above, there was much more heterogeneity. This may be best viewed within the categories shown in Table 4. One may note that emphasis is on the future as approached in terms of macro-social change, changes in society, in organisations and institutions, etc, down to the small community level. The least emphasis is on the future of the individual. A counter note might be that the individual’s future is implied within the macrosocial context but, perhaps, that is the problem. Funding and time spent It is difficult to unravel the ‘interconnections’ of the various sources of funding support. For instance, many individuals reported support source as deriving from the corporation they worked for, which in turn might have contractual funding from government to support this work. Furthermore, some of the larger futures research programmes have varied sector support including business, government and foundations. In general, the responses to questions about the support and its range do not tell
FUTURES June 1873
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research zk the USA
TABLE
4. SPECIFIC
FOCUS OF WORK
Numbers in category
Categories
Organisations
Individuals Alternative
futures
19
Science and technology forecasting Resources Food supply systems Environmental quality Transportation Public service systems Policy research Business Economic forecasting Communications/media National security Military Documentation Science fiction
SUPPORT
AND TIME ALLOCATION
Methodology Planning Social change (general) Institutional change Family Leisure Education F$J$;n Law Values/ethics Politics Individual
TABLE
Numbers in category
Categories
5. FUNDING
Individuals Source of support and time allocated to:
Private business National government Social agencies Local of reg. govt. Foundations International agencies Others
support
lime
Organisations spent+
support
% 35.0 25.9
% 31.7 22.9
;::
;:9”
5.5 2.5 15.5
3.6
I:.: 6.6
2:.90
lg.96
* In terms of percentage
% g.t
Time
spent* % 31.5 23.5 1:.x 4.0 1.0 16.5
of work done for each sector.
much about the total amount of funding given to futures research. The amount of time spent, in terms of percentage of work done for each sector of support, is closely related to the support profile (Table 5). Direction
of work
Analysis of the factors most influencing the direction of futures work revealed that individuals ranked personal and professional interests first, then funding and organisational goals followed closely by “available time”. Organisations ranked organisational goals and funding linked less directly with available time. Perhaps their responses don’t tell us very much directly except where the response profile is obvious. Where questioned on whether their futures work was aimed towards aflecting changein the present, response was quite direct. With 25-30% not replying in each case, the response profile was even-87a/o of both individuals and organisations stated that the aim of their work was to affect present changes. The change process channels ranked as most relevant by both individual and organisations were client relations, corporate policy, educational policy in the first rank; in the second rank-but at considerable scale distance-professional organisations, community groups, political and legislative process. Organisations rated the legislative and political slightly higher than individual respondents.
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The Chunging Pattem of Futures Research in the USA
Methodologies
A comparison of methodologies being used revealed, for example, the lower ranking of Delphi and simulation in the second survey. This may be explicable: l
l
In terms of the fashionability cycle of methodologies. For some time, during 1969-71, there were a large number of Delphi and quasi-Delphi techniques being used, many of them much less rigorous and controlled than those developed by the originators of the method. Consequently, one may assume that these second and third generation Delphis were less productive and took more time, energy and care in their administration than their users had anticipated. In terms of the relatively large inflow of social scientists, educators, and others into the futures area where they tend to use different methodological approaches. This may account for the continued high ranking of “scenario writing” as a method which lends itself more easily to conjecture and “historical analogy” than the Delphi or cross-impact techniques.
As a crosscheck in this area of methodology, respondents were also asked to rank the given list of methods in terms of those most and least preferred (Table 6). TABLE
6. METHODOLOGIES
Most preferred
Scenario building Expert panels Probabilistic forecasting Delphi techniques Simulation Extrapolation techniques Brainstorming Indiv. ‘expert’ forecasting Gaming Cross-impact analysis Historical analogy Operational models Statistical models Causal modeling Relevance trees Contextual mapping Precursive analysis ;;;etFsrk analysis
RANKED
IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE Least preferred
Indiv. ‘expert’ forecasting Expert panels Extrap. techniques Brainstorming Gaming Historical analogy Delphi techniques Statistical models Operational models Probabilistic forecasting Scenario building Contextual mapping Network analysis Simulation Causal modeling Precursive analysis Relevance trees Cross-impact analysis Others
Range of forecasting
The majority of respondents (33.8% of individuals and 41.9% of organisations) are only doing short range forecasting-the next decade. Medium term forecasting (next 30 years) accounts for 33.2% and 3@4%, respectively, and long range (beyond 2000) only 3.1% and 0.8%. But compared with the first survey there is an overall increase in individual long range forecasting and even more in the medium and long range category. The ‘individual’ shift to longer range forecasting probably represents the increase in ecological long range concerns and associated phenomena, eg population, urban concentrations, etc. We may also enter the caveat that not all of the medium to long range studies, or those reporting throughout the ranges, are indicative of continuous and methodical studies, but include ‘intuitive’ scenarios, descriptive and speculative forecasts.
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June lB73
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research the in USA
Future directions One set of questions was directed towards eliciting some profiles of needs, desired directions or reassignment ofpriorities, etc, within the futures field itself The first question addressed was what do we need “more of” in terms of a given list of areas (Table 7). The highest rankings were accorded to professional expertise, critical assessment and futures education-and though popular dissemination was also ranked high, public feedback had slightly less in first rank but was still strongly indicated in successive rankings. TABLE Need more
7. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
:
Ranking
Professional expertise Popular dissemination of work Futures education Critical assessment Conferences, meetings, etc. Public feedback Visual media use Others* Others*:
1
2
3
4
5
32 ;;
21 if
25 ::
21 :2”
8
36
26
22
14
:
8 3
2:
1:
::
0”
15 7
:,
134
2”
3”
interdisciplinary effort; definition of the futures field; coordination of forecasting; channelling of grass-roots (minorities, etc) goals and needs; consistent monitoring against past projections.
The concern with professional expertise and critical assessment is much greater than in the first survey and may well accord with responses given earlier on length of time most respondents have been in the field, and with the emphasis on futures education. To some extent, one may note that there has been a move into the futures area of a number of persons actively concerned with current “issue-oriented” problems. This is particularly demonstrated in Table 8 which ranks responses to the question, “Shouldfutures work be more . . . .?” TABLE Futures
should
8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
be more?
Related to social problems Scientifically oriented Long range Actively engaged with current Methodologically rigorous Engaged with social goals Conjectural Normatively oriented Concerned with the individual Ethically oriented Others
Ranking1 22 : issues
21 :; 8 7 152
2
3
4
5
27 14 7
26 11 8 14 14 19
14 8 ::
1 0 0
13
:,
:o” 24 8 :‘2 7 5
; 11 7 2
3” 70 :4’ 7
0” 1” 0
From this one can discern a strong shift towards engagement with social goals and problems, and with current issues. “Long range” is ranked low in comparison. The lesser emphasis, accorded “scientific orientation” and “conjectural”, underlines this practical shorter range problems/issue orientation. What may be somewhat disturbing is the comparatively lesser ranking of normative ethical orientations which, presumably, should accompany the above shift. Perhaps this is puzzling rather than
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June 1873
269
disturbing-but, at any rate, reminds us that this kind of survey can only indicate given patterns of response. In this specific question area one might also suggest that the enquiry attracted greater attention from those more closely involved with current social issues and more concerned, therefore, with underlining their preferences. The last question in the survey sheds more light on the value orientation touched upon above. Here, given a set of statements, respondents were asked to register their level of agreement or disagreement. Strongly
Agree
30
44
79
23
30
70
56
23
37
49
64
33
34 98
zl
61 17
18 4
21
88
46
18
18
59
60
19
6
69
82
43
37
88
41
16
agree
1. The gap between the development of technology and man’s values will increase rather than decrease in the next several decades 2. The development of technology has inevitabiy brought progress to man 3. We are approaching a point in economic and technological development at which growth must be reduced 4. Man is an almost infinitely adaptable creature 5. There has been too much concern for technological development without regard to its social and psychological consequences 6. The future is limited by man’s basic psvcho_ biology 7. The complexities of the modern world suggest that man in the future will have to learn how to organise and live in smaller units 8. “Getting back to nature” represents an important corrective to the artificialities of an urban, industrial way of life 9. As society has become more complex and technologically based, there is more opportunity for individuality than in past periods
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The above shows some interesting clusters of opinion. It is assumed that the gap between the development of technology and values will close though the negative assumption is still high. A somewhat similar ambivalence is shown regarding the proposition that technology has inevitably brought progress. Growth limitation is almost equally balanced. There is a slightly stronger feeling that man can adapt more and that his future is not constrained by his basic psycho-biological make up. Though somewhat closer in balance on the nature versus urban theme, there is a strong proportion of agreement that there is more opportunity for individuality than in past periods. In general terms, within the limitation of the given questions, the response pattern here tends to set the futurist orientation as a relatively optimistic and affirmative one.
Notes and references 1. “Typological Survey of Futures Research in the U.S.“, sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, Contract Number HSM-42-69-47, 1970 2. One should confine this observation more specifically to the USA. There has been a considerable increase in the number of future oriented institutions and individual workers in Western and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan, see also, . . . and mw the future, a PEP survey of futures studies by C. de Hoghton, W. Page and G. Streatfeild (London, PEP, 1971) 3. Such questions have a longer and more traditional history within science than its present critics are aware of. For example, J. D. Bernal’s “World Without War” (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1959) is a key ‘futurist’ work grounded
FUTURES
June 1973
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
4. 5.
6. 7. 8.
9.
10. 11. 12.
13.
14. 15.
16. 17.
within a radical view of the need for fundamental changes in the relationships of science, technology and society which anticipates many of our current discussions. There are other earlier works of this kind which have been similarly neglected Ihe Ecologist, 13 January, 1972 “A Blueprint for Survival”, Adlai Stevenson, 1965, extract from his last speech: “We travel together on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulnerable supplies of air and soil . . . preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and . . . the love, we give our fragile craft.” Alvin Toffler ed, The Futurists (New York, Random House, 1972) pages 4, 5 Samuel H. Ordway, Jr, Resources and The American Dream : Including A Theory of the Limits of Growth (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1953) page V The closer engagement of this sector particularly has been due to the founding of the Center for a Voluntary Society. Constituting a new futures organisation, the latter is directed by John Dixon, one of the key ‘network’ figures in the development of futures research. The mission of the Center is to coordinate the national and international voluntary sectors and to help orient their work towards longer range, and more interrelated sets of policy objectives International Encyclofiedia of the R. Heberis, J. R. Gusfield, “Social Movements”, Social Sciences (New York, Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968) Vol. 14, page 440 Richard L. Henshel, “Sociology and Prediction”, The American Sociologist, Vol. 6, August, 1971, pages 213-220 See also Magorah Maruyama, James A. Dator, eds, Human Futuristics (University of Hawaii, Social Science Research Institute, 1972) Arthur M. Harkins, “The Birth of Cultural Futurology”, paper for the Symposium “Towards a Philosophy of Choice”, First Congress of the World Future Society, Washington, DC, May, 1971 Elise Boulding, “Futurology and the Imaging Capacity of the West”, Teilhard Review, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1972. A fuller version appears as a chapter in Human Futuristics, op. tit Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (Oxford University Press, 1970) We might also note the feedback into the futures movement itself. For example, the First World Future Society Congress in Washington, 1971, included an exhibit booth offering “Future Shock Therapy” “Putting Aside the Crystal Ball”, editorial comment, Futures, Vol. 4, No. 1, March, 1972 Reyner Banham, catalogue notes, This is Tomorrow (The Whitechapel Art Gallery, August g-September 9, 1956)
FUTURES
June 1973
271
RESEARCH
OF
IN THE
USA John ~cHaIe
Although mainly confined to ‘formal’ work in the field, a recent survey of futures research in the United States does show that a considerable number of changes have occurred. There have been major shifts in the orientation and focus of work being done, in the range of disciplines involved, and in the overall relationship of the field to the larger society. However, the earlier assessment1 and its critical evaluation of the range and content of futures research remains valid in broad outline. The specific differences which emerge from this second study are discussed from several viewpoints. From dbciplinary
enclave
to social
movement
The number of people engaged full time with futures research has not expanded significantly” in comparison with the vast increase in the number of people now involved with the future in many more different ways. The wider involvement has two related aspects. The first is the concern with the longer range effects and potential consequences of science and technology which has emerged more strongly in the past few years within the scientific community itself Beginning, perhaps, with the earlier set of question9 regarding the social responsibilities of science with specific reference to the development of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological warfare, biological and behavioural engineering, this has been cross-impacted with the increased visibility of environmental problems, with the “‘quality of life” issue, and latterly, as in the “Blueprint for Survival” 4 manifesto, has linked up with the growth/no growth debate. It is noteworthy that the widening of scientific concern has also lead to increased interaction between the physical and social sciences and the humanities This article is based on a paper “A intonation of the Typological Survey of FuturesResearch, U.S.” sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health. Principal investigator, John M&ale, is Director of the Center for Integrative Studies, School of Advanced Technology, State University of New York at Binghampton; his research associate was Magda Cordell. The period of study was from June 1971 to June 1972.
FUTURES June lS73
-in SOfar as these divisions retain their stricter meaning today. The gap between the two cultures is being bridged by a set of common anxieties which transcends their differences through a more holistic concern for the survival of human society and its earth environment. The Spaceship Earth6 metaphor has come to provide a flag of mutual convenience for many different groups. It is becoming acceptable, in academic circles, to talk about the future. (Before now it seemed unscholarly, unscientific, even ‘unserious’.) Some of the new energies are spilling over into and influencing the social sciences, the humanities, and other disciplines, forcing them again and again to ask, “what are the hidden side effects, the long-range consequences of any action ?” or “what are the value implications of our behaviour ?” _ . .g
On the surface this may be viewed as an important, and overdue, development. However, a closer look at the traffic over “the bridge”, and the implications of many of the more shrilil statements being broadcast may temper one’s enthusiasm. In some cases, the rush to protect the future from the consequences of an improvident present looks less like concern with the future than with a nostalgic return to past, and even pastoral, simp~cities. Both ~~~~~~n~for ~ur~~~~~ and 7% Limits to Growth, despite the sophistication and rigour of their arguments, share, in varying degree, an intrinsically conservative set of implicit premises. We have gone too far, too fast, perhaps even too comfortably. The dream of (potential) affluence and abundance is over, and the iron law of the exponentials will punish our MrZs by forcing us back upon simpler and more straitened circu~tances. Obviously, there is much that one may agree with in their detailed assessment of possible catastrophe if many of our current malpractices are not corrected. On the other hand, the too ready acceptance by the various ‘official’ establishments, of the n~~~a~thusia~ constraints and l~ita~ons on further material improvement, is in itself somewhat suspicious. Urdway, in his f953, rfraoly af the L&z&~~~~~w~~, was, if Iess sophisticated, at least more candid in his assertion that: The arguments used to support the theory are not based on technical, economic, social or scientific doctrine. This is reasoning influenced by a predilection for the old fashioned luxuries of simplicity (like candlelight) as distinguished from modem engineering achievements (like neon), and synthetics. In the matter of timing, the book submits that “within foreseeable time”’ increasing consumption of resources can produce scarcities serious enough to destroy OUTAmerican Dream of an everhigher level of living and with it our present culture. 7 The extent to which the wider diffusion of scientific and socio-economic concern with longer range futures has so swiftly become part of a larger **social movement” is an important and recent development. It also makes for strange bedfellows! We may note, for example, how the spirit of ‘Woodstock’ interpenetrated the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment with the counter-conference’s Tent City being catered by the Hog Farm commune. Within the more formal sector of the “futures movement” our survey shows an increase in the number of religious groups, voluntary associations,* consumer
oriented work, etc, which have become directly involved. We can gauge also the much larger general audience which has been created by bestsellers like FUTURES
June 1#73
T7teChanging PatternofFutures Research inthe USA
Toffler’s Future Shock, Drucker’s The Age of Dticontin+-and the futures perspective spin-off from the range of ‘eco-crisis’ texts such as The Po~Zut~o~ Bomb, Science and Survival, Famine Nineteen Seventyjive, and many others. Impacting closely one upon the other, these works have created a vast potential audience in the general public. They have also circulated a new range of public metaphors and images which enable more people to address and formulate questions about the future in ways within which they can identify their own experiences, and, importantly, become aware of their personal value preferences for various alternatives. Whilst this widening of participation in future oriented activity is encouraging, there are also some possibly negative connotations which may emerge as it develops a more “mass movement” profile. One can distinguish the following socio-physical types of movements according to the prevailing motivation of their members. (1) The value-rational ‘spiritual community’ or ‘fellowship’ of believers in the truth of constitutive ideas and in the practical aims of a movement. (2) The emotional-affectual ‘following’ of a charismatic leader. (3) The purposive-rationa or utilitarian association fox the pursuit of individual interests. Combinations of these types are frequent, and transition from one type to another may occur during the life cycle of a movement as a community of believe=, in a ‘cause’ may develop into a ‘bandwagon’ attracting socially or politically ambitious opportunists.0 The ccfutures movement” has already attracted many people who have come to it through successive involvement with other issue-oriented movements with the above motivational profiIes, eg civil rights, anti-war, ecology, intentional communities, consumerism, etc. Though the latter movements are still strong, one can observe a high turnover of membership as participants become disenchanted with the lack of more immediate results, and move on successively to other active issues. Such shifts also occur where such movements are co-opted officially, or where their further development lies with less directly active modes of professional participation. It may well be, of course, that this rapid shift of attention from issue to issue and the increase of temporarily active groups and coalitions is an indicator of the future in itself Its other and more negative aspects lie with the dilution and fragmentation of more long term ideas and goals which occurs, and with the fringe effects of cultism, faddism, instant celebrity, etc, as the issues grow and decline in public interest. Some of these side effects may be observable in the futures area. There is, on the one hand, a drive for professional respectability and methodological rigour through more formal organisation and the adoption of what Henshel has called a new “subject imperialism”.l0 A balancing “middle ground” trend here is the development of specific future orientations ~~~~~nthe existing disciplines. The case for this has been best outlined by Maruyama in the pre-conference volume, Towards a Cultural
FuturoZogy,ll for the 1970 American Anthropological Association Cultural Futurology Symposium. Harkins, describing this symposium, also draws attention to : FUTURES
June 1973
259
260
2% Changing Pattern
of Futures Research
in the USA
. - . . (the) skepticism, sadness and even bostiiity expressed by some members of the audience towards apparent elitism-an alleged tendency of the symposium part& pants to &m&ate ihe third world, sisterhood, ethnic, raciaf, social class and other interests from serious treatment . . +The safari to the distant future was to be managed by the corporate, academic, military and other elites, and would mean little for the
currentfy under-classed,unconvinced, and out-classed, whosefutures held more of the same injustice. Or so the argument seemed to go.18
This polarisation within the field was evident as early as the first Oslo Congress in which the present author made a plea against the possible professionalisation of the future “out of all possible interest”“, ie “Our central problem is to keep futures research ‘open-ended’ . . . . We should avoid its division into a number of intellectual provinces cultivated only by their respective expert e&es.” EIise Boufding expresses this decent even more clearly: The pro&ssionai futuristsare too tied to present spatiaf distribution of social, economic and pditicaf. resources, and too wedded to thirty-year projections based on an artificial isolation of a Hellenic-European stream of history from the total stream of history, to be able to conceive of the breaches in time and space that history in its planet-wide dimension should lead us to expect. Their man-computer symbiosis allows for no sense af the totally other, transcendent or otherwise. The paradoxical thought arises that it may be precisely the most prafessionalised of the professional futurists who will be in for the most violent “future shock”“.Xs Some professional futurists have sought to avoid this dilemma by engaging in attempts to involve a wider range of non-professional participant in the ‘?ittures creative” process through continuous interactive “network” dialogues. TheobaId’s work is the most sustained effort in this direction. One of the problems here is that the volume of messages per person increases in direct proportion as the interactive network grows. Attention and available time spans become progressively attenuated as ‘noise” increases on the channel. There is also the tendency for those least engaged in substantive work in the area to be the most active in such organised network interaction. This is not to denigrate such modes for, obviously, they are also “substantive” work albeit of a different nature, The phenomena may also be observed in the growth of documentation, bibliographical services and academic programmes and courses. These are essential to field development and extremely important areas in themselves. However, where they are often accompanied by pressures for closer and more efficient organisation of the field they raise a question which in itself may be questionable. Would more efficiency in or~n~sation~ at this point, be more effective and/or desirabIe? No matter how these internal, field debates may come out, it seems unlikely that the professional&d futurist will be the only, or perhaps even the major, source for the provision of viable projections and firture images through which public policies and other forms of social navigation will be guided. As underlined in our earlier report, the potential contribution of futures research per se is very great. Many areas of its specific functions of alerting the society, exploring new goal and value orientations, etc, are, however, being pre-empted by other
lb
groups, or subsumed above. From predictions
Changing Pattern of Futures Research in t& USA
within the more generalised
social movement
mentioned
to alternatives
This is another shift within our present survey which tends to confirm the above comment. The earlier emphasis, within futures research itself, on ‘forecasting’ and ‘prediction’ seems to have shifted more towards the normative mode of exploring the overall costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, alternative goal orientations and options. Obviously, technological, economic, social, and other forecasting and predictive modes will continue as a central activity and will probably increase in use and degree of sophistication in the areas of technology assessment, social accounting, etc. It is also possible that the use of the term alternatives may simply be a ‘buzzword’ phenomenon-like ‘systems’, ‘eco-crisis’, ‘participatory’, ‘consciousness raising’, and so on. Futures research and social change In our earlier survey of the field we put forward many of these topics in the form of questions. l
l
l
For example, how is futures research related to other institutions and groups affecting change in the present? What is its actual relationship to long-range planning as undertaken in various sectors of society? What z&e effects do the images and projections of future human conditions have upon present perceptions of reality?
To a certain extent, parts of these questions have been answered above. However rational and desirable it may seem that futures exploration should be institutionalised as a “look-out function” for the society, the wider linkage may remain somewhat more indirect and non-linear-even though many such agencies and centres are being developed along these lines. This has been particularly demonstrated in the past three years. Public attention to, and pressure upon, legislative and corporate policies have been spurred on less by the acceptance of coherent and logical future plans and scenarios emanating directly from futures research, than by the profusion of images and metaphors circulating in the mass media, ie in the broadest sense, including paperbacks and other communications. Interestingly enough, many of the more popular images have been negative and dystopian. The book titles themselves sound like a drumroll for the coming Apocalypse, eg The Doonwday Book, Terracide, Our Plundered Planet, The Chasm Ahead, The Hungry Planet, etc. One might speculate on the relationship of this range of imagery to the parallel revival of the gothic novel, the horror movie, and the widespread renewal of interest in the occult and other forms of mystical and transcendental experience. Also, in the rhetorical metaphors which accompany this recent wave of social movements, there is more than a hint of the milleniarist tradition. Anti-
FUTURES
Juno 1973
261
262
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
scientific and anti-technological attitudes combined with an attraction towards romantic irrational&m, exaltation of the immediacy of personal revelation through changes in the levels of ‘group consciousness’, have much in common with the$n de sikcle movements during the latter part of the 19th century, and even with the medieval waves of mrllenarianism. It is characteristic of this type of movement that its aims and premises are boundless. A social struggle is seen not as a struggle for specific limited objectives, but as an event of unique importance, different in kind from all other struggles known to history, a cataclysm from which the world is to emerge totally transformed and redeemed.14 These elements aside, we should note one work, Future Shock, which is somewhat in a class by itself as being neither wholly negative nor dystopian. Whether one may agree with its central thesis or not, it has become a household wordwith over three million copies sold and possibly five or six times that number in multiple readership and translations. The extent to which a single work of this nature may have influenced even larger numbers of people is certainly a strong indicator of widening concern with the future. It is also further evidence of the increased speed and global diffusion of ideas and images in the communications media as playing a major role in changing perceptions of current reality, redefining and reformulating popular attitudes to the future.15 Distilled catchphrases describing the responses of futures research attract popular attention in much the same way as do Old Moore’s predictions. And they begin to assume enormous importance in the public imagination. Population explosion, pollution crisis, post-industrial society, future shock . . . explain conditions and future conditions and are repeated with earnest shakes of the head with scarcely a pause to estimate their validity as generalisations. On the odd occasion some pundit, known or unknown, created or oblivious to the fact that he is being created by the ‘futuristfollowers’, will identify the genesis of a likely future -a future-bearing fact; or he might put into new words with new metaphors, ideas about the future. Quick as a flash the word is abroad, and before you know where you are, another ‘futurist’ is created and a new catchphrase is accepted currency for the ‘futurists’ ledger.16 Future(s)--‘cism”,
ecology” or ccistics”
This is another area of the internal debate in futures research which shows little sign of resolution. It is probably not very important except where it may convey inaccuracies and ambiguities regarding the nature of the field itself. One interesting point may be the unconscious ahistorical use of the term “futurism”. In general, however, the arts in present futures research are a particularly weak area. The 1st World Future Society Congress in Washington did, at least, attempt to include art and design within its exhibition. The result, unfortunately, was certainly less than future oriented-geodesics and inflatables have been around for nearly a quarter of a century. The “art of the future” looked rather more like the Ghost of Christmas Past ! For 1971, it seemed to present an early forerunner to the This is Tomorrow17 exhibition which was held in London in 1956. A quotation from the catalogue notes of the latter event may provide an appropriate closure to these comments:
FUTURES
June 1373
The Changtng Pattern of Futures Research in th USA
men are equal as to nose eyes ears mouth hands feet less so as to language
marrying
brunettes
saying dont know 9 per cent having heard of cybernetics much less so as to having heard of jackson coppi oberth abarth RTP
TNP
IBM
providence
IBV
pollock annette
klooger
dirty dick godot nkruma PM1 PLM
tex
PSI ESP EEG
ARB
IQJ
NPL ZDA
rhode island or divine
never mind how you rate the fact is you do rate contexts
are made of you your likes and dislikes semblables and freres no need to stick to squares
master your context symbols and channels
and the rest shall be added unto
You cult object You culture hero You end product
APPENDIX: Summary
of data obtained from the surveys
Results of the first survey are summarised in Table 1. For the second survey a list of 527 individuals, organisations and institutional units concerned with futures research was used: 260 responded with information. This information was sought and classified under the following headings : (1) Personnel characteristics -overall work force -age range -academic field -level of formal education (2) Orientation of work -forecasting, research, -specific focus
FUTURES
June 1973
planning
263
264
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
TABLE
1. SUMMARY/OF,FIRST,PHASE
SURVEY.l96Q-70
1. Objectives of work. Two-thirds reported major economic and technological focus to their work. Others ranked social, political and environmental foci in that order, with concern for the individual occurring very low in the scale. 2. Range of forecasting. Major concentration on short range (next decade), medium concentration on next thirty years, about 1% on long range, ie beyond next thirty years. (‘Forecasting’ is used here to indicate general range of concern or interest rather than as prediction per se.) 3. Funding support. Was inversely related to length of forecasting-most, for very short term: least, for long term. Allocation by sectors was approximately as follows: Government (in house and contractual) Corporate (mainly internal) Academic Foundations and other agencies
50%
Major support allocated focused objectives.
work in short
to client
;;q 1oy:
defined
4. Disciplinary profile of workers. Dominated chemistry and political science.
by engineering,
range with specifically economics,
physics,
5. Age profile. Showed concentration between 36 and 45 years, suggesting professionals whose major work had been accomplished in their defined fields before moving into the futures research area. 6. Sex. Almost
90% male, with remainder
including
non-professional
‘support’
staff.
7. Generalised conclusions a) Apart from few established institutions, most of significant work in the field done by individuals-not necessarily tied to their institutional setting. b) Major emphasis and funding allocated to short range economic and technological forecasting. c) Lack of adequately supported work in terms of “whole system(s)” and multi_ . variate approaches to national and world problems. d) Little systematic research on values and other areas of socio-cultural change. e) Weak linkage of futures reserch to actual policy planning process and to action.
(3) Funding support and time allocation -amount of time spent -range of annual funding -factors most influencing the direction of futures work (4) Methodologies being used -range of forecasting (5) Communications/information -media used in disseminating information -major sources of information in the field (6) Educational involvement (7) Future directions Academic
background
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the academic backgrounds of respondents to the first and second surveys. Some of the shifts between surveys may be explained as follows: l
Decline in numbers in engineering may be mainly due to reduction in aerospace. Many technological forecasting, and similarly oriented groups, have been disbanded or cut back.
FUTURES
June 1973
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research in th USA
TABLE Second 19714ne
survey (period 1972)
l
FIELD OF RESPONDENT
June First
Social/Behav. sciences Physical sciences Engineering Humanities Education Mathematics Design Arts Life sciences Law Journalism ~~e;salTV
l
2. ACADEMIC
;;;E$ 8.5y; 6.8% 6.2%
survey
(period
19694970)
Engineering Economics Physics Political science Chemistry Psychology Mathematics Business admin. Education Philosophy Business Social science Architecture International relations Urban planning Athropology
36 ;: 12 11 11 9
(in number Finance History Law Statistics E;;ps;ter
of responses) 4 4” science
Geography Medicine Humanities Journalism Landscape architecture Management science Pharmacy Psychiatry Regional planning Theology
f 3 3 ; 2 2 2 : f
Increase in social sciences, behavioural sciences, education, arts, etc., due to: (1) growing interest in these subjects; (2) more futures courses being taught; (3) fashionability. A number of individual workers listed in the first survey in areas of physical science, etc, have moved out of field, eg no longer consider ‘futures’ as a usable definition of their activities-though the activities may remain the same.
Information obtained about the length of time spent by individuals or organisations in futures research shows that the response “more than 10 years” still has the highest percentage (32.8% of individuals and 22.4% of organisations), although a considerable proportion, about half of the individual respondents, have been working in this area less than five years; 29.2% entered within the last three years. Similarly, over half of the organisations (58.6%) entered the field within the last five years, and most of these (37.6%) in the last three years. Orientation
of work
An analysis of the orientation of work, split between individual and organisational responses is set out in Table 3. In forecasting, though the individual and organisational response profiles rank social forecasting high, it should be noted that when this and other categories are regrouped the balance is somewhat different, eg Percent Social Cultural Educational Ecological Population
17.4 89:; 3”:;
G
Percent Technological Economic Market Resources Military Scientific
13.3 10.2 7-O 3’:; 7.0 ZI
In research, however, there is a shift towards Alternative Futures, Social Impacts, Priorities and Value Systems, etc, in both individual and organisational profiles. This difference is, of course, explicable in terms of the general change of social climate in the past two years towards consideration of the social and environmental consequences of technologies. It also indicates an internal divergence which suggests that
FUTURES June 1973
265
266
Th.e Changing Pattern of Futures Research in the USA
TABLE Forecasting
3. ORIENTATION
OF WORK (GENERAL)
Research
Planning
individuals Social Technological Economic Cultural Educational Resources Market Scientific Ecological Manpower Military Population Other
!gi$ 9.82
3.9%
Alternative futures Social impacts/technology Value systems Futures-methodology Social oriorities Policy research Individual in future Environmental Resource utilisation Family in future Manpower Population Consumer affairs Other
14.4% 12.0% 10.9% 10.2% 9.7% 8.8% 7.5% 6.4% 4.5% 4.20/, 3.6% 2.9% 2.1% 2.8%
Social Technological Educational Corporate Urban Scientific Political Resources Regional Ecological Architecture/Design Military Labour Other
11.9% 10.9% 10.6% 10.6% 9.8% 9.3% 8.5O 7.1 4/o 5.3% 4.4% 4.1% 3.9% 2.8% 0.8%
Educational Social Corporate Technological Urban Regional Resources Scientific Ecological Political Architecture/Design: Military Labour Other
8.87 8.59 7*50/, 6.8%
55r 4$ 1.3y: 2.8%
Organisations
Scientific Resouces Ecological Manpower Population h%&ry
7.0% 7.0% 5.9%
2.80/,
Alternative futures Social impacts/technology Social priorites Policy research Value systems Environmental Futures methodology Resources utilisation Individual In future Population Manpower Family in future Consumer affairs Other
12.0% 11.8% 11.1% 16:6? ;I;$ 7.27: 58% 5.6% 3.2%
though the research objectives may be directed towards socio-cultural dimensions the forecasting methodologies tend to be biased towards technological, economic and other measures as more objectively determinable. The planning dimension lies somewhere between the two other areas. More specifically the field of planning itself is an area which tends to be more directly related to social policy and decision making, eg, by inclusion of educational, urban and regional planning, etc, at various levels. This area of response also underlines the degree to which planning in general has become aware of, and more directly linked to futures research. In terms of specific work focus, that is within the general orientation of work above, there was much more heterogeneity. This may be best viewed within the categories shown in Table 4. One may note that emphasis is on the future as approached in terms of macro-social change, changes in society, in organisations and institutions, etc, down to the small community level. The least emphasis is on the future of the individual. A counter note might be that the individual’s future is implied within the macrosocial context but, perhaps, that is the problem. Funding and time spent It is difficult to unravel the ‘interconnections’ of the various sources of funding support. For instance, many individuals reported support source as deriving from the corporation they worked for, which in turn might have contractual funding from government to support this work. Furthermore, some of the larger futures research programmes have varied sector support including business, government and foundations. In general, the responses to questions about the support and its range do not tell
FUTURES June 1873
The Changing Pattern of Futures Research zk the USA
TABLE
4. SPECIFIC
FOCUS OF WORK
Numbers in category
Categories
Organisations
Individuals Alternative
futures
19
Science and technology forecasting Resources Food supply systems Environmental quality Transportation Public service systems Policy research Business Economic forecasting Communications/media National security Military Documentation Science fiction
SUPPORT
AND TIME ALLOCATION
Methodology Planning Social change (general) Institutional change Family Leisure Education F$J$;n Law Values/ethics Politics Individual
TABLE
Numbers in category
Categories
5. FUNDING
Individuals Source of support and time allocated to:
Private business National government Social agencies Local of reg. govt. Foundations International agencies Others
support
lime
Organisations spent+
support
% 35.0 25.9
% 31.7 22.9
;::
;:9”
5.5 2.5 15.5
3.6
I:.: 6.6
2:.90
lg.96
* In terms of percentage
% g.t
Time
spent* % 31.5 23.5 1:.x 4.0 1.0 16.5
of work done for each sector.
much about the total amount of funding given to futures research. The amount of time spent, in terms of percentage of work done for each sector of support, is closely related to the support profile (Table 5). Direction
of work
Analysis of the factors most influencing the direction of futures work revealed that individuals ranked personal and professional interests first, then funding and organisational goals followed closely by “available time”. Organisations ranked organisational goals and funding linked less directly with available time. Perhaps their responses don’t tell us very much directly except where the response profile is obvious. Where questioned on whether their futures work was aimed towards aflecting changein the present, response was quite direct. With 25-30% not replying in each case, the response profile was even-87a/o of both individuals and organisations stated that the aim of their work was to affect present changes. The change process channels ranked as most relevant by both individual and organisations were client relations, corporate policy, educational policy in the first rank; in the second rank-but at considerable scale distance-professional organisations, community groups, political and legislative process. Organisations rated the legislative and political slightly higher than individual respondents.
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The Chunging Pattem of Futures Research in the USA
Methodologies
A comparison of methodologies being used revealed, for example, the lower ranking of Delphi and simulation in the second survey. This may be explicable: l
l
In terms of the fashionability cycle of methodologies. For some time, during 1969-71, there were a large number of Delphi and quasi-Delphi techniques being used, many of them much less rigorous and controlled than those developed by the originators of the method. Consequently, one may assume that these second and third generation Delphis were less productive and took more time, energy and care in their administration than their users had anticipated. In terms of the relatively large inflow of social scientists, educators, and others into the futures area where they tend to use different methodological approaches. This may account for the continued high ranking of “scenario writing” as a method which lends itself more easily to conjecture and “historical analogy” than the Delphi or cross-impact techniques.
As a crosscheck in this area of methodology, respondents were also asked to rank the given list of methods in terms of those most and least preferred (Table 6). TABLE
6. METHODOLOGIES
Most preferred
Scenario building Expert panels Probabilistic forecasting Delphi techniques Simulation Extrapolation techniques Brainstorming Indiv. ‘expert’ forecasting Gaming Cross-impact analysis Historical analogy Operational models Statistical models Causal modeling Relevance trees Contextual mapping Precursive analysis ;;;etFsrk analysis
RANKED
IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE Least preferred
Indiv. ‘expert’ forecasting Expert panels Extrap. techniques Brainstorming Gaming Historical analogy Delphi techniques Statistical models Operational models Probabilistic forecasting Scenario building Contextual mapping Network analysis Simulation Causal modeling Precursive analysis Relevance trees Cross-impact analysis Others
Range of forecasting
The majority of respondents (33.8% of individuals and 41.9% of organisations) are only doing short range forecasting-the next decade. Medium term forecasting (next 30 years) accounts for 33.2% and 3@4%, respectively, and long range (beyond 2000) only 3.1% and 0.8%. But compared with the first survey there is an overall increase in individual long range forecasting and even more in the medium and long range category. The ‘individual’ shift to longer range forecasting probably represents the increase in ecological long range concerns and associated phenomena, eg population, urban concentrations, etc. We may also enter the caveat that not all of the medium to long range studies, or those reporting throughout the ranges, are indicative of continuous and methodical studies, but include ‘intuitive’ scenarios, descriptive and speculative forecasts.
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Future directions One set of questions was directed towards eliciting some profiles of needs, desired directions or reassignment ofpriorities, etc, within the futures field itself The first question addressed was what do we need “more of” in terms of a given list of areas (Table 7). The highest rankings were accorded to professional expertise, critical assessment and futures education-and though popular dissemination was also ranked high, public feedback had slightly less in first rank but was still strongly indicated in successive rankings. TABLE Need more
7. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
:
Ranking
Professional expertise Popular dissemination of work Futures education Critical assessment Conferences, meetings, etc. Public feedback Visual media use Others* Others*:
1
2
3
4
5
32 ;;
21 if
25 ::
21 :2”
8
36
26
22
14
:
8 3
2:
1:
::
0”
15 7
:,
134
2”
3”
interdisciplinary effort; definition of the futures field; coordination of forecasting; channelling of grass-roots (minorities, etc) goals and needs; consistent monitoring against past projections.
The concern with professional expertise and critical assessment is much greater than in the first survey and may well accord with responses given earlier on length of time most respondents have been in the field, and with the emphasis on futures education. To some extent, one may note that there has been a move into the futures area of a number of persons actively concerned with current “issue-oriented” problems. This is particularly demonstrated in Table 8 which ranks responses to the question, “Shouldfutures work be more . . . .?” TABLE Futures
should
8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
be more?
Related to social problems Scientifically oriented Long range Actively engaged with current Methodologically rigorous Engaged with social goals Conjectural Normatively oriented Concerned with the individual Ethically oriented Others
Ranking1 22 : issues
21 :; 8 7 152
2
3
4
5
27 14 7
26 11 8 14 14 19
14 8 ::
1 0 0
13
:,
:o” 24 8 :‘2 7 5
; 11 7 2
3” 70 :4’ 7
0” 1” 0
From this one can discern a strong shift towards engagement with social goals and problems, and with current issues. “Long range” is ranked low in comparison. The lesser emphasis, accorded “scientific orientation” and “conjectural”, underlines this practical shorter range problems/issue orientation. What may be somewhat disturbing is the comparatively lesser ranking of normative ethical orientations which, presumably, should accompany the above shift. Perhaps this is puzzling rather than
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disturbing-but, at any rate, reminds us that this kind of survey can only indicate given patterns of response. In this specific question area one might also suggest that the enquiry attracted greater attention from those more closely involved with current social issues and more concerned, therefore, with underlining their preferences. The last question in the survey sheds more light on the value orientation touched upon above. Here, given a set of statements, respondents were asked to register their level of agreement or disagreement. Strongly
Agree
30
44
79
23
30
70
56
23
37
49
64
33
34 98
zl
61 17
18 4
21
88
46
18
18
59
60
19
6
69
82
43
37
88
41
16
agree
1. The gap between the development of technology and man’s values will increase rather than decrease in the next several decades 2. The development of technology has inevitabiy brought progress to man 3. We are approaching a point in economic and technological development at which growth must be reduced 4. Man is an almost infinitely adaptable creature 5. There has been too much concern for technological development without regard to its social and psychological consequences 6. The future is limited by man’s basic psvcho_ biology 7. The complexities of the modern world suggest that man in the future will have to learn how to organise and live in smaller units 8. “Getting back to nature” represents an important corrective to the artificialities of an urban, industrial way of life 9. As society has become more complex and technologically based, there is more opportunity for individuality than in past periods
Disagree
Strongly disagree
The above shows some interesting clusters of opinion. It is assumed that the gap between the development of technology and values will close though the negative assumption is still high. A somewhat similar ambivalence is shown regarding the proposition that technology has inevitably brought progress. Growth limitation is almost equally balanced. There is a slightly stronger feeling that man can adapt more and that his future is not constrained by his basic psycho-biological make up. Though somewhat closer in balance on the nature versus urban theme, there is a strong proportion of agreement that there is more opportunity for individuality than in past periods. In general terms, within the limitation of the given questions, the response pattern here tends to set the futurist orientation as a relatively optimistic and affirmative one.
Notes and references 1. “Typological Survey of Futures Research in the U.S.“, sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, Contract Number HSM-42-69-47, 1970 2. One should confine this observation more specifically to the USA. There has been a considerable increase in the number of future oriented institutions and individual workers in Western and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan, see also, . . . and mw the future, a PEP survey of futures studies by C. de Hoghton, W. Page and G. Streatfeild (London, PEP, 1971) 3. Such questions have a longer and more traditional history within science than its present critics are aware of. For example, J. D. Bernal’s “World Without War” (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1959) is a key ‘futurist’ work grounded
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4. 5.
6. 7. 8.
9.
10. 11. 12.
13.
14. 15.
16. 17.
within a radical view of the need for fundamental changes in the relationships of science, technology and society which anticipates many of our current discussions. There are other earlier works of this kind which have been similarly neglected Ihe Ecologist, 13 January, 1972 “A Blueprint for Survival”, Adlai Stevenson, 1965, extract from his last speech: “We travel together on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulnerable supplies of air and soil . . . preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and . . . the love, we give our fragile craft.” Alvin Toffler ed, The Futurists (New York, Random House, 1972) pages 4, 5 Samuel H. Ordway, Jr, Resources and The American Dream : Including A Theory of the Limits of Growth (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1953) page V The closer engagement of this sector particularly has been due to the founding of the Center for a Voluntary Society. Constituting a new futures organisation, the latter is directed by John Dixon, one of the key ‘network’ figures in the development of futures research. The mission of the Center is to coordinate the national and international voluntary sectors and to help orient their work towards longer range, and more interrelated sets of policy objectives International Encyclofiedia of the R. Heberis, J. R. Gusfield, “Social Movements”, Social Sciences (New York, Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968) Vol. 14, page 440 Richard L. Henshel, “Sociology and Prediction”, The American Sociologist, Vol. 6, August, 1971, pages 213-220 See also Magorah Maruyama, James A. Dator, eds, Human Futuristics (University of Hawaii, Social Science Research Institute, 1972) Arthur M. Harkins, “The Birth of Cultural Futurology”, paper for the Symposium “Towards a Philosophy of Choice”, First Congress of the World Future Society, Washington, DC, May, 1971 Elise Boulding, “Futurology and the Imaging Capacity of the West”, Teilhard Review, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1972. A fuller version appears as a chapter in Human Futuristics, op. tit Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (Oxford University Press, 1970) We might also note the feedback into the futures movement itself. For example, the First World Future Society Congress in Washington, 1971, included an exhibit booth offering “Future Shock Therapy” “Putting Aside the Crystal Ball”, editorial comment, Futures, Vol. 4, No. 1, March, 1972 Reyner Banham, catalogue notes, This is Tomorrow (The Whitechapel Art Gallery, August g-September 9, 1956)
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