The construct of intergenerational solidarity in a lineage perspective: A discussion on underlying theoretical assumptions

Journal of Aging Studies 19 (2005) 33 – 51 www.elsevier.com/locate/jaging

The construct of intergenerational solidarity in a lineage perspective: A discussion on underlying theoretical assumptions Gunhild Hammarstro¨m* Department of Sociology, Uppsala University, Box 624, S-751 26 Uppsala, Sweden Received 3 July 2003; received in revised form 17 February 2004; accepted 19 March 2004

Abstract Although the construct of intergenerational solidarity has been crucial in analyses of relationships between family generations and contradictory results are obtained, the theoretical assumptions underlying the construct have not been discussed. The present aim is to make this construct of intergenerational solidarity a subject of debate, primarily focusing on the assumed connections between the dimensions of the construct and the theoretical presumptions found in Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity. The discussion relies on various empirical studies of family generations. It is concluded that the theoretical assumptions underlying the construct do not seem to be adequate for describing family relations across generations, and an alternative theoretical approach is suggested as a basis for further discussion. D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Gerontology; Intergenerational solidarity; Intergenerational relations; Mechanical solidarity; Theory

1. Introduction During the past 30 years, and primarily in Western Europe and the United States, studies of intergenerational family relationships have increased within gerontology and family sociology. A major reason for this interest in family relations across generations may be the growing demands on families brought about by the changing age structure of the population, together with constraints on

* Tel.: +46 18 471 1201; fax: +46 18 471 1170. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0890-4065/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jaging.2004.03.009

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public expenditure with regard to financial transfer payments for health care for the aged (e.g., Bumpass, 1990). This interest is also illuminated by the fact that The ISA Committee on Family Research held its international conference in 2003 on the theme bIntergenerational Relations in Families’ Life CourseQ. Several studies on intergenerational family relationships have relied on the construct of solidarity, elaborated by Vern Bengtson and colleagues (e.g., Bengtson & Schrader, 1982), and focused on later life families and relations between old parents, their adult children, and grandchildren. Examples of such studies in recent years are Daatland and Herlofson (2003); Katz, Lowenstein, and Mehlhausen (2001); Parrot and Bengtson (1999); Silverstein, Burholt, Wenger, and Bengtson (1998), just to mention a few. The purpose of this article is to make this construct of intergenerational solidarity a subject of debate and, above all, to discuss the relevance of some of its basic theoretical assumptions, thereby contributing to a theoretical discussion of this construct. Although the most recent years have witnessed an intense discussion on various theoretical stances and schools within social gerontology (e.g., in The Gerontologist 1996, No. 6, and Journal of Gerontology 1997, No. 2), there has been no mention of the relevance of the basic theoretical assumptions underlying central concepts. The discussion carried on hitherto on the construct of intergenerational solidarity has primarily dealt with two issues and has mainly emanated from Bengtson and colleagues themselves; moreover, it has not focused on the basic theoretical assumptions, but on their consequences. The first issue has concerned the extent to which the construct of solidarity can be seen as a single higher-order construct of various intercorrelated dimensions (e.g., Bengtson & Roberts, 1991). The second issue has concerned the idea that the construct of solidarity must be complemented with other concepts, for example, that families must be reconceptualized as comprising relationships that involve both solidarity and conflict between and within generations (Bengtson, Rosenthal, & Burton, 1996; Clarke, Preston, Raksin, & Bengtson, 1999; Parrot & Bengtson, 1999). After Luescher and Pillemer (1998) attempted to establish ambivalence as a theoretically and empirically more useful concept with which to approach the study of later life family relations, as compared with the concepts of solidarity and conflict, Bengtson, Giarusso, Mabry, and Silverstein (2002) recently discussed ambivalence in relation to solidarity. The discussion in this article is primarily aimed at Bengtson and colleagues’ theoretical point of departure in Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity and the presumed analogy between solidarity at a societal level and solidarity among individuals, and as well the assumed connections between the dimensions of the construct. The discussion is thus not aimed at the solidarity dimensions per se included in the construct. As the solidarity construct is elaborated with respect to relations between family relations, the focus of the discussion is on lineage generational relationships at the micro social level, that is, specific family relations, not relations between cohort-based generation aggregates at the macro structural level.1 As a background to the following discussion, the next section provides a short description of the development of the solidarity construct elaborated by Bengtson and colleagues.2

1

For various definitions of the generation concept and their empirical implications, see, for example, Uhlenberg and Riley (1966) and Hammarstro¨m (2004). 2 It has not been possible to refer to all works written by Bengtson and colleagues, as this would take too much space in the reference list.

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2. The development of the construct Research on family and intergenerational relationships may be described as a debate about the decline of the family versus the high degree of intergenerational solidarity. The sociological literature in the 1940s and 1950s primarily considered the possibility that the process of industrialization had undermined the family, followed by a focus on the nature and extent of the bgeneration gapQ and conflicts within families, and especially between the youth and their parents (Bengtson et al., 1996; Lynott & Roberts, 1997). During the 1960s and early 1970s, according to Lynott and Roberts (1997, p. 396), bthe great gap proponents focused on cohorts within society, while proponents focused on familylineage members claimed a view of the gap as an illusionQ. This view was supported, among others, by a study of multigenerational family members’ perceptions of a generation gap, carried out by Bengtson (1971), showing that the cohort gap perceived between generations was considerably larger than the lineage gap perceived within the respondents’ own family. Social gerontologists also opposed the widespread assumption of the decline of the family counteracting the myth of family neglect (Bengtson et al., 1996). Studies that supported high levels of integration between old parents and their adult children were carried out already in the 1960s by Shanas, Townsend, Wederburn, Friis, Milhoj, and Stehouver, (1968) and Shanas (1979), among others. In this period, almost 30 years ago, Vern Bengtson and colleagues began to elaborate an individualoriented construct of solidarity aimed at the relations between family generations (e.g., Bengtson & Black, 1973; Black & Bengtson, 1974). This solidarity construct was originally developed to summarize various behaviors and sentiments that appear to characterize parent–child relations across the life span and was focused on issues of cohesion, or integration. In the anthology Measurement of Intergenerational Relations, Mangen, Bengtson, and Landry (1988) described the various attempts to formulate a theory of solidarity and to operationalize the concept. By reviewing the diverse literature addressing parent–child relations in old age, they detected an implicit conceptual ordering reflecting various dimensions of what Durkheim termed bsolidarityQ (Bengtson, Cutler, Mangen, & Marshall, 1985). The intergenerational solidarity construct refers, according to Bengtson and colleagues, mainly to the positive dimensions of intergenerational relations, to bgood old ageQ, and the absence of conflict between parents and children or grandparents and grandchildren (Bengtson et al., 1996). According to Bengtson and Roberts (1991), the developed models of the construct are applicable to bnormalQ family relations and not to crises or elderly persons in need of care.3 Marshall, Matthews, and Rosenthal (1993) later asserted that the term solidarity indicates an emphasis on consensus rather than conflict and ambivalence. The construct of solidarity that Bengtson and colleagues (e.g., Bengtson & Black, 1973; Black & Bengtson, 1974) originally developed was primarily based on the concepts for family integration previously elaborated by Nye and Rushing (1969, pp. 135–136). These were associational integration, affectional integration, consensual integration, functional integration, normative integration, and goal integration seen as separate dimensions. Black and Bengtson (1974) conceptualized family solidarity as the interaction of the three dimensions associational, affectional, and consensual solidarity. Inspired by Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity, and emphasizing value similarity, their assumption was

3

Discussions on parent care, on the other hand, are often described in terms of caregiver stress and intergenerational conflicts within the family (e.g., Brody, 1985, 1990).

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that ideological similarity among family members (consensual solidarity) would reinforce and be reinforced by high levels of affect and association. This latter assumption was drawn from Homans’ (1950) small group theory regarding the relations between free actors. Bengtson, Olander, and Haddad (1976) defined the construct of solidarity as the simple sum of the dimensions affection, association, and consensus, which were all assumed to be highly correlated with one another and thereby constitute dimensions of one single higher-order construct. According to this definition, a theoretical model was elaborated, in which helping behavior, among other things, was seen as a predictor of solidarity. The construct of solidarity that Bengtson and Schrader (1982) developed some years later is based on these assumptions and also includes—in addition to the original dimensions association, affection, and consensus—functional solidarity, as well as family structure, including geographic proximity, which were added to the three original dimensions. Nominal definitions and various formal models were gradually produced to achieve an overall theory of family cohesion and solidarity. To make the following discussion easier to understand, I find it necessary to present nominal definitions of the various dimensions. Affectional solidarity refers to the degree of positive sentiments present in the intergenerational relationships, for example, feelings of trust, understanding, respect, fairness, affection, and warmth. Associational solidarity refers to the degree to which members of a lineage are in contact with one another and includes frequency of intergenerational interaction, formal, and ritualistic contacts and informal contacts. Functional solidarity refers to the degree to which financial assistance and service exchanges occur among family members. Consensus refers to the degree of consensus or conflict in beliefs, or orientations, external to the family, and as well to perceived subjective consensus. Normative solidarity refers to the norms of familism held by the family members. The original model, which presupposes that contact, affection, and value consensus were significantly correlated with one another, given that they are dimensions of one single construct of intergenerational solidarity, was empirically tested in a path model by Atkinson, Kivett, and Campbell (1986). The result was that the expected correlations failed to appear. The three components constituted separate dimensions. One of the weaknesses of this study is that it only included one generation of older parents and relied on parents’ reports of their own child’s relations to them, not just concerning contact (association), but also affection and value consensus. Moreover, the parents were only asked about the child with whom they had the most contact. Some years later, Bengtson and Roberts (1991) examined the extent to which the construct of solidarity, developed by Bengtson and Schrader (1982), could be viewed as a single higher-order construct. Besides the original three solidarity dimensions of association, affection, and consensus, helping behavior (functional solidarity) was included as an independent variable. Two generations were studied: a parent generation and their children. The first phase of the analysis was based on parent–child dyads. Because the only significant correlation found was between affection and association, while consensus differed from the other solidarity components, the conclusion was that solidarity could not be seen as one single construct. With that, the notion of developing a model of solidarity as a one-quality construct was abandoned. After some further tests, Bengtson and Roberts (1991) reformulated the model to only comprise connections between the different solidarity dimensions and thus shifted from viewing solidarity as a simple linear composite of association, affect, and consensus. They also changed the emphasis from attitudinal consensus to normative expectations of familial closeness and thus replaced the consensus dimension with normative solidarity. Relationships were assumed between normative solidarity and

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affection and parent–child interaction (association). As the focus on dyads can conceal possible independent correlations pertaining to one or the other of the dyad members, tests of the predicted correlations between the various solidarity components were made at the individual level instead of the dyad level. These tests revealed some of the expected correlations but did not provide support for the entire model. This lack of empirical support also resulted in a reassessment of the point of departure in small group theory. The characteristic of small groups is, among other things—and perhaps most important in this context—that membership in the group is voluntary, and the family, or the lineage, does not constitute such a freely chosen group, a condition also stated by Bengtson and Roberts (1991). It is likely that parental behavior is guided by normative expectations different from those guiding small groups of independent actors. Because the original formal models have not always received empirical support, there has been some reconsideration of some of the assumptions underlying these models. The original model, in which solidarity constitutes a single higher-order construct, was thus abandoned. Except for a renewed framework including family conflict, the construct still, according to Parrot and Bengtson (1999), relies on the exchange theories elaborated by Homans (1961) and Dowd (1975), as well as expected connections between exchange of help and support and normative expectations about familial obligations. Although several analyses of the relationships between the various dimensions of the solidarity construct have shown some of the dimensions to be statistically independent, Parrot and Bengtson (1999, p. 76) have nevertheless recently claimed that the dimensions are theoretically interrelated. Thus, the lack of expected correlations has not led to a critical discussion of the theoretical assumptions underlying the construct, such as the reasonableness of assuming correlations between all the solidarity dimensions. Neither has it led to a consideration of the theoretical relevance of the point of departure in Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity. In the next section, the first part of the discussion focuses on some fundamental theoretical assumptions, such as the transfer of Durkheim’s structural macrolevel concept to the individual level, for example, relationships between parents, children, and grandchildren, and as well Homans’ theory. Second, the assumption of value similarity across generations and normative solidarity is discussed based on empirical results, with a focus on the assumed relationships with affection, association, and functional solidarity. Third, the theoretical relevance of assuming relationships between affection, association, and functional solidarity is discussed. The fourth discussion concerns the concept mechanical solidarity as a theoretical point of departure when studying intergenerational solidarity in modern society.

3. Theoretical assumptions and contradictory empirical results In Bengtson and colleagues’ descriptions of their elaboration of the construct of intergenerational solidarity, primarily, Durkheim and Homans are mentioned as sources of inspiration. The theoretical framework of the construct is mainly anchored in Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity and Homans’ theories of small groups and exchange between the members. According to Bengtson et al. (1985), a broader perspective on solidarity was derived from Durkheim’s theory developed in his work The Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim, 1964/1893) to describe and characterize relations between different family generations. As is well known, Durkheim analyzed the

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process of industrialization in Western Europe in terms of a social change from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. That is, from a society characterized by value similarity, reinforced by repressive laws, and coercion, and based on a low degree of division of labor, to a society characterized by a high degree of division of labor and a subsequent low degree of value similarity. As the grounds for collective mental similarity disappeared along with the specialization of labor, contracts between society members formed the basis for solidarity, that is, organic solidarity. In Durkheim’s theory, the concept of solidarity stands for integration at the structural level, not at the social level. Durkheim mentioned only parenthetically solidarity within the family, based on the division of labor between the sexes, called conjugal solidarity (Durkheim, 1964, pp. 17–20, 61). In his book Suicide, on the other hand, Durkheim (1951/1897) discussed loosening family ties in relation to increasing individualism. A relevant question in this context is whether the family as a social organization, and relations between family generations, can be compared with the structural concept mechanical solidarity, a question I will return to later in this article. In Bengtson and colleagues’ (e.g., Black & Bengtson, 1974; Bengtson & Schrader, 1982; Bengtson & Roberts, 1991) theoretical framework, it is thus implied that relations between family generations in modern society may be characterized by a value similarity based on a low degree of division of labor. They have, however, emphasized similarity in traditional norms and values and not, according to Bengtson and Roberts (1991), the interdependence between members formed by a specialized division of labor. Later, however, they added the component functional solidarity, but it is not quite clear whether this was done with reference to Durkheim or to Homans.4 Value similarity is a concept upon which also Homans relied. It is not easy to understand the theoretical relation between Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity and Homans’ (1961) theory of behavior and exchange in small groups, mainly elaborated in Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. Homans’ theory is characterized as a behaviorist interpretation of social behavior based on psychological and early economic postulates, and the theory was heavily criticized during the 1960s, for example, by Davis (1961) and Deutsch (1964). The fundamental idea of Homans’ theory is the utilitarian doctrine that the human being strives for maximizing brewardsQ and minimizing bpunishmentQ. One of the basic assumptions is that social behavior is seen as an exchange of activities, which are more or less costly. The theory presupposes, according to Homans (1961), at least two equals interacting with each other, and the more they interact, the more they like each other. Thus, liking and interaction are given in exchange for activities that are perceived as rewarding. Most important in explaining behavior are the interacting persons’ values and, particularly, the relation of these values to one another; the more similar their values, the more apt they are to like each other (see Homans, 1961, pp. 214–215). The various concepts are not defined nominally independent of one another, and the relations between them can be judged as tautological. For example, Homans’ defined his concept of values as a utility. As help can be a utility, help can be used as a reward, and consequently, help can be seen as a value (see Homans, 1961, pp. 41–44). Homans maintained, however, that when the persons are not equals, his 4

The dimension functional solidarity was, according to some sources (e.g., Bengtson & Roberts, 1991), added to develop a construct of family solidarity based on value similarity between the family members and departed from Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity. Some years later, Bengtson et al. (1996), as well as Parrott and Bengtson (1999), instead referred to norms of reciprocity and distributive justice in American society with reference to Gouldner (1960), Homans (1961), and Dowd (1975), respectively, without mentioning Durkheim. Moreover, social exchange theories applied to aging were, for example, treated in Bengtson, Burgess, and Parrott (1997).

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propositions do not hold true. He also pointed out that frequent interaction is not associated with much liking when one person receives punishment as a result of the other’s activity and is not free to break the interaction (Homans, 1961, p. 203). Thus, it would seem to be difficult to understand how Homans’ theory of exchange in small groups could apply to families, into which people are born. Owing to the family’s special nature as a primary group, the family’s normative expectations with respect to behavior probably differ from those of small groups based on voluntary membership. The possibilities for families to impose sanctions, such as exclusion from the family, are fewer or almost nonexistent. Applying Homans’ theory of interaction within the family across generations, therefore, does not seem to be theoretically grounded. The theoretical views of Homans can be compared with, for example, those of Simmel (1923), who claimed that conflicts are included in all kinds of social interaction. The human being continuously lives in conflict with his/her social surroundings. With respect to the family, family members, because of family ties and emotional closeness, can live with equivocal attitudes and conflicts among themselves without risk of total dissolution—a thesis quite different from that of Homans. Without referring to Simmel, Luescher and Pillemer (1998) carried on a similar discussion, and based on historical studies of the family in Europe and America, they suggested that ambivalence among adults in parent–child relations is nearly universal. 3.1. Values and their relation to affection and association Value similarity, or shared values across generations, forming the consensus dimension, was, as already mentioned, one of the original ideas in the theoretical framework of the construct of intergenerational solidarity. It was later replaced by normative solidarity due to the lack of relationships between the consensus dimension, on the one hand, and affection and association, on the other (e.g., Bengtson et al., 1985; Bengtson & Roberts, 1991). The idea of shared values across generations (consensus) and the assumed connections with affection and association may have been deduced from Durkheim’s theory, but just as well from Weber (1969/1921), among others. According to them, values are seen as mediating links between the structural and the individual levels and as having been transmitted and preserved in successive generations through one or more of society’s institutions. On the individual level, values can be seen as guides or determinants of social attitudes and social behavior (Rokeach, 1973). In general, empirical findings are quite ambiguous concerning the extent to which values, as such, and shared values actually affect behavior. The lack of connections between values and behavior is often explained by the perceived situation, on the one hand, or by competing values, on the other—or by both. This lack of connections may even depend on which values are studied in relation to a certain behavior. According to Rokeach (1973), religious values should best predict differences in religious behavior, political values should best predict political behavior, and so on—assumptions that are supported by his studies. It should follow from this that values concerning familism (normative solidarity) predict differences in intergenerational relations, as assumed by Bengtson and colleagues. In the different tests of the theoretical models described earlier, which did not result in the expected relationships between consensus and the other solidarity dimensions, consensus was measured through ideological similarity in religious and political attitudes (Bengtson & Roberts, 1991). As values are seen as superior to attitudes (Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973), and to avoid questions reminiscent of attitudes, values and value similarity were studied on the basis of a modified version of Rokeach’s

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(1973) Human Value Scale in a Swedish study of solidarity in three family generations.5 One of the studied values was supposed to tap normative solidarity with the statement bto live for the good of the familyQ, which, according to Rokeach, measures family security and taking care of loved ones (Hammarstro¨m, 1993a, 1993b). Here, it seems necessary to mention that the Swedish study departed from Bengtson and Schrader’s (1982) suggested solidarity dimensions, thus, from affection, association, functional solidarity, and consensus, as well as geographic proximity and family structure. The study was based on a sample of lineages, consisting of one older generation of women, one of their children, the middle generation, and one of their child’s children, the grandchild generation (Hammarstro¨m, 1986, 1993a, 1993b).6 Despite the different ways of measuring values, but in line with earlier results (Atkinson et al., 1986; Black & Bengtson, 1974; Bengtson & Roberts, 1991), actual value similarity (consensus)7 did not show any significant relationships with the other solidarity dimensions, such as affection, association, and functional solidarity. This means no relationships with perceived value consensus, emotional closeness, or with the various patterns of contact or help and assistance (Hammarstro¨m, 1993a). The comparison of the three generations showed some differences in their value preferences, except for the value bto live for the good of the familyQ, which was the most frequently preferred value in all three generations.8 The proportion of common value choices was also highest for the value bto live for the good of the familyQ. For the other values, value similarity was relatively weak and statistically random, indicating the younger generations’ independence from the values of their parents and grandmothers.9 Although normative solidarity focused on familism replaced the consensus component, obtained results in various studies still show differing outcomes. Bengtson and Roberts (1991) pointed out a possible relationship between norms of family obligation, measured through attitudes to familism, and help and support exchanges. They found that normative familism predicted levels of affect between the studied parents and their middle-aged children, but not the levels of association. In a later study, Parrot and Bengtson (1999) found a negative relationship between a strong sense of familism among adult children and exchange of help and support with fathers; the lower the degree of familism, the more help and support. No similar relationship was obtained concerning mothers. On the other hand, studies focused on norms of filial obligation instead of familism show other results. In Ciricelli’s (1983) study of adult children, norms of filial obligation were shown to have an 5

The modified version of Rokeach’s (1973) Human Value Scale is extensively described in Hammarstro¨m (1993a) and in a shorter version in Hammarstro¨m (1993b). 6 The sampling procedure is described in Hammarstro¨m (1986, 1993a, 1993b). The design allows the exploration of the relationship concerning two parent generations and two child generations with different historical experiences, as well as of a generation of grandmothers and a grandchild generation. Six generational relationships are studied on the individual level. In addition to individual-level analyses, the design allows analyses of parent–child dyads with varying historical location, as well as grandmother–grandchild dyads. A total of 888 individuals between 15 and 97 years of age participated in the study. The total number of dyads was 563. The oldest generation (G1) included 423 mothers (average age 73). The middle generation (G2) included 316 individuals, 55% women and 45% men (average age 44). The grandchild generation (G3) included 149 individuals, 57% women and 43% men (average age 24). 7 Value similarity was based on the proportion of common value choices for each parent–child and grandmother–grandchild dyad. 8 Neither this value nor any of the other studied values were significantly connected with the other solidarity dimensions, such as perceived value consensus, affection, association, nor functional solidarity. Some of the values did, however, show a significant relationship with life satisfaction—a matter left aside in the present discussion (Hammarstro¨m 1993a). 9 In some families, however, there was continuity in values across the three generations because the adult child in the middle generation formed a link between its own mother and child. In other cases, value similarity as a dependent variable was found under certain conditions, such as educational level of the subjects, and in relation to retrospective questions about upbringing during childhood (Hammarstro¨m 1993a).

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indirect influence on children’s help and support to old parents. In a quite recent study carried out in five European countries, another result was obtained, showing that norms of filial obligation did not imply that the family was seen as the natural care provider (Daatland & Herlofson, 2003). Instead, in the countries with the highest scores of filial responsibility, the welfare state was found to be the main source of care provision. These contradicting results may depend on the notion that general familism values compete with one another, or with norms of filial obligation (cf. Rokeach, 1973), concerning, for example, to whom a middle-aged person should give help and assistance in the first place: the person’s old parents or own children? Familism values may even compete with other values, such as moral obligations to work to earn one’s living, just to mention some possible explanations. Luescher and Pillemer (1998) pointed out, for example, that conflicting norms of independence and autonomy in parent–child relations might generate ambivalence. It seems further plausible that these norms of independence and autonomy might influence old parents in need of help and support and their adult children differently. Of importance in this context is also Rokeach’s (1973, p. 122) discussion of what can legitimately be called bbehaviorQ, as behavior can range from a single act at one extreme to a whole set of acts at the other. A question related to this discussion may also be whether behavior necessarily means actual behavior or could include verbal behavior. This distinction between actual and verbal behavior is brought about by a differentiation between normative integration and solidarity in society, formulated by the Finnish sociologist Erik Allardt. According to him, normative integration exists in cases where there is a correspondence between fundamental rules in society and actual behavior of the society members. Solidarity, on the other hand, depends on the degree to which society members agree with fundamental rules, independent of their actual behavior. Only in cases in which society members consciously reject the fundamental rules is there a low degree of solidarity (Allardt, 1965). Thus, according to Allardt, agreement with the rules independent of actual behavior is to be seen as solidarity. Norms of familism and/or filial obligation may, accordingly, be agreed with without resulting in actual behavior, and they may still be of theoretical interest when studying relations between family members across generations. Seeing family norms as guidelines rather than as concrete rules is a view also preferred by Finch and Mason (1990), who further mean that actual behavior such as help and care is primarily a matter of negotiations between old parents and their old children. On the other hand, according to Jarret (1985), normative obligation to help an aging parent need not be accompanied by affection for the family member with whom the exchange is occurring. He even suggested that it may be easier for family members to help in the absence of such bonds. Accepting thoughts such as these opens for a discussion of whether solidarity between old parents, and their children, or grandchildren, exists, even in the absence of connections between the component of normative solidarity and the other components. 3.2. Connections between the components of the construct Although the idea of a solidarity construct as an additive composite was abandoned, the relationships between the solidarity dimensions were still assumed as a theoretical framework, with the exception of the consensus component (Bengtson & Roberts, 1991; Bengtson et al., 1996). Because of differing results obtained in various studies, there are still reasons to wonder what it really means when there are sometimes statistical relationships between the solidarity dimensions and sometimes not. For example, the differing results between parents and children concerning the expected correlations between affection

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and association, found by Bengtson and Roberts (1991), may indicate that the relationship between them is perceived in different ways based on their respective perspectives. The previously mentioned Swedish study based on three family generations also illuminates that relations across generations are different in nature, depending on whether parents or children, as well as grandparents or grandchildren, are focused on in the analysis. As the connections between the solidarity dimensions in parent and child generations found in the Swedish study are somewhat different from those obtained by Bengtson and Roberts (1991), they may be worth mentioning as a basis for the further discussion. It is notable that, except for minor differences, the overall results with regard to affection and association did not differ between the two parent generations, or between the two child generations, despite their different life course positions and historical locations. Important is that only reported contacts between the generations, studied in terms of frequency, such as talking to and seeing each other, were symmetric; most of the studied indicators of affection and functional solidarity showed an asymmetric relationship, exemplified below. In line with earlier studies, the parents and grandmothers in the Swedish study expressed to a higher extent ties of emotional closeness and perceived value consensus in relation to children and grandchildren than did the children and grandchildren in relation to parents and grandmothers (c.f. Bengtson & Kuypers, 1971; Shanas et al., 1968; Troll & Bengtson, 1979). The dyad analysis showed, however, that both mutual emotional closeness and mutual perceived value consensus between parents and children were still relatively strong, while a corresponding covariance for the grandmother– grandchild dyads was not evident (Hammarstro¨m, 1986). Financial assistance was mainly unidirectional, going from older to younger generations. The obtained results regarding exchange of help and assistance, on the other hand, had different directions in the older and younger parent–child relationships, as the middle generation had provided most of the help and assistance, both upward and downward in the lineage (Hammarstro¨m, 1986). As the study was cross-sectional, we can only suggest the hypothesis that the pattern of help and assistance may change over the life course and could be characterized as symmetrical, or balanced, over time, or as serial reciprocity, to use Sussman’s (1976) terms. Because of the asymmetric character of the relations between the generations—although with a certain amount of variation—the statistical relationships between perceived value consensus, affection, association, and functional solidarity were different between the parent generations, on the one hand, and the child generations, on the other. This difference also concerns the grandmother–grandchild relations. The presence of statistically significant relationships between perceived consensus, emotional closeness, association, and exchange of help and support was, according to the Swedish study, connected to lineage position, thus dependent on whether one is a parent, a grandparent, a child, or a grandchild. This is exemplified below. In all the six studied generation relations, there was a positive covariance between the various measures of association (such as interaction frequency) and exchange of help and assistance (Hammarstro¨m, 1986). This was expected, as contact is one of the prerequisites for giving and receiving help and assistance, as is geographic proximity. In a study of old parents’ reported relationships with children, similar results were obtained (Silverstein et al., 1998). As concerns the two parent generations in relation to their child, perceived value consensus, and emotional closeness were significantly independent of each other. Perceived value consensus and emotional closeness to the child were also independent of geographic proximity/distance, whereas

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geographic proximity was significantly related to the interaction patterns and exchange of help and support. Neither perceived value consensus nor emotional closeness to their child, respectively, was statistically related to different criteria of association and exchange of help and assistance (functional assistance). Metaphorically speaking, the three aspects perceived value consensus, emotional closeness (affection), and patterns of behavior, such as interaction (association) together with exchange of help and support (functional solidarity), constituted three separate islands with no real interconnections (Hammarstro¨m, 1986). This means that the mothers in the oldest generation were not more likely to receive help and support from children to whom they were emotionally close. The help that they received and themselves gave, as well as their interaction frequency, was statistically independent of their own emotional ties to that child and of their perceived value consensus. These results differ from those obtained in the Welsh sample in Silverstein et al. (1998), as old parents in their study received help to a higher extent from children to whom they were emotionally close. Furthermore, in the Bengtson and Roberts (1991) study, old parents’ affection for the child was a significant predictor of frequency of association. The Swedish results for parents are thus more similar to those obtained by Atkinson et al. (1986), mentioned earlier. Also, as concerns the two child generations, the results differ slightly from those of other studies. The covariance between perceived value consensus and emotional closeness (affection) in the Swedish study had the highest degrees of significance in the two studied generational relations. In Bengtson and Roberts’ (1991) study, the child’s affection for the parent did not predict association with their old parents. In the Swedish study, on the other hand, for the children, in relation to their parents, significant relationships were found between association and emotional closeness, as well as perceived value consensus. For example, of those in the middle generation who reported emotional closeness to their mother, 95% had contact with her at least once a weak, either personally or by telephone, compared with 82% of those not emotionally close ( pb.001, /=.51; Hammarstro¨m, 1986). Corresponding relationships were also obtained concerning exchange of help and support (functional solidarity) and affection (emotional closeness and perceived value consensus). These latter results are comparable with those of Ciricelli (1983), who found that the stronger the feelings of attachment to the parent, the greater the commitment to help the parent when assistance was needed, illuminating a connection between affection and help. Rosenmayr (1997), however, argued that help patterns, in themselves, should not be regarded as a criterion for a positive relationship between generations, because caring for older parents may be a source of stress for the care-providing children. In the Swedish study, the four components were thus interrelated when the child generations were focused on. Furthermore, perceived value consensus and emotional closeness (affection) to the parent were also significantly related to geographic proximity/distance, which was not the case for the two parent generations. As regards the oldest generation, as grandmothers in their relation to their grandchild, the results are consistent with those of previous studies in the sense that the middle-generation serves as a link, or a gate-keeper, between them (e.g., Uhlenberg & Hammill, 1998). Also in accordance with earlier studies, the levels of perceived value consensus, emotional closeness, association, and functional solidarity were lower in relation to the grandchild compared with the child. Furthermore, the presence of statistical relationships between perceived value consensus, emotional closeness, association, and functional solidarity were somewhat different for the oldest generation as grandmothers compared with the same generation as mothers. Perceived value consensus and

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emotional closeness were not significantly correlated with each other. Furthermore, perceived value consensus did not covary with association or functional solidarity, whereas there were significant relationships between emotional closeness and association and functional solidarity, respectively (Hammarstro¨m, 1986). Also for grandchildren, in relation to their grandmother, the levels of perceived value consensus, emotional closeness, association, and functional solidarity were lower compared with the levels in relation to their parents. The relationships between the solidarity dimensions were, however, similar to those obtained in relation to their parent. Besides, the positive covariance between perceived subjective value consensus and emotional closeness, emotional closeness, and perceived value consensus were each significantly correlated with association and functional solidarity. Of those grandchildren reporting emotional closeness to their grandmother, 68% had contact with her at least once a weak, either personally or by telephone, compared with 39% of those not emotionally close ( pb.001, /=.53; Hammarstro¨m, 1986). Hence, when comparing the parent generations with the child generations, significant relationships were found between perceived consensus, affection, association, and functional solidarity for the relations moving upward in the lineage, whereas this does not apply to the same extent to the relations downward in the lineage. The question of interest here concerns the theoretical implications of results such as these for the theoretical framework of solidarity across family generations. Which of the generational relationships is to be characterized as implying a high degree of solidarity? Those for which there are significant relationships, as assumed by Bengtson and colleagues, which would mean the child generations in the Swedish study, or those for which such relationships are lacking, which would mean the parent generations, when also considering the presence of asymmetric relationships between them? That parents feel they are emotionally close to their children, at the same time as their contacts of different kinds with their adult children are statistically independent of these feelings, may depend on the normative expectations tied to the parental role. An alternative explanation may be that the patterns of contact between elderly parents and their adult children are determined by the children, just as contact between the oldest generation and their grandchildren is mainly determined by the middle generation. The adult children’s emotional closeness to their parents could be seen as a predictor of association analogous to one of the earlier models proposed in Bengtson and Roberts (1991), in which adult children’s normative solidarity was assumed to be a predictor of association and affection.10 This presupposes, however, that their contacts with their parents are not of a traditional or ritual character, a possibility I will return to later in this article. The results of the Swedish study concerning the two parent generations showing an absence of relationships between affection and association, and as well functional solidarity, may then be understood as parents’ unlimited emotional ties to their children. The relationships between the solidarity components obtained for the two child generations, on the other hand, may be understood as indicating that children’s relations to their parents are limited by several conditions, such as looser emotional ties, or ambivalence, geographical distance, and so forth. The relations across generations, however, seem to be more complicated than this. For example, if the relations between family generations were examined

10

In Bedford’s (1992) analysis, based on Hammarstro¨m’s data, memories of parental fairness and unfairness were able to predict children’s emotional bonds to their parents.

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in more detail, we would identify at least four categories of relational patterns based on emotional closeness and patterns of contact, or help and support: ! one category of relations would be characterized by both emotional closeness and a high degree of contact (or help and support); ! a second, by emotional closeness and a low degree of contact (or assistance); ! a third, by a lack of emotional closeness but a high degree of contact (or assistance); and ! fourth, neither by emotional closeness nor contact (or assistance). The number of relations belonging to the respective categories would probably vary depending on which of the particular generational relations was being studied. This could be exemplified with a simple cross-tabulation, as in Table 1, based on data from the Swedish study. The figures refer to the reported contact frequency, either personally or by telephone, of the middle generation as child in relation to the mother in the oldest generation, as well as to the reported contact frequency of the youngest generation in relation to the grandmother (Hammarstro¨m, 1986). In a table such as this, the diagonal is most often the focus when studying family relations across generations, although the other relations are also of theoretical interest. However, even with very sophisticated correlation analyses, it is not possible to elucidate the circumstances and conditions underlying these various patterns of relations between family generations. Because parents and children, as well as grandparents and grandchildren, owing to their specific family and generation positions, are distinct from one another, it is theoretically reasonable to expect that the occurrence of correlations between the various solidarity components will also differ across the generations. With this in mind, as well as the various results of studies referred to earlier, I will return to Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity and its theoretical implications for the theoretical framework of solidarity across family generations. 3.3. Mechanical solidarity related to family relations As a starting point for the discussion of whether the family relations across generations can be compared with the structural concept mechanical solidarity, I wish to tentatively suggest that the Western family has undergone a development different from that Durkheim described with regard to society. As a foundation for this discussion, a comparison is made with the ideal type of the Western family according to Parson (1951, 1955), the sociologist who has developed the most elaborated theory of family. Using

Table 1 Emotional closeness mother and grandmother and contact frequency

Contact frequency

At least once a week More seldom Sum

Percentage on total sum.

Emotional closeness to mother

Emotional closeness to grandmother

No (%)

Yes (%)

No (%)

Yes (%)

25 6 31

65 4 69

24 36 60

27 13 40

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Durkheim’s concepts of division of labor and value similarity and based on an idea of the Finnish sociologist Allardt (1965), this development is schematically illustrated in Fig. 1. According to Durkheim, a societal change has occurred from mechanical to organic solidarity, from Cell 1 to 4. As concerns the Western family, I would suggest that a more adequate description is found in a change from Cell 2 to 3. The figure is, however, not immune to objections. As the household was the predominating institution in Western preindustrial society, not merely for reproduction, but also for production and, thereby, division of labor, the ideal type of the traditional Western family cannot really be separated from society. It could thus be argued that it should therefore be placed in Cell 1. However, with reference to Parson (1951, 1955), the ideal type of the traditional Western family was characterized by a clearly defined authority structure concerning relations between parents and children, and the family members were also mutually and functionally interdependent of one another. This family was marked both by a high degree of similarity in values and norms and by a clearly specified division of labor— gender related and between generations—in contrast to society. It could thus be claimed that the ideal type of the traditional family/household is different from a society characterized by mechanical solidarity in terms of the dimensions of division of labor and value similarity. The question of theoretical relevance here is to what degree the traditional family in reality was characterized by mechanical solidarity. Although we cannot know the truth in this case, historical studies suggest that care of old people was based on contractual rather than affectional relations (Laslett, 1977), and that old people in Western society never experienced a golden old age (among others, Goode, 1963; Hareven, 2001). Such relationships across generations are hardly to be characterized as reflecting mechanical solidarity according to Durkheim’s definition of the concept, and the traditional family is therefore tentatively placed in Cell 2. The ideal type of the modern Western family is then found in Cell 3. Contrary to Popenoe (1988, 1993), who defined families as nuclear households in his discussion of the decline of the Western family, my view, in line with Bengtson et al. (1996, p. 256), is that bwe must regard families as networks or systems that extend both upward and downward across generationsQ. As concerns division of labor within the family, and between family generations, the opposite development seems to have occurred in comparison with the society. The family has changed from having a high degree of division of labor with strict role distribution to having a lower degree of division of labor and relatively less far-reaching division of roles, that is, a more diffuse role distribution and more diffuse role expectations, according to Parson (1951, 1955).

Fig. 1. The relationship between division of labor and similarity in values, norms, etc.

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What further characterizes the modern family in comparison with the traditional ideal type is a relative differentiation in values and norms between family generations, as is the pattern of the modern society according to Durkheim. In this respect, family members are, relatively speaking, more independent of one another. The main function of the family lies in emotional solidarity and particularity as opposed to competition and universalism, according to Parson (1951, p. 154 ff.). Thus, on the theoretical level, affectional bonds to one another, together with functional independence, are not necessarily opposing qualities of solidarity in the modern family. A similar development was outlined by Hareven (2001), who described a redefinition of family functions and values. A shift to intimacy as one of the major cohesive forces has led to a weakening of the interdependence among members of the family. Central to the discussion here is that the modern family can hardly be characterized in terms of mechanical solidarity on the basis of the empirical studies discussed in the former section. Illuminated in these studies was that the relationships between old parents and their children, as well as between middle-aged parents and their adult children, were characterized as being independent with regard to value similarity, but as close in terms of emotional ties. However, regarding exchange of help and support, it is not easy to decide whether the patterns more closely approximate the ideal type of the modern Western family, as it is depicted in Cell 3 of Fig. 1, or the characteristics of organic solidarity in Cell 4. There is, however, no reason to assume that family relations across generations in Western society are based on contracts, which signifies organic solidarity.11 Therefore, it is more plausible to refer to Cell 3 when characterizing the modern Western family of today. I doubt, however, that this should be seen as a decline of the family. Hence, the development of the Western family outlined above does not seem to be adapted to Durkheim’s theory of division of labor and the change from mechanical to organic solidarity. The concept of mechanical solidarity does not seem appropriate for analyzing relations across family generations, neither on theoretical nor empirical grounds. There may therefore be reason to assume that the choice of the concept of mechanical solidarity as a theoretical point of departure is ideologically conditioned and a symptom of what Goode (1963) called bWestern nostalgiaQ and the notions of the idyllic family of the preindustrial period. The choice of concept may also have been in opposition to Parsons’ theoretical framework, insofar as it was interpreted as a description of the decline of the American family. Although Bengtson and colleagues also realized the connotations of Western nostalgia, I have not found that they have abandoned the idea of mechanical solidarity as applied to family relations across generations. There seems, however, to be reason to ask what actually remains of Durkheim’s theory and the concept of mechanical solidarity in the theoretical framework of intergenerational solidarity, except for the mere term itself. This question appears to be relevant, considering the replacement of value consensus with normative solidarity and the fact that division of labor as a basis for value similarity was not actually integrated into the theoretical framework.

4. In conclusion: alternative approaches with respect to variation and diversity Bengtson and colleagues have made extensive and praiseworthy efforts in elaborating the solidarity dimensions (see, e.g., Bengtson & Schrader, 1982). These dimensions per se are not affected by the 11

Organic solidarity may perhaps signify relations between cohorts at the macrolevel, at least in welfare states, with extensive economic transfers between generations.

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weakness of the theoretical grounds for the assumption of statistical relationships between them, nor are they affected by the meaning of such relationships when they appear. Starting from the solidarity dimensions developed by Bengtson and colleagues, it may be fruitful to identify alternative approaches and theoretical frameworks for describing and analyzing relations between family generations. As relations between family members across generations seem to be considerably more complicated than is presumed, as exemplified in Table 1, it would appear to be difficult to find a model of intergenerational solidarity that can accommodate all of the various intergenerational relations (cf. Gubrium & Holstein, 1994; Bengtson et al., 1996). When addressing relationships across family generations, an alternative theoretical approach to both the solidarity and conflict perspectives, as well as considering the variability in relations across generations, may, for example, be offered by Weber’s (1969/1921) typology of social action and related concepts. The concepts of interest in this context are community (Vergemeinschaftung) and association (Vergesellschaftung) as applicable to family relations, which were developed from To¨nnies’ (1957/1887) pair of concepts Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association). Weber also outlined conflict as a third type of social relation. The concept of community (Vergemeinschaftung) refers to a social relation wherein the orientation of social action depends on a subjective feeling of affinity, which can be affectual or traditional in nature. The concept of association (Vergesellschaftung) refers to a social relation wherein the orientation of social action depends on a rational agreement, which can be a value or goal rationally motivated compromise of interests between the participating actors. A conflict is, according to Weber, a social relation wherein social action is oriented intentionally to carrying out the actor’s own will against the resistance of the other party (Weber, 1969/1921). Affectual action flows purely from sentiments without consciously manifested values and ends or rational calculations of appropriate means. Human beings who act affectually are satisfying their own needs. A traditional action comprises habitual conduct originating in conventional manners and customs. Value-rational action is related to fundamental values such as honor and fulfillment of one’s obligations. Human beings who act in a value-rational manner are realizing their own ideals using morally good means. Goal-rational action implies that human beings consciously calculate and choose those means that, according to available knowledge, most effectively lead to realization of their ends (Weber 1969/1921). According to Weber, there is great variation in the degree to which the family is perceived as a community (Vergemeinschaftung) or an association (Vergesellschaftung), as most social relationships are a mixture of community and association. From the typology of action—that is, affectual, traditional, value-oriented and goal-oriented action, in different combinations—Weber saw that it was possible to construct a complex categorization of various social relations and their characteristics. Weber’s concepts have the advantage of allowing variation in relations, in that they do not constitute a dualistic dichotomy, such as Durkheim’s concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity or To¨nnies’ concepts. Furthermore, in contrast to Durkheim’s concepts, Weber’s are based on human beings’ actions and the emphasis is on understanding social action and motives as generated through individuals in their particular circumstances, not on societies as integrated wholes. Returning to Table 1, we may, for example, suggest, or hypothesize, that the grandchild–grandmother relationship is more similar to association (Vergesellschaftung) than is the adult child–mother relation, even if there is great variation. The degree to which the adult child–mother relationship can be referred to as community (Vergemeinschaftung), based on Table 1, is not unambiguous. As we know that the middle

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generation is the one primarily initiating contact with the oldest generation, we could hypothesize that, in cases where children are emotionally close to their mother and have a frequent contact with her, the relationship may be characterized as affectionate. We could perhaps even hypothesize that a relationship in which the children have had frequent contact with their mother, without being emotionally close to her, may be characterized as traditional, or ritual—or be directed by filial obligation. But how would we characterize those adult children who have less frequent contact with their mother? To address this, we need to know the motives underlying family members’ choices to have these contacts with one another or not. Are their behaviors emotionally conditioned, or ritual in character and based on traditional behavior patterns, or are they based on feelings of obligation or caused by coercion? Do they produce conflicts or ambivalence? These are just some examples of questions that need an answer. Questions such as these, however, are not easily studied using a quantitative approach and require qualitative methods, at least as a complement to quantitative methods, as was also suggested by Bengtson and colleagues (Bengtson et al., 1996; Clarke et al., 1999; Luescher & Pillemer, 1998; Marshall et al., 1993). This approach based on Weber is outlined merely as a foundation for further discussion. What social gerontology needs for the future are approaches that allow theoretical and empirical delimitation of the complexity of parent–child and grandparent–grandchild relationships, making it possible to clarify and specify the variation and diversity in family relations across generations and to develop additional descriptive and theoretical concepts. Weber’s theory of social action suggests one possible approach, not founded on normative values concerning what should be characterized as bidealQ family relations.

Acknowledgements I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and comments on an earlier version. To Sandra Torres, PhD, Senior Lecturer at M7lardalen University College, I wish to express my great thanks for our inspiring discussions.

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