The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation

50

Abstracts (1995)

Volume 29 (The issue number is given in front of the page numbers)

AI-Najjar, N., Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely m a n y pure strategies

(2) 151-164

Abstract

This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.

Keywords" Strategic stability; Perfect equilibria; Forward induction.

Arce M, D . G . , The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation

(3) 263-276

Abstract

The Allies' decision to enforce the reparations agreement in the Treaty of Versailles is examined as a Bayesian game where the Allies are uncertain about Germany's capacity to pay reparations. The initial decision to enforce the Treaty is shown to be the Bayes/Nash equilibrium of the game. Subsequent revisions consistent with Keynes' interpretation of the Treaty satisfy the conditions of communication equilibrium. As such, the revisions are strategically justified as equilibria that are consistent with the Allies' (and Keynes') discussions on how to revise the Treaty. Here are the collected croakings of twelve years - the croaking of a Cassandra who could never influence the course of events of time (Keynes, 1932, p. v).

Keywords: Treaty of Versailles; Communication equilibrium; Revelation principle; Cheap talk

Bolle, F., T e a m selection: Factor pricing with discrete and inhomogeneous factors

(2) 131-150

Abstract

Imagine an entrepreneur who has the opportunity of selecting a team T from a set of persons N for a common enterprise. Every potential team member i requires a reward a i