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The concept of information in ordinary discourse
0306-4’73~85 $3 00 + 00 C 198? Pergamon Press Lid
THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION DISCOURSE
IN ORDINARY
RICHARD L. DERR Matthew A. Baxter School of Information and Library Science, Case Western Reserve Umverslty. Cleveland, OH 44106 (Received 17 Januav
1984; in ret+sedform
11 March
1985)
concept of information as it is actually used in ordinary discourse is elucidated, using philosophical methods of conceptual analysis. Five essential properties and four derivative properties of the phenomenon of information are identified. This concept of information is contrasted with several proposed concepts in the Abstract-The
literature
of information
theory.
communication
theory,
Although the concept of information is central to research Science. there is no consensus as to its nature.
and Information
Science.
and practice in Information
In spite of the undeniable utility of information retrieval systems, the conceptual foundations of information science are not well established. In particular, there is no agreement on the nature of information itself.[l]
This condition undoubtedly has retarded theoretical development and, in all likelihood, has prevented the processes of information retrieval and of information transfer from fully realizing their potential. The development of theory ordinarily involves the collective efforts of several researchers in the field. In order for their individual efforts to contribute to a common outcome, minimally, there must be some general agreement as to the nature of the phenomenon which is the subject of the theorizing. Moreover, if we do not agree on what information is, then it is questionable whether we really know when it has been collected, organized, represented, retrieved, disseminated and used. Numerous concepts of information have been proposed in the literature. Shannon’s concept is best known but disagreement exists as to whether it can be extended beyond the context of the engineering aspects of signal transmission[2]. Several authors have proposed concepts or definitions, which, in part, are intended to compensate for the apparent limitations of the Shannon concept[3]. However, none of these concepts or definitions has been integrated extensively into theory construction or practice[4]. No concept or definition, which has been specifically designed for the technical discourses of information theory, communication theory, or Information Science, has been widely accepted by information scientists. Despite the absence of a systematic use of particular concepts of information by researchers and information professionals, some conception as to the nature of this phenomenon undoubtedly is guiding their activities[5]. Given the lack of acceptance of proposed concepts of information, it is a reasonable hypothesis that information specialists are using the concept(s) of information which prevails in ordinary discourse to deal with the tasks of developing and operating information systems. Hence, it behooves us to better understand the concept(s) which information specialists apparently have brought to their professional tasks from everyday experience. Even if this hypothesis is incorrect, the clarification of the concept of information as it is actually used in ordinary discourse provides a base for further analysis of the concept within the field of Information Science. This paper has two purposes: (1) elucidate the concept of information in ordinary discourse, using philosophical methods of conceptual analysis; and (2) compare and 489 IPpl21:6-8
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contrast the concept of information in ordinary discourse with certain proposed concepts in the literature. Reference will be made to a conceptual analysis of information by Christopher Fox which recently has been published[6]. Fox’s major conclusion is that information is propositions. The following analysis fails to corroborate this conclusion. METHODOLOGY
This conceptual analysis is based upon the view that a concept is an abstract specification of properties which are essential for membership in a class of objects[7]. Hence, the elucidation will focus upon the identification of the essential properties of the phenomenon of information. Since classes of objects are denoted by words, e.g. “information,” concepts and word meanings are essentially equivalent entities. Our conception of the essential properties of a class of objects constitutes a set of criteria which guides our use of a word to refer to members of this class. In effect, then, the notion of what a word means is reflected in the set of criteria we use for determining whether the word applies to a particular object. Accordingly, an analysis of the use of “information” in various sentential contexts can yield an identification of the implicit concept which is guiding the application of the word in such contexts. If it is discovered that a single set of criteria is guiding the use of “information” in a variety of sentences, then it is reasonable to conclude that there is a single, prevailing concept of information in ordinary discourse. The criteria (or essential properties) will be elicited by an identification of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the truth of sentences whose truth is not likely to be questioned. The sentences which will be analyzed consist of claims pertaining to the phenomenon of information. In several of the sentences, the referent of “information” will be clearly indicated. Our query will be as follows: (1) what properties must information necessarily have in order for the claim to be true? (2) are these necessary conditions sufficient to insure the truth of the claim? These conditions will yield a specification of the essential properties of those entities in the sentences which are referred to as instances of “information”[8]. This mode of analysis differs somewhat from Fox’s approach. Fox does not make explicit his notion of the nature of concepts. While he occasionally uses sentential analysis, he does not treat sentences explicitly as claims; consequently, he does not seem to recognize the utility of using sentences in which the referent of “information” is clearly indicated. This device affords the opportunity for subjecting instances of the phenomenon to rigorous analysis. NECESSARY
AND SUFFICIENT
CONDITIONS
The analysis will begin with the following sentence: 1. Sentence A, “The school is large and old.” contains more information than Sentence B, “The school is large.” The first condition to be noted is that information must be a representation of some kind. If Sentence A said no more than Sentence B, i.e., if it provided no representation beyond that provided by B, then it would be false that it contains more information than B. To say that information is a representation is to say that its content assumes some identifiable form. So, a necessary condition for the truth of the claim in Sentence 1 is that the additional information be represented in some way. What kind of representation is information? This writer agrees with Fox that information is an abstract entity[9]. Support for this claim is provided by the fact that Sentence 1 claims that A contains more information than B. It is not asserted than A is more information than B. A sentence is a physical object. A written sentence is a meaningful sequence of marks on paper or some other surface. A spoken sentence is a meaningful sequence of sounds. If information were a physical object, such as a sentence, Sentence 1 could be true only if it were reformulated so as to claim that A
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is more i~ormation than B, which is counter-intuitive. In Sentence 1, information is an abstract representation contained in the physical object of a sentence. It also is appropriate to say that information is expressed or provided by sentences. There will be further discussion of the abstract nature of information below. It is necessary that the representation be meaningful. If the representations contained by Sentences A and B were structured in ways which made them incomprehensible, then such representations could not be used to form sentences, Consequently, A and B would not exist, and, obviously, it would be false that A contains more info~ation than B. Another property of information is that it pertains to objects. “Objects” is defined broadly to include individuals, groups, situations, linguistic expressions, abstract entities, physical things, and other existents. We would not say that the expression “and old” by itself contains information. It does so only within a sentential context in which reference is made to an object. So the truth of the claim in Sentence 1 depends on the fact that “information” pertains to an object, that is the school. How does the representation pertain to the object, in question, the school? It consists of a determination which has been made of the school. It has been determined that the school is old. A determination is a judgment of what is the case. It is true that Sentence A contains more information than Sentence B because it contains a representation of two determinations which have been made of the school, that it is large and that it is old, whereas the representation in Sentence B contains only a single determination. (It is assumed that both sentences refer to the same school.) Five necessary conditions of the truth of the first sentence have been identified: In order for Sentence I to be true, it is necessary that: (1) i~ormation be a representation, (2) that the representation be abstract, (3) that the representation be meaningful, (4) that the representation consists of determinations which have been made, (5) that the determinations have been made of certain objects. None of these conditions by itself is sufficient to insure the truth of this sentence; however, jointly, they constitute a set of sufficient conditions. No other condition appears necessary in order for this sentence to be true. If information is an abstract, meanin~ul representation of determinations which have been made of objects, then it is true that “The school is large and old” contains more information than “The school is large.” Within the context of this sentence, “and old” contains a meaningful representation of a determination which has been made of an object. EXPLORING
THE HYPOTHESIS
The analysis of Sentence 1 has produced the hypothesis that i~ormation is an abstract, meanin~ul representation of determinations made of objects. The hypothesis now will be explored by an examination of a variety of other sentences. 2. “The following sentences provide the same information: (A) ‘John memorized the Declaration of Independence.’ (B) ‘The Declaration of Independence was memorized by John.“’ The common information which A and B provide is not a physical object. It is not the sentences themselves since the common information is provided by the sentences. This common i~ormation is an abstraction. It cannot be seen, heard, or touched; it only can be apprehended by the mind. Of course, it can be represented as a physical entity by being formulated into words which are uttered or written. But, within the context of Sentence 2, the information which is common to the two sentences is an abstract representation and it is knowable only by apprehension or intuition[lO]. This abstract representation is meaningful. A and B could not be formulated as sentences if the representations which they contain were meaningless. Moreover, this representation pertains to an object, i.e. the Declaration of Independence, and a dete~ination which has been made in regard to the object, Le. John memorized it (or,
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it was memorized by John). Our analysis of Sentence 2 supports the hypothesis that information is an abstract, meaningful representation of determinations made of objects. Let us consider another sentence. 3. “Carl told me that the Martin Company went bankrupt, but I don’t know where he got that information.” In this sentence, the information, in question, is expressed by the phrase, “the Martin Company went bankrupt.” Again, information is a meaningful representation of a determination made in regard to an object. It has been determined by the originator of the information that the Martin Company went bankrupt. That this representation is abstract in nature is evidenced by the fact the information would remain the same whether it had been written by Carl or uttered by someone else. It may be objected that there are clear examples of where the referent of information is some kind of spatio-temporal entity such as a physical object or a psychological entity. Examples of the former will be considered first: 4. “There is information about the concert next week on the bulletin board.“ Using our general knowledge of the situation described in Sentence 4, it appears that the referent of “information” in this sentence are the linguistic expressions and figures on a piece of paper regarding an upcoming concert, for example, when it is scheduled, where it will be held, who will participate, etc. However, on closer examination, it is clear that this is a case of where information as an abstract entity has been given a physical representation. Consider sentences which hearers of Sentence 4 could utter: 5. “I can give you the same information myself.” 6. “The same information can be found in the newspaper.” If information were a physical entity, then it would be a particular spatio-temporal entity, and, it could not exist in several places. If the information is on the bulletin board, it could not be given by the speaker of Sentence 5 or exist in the newspaper. A similar rebuttal could be made in the case of Sentence 7. 7. “Policeman A asked Policeman B for the information given about a crime by the victim and was handed a set of notes taken by Policeman B.” The same information could be given by the victim to a newspaper reporter or it could be reconstructed by the policemen at the police station, assuming that Policeman A has misplaced the notes he had received from Policeman B. Note, the information consists of determinations made about an object; that is. the crime. by the victim. Sentence 8 below is ambiguous. It appears that “information” may refer either to a physical object-probably notes-or to memories stored by Susan in regard to the accident. 8. “Susan has information about the accident which she does not want to give to the police.” This ambiguity is itself evidence against that the claim that information is a physical object, on the one hand, or that it is a psychological entity, on the other hand. Again, spatio-temporal entities exist in a particular location and at a particular time. If information were a set of notes taken by Susan about the accident, then it could not be memories which she possesses. But an abstraction can be given a physical representation or cognized and remembered. To say that Susan has information about the accident either is to say that she has notes in regard to such matters as when the accident occurred, how it occurred, and who was responsible, or that she has stored such determinations about the accident in her memory. These same determinations could have been noted or remembered by other witnesses, supporting the conclusion that information is abstract in nature. It should be emphasized that numerous persons can understand, remember, or forget the same information. Each of these understandings, memories, and forgotten memories is a particular spatio-temporal entity pertaining to one and the same abstraction. Information is one thing and its understanding or memorization by particular persons is another. They are distinctly different entities. The former is an abstraction and the latter are psychological representations, which may pertain to information.
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When we say that individuals “get,” “acquire,” “glean,” or “extract” information, we are referring to psychological processes which are occurring in regard to information, not to the phenomenon, itself. Consider the following sentences. 9. “Narry got more information from the meeting than I did.” 10. “Two individuals can read an article on the causes of the Civil War and differ in the amount of information which they extract from it.” Reference is being made in these sentences to the cognitive processes of perception, comprehension, and learning which the individuals in question are performing in regard to information. To say that information is gotten or extracted is to say that individuals have formed cognitive representations of certain abstractions. These cognitive structures should not be confused with information, which is an objective, abstract entity. USEOFOTHERTYPESOFSENTENCES
The analysis of “information” thus far has been limited to its use in declarative sentences. The hypothesis will be explored further by dete~ning whether it holds in the case of interrogative sentences and imperative sentences. 11. “Do you have information on the whereabouts of the three brothers?” The speaker is asking the listener whether he has determined where the three brothers are located. Information here is a representation pertaining to an object, the three brothers, and consists of determinations made in regard to their whereabouts. That the representation is meanin~~l is indicated by the fact that the speaker undoubtedly would not be requesting information if it were a meaningless phenomenon. Since the ambiguity noted in Sentence 8 also exists here, the same arguments can be used to support the conclusion that information is an abstract object. Consider another example. 12. “Should we collect information on the voting records of the opposition party?” The speaker is asking whether he and others should collect representations consisting of determinations as to how each member of the opposition party voted on various issues. These abstract representations probably are available in the form of verbal testimony or written records. Clearly. the same concept of information, which was employed in the declarative sentences, is being used in the above questions. Likewise, the same concept appears in the following commands: 13. “Get me all the information which you can about our competitor’s products and report your findings to me immediately.” The speaker is ordering the listener to collect representations of determinations which have been made of the competitor’s products, presumably, what they are, how well they are selling, whether customers have experienced problems with them and so on. 14. “Give me all the i~ormation which you and the other doctors have about my condition.” The patient is directing a physician to provide him with a summary of whatever determinations the latter and other physicians have made of his condition. DERIVATIVE
PROPERTIES
Support has been provided for the hypothesis that information is an abstract, meaningful representation of determinations made of objects. On the basis of this analysis, no other property appears essential to the existence of instances of the phenomenon of information. Further analysis, of course, may reveal other essential properties. In addition to the five essential properties. a set of four derivative properties are possessed by each member of the class of things which we call “info~ation.” These properties owe their existence ultimately to the existence of one or more of the essential or primary properties of information. The derivative properties are as follows: 1. Communicability property: information has the capacity of being comprehended by individuals.
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property: information has the capacity to acquaint individuals with states of affairs with which they previously were unfamiliar. 3. Empowering property: information makes it possible for individuals to take courses of actions which otherwise they may not have taken. 4. Quantitative property: information varies in amount. Communicability
property
Since information is a meaningful representation, it can be communicated to individuals. The i~ormation in the sentence, “The school is Large and old.” can be communicated to individuals who understand the sentence. The isolation about the accident which Susan may have stored in her memory can be communicated to others. The information about the concert on the bulletin board is communicated to those who comprehend it. Communicability is a derivative property, in that it issues from two primary properties of i~ormation, namely, that it is me~in~ul and is a representation of past states of affairs. If information did not form a representation, then there would be nothing existing to be communicated. If that representation were meaningless, it could not be understood. informing
property
This property also can be identified by a re-examination of previously discussed sentences. It is precisely because information has the essential properties which it does have that the information on the bulletin board has the capacity to acquaint individuals with states of affairs with which they were previously unfamiliar. The state of affairs with which they become acquainted is the determinations or judgments about the concert made by the originator of the information. The informing property derives directly from the fact that information is communicable and indirectly from the fact that it is a meaningful representation and that the representation consists of determinations which have been made of objects. Coming into possession of information enables the individual to become informed of determinations made of objects by others. So by reading the information on the bulletin board, individuals can become acquainted with judgments as to the date and time of the concert, the Iocation of the concert, and so on. It should be emphasized that it is being claimed that information has the capacity to inform, rather than that information is that which informs. That information actually acquaints an individual with a state of affairs is not a necessary condition for it being information. The expressions and figures regarding the concert provide information about the concert even though a given reader of the i~ormation already may be familiar with the details regarding the concert. Otherwise, we would have the absurd situation of where this abstract object exists in one circumstance, for example at IO:02 A.M. when Mary Bell, who was not acquainted with the details regarding the concert, read them, but does not exist at 1093 A.M. on the same day when Joe Whitman, who was acquainted with the detaiIs, read them. Indeed, the information about the concert is information even if no one becomes informed as a result of reading the notice on the bulletin board. But, information does possess the capacity to inform, which is actualized under the condition of unfamiliarity with its content on the part of a comprehending reader or listener. This conclusion holds no matter what form the abstract entity of information is given. Consider Sentence 8, in which the referent of “information” may be a psychological entity. Susan has the information about the accident even though she may not share it with the police or anyone else. Or, consider the case in which information is obviously an abstract entity, as in Sentence 2. It is true that the two sentences which pertain to John’s memorizing the Declaration of Independence contain the same information whether anyone hears or reads the sentences and consequently becomes informed about the situation involving John and the Declaration of Independence.
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This conclusion differentiates the concept of information in ordinary discourse from several proposed concepts of information in the literature of information theory, communication theory, and Information Science. Belkin defines “information” as “the structure of any text which is capable of changing the image structure of some recipient.“[ 1l] Belkin believes information is that which has the capacity to change the state of knowledge of a recipient. His expression, “changing the recipient’s state of knowledge ,” is roughly equivalent to our expression, “becoming acquainted with a state of affairs with which one was previously unfamiliar.” Insofar as this particular point is concerned, the difference between Belkin’s concept and the concept within ordinary discourse is that this capacity to produce a change in the recipient is an essential property in the case of the former and a derivative property in the case of the latter. MacKay[ 121 defines information “as that which does logical work on the organism’s orientation.” Information is that which changes the cognitive structures that the individual uses to relate himself to the environment. This is similar to the view of Nauta[l3] who describes information as “that which removes the doubt, restricts the uncertainty, reduces the ignorance, curtails the variance.” MacKay and Nauta share with Belkin the view that information is concerned with changing the cognitive structures of the individual. However, Belkin regards information as that which has the capacity to change such structures; whereas, MacKay and Nauta conceive of information as that which actually changes such structures. Hence the concepts held by MacKay and Nauta differ from the concept in ordinary discourse since, in the latter, the property of informing the individual is also viewed as a capacity. An entity may be information whether it informs or changes the cognitive structures of any given individual. Moreover, the informing property is derivative, in the case of the ordinary concept; whereas, changing the cognitive structures of the individual is essential to the concepts proposed by MacKay and Nauta. Some theorists treat information as a psychological phenomenon. Hintikka[ 141, for example, defines information as follows: “The information of s is the amount of uncertainty we are relieved of when we come to know that s is true.” Being relieved of uncertainty is a psychological state. Pratt[lS] defines information as: the alteration of the Image which occurs when it receives a message. Information is thus an event which occurs at some unique point in time and space, to some particular individual. . . (It is) “That-which-occurs-within-the-mind-upon-absorption-of-a-message.”
Such definitions make the existence of the phenomenon of information dependent upon whether the receiver undergoes some psychological process such as being relieved of uncertainty or having his cognitive structures altered. As we have seen, information, as it is conceptualized in everyday experience, is an objective phenomenon. It exists independently of whether it produces an effect on a receiver. This holds no matter what representational form it is given. Another difference between the concept in ordinary discourse and the concepts held by Hintikka and Pratt should be noted. The latter conceptualize information in terms of consequences, namely, the reduction of uncertainty or alteration of the individual’s images of the world. In the case of the former, information is an entity which may produce such consequences. Despite these differences, there is a significant affinity between the concept proposed by Hintikka and the ordinary concept. Information, in the ordinary sense, is the product of a cognitive act in which an individual or individuals has resolved an uncertainty ai to what is the case in regard to certain objects. Information is a record of resolved uncertainty; that is, the making of a determination. The resolution of uncertainty is pertinent to the ordinary concept of information, in regard to the relationship between the cognitive act of making a determination and the creation of a representation. In Hintikka’s case it pertains to the relationship between some unspecified phenomenon
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and receivers. Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that the belief held by information theorists such as Hintikka, Shannon and Weaver[ 161, and Bar-Hillel and Carnap[l7] that information is concerned, in some way, with the resolution of uncertainty is corroborated by this analysis of the concept in ordinary discourse. Hintikka’s definition also implies that the question of whether an entity is information cannot be settled until its truth status has been determined. Such is not the case in ordinary discourse. We identify entities as information even though their truth status may be unknown. For example, in regard to Sentence 7, Policeman A does not first verify the statements made to Policeman B by the victim of a crime before he refers to them as information. Or, as in the case of Sentence 8, it is meaningful to say that Susan has information about the accident, even though it has not been verified. The truth and falsity of information is not essential to its nature. These sentences are counterexamples to Fox’s claim that information is propositions. For, if this were the case, truth or falsity would be an essential consideration in identifying certain entities as information. This follows from the fact that the property of truth and falsity is central to the concept of a proposition.[l8] Recall the analysis of Sentences 1 and 2. The issue of truth and falsity simply was not relevant to the question of whether “The school is large and old.” contains more information than “The school is large.” or whether sentences in the active and passive voices can provide the same information. Information and propositions are both abstract entities but the former cannot be reduced to the latter. It is a distinct kind of abstraction. In a related point, Hintikka’s concept implies that an entity is information if and only if it is true. This view also is held by Dretske[l9]. Clearly, truth is not an essential property of the concept of information in ordinary discourse. If the statements made by the victim of a crime (Sentence 7) proved to be false, we would not say that the victim had no information about the crime. We would say that his information was incorrect. Support for this conclusion is given by the fact that such sentences as the following are commonplace: 15. “Is her information accurate?” 16. “Your information is wrong.” 17. “Check out his information.” Moreover, the internal logic of our language must be taken into account. Information would not be described as “false,” “incorrect,” “wrong,” and “inaccurate” if truth were inherent to the concept. These adjectives are appropriate, as are “true,” “corbecause determinations which are made either may rect, ” “right,” and “accurate,” be correct or incorrect. Empowering property This property is derived from the informing property of information which, of course, was derived from the primary properties. The capacity of information to inform makes it possible for individuals to take courses of action which otherwise they may not have taken. If information lacked the capacity to inform, it would have no bearing on the states of affairs which individuals could consider when planning courses of action, The empowering property of information is akin to the common belief that knowledge is power. Obviously, the empowering property of information is the principal source of its immense practical utility. It goes far in explaining why information is such a significant force in the world. Quantitative Property The concept of information in ordinary discourse has a quantitative dimension. Information varies in amount in two respects: (1) the number of determinations made of objects which any given representation contains, (2) the specificity with which objects are identified in the representation. The quantitative property is derivative in that whatever determinations the representation contains such determinations will exist in some
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number; moreover, the expression that identifies the object to which the determination pertains necessarily will be formulated in terms of some degree (high, medium, low) of specificity. We say that “The school is large and old.” contains more information than “The school is large,” because the former contains two determinations whereas the latter contains only one. Sentence 18 contains more information than Sentence 19 because an additional determination has been made about vacations. 18. “Vacations are fun, but they also may be expensive.” 19. “Vacations are fun.” On the other hand, Sentence 20 contains more information than Sentence 21 because the object about which a determination has been made; that is, the city, is identified in more specific terms. 20. “The southeastern section of the city contains a high proportion of ethnic groups. ’ ’ 21. “A section of the city contains a high proportion of ethnic groups.” Often it is not clear in which of the two respects information is being treated as a quantity. Consider Sentence 22, for example. 22. “The amount of information in those manuals is too great for our salesmen to grasp.” The term “amount” is ambiguous, since it may either refer to the number of determinations made of objects or to the specificity of the objects. Such ambiguity in the reference to the quantitative property of information is common as suggested by the sentences below: 23. “How much information do you want?” 24. “He has a lot of information about the stock market.” 25. “News broadcasts sometimes give less information than you need to form judgments.” The context within which such sentences are presented may allow disambiguation of the quantitative expression. It is worthwhile noting that the quantitative aspect of the concept of information in ordinary discourse is different from the quantitative concept of information in Shannon’s and Weaver’s communication theory. In the latter, information is viewed exclusively as a quantity[tO]. Information is the amount of choice or the amount of uncertainty involved in the selection of a message, which is produced by the statistical character of the set of messages from which the message was selected[21]. If the probability of each message in the set being selected is equal, then the amount of information, choice or uncertainty is maximal. If the probability of selection is greater, in the case of a particular message, then the amount of choice, uncertainty, or information is less. One fundamental difference between the concept of isolation in communication theory and the ordinary concept is that, in the former, the quantity of information arises from the reIationship of the selected message to other possible messages in the set, whereas, in the latter, quantity is a property of the representation itself. In the case of the Shannon and Weaver concept, the statistical character of the entire set of messages must be known before the quantity of information can be determined. On the other hand, the quantity of information can be determined, in the case of the ordinary concept of information, from an inspection of the representation itself, specifically, by determining the specificity with which objects are identified and the number of determinations which it contains. SUMMARY
This paper has developed and explored the hypothesis that information. as it is reflected in ordinary discourse, is an abstract, meaningful representation of determinations made of objects. Furthermore, it has been concluded that information has derivative properties which enable it to communicate, inform, empower and to exist
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in some quantity. These conclusions are empirical in nature. They constitute findings from an analysis of language. This is one point of contrast between the concept of information which has been identified in this paper and the other concepts which have been discussed. The latter are proposals, not claims as to what the concept is, as it is used in some type of discourse. hopefully, the tentative conclusions which have been reached here will be subjected to further examination. Its use in ordinary discourse shoufd be analyzed further, Additional concepts may be discovered. Another promising direction for research would be to determine the criteria which are guiding the use of “information” in the literature of Information Science. Such an analysis would provide a direct test of the hypothesis that the concept of information from ordinary discourse is being employed by researchers and practitioners as they deal with the tasks of the field. The analysis of sentences which refer clearly to the phenomenon of information and in which claims are made in regard to this phenomenon provides a ‘useful methodology for identifying the concepts which actually are being used. Once these concepts have been identified, then it would be possible to determine the consequences of such use for the way the problems of the field are being formulated and attacked. Generally, it has been discovered here that the concept of information in ordinary discourse differs significantly from certain concepts which have been proposed in the literature. Various differences were identified between it and the concepts which have been advanced by Belkin, Pratt, MacKay, Shannon and Weaver, Bar-Hillel and Carnap, Nauta, Hintikka, Dretske, and Fox. However it does support the views that i~ormation is an abstract phenomenon and that it is concerned with the resolution of uncertainty, in the sense that it is a record of resolved uncertainty. REFERENCES I. Walker. D. W. “The Organization
and Use of Information: Contributions of Information Science. Computational Linguistics, and Artifical Intelligence. ” J. Am. Sot. Inform. Sri. 32(S): 349; 1981. 2. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. Thr ,~a~~e~urirul Theor?: qf Cum~7i~n;cu~ion. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press; 1949. S. Artandi Information Concepts and Their Utility. J. Am. Sac. Inform. Sci. 24(4): 1973; 300-304. Cherry, C. On Haman Communication. (Second Edition) Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press; 1966. Singh, J. Great Ideas in Information Theoq. Language. and Cybernerics. New York: Dover Publications; 1966. 3. Bar-Hillel, Y. and Carnap, R. “Semantic Information.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 4(14): 1953; 144-157. Hintikka, J. “The Varieties of Information and Scientific Explanation.” (Edited by B. Van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal). Logic, Methodology, andPhilosophy ofscience III. 311-332. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company 31 l-332; 1968. Nauta, D. The Meaning ofInformation. The Hague: Mouton; 1972. MacKay, D. M. fnformation, Mechanism and Meaning. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press; 1969. Belkin, N. J. “information Concepts for Information Science.” J. Dar. 34(l): 5.5-85; 1978 Belkin, N. J. and Robertson. S. E. *~lnformation Science and the Phenomenon of Information.” J. Am. Sot. Inform. Sri. 27{4): 197-204; 1976. Dretske, F. 1. Kn&edge and ihe F/o)13 of Information. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press; 1981. Hoffman, E. “Defining Information: An Analysis of the Information Content of Documents.” Inform. Proc. Munagement. 16(6): 291-304; 1980. A. D. Pratt, The Information of the Image. Libri, 27(3): 204-220; 1977. 4. Hoffman, E. “Defining Information: An Analysis of the Information Content of Documents.” Inform. Proc. Management.
16(6): 291; 1980.
5. Belkin. N. J. “Information Concepts of Information Science.” J. Dor. 34(l): 1978: 62. Fox. c. J. Information and Misinformation. Connecticut: Greenwood Press (1983). 76: Schwartz. S. P. fed.) Naminp, Necessitv. and Natural Kinds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1977; i6-20. &pi, I. I&. ~~fro~~~~o~ fo Lo& (Fourth Edition) New York: MacMillan 1972; 125. Lewis. C. I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Vu~aafjo~. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company Illinois 1946: 131-170. Werkmeister, W. H. The Basis and Structure ofKnowledge. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers: 1948; 3-72. 8. Wittaenstein and Austin are notable critics of this approach. See Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Znvekgations. New York: Macmillan: 1958. Austin, x L. Philosophical Papers. London: oxford University Press; 1961. 9. Fox, C. J. Information and Misinformation. Connecticut: Greenwood Press; 1983. 10. Katz, J. J. Language and Other Abstract Objects. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield; 1981; 19273n 11. Be&in, N. J. “Information Concepts for Isolation Science.” J. Dot. 34(l): 80, 1978 12. MacKay, D. M. ~~farmuzion, Mechanism and Meaning. MIT Press; 1969: 95. 13. Nauta, D. The Meaning of Information. The Hague: Mouton; 1972; 179. a..“.
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14. Hintikka. J. “The Varieties of Information and Scientific Explanation.” (Edited by B. Van Rootselaar and .I. F. Staal) Logic, Methodology, nnd Philosophy ofbcience. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company: 1968; 311-312. 15. Pratt, A. D. “The Information of the Image.” Libri. 27(3): 204-220. 1977. 16. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. The Mathematical Theoq of Communication. Urbana The University of lllinois Press; 1949. 17. Bar-Hillel, Y. and Carnap, R “Semantic Information.” &if. J. Phil. Sri.. 4( 14): 144-157: 1953. 18. Cohen, M. R. and Nagel,.E. An Inrroducrion ?o Logic and Scientific Method. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company: (1934); 27; Langer, S. K. An Introduction ro Symbolic Logic (Second Revised Edition). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,; 1953; Lewis, C. I. An Analysis ofKnoM,/edge and Valuation. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company; 1950; Rosenberg, J. F. and Travis, C. “Introduction: Propositions.” Readings in the Philosophy of Language. New Jersey: 1971; 219_*_ LLL.
19. Dretske, F. I. Knowledge and the Flow ofInformation. Massachussets: MIT Press; 1981: 43-45. 20. Dretske, F. I. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Massachussets: MIT Press; 1981: 3. 21. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. The Mathematical Theory of Communicarion. Urbana: The Umversity of Illinois Press: 1949.
THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION DISCOURSE
IN ORDINARY
RICHARD L. DERR Matthew A. Baxter School of Information and Library Science, Case Western Reserve Umverslty. Cleveland, OH 44106 (Received 17 Januav
1984; in ret+sedform
11 March
1985)
concept of information as it is actually used in ordinary discourse is elucidated, using philosophical methods of conceptual analysis. Five essential properties and four derivative properties of the phenomenon of information are identified. This concept of information is contrasted with several proposed concepts in the Abstract-The
literature
of information
theory.
communication
theory,
Although the concept of information is central to research Science. there is no consensus as to its nature.
and Information
Science.
and practice in Information
In spite of the undeniable utility of information retrieval systems, the conceptual foundations of information science are not well established. In particular, there is no agreement on the nature of information itself.[l]
This condition undoubtedly has retarded theoretical development and, in all likelihood, has prevented the processes of information retrieval and of information transfer from fully realizing their potential. The development of theory ordinarily involves the collective efforts of several researchers in the field. In order for their individual efforts to contribute to a common outcome, minimally, there must be some general agreement as to the nature of the phenomenon which is the subject of the theorizing. Moreover, if we do not agree on what information is, then it is questionable whether we really know when it has been collected, organized, represented, retrieved, disseminated and used. Numerous concepts of information have been proposed in the literature. Shannon’s concept is best known but disagreement exists as to whether it can be extended beyond the context of the engineering aspects of signal transmission[2]. Several authors have proposed concepts or definitions, which, in part, are intended to compensate for the apparent limitations of the Shannon concept[3]. However, none of these concepts or definitions has been integrated extensively into theory construction or practice[4]. No concept or definition, which has been specifically designed for the technical discourses of information theory, communication theory, or Information Science, has been widely accepted by information scientists. Despite the absence of a systematic use of particular concepts of information by researchers and information professionals, some conception as to the nature of this phenomenon undoubtedly is guiding their activities[5]. Given the lack of acceptance of proposed concepts of information, it is a reasonable hypothesis that information specialists are using the concept(s) of information which prevails in ordinary discourse to deal with the tasks of developing and operating information systems. Hence, it behooves us to better understand the concept(s) which information specialists apparently have brought to their professional tasks from everyday experience. Even if this hypothesis is incorrect, the clarification of the concept of information as it is actually used in ordinary discourse provides a base for further analysis of the concept within the field of Information Science. This paper has two purposes: (1) elucidate the concept of information in ordinary discourse, using philosophical methods of conceptual analysis; and (2) compare and 489 IPpl21:6-8
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R. L. DERR
contrast the concept of information in ordinary discourse with certain proposed concepts in the literature. Reference will be made to a conceptual analysis of information by Christopher Fox which recently has been published[6]. Fox’s major conclusion is that information is propositions. The following analysis fails to corroborate this conclusion. METHODOLOGY
This conceptual analysis is based upon the view that a concept is an abstract specification of properties which are essential for membership in a class of objects[7]. Hence, the elucidation will focus upon the identification of the essential properties of the phenomenon of information. Since classes of objects are denoted by words, e.g. “information,” concepts and word meanings are essentially equivalent entities. Our conception of the essential properties of a class of objects constitutes a set of criteria which guides our use of a word to refer to members of this class. In effect, then, the notion of what a word means is reflected in the set of criteria we use for determining whether the word applies to a particular object. Accordingly, an analysis of the use of “information” in various sentential contexts can yield an identification of the implicit concept which is guiding the application of the word in such contexts. If it is discovered that a single set of criteria is guiding the use of “information” in a variety of sentences, then it is reasonable to conclude that there is a single, prevailing concept of information in ordinary discourse. The criteria (or essential properties) will be elicited by an identification of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the truth of sentences whose truth is not likely to be questioned. The sentences which will be analyzed consist of claims pertaining to the phenomenon of information. In several of the sentences, the referent of “information” will be clearly indicated. Our query will be as follows: (1) what properties must information necessarily have in order for the claim to be true? (2) are these necessary conditions sufficient to insure the truth of the claim? These conditions will yield a specification of the essential properties of those entities in the sentences which are referred to as instances of “information”[8]. This mode of analysis differs somewhat from Fox’s approach. Fox does not make explicit his notion of the nature of concepts. While he occasionally uses sentential analysis, he does not treat sentences explicitly as claims; consequently, he does not seem to recognize the utility of using sentences in which the referent of “information” is clearly indicated. This device affords the opportunity for subjecting instances of the phenomenon to rigorous analysis. NECESSARY
AND SUFFICIENT
CONDITIONS
The analysis will begin with the following sentence: 1. Sentence A, “The school is large and old.” contains more information than Sentence B, “The school is large.” The first condition to be noted is that information must be a representation of some kind. If Sentence A said no more than Sentence B, i.e., if it provided no representation beyond that provided by B, then it would be false that it contains more information than B. To say that information is a representation is to say that its content assumes some identifiable form. So, a necessary condition for the truth of the claim in Sentence 1 is that the additional information be represented in some way. What kind of representation is information? This writer agrees with Fox that information is an abstract entity[9]. Support for this claim is provided by the fact that Sentence 1 claims that A contains more information than B. It is not asserted than A is more information than B. A sentence is a physical object. A written sentence is a meaningful sequence of marks on paper or some other surface. A spoken sentence is a meaningful sequence of sounds. If information were a physical object, such as a sentence, Sentence 1 could be true only if it were reformulated so as to claim that A
The concept of information
in ordinary discourse
491
is more i~ormation than B, which is counter-intuitive. In Sentence 1, information is an abstract representation contained in the physical object of a sentence. It also is appropriate to say that information is expressed or provided by sentences. There will be further discussion of the abstract nature of information below. It is necessary that the representation be meaningful. If the representations contained by Sentences A and B were structured in ways which made them incomprehensible, then such representations could not be used to form sentences, Consequently, A and B would not exist, and, obviously, it would be false that A contains more info~ation than B. Another property of information is that it pertains to objects. “Objects” is defined broadly to include individuals, groups, situations, linguistic expressions, abstract entities, physical things, and other existents. We would not say that the expression “and old” by itself contains information. It does so only within a sentential context in which reference is made to an object. So the truth of the claim in Sentence 1 depends on the fact that “information” pertains to an object, that is the school. How does the representation pertain to the object, in question, the school? It consists of a determination which has been made of the school. It has been determined that the school is old. A determination is a judgment of what is the case. It is true that Sentence A contains more information than Sentence B because it contains a representation of two determinations which have been made of the school, that it is large and that it is old, whereas the representation in Sentence B contains only a single determination. (It is assumed that both sentences refer to the same school.) Five necessary conditions of the truth of the first sentence have been identified: In order for Sentence I to be true, it is necessary that: (1) i~ormation be a representation, (2) that the representation be abstract, (3) that the representation be meaningful, (4) that the representation consists of determinations which have been made, (5) that the determinations have been made of certain objects. None of these conditions by itself is sufficient to insure the truth of this sentence; however, jointly, they constitute a set of sufficient conditions. No other condition appears necessary in order for this sentence to be true. If information is an abstract, meanin~ul representation of determinations which have been made of objects, then it is true that “The school is large and old” contains more information than “The school is large.” Within the context of this sentence, “and old” contains a meaningful representation of a determination which has been made of an object. EXPLORING
THE HYPOTHESIS
The analysis of Sentence 1 has produced the hypothesis that i~ormation is an abstract, meanin~ul representation of determinations made of objects. The hypothesis now will be explored by an examination of a variety of other sentences. 2. “The following sentences provide the same information: (A) ‘John memorized the Declaration of Independence.’ (B) ‘The Declaration of Independence was memorized by John.“’ The common information which A and B provide is not a physical object. It is not the sentences themselves since the common information is provided by the sentences. This common i~ormation is an abstraction. It cannot be seen, heard, or touched; it only can be apprehended by the mind. Of course, it can be represented as a physical entity by being formulated into words which are uttered or written. But, within the context of Sentence 2, the information which is common to the two sentences is an abstract representation and it is knowable only by apprehension or intuition[lO]. This abstract representation is meaningful. A and B could not be formulated as sentences if the representations which they contain were meaningless. Moreover, this representation pertains to an object, i.e. the Declaration of Independence, and a dete~ination which has been made in regard to the object, Le. John memorized it (or,
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it was memorized by John). Our analysis of Sentence 2 supports the hypothesis that information is an abstract, meaningful representation of determinations made of objects. Let us consider another sentence. 3. “Carl told me that the Martin Company went bankrupt, but I don’t know where he got that information.” In this sentence, the information, in question, is expressed by the phrase, “the Martin Company went bankrupt.” Again, information is a meaningful representation of a determination made in regard to an object. It has been determined by the originator of the information that the Martin Company went bankrupt. That this representation is abstract in nature is evidenced by the fact the information would remain the same whether it had been written by Carl or uttered by someone else. It may be objected that there are clear examples of where the referent of information is some kind of spatio-temporal entity such as a physical object or a psychological entity. Examples of the former will be considered first: 4. “There is information about the concert next week on the bulletin board.“ Using our general knowledge of the situation described in Sentence 4, it appears that the referent of “information” in this sentence are the linguistic expressions and figures on a piece of paper regarding an upcoming concert, for example, when it is scheduled, where it will be held, who will participate, etc. However, on closer examination, it is clear that this is a case of where information as an abstract entity has been given a physical representation. Consider sentences which hearers of Sentence 4 could utter: 5. “I can give you the same information myself.” 6. “The same information can be found in the newspaper.” If information were a physical entity, then it would be a particular spatio-temporal entity, and, it could not exist in several places. If the information is on the bulletin board, it could not be given by the speaker of Sentence 5 or exist in the newspaper. A similar rebuttal could be made in the case of Sentence 7. 7. “Policeman A asked Policeman B for the information given about a crime by the victim and was handed a set of notes taken by Policeman B.” The same information could be given by the victim to a newspaper reporter or it could be reconstructed by the policemen at the police station, assuming that Policeman A has misplaced the notes he had received from Policeman B. Note, the information consists of determinations made about an object; that is. the crime. by the victim. Sentence 8 below is ambiguous. It appears that “information” may refer either to a physical object-probably notes-or to memories stored by Susan in regard to the accident. 8. “Susan has information about the accident which she does not want to give to the police.” This ambiguity is itself evidence against that the claim that information is a physical object, on the one hand, or that it is a psychological entity, on the other hand. Again, spatio-temporal entities exist in a particular location and at a particular time. If information were a set of notes taken by Susan about the accident, then it could not be memories which she possesses. But an abstraction can be given a physical representation or cognized and remembered. To say that Susan has information about the accident either is to say that she has notes in regard to such matters as when the accident occurred, how it occurred, and who was responsible, or that she has stored such determinations about the accident in her memory. These same determinations could have been noted or remembered by other witnesses, supporting the conclusion that information is abstract in nature. It should be emphasized that numerous persons can understand, remember, or forget the same information. Each of these understandings, memories, and forgotten memories is a particular spatio-temporal entity pertaining to one and the same abstraction. Information is one thing and its understanding or memorization by particular persons is another. They are distinctly different entities. The former is an abstraction and the latter are psychological representations, which may pertain to information.
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When we say that individuals “get,” “acquire,” “glean,” or “extract” information, we are referring to psychological processes which are occurring in regard to information, not to the phenomenon, itself. Consider the following sentences. 9. “Narry got more information from the meeting than I did.” 10. “Two individuals can read an article on the causes of the Civil War and differ in the amount of information which they extract from it.” Reference is being made in these sentences to the cognitive processes of perception, comprehension, and learning which the individuals in question are performing in regard to information. To say that information is gotten or extracted is to say that individuals have formed cognitive representations of certain abstractions. These cognitive structures should not be confused with information, which is an objective, abstract entity. USEOFOTHERTYPESOFSENTENCES
The analysis of “information” thus far has been limited to its use in declarative sentences. The hypothesis will be explored further by dete~ning whether it holds in the case of interrogative sentences and imperative sentences. 11. “Do you have information on the whereabouts of the three brothers?” The speaker is asking the listener whether he has determined where the three brothers are located. Information here is a representation pertaining to an object, the three brothers, and consists of determinations made in regard to their whereabouts. That the representation is meanin~~l is indicated by the fact that the speaker undoubtedly would not be requesting information if it were a meaningless phenomenon. Since the ambiguity noted in Sentence 8 also exists here, the same arguments can be used to support the conclusion that information is an abstract object. Consider another example. 12. “Should we collect information on the voting records of the opposition party?” The speaker is asking whether he and others should collect representations consisting of determinations as to how each member of the opposition party voted on various issues. These abstract representations probably are available in the form of verbal testimony or written records. Clearly. the same concept of information, which was employed in the declarative sentences, is being used in the above questions. Likewise, the same concept appears in the following commands: 13. “Get me all the information which you can about our competitor’s products and report your findings to me immediately.” The speaker is ordering the listener to collect representations of determinations which have been made of the competitor’s products, presumably, what they are, how well they are selling, whether customers have experienced problems with them and so on. 14. “Give me all the i~ormation which you and the other doctors have about my condition.” The patient is directing a physician to provide him with a summary of whatever determinations the latter and other physicians have made of his condition. DERIVATIVE
PROPERTIES
Support has been provided for the hypothesis that information is an abstract, meaningful representation of determinations made of objects. On the basis of this analysis, no other property appears essential to the existence of instances of the phenomenon of information. Further analysis, of course, may reveal other essential properties. In addition to the five essential properties. a set of four derivative properties are possessed by each member of the class of things which we call “info~ation.” These properties owe their existence ultimately to the existence of one or more of the essential or primary properties of information. The derivative properties are as follows: 1. Communicability property: information has the capacity of being comprehended by individuals.
R. L. DERR
494 2. Informing
property: information has the capacity to acquaint individuals with states of affairs with which they previously were unfamiliar. 3. Empowering property: information makes it possible for individuals to take courses of actions which otherwise they may not have taken. 4. Quantitative property: information varies in amount. Communicability
property
Since information is a meaningful representation, it can be communicated to individuals. The i~ormation in the sentence, “The school is Large and old.” can be communicated to individuals who understand the sentence. The isolation about the accident which Susan may have stored in her memory can be communicated to others. The information about the concert on the bulletin board is communicated to those who comprehend it. Communicability is a derivative property, in that it issues from two primary properties of i~ormation, namely, that it is me~in~ul and is a representation of past states of affairs. If information did not form a representation, then there would be nothing existing to be communicated. If that representation were meaningless, it could not be understood. informing
property
This property also can be identified by a re-examination of previously discussed sentences. It is precisely because information has the essential properties which it does have that the information on the bulletin board has the capacity to acquaint individuals with states of affairs with which they were previously unfamiliar. The state of affairs with which they become acquainted is the determinations or judgments about the concert made by the originator of the information. The informing property derives directly from the fact that information is communicable and indirectly from the fact that it is a meaningful representation and that the representation consists of determinations which have been made of objects. Coming into possession of information enables the individual to become informed of determinations made of objects by others. So by reading the information on the bulletin board, individuals can become acquainted with judgments as to the date and time of the concert, the Iocation of the concert, and so on. It should be emphasized that it is being claimed that information has the capacity to inform, rather than that information is that which informs. That information actually acquaints an individual with a state of affairs is not a necessary condition for it being information. The expressions and figures regarding the concert provide information about the concert even though a given reader of the i~ormation already may be familiar with the details regarding the concert. Otherwise, we would have the absurd situation of where this abstract object exists in one circumstance, for example at IO:02 A.M. when Mary Bell, who was not acquainted with the details regarding the concert, read them, but does not exist at 1093 A.M. on the same day when Joe Whitman, who was acquainted with the detaiIs, read them. Indeed, the information about the concert is information even if no one becomes informed as a result of reading the notice on the bulletin board. But, information does possess the capacity to inform, which is actualized under the condition of unfamiliarity with its content on the part of a comprehending reader or listener. This conclusion holds no matter what form the abstract entity of information is given. Consider Sentence 8, in which the referent of “information” may be a psychological entity. Susan has the information about the accident even though she may not share it with the police or anyone else. Or, consider the case in which information is obviously an abstract entity, as in Sentence 2. It is true that the two sentences which pertain to John’s memorizing the Declaration of Independence contain the same information whether anyone hears or reads the sentences and consequently becomes informed about the situation involving John and the Declaration of Independence.
The concept of information in ordinary discourse
49s
This conclusion differentiates the concept of information in ordinary discourse from several proposed concepts of information in the literature of information theory, communication theory, and Information Science. Belkin defines “information” as “the structure of any text which is capable of changing the image structure of some recipient.“[ 1l] Belkin believes information is that which has the capacity to change the state of knowledge of a recipient. His expression, “changing the recipient’s state of knowledge ,” is roughly equivalent to our expression, “becoming acquainted with a state of affairs with which one was previously unfamiliar.” Insofar as this particular point is concerned, the difference between Belkin’s concept and the concept within ordinary discourse is that this capacity to produce a change in the recipient is an essential property in the case of the former and a derivative property in the case of the latter. MacKay[ 121 defines information “as that which does logical work on the organism’s orientation.” Information is that which changes the cognitive structures that the individual uses to relate himself to the environment. This is similar to the view of Nauta[l3] who describes information as “that which removes the doubt, restricts the uncertainty, reduces the ignorance, curtails the variance.” MacKay and Nauta share with Belkin the view that information is concerned with changing the cognitive structures of the individual. However, Belkin regards information as that which has the capacity to change such structures; whereas, MacKay and Nauta conceive of information as that which actually changes such structures. Hence the concepts held by MacKay and Nauta differ from the concept in ordinary discourse since, in the latter, the property of informing the individual is also viewed as a capacity. An entity may be information whether it informs or changes the cognitive structures of any given individual. Moreover, the informing property is derivative, in the case of the ordinary concept; whereas, changing the cognitive structures of the individual is essential to the concepts proposed by MacKay and Nauta. Some theorists treat information as a psychological phenomenon. Hintikka[ 141, for example, defines information as follows: “The information of s is the amount of uncertainty we are relieved of when we come to know that s is true.” Being relieved of uncertainty is a psychological state. Pratt[lS] defines information as: the alteration of the Image which occurs when it receives a message. Information is thus an event which occurs at some unique point in time and space, to some particular individual. . . (It is) “That-which-occurs-within-the-mind-upon-absorption-of-a-message.”
Such definitions make the existence of the phenomenon of information dependent upon whether the receiver undergoes some psychological process such as being relieved of uncertainty or having his cognitive structures altered. As we have seen, information, as it is conceptualized in everyday experience, is an objective phenomenon. It exists independently of whether it produces an effect on a receiver. This holds no matter what representational form it is given. Another difference between the concept in ordinary discourse and the concepts held by Hintikka and Pratt should be noted. The latter conceptualize information in terms of consequences, namely, the reduction of uncertainty or alteration of the individual’s images of the world. In the case of the former, information is an entity which may produce such consequences. Despite these differences, there is a significant affinity between the concept proposed by Hintikka and the ordinary concept. Information, in the ordinary sense, is the product of a cognitive act in which an individual or individuals has resolved an uncertainty ai to what is the case in regard to certain objects. Information is a record of resolved uncertainty; that is, the making of a determination. The resolution of uncertainty is pertinent to the ordinary concept of information, in regard to the relationship between the cognitive act of making a determination and the creation of a representation. In Hintikka’s case it pertains to the relationship between some unspecified phenomenon
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and receivers. Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that the belief held by information theorists such as Hintikka, Shannon and Weaver[ 161, and Bar-Hillel and Carnap[l7] that information is concerned, in some way, with the resolution of uncertainty is corroborated by this analysis of the concept in ordinary discourse. Hintikka’s definition also implies that the question of whether an entity is information cannot be settled until its truth status has been determined. Such is not the case in ordinary discourse. We identify entities as information even though their truth status may be unknown. For example, in regard to Sentence 7, Policeman A does not first verify the statements made to Policeman B by the victim of a crime before he refers to them as information. Or, as in the case of Sentence 8, it is meaningful to say that Susan has information about the accident, even though it has not been verified. The truth and falsity of information is not essential to its nature. These sentences are counterexamples to Fox’s claim that information is propositions. For, if this were the case, truth or falsity would be an essential consideration in identifying certain entities as information. This follows from the fact that the property of truth and falsity is central to the concept of a proposition.[l8] Recall the analysis of Sentences 1 and 2. The issue of truth and falsity simply was not relevant to the question of whether “The school is large and old.” contains more information than “The school is large.” or whether sentences in the active and passive voices can provide the same information. Information and propositions are both abstract entities but the former cannot be reduced to the latter. It is a distinct kind of abstraction. In a related point, Hintikka’s concept implies that an entity is information if and only if it is true. This view also is held by Dretske[l9]. Clearly, truth is not an essential property of the concept of information in ordinary discourse. If the statements made by the victim of a crime (Sentence 7) proved to be false, we would not say that the victim had no information about the crime. We would say that his information was incorrect. Support for this conclusion is given by the fact that such sentences as the following are commonplace: 15. “Is her information accurate?” 16. “Your information is wrong.” 17. “Check out his information.” Moreover, the internal logic of our language must be taken into account. Information would not be described as “false,” “incorrect,” “wrong,” and “inaccurate” if truth were inherent to the concept. These adjectives are appropriate, as are “true,” “corbecause determinations which are made either may rect, ” “right,” and “accurate,” be correct or incorrect. Empowering property This property is derived from the informing property of information which, of course, was derived from the primary properties. The capacity of information to inform makes it possible for individuals to take courses of action which otherwise they may not have taken. If information lacked the capacity to inform, it would have no bearing on the states of affairs which individuals could consider when planning courses of action, The empowering property of information is akin to the common belief that knowledge is power. Obviously, the empowering property of information is the principal source of its immense practical utility. It goes far in explaining why information is such a significant force in the world. Quantitative Property The concept of information in ordinary discourse has a quantitative dimension. Information varies in amount in two respects: (1) the number of determinations made of objects which any given representation contains, (2) the specificity with which objects are identified in the representation. The quantitative property is derivative in that whatever determinations the representation contains such determinations will exist in some
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number; moreover, the expression that identifies the object to which the determination pertains necessarily will be formulated in terms of some degree (high, medium, low) of specificity. We say that “The school is large and old.” contains more information than “The school is large,” because the former contains two determinations whereas the latter contains only one. Sentence 18 contains more information than Sentence 19 because an additional determination has been made about vacations. 18. “Vacations are fun, but they also may be expensive.” 19. “Vacations are fun.” On the other hand, Sentence 20 contains more information than Sentence 21 because the object about which a determination has been made; that is, the city, is identified in more specific terms. 20. “The southeastern section of the city contains a high proportion of ethnic groups. ’ ’ 21. “A section of the city contains a high proportion of ethnic groups.” Often it is not clear in which of the two respects information is being treated as a quantity. Consider Sentence 22, for example. 22. “The amount of information in those manuals is too great for our salesmen to grasp.” The term “amount” is ambiguous, since it may either refer to the number of determinations made of objects or to the specificity of the objects. Such ambiguity in the reference to the quantitative property of information is common as suggested by the sentences below: 23. “How much information do you want?” 24. “He has a lot of information about the stock market.” 25. “News broadcasts sometimes give less information than you need to form judgments.” The context within which such sentences are presented may allow disambiguation of the quantitative expression. It is worthwhile noting that the quantitative aspect of the concept of information in ordinary discourse is different from the quantitative concept of information in Shannon’s and Weaver’s communication theory. In the latter, information is viewed exclusively as a quantity[tO]. Information is the amount of choice or the amount of uncertainty involved in the selection of a message, which is produced by the statistical character of the set of messages from which the message was selected[21]. If the probability of each message in the set being selected is equal, then the amount of information, choice or uncertainty is maximal. If the probability of selection is greater, in the case of a particular message, then the amount of choice, uncertainty, or information is less. One fundamental difference between the concept of isolation in communication theory and the ordinary concept is that, in the former, the quantity of information arises from the reIationship of the selected message to other possible messages in the set, whereas, in the latter, quantity is a property of the representation itself. In the case of the Shannon and Weaver concept, the statistical character of the entire set of messages must be known before the quantity of information can be determined. On the other hand, the quantity of information can be determined, in the case of the ordinary concept of information, from an inspection of the representation itself, specifically, by determining the specificity with which objects are identified and the number of determinations which it contains. SUMMARY
This paper has developed and explored the hypothesis that information. as it is reflected in ordinary discourse, is an abstract, meaningful representation of determinations made of objects. Furthermore, it has been concluded that information has derivative properties which enable it to communicate, inform, empower and to exist
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in some quantity. These conclusions are empirical in nature. They constitute findings from an analysis of language. This is one point of contrast between the concept of information which has been identified in this paper and the other concepts which have been discussed. The latter are proposals, not claims as to what the concept is, as it is used in some type of discourse. hopefully, the tentative conclusions which have been reached here will be subjected to further examination. Its use in ordinary discourse shoufd be analyzed further, Additional concepts may be discovered. Another promising direction for research would be to determine the criteria which are guiding the use of “information” in the literature of Information Science. Such an analysis would provide a direct test of the hypothesis that the concept of information from ordinary discourse is being employed by researchers and practitioners as they deal with the tasks of the field. The analysis of sentences which refer clearly to the phenomenon of information and in which claims are made in regard to this phenomenon provides a ‘useful methodology for identifying the concepts which actually are being used. Once these concepts have been identified, then it would be possible to determine the consequences of such use for the way the problems of the field are being formulated and attacked. Generally, it has been discovered here that the concept of information in ordinary discourse differs significantly from certain concepts which have been proposed in the literature. Various differences were identified between it and the concepts which have been advanced by Belkin, Pratt, MacKay, Shannon and Weaver, Bar-Hillel and Carnap, Nauta, Hintikka, Dretske, and Fox. However it does support the views that i~ormation is an abstract phenomenon and that it is concerned with the resolution of uncertainty, in the sense that it is a record of resolved uncertainty. REFERENCES I. Walker. D. W. “The Organization
and Use of Information: Contributions of Information Science. Computational Linguistics, and Artifical Intelligence. ” J. Am. Sot. Inform. Sri. 32(S): 349; 1981. 2. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. Thr ,~a~~e~urirul Theor?: qf Cum~7i~n;cu~ion. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press; 1949. S. Artandi Information Concepts and Their Utility. J. Am. Sac. Inform. Sci. 24(4): 1973; 300-304. Cherry, C. On Haman Communication. (Second Edition) Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press; 1966. Singh, J. Great Ideas in Information Theoq. Language. and Cybernerics. New York: Dover Publications; 1966. 3. Bar-Hillel, Y. and Carnap, R. “Semantic Information.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 4(14): 1953; 144-157. Hintikka, J. “The Varieties of Information and Scientific Explanation.” (Edited by B. Van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal). Logic, Methodology, andPhilosophy ofscience III. 311-332. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company 31 l-332; 1968. Nauta, D. The Meaning ofInformation. The Hague: Mouton; 1972. MacKay, D. M. fnformation, Mechanism and Meaning. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press; 1969. Belkin, N. J. “information Concepts for Information Science.” J. Dar. 34(l): 5.5-85; 1978 Belkin, N. J. and Robertson. S. E. *~lnformation Science and the Phenomenon of Information.” J. Am. Sot. Inform. Sri. 27{4): 197-204; 1976. Dretske, F. 1. Kn&edge and ihe F/o)13 of Information. Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press; 1981. Hoffman, E. “Defining Information: An Analysis of the Information Content of Documents.” Inform. Proc. Munagement. 16(6): 291-304; 1980. A. D. Pratt, The Information of the Image. Libri, 27(3): 204-220; 1977. 4. Hoffman, E. “Defining Information: An Analysis of the Information Content of Documents.” Inform. Proc. Management.
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5. Belkin. N. J. “Information Concepts of Information Science.” J. Dor. 34(l): 1978: 62. Fox. c. J. Information and Misinformation. Connecticut: Greenwood Press (1983). 76: Schwartz. S. P. fed.) Naminp, Necessitv. and Natural Kinds. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1977; i6-20. &pi, I. I&. ~~fro~~~~o~ fo Lo& (Fourth Edition) New York: MacMillan 1972; 125. Lewis. C. I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Vu~aafjo~. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company Illinois 1946: 131-170. Werkmeister, W. H. The Basis and Structure ofKnowledge. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers: 1948; 3-72. 8. Wittaenstein and Austin are notable critics of this approach. See Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Znvekgations. New York: Macmillan: 1958. Austin, x L. Philosophical Papers. London: oxford University Press; 1961. 9. Fox, C. J. Information and Misinformation. Connecticut: Greenwood Press; 1983. 10. Katz, J. J. Language and Other Abstract Objects. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield; 1981; 19273n 11. Be&in, N. J. “Information Concepts for Isolation Science.” J. Dot. 34(l): 80, 1978 12. MacKay, D. M. ~~farmuzion, Mechanism and Meaning. MIT Press; 1969: 95. 13. Nauta, D. The Meaning of Information. The Hague: Mouton; 1972; 179. a..“.
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14. Hintikka. J. “The Varieties of Information and Scientific Explanation.” (Edited by B. Van Rootselaar and .I. F. Staal) Logic, Methodology, nnd Philosophy ofbcience. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company: 1968; 311-312. 15. Pratt, A. D. “The Information of the Image.” Libri. 27(3): 204-220. 1977. 16. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. The Mathematical Theoq of Communication. Urbana The University of lllinois Press; 1949. 17. Bar-Hillel, Y. and Carnap, R “Semantic Information.” &if. J. Phil. Sri.. 4( 14): 144-157: 1953. 18. Cohen, M. R. and Nagel,.E. An Inrroducrion ?o Logic and Scientific Method. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company: (1934); 27; Langer, S. K. An Introduction ro Symbolic Logic (Second Revised Edition). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,; 1953; Lewis, C. I. An Analysis ofKnoM,/edge and Valuation. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company; 1950; Rosenberg, J. F. and Travis, C. “Introduction: Propositions.” Readings in the Philosophy of Language. New Jersey: 1971; 219_*_ LLL.
19. Dretske, F. I. Knowledge and the Flow ofInformation. Massachussets: MIT Press; 1981: 43-45. 20. Dretske, F. I. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Massachussets: MIT Press; 1981: 3. 21. Shannon, C. E. and Weaver, W. The Mathematical Theory of Communicarion. Urbana: The Umversity of Illinois Press: 1949.