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The debate in the USA
Access to space after Challenger The debate in the USA The tragic Shuttle accident last January has had a number of impacts on US space policy. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is an almost total reversal of the policy that the Space Shuttle would be the launcher of choice for almost all US government missions and that NASA would compete aggressively for commercial and foreign launch contracts, with a Shuttle pricing policy that provided significant economic incentives for satellite owners and operators to select the Shuttle over its major competitor, Ariane. On August 15, the White House announced that an orbiter to replace the Challenger would be built, but that 'NASA will no longer be in the business of launching private satellites'. This announcement implied a strong re-endorsement of the Space Station program and suggested that NASA's future priorities will focus 'on exploration, pioneering, and developing new technologies and uses of space'. The government's hope is that 'free enterprise corporations will become a highly competitive method of launching commercial satellites and doing those things that do not require a manned presence in space'. The White House announcement on a revised space launch policy followed months of debate on how best to reconstitute US launch capability in the wake of the Shuttle accident. The following pages contain several statements and proposals that are representative of that debate. Among the first to call for a shift to mixed manned and unmanned launch fleet was the space science community; the May statement of the Space S c i e n c e B o a r d of the N a t i o n a l Academy of Sciences called for the development of such a fleet 'as a matter of highest priority'. Most
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manufacturers and owners/operators of communications satellites indicated that, while they did not want to be denied access to the Shuttle, they would prefer to launch their satellites on e x p e n d a b l e l a u n c h v e h i c l e s (ELVs), if such were available and were economically competitive and equally reliable; the statements of RCA American Communications and Hughes Aircraft included here are typical of those put forward during the recent debate. The other major customer for launch services is the national security community. Even before the Shuttle accident, the Air Force had been moving to restore its ELV capability; that movement has accelerated since January, as the statement included below indicates. Even so, the Department of Defense will remain a major Shuttle user once the system is operating again. C o r p o r a t i o n s such as M a r t i n Marietta and General Dynamics have indicated their willingness to enter the global competition for commercial launch contracts, if the conditions are right. The most important requirement, they suggested, was assurance from the US government that they would not be competing with NASA for such contracts; that assurance was provided in August. Because it already has a Department of Defense contract to produce at least 23 large expendable launch vehicles, now called Titan IV but formerly known as the C o m p l e m e n t a r y E x p e n d a b l e Launch Vehicle (CELV), Martin Marietta has a particular advantage in producing additional vehicles for commercial customers. Martin Marietta's commercialization plans are described in the statement included here. The winner of the current Department of Defense c o m p e t i t i o n to build a
Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) for national security launches will have a similar advantage. Policy options for developing a viable ELV industry were discussed in a June workshop organized by the American Institute of Aeronautics and A s t r o n a u t i c s ; the workshop brought together for the first time satellite owners, operators, and manufacturers and launch vehicle manufacturers. Results of the workshop were presented to Congress in late July. Among the proposals discussed at the workshop were the creation of a National Launch Services Company, a ' U S A r i a n e s p a c e ' , and a new, government-created commercial launch insurance program. Based on inputs such as these and on intense bargaining and negotiation within and outside of the government, both Congress and the White House put forth a proposed course of action on August 15. While there are compatible elements in both proposals, they are not identical, and the precise content of US launch vehicle policy and its budgetary and programmatic implications are likely to remain unclear for some time. In particular, the proposal put forward by Representative Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications in the House of Representatives, requires NASA to purchase ELVs from the private sector for government launchers, but also makes the Shuttle available as a backup to commercial ELVs for private satellite launches. It also gives NASA formal responsibility for fostering a commercial launch industry. The Presidential statement on the new Shuttle orbiter and the ban on NASA as a launcher of commercial satellites left many questions unclear, as the subsequent White House Press Conference indicates. Thus while the main outlines of a revised US policy for access to space have been put in place, the details remain to be filled in.
John M. Logsdon North American Editor Space Policy
SPACE POLICY November 1986
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manufacturers and owners/operators of communications satellites indicated that, while they did not want to be denied access to the Shuttle, they would prefer to launch their satellites on e x p e n d a b l e l a u n c h v e h i c l e s (ELVs), if such were available and were economically competitive and equally reliable; the statements of RCA American Communications and Hughes Aircraft included here are typical of those put forward during the recent debate. The other major customer for launch services is the national security community. Even before the Shuttle accident, the Air Force had been moving to restore its ELV capability; that movement has accelerated since January, as the statement included below indicates. Even so, the Department of Defense will remain a major Shuttle user once the system is operating again. C o r p o r a t i o n s such as M a r t i n Marietta and General Dynamics have indicated their willingness to enter the global competition for commercial launch contracts, if the conditions are right. The most important requirement, they suggested, was assurance from the US government that they would not be competing with NASA for such contracts; that assurance was provided in August. Because it already has a Department of Defense contract to produce at least 23 large expendable launch vehicles, now called Titan IV but formerly known as the C o m p l e m e n t a r y E x p e n d a b l e Launch Vehicle (CELV), Martin Marietta has a particular advantage in producing additional vehicles for commercial customers. Martin Marietta's commercialization plans are described in the statement included here. The winner of the current Department of Defense c o m p e t i t i o n to build a
Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) for national security launches will have a similar advantage. Policy options for developing a viable ELV industry were discussed in a June workshop organized by the American Institute of Aeronautics and A s t r o n a u t i c s ; the workshop brought together for the first time satellite owners, operators, and manufacturers and launch vehicle manufacturers. Results of the workshop were presented to Congress in late July. Among the proposals discussed at the workshop were the creation of a National Launch Services Company, a ' U S A r i a n e s p a c e ' , and a new, government-created commercial launch insurance program. Based on inputs such as these and on intense bargaining and negotiation within and outside of the government, both Congress and the White House put forth a proposed course of action on August 15. While there are compatible elements in both proposals, they are not identical, and the precise content of US launch vehicle policy and its budgetary and programmatic implications are likely to remain unclear for some time. In particular, the proposal put forward by Representative Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications in the House of Representatives, requires NASA to purchase ELVs from the private sector for government launchers, but also makes the Shuttle available as a backup to commercial ELVs for private satellite launches. It also gives NASA formal responsibility for fostering a commercial launch industry. The Presidential statement on the new Shuttle orbiter and the ban on NASA as a launcher of commercial satellites left many questions unclear, as the subsequent White House Press Conference indicates. Thus while the main outlines of a revised US policy for access to space have been put in place, the details remain to be filled in.
John M. Logsdon North American Editor Space Policy
SPACE POLICY November 1986