The economics of hunting, game-preservation, and their legal setting

European Journal of

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EuropeanJournalof PoliticalEconomy Vol. 11 (1995) 453-468

POLITICAL ECONOMY

The economics of hunting, game-preservation, and their legal setting Georg Hasenkamp Universitiit Hamburg, Sozial6konomischesSeminar, von-Melle-Park5, D-20146Hamburg, Germany

Accepted for publication April 1994

Abstract Hunting and game-preservation are interrelated: Hunting must respect the intentions of game-preservation, and game-preservation must rely on hunting as one method to achieve its intentions. The economic theory of common resources is applied to this problem in order to provide conclusions which are (perhaps unintentionally) reflected in the existing relevant legal setting for Germany. JEL classification: Q28; Q29 Keywords: Hunting; Game preservation; Economic theory of common resources

O. Prologue Applying the economic theory of common resources to 'hunting and game-preservation' leads to conclusions which are almost exactly reflected within the respective legal setting for Germany. As an Economist, I observe this with surprise and admiration. And, as a person with a sincere interest in protecting and preserving nature, I observe this with gratitude: This legal setting regulating hunting (almost optimally) complies with goals raised by game-preservation and wild-life protection. In order to illustrate this, I start with the 'evolution' of this legal setting, and then show the connection to the relevant Economic Theory. With just a few steps from my house I venture out into a country side to pursue one of the very original activities of man, namely hunting. This, I consider a very

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precious privilege. It takes a genuine feeling and interest for all aspects of nature, and not only game, in order to understand the quiet enjoyment and satisfaction received from hunting: One becomes again part of nature, and having realized this I think it is easier to master other aspects of life. 1 Game in my area includes many species. 2 But, roe deer receives a touch of more affection from me. Partly, this is due to the mystery that roe deer lives like a loner, not in herds like other species of deer. My sympathy is enhanced because one could not confine roe deer to a fenced-in preserve (or to a zoo) like most other wild animals: Roe deer will flourish only in the wild.t

1. Introduction T h e desire b y f a r m e r s to e x e r c i s e the r i g h t to h u n t o n the l a n d they w e r e tilling w a s o n e o f the d r i v i n g f o r c e s for political r e v o l u t i o n a g a i n s t the t h e n e x i s t i n g f e u d a l s y s t e m o f the first h a l f o f the last century. 3 U p to this t i m e - for m a n y c e n t u r i e s - the r i g h t to h u n t w a s r e s e r v e d to the f e u d a l class, w h i c h c o n s i d e r e d h u n t i n g as a p a s t i m e , for the p u r p o s e o f s a t i s f y i n g social pleasure. 4 A r o u n d the m i d d l e o f the last c e n t u r y , legal a s p e c t s o f f a r m e r s o w n i n g t h e i r l a n d w e r e clarified. C o n n e c t e d to o w n e r s h i p o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d w a s the r i g h t to h u n t o n this land. But, o n c e f a r m e r s w e r e a l l o w e d to h u n t o n t h e i r o w n land, g a m e - a n d o t h e r w i l d a n i m a l s - w e r e t h r e a t e n e d b y e x t i n c t i o n w i t h i n a v e r y s h o r t period, a n d this for t w o r e a s o n s : O n e r e a s o n w a s that f a r m e r s c o n s i d e r e d a l m o s t all w i l d a n i m a l s as a d v e r s a r i e s to g o a l s p u r s u e d in agriculture, s i n c e w i l d a n i m a l s n e c e s s a r i l y f e e d

i Philosophical aspects of hunting are discussed, e.g., by Ortega y Gasset (1944) in Spanish; a German translation is Ortega y Gasset (1985). 2 1 live in the state of Schleswig-Holstein. This is a rather small state within Germany, located in the north between Hamburg and Denmark. This state has relatively few large forests, and many small patches of woods interspersed to pastures and fields which are intensively used by agriculture. Very characteristic of the landscape are the hedges bordering every pasture and field: These hedges not only serve to break the steady winds coming from the North Sea going to the Baltic Sea; they also provide an almost ideal habitat for a wide range of wild animals. Of the species of deer, roe deer (Capreolus capreolus), fallow deer (Dama dama) and red deer (Cervus elaphus) are naturally adapted to this state, and a deer from Japan (Cervus nippon) escaped into the wild about hundred years ago and is presently confined locally with a small stock. 3 With this comment I refer to the area and states that composed at the end of the last century the initial form of Germany (which changed since then substantially). I suppose that with minor variations, pressure for political changes had similar causes in other European countries, as a reaction to the American and French revolution. 4 The use of the word 'hunt' changes in this paper from its primitive form 'searching for and killing wild animals' - as it applies to a situation described in this paragraph - to an instrument of game-preservation.

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on the same plants (or on farm animals), and less effort was required to obtain meat from farm animals than from game. The other reason was that game - just like any wild animal - could move around freely, and if one farmer did not kill a wild animal, the other one could. In other words, game is a common resource. s It was during the second half of the last century that the obvious need surfaced to reformulate the legal setting for hunting, and in general for wild-life protection and natural conservation programs. This induced - in stages - a legal framework (for Germany) which might be considered superb for its part regulating hunting and game-preservation. 6 The very first paragraph of this legal setting requires that hunting must be subservient to game-preservation in the sense that a person assuming and exercising the permission to hunt must preserve by any (legal) means a stock of wild animals and game suitable to the particular eco-system, and this for each species adapted to the particular area. 7 Depending on the 'quality' of the habitat and eco-system, an 'optimal' stock for each species is determined for an area by a (public) administrative body (which must reconcile this stock with the interest of agriculture a n d / o r forestry). The person admitted to hunt in a particular area is then required to maintain these optimal stocks of game - and other wild animals: This includes cultivating patches of land with suitable plants, feeding game and other wild animals during hard winters, and regulating any surplus above the optimal stocks by hunting. Because there would be no incentive to accomplish these duties within 'one period' (which requires investment into appropriate equipment), the law regulates that the exclusive admission to hunt within a particular area runs for nine to twelve years. Hunting must obey biological principles; i.e., sick, weak, or old animals should be taken from the habitat first, since these would fall prey to (extinct) beast more easily in an ecology unspoiled by man, and these are more vulnerable to contracting - and therefore spreading - a disease. After this is accomplished, any surplus beyond the optimal stock for each species must be bagged during a season. Every hunter must pass a rather rigorous (public) exam on all aspects of hunting in order to obtain a hunting license: 8 This exam spans from wildlife biology a n d / o r management, to all relevant aspects of ecology including basic knowledge of agriculture and forestry, and to goals and programs of preserving nature, and

5 The only remaining refuges of wild animals at that time were state owned forests and (huge) areas of land owned by estate owners. The initiative to reformulate the laws regulating hunting at that time was assumed by persons from these circles of foresters and estate owners. 6 For more than half a century now, the basic setting and intentions of these laws have been unchanged in the remaining Germany. Relatively minor changes were due in the course of time, due to industrialization and the European integration process. 7 The law lists more than thirty wild animals with the intention to maintain their existence. Only some of these are classified as game, and thus may be hunted. 8 The hunting license is then obtainable for a fee and must be renewed annually. The annual renewal is conditional on a conduct free of criminal charges, drunken driving, etc.!

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further to all legal aspects and the unwritten 'laws' defining ethics, customs and 'fairness' in hunting, and finally to the theory and a practical test concerning a proper and safe handling of firearms. Formally, the right to hunt is tied to the land owned. But, in order to exercise this right, two additional conditions have to be satisfied under the legal setting: The person must have a hunting license, and the (agricultural a n d / o r forest) land owned must compose an area 'sufficiently large enough'. The law stipulates a minimum size for a hunting area, where this minimum size reflects the biologically determined territories for the variety of wild animals. Only a very few farmers own this much land, in which case I will refer to them as estate owners. In contrast, most farmers do not own this much land (all connected together). In this case, the law requires that every farmer transfers the formal right to hunt on his land to a 'cooperative', which is established for every municipality. 9 In order to minimize disturbance to nature, the law restricts the number of persons allowed to hunt on this (usually large) area established by the cooperative. (That is, even if every farmer has a hunting license, not all may go hunting within the area established by their cooperative.) The cooperative must therefore lease-out the admission to hunt in its area to a limited (by law) number of persons, where these persons leasing the exclusive admission to hunt must not necessarily be land owners anymore, but they must have a hunting license. As will be argued below, this legal setting may be 'justified' by conclusions drawn from the economic theory of common resources: Since each species of game (or any wild animal) claims a biologically determined territory which does not regard (legal) borders of land ownership, game becomes a common resource to farmers with bordering land. 10 Since the territories required by game also do not regard borders of the areas established by cooperatives, the law recommends that several (connected) cooperatives and estate owners join together in order to decide mutually on arising problems of game-preservation and hunting. Almost all cooperatives and estate owners follow this recommendation.

Observing is perhaps the most important activity of hunting, because only after a careful evaluation of the situation - under aspects of game-preservation - the decision to bag an animal is made. Such a decision must serve the ultimate goal of hunting, which is the maintenance of a healthy stock for each species of game, with a natural age structure and normal social order between the individual

9 Every farmer may use his own land as a private entrepreneur for use in agriculture, since no common resource problem arises here (except perhaps for questions like draining, a common water well, etc.). The forced submission to a cooperativeapplies only to the use of land for hunting. Damages to agricultural crops by game - beyond a 'tolerable' level - are reimbursed to the farmer indirectly by the cooperative, which in turn usually claims a compensation directly from the hunter. lo That is, game - or any other wild animal - standing for a moment on a particular patch of land is not 'owned' then by the proprietor of the particular patch of land.

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animals. A prerequisite for such a decision is a knowledge how each individual animal fits into the stock, and this can be obtained only by first observing all details. Just like all other activities of hunting, this should be done with the least disturbance to nature. For this reason, I have fifteen high-stands - hidden in large oak trees - dispersed in my hunting area. While approaching one of the high-stands, some disturbance may be caused. But, once I have settled down on the high-stand, nature around me reaches again tranquillity: It is like an eyeopener, because in stages one will notice more and more details. Going to the high-stand is just like walking up to, and opening up, an imaginary door to a different world, where it is evident that man too, is just a part of nature. Fairy tales for our children reflect - I believe - some of the hidden dreams of mankind. One of these dreams tells the story of becoming invisible. Exactly this dream is revealed while sitting on a high-stand: As long as one stays silent, does not move, and the wind comes from the 'proper' direction, no animal (or man) will take notice of you, not even a fox with his very fine senses. The proper time for observing is the morning at sunrise, and the evening at sunset. It is the time when most wild animals come out of the hiding in order to feed. It was on such an occasion - some years ago - that I noticed a young roebuck approaching .my high-stand. One of his antlers was deformed, it had an unusual separation. At that time, he was two years old, and he did not have his own territory, which I could conclude from his very cautious and subdued behavior. A buck must be sufficiently old and strong enough to establish - and defend against younger rival bucks - his own territory for mating. During the following years, I did not observe this buck again. (Bucks usually maintain a similar form for their antlers over the years.) Therefore, I concluded that this buck must have established his territory in a neighboring hunting area.

2. The theory 2.1. The pure (static) theory of common resources

The theory presented by Dasgupta and Heal (1979, Chapter 3) is adopted here to suit our purpose: I start with assumptions which (approximately) represent the situation I described in the introduction concerning the middle of the last century, where farmers used their land for two production activities: One is the usual agricultural use, and the other (minor) use is for hunting. A (large) area is considered - say a municipality. For reasons of simplicity, a given stock of only one species of game is considered, which is evenly dispersed in this area. A fixed number (N) of persons is allowed to 'hunt', namely the persons owning the

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Y

X Fig. 1.

individual patches of land which make up the municipality. At that time, no hunting license was required, and no law reflecting any concern of game-preservation existed, so that the'use of the word 'hunting' within this section refers to its primitive form of 'searching for and killing wild animals'. The 'hunting' production function is written

V=f(X);

(1)

where Y is output and X is the (aggregate measure for) input per period, u (The length of this period I assume - for reasons developed later on - to be a reproductive time span for the species, for example one year for deer, since does give birth to fawns once every year.) For simplicity, Y and X are defined to be perfectly divisible etc., so both are in ~+, and f ( . ) should possess all the usual properties of production functions: (all this is shown in Fig. 1.) (i) f(0) = 0, f'(X) = Of(X)/OX > 0 and f"(X) < O. (ii) Since the stock of game is fixed, this is indicated by the dotted horizontal line in Fig. 1, f(X) is bounded from above, so f ( X ) / X approaches zero as X tends to infinity; furthermore, f ( X ) / X >f'(X). Input by hunter i, i = 1 , - . . , N, is denoted by x i, so that total input by all N hunters is given by X = E x i. The share of total output obtained by a representative hunter (i) is

Yi = xi[ f( X) /X] ;

(2)

11 Interrelationships or externalities between the production function describing 'hunting' and the production function describing agricultural activities are ignored.

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this is his individual production function. Since output (Yi) depends on total input (X) by all hunters, the fact that the given stock of game is a common resource to all (N) hunters is reflected for the following reason: Envision that the area is partitioned into N evenly sized sub-areas, one for each 'hunter', (the owner of this sub-area). Now, if one hunter, e.g., located in the middle, would 'clear' his sub-area of all game, game from the other sub-areas moves into the cleared space, since game will distribute itself evenly over the whole area. (Game will do this, because it does not perceive borders of the sub-areas established by land owners.) Thus, the stock for the surrounding sub-areas will decrease, which means that the other hunters must either increase their individual input to obtain a desired output, or for a given input these hunters will obtain less output. Exactly this is reflected in the production function (2): As total input (X) increases, average product f ( X ) / X will decrease, so that for a given yi-value, individual input (x~) must increase. The other way around, for given x:value, individual output ( y ) will decrease. Profit for hunter i is defined by

= x,[ :(

i + x,)/(

i + x,)] - wx,,

(3)

where w denotes the positive input price common to all hunters, output price is normalized to equal unity, and ~ denotes the 'representative' input by other hunters, which are all identically the same, so that X i = (N - 1)32 denotes total input by the other hunters. Assuming that each hunter i makes individual and independent decisions on his input (x~), the derivative of Gi is taken with respect to x~ and set equal to zero. Now, since every hunter i = 1---N does this, the optimal input is 2~ = ~ for every hunter. By reformulating the resulting optimality condition one obtains the following two (equivalent) expressions:

w=f( X)/2-

( l / N ) [ f(

X)/)?-f'( 2)],

(4)

or

w = f ' ( X) + { ( N - 1)/N} [ f( X ) / P ( - f ' ( X)],

(4')

where 2 = NYc. The term [ f ( X ) / X - f'()?)] is positive; multiplying both sides in (4) with X, it follows that total profit for all hunters, given by (2/N)[f(2)/)?f ( 2 ) ] , is always positive. The central point of the theory of the common is that the above solution to an independent profit-maximizing behavior by each hunter is not efficient: Every hunter would obtain a larger profit if he subordinates his input decision to the collective profit-maximizing problem, with profit defined by G = f(x)

- wx,

(5)

with the optimality condition w = f ' ( X * ),

(6)

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Y

wlll]lllllllllt~ × X*

X Fig. 2.

where X * is the optimal total input, with 'allocated' individual input given by xi* = ( 1 / N ) X *. From (4') and (6) it is easily shown that f ' ( , ~ ) < f ' ( X * ), and therefore ,~> X * must hold (for N > 1). (However, there is no way to monitor that each hunter will actually comply with this collective profit-maximization.) All this is illustrated in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, the combined areas of the vertical and slanted lines represent total profit under collective profit-maximization, and the combined areas of the crossed and vertical lines represent total profit under independent input determination. At this point, it is appropriate to introduce the prospect of extinction and therefore the need of a game-preservation program. (This necessarily leads to a confinement for the definition of 'hunting' - along the line implicitly developed already in the introduction.): Suppose, 'survival' of the game requires that at least a stock of a certain size must be maintained. (This is a very plausible assumption.) Let this stock of survival-size be determined by the available stock (this is represented by the dotted line in Fig. 1) minus Y' (not explicitly indicated in Fig. 1). Any output larger than Y' leads to extinction. From the production function (1), Y' determines X' uniquely, the maximum inputpermissible in order to avoid extinction of game. Now, neither the input level X nor the input level X *, as determined above, consider the side-constraint stipulated by X'. Furthermore, history suggests that X' < .~, so that extinction of game is a logical consequence. 12 My first paragraph in the Introduction provides an illustration to this point, and I think that there is a fundamental and general 'truth' to it:

12 The solution o f collective profit-maximization X * is not a stable one, but even if it is enforced, assume X ' < X *

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In the old days we came in wagons: the guns, the bedding, the dogs, the food, the whisky; the young men then who could drive all night and all the next day in the cold rain and pitch a camp in the rain and sleep in wet blankets and rise at daylight the next morning and hunt. There had been bear then. A man shot a doe or a fawn as quickly as he did a buck, and in the afternoons we shot wild turkey with pistols to test our stalking skill and aim, feeding all but the breasts to the dogs. But that time is gone now . . . . ... there is nothing left now ponderable enough to cause a man to tremble: only to remember and to grieve of this land which man has deswamped and denuded and derivered in two generations... ... cotton grows man-tall in the very cracks in the sidewalk, mortgaged before it is even planted and sold and the money spent before it is ever harvested, and usury and mortgage and bankruptcy and meamtreless wealth all breed and spawn together until no man has time to say which one is which, o r c a r e s . . . . This is quoted from some o f the last lines 'The Old Hunter Said' in the book ' B i g W o o d s ' by Faulkner (1930). t3 This masterpiece of literature provides clues to us what hunting has been at a time when the believe prevailed that man may 'harvest' game virtually unrestrained, and to pursue beast just to test ones guts, to satisfy the desire for adventure by killing animals, . . . . 14 The logical consequence of extinction depends of course on the assumption o f a static model, and this consequence is not necessarily conform with a dynamic model of renewable resources, as presented by Dasgupta and Heal (1979, Chapter 5). If the assumed (large) area, the cooperative of a municipality in the above setting, is an 'island" - for example a fenced-in preserve - such dynamic model o f renewable resoitrces is appropriate, and the problem of extinction becomes a different one. 15 But, since an 'island' assumption is not appropriate in general, I could repeat the analysis with a 'larger' area, say a county where the sub-areas are the municipalities, and so on for the next stages o f aggregation. Hunters for their area - the land belonging to farmers within a municipality - have no incentive to restrict hunting input to something less than or equal to X ' just to avoid extinOion of game: This is so, because no one is assured that hunters in neighboring areas will restrict their hunting activity in order to avoid game extinction.

13 With WOWl~l', Ul~4~'sity of ~

w~ls so ~

Io bring this book to my attention.

14Persons ind~tlng an 'immma' in hunli~ - as it is undersO~odin a vca-ybroad ~ m - ~ y have a variety of p e ~ v a l mmives for this; only a minority cousiders aspects of g a m e ~ at all: For this reason, and to avoid cruelty to ~nin~k, and for ~ ¢ p m p o ~ of public safety, the law should

be very reslrictive and selective on pc~scms allowed to hunt. 1~In this case, ' ~ ' of the stock of mine follows the same principles which farmers use for their stuck of ~ A dymmuic model of ~ resomccs is thca ~ ; and within this sc~ing it is conceivable(but, mot m e ~ ! ) that with proper pric~ and a l:m~per cl,~cmmntrate extinction is avoided.

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2.2. Modifications of the model to suit our purpose The pure theory of the common resources (see e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1979, Chapter 3)) shows that by auctioning-off a permission to hunt - tied to input x at a price ~= {(N-

1)/N}[f()()/X-f'(,~)],

(7)

with X = X * enforced so that w = f ' ( X * ) holds, every hunter would make his input decision conform to the collectively optimal solution. This follows from Eq. (4'), by using X * instead of X. I refer to the Introduction, where the legal setting was indicated: For every municipality, farmers have to transfer the fight to hunt which is formally tied to ownership of their land - to a cooperative, and this cooperative leases-out the permission to hunt on the established area. In terms of the above model, w reflects the private cost of the 'hunting' input x, and efficiency requires that the condition stated in Eq. (6) must hold for any variation of the basic model discussed so far; the term • from Eq. (7) indicates an additional 'fee' charged by the cooperative from the hunters. But, the above does not make much sense: Two very relevant side-constraints are ignored. One side-constraint results from the fact that not all land owners (or farmers) have a personal interest and inclination for hunting. Furthermore, just alone for reasons of public safety, the persons allowed to hunt should be controlled and severely restricted. The second side-constraint refers to the restrictions gamepreservation imposes on any hunting activity to avoid extinction of game. (In other words, the term 'hunting' should apply to a more restricted activity than the one commonly regarded.) The two side-constraints require a different discussion, and I treat them separately before I combine the derived conclusions.

2.2.1. Determination of the number of persons allowed to hunt The public exam for hunters - as a prerequisite to obtain a hunting license - is so rigorous that practically only a small number of persons A) < N, from the total number of land owners N could obtain a hunting license at all, and thus lease the permission to hunt on the area established by the cooperative. (I mention this version of determining the number of hunters, because some cooperatives stipulate that the hunters for their area should be recruited from members of the cooperative - if possible at all.) In this case, the above analysis is the same with N instead of N. The total 'fee'-income by the cooperative is determined by multiplying expression (7) with .,~ = X *, and using N instead of N. If this is distributed to the N members, this amounts to a net payment from the A~ hunters to the ( N - A?) non-hunters of the cooperative. But, even such a determination of the number A~ of hunters does not make much sense: First, I point out that any efficient solution of total hunting input such as ( X * ) - does not depend on the number of hunters, because the aggregate hunting input is measured continuously and the number of hunters is an integer.

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Second, most (almost all) persons engaged in hunting do this within their spare time; this will place an upper bound on the possible individual input by any hunter, say x ub. In addition, consideration for game and nature requires avoidance of unnecessary disturbances, which in turn requires that the smallest number of hunters possible should go hunting at all in an area. By using these 'guidelines', the 'optimal' number N * of hunters for the total area of a cooperative must satisfy the following condition: X * ~ N * x ub < X * + x ub.

(8)

The first (weak) inequality of this condition states that at least the efficient total input - this is so far given by X * - can be provided; the second inequality restricts the number of hunters to the smallest number. 16 Having determined the number N * of hunters in this way, N * is used for N in (7) to determine the fee charged by the cooperative. 2.2.2. Regulating hunting input in order to avoid extinction The existing law (for Germany) requires the maintenance of an 'optimal' stock for each species of game - not more and not less. There are two aspects to this: One is a justification why extinction of wild animals and game should be avoided, and the other one should clarify what is meant by an 'optimal' stock. 17 The (possible) answers to both questions are not based on conventional economics, and for this reason I will not discuss these aspects in detail:

Extinction of wild animals - due to the influence of man - may be considered as undesirable for reasons provided by Ethics, or Religion, or . . . . The 'optimal' stock for a species of game must be at least of the survival-size (as discussed already above), and in general it will be well above this survival-size. (This is necessary for the following reason: If, due to a hard winter or the outbreak of a disease, the existing stock diminishes, the remaining stock must be at least of the survival-size.) But, why is a regulation of the stock required? The stock for each species must tolerate a variety of interests: Agriculture and forestry, the stocks of other species of game, and the survival of other wild animals and plants. Some of the game, animals, and plants in the habitat are partially in conflict with each other, and partially all these are complementarily related to each other. The quality of the habitat, combined with the desire to find a balance of the whole eco-system, will yield the 'optimal' stocks to all species of game, wild animals and plants, as a 'simultaneous solution' to a very complex problem - with

16 The legal setting is actually a little bit more flexible by stipulating a lower and upper bound for N *, by allowing different values for x ub across individuals. 17 In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding: The optimal size of stock is not determined under aspects of either maximizing output Y or maximizing profit in hunting.

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side-constraints imposed by Ethics (or Religion), Biology, and perhaps a touch of Economics. For this paper all this is taken as exogenously given. Given that the optimal stock for the species of game considered has been set (for example by an administrative body), the rate of reproduction per period is (approximately) known. Exactly this reproduction must be bagged (by hunt/n# in order to maintain the optimal stock. However, sound biological principles of game-preservation will not only require a quantitative regulation of the optimal stock. Of equal importance are aspects of qualitative regulation: By this is meant the maintenance of a natural sex-ratio and age structure of the stock, a normal social order between the individual animals, and that hunting must play the role of the 'health-police' in the absence of any beast. The natural 'law' of survival of the fittest dictates that the strongest and healthiest animals should be maintained for reproduction. This leads to the requirement that the sick, the weakest, and old animals must be bagged first of all. This might be considered a handicap, since it obviously requires additional efforts, like first observing carefully the entire situation within the area assigned to a hunter. But, I view this qualitative restriction as an additional challenge, because compliance with these restrictions requires substantially more skills and proficiency from the hunter. ~8 Within the formal analysis of this model, only the quantitative measure of the required output from hunting matters, which must be equal to the reproduction of the optimal stock: 19 Let this required output be denoted with yo. Given the production function" (1), this gives the required total input level X °. The input level X ° is related to the previously discussed input levels by the inequality X ° < X'; therefore also X ° < X * < X will hold. In order to make the required total input X ° also an efficient input level, that is collectively optimal, the private cost of hunting (w) must increase so that w = f ' ( X °) holds. (For example by charging an appropriate fee for the hunting license, tied now to the possible input level by each hunter x ub. Under the legal setting such a fee is charged!) Once the optimal input is determined at X °, the then relevant number of hunters, here denoted by N ~, must satisfy - in analogy to expression (8) - the condition X ~ .
(8')

By using N ° for N, and X ° for )f in expression (7), the fee charged by the cooperative to lease-out the permission to hunt is determined: Measured per unit

is One very substant/al deficiency of the license system for hl~ng, where (any) person may lmrchase the permit to kill a certain numberof game, is exactly in this respect: Killing game according to tbe order in wlhich/ndividual animals come within reach of rite rifle cau never be in accord with biological pa,~Cil~S of hunting. t9 The qualitative aspectof I ~ namelythat game may only be baggedvery selectively,mightbe transJated into a downward shift of the production famOdmm. I ignore lifts within the focmal model.

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Y

W°

~ooo~oo

\

X

X'X*

X Fig. 3.

of the hunting input, this fee is given by [w ° - f'(X°)] in Fig. 3. 20 Profit obtained (by the N ° hunters) is indicated by the shaded area in Fig. 3. 2.2.3. Bringing it all together I have indicated a solution which is (almost exactly) reflected by the legal setting (in Germany). This solution is based on two basic premises: One is that extinction of game (and other wild animals) is a logical consequence in the absence of any institutional and legal regulation as described in the introduction, because game is a common resource. The other is the public decision to avoid extinction of game (and other wild animals), and therefore create an appropriate institutional and legal setting: Within the legal setting illustrated in this paper, hunting is sub-ordinated to goals established by game-preservation. From a purely legal point of view (not discussed here in detail), this is a 'trade-off" between the relinquished (private) property right to use the land owned also for (unregulated) hunting, and a 'right' to exist granted to wild animals and game. During the rutting season of 1992 1 observed this particular buck again; all of a sudden, he was there. The year before, I bagged an old buck near by, whose territory was claimed by a younger buck who could not maintain the original size of the territory against neighboring bucks. This must have enabled the particular buck to expand his territory into my hunting area. The first time I saw him, he was mating with a doe. During the rut, the buck chases the doe over a period of

The rentsl fee for the hunting permit charged by the c o o ~ c is ~ t l y mcasmcd for a given size of aa area, say an a a e , If A denmes the acres o f the area establisi~d by the ~ ¢ , ~ f~

for the Ue.ting pen~ ~

per ~re ts th~ ~vee by [w° - [ ( r ) L r / A.

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G. Hasenkamp/ European Journal of PoliticalEconomy 11 (1995) 453-468

several hours. The chase goes round and round in connecting circles, forming at the end a figure like the number '8'. The mating act is repeated several times: The buck usually rests during pauses, while the doe is feeding near by (which is sometimes used by younger bucks to sneak-up in order to try their chance). During the rut, the buck is 'blind' due to all of his 'love-efforts'; at least his senses are focussed more or less to does and potential rival bucks, and he loses his usual caution. Even though it is not illegal, I consider it 'unfair' to bag a buck during the rut. Does will always stay within the vicinity of their birthplace. And, since bucks usually maintain the same territory over several years, older bucks are then bound to mate with their own daughters. For this reason, to maintain genetic diversity, old bucks should be bagged in order to give younger bucks a chance to conquer a territory of their own. (This, in a way, reflects natural selection, since the old bucks would fall prey to beast more easily during the rut than younger bucks.) Therefore, my mind was readily made up to bag this buck. Three weeks I had to wait: One week because the rut was still going on, and two weeks so that the buck would lose the particular rut-odor. After the rut, bucks usually become very sneaky; one could sometimes believe that they have disappeared. But, 1 knew that my buck had a noticeable (with binocular or telescopic sight), scitr on his left shoulder. Then, one evening just before it became too dark to observe anything at all, my buck came out of the hiding. The cross within the telescopic sight took aim at the scar, moved down to the right, and then - with just a tip of the ftnger - a bullet from a 0.30-06 calibre rifle was sent off." The moment of the rifle's crack merged with the moment the buck fell into the grass.

3. Final comments In spite of damages to nature due to industrialization, the stock for all species of deer - roe deer, fallow deer and red deer - have shown a drastic increase from the last century, in particular during the last forty years! To a fair extent, this is due to the established legal setting, and its enforcement by hunters themselves. But, perhaps to a much larger extent, the increase in the stocks of deer are due to changing forms of agricultural methods. While this change induced 'positive' externalities to the species of deer, 'negative' externalities resulted for other wild animals, like partridge, pheasant, and hare. The whole eco-system, and in particular the quality of the habitat, has by far the biggest influence on the 'survival' of wild animals. In Table 1 I indicate the trend on the number of deer bagged over the last forty years within the rather small state of Schleswig-Holstein. 21 These numbers

G. Hasenkamp/ EuropeanJournal of PoliticalEconomy 11 (1995)453-468

467

Table 1 1939 1955 1965 1975 1985 1991

Roe deer

Fallow deer

Red deer

Japanese deer

12.947 17.013 23.523 28.917 34.132 41.405

2.389 1.915 2.571 3.852 4.240 5.460

400 259 391 553 613 545

0 1 46 56 68 61

indicate roughly the reproduction of the optimal stocks for each species of deer, where these optimal stocks increased over time for reasons mentioned above. These numbers also illustrate that a co-existence of game (and other wild animals) with an intensive agriculture is possible, even in a very densely populated and industrialized country. I quote again from Faulkner (1930), namely the very last paragraph of ' B i g Woods':

This land, said the old hunter. No wonder the ruined woods I used to know don't cry for retribution. The very people who destroyed them will accomplish their revenge. We do not have to accept this bleak outlook as a prophecy to an unavoidable fate for game, for wild animals, and for nature in general: The purpose of this paper was to show one logical way out of the 'dilemma' called extinction, and the numbers in Table 1 indicate the success of this story. Across nations several different forms of regulating hunting and game-preservation exist. An example are the various wild-life conservation programs practices in the U.S., where a license to hunt a particular number of game and type of game is auctioned off per period. But, in comparison to such a license system to regulate hunting, the German system - where the exclusive right to hunt in a particular area is leased for a period of nine to twelve years - has the advantage that the hunter is confronted directly with the objectives of game-preservation, and he is held responsible for pursuing these goals. This I consider an advantage. A complementary approach to the topic which I have pursued here is provided in the paper 'Economics from a biological viewpoint' by Hirshleifer (1977), which might explain - if extended - why some persons still hunt, even under the restrictions of game-preservation. I must admit, the topic of this paper is partly due to my personal hunting activities, and the fascination it induces on me. Does this follow from the shaded area in Fig. 3, the ' profit' obtained from hunting? If prices used in this paper reflect all the opportunity cost and benefit involved (that is, the

21 These data I obtained from the Landesjagdverband Schleswig-Holstein.

468

G. Hasenkamp~EuropeanJournal of PoliticalEconomy11 (1995)453--468

prices used are not necessarily observable market prices), there might be a point to this. But, that is not all, and I could not explain it.

My wife grew up in a city without any practical sense and knowledge of hunting. But, she mentally approached hunting after she accepted my fascination of it (which is perhaps also due to her appreciation of a regular supply of roast of venison). Once she asked me, what is going through my mind in the very moments after I take aim at a buck. It is a momen~ when built-up tensions are released: To my own surprise, I said that my mind is occupied with the next buck. Deliberately, I let my children take part in all my hunting activities. I do this, so that within their process of growing up and maturing, they are constantly made aware of the fact that 'meat' is not something wrapped-up in plastic at the super market - as it is perceived by most people nowadays: Behind the plenty and assured supply of meat by efficient agriculture are animals raised only for the slaughter-house. Man may (and perhaps must) accept this for reasons of securing an efficient supply source of meat. But, it is very much more in harmony wi~ nature to accept venison as one (additional) source of meat. If my children understand that the same money worth of meat represents something 'more' than that of other goods, I am satisfied.

Acknowledgment Dr. Richard L. Sell from Manitowoc, Wisconsin, USA, shares with me the fascination derived from hunting, and the concern for wild animals or nature in general: He was so kind to comment on sketches for the first draft. My colleagues Keith Womer (University o f Mississippi), Cffmter Bamberg (Universit~t Augsburg), and Manfred Holler (Universit~t Hamburg), provided helpful comments on the first draft.

References Dasgupta, P.S. and G.M. Heal, 1979, Economic theory and exhaustible resources(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). Faulkner, William, 1930, Big woods ( ~ House, New York). I-Fn'shleifer,J., 1977, Ectmomiesfrom a biological viewpoint, Jouraal of Law and Eoacomics 20, 1-52. Ortega y Gasset, Jos~, 1944, Pr61ogoa an tratado de moetella, Revistade Oeeide4nte,Madrkl. (German Iranslation (1985):. Medilatieeen ~tber die Jagd, Deutsche Vedags-Anstalt, Stuttgart).