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The Danish referendum on the EC Common Act
189
The Danish Referendum on the EC Common Act OLEBORRE University
gfAarhus, LX-8000 &JW.
The European Common Act, containing
amendments to the Treaty of Rome, was negotiated by the governments of the EC countries during most of 1985. By early 1986 the road seemed clear for its ratification by the parliaments in eleven of the twelve EC countries. Only in Denmark a parliamentary majority opposed ratification, and as a consequence of this, a consultative referendum was held on 27 February, producing a majority of 56 against 44 per cent in favour of the European Common Act. Why did this peculiar situation arise in Denmark, how was the outcome produced, and what are the implications for Denmark’s future role in the European Community? Background
and Campaign
The four-party government under i”iIr Poui Schliiter which replaced the Social Democratic government under Mr Anker Jdrgensen in September 1982, depends on support from the small Radical Liberal party for a majority in the Folketing. This support has been given on most domestic matters and especially on central economic policy matters. But the traditional neutral and anti-military posture of the Radical Liberals means that the bourgeois government have to compromis,e with the Social Democrats on matters of foreign policy. With regard to Denmark’s membership of EC, Social Democratic leaders have not exactly been enthusiastic. In 1972, most of them advocated a Yes to the membership but a No to a European union. But some of them were against membership, and so too were a majority of the Sociai Democratic voters. This divisiveness accounts for the poor showing of the party in the European parliamentary e1ectior.s in 1979 and 1984 and the success of the People’s Movement Against the EC. During Denmark’s thirteen years in the EC, opinion polls have regularly shown a strong opposition against the EC not only on the left wing but also in the Social Democratic voter base, especially the union cf unskilled workers. In parliamentary elections, of which Denmark has had no less than six during the last thirteen years, the EC issues have played a minor role; and in parliamentary debates they have mostly been promoted by the left wing parties, which have criticized Denmark’s relationship with the EC.
Denmark
However, the shifting of the governments’ EC policy has been closely watched and often controlled through the standing parliamentary committee on EC matters. Though its meetings are closed to the public, the press statements of its members reveai an often heated struggle between government and parliament for control of the EC policy. In the years of bourgeois government, 1982-85, the two main antagonists have been Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and former Social Democrat ‘Market Minister’ Ivar Norgaard. The delicate parliamentary position and tight parliamentary control have caused the Danish government to tread cautiously during its negotiations of the European Common Act. The Danish negotiators wanted to protect the veto right of individual EC countries, demanded guarantees that the intema! European market would not damage the efforts to protect the environment and work milieu, and yielded only reluctantly to the ideas about European foreign policy consultations, often to the exasperation of their EC partners. The agreement reached in the end. popularly called the ‘EC package’, was generally well received in Denmark; even the leader of the Social Democratic opposition, former Prime Minister Anker Jergensen, spoke positively of it. But it appears that even before the EC summit meeting in Luxemburg on 2-3 December most of the Social Democratic parliamentarians were set on a sharply oppositional course on the EC issue in order to press for an election, in which a whole range of domestic issues would overshadow the EC issue. In a new meeting on 8 January, the Social Democratic parliamentary group formulated a series of demands for guarantees; and on 14 January the group declared that it would vote against ratification. Since the Radical Liberals had previously stated that they opposed ratification on the grounds that the EC package institutionalized foreign policy consultations, the government faced a defeat in parliament. It might either call an election or ask the EC partners to reopen the negotiations, two equally unattractive alternatives. In this situation the idea of a consultative referendum, which had been discussed earlier in the inner circle of the government as a possible means to force the Social Democrats :o accept the EC package,
The Danisb
190
Referendum
became important;
and a few hours after the Social Democratic rejection of the package. Prime Minister Schliiter publicly proposed the referendum. The Danish constitution provides for referendums either if the voting age is to be lowered, or if one-third of the parliament collect signatures to oppose a bill (except budget bills). A consultative referendum, conducted before the parliament has voted, is not provided for in the constitution, and has been used only on one previous occasion in 1916. In the present case some observers argued that the idea was incompatible with the Danish constitution, which states that members of parliament are bound only by their own conviction. However, both the Social Democratic and the Radical Liberal groups declared that they would vote according to the result of the referendum. as did the parties of the government; only the Foreign Minister expressed some reluctance to do so. The bill stating conditions for the referendum occasioned some discussion both in the parliamentary committee and among the public. The ~ovemment wanted an early date, both out of a sense of responsibility to the EC partners and in order to exploit the initiative which it had gained. Concerning the text, the government wanted a referendum on ‘the EC reform’; the Social Democrats protested because of the positive connotations of this phrase, preferring the phrase ‘the European Common Act’. The skirmish was resolved, 27 February chosen, and the ballot text would read ‘the EC package {European Common Act)‘.
The Campaign From the beginning, the government claimed that it was necessary to accept the package if the economic advantage of staying in the EC be maintained. The package itself did not undermine Danish sovereignty. On some points, such as environmental protection, it even improved national self-determination. Against this the Social Democrats came up smith a number of arguments. In the first place, a refusal to ratify the package could not possibly bring Denmark out of the EC. Secondly, the package confined the veto right to certain matters and involved the European parliament in the decisions of the Council of Ministers. In the long run, it was argued, to accept the package would take Denmark into a European Union; this would stall the welfare system and put priority for free trade above priority for environmental protection and quality of life. So, the argument about the ‘slide’ played a great role on both sides. In the eyes of the
on the EC Common
Act
government. a ‘No’ to the package would entail a sliding out of the EC; in the e,yes of the opposition, a ‘Yes’ would entail a sliding into a European Union. Everybody agreed, however, that the package itself would have few short-term consequences. During the campaign, Danish business and industry, including the farmers, were unanimously in favour of the package, and a total of around 17 million Dkr. were invested in advertisements by the proponents. A major canned goods producer sent out fetters to all their employees saying that half of them would be fired if the package was rejected. The trade unions were divided. Most unions of unskilled workers went against the package, while the unions of skilled workers typically abstained from recommending either a Yes or a No. The opponents used around 8-9 million Dkr. for their advertising campaign. The Danish television broadcast four debates. The three first dealt with major aspects of the EC package: EC’s role in foreign policy, the internal market and its effects on the environment, and the roles of the EC Parliament and other EC institutions. In these debates, experts and administrators took part. In the last debate two days before the election, the parties in parliament shared equal time. The objection, supported by the Ombudsman, that all parties running candidates ought to participate, was overruled by the board of television with the argument that it was the parties in parliament which had asked the voters’ advice. The opinion polls right from the beginning showed a majority in favour of the EC package. Around the middle of February the lead of the supporters had increased to the level of 20-25 per cent according to the four major polling bureaus. Broken down by parties, the opinion polls showed a familiar pattern. In the government parties, the support was almost unanimous. In the left wing parties there was a wholehearted rejection of the package. The Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals were divided, the former having a majority against. and the latter, a majority in favour of the package. A major feature of the campaign was the broken front that was revealed among the opponents. In the Social Democratic party as well as the Radical Liberals, a number of prominent individuals declared that they wouId vote in favour of the package. Different opponents claimed different aspects of the package as grounds for their attitude. Shortly before the referendum there were some signs that the opponents were catching up, though not enough to endanger the victory of the supporters.
OLE BoRRE
Analysis
of the Result
The government gained a clear victory but not as convincing a one as most people had expected. On the basis of the campaign and opinion polls up to a week before election day, many had drawn paraIleis to the 1972 referendum, which finished with the supporters leading the opponents of EEC by 27 per cent. This time, however, the margin was only 12 per cent, as is seen from Table 1. It is true that in 1972, the Social Democratic party had advocated a ‘Yes’ whereas this time it advocated a ‘No’. But not many observers thought this difference important as the party had been divided on both occasions. TADLE 1. Result of the Danish Referendum
on the European Common Act, compared with the 1972 Referendum on the EC Membership (per cent)
Yes No Total Voting ;urnoutd
1986 Referendum
1972 Referendum
56.2 43.8 100.0 74.8
;z:: 100.0 89.8
a The number of valid votes cast was 2,897,824 in 1986, 3,080,150 in 1972. In 1972 there were 18,962 invalid votes. Invalid votes were not reported in the 1986 referendum. In regard to the ecology of the vote, the parahei between the 1972 and the 1986 referendums is justified, however. For the seventeen county constituencies, including the three into which the city of Copenhagen is divided, the linear correlation is as high as r=0.975. The EC supporters came from the rural western parts of the country, the opponents from the major towns and the eastern parts. Table 2 shows that in Copenhagen city and county only 43 per cent voted Yes while almost 70 per cent did so in west and south TABLE 2. Result of the 1972 and 1986 referendums in four geographical areas (per cent voting ‘Yes’) Change 1986 1972 1972-86 Copenhagen city and county Island region East and North Jutland West and South Jutland
43.2 57.0 57.7 69.6
52.3 66.4 65.0 74.1
-9.1 -9.4 -7.3 -4.5
191
Jutland, the two remaining regions having a vote division much closer to the national average. The divisions of opinion on the EC package within different voter categories is clarified by a tele phone sumey carried out the day before the referendum. The result is presented in Table 3. As for the participation in the referendum, the survey was somewhat optimistic in predicting 83 per cent as against the actual 75 per cent. The margin of 12 per cent in favour of Yes is correct, however, so that the lower turnout might welt have been caused by an almost equal number defecting from both sides. The male population differs from the female in having a higher per cent voting Yes and correspondingly lower per cent abstaining. The age difference, amounting to a majority of almost two to one among the older as against a minority voting Yes in the younger generations was expected, given the leftist preference of young voters in all recent elections. As for the regional variation, Table 3 agrees reasonably well with Table 2, by showing a majority voting Yes in the provincial districts as against a smaller majority voting No in the capital. With regard to occupation, one finds a huge majority of around six to one voting Yes among self-employed (including farmers). White collar workers were almost evenly divided between the two camps, whereas blue collar workers voted No by a fairly small margin but also showed a smaller turnout. The fact that the turnout in all three groups is higher than the average is accounted for by a lower turnout among pensioners and other non-employed categories. Finally, the difference among the partisan camps shows the strongly left-right character of the issue. The parties are arranged approximately from left to right in the table. On the left wing, few defected to the camp of supporters, and even the Social Democratic voters went overwhelmingly against the EC package. The bourgeois voters in all parties favoured a Yes, and in three of the four government parties the defection to vote No was negligible. Only the right wing Progressive party voters break the left-right pattern by dividing more evenly than the government’s voters. Although for four of the nine parties the sample contained less than twenty respondents, one is hardly left in doubt as to the different reception of the EC package across the political spectrum. The Future
of the EC Issue
Before the European Common Act was con ceived, opinion polls over a number of years showed that almost half the Danish electorate was
192 TibrF: 3. Vote decisicn in various groups (per cent)
______.
..-.._
Will vote Yes
Will vote NO
Will not vote, or Don’t Know
Yesi
IN -No (= 100%) Diff.
-.__
All respondems
48
36
17
(900)
+ 12
Gender: ILlale Female
53 43
35 37
12 20
(412) (488)
+ 16 i-6
Age: 18-29 30-44 45-59 60 or over
35 46 59 52
48 42 29 25
17 13 12 24
(215) (254) (201) (230)
-13
Region: Copenhagen Islands Jutland
39 47 52
44 38 31
17 14 17
Occupation: Self-employed White collar worker Blue collar worker
Sl 45 37
13 44 46
5 10 16
(98) (293) (224)
+68 + 1 -9
Vote in 1984: Left Socialist People’s Socialist Social Democratic Radical Liberal Center Democratic Christian People’s Conservative Agrarian Liberal Progressive
11 13 20 63 72 94 89 91 59
89 73 65 21 17 0 5 1 35
0
5
(17) (128) (211) (44) (13) (13) (214) (85) (17)
-78 -60 -45 +43 +55 +94 +84 +90 + 24
43 10
11 44
46 46
(44) (19)
+32 -34
Did not vote Too young to vote
13 16 15 11 6 6
+z +27
Source: Kasper Vilstrup Bureau. opposed to Denmark’s membership of the EC. But these polls may well have been based on the unrealistic assumption that Denmark could choose among several market arrangements. In any case, the membership had not been put to a test since 1972; and it might have been better to trust a few polls which showed that far less than half the electors were prepared to take the risk of voting Denmark out of the EC unless a good alternative was available. This interpretation can explain why a majority of the Danish voters accepted a measure which implies a further step toward European integration. The interpretation is also warranted by a further probing of the answers to the telephone poll underlying Table 3. In Table 4, those voting Yes were asked whether they wanted a closer
political association with the EC or whether they only voted for the package. Those voting No were asked whether they wanted Denmark to leave the EC or whether they still preferred to remain in the EC (that is, the Social Democratic position). When the vote is subdivided in this fashion, the result of the referendum appears more positive toward the EC than the simple vote counting suggests. Nearly half of those voting Yes-one quarter of the whole sample-want a closer association with the EC. It may be going too far to claim that they are heading for an outright European Union, but at the least they refute the widespread notion that practially no Danes are ardent Europeans. At the other end of the integration scale. about
OLE BORRE
193
TABLE 4. Stands on Denmark’s integration in the EC (per cent)
Left wing Voted Yes: Want closer association Merely accept EC package Total Yes vote
5
1983 Vote SOC. Rad. Dem. Lib.
11
Ail. including non-voters
43
25
(15)
(&
(:;)
(&
(:5)
35
60
22
4
27
(2:)
(li’)
36
279
Voted No: Want to remain in the EC Want to leave the EC Total No voted
(&
(&
No. of respondents
130
166
(= 100%)
25
Government
a ‘Don’t knows’ omitted. Source: Kasper Vilstrup Bureau. one in six want Denmark to leave the EC. A lot more supported the Social Democratic stand, voting No to the EC package but still preferring the EC membership. Even on the left wing this position was not uncommon, as the first column shows. On the basis of these figures one may forecast a very poor showing for the anti-EC forces should the occasion arise for a renewed referendum on Denmark’s membership. This issue seems to have been more or less killed by the referendum on the EC package.
The Social Democratic view, accused by many as being unclear or petty, and even provoking old-timers in the party to dissent publicly, seems to have gained support in the end: though the party lost the referendum. Table 4 shows its voters to bc more united than the voters of any other party. The left wing is torn between EC opponents and lukewarm EC supporters. and the got’ernment parties may face some difficulties in the future in finding the right tempo of European integration.
The Danish Referendum on the EC Common Act OLEBORRE University
gfAarhus, LX-8000 &JW.
The European Common Act, containing
amendments to the Treaty of Rome, was negotiated by the governments of the EC countries during most of 1985. By early 1986 the road seemed clear for its ratification by the parliaments in eleven of the twelve EC countries. Only in Denmark a parliamentary majority opposed ratification, and as a consequence of this, a consultative referendum was held on 27 February, producing a majority of 56 against 44 per cent in favour of the European Common Act. Why did this peculiar situation arise in Denmark, how was the outcome produced, and what are the implications for Denmark’s future role in the European Community? Background
and Campaign
The four-party government under i”iIr Poui Schliiter which replaced the Social Democratic government under Mr Anker Jdrgensen in September 1982, depends on support from the small Radical Liberal party for a majority in the Folketing. This support has been given on most domestic matters and especially on central economic policy matters. But the traditional neutral and anti-military posture of the Radical Liberals means that the bourgeois government have to compromis,e with the Social Democrats on matters of foreign policy. With regard to Denmark’s membership of EC, Social Democratic leaders have not exactly been enthusiastic. In 1972, most of them advocated a Yes to the membership but a No to a European union. But some of them were against membership, and so too were a majority of the Sociai Democratic voters. This divisiveness accounts for the poor showing of the party in the European parliamentary e1ectior.s in 1979 and 1984 and the success of the People’s Movement Against the EC. During Denmark’s thirteen years in the EC, opinion polls have regularly shown a strong opposition against the EC not only on the left wing but also in the Social Democratic voter base, especially the union cf unskilled workers. In parliamentary elections, of which Denmark has had no less than six during the last thirteen years, the EC issues have played a minor role; and in parliamentary debates they have mostly been promoted by the left wing parties, which have criticized Denmark’s relationship with the EC.
Denmark
However, the shifting of the governments’ EC policy has been closely watched and often controlled through the standing parliamentary committee on EC matters. Though its meetings are closed to the public, the press statements of its members reveai an often heated struggle between government and parliament for control of the EC policy. In the years of bourgeois government, 1982-85, the two main antagonists have been Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and former Social Democrat ‘Market Minister’ Ivar Norgaard. The delicate parliamentary position and tight parliamentary control have caused the Danish government to tread cautiously during its negotiations of the European Common Act. The Danish negotiators wanted to protect the veto right of individual EC countries, demanded guarantees that the intema! European market would not damage the efforts to protect the environment and work milieu, and yielded only reluctantly to the ideas about European foreign policy consultations, often to the exasperation of their EC partners. The agreement reached in the end. popularly called the ‘EC package’, was generally well received in Denmark; even the leader of the Social Democratic opposition, former Prime Minister Anker Jergensen, spoke positively of it. But it appears that even before the EC summit meeting in Luxemburg on 2-3 December most of the Social Democratic parliamentarians were set on a sharply oppositional course on the EC issue in order to press for an election, in which a whole range of domestic issues would overshadow the EC issue. In a new meeting on 8 January, the Social Democratic parliamentary group formulated a series of demands for guarantees; and on 14 January the group declared that it would vote against ratification. Since the Radical Liberals had previously stated that they opposed ratification on the grounds that the EC package institutionalized foreign policy consultations, the government faced a defeat in parliament. It might either call an election or ask the EC partners to reopen the negotiations, two equally unattractive alternatives. In this situation the idea of a consultative referendum, which had been discussed earlier in the inner circle of the government as a possible means to force the Social Democrats :o accept the EC package,
The Danisb
190
Referendum
became important;
and a few hours after the Social Democratic rejection of the package. Prime Minister Schliiter publicly proposed the referendum. The Danish constitution provides for referendums either if the voting age is to be lowered, or if one-third of the parliament collect signatures to oppose a bill (except budget bills). A consultative referendum, conducted before the parliament has voted, is not provided for in the constitution, and has been used only on one previous occasion in 1916. In the present case some observers argued that the idea was incompatible with the Danish constitution, which states that members of parliament are bound only by their own conviction. However, both the Social Democratic and the Radical Liberal groups declared that they would vote according to the result of the referendum. as did the parties of the government; only the Foreign Minister expressed some reluctance to do so. The bill stating conditions for the referendum occasioned some discussion both in the parliamentary committee and among the public. The ~ovemment wanted an early date, both out of a sense of responsibility to the EC partners and in order to exploit the initiative which it had gained. Concerning the text, the government wanted a referendum on ‘the EC reform’; the Social Democrats protested because of the positive connotations of this phrase, preferring the phrase ‘the European Common Act’. The skirmish was resolved, 27 February chosen, and the ballot text would read ‘the EC package {European Common Act)‘.
The Campaign From the beginning, the government claimed that it was necessary to accept the package if the economic advantage of staying in the EC be maintained. The package itself did not undermine Danish sovereignty. On some points, such as environmental protection, it even improved national self-determination. Against this the Social Democrats came up smith a number of arguments. In the first place, a refusal to ratify the package could not possibly bring Denmark out of the EC. Secondly, the package confined the veto right to certain matters and involved the European parliament in the decisions of the Council of Ministers. In the long run, it was argued, to accept the package would take Denmark into a European Union; this would stall the welfare system and put priority for free trade above priority for environmental protection and quality of life. So, the argument about the ‘slide’ played a great role on both sides. In the eyes of the
on the EC Common
Act
government. a ‘No’ to the package would entail a sliding out of the EC; in the e,yes of the opposition, a ‘Yes’ would entail a sliding into a European Union. Everybody agreed, however, that the package itself would have few short-term consequences. During the campaign, Danish business and industry, including the farmers, were unanimously in favour of the package, and a total of around 17 million Dkr. were invested in advertisements by the proponents. A major canned goods producer sent out fetters to all their employees saying that half of them would be fired if the package was rejected. The trade unions were divided. Most unions of unskilled workers went against the package, while the unions of skilled workers typically abstained from recommending either a Yes or a No. The opponents used around 8-9 million Dkr. for their advertising campaign. The Danish television broadcast four debates. The three first dealt with major aspects of the EC package: EC’s role in foreign policy, the internal market and its effects on the environment, and the roles of the EC Parliament and other EC institutions. In these debates, experts and administrators took part. In the last debate two days before the election, the parties in parliament shared equal time. The objection, supported by the Ombudsman, that all parties running candidates ought to participate, was overruled by the board of television with the argument that it was the parties in parliament which had asked the voters’ advice. The opinion polls right from the beginning showed a majority in favour of the EC package. Around the middle of February the lead of the supporters had increased to the level of 20-25 per cent according to the four major polling bureaus. Broken down by parties, the opinion polls showed a familiar pattern. In the government parties, the support was almost unanimous. In the left wing parties there was a wholehearted rejection of the package. The Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals were divided, the former having a majority against. and the latter, a majority in favour of the package. A major feature of the campaign was the broken front that was revealed among the opponents. In the Social Democratic party as well as the Radical Liberals, a number of prominent individuals declared that they wouId vote in favour of the package. Different opponents claimed different aspects of the package as grounds for their attitude. Shortly before the referendum there were some signs that the opponents were catching up, though not enough to endanger the victory of the supporters.
OLE BoRRE
Analysis
of the Result
The government gained a clear victory but not as convincing a one as most people had expected. On the basis of the campaign and opinion polls up to a week before election day, many had drawn paraIleis to the 1972 referendum, which finished with the supporters leading the opponents of EEC by 27 per cent. This time, however, the margin was only 12 per cent, as is seen from Table 1. It is true that in 1972, the Social Democratic party had advocated a ‘Yes’ whereas this time it advocated a ‘No’. But not many observers thought this difference important as the party had been divided on both occasions. TADLE 1. Result of the Danish Referendum
on the European Common Act, compared with the 1972 Referendum on the EC Membership (per cent)
Yes No Total Voting ;urnoutd
1986 Referendum
1972 Referendum
56.2 43.8 100.0 74.8
;z:: 100.0 89.8
a The number of valid votes cast was 2,897,824 in 1986, 3,080,150 in 1972. In 1972 there were 18,962 invalid votes. Invalid votes were not reported in the 1986 referendum. In regard to the ecology of the vote, the parahei between the 1972 and the 1986 referendums is justified, however. For the seventeen county constituencies, including the three into which the city of Copenhagen is divided, the linear correlation is as high as r=0.975. The EC supporters came from the rural western parts of the country, the opponents from the major towns and the eastern parts. Table 2 shows that in Copenhagen city and county only 43 per cent voted Yes while almost 70 per cent did so in west and south TABLE 2. Result of the 1972 and 1986 referendums in four geographical areas (per cent voting ‘Yes’) Change 1986 1972 1972-86 Copenhagen city and county Island region East and North Jutland West and South Jutland
43.2 57.0 57.7 69.6
52.3 66.4 65.0 74.1
-9.1 -9.4 -7.3 -4.5
191
Jutland, the two remaining regions having a vote division much closer to the national average. The divisions of opinion on the EC package within different voter categories is clarified by a tele phone sumey carried out the day before the referendum. The result is presented in Table 3. As for the participation in the referendum, the survey was somewhat optimistic in predicting 83 per cent as against the actual 75 per cent. The margin of 12 per cent in favour of Yes is correct, however, so that the lower turnout might welt have been caused by an almost equal number defecting from both sides. The male population differs from the female in having a higher per cent voting Yes and correspondingly lower per cent abstaining. The age difference, amounting to a majority of almost two to one among the older as against a minority voting Yes in the younger generations was expected, given the leftist preference of young voters in all recent elections. As for the regional variation, Table 3 agrees reasonably well with Table 2, by showing a majority voting Yes in the provincial districts as against a smaller majority voting No in the capital. With regard to occupation, one finds a huge majority of around six to one voting Yes among self-employed (including farmers). White collar workers were almost evenly divided between the two camps, whereas blue collar workers voted No by a fairly small margin but also showed a smaller turnout. The fact that the turnout in all three groups is higher than the average is accounted for by a lower turnout among pensioners and other non-employed categories. Finally, the difference among the partisan camps shows the strongly left-right character of the issue. The parties are arranged approximately from left to right in the table. On the left wing, few defected to the camp of supporters, and even the Social Democratic voters went overwhelmingly against the EC package. The bourgeois voters in all parties favoured a Yes, and in three of the four government parties the defection to vote No was negligible. Only the right wing Progressive party voters break the left-right pattern by dividing more evenly than the government’s voters. Although for four of the nine parties the sample contained less than twenty respondents, one is hardly left in doubt as to the different reception of the EC package across the political spectrum. The Future
of the EC Issue
Before the European Common Act was con ceived, opinion polls over a number of years showed that almost half the Danish electorate was
192 TibrF: 3. Vote decisicn in various groups (per cent)
______.
..-.._
Will vote Yes
Will vote NO
Will not vote, or Don’t Know
Yesi
IN -No (= 100%) Diff.
-.__
All respondems
48
36
17
(900)
+ 12
Gender: ILlale Female
53 43
35 37
12 20
(412) (488)
+ 16 i-6
Age: 18-29 30-44 45-59 60 or over
35 46 59 52
48 42 29 25
17 13 12 24
(215) (254) (201) (230)
-13
Region: Copenhagen Islands Jutland
39 47 52
44 38 31
17 14 17
Occupation: Self-employed White collar worker Blue collar worker
Sl 45 37
13 44 46
5 10 16
(98) (293) (224)
+68 + 1 -9
Vote in 1984: Left Socialist People’s Socialist Social Democratic Radical Liberal Center Democratic Christian People’s Conservative Agrarian Liberal Progressive
11 13 20 63 72 94 89 91 59
89 73 65 21 17 0 5 1 35
0
5
(17) (128) (211) (44) (13) (13) (214) (85) (17)
-78 -60 -45 +43 +55 +94 +84 +90 + 24
43 10
11 44
46 46
(44) (19)
+32 -34
Did not vote Too young to vote
13 16 15 11 6 6
+z +27
Source: Kasper Vilstrup Bureau. opposed to Denmark’s membership of the EC. But these polls may well have been based on the unrealistic assumption that Denmark could choose among several market arrangements. In any case, the membership had not been put to a test since 1972; and it might have been better to trust a few polls which showed that far less than half the electors were prepared to take the risk of voting Denmark out of the EC unless a good alternative was available. This interpretation can explain why a majority of the Danish voters accepted a measure which implies a further step toward European integration. The interpretation is also warranted by a further probing of the answers to the telephone poll underlying Table 3. In Table 4, those voting Yes were asked whether they wanted a closer
political association with the EC or whether they only voted for the package. Those voting No were asked whether they wanted Denmark to leave the EC or whether they still preferred to remain in the EC (that is, the Social Democratic position). When the vote is subdivided in this fashion, the result of the referendum appears more positive toward the EC than the simple vote counting suggests. Nearly half of those voting Yes-one quarter of the whole sample-want a closer association with the EC. It may be going too far to claim that they are heading for an outright European Union, but at the least they refute the widespread notion that practially no Danes are ardent Europeans. At the other end of the integration scale. about
OLE BORRE
193
TABLE 4. Stands on Denmark’s integration in the EC (per cent)
Left wing Voted Yes: Want closer association Merely accept EC package Total Yes vote
5
1983 Vote SOC. Rad. Dem. Lib.
11
Ail. including non-voters
43
25
(15)
(&
(:;)
(&
(:5)
35
60
22
4
27
(2:)
(li’)
36
279
Voted No: Want to remain in the EC Want to leave the EC Total No voted
(&
(&
No. of respondents
130
166
(= 100%)
25
Government
a ‘Don’t knows’ omitted. Source: Kasper Vilstrup Bureau. one in six want Denmark to leave the EC. A lot more supported the Social Democratic stand, voting No to the EC package but still preferring the EC membership. Even on the left wing this position was not uncommon, as the first column shows. On the basis of these figures one may forecast a very poor showing for the anti-EC forces should the occasion arise for a renewed referendum on Denmark’s membership. This issue seems to have been more or less killed by the referendum on the EC package.
The Social Democratic view, accused by many as being unclear or petty, and even provoking old-timers in the party to dissent publicly, seems to have gained support in the end: though the party lost the referendum. Table 4 shows its voters to bc more united than the voters of any other party. The left wing is torn between EC opponents and lukewarm EC supporters. and the got’ernment parties may face some difficulties in the future in finding the right tempo of European integration.