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The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: infants prefer prosocial others
Accepted Manuscript Title: The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: Infants prefer prosocial others Author: Julia W Van de Vondervoort J Kiley Hamlin PII: DOI: Reference:
S2352-250X(17)30122-7 http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.014 COPSYC 539
To appear in: Received date: Revised date: Accepted date:
2-5-2017 26-6-2017 3-8-2017
Please cite this article as: J.W. Van de Vondervoort, The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: Infants prefer prosocial others, COPSYC (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.014 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
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Running Head: INFANTS PREFER PROSOCIAL OTHERS
Highlights Infants’ evaluate third-parties’ prosocial and antisocial acts
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Infants demonstrate preferences for prosocial others and against antisocial others
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Infants’ preferences depend on the prosocial/antisocial agents and their targets
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Infants’ prosocial preferences may reflect self-interested and/or moral concerns
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INFANTS PREFER PROSOCIAL OTHERS
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The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: Infants prefer prosocial others
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Julia W. Van de Vondervoort & J. Kiley Hamlin
University of British Columbia 3126 West Mall Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4 email: [email protected]; [email protected]
Abstract
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Humans readily evaluate third-parties’ prosocial and antisocial acts. Recent evidence reveals that this tendency emerges early in development – even preverbal infants selectively approach prosocial others and avoid antisocial ones. Rather than reflecting attraction toward or away from
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low-level characteristics of the displays or simple behavioral rules, infants are sensitive to characteristics of both the agents and recipients of prosocial and antisocial acts. Specifically,
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infants’ preferences require that the recipients of positive and negative acts be social agents with
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clear unfulfilled goals, who have not previously harmed others. In addition, prosocial and antisocial agents must act intentionally, in the service of positive and negative goals. It is an open
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question whether these prosocial preferences reflect self-interested and/or moral concerns.
Beyond caring about their own well-being, humans care about the well-being of others. One facet of this other-oriented concern is the positive and negative evaluation of those who help
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and harm third-parties, even when both agents and recipients of prosocial and antisocial acts are strangers and when there is no possibility of personal gain or loss [see reviews in 1]. The current article reviews research demonstrating that evaluative tendencies emerge early in development:
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Even preverbal infants prefer prosocial to antisocial others. We then discuss whether these
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preferences reflect moral concerns.
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Infants’ responses to third-party interactions
Recent research suggests that infants are sensitive to the sociomoral valence of third-
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party interactions – that is, whether an action is positive (prosocial) or negative (antisocial). In a seminal study, 12-month-olds categorized third-party social interactions according to valence
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rather than physical characteristics: Infants viewed hitting as similar to hindering (pushing an individual away from his goal) but dissimilar to helping (pushing an individual towards his goal;
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2). Further studies suggest that infants hold expectations regarding whether others will perform
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positively valenced acts: Before age 2, infants expect others to help needy over non-needy individuals [3], and to divide resources equally between similar recipients [4-7] but equitably according to recipient merit [8]. Finally, infants form expectations regarding the interactions that follow prosocial and antisocial acts. For example, around 12 months, infants expect those who were helped and hindered to later approach the helper versus the hinderer [9; see also 10-12], and that those who observed helping and hindering will too [13-15; see also 16]. Together, these studies demonstrate that infants interpret and form expectations of valenced third-party interactions. Infants’ preferences for prosocial versus antisocial others
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Critically, these studies do not speak to infants’ own evaluations: Do infants themselves evaluate those who help and harm third-parties? To examine this, researchers have measured infants’ preferences for helpful versus unhelpful others. In one study, infants watched a puppet
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show featuring a protagonist unsuccessfully attempting to climb a steep hill (adapted from 10). The protagonist was alternately assisted by a helper, who pushed the protagonist up the hill, and
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thwarted by a hinderer, who pushed the protagonist down the hill. After viewing these events
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several times, 6- and 10-month-olds preferentially reached for the helper over the hinderer, suggestive that infants engage in social evaluation [11; replicated in 17; but see 18 for negative
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evidence with a modified procedure].
Infants demonstrate such prosocial preferences in a variety of social scenarios, including
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helping versus hindering a failed attempt to open a box or retrieve a dropped ball [19; see also 20, but see 21]; even 3-month-olds prefer to look at helpers over hinderers in these scenarios [19,
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22]. Further, infants’ evaluative tendencies are not limited to helping and hindering scenarios. By
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the second year, infants preferentially approach and receive toys from fair versus unfair individuals (e.g., those who distribute resources equally versus unequally; 13, 23).
Are infants positively evaluating helpers, negatively evaluating hinderers, or both? A preference for helpers over hinderers could be a positive evaluation of helpers, a negative evaluation of hinderers, or both. To determine whether both positive and negative evaluation emerge in tandem or whether one precedes the other, studies have examined infants’ preferences for a helper or a hinderer compared to a neutral puppet who was neither prosocial nor antisocial. Here, 6- and 10-month-olds prefer helpers over neutral puppets, but neutral puppets over hinderers, demonstrating both positive and negative social evaluation [11]. In
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contrast, 3-month-olds only prefer neutral puppets over hinderers [22], suggestive that negative social evaluations emerge first, consistent with evidence of a negativity bias in development
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[24].
Do infants consider the target of helping and hindering?
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Infants’ preferences for prosocial and against antisocial others might indicate that infants
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like seeing others treated well and dislike seeing others treated poorly. Conversely, infants’ preferences could be based on low-level physical characteristics of the scenarios, such as the
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characters’ movements [see 25]. To explore this, infants have been shown scenarios in which “prosocial” and “antisocial” characters direct their behaviors towards non-social targets; for
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example, pushing an inanimate shape up/down a hill, opening/closing a box with a non-agentive claw, rolling back/taking away a ball from a claw, or distributing resources amongst objects
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rather than agents. Critically, infants show no preferences in these cases, suggestive that their
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evaluations are based on sociomoral concerns [11, 13, 19, 22]. In the same vein, 10-month-olds in another study accepted toys from a human who comforted a child and pushed an object, as opposed to one who pushed a child and comforted an object [26]. Infants’ prosocial preferences not only require an agentive target, but also that the target has a clear unfulfilled goal. To illustrate, 6- to 11-month-olds only preferred helpers over hinderers in the hill scenario when the protagonist’s eyes were fixed pointing uphill, consistent with his goal to climb upwards; they showed no preference when the protagonist’s eyes were unfixed and tended to point downwards [17; see 25]. Likewise, 10-month-olds evaluated identical actions differently depending on whether they facilitated/blocked an unfulfilled attempt to retrieve a preferred object versus facilitated/blocked a repetitive path of motion [27].
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Furthermore, rather than reflecting a simple behavioral rule whereby helping is good and hindering is bad, infants consider the context in which prosocial and antisocial actions occurred. A series of studies demonstrates that 4.5-, 8-, and 19-month-olds prefer those who helped
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previously prosocial targets, but those who hindered previously antisocial targets [28-29]. These preferences are not due to simple valence matching, whereby anyone involved in an antisocial
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act is an appropriate recipient of hindering. Instead, infants consider whether the individual
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receiving help or harm was previously the perpetrator or victim of an antisocial act (that is, infants prefer those who help victims; 28-29).
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Together, these results suggest that infants’ prosocial preferences require that the target of prosocial and antisocial acts holds several characteristics: The target must be a social agent,
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must have a clear unfulfilled goal, and must not have previously harmed others. Notably, these characteristics also influence adults’ sociomoral evaluations: Adults reason about which targets
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antisocially (e.g., as punishment, 31).
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can be the recipient of prosocial and antisocial acts [30] and when others should be treated
Do infants consider the mental states of helpers and hinderers? Adults’ sociomoral evaluations are not only sensitive to characteristics of the targets of prosocial and antisocial acts, but also to characteristics of actors themselves. For example, adults consider actors’ mental states when assigning praise and blame, such as whether they intended to cause harm. When intentions and outcomes are opposed, adults tend to privilege intention in their evaluations [e.g., 32]. In contrast, a host of studies suggest that preschoolers privilege outcomes [e.g., 33-36], consistent with the simple rule “do not cause bad things.”
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Growing evidence suggests that, unlike preschoolers, infants consider mental states when evaluating others’ valenced acts. In one study, 10-month-olds appeared sensitive to whether actors could have known that their action would result in help or harm: Infants distinguished
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knowledgeable (and so intentional) helpers from hinderers but did not distinguish ignorant (accidental) helpers from hinderers [27]. In addition, whereas 13-month-olds expect that an
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individual who sees a third-party behave antisocially will subsequently cease positive
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interactions with him, this expectation is disrupted both when the individual did not observe the antisocial act (and so is ignorant of it) and when the act was performed accidentally [15].
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Other studies have examined conflicts between intention and outcome; for instance, unsuccessful helpers who try but fail to help (leading to a negative outcome) and unsuccessful
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hinderers who try but fail to hinder (leading to a positive outcome). In one study, 16-month-olds expected a character to approach someone who had tried but failed to help him over someone
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who had successfully harmed him [12]. Another study contrasted infants’ preferences across
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different combinations of successful and unsuccessful helpers and hinderers, and found that 8month-olds consistently preferred characters with positive over negative intentions, irrespective of outcome (5-month-olds failed to distinguish between characters in comparisons involving unsuccessful individuals; 37).
Notably, 8-month-olds in the latter study did not distinguish between those with the same intention: failed versus successful helpers or failed versus successful hinderers [37]. Here, infants might have distinguished between these characters either by preferring those associated with better outcomes, or by preferring more competent characters; infants did neither. As mentioned above, young children often consider (even privilege) outcomes when making moral judgments [33-36], and incorporate competence information into their judgments. Specifically, when 2-
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year-olds observe a competent and an incompetent individual both refusing to help, they view the incompetent individual as nicer (as incompetence excuses failures to help; 38). Research with older children also suggests a fluid relationship between judgments of competence and
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judgments of prosociality: 4- and 5-year-olds’ judgments of what others will know are influenced by the individual’s prosociality [39] and 5-year-olds predict that accurate object
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labelers will be more prosocial than inaccurate ones [40; see also 41; but see 42]. Future work
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should systematically explore how infants evaluate competence inside and outside the moral
Why do infants possess prosocial preferences?
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domain.
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Thus, infants’ prosocial preferences are sensitive to factors that also influence adults’ sociomoral evaluations: Infants consider the social status, goals, and previous behavior of the
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target of prosocial and antisocial acts, as well as the mental states of prosocial and antisocial
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individuals. Yet, it remains unclear what motivates infants’ prosocial preferences [see 43 and reply by 44]. Here we outline two not mutually-exclusive possibilities. First, infants’ evaluations may be rooted in egocentric concerns, such as which social others are more likely to benefit infants themselves. If so, infants’ evaluations are sophisticated and social, but nevertheless focused on determining which individuals will help versus harm them. For instance, given that intentions to help versus harm likely persist over time, infants’ consideration of mental states would allow them to predict who is more likely to (at least attempt to) benefit or harm them in the future. Likewise, infants’ preferences for those who hinder antisocial others may reflect a sense of affiliation with the “punisher” that is fostered by a shared negative evaluation of the wrongdoer [e.g., 45] rather than a sense that antisocial others deserve
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punishment. This account is consistent with work showing that infants’ prosocial preferences are influenced by the similarity of the target to the infant, such as whether the target shares infants’ food preferences [46] or race [23]. Such tendencies may stem from a view that similar others are
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more likely than dissimilar others to benefit infants. On the other hand, infants’ evaluations may indeed be rooted in impersonal moral
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concerns; that is, infants may possess an implicit, impartial sense that helping is better than
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hindering. One study attempted to distinguish between personal and moral responding [47] by capitalizing on the fact that infants tend to approach more versus fewer treats [e.g., 48]. In this
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study, two puppets presented 12-13-month-olds with one cracker or two crackers. Critically, either both puppets were neutral, or a hinderer puppet presented 2 crackers and a helper puppet
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presented 1. Infants chose more crackers from neutral puppets, but fewer crackers from helpers, suggestive that infants will take a small cost to themselves to avoid interacting with antisocial
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others. Though infants did approach the hinderer when he offered 8 crackers (the helper offered
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1), this study reveals that infants can prioritize moral concerns over self-interest [47]. That said, perhaps infants view prosocial/antisocial acts as better indicators of future behaviors than giving two crackers versus one; more work is needed to tease apart these possibilities. Overall, it remains an open question whether infants’ prosocial preferences are due to personal or to moral concerns. Though infants (like adults) may be motivated by personal and moral concerns at different times or in different situations, future studies should attempt to determine (a) whether infants do clearly demonstrate impartial moral concern, and (b) if so, what situations inspire moral versus self-interested responding. In addition, to date studies have not addressed the question of whether the looking and/or reaching preferences measured in early infancy reflect long-term, stable tendencies related to other aspects of moral development such as
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children’s own prosocial acts. Such relationships would suggest that infant measures are meaningful reflections of an emerging moral sensitivity [for further discussion, see 49].
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Conclusion Infants’ prefer prosocial others over antisocial others. These prosocial preferences appear
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to depend on the social nature of third-parties’ interactions, as well as to some of the factors
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known to influence adults’ moral judgments. Future work is necessary to determine whether preferences for prosocial others are motivated solely by self-interest, or whether they also reflect
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early-emerging moral concerns.
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doi: 10.1177/0956797612457785 47. ** Tasimi, A., & Wynn, K. (2016). Costly rejection of wrongdoers by infants and children. Cognition, 151, 76-79. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.03.004
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In this empirical article 12- and 13-month-olds selectively approached plates containing more rather than fewer crackers when both plates were offered by neutral puppets.
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However, when a previously prosocial puppet offered 1 cracker and a previously
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antisocial puppet offered 2 crackers, infants were willing to accept 1 fewer cracker to avoid interacting with the antisocial puppet. These finding suggests that infants’
over egocentric self-interested concerns.
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preferences for helpful over unhelpful puppets can privilege impartial moral concerns
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48. Feigenson, L., Carey, S., & Hauser, M. (2002). The representations underlying infants' choice of more: Object files versus analog magnitudes. Psychological Science, 13(2),
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Conflict of Interest Statement
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The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest to report.
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This work was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Number 435-2014-2173) and a grant from the John Templeton Foundation (Number 60502) awarded to Dr. Kiley Hamlin.
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S2352-250X(17)30122-7 http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.014 COPSYC 539
To appear in: Received date: Revised date: Accepted date:
2-5-2017 26-6-2017 3-8-2017
Please cite this article as: J.W. Van de Vondervoort, The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: Infants prefer prosocial others, COPSYC (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.014 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
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Running Head: INFANTS PREFER PROSOCIAL OTHERS
Highlights Infants’ evaluate third-parties’ prosocial and antisocial acts
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Infants demonstrate preferences for prosocial others and against antisocial others
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Infants’ preferences depend on the prosocial/antisocial agents and their targets
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Infants’ prosocial preferences may reflect self-interested and/or moral concerns
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The early emergence of sociomoral evaluation: Infants prefer prosocial others
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Julia W. Van de Vondervoort & J. Kiley Hamlin
University of British Columbia 3126 West Mall Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4 email: [email protected]; [email protected]
Abstract
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Humans readily evaluate third-parties’ prosocial and antisocial acts. Recent evidence reveals that this tendency emerges early in development – even preverbal infants selectively approach prosocial others and avoid antisocial ones. Rather than reflecting attraction toward or away from
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low-level characteristics of the displays or simple behavioral rules, infants are sensitive to characteristics of both the agents and recipients of prosocial and antisocial acts. Specifically,
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infants’ preferences require that the recipients of positive and negative acts be social agents with
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clear unfulfilled goals, who have not previously harmed others. In addition, prosocial and antisocial agents must act intentionally, in the service of positive and negative goals. It is an open
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question whether these prosocial preferences reflect self-interested and/or moral concerns.
Beyond caring about their own well-being, humans care about the well-being of others. One facet of this other-oriented concern is the positive and negative evaluation of those who help
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and harm third-parties, even when both agents and recipients of prosocial and antisocial acts are strangers and when there is no possibility of personal gain or loss [see reviews in 1]. The current article reviews research demonstrating that evaluative tendencies emerge early in development:
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Even preverbal infants prefer prosocial to antisocial others. We then discuss whether these
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preferences reflect moral concerns.
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Infants’ responses to third-party interactions
Recent research suggests that infants are sensitive to the sociomoral valence of third-
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party interactions – that is, whether an action is positive (prosocial) or negative (antisocial). In a seminal study, 12-month-olds categorized third-party social interactions according to valence
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rather than physical characteristics: Infants viewed hitting as similar to hindering (pushing an individual away from his goal) but dissimilar to helping (pushing an individual towards his goal;
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2). Further studies suggest that infants hold expectations regarding whether others will perform
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positively valenced acts: Before age 2, infants expect others to help needy over non-needy individuals [3], and to divide resources equally between similar recipients [4-7] but equitably according to recipient merit [8]. Finally, infants form expectations regarding the interactions that follow prosocial and antisocial acts. For example, around 12 months, infants expect those who were helped and hindered to later approach the helper versus the hinderer [9; see also 10-12], and that those who observed helping and hindering will too [13-15; see also 16]. Together, these studies demonstrate that infants interpret and form expectations of valenced third-party interactions. Infants’ preferences for prosocial versus antisocial others
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Critically, these studies do not speak to infants’ own evaluations: Do infants themselves evaluate those who help and harm third-parties? To examine this, researchers have measured infants’ preferences for helpful versus unhelpful others. In one study, infants watched a puppet
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show featuring a protagonist unsuccessfully attempting to climb a steep hill (adapted from 10). The protagonist was alternately assisted by a helper, who pushed the protagonist up the hill, and
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thwarted by a hinderer, who pushed the protagonist down the hill. After viewing these events
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several times, 6- and 10-month-olds preferentially reached for the helper over the hinderer, suggestive that infants engage in social evaluation [11; replicated in 17; but see 18 for negative
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evidence with a modified procedure].
Infants demonstrate such prosocial preferences in a variety of social scenarios, including
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helping versus hindering a failed attempt to open a box or retrieve a dropped ball [19; see also 20, but see 21]; even 3-month-olds prefer to look at helpers over hinderers in these scenarios [19,
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22]. Further, infants’ evaluative tendencies are not limited to helping and hindering scenarios. By
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the second year, infants preferentially approach and receive toys from fair versus unfair individuals (e.g., those who distribute resources equally versus unequally; 13, 23).
Are infants positively evaluating helpers, negatively evaluating hinderers, or both? A preference for helpers over hinderers could be a positive evaluation of helpers, a negative evaluation of hinderers, or both. To determine whether both positive and negative evaluation emerge in tandem or whether one precedes the other, studies have examined infants’ preferences for a helper or a hinderer compared to a neutral puppet who was neither prosocial nor antisocial. Here, 6- and 10-month-olds prefer helpers over neutral puppets, but neutral puppets over hinderers, demonstrating both positive and negative social evaluation [11]. In
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contrast, 3-month-olds only prefer neutral puppets over hinderers [22], suggestive that negative social evaluations emerge first, consistent with evidence of a negativity bias in development
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[24].
Do infants consider the target of helping and hindering?
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Infants’ preferences for prosocial and against antisocial others might indicate that infants
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like seeing others treated well and dislike seeing others treated poorly. Conversely, infants’ preferences could be based on low-level physical characteristics of the scenarios, such as the
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characters’ movements [see 25]. To explore this, infants have been shown scenarios in which “prosocial” and “antisocial” characters direct their behaviors towards non-social targets; for
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example, pushing an inanimate shape up/down a hill, opening/closing a box with a non-agentive claw, rolling back/taking away a ball from a claw, or distributing resources amongst objects
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rather than agents. Critically, infants show no preferences in these cases, suggestive that their
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evaluations are based on sociomoral concerns [11, 13, 19, 22]. In the same vein, 10-month-olds in another study accepted toys from a human who comforted a child and pushed an object, as opposed to one who pushed a child and comforted an object [26]. Infants’ prosocial preferences not only require an agentive target, but also that the target has a clear unfulfilled goal. To illustrate, 6- to 11-month-olds only preferred helpers over hinderers in the hill scenario when the protagonist’s eyes were fixed pointing uphill, consistent with his goal to climb upwards; they showed no preference when the protagonist’s eyes were unfixed and tended to point downwards [17; see 25]. Likewise, 10-month-olds evaluated identical actions differently depending on whether they facilitated/blocked an unfulfilled attempt to retrieve a preferred object versus facilitated/blocked a repetitive path of motion [27].
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Furthermore, rather than reflecting a simple behavioral rule whereby helping is good and hindering is bad, infants consider the context in which prosocial and antisocial actions occurred. A series of studies demonstrates that 4.5-, 8-, and 19-month-olds prefer those who helped
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previously prosocial targets, but those who hindered previously antisocial targets [28-29]. These preferences are not due to simple valence matching, whereby anyone involved in an antisocial
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act is an appropriate recipient of hindering. Instead, infants consider whether the individual
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receiving help or harm was previously the perpetrator or victim of an antisocial act (that is, infants prefer those who help victims; 28-29).
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Together, these results suggest that infants’ prosocial preferences require that the target of prosocial and antisocial acts holds several characteristics: The target must be a social agent,
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must have a clear unfulfilled goal, and must not have previously harmed others. Notably, these characteristics also influence adults’ sociomoral evaluations: Adults reason about which targets
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antisocially (e.g., as punishment, 31).
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can be the recipient of prosocial and antisocial acts [30] and when others should be treated
Do infants consider the mental states of helpers and hinderers? Adults’ sociomoral evaluations are not only sensitive to characteristics of the targets of prosocial and antisocial acts, but also to characteristics of actors themselves. For example, adults consider actors’ mental states when assigning praise and blame, such as whether they intended to cause harm. When intentions and outcomes are opposed, adults tend to privilege intention in their evaluations [e.g., 32]. In contrast, a host of studies suggest that preschoolers privilege outcomes [e.g., 33-36], consistent with the simple rule “do not cause bad things.”
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Growing evidence suggests that, unlike preschoolers, infants consider mental states when evaluating others’ valenced acts. In one study, 10-month-olds appeared sensitive to whether actors could have known that their action would result in help or harm: Infants distinguished
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knowledgeable (and so intentional) helpers from hinderers but did not distinguish ignorant (accidental) helpers from hinderers [27]. In addition, whereas 13-month-olds expect that an
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individual who sees a third-party behave antisocially will subsequently cease positive
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interactions with him, this expectation is disrupted both when the individual did not observe the antisocial act (and so is ignorant of it) and when the act was performed accidentally [15].
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Other studies have examined conflicts between intention and outcome; for instance, unsuccessful helpers who try but fail to help (leading to a negative outcome) and unsuccessful
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hinderers who try but fail to hinder (leading to a positive outcome). In one study, 16-month-olds expected a character to approach someone who had tried but failed to help him over someone
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who had successfully harmed him [12]. Another study contrasted infants’ preferences across
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different combinations of successful and unsuccessful helpers and hinderers, and found that 8month-olds consistently preferred characters with positive over negative intentions, irrespective of outcome (5-month-olds failed to distinguish between characters in comparisons involving unsuccessful individuals; 37).
Notably, 8-month-olds in the latter study did not distinguish between those with the same intention: failed versus successful helpers or failed versus successful hinderers [37]. Here, infants might have distinguished between these characters either by preferring those associated with better outcomes, or by preferring more competent characters; infants did neither. As mentioned above, young children often consider (even privilege) outcomes when making moral judgments [33-36], and incorporate competence information into their judgments. Specifically, when 2-
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year-olds observe a competent and an incompetent individual both refusing to help, they view the incompetent individual as nicer (as incompetence excuses failures to help; 38). Research with older children also suggests a fluid relationship between judgments of competence and
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judgments of prosociality: 4- and 5-year-olds’ judgments of what others will know are influenced by the individual’s prosociality [39] and 5-year-olds predict that accurate object
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labelers will be more prosocial than inaccurate ones [40; see also 41; but see 42]. Future work
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should systematically explore how infants evaluate competence inside and outside the moral
Why do infants possess prosocial preferences?
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domain.
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Thus, infants’ prosocial preferences are sensitive to factors that also influence adults’ sociomoral evaluations: Infants consider the social status, goals, and previous behavior of the
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target of prosocial and antisocial acts, as well as the mental states of prosocial and antisocial
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individuals. Yet, it remains unclear what motivates infants’ prosocial preferences [see 43 and reply by 44]. Here we outline two not mutually-exclusive possibilities. First, infants’ evaluations may be rooted in egocentric concerns, such as which social others are more likely to benefit infants themselves. If so, infants’ evaluations are sophisticated and social, but nevertheless focused on determining which individuals will help versus harm them. For instance, given that intentions to help versus harm likely persist over time, infants’ consideration of mental states would allow them to predict who is more likely to (at least attempt to) benefit or harm them in the future. Likewise, infants’ preferences for those who hinder antisocial others may reflect a sense of affiliation with the “punisher” that is fostered by a shared negative evaluation of the wrongdoer [e.g., 45] rather than a sense that antisocial others deserve
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punishment. This account is consistent with work showing that infants’ prosocial preferences are influenced by the similarity of the target to the infant, such as whether the target shares infants’ food preferences [46] or race [23]. Such tendencies may stem from a view that similar others are
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more likely than dissimilar others to benefit infants. On the other hand, infants’ evaluations may indeed be rooted in impersonal moral
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concerns; that is, infants may possess an implicit, impartial sense that helping is better than
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hindering. One study attempted to distinguish between personal and moral responding [47] by capitalizing on the fact that infants tend to approach more versus fewer treats [e.g., 48]. In this
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study, two puppets presented 12-13-month-olds with one cracker or two crackers. Critically, either both puppets were neutral, or a hinderer puppet presented 2 crackers and a helper puppet
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presented 1. Infants chose more crackers from neutral puppets, but fewer crackers from helpers, suggestive that infants will take a small cost to themselves to avoid interacting with antisocial
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others. Though infants did approach the hinderer when he offered 8 crackers (the helper offered
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1), this study reveals that infants can prioritize moral concerns over self-interest [47]. That said, perhaps infants view prosocial/antisocial acts as better indicators of future behaviors than giving two crackers versus one; more work is needed to tease apart these possibilities. Overall, it remains an open question whether infants’ prosocial preferences are due to personal or to moral concerns. Though infants (like adults) may be motivated by personal and moral concerns at different times or in different situations, future studies should attempt to determine (a) whether infants do clearly demonstrate impartial moral concern, and (b) if so, what situations inspire moral versus self-interested responding. In addition, to date studies have not addressed the question of whether the looking and/or reaching preferences measured in early infancy reflect long-term, stable tendencies related to other aspects of moral development such as
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children’s own prosocial acts. Such relationships would suggest that infant measures are meaningful reflections of an emerging moral sensitivity [for further discussion, see 49].
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Conclusion Infants’ prefer prosocial others over antisocial others. These prosocial preferences appear
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to depend on the social nature of third-parties’ interactions, as well as to some of the factors
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known to influence adults’ moral judgments. Future work is necessary to determine whether preferences for prosocial others are motivated solely by self-interest, or whether they also reflect
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early-emerging moral concerns.
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doi: 10.1177/0956797612457785 47. ** Tasimi, A., & Wynn, K. (2016). Costly rejection of wrongdoers by infants and children. Cognition, 151, 76-79. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.03.004
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In this empirical article 12- and 13-month-olds selectively approached plates containing more rather than fewer crackers when both plates were offered by neutral puppets.
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However, when a previously prosocial puppet offered 1 cracker and a previously
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antisocial puppet offered 2 crackers, infants were willing to accept 1 fewer cracker to avoid interacting with the antisocial puppet. These finding suggests that infants’
over egocentric self-interested concerns.
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preferences for helpful over unhelpful puppets can privilege impartial moral concerns
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48. Feigenson, L., Carey, S., & Hauser, M. (2002). The representations underlying infants' choice of more: Object files versus analog magnitudes. Psychological Science, 13(2),
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150-156. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00427
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49. Hamlin, J. K. (2015). Does the infant possess a moral concept? In E. Margolis & S. Laurence (Eds.), The Conceptual Mind: New Directions in the Study of Concepts (pp. 477-518). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Conflict of Interest Statement
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The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest to report.
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This work was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Number 435-2014-2173) and a grant from the John Templeton Foundation (Number 60502) awarded to Dr. Kiley Hamlin.
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