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The Darwinian status of mind
~ ) Pergamon
J. Behav. Ther~ & Exp. Psychiat. Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 347-350,1996 Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Prin~d in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0005-7916/96 $15.00 + 0.00
S0005-7916(96)00045-6
THE DARWINIAN STATUS OF MIND JOHN GARCIA University of California, Los Angeles, U.S.A.
S u m m a r y - - Behavioristic criticisms of cognitive psychology stem from a Skinnerian argument by analogy, to wit, natural selection of species replaced divine creation, and therefore shaping of behavior by reinforcement replaces the immaterial mind. But Darwin argued that mind existed materially in mental organs evolved by natural selection, thus Skinner's analogy is false. Neuroscientists are rapidly amassing evidence for the Darwinian status of cognitive functions within the central nervous systems of animals and humans. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd
Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) believed the human mind, like the human body, evolved from lower animals through the process of natural selection, yet today, Skinnerian critics argue by analogy that cognitive functions are akin to creationism. For example, Blumberg and Wasserman (1995) say that cognitive theories are similar to the arguments from design. Catania (1995) criticizes the causal status of self-efficacy as follows: "Bandura's views on these concepts can be interpreted as a contemporary variety of Creationism." Lee (1995) argues that: "Contemporary cognitive models of psychology are based on an implicitly dualistic view of human behavior assuming the existence of a nonmaterial mental realm which has the capacity to act on the material world." The behavioral critics believe that minds and cognitive functions are immaterial concepts, like creationism, and have no proper place in scientific psychology. Darwin believed that creationism and arguments from design were indeed replaced by natural selection. Pondering the popular belief in the existence of God, Darwin wrote in his autobiography (Barlow, 1958, p. 87): The old argument from design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve must be designed by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, then in the course which the wind blows. But Darwin assumed mind to be a material corporeal (brain) structure. He makes this point abundantly clear (Barlow, 1958, pp. 88-89): Address correspondence to John Garcia, 1950-A Chilberg Road, Mt. Vernon, WA 98273, U.S.A. 347
348
JOHN GARCIA Everyone who believes, as I do, that all corporeal structures and mental organs.., of all beings have been developed by natural selection...will admit that the organs have been formed so that their possessors may compete successfully with other beings, and thus increase in number.
Catania (1995, p. 195) questioned Skinner on interpretation of two alternative links in causal chains: Skinner's reply was that private events may be called causes, but not initiating causes ... We do engage in productive private verbal behavior ... but public versions must have been established first ... In that case, the initiation passes over to the environment. Darwin's autobiography (Barlow, 1958) reveals that he was aware that the search for initiating, or first causes, puts the seeker on a slippery slope to creationism. He ruminates (pp. 92-94) as follows: When thus reflecting, I am compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist... But then arises the doubt---can the mind of man, which has, as I believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? ... The mystery of the beginnings of all things is insolvable for us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic. Psychologists accepting evolution through natural selection cannot be rationally likened to creationists. No matter what words they use to explicate cognitive theory, it must be assumed that they are referring to material nervous system mechanisms. Darwin himself made that assumption explicit, specifying that, corporeal structures, instincts, habits, and cognitions are all material grist for the mill of evolution (Garcia y Robertson & Garcia, 1987). Therefore, the Darwinian view subsumes operant conditioning and evacuates the Skinnerian analogy. Words, perhaps unfortunately, change their meaning depending on when, where, and by whom they are used. Darwin lodged the complaint, In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term; but who ever objected to chemists speaking of elective affinities of various elements? - - and yet an acid cannot strictly be said to elect the base with which it in preferences combines (Garcia y Robertson & Garcia, 1987, p. 24). It can be argued that behaviorism puts the case backwards. Taken literally, all terms describing behavior, such as stimulus, response, drive, or reinforcement, are ephemeral states leaving more permanent cognitive memories. Any mark they may leave, merely on recording devices, are but pale residue compared to the vivid, compelling memory of direct observation. W e would save a lot of time and paper if we were to assume that anyone dealing with psychological and/or biological science in this day and age is a materialistic monist who believes in evolution by natural selection. If you have doubts about this assumption, just ask the person! A n d be prepared for a long discourse because I have never met dualists, vitalists, or spiritualists not willing to defend their position zealously. As this author has written before (Garcia, 1995, p. 231), Skinner conceded the reality of the introspective mind, but he assigned it to physiology, particularly brain science, where it would not trouble psychology; much as Descartes assigned the troublesome soul to the pineal body in the center of the brain, so he could deal hydraulically with the rest of the body. This strategem
Darwinian Status of Mind
349
gave Skinnerian behaviorism an exalted position equivalent to Darwinian biology, from which they could describe cognition as creationism. Many physiological psychologists and biological psychiatrists think Skinner gave away too much, so they joined the neuroscientists. There they could safely assume that all of their fellows understood Darwin and took him seriously. Santiago Ramon y Cajal, the pioneer of modern neuroscience, with a keen eye at the microscope and a pen in his artistic hand drawing the microstructures of the brain, put forth the credo for all life science in poetic Darwinian phrasing: To know a brain ... is equivalent to ascertaining the material course of thought and will, to discovering the intimate history of life in its perpetual duel with external forces: a history summarized, and in a way engraved in the defensive neuronal coordinations of the reflex, of instinct, and of the associations of ideas (Garcia, 1992, p, 267). Neuroscientific titles may seemingly imply brain/mind dualities, but their contents reveal structural/functional singularities. The following examples are chapter titles from a recent volume, Plasticity in the central nervous system: Learning and memoo', edited by McGaugh, Bermudez-Rattoni, and Prado-Alcala (1995): (1) Involvement of the amygdala in the regulation of memory storage; (2) The role of the insular cortex in acquisition and long lasting memory for aversively motivated behavior; and (3) Serial and parallel processing during memory consolidation. These three chapters are the contributions delivered by the three editors, respectively. The editors' preface begins (p. viii): Research exploring the brain functions has greatly increased in recent years. The rapid pace of research was catalyzed by the development of new neurobiological and behavioral techniques, as well as by new conceptual and theoretical approaches to the study of the relationship of brain and behavior. A couple of quotes from two papers serve to illustrate the thoroughly materialistic interaction of brain function with brain structure assumed by all the contributors. For example, Richard F. Thompson and Jo Anne Tracy (McGaugh et al., 1995, p. 122) unequivocally conclude that: An understanding of the molecular biology of the memory trace formation will lead to an understanding of the mechanisms of memory storage, but this information will never inform us of the content of a memory store. The memory itself, be it an appropriately timed eye-blink, the correct turn in a maze, or a particular experience, is the properly of the neural network that encodes the memory. This statement is admirable in its clarity and concreteness, and it is ultimately testable. Joaquin M. Fuster (McGaugh et al., 1995, pp. 154--155), after reviewing the role of the frontal cortex in monkeys performing delayed matching to sample tasks, reports: We trained human subjects to perform a delayed matching to sample tasks. By imaging with positron emission tomography (PET), we observed that labeled glucose uptake in the prefrontal
350
JOHN GARCIA cortex (areas 9, 10, and 46) was significantly greater during performance of the memory task (delayed matching) than during performance of a control task that required the same number of matches and motor responses, but without the memory requirement.
Comparison of monkey and human is quintessentially Darwinian. Today's arguments about mind, pro or con, tell us little about what mind might be, but mind is a universal human concept. Introspectively, mind is called self. Projection of mind onto external objects is called animism, superstition, religion, or an explanatory model. This author says (McGaugh et al., 1995, p. 14): Seeing minds is a mnemonic device that assembles all that is known about the universe, or about a single organism, into a coherent unitary memory. Such projections are both subjective and adaptive. Therefore they have a structural network in the brain. I believe that other organisms also have minds. I have always thought so. Perhaps I had no choice but to think so.
References Barlow, N. (Ed.) (1958). The autobiography of Charles Darwin: 1809-1882. New York: Norton. Blumberg, M. S., & Wasserman, E. A. (1995). Animal mind and the argument from design. American Psychologist, 50, 133-144. Catania, C. R. (1995). Higher-order behavioral classes: Contingencies, beliefs, and verbal behavior. In Special issue: Cognition, behavior and causality. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 191-200. Garcia, J. (1992). Learning and the nature-nurture paradox. Proceedings of the Western Psychological Association, 1, 267-270. Garcia, J. (1995). Mind is back in control of Pavlovian and Skinnerian responses: Was it ever away? In Special issue: Cognition, behavior, and causality. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 229-234. Garcia y Robertson, R., & Garcia, J. (1987). Darwin was a learning theorist. In R. C. Bolles & M. D. Beecher (Eds.), Evolution and learning. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Lee, C. (1995). Comparing the incommensurable: Where science and politics collide. In Special issue: Cognition, behavior and causality. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 259-263. McGaugh, J. L., Bermudez-Rattoni, F., & Prado-Alcala, R. A. (Eds.) (1995). Plasticity in the nervous system: Learning and memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
J. Behav. Ther~ & Exp. Psychiat. Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 347-350,1996 Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd Prin~d in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0005-7916/96 $15.00 + 0.00
S0005-7916(96)00045-6
THE DARWINIAN STATUS OF MIND JOHN GARCIA University of California, Los Angeles, U.S.A.
S u m m a r y - - Behavioristic criticisms of cognitive psychology stem from a Skinnerian argument by analogy, to wit, natural selection of species replaced divine creation, and therefore shaping of behavior by reinforcement replaces the immaterial mind. But Darwin argued that mind existed materially in mental organs evolved by natural selection, thus Skinner's analogy is false. Neuroscientists are rapidly amassing evidence for the Darwinian status of cognitive functions within the central nervous systems of animals and humans. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd
Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) believed the human mind, like the human body, evolved from lower animals through the process of natural selection, yet today, Skinnerian critics argue by analogy that cognitive functions are akin to creationism. For example, Blumberg and Wasserman (1995) say that cognitive theories are similar to the arguments from design. Catania (1995) criticizes the causal status of self-efficacy as follows: "Bandura's views on these concepts can be interpreted as a contemporary variety of Creationism." Lee (1995) argues that: "Contemporary cognitive models of psychology are based on an implicitly dualistic view of human behavior assuming the existence of a nonmaterial mental realm which has the capacity to act on the material world." The behavioral critics believe that minds and cognitive functions are immaterial concepts, like creationism, and have no proper place in scientific psychology. Darwin believed that creationism and arguments from design were indeed replaced by natural selection. Pondering the popular belief in the existence of God, Darwin wrote in his autobiography (Barlow, 1958, p. 87): The old argument from design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve must be designed by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, then in the course which the wind blows. But Darwin assumed mind to be a material corporeal (brain) structure. He makes this point abundantly clear (Barlow, 1958, pp. 88-89): Address correspondence to John Garcia, 1950-A Chilberg Road, Mt. Vernon, WA 98273, U.S.A. 347
348
JOHN GARCIA Everyone who believes, as I do, that all corporeal structures and mental organs.., of all beings have been developed by natural selection...will admit that the organs have been formed so that their possessors may compete successfully with other beings, and thus increase in number.
Catania (1995, p. 195) questioned Skinner on interpretation of two alternative links in causal chains: Skinner's reply was that private events may be called causes, but not initiating causes ... We do engage in productive private verbal behavior ... but public versions must have been established first ... In that case, the initiation passes over to the environment. Darwin's autobiography (Barlow, 1958) reveals that he was aware that the search for initiating, or first causes, puts the seeker on a slippery slope to creationism. He ruminates (pp. 92-94) as follows: When thus reflecting, I am compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist... But then arises the doubt---can the mind of man, which has, as I believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? ... The mystery of the beginnings of all things is insolvable for us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic. Psychologists accepting evolution through natural selection cannot be rationally likened to creationists. No matter what words they use to explicate cognitive theory, it must be assumed that they are referring to material nervous system mechanisms. Darwin himself made that assumption explicit, specifying that, corporeal structures, instincts, habits, and cognitions are all material grist for the mill of evolution (Garcia y Robertson & Garcia, 1987). Therefore, the Darwinian view subsumes operant conditioning and evacuates the Skinnerian analogy. Words, perhaps unfortunately, change their meaning depending on when, where, and by whom they are used. Darwin lodged the complaint, In the literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a false term; but who ever objected to chemists speaking of elective affinities of various elements? - - and yet an acid cannot strictly be said to elect the base with which it in preferences combines (Garcia y Robertson & Garcia, 1987, p. 24). It can be argued that behaviorism puts the case backwards. Taken literally, all terms describing behavior, such as stimulus, response, drive, or reinforcement, are ephemeral states leaving more permanent cognitive memories. Any mark they may leave, merely on recording devices, are but pale residue compared to the vivid, compelling memory of direct observation. W e would save a lot of time and paper if we were to assume that anyone dealing with psychological and/or biological science in this day and age is a materialistic monist who believes in evolution by natural selection. If you have doubts about this assumption, just ask the person! A n d be prepared for a long discourse because I have never met dualists, vitalists, or spiritualists not willing to defend their position zealously. As this author has written before (Garcia, 1995, p. 231), Skinner conceded the reality of the introspective mind, but he assigned it to physiology, particularly brain science, where it would not trouble psychology; much as Descartes assigned the troublesome soul to the pineal body in the center of the brain, so he could deal hydraulically with the rest of the body. This strategem
Darwinian Status of Mind
349
gave Skinnerian behaviorism an exalted position equivalent to Darwinian biology, from which they could describe cognition as creationism. Many physiological psychologists and biological psychiatrists think Skinner gave away too much, so they joined the neuroscientists. There they could safely assume that all of their fellows understood Darwin and took him seriously. Santiago Ramon y Cajal, the pioneer of modern neuroscience, with a keen eye at the microscope and a pen in his artistic hand drawing the microstructures of the brain, put forth the credo for all life science in poetic Darwinian phrasing: To know a brain ... is equivalent to ascertaining the material course of thought and will, to discovering the intimate history of life in its perpetual duel with external forces: a history summarized, and in a way engraved in the defensive neuronal coordinations of the reflex, of instinct, and of the associations of ideas (Garcia, 1992, p, 267). Neuroscientific titles may seemingly imply brain/mind dualities, but their contents reveal structural/functional singularities. The following examples are chapter titles from a recent volume, Plasticity in the central nervous system: Learning and memoo', edited by McGaugh, Bermudez-Rattoni, and Prado-Alcala (1995): (1) Involvement of the amygdala in the regulation of memory storage; (2) The role of the insular cortex in acquisition and long lasting memory for aversively motivated behavior; and (3) Serial and parallel processing during memory consolidation. These three chapters are the contributions delivered by the three editors, respectively. The editors' preface begins (p. viii): Research exploring the brain functions has greatly increased in recent years. The rapid pace of research was catalyzed by the development of new neurobiological and behavioral techniques, as well as by new conceptual and theoretical approaches to the study of the relationship of brain and behavior. A couple of quotes from two papers serve to illustrate the thoroughly materialistic interaction of brain function with brain structure assumed by all the contributors. For example, Richard F. Thompson and Jo Anne Tracy (McGaugh et al., 1995, p. 122) unequivocally conclude that: An understanding of the molecular biology of the memory trace formation will lead to an understanding of the mechanisms of memory storage, but this information will never inform us of the content of a memory store. The memory itself, be it an appropriately timed eye-blink, the correct turn in a maze, or a particular experience, is the properly of the neural network that encodes the memory. This statement is admirable in its clarity and concreteness, and it is ultimately testable. Joaquin M. Fuster (McGaugh et al., 1995, pp. 154--155), after reviewing the role of the frontal cortex in monkeys performing delayed matching to sample tasks, reports: We trained human subjects to perform a delayed matching to sample tasks. By imaging with positron emission tomography (PET), we observed that labeled glucose uptake in the prefrontal
350
JOHN GARCIA cortex (areas 9, 10, and 46) was significantly greater during performance of the memory task (delayed matching) than during performance of a control task that required the same number of matches and motor responses, but without the memory requirement.
Comparison of monkey and human is quintessentially Darwinian. Today's arguments about mind, pro or con, tell us little about what mind might be, but mind is a universal human concept. Introspectively, mind is called self. Projection of mind onto external objects is called animism, superstition, religion, or an explanatory model. This author says (McGaugh et al., 1995, p. 14): Seeing minds is a mnemonic device that assembles all that is known about the universe, or about a single organism, into a coherent unitary memory. Such projections are both subjective and adaptive. Therefore they have a structural network in the brain. I believe that other organisms also have minds. I have always thought so. Perhaps I had no choice but to think so.
References Barlow, N. (Ed.) (1958). The autobiography of Charles Darwin: 1809-1882. New York: Norton. Blumberg, M. S., & Wasserman, E. A. (1995). Animal mind and the argument from design. American Psychologist, 50, 133-144. Catania, C. R. (1995). Higher-order behavioral classes: Contingencies, beliefs, and verbal behavior. In Special issue: Cognition, behavior and causality. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 191-200. Garcia, J. (1992). Learning and the nature-nurture paradox. Proceedings of the Western Psychological Association, 1, 267-270. Garcia, J. (1995). Mind is back in control of Pavlovian and Skinnerian responses: Was it ever away? In Special issue: Cognition, behavior, and causality. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 229-234. Garcia y Robertson, R., & Garcia, J. (1987). Darwin was a learning theorist. In R. C. Bolles & M. D. Beecher (Eds.), Evolution and learning. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Lee, C. (1995). Comparing the incommensurable: Where science and politics collide. In Special issue: Cognition, behavior and causality. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 259-263. McGaugh, J. L., Bermudez-Rattoni, F., & Prado-Alcala, R. A. (Eds.) (1995). Plasticity in the nervous system: Learning and memory. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.