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The electoral impact of casework
U T T E R W O R T H -E [ N E M A N N
Electoral Studies. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 171-177, 199~ Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All fights reserved 0261-3794/9~ $10.00+0.00
0261-3794(94)00011-5
The Electoral Impact o f Casework GEORGE SERRA*
University of Miami, Department of Political Science, PO Box 248047, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6534, USA ALBERT D COVER
State Universi~ of New York, Department of Political Science, Ston~, Brook, NY 11794-4.392, USA
There is no doubt that legislators assume casework has an important political impact, but the evidence that such service can bc used to win electoral support from grateful constituents is mixed. The research reported here offers a model to assess the overall electoral impact of casework. The model suggests that while the impact does benefit the incumbent, it varies as a function of voter partisanship. In particular, the recognition effect of casework is the dominant one for incumbent partisans, while improved incumbent evaluation accounts for more of the overall impact among challenger partisans and Independents.
T h e r e is n o d o u b t that legislators assume that c o n s t i t u e n t service has an i m p o r t a n t political impact. T h e empirical e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , that c a s e w o r k can be used to w i n electoral s u p p o r t from grateful c o n s t i t u e n t s is m i x e d (e.g., Serra a n d Moon, 1994; Serra a n d Cover, 1992; J o h a n n e s , 1984; J o h a n n e s a n d McAdams, 1981). This p a p e r builds o n an earlier article (Serra a n d Cover, 1992) that p r e s e n t e d some basic data o n the i m p a c t of c a s e w o r k in o n e particular congressional district in the United States a n d also d e v e l o p e d a simple m o d e l that assessed the overall i m p a c t of such service. This analysis e x t e n d s the previously p u b l i s h e d results in t w o significant respects. First, it p r e s e n t s a m o r e c o m p l e x m o d e l that explicitly takes into a c c o u n t t w o distinguishable effects of casework: (1) the i m p r o v e m e n t in an i n c u m b e n t ' s r e c o g n i t i o n level a m o n g c o n s t i t u e n t s , and (2) the i m p r o v e m e n t in the i n c u m b e n t ' s evaluation a m o n g c o n s t i t u e n t s . Second, here w e also e x a m i n e the different impact of c a s e w o r k o n each partisan g r o u p rather t h a n a s s u m i n g (as did the earlier study) that the effect is similar in all target groups.
R e s e a r c h Design: The O m b u d s m a n Data In r e t u r n for a p r o m i s e of a n o n y m i t y , a House m e m b e r c u r i o u s a b o u t the impact of o m b u d s m a n activity p r o v i d e d the researchers w i t h a list of c o n s t i t u e n t s . The *Both authors contributed equally to this research. It is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant SES 88-17862).
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The Electoral Impact of Casework
n a m e s w e r e a s s i g n e d to t w o categories: o n e c o n s i s t e d o f beneficiaries o f o m b u d s m a n service, t h e o t h e r o f c o n s t i t u e n t s w h o h a d n o t b e n e f i t e d from s u c h assistance a n d w e r e r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d f r o m t h e roll o f r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s in the district? T h e r e s e a r c h design, o u t l i n e d here, is d e s c r i b e d in g r e a t e r detail e l s e w h e r e (Serra a n d Cover, 1992, p p . 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 ) . Interviews were conducted with constituents whose names were provided by t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l office. All i n t e r v i e w s c o n d u c t e d i n c l u d e d t h e r e s p o n d e n t recognition o f "Legislator X" a n d r e s p o n d e n t e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i n c u m b e n t . By c o m p a r i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s for w h o m o m b u d s m a n service has b e e n p e r f o r m e d w i t h c o n s t i t u e n t s w h o h a v e n o t b e n e f i t e d f r o m o m b u d s m a n assistance, w e c a n d i s c e r n m o r e explicitly t h e i m p a c t o f s u c h service o n i n c u m b e n t r e c o g n i t i o n and evaluation. To measure i n c u m b e n t saliency, r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e asked at the outset w h e t h e r they r e c o g n i z e d the i n c u m b e n t ( a m o n g o t h e r political figures). Those w i t h a credible identification of the i n c u m b e n t w e r e c r e d i t e d as recognizing him. A standard feeling t h e r m o m e t e r w a s used to assess h o w w a r m l y r e s p o n d e n t s felt t o w a r d the i n c u m b e n t (and o t h e r political figures w h o s e n a m e s w e r e used in the saliency question). T h e data i n d i c a t e d that t h e i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k w a s to i n c r e a s e i n c u m b e n t recognition b y a p p r o x i m a t e l y 13 p e r c e n t a n d to i m p r o v e t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s evaluation a b o u t 15 d e g r e e s a m o n g c o n s t i t u e n t s . A p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t , of course, is that c o n s t i t u e n t s w h o r e c o g n i z e d t h e i n c u m b e n t o r w h o e v a l u a t e d him w a r m l y w e r e e s p e c i a l l y likely to s e e k c a s e w o r k assistance f r o m h i m / h e r . F r o m this p e r s p e c tive, t h e h i g h e r e v a l u a t i o n a n d g r e a t e r saliency m a y have p r e d i s p o s e d c o n s t i t u e n t s to s e e k c o n t a c t r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g t h e result o f t h e c o n t a c t itself. W h i l e w e c a n n o t c o m p l e t e l y e x c l u d e this possibility, o t h e r e v i d e n c e suggests that i n d e e d it w a s t h e i n c u m b e n t c o n t a c t that i n f l u e n c e d c o n s t i t u e n c y attitudes r a t h e r than t h e attitudes that g e n e r a t e d c o n t a c t s . For e x a m p l e , r e s e a r c h o n t h e i m p a c t o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l mailings in an e x p e r i m e n t a l setting i n d i c a t e d c o m p a r a b l e evaluation and saliency effects to t h o s e c i t e d a b o v e , a n d in that study c o n s t i t u e n t s d i d n o t initiate any a c t i o n at all ( C o v e r a n d B r u m b e r g , 1982; Cover, 1985).
Casework Impact on Incumbent Recognition and Evaluation In this s e c t i o n w e p r e s e n t a m o d e l to assess r e c o g n i t i o n a n d evaluation effects o f c a s e w o r k . T h e m o d e l f o c u s e s on t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t a m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans, c h a l l e n g e r partisans, a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s . By c o m p a r i n g the e x p e c t e d v o t e s b e f o r e a n d after c a s e w o r k , w e assess t h e i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k w i t h i n e a c h partisan g r o u p Let Fb~f,,r~ a n d F~f,~r = fraction o f v o t e r s w h o are able to recognize t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e b e f o r e / a f t e r c a s e w o r k ; F*b~f,,,. a n d F~,~,.r = fraction o f v o t e r s w h o are n o t able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e b e f o r e / a f t e r c a s e w o r k ; Px, b~,,r~ a n d p~, ~ r = p r o b a b i l i t y that a v o t e r in t h e "x" partisan g r o u p w h o recognizes t h e i n c u m b e n t b e f o r e / a f t e r c a s e w o r k will v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t ( w h e r e "x" refers to i n c u m b e n t partisans, c h a l l e n g e r partisans, a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s ) ; and P*x = p r o b a b i l i t y that a v o t e r in t h e "x" partisan g r o u p w h o d o e s not r e c o g n i z e the incumb e n t will still v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t . W e are i n t e r e s t e d initially in calculating the e s t i m a t e d v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t in t h e "x" partisan g r o u p b e f o r e c a s e w o r k . An a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d w o u l d b e to calculate t h e f o l l o w i n g sum: e x p e c t e d v o t e = ([the fraction o f x v o t e r s able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t b e f o r e c o n t a c t ] t i m e s [the p r o b a b i l i t y that s u c h v o t e r s will v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t ] p l u s [the fraction o f x v o t e r s u n a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t
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b e f o r e c o n t a c t ] t i m e s [the p r o b a b i l i t y that s u c h v o t e r s will still v o t e for t h e incumbent]). More succinctly, E(vote)x. b,for~ = Vbclorc * ex. before + F *b,'for* * P*x (1). In a similar fashion, t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t in t h e "x" g r o u p after c a s e w o r k is e x p r e s s e d b y t h e f o l l o w i n g equation: E(vote)x. :a~r = /~after * Px, after "{- F'after * e * x ( 2 ) . F r o m t h e s e e q u a t i o n s w e c a n calculate t h e e x p e c t e d i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k in t h e "x" g r o u p b y s u b t r a c t i n g t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e b e f o r e c o n t a c t from t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e after contact. To d o all this, h o w e v e r , w e n e e d e s t i m a t e s for t h e t e r m s o n the right-hand side o f t h e equations. F r o m t h e t e l e p h o n e survey o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n c y in this study, w e c a n e s t i m a t e t h e various " F ' terms. T h e effect o f r e c e i v i n g o m b u d s m a n service w a s to i n c r e a s e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s r e c o g n i t i o n b y 13.1 p e r cent. T h e fraction o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e that w a s i n f o r m e d b e f o r e c a s e w o r k equals 0.865 (Vhcforc). Thus, t h e fraction of the e l e c t o r a t e that is u n i n f o r m e d b e f o r e c a s e w o r k equals 0.135 (F"b~t~,r,,). T h e fraction of the e l e c t o r a t e that is i n f o r m e d after c a s e w o r k equals 0.996 (E~tt~r) w h i l e the fraction that is u n i n f o r m e d after c a s e w o r k equals 0.004 (F*~,,,r). E s t i m a t i n g t h e v a r i o u s "P" t e r m s is a bit m o r e c o m p l e x . Let us b e g i n w i t h v o t e r s u n a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t . If w e w i s h to e s t i m a t e t h e p r o b a b i l ity t h a t u n i n f o r m e d v o t e r s will s u p p o r t t h e i n c u m b e n t , t h a t is, if w e w i s h to e s t i m a t e t h e v a r i o u s P*x t e r m s , w e c a n use p e r c e n t a g e s f r o m s u r v e y s c o n d u c t e d b y t h e C e n t r e for Political S t u d i e s at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n . In p a r t i c u l a r , w c c a n f o c u s o n t h e s u b s e t o f r e s p o n d e n t s w h o (a) c l a i m e d to h a v e v o t e d in a g i v e n e l e c t i o n , ( b ) w e r e n o t a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e n a m e o f t h e local c o n g r e s sional i n c u m b e n t , a n d (c) lived in d i s t r i c t s w i t h g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t s . T h e s e c a n b e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o i n c u m b e n t p a r t i s a n s (i.e., t h o s e i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s p a r t y ) , c h a l l e n g e r p a r t i s a n s (i.e., t h o s e i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s p a r t y ) , a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s . ( I n d e p e n d e n t s a r e "true" I n d e p e n d e n t s ; t h o s e l e a n i n g to a p a r t y are c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t y i d e n t i f i e r s . ) O f t h e i n c u m b e n t p a r t i s a n s 97 p e r c e n t v o t e d for t h e i n c u m b e n t in t h e i r district; thus, P*~....... h,.,, = 0.97. O f t h e c h a l l e n g e r p a r t i s a n s 32 p e r c e n t v o t e d for t h e i n c u m b e n t , so P*d,~,~.~g~ e q u a l s 0.32. Finally, 50 p e r c e n t o f I n d e p e n d e n t s s u p p o r t e d t h e i n c u m b e n t ; t h e r e f o r e , P*~nOep,.~d~m = 0.50. T h e p r o c e s s o f e s t i m a t i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y that a v o t e r w h o d o e s r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t will v o t e for that c a n d i d a t e is m o r e i n v o l v e d t h a n is t h e p r o c e s s o f e s t i m a t i n g t h e a n a l o g o u s p r o b a b i l i t y for a v o t e r u n a b l e to r e c o g n i z e the i n c u m b e n t . In t h e latter case, w e d o n o t c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h e v o t e r ' s e v a l u a t i o n o f the i n c u m b e n t since it is u n c l e a r w h a t m e a n i n g c o u l d p o s s i b l y be a t t a c h e d to t h e evaluation o f an u n r e c o g n i z e d c a n d i d a t e . In contrast, the v o t e r w h o d o e s r e c o g n i z e an i n c u m b e n t is likely to have s o m e m e a n i n g f u l evaluation. T h e r e f o r e , in e s t i m a t i n g t h e various Px t e r m s for v o t e r s able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t , w e m u s t c o n s i d e r the i m p a c t o f i n c u m b e n t e v a l u a t i o n o n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of v o t i n g for that c a n d i d a t e . To d o this, w e c a n again use i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e C e n t r e for Political Studies survey as well as from t h e survey o f Legislator X ' s district. In the 1988 survey t h e r e w e r e 662 r e s p o n d e n t s w h o (a) c l a i m e d to have v o t e d in t h e 1988 c o n g r e s s i o n a l elections, (b) w e r e able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t a n d p l a c e that c a n d i d a t e o n a s t a n d a r d feeling t h e r m o m e t e r , a n d (c) lived in districts w i t h g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n contests. W e w o u l d e x p e c t that t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s w h o v o t e d for t h e local i n c u m b e n t to vat3' as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s partisan o r i e n t a t i o n a n d t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i n c u m b e n t as m e a s u r e d by the t h c r m o m e t c r score. Table 1 i n d i c a t e s that the data m e e t t h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s .
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TABtE 1. Proportion of respondents voting for house incumbent, by partisan group and incumbent evaluation r°
0-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
Incumbent partisans
(N)
Challenger partisans
(N)
Independents
(N)
1.000 1.000 0.958 0.989 0.968 0.984
15 57 71 92 94 64
0.143 0.388 0.550 0.683 0.756 0.810
21 49 40 41 45 21
0.750 0.583 0.818 0.833 0.833 1.000
4 12 11 12 6 7
0.750 0.743 0.833 1.000
4 35 6 7
0-49 50-79 80-89 90-100 Source: Centre for Political Studies 1988 Election Study.
T h e table makes it clear that b o t h partisan identification a n d candidate evaluation i n f l u e n c e the p r o p o r t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s v o t i n g for the i n c u m b e n t . To estimate the i m p a c t of c a s e w o r k o n voters able to recognize the i n c u m b e n t , w e n e e d to k n o w a b o u t the relationship b e t w e e n evaluation and voting (summarized in Table 1) as well as i n f o r m a t i o n o n the c o n t a c t ' s i m p a c t o n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of evaluations. For this i n f o r m a t i o n w e t u r n from the national survey data to survey data collected in Legislator X ' s district. Table 2 p r e s e n t s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of incumb e n t evaluations. Table 2 s u m m a r i z e s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s along the standard feeling t h e r m o m e t e r a m o n g t w o g r o u p s of r e s p o n d e n t s , o n e of w h i c h had c a s e w o r k p e r f o r m e d a n d the o t h e r of w h i c h did n o t b e n e f i t from such service. The latter is referred to as the "before" g r o u p a n d the f o r m e r is the "after" group. W e can use the i n f o r m a t i o n from Tables 1 a n d 2 to estimate the various Px terms b o t h before a n d after casework. T h e p r o c e d u r e has b e e n d e s c r i b e d e l s e w h e r e (Cover, 1985). To calculate a particular p~ value c o n s u l t the a p p r o p r i a t e c o l u m n o n
TABLE2. Evaluation of incumbent - - before and after contact Thermometer ratings
Number of respondents: before
Number of respondents: after
0-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
23 71 24 22 18 12
10 26 23 33 41 65
N = 170
N = 198
Source: Survey of Congressman X's district. Note: different respondents in each period.
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Table 2 for n, values, c o n s u l t the a p p r o p r i a t e c o l u m n in Table 1 for lT values, multiply the two, s u m all such p r o d u c t s over relevant evaluation categories, a n d finally divide this s u m by the total n u m b e r of r e s p o n d e n t s in the a p p r o p r i a t e c o l u m n in Table 2. T h e various p~ values are s u m m a r i z e d below: P~.......b.... bee,,r~ = 0.988, P i . . . . . b.... after = 0"9812, Pindepend .... before = 0.769, Pi,,a,'p,',,d.......ftcr = 0.844, Pch,,~,,g,',. b,'~,,r, = 0.485, Pch,n,-,g~r,,~r = 0.658. T h e various p,. estimates are plausible despite the c o m p l e x i t y of calculating them. I n c u m b e n t partisans are almost c o m p l e t e l y loyal to the i n c u m b e n t ; I n d e p e n d e n t s are s o m e w h a t less supportive; c h a l l e n g e r partisans do s u p p o r t the i n c u m b e n t candidate o n balance, b u t their s u p p o r t is m u c h w e a k e r t h a n that of o t h e r voters. W e have n o w estimated all of the right-hand terms in Equations (1) a n d (2). W e can n o w p r o c e e d to the calculation of the i m p a c t of c o n t a c t in each partisan group? I n c u m b e n t Partisans: From the earlier calculations w e k n o w that P*i.......b~,,t equals 0.97. Thus, the probability of v o t i n g for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans u n a b l e to recognize h i s / h e r n a m e is 97 p e r cent. We also k n o w that the fraction of voters u n a b l e to recognize the i n c u m b e n t before c a s e w o r k Pb~.f,,r~ equals 0.135. The e x p e c t e d vote for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g these voters is Fb,.f,,~,, * P*~,,,,,.,,,,.,,, = (0.135)(0.97) = 0.131. For i n c u m b e n t partisans able to r e c o g n i z e their party's candidate, the probability of s u p p o r t i n g the i n c u m b e n t before c a s e w o r k (P~...... ~ , , b,.f,,r,-) is essentially equal to 1.000. The fraction of the electorate that is i n f o r m e d before c a s e w o r k (k],,.t,,~,.) equals 0.865. In o t h e r words, 86.5 p e r c e n t of the voters are able to recognize the i n c u m b e n t before casework. Therefore, the e x p e c t e d i n c u m b e n t vote from these voters is Fh~f,,~,. * Pi .........h~.t. h~for,. = (0.865)(1.000) = 0.865. Thus, m a k i n g the appropriate s u b s t i t u t i o n s into Equation (1) gives us the overall e x p e c t e d vote as follows: E(vote)~ ........b,'.L b,'fo~,-= 0.865 + O. 131 = 0.996. A m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans, therefore, the i n c u m b e n t is e x p e c t e d to pick u p 99.6 p e r c e n t of the vote if the election is held before contact. Independents: W e w o u l d e x p e c t a generally l o w e r level of s u p p o r t for the incumb e n t a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s . Making a p p r o p r i a t e s u b s t i t u t i o n s o n c e again in Equation (1) and (2) w e find that E(vote)ioa,.p,.,d ...... b~t~,~ equals 0.733 a n d E(vote)i,,aq,,.,a ........~,,.r equals 0.843. Thus, the e x p e c t e d vote is l o w e r a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s t h a n a m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans b o t h before a n d after casework. T h e impact of casework, h o w e v e r , is s o m e w h a t greater a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s . The 11 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t increase a m o u n t s to a boost of 15 p e r c e n t (11/73.3 = 0.150) b e y o n d the e x p e c t e d w)te a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s w h o did n o t have c a s e w o r k p e r f o r m e d . Challenger Partisans: W e s h o u l d anticipate the lowest levels of i n c u m b e n t s u p p o r t a m o n g c h a l l e n g e r partisans a n d a p p r o p r i a t e s u b s t i t u t i o n s in Equations (1) and (2) indicate this is i n d e e d the c a s e E(vote)d~,,.ng,.,. ' bctore equals 0.463 a n d /:"(vote),-h~,,~,,g . . . . . ft,.~ equals 0.656. Results indicate that the i m p a c t of c a s e w o r k is c o n s i d e r a b l y greater for voters of the challengers party. By b o o s t i n g the incumb e n t ' s e x p e c t e d vote from 46.3 p e r c e n t to 65.6 p e r cent, c a s e w o r k i m p r o v e s the i n c u m b e n t ' s vote b y 41.7 p e r c e n t b e y o n d that a n t i c i p a t e d w i t h o u t casework (19.3/46.3 = 41.7 p e r c e n t increase). The impact of r e c o g n i t i o n is c o n s i d e r a b l y greater a m o n g voters of the challenger's party than a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s or i n c u m b e n t partisans. For i n c u m b e n t partisans the s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t candidate is e x t r e m e l y high regardless of w h e t h e r or not
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that candidate is recognized (P'incumbent = 0.97, while eincumbent, before = l . O 0 0 ) . For challenger partisans and Independents, however, there is a considerable increase in the probability of voting for the incumbent if a voter recognizes the incumbent's name. Support for the i n c u m b e n t among challenger partisans jumps from 32 per cent to 48.5 p e r cent; for I n d e p e n d e n t s the impact of recognition is somewhat greater /)*independent = 0 . 5 0 , while Pindependent. before = 0.769). Thus, part of the explanation for the impact of casework on challenger partisans and I n d e p e n d e n t s is that improved incumbent recognition counts for a lot more among these partisans than it does among i n c u m b e n t partisans. A s e c o n d part of the explanation involves the impact of casework on i n c u m b e n t evaluation. Table 1 shows an u p w a r d shift in evaluations is of relatively little importance among i n c u m b e n t partisans. Their s u p p o r t is e x t r e m e l y high over virtually the entire evaluation spectrum. For i n d e p e n d e n t s s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t is also reasonably high regardless of their evaluation of the incumbent. The p r o p o r t i o n of challenger partisans voting for the i n c u m b e n t moves up quite rapidly as i n c u m b e n t evaluation counts for a lot more among challenger partisans than it does among any o t h e r group. Thus far the distinction b e t w e e n recognition and evaluation effects has entered the discussion only incidentally. No attempt has b e e n made to c o m p a r e these effects separately. Let us isolate the recognition effect. Within each partisan class some voters are unable to recognize the incumbent. We can calculate their e x p e c t e d i n c u m b e n t vote as w e have done above. For voters w h o are able to recognize the incumbent, our e x p e c t e d vote calculations must be modified somewhat. The earlier calculations took into account both recognition and evaluation effects since both c o n t r i b u t e d to the various p,. terms. What we must do n o w is to "purge" these terms of their evaluation c o m p o n e n t s , leaving only information on i n c u m b e n t recognition. In o t h e r words, w e must t h r o w out information gained by knowing w h e r e along the evaluation scale voters p l a c e d incumbents. That can be accomplished quite readily. For example, consider incumbent partisans able to recognize the incumbent in the 1988 Centre for Political Studies survey. As a group 98 p e r cent of these respondents voted for the incumbent. Let us define P' as the probability that a voter in the "x" group w h o recognizes the incumbent will vote for the incumbent w h e n we consider only recognition effects. Then P'i . . . . bent equals 0.98. Likewise, we find that P'independeot equals 0.79 and P'challengrr equals 0.57. We can use these newly defined terms in a set of equations that predict the i n c u m b e n t ' s vote using only information on the impact of casework on incumbent recognition: E(vote)~, b~f,,r~ = Fb,or,. * P'x + F'~-f,,r,- * P*x (3) and E(vote)x. after = Rafter * P'x + F~aftcr * P*x (4). Equations (3) and (4) are identical to Equations (1) and (2) e x c e p t that the P'x terms replace p~ terms throughout. Making the a p p r o p r i a t e substitutions in Equations (3) and (4), w e find that by itself recognition accounts for almost all of c a s e w o r k ' s overall (albeit modest) impact for i n c u m b e n t partisans, 56.5 p e r cent of the impact for Independents, and only 26.9 p e r cent of the impact for challenger partisans. Table 1 suggests w h y the partisan groups differ so much in the relative impact of recognition and evaluation effects of casework. Among i n c u m b e n t partisans in the survey there is a uniformly high level of i n c u m b e n t s u p p o r t regardless of evaluation. Among I n d e p e n d e n t s there is more substantial variation in s u p p o r t as a function of evaluation. By far the largest variation, however, is observed among challenger partisans. Hence, the
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effect o f i m p r o v i n g e v a lu a t io n s a m o n g c a s e w o r k r e c i p i e n t s will be negligible for i n c u m b e n t partisans, fairly substantial a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s , and q u i t e large a m o n g c h a l l e n g e r partisans.
Conclusion This study assesses t h e e le c t o r a l significance o f a key legislative perquisite, c a s e w o r k . Using data f r o m a r e s e a r c h design i n t e n d e d to p r o t e c t results from c o m m o n f o rm s o f c o n t a m i n a t i o n , t h e m o d e l p r e s e n t e d h e r e p e r m i t s us to distinguish t h e r e c o g n i t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n effects w i t h i n t h e overall i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k . T h e study indicates that t h e i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k varies as a f u n c t i o n o f partisan identification. It f u r t h e r s h o w s that w h i l e the r e c o g n i t i o n effect o f c a s e w o r k is significant for all partisan groups, th e evaluation c o m p o n e n t o f c a s e w o r k is q u i t e i m p o r t a n t for I n d e p e n d e n t s and d o m i n a n t for c h a l l e n g e r partisans. T h e t e c h n i q u e o u t l i n e d h e r e is a g e n e r a l o n e that can be u s e d to assess t h e i m p a c t o f o t h e r incumb e n t activities as well.
Notes 1. Casework is defined here as the provision of assistance to constituents to resolve a problem with federal bureaucracy; constituents in this study requested assistance from their representative for social security benefits (including Medicare), veterans benefits, civil service, pensions, immigration, and for assistance with the Internal Revenue Service and other federal bureaucracies. Although casework is a broader term than ombudsman service, the two will be used interchangeably in the subsequent discussion. 2. Given the high, unwavering support among incumbent partisans who recognize the incumbent, for the sake of simplicity we substitute the value 1.000 rather than use the P,.......bent. h~t~,~"and Pi. . . . b..... tier values. 3. The estimates of the effects of ombudsman services on electoral support are based on the assumption that all constituents would have benefited from such services. Realistically, only a small minority of constituents in any district could have received casework; thus its actual electoral impact will be smaller. However, there may be some indirect benefits to the incumbent from constituents who hear about services provided to friends or relatives in the district (Serra, 1992).
References Cover, Albert D. and Brumberg, Bruce S. (1982) Baby Books and BaUots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion, American Political Science Revieu', 76 437-459. Cover, Albert D. (1985) The Electoral Impact of Franked Mail, PolitF, 17 649-663. Johannes, John R. and McAdams, John (1981) The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? American Journal o f Political Science, 25 520-542. Johannes, John R. (1984) To Serve The People. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London. Scrra, George and Moon, David (1994) Casework, Issue Positions and Voting in Congressional Elections: A District Analysis, The Journal o f Politics, 56 200-213. Serra, George (1992) Reach Out And Help Someone: The hnpact of Casework Solicitation and Word of Mouth Publicity on Member-Constituent Contact, Southeastern Political Review, 20 231-244. Serra, George and Covcr, Albert D. (1992) The Electoral Consequences of Perquisite Use: The Casework Case, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17 233-246
Electoral Studies. Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 171-177, 199~ Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All fights reserved 0261-3794/9~ $10.00+0.00
0261-3794(94)00011-5
The Electoral Impact o f Casework GEORGE SERRA*
University of Miami, Department of Political Science, PO Box 248047, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6534, USA ALBERT D COVER
State Universi~ of New York, Department of Political Science, Ston~, Brook, NY 11794-4.392, USA
There is no doubt that legislators assume casework has an important political impact, but the evidence that such service can bc used to win electoral support from grateful constituents is mixed. The research reported here offers a model to assess the overall electoral impact of casework. The model suggests that while the impact does benefit the incumbent, it varies as a function of voter partisanship. In particular, the recognition effect of casework is the dominant one for incumbent partisans, while improved incumbent evaluation accounts for more of the overall impact among challenger partisans and Independents.
T h e r e is n o d o u b t that legislators assume that c o n s t i t u e n t service has an i m p o r t a n t political impact. T h e empirical e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , that c a s e w o r k can be used to w i n electoral s u p p o r t from grateful c o n s t i t u e n t s is m i x e d (e.g., Serra a n d Moon, 1994; Serra a n d Cover, 1992; J o h a n n e s , 1984; J o h a n n e s a n d McAdams, 1981). This p a p e r builds o n an earlier article (Serra a n d Cover, 1992) that p r e s e n t e d some basic data o n the i m p a c t of c a s e w o r k in o n e particular congressional district in the United States a n d also d e v e l o p e d a simple m o d e l that assessed the overall i m p a c t of such service. This analysis e x t e n d s the previously p u b l i s h e d results in t w o significant respects. First, it p r e s e n t s a m o r e c o m p l e x m o d e l that explicitly takes into a c c o u n t t w o distinguishable effects of casework: (1) the i m p r o v e m e n t in an i n c u m b e n t ' s r e c o g n i t i o n level a m o n g c o n s t i t u e n t s , and (2) the i m p r o v e m e n t in the i n c u m b e n t ' s evaluation a m o n g c o n s t i t u e n t s . Second, here w e also e x a m i n e the different impact of c a s e w o r k o n each partisan g r o u p rather t h a n a s s u m i n g (as did the earlier study) that the effect is similar in all target groups.
R e s e a r c h Design: The O m b u d s m a n Data In r e t u r n for a p r o m i s e of a n o n y m i t y , a House m e m b e r c u r i o u s a b o u t the impact of o m b u d s m a n activity p r o v i d e d the researchers w i t h a list of c o n s t i t u e n t s . The *Both authors contributed equally to this research. It is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant SES 88-17862).
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n a m e s w e r e a s s i g n e d to t w o categories: o n e c o n s i s t e d o f beneficiaries o f o m b u d s m a n service, t h e o t h e r o f c o n s t i t u e n t s w h o h a d n o t b e n e f i t e d from s u c h assistance a n d w e r e r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d f r o m t h e roll o f r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s in the district? T h e r e s e a r c h design, o u t l i n e d here, is d e s c r i b e d in g r e a t e r detail e l s e w h e r e (Serra a n d Cover, 1992, p p . 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 ) . Interviews were conducted with constituents whose names were provided by t h e c o n g r e s s i o n a l office. All i n t e r v i e w s c o n d u c t e d i n c l u d e d t h e r e s p o n d e n t recognition o f "Legislator X" a n d r e s p o n d e n t e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i n c u m b e n t . By c o m p a r i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s for w h o m o m b u d s m a n service has b e e n p e r f o r m e d w i t h c o n s t i t u e n t s w h o h a v e n o t b e n e f i t e d f r o m o m b u d s m a n assistance, w e c a n d i s c e r n m o r e explicitly t h e i m p a c t o f s u c h service o n i n c u m b e n t r e c o g n i t i o n and evaluation. To measure i n c u m b e n t saliency, r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e asked at the outset w h e t h e r they r e c o g n i z e d the i n c u m b e n t ( a m o n g o t h e r political figures). Those w i t h a credible identification of the i n c u m b e n t w e r e c r e d i t e d as recognizing him. A standard feeling t h e r m o m e t e r w a s used to assess h o w w a r m l y r e s p o n d e n t s felt t o w a r d the i n c u m b e n t (and o t h e r political figures w h o s e n a m e s w e r e used in the saliency question). T h e data i n d i c a t e d that t h e i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k w a s to i n c r e a s e i n c u m b e n t recognition b y a p p r o x i m a t e l y 13 p e r c e n t a n d to i m p r o v e t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s evaluation a b o u t 15 d e g r e e s a m o n g c o n s t i t u e n t s . A p o s s i b l e c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t , of course, is that c o n s t i t u e n t s w h o r e c o g n i z e d t h e i n c u m b e n t o r w h o e v a l u a t e d him w a r m l y w e r e e s p e c i a l l y likely to s e e k c a s e w o r k assistance f r o m h i m / h e r . F r o m this p e r s p e c tive, t h e h i g h e r e v a l u a t i o n a n d g r e a t e r saliency m a y have p r e d i s p o s e d c o n s t i t u e n t s to s e e k c o n t a c t r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g t h e result o f t h e c o n t a c t itself. W h i l e w e c a n n o t c o m p l e t e l y e x c l u d e this possibility, o t h e r e v i d e n c e suggests that i n d e e d it w a s t h e i n c u m b e n t c o n t a c t that i n f l u e n c e d c o n s t i t u e n c y attitudes r a t h e r than t h e attitudes that g e n e r a t e d c o n t a c t s . For e x a m p l e , r e s e a r c h o n t h e i m p a c t o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l mailings in an e x p e r i m e n t a l setting i n d i c a t e d c o m p a r a b l e evaluation and saliency effects to t h o s e c i t e d a b o v e , a n d in that study c o n s t i t u e n t s d i d n o t initiate any a c t i o n at all ( C o v e r a n d B r u m b e r g , 1982; Cover, 1985).
Casework Impact on Incumbent Recognition and Evaluation In this s e c t i o n w e p r e s e n t a m o d e l to assess r e c o g n i t i o n a n d evaluation effects o f c a s e w o r k . T h e m o d e l f o c u s e s on t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t a m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans, c h a l l e n g e r partisans, a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s . By c o m p a r i n g the e x p e c t e d v o t e s b e f o r e a n d after c a s e w o r k , w e assess t h e i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k w i t h i n e a c h partisan g r o u p Let Fb~f,,r~ a n d F~f,~r = fraction o f v o t e r s w h o are able to recognize t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e b e f o r e / a f t e r c a s e w o r k ; F*b~f,,,. a n d F~,~,.r = fraction o f v o t e r s w h o are n o t able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e b e f o r e / a f t e r c a s e w o r k ; Px, b~,,r~ a n d p~, ~ r = p r o b a b i l i t y that a v o t e r in t h e "x" partisan g r o u p w h o recognizes t h e i n c u m b e n t b e f o r e / a f t e r c a s e w o r k will v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t ( w h e r e "x" refers to i n c u m b e n t partisans, c h a l l e n g e r partisans, a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s ) ; and P*x = p r o b a b i l i t y that a v o t e r in t h e "x" partisan g r o u p w h o d o e s not r e c o g n i z e the incumb e n t will still v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t . W e are i n t e r e s t e d initially in calculating the e s t i m a t e d v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t in t h e "x" partisan g r o u p b e f o r e c a s e w o r k . An a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d w o u l d b e to calculate t h e f o l l o w i n g sum: e x p e c t e d v o t e = ([the fraction o f x v o t e r s able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t b e f o r e c o n t a c t ] t i m e s [the p r o b a b i l i t y that s u c h v o t e r s will v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t ] p l u s [the fraction o f x v o t e r s u n a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t
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b e f o r e c o n t a c t ] t i m e s [the p r o b a b i l i t y that s u c h v o t e r s will still v o t e for t h e incumbent]). More succinctly, E(vote)x. b,for~ = Vbclorc * ex. before + F *b,'for* * P*x (1). In a similar fashion, t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e for t h e i n c u m b e n t in t h e "x" g r o u p after c a s e w o r k is e x p r e s s e d b y t h e f o l l o w i n g equation: E(vote)x. :a~r = /~after * Px, after "{- F'after * e * x ( 2 ) . F r o m t h e s e e q u a t i o n s w e c a n calculate t h e e x p e c t e d i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k in t h e "x" g r o u p b y s u b t r a c t i n g t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e b e f o r e c o n t a c t from t h e e x p e c t e d v o t e after contact. To d o all this, h o w e v e r , w e n e e d e s t i m a t e s for t h e t e r m s o n the right-hand side o f t h e equations. F r o m t h e t e l e p h o n e survey o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n c y in this study, w e c a n e s t i m a t e t h e various " F ' terms. T h e effect o f r e c e i v i n g o m b u d s m a n service w a s to i n c r e a s e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s r e c o g n i t i o n b y 13.1 p e r cent. T h e fraction o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e that w a s i n f o r m e d b e f o r e c a s e w o r k equals 0.865 (Vhcforc). Thus, t h e fraction of the e l e c t o r a t e that is u n i n f o r m e d b e f o r e c a s e w o r k equals 0.135 (F"b~t~,r,,). T h e fraction of the e l e c t o r a t e that is i n f o r m e d after c a s e w o r k equals 0.996 (E~tt~r) w h i l e the fraction that is u n i n f o r m e d after c a s e w o r k equals 0.004 (F*~,,,r). E s t i m a t i n g t h e v a r i o u s "P" t e r m s is a bit m o r e c o m p l e x . Let us b e g i n w i t h v o t e r s u n a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t . If w e w i s h to e s t i m a t e t h e p r o b a b i l ity t h a t u n i n f o r m e d v o t e r s will s u p p o r t t h e i n c u m b e n t , t h a t is, if w e w i s h to e s t i m a t e t h e v a r i o u s P*x t e r m s , w e c a n use p e r c e n t a g e s f r o m s u r v e y s c o n d u c t e d b y t h e C e n t r e for Political S t u d i e s at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n . In p a r t i c u l a r , w c c a n f o c u s o n t h e s u b s e t o f r e s p o n d e n t s w h o (a) c l a i m e d to h a v e v o t e d in a g i v e n e l e c t i o n , ( b ) w e r e n o t a b l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e n a m e o f t h e local c o n g r e s sional i n c u m b e n t , a n d (c) lived in d i s t r i c t s w i t h g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t s . T h e s e c a n b e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o i n c u m b e n t p a r t i s a n s (i.e., t h o s e i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s p a r t y ) , c h a l l e n g e r p a r t i s a n s (i.e., t h o s e i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s p a r t y ) , a n d I n d e p e n d e n t s . ( I n d e p e n d e n t s a r e "true" I n d e p e n d e n t s ; t h o s e l e a n i n g to a p a r t y are c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t y i d e n t i f i e r s . ) O f t h e i n c u m b e n t p a r t i s a n s 97 p e r c e n t v o t e d for t h e i n c u m b e n t in t h e i r district; thus, P*~....... h,.,, = 0.97. O f t h e c h a l l e n g e r p a r t i s a n s 32 p e r c e n t v o t e d for t h e i n c u m b e n t , so P*d,~,~.~g~ e q u a l s 0.32. Finally, 50 p e r c e n t o f I n d e p e n d e n t s s u p p o r t e d t h e i n c u m b e n t ; t h e r e f o r e , P*~nOep,.~d~m = 0.50. T h e p r o c e s s o f e s t i m a t i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y that a v o t e r w h o d o e s r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t will v o t e for that c a n d i d a t e is m o r e i n v o l v e d t h a n is t h e p r o c e s s o f e s t i m a t i n g t h e a n a l o g o u s p r o b a b i l i t y for a v o t e r u n a b l e to r e c o g n i z e the i n c u m b e n t . In t h e latter case, w e d o n o t c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h e v o t e r ' s e v a l u a t i o n o f the i n c u m b e n t since it is u n c l e a r w h a t m e a n i n g c o u l d p o s s i b l y be a t t a c h e d to t h e evaluation o f an u n r e c o g n i z e d c a n d i d a t e . In contrast, the v o t e r w h o d o e s r e c o g n i z e an i n c u m b e n t is likely to have s o m e m e a n i n g f u l evaluation. T h e r e f o r e , in e s t i m a t i n g t h e various Px t e r m s for v o t e r s able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t , w e m u s t c o n s i d e r the i m p a c t o f i n c u m b e n t e v a l u a t i o n o n t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of v o t i n g for that c a n d i d a t e . To d o this, w e c a n again use i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e C e n t r e for Political Studies survey as well as from t h e survey o f Legislator X ' s district. In the 1988 survey t h e r e w e r e 662 r e s p o n d e n t s w h o (a) c l a i m e d to have v o t e d in t h e 1988 c o n g r e s s i o n a l elections, (b) w e r e able to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n c u m b e n t a n d p l a c e that c a n d i d a t e o n a s t a n d a r d feeling t h e r m o m e t e r , a n d (c) lived in districts w i t h g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n contests. W e w o u l d e x p e c t that t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t s w h o v o t e d for t h e local i n c u m b e n t to vat3' as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s partisan o r i e n t a t i o n a n d t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e i n c u m b e n t as m e a s u r e d by the t h c r m o m e t c r score. Table 1 i n d i c a t e s that the data m e e t t h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s .
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TABtE 1. Proportion of respondents voting for house incumbent, by partisan group and incumbent evaluation r°
0-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
Incumbent partisans
(N)
Challenger partisans
(N)
Independents
(N)
1.000 1.000 0.958 0.989 0.968 0.984
15 57 71 92 94 64
0.143 0.388 0.550 0.683 0.756 0.810
21 49 40 41 45 21
0.750 0.583 0.818 0.833 0.833 1.000
4 12 11 12 6 7
0.750 0.743 0.833 1.000
4 35 6 7
0-49 50-79 80-89 90-100 Source: Centre for Political Studies 1988 Election Study.
T h e table makes it clear that b o t h partisan identification a n d candidate evaluation i n f l u e n c e the p r o p o r t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s v o t i n g for the i n c u m b e n t . To estimate the i m p a c t of c a s e w o r k o n voters able to recognize the i n c u m b e n t , w e n e e d to k n o w a b o u t the relationship b e t w e e n evaluation and voting (summarized in Table 1) as well as i n f o r m a t i o n o n the c o n t a c t ' s i m p a c t o n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of evaluations. For this i n f o r m a t i o n w e t u r n from the national survey data to survey data collected in Legislator X ' s district. Table 2 p r e s e n t s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of incumb e n t evaluations. Table 2 s u m m a r i z e s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s along the standard feeling t h e r m o m e t e r a m o n g t w o g r o u p s of r e s p o n d e n t s , o n e of w h i c h had c a s e w o r k p e r f o r m e d a n d the o t h e r of w h i c h did n o t b e n e f i t from such service. The latter is referred to as the "before" g r o u p a n d the f o r m e r is the "after" group. W e can use the i n f o r m a t i o n from Tables 1 a n d 2 to estimate the various Px terms b o t h before a n d after casework. T h e p r o c e d u r e has b e e n d e s c r i b e d e l s e w h e r e (Cover, 1985). To calculate a particular p~ value c o n s u l t the a p p r o p r i a t e c o l u m n o n
TABLE2. Evaluation of incumbent - - before and after contact Thermometer ratings
Number of respondents: before
Number of respondents: after
0-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
23 71 24 22 18 12
10 26 23 33 41 65
N = 170
N = 198
Source: Survey of Congressman X's district. Note: different respondents in each period.
GEORGE SERRA AND ALBERT D COVER
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Table 2 for n, values, c o n s u l t the a p p r o p r i a t e c o l u m n in Table 1 for lT values, multiply the two, s u m all such p r o d u c t s over relevant evaluation categories, a n d finally divide this s u m by the total n u m b e r of r e s p o n d e n t s in the a p p r o p r i a t e c o l u m n in Table 2. T h e various p~ values are s u m m a r i z e d below: P~.......b.... bee,,r~ = 0.988, P i . . . . . b.... after = 0"9812, Pindepend .... before = 0.769, Pi,,a,'p,',,d.......ftcr = 0.844, Pch,,~,,g,',. b,'~,,r, = 0.485, Pch,n,-,g~r,,~r = 0.658. T h e various p,. estimates are plausible despite the c o m p l e x i t y of calculating them. I n c u m b e n t partisans are almost c o m p l e t e l y loyal to the i n c u m b e n t ; I n d e p e n d e n t s are s o m e w h a t less supportive; c h a l l e n g e r partisans do s u p p o r t the i n c u m b e n t candidate o n balance, b u t their s u p p o r t is m u c h w e a k e r t h a n that of o t h e r voters. W e have n o w estimated all of the right-hand terms in Equations (1) a n d (2). W e can n o w p r o c e e d to the calculation of the i m p a c t of c o n t a c t in each partisan group? I n c u m b e n t Partisans: From the earlier calculations w e k n o w that P*i.......b~,,t equals 0.97. Thus, the probability of v o t i n g for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans u n a b l e to recognize h i s / h e r n a m e is 97 p e r cent. We also k n o w that the fraction of voters u n a b l e to recognize the i n c u m b e n t before c a s e w o r k Pb~.f,,r~ equals 0.135. The e x p e c t e d vote for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g these voters is Fb,.f,,~,, * P*~,,,,,.,,,,.,,, = (0.135)(0.97) = 0.131. For i n c u m b e n t partisans able to r e c o g n i z e their party's candidate, the probability of s u p p o r t i n g the i n c u m b e n t before c a s e w o r k (P~...... ~ , , b,.f,,r,-) is essentially equal to 1.000. The fraction of the electorate that is i n f o r m e d before c a s e w o r k (k],,.t,,~,.) equals 0.865. In o t h e r words, 86.5 p e r c e n t of the voters are able to recognize the i n c u m b e n t before casework. Therefore, the e x p e c t e d i n c u m b e n t vote from these voters is Fh~f,,~,. * Pi .........h~.t. h~for,. = (0.865)(1.000) = 0.865. Thus, m a k i n g the appropriate s u b s t i t u t i o n s into Equation (1) gives us the overall e x p e c t e d vote as follows: E(vote)~ ........b,'.L b,'fo~,-= 0.865 + O. 131 = 0.996. A m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans, therefore, the i n c u m b e n t is e x p e c t e d to pick u p 99.6 p e r c e n t of the vote if the election is held before contact. Independents: W e w o u l d e x p e c t a generally l o w e r level of s u p p o r t for the incumb e n t a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s . Making a p p r o p r i a t e s u b s t i t u t i o n s o n c e again in Equation (1) and (2) w e find that E(vote)ioa,.p,.,d ...... b~t~,~ equals 0.733 a n d E(vote)i,,aq,,.,a ........~,,.r equals 0.843. Thus, the e x p e c t e d vote is l o w e r a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s t h a n a m o n g i n c u m b e n t partisans b o t h before a n d after casework. T h e impact of casework, h o w e v e r , is s o m e w h a t greater a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s . The 11 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t increase a m o u n t s to a boost of 15 p e r c e n t (11/73.3 = 0.150) b e y o n d the e x p e c t e d w)te a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s w h o did n o t have c a s e w o r k p e r f o r m e d . Challenger Partisans: W e s h o u l d anticipate the lowest levels of i n c u m b e n t s u p p o r t a m o n g c h a l l e n g e r partisans a n d a p p r o p r i a t e s u b s t i t u t i o n s in Equations (1) and (2) indicate this is i n d e e d the c a s e E(vote)d~,,.ng,.,. ' bctore equals 0.463 a n d /:"(vote),-h~,,~,,g . . . . . ft,.~ equals 0.656. Results indicate that the i m p a c t of c a s e w o r k is c o n s i d e r a b l y greater for voters of the challengers party. By b o o s t i n g the incumb e n t ' s e x p e c t e d vote from 46.3 p e r c e n t to 65.6 p e r cent, c a s e w o r k i m p r o v e s the i n c u m b e n t ' s vote b y 41.7 p e r c e n t b e y o n d that a n t i c i p a t e d w i t h o u t casework (19.3/46.3 = 41.7 p e r c e n t increase). The impact of r e c o g n i t i o n is c o n s i d e r a b l y greater a m o n g voters of the challenger's party than a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s or i n c u m b e n t partisans. For i n c u m b e n t partisans the s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t candidate is e x t r e m e l y high regardless of w h e t h e r or not
176
The Electoral Impact of Casework
that candidate is recognized (P'incumbent = 0.97, while eincumbent, before = l . O 0 0 ) . For challenger partisans and Independents, however, there is a considerable increase in the probability of voting for the incumbent if a voter recognizes the incumbent's name. Support for the i n c u m b e n t among challenger partisans jumps from 32 per cent to 48.5 p e r cent; for I n d e p e n d e n t s the impact of recognition is somewhat greater /)*independent = 0 . 5 0 , while Pindependent. before = 0.769). Thus, part of the explanation for the impact of casework on challenger partisans and I n d e p e n d e n t s is that improved incumbent recognition counts for a lot more among these partisans than it does among i n c u m b e n t partisans. A s e c o n d part of the explanation involves the impact of casework on i n c u m b e n t evaluation. Table 1 shows an u p w a r d shift in evaluations is of relatively little importance among i n c u m b e n t partisans. Their s u p p o r t is e x t r e m e l y high over virtually the entire evaluation spectrum. For i n d e p e n d e n t s s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t is also reasonably high regardless of their evaluation of the incumbent. The p r o p o r t i o n of challenger partisans voting for the i n c u m b e n t moves up quite rapidly as i n c u m b e n t evaluation counts for a lot more among challenger partisans than it does among any o t h e r group. Thus far the distinction b e t w e e n recognition and evaluation effects has entered the discussion only incidentally. No attempt has b e e n made to c o m p a r e these effects separately. Let us isolate the recognition effect. Within each partisan class some voters are unable to recognize the incumbent. We can calculate their e x p e c t e d i n c u m b e n t vote as w e have done above. For voters w h o are able to recognize the incumbent, our e x p e c t e d vote calculations must be modified somewhat. The earlier calculations took into account both recognition and evaluation effects since both c o n t r i b u t e d to the various p,. terms. What we must do n o w is to "purge" these terms of their evaluation c o m p o n e n t s , leaving only information on i n c u m b e n t recognition. In o t h e r words, w e must t h r o w out information gained by knowing w h e r e along the evaluation scale voters p l a c e d incumbents. That can be accomplished quite readily. For example, consider incumbent partisans able to recognize the incumbent in the 1988 Centre for Political Studies survey. As a group 98 p e r cent of these respondents voted for the incumbent. Let us define P' as the probability that a voter in the "x" group w h o recognizes the incumbent will vote for the incumbent w h e n we consider only recognition effects. Then P'i . . . . bent equals 0.98. Likewise, we find that P'independeot equals 0.79 and P'challengrr equals 0.57. We can use these newly defined terms in a set of equations that predict the i n c u m b e n t ' s vote using only information on the impact of casework on incumbent recognition: E(vote)~, b~f,,r~ = Fb,or,. * P'x + F'~-f,,r,- * P*x (3) and E(vote)x. after = Rafter * P'x + F~aftcr * P*x (4). Equations (3) and (4) are identical to Equations (1) and (2) e x c e p t that the P'x terms replace p~ terms throughout. Making the a p p r o p r i a t e substitutions in Equations (3) and (4), w e find that by itself recognition accounts for almost all of c a s e w o r k ' s overall (albeit modest) impact for i n c u m b e n t partisans, 56.5 p e r cent of the impact for Independents, and only 26.9 p e r cent of the impact for challenger partisans. Table 1 suggests w h y the partisan groups differ so much in the relative impact of recognition and evaluation effects of casework. Among i n c u m b e n t partisans in the survey there is a uniformly high level of i n c u m b e n t s u p p o r t regardless of evaluation. Among I n d e p e n d e n t s there is more substantial variation in s u p p o r t as a function of evaluation. By far the largest variation, however, is observed among challenger partisans. Hence, the
GEORGE SERRA AND ALBERT D COVER
17"7
effect o f i m p r o v i n g e v a lu a t io n s a m o n g c a s e w o r k r e c i p i e n t s will be negligible for i n c u m b e n t partisans, fairly substantial a m o n g I n d e p e n d e n t s , and q u i t e large a m o n g c h a l l e n g e r partisans.
Conclusion This study assesses t h e e le c t o r a l significance o f a key legislative perquisite, c a s e w o r k . Using data f r o m a r e s e a r c h design i n t e n d e d to p r o t e c t results from c o m m o n f o rm s o f c o n t a m i n a t i o n , t h e m o d e l p r e s e n t e d h e r e p e r m i t s us to distinguish t h e r e c o g n i t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n effects w i t h i n t h e overall i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k . T h e study indicates that t h e i m p a c t o f c a s e w o r k varies as a f u n c t i o n o f partisan identification. It f u r t h e r s h o w s that w h i l e the r e c o g n i t i o n effect o f c a s e w o r k is significant for all partisan groups, th e evaluation c o m p o n e n t o f c a s e w o r k is q u i t e i m p o r t a n t for I n d e p e n d e n t s and d o m i n a n t for c h a l l e n g e r partisans. T h e t e c h n i q u e o u t l i n e d h e r e is a g e n e r a l o n e that can be u s e d to assess t h e i m p a c t o f o t h e r incumb e n t activities as well.
Notes 1. Casework is defined here as the provision of assistance to constituents to resolve a problem with federal bureaucracy; constituents in this study requested assistance from their representative for social security benefits (including Medicare), veterans benefits, civil service, pensions, immigration, and for assistance with the Internal Revenue Service and other federal bureaucracies. Although casework is a broader term than ombudsman service, the two will be used interchangeably in the subsequent discussion. 2. Given the high, unwavering support among incumbent partisans who recognize the incumbent, for the sake of simplicity we substitute the value 1.000 rather than use the P,.......bent. h~t~,~"and Pi. . . . b..... tier values. 3. The estimates of the effects of ombudsman services on electoral support are based on the assumption that all constituents would have benefited from such services. Realistically, only a small minority of constituents in any district could have received casework; thus its actual electoral impact will be smaller. However, there may be some indirect benefits to the incumbent from constituents who hear about services provided to friends or relatives in the district (Serra, 1992).
References Cover, Albert D. and Brumberg, Bruce S. (1982) Baby Books and BaUots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion, American Political Science Revieu', 76 437-459. Cover, Albert D. (1985) The Electoral Impact of Franked Mail, PolitF, 17 649-663. Johannes, John R. and McAdams, John (1981) The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? American Journal o f Political Science, 25 520-542. Johannes, John R. (1984) To Serve The People. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London. Scrra, George and Moon, David (1994) Casework, Issue Positions and Voting in Congressional Elections: A District Analysis, The Journal o f Politics, 56 200-213. Serra, George (1992) Reach Out And Help Someone: The hnpact of Casework Solicitation and Word of Mouth Publicity on Member-Constituent Contact, Southeastern Political Review, 20 231-244. Serra, George and Covcr, Albert D. (1992) The Electoral Consequences of Perquisite Use: The Casework Case, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17 233-246