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The epistemic authority of solution-oriented global environmental assessments
Environmental Science and Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
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Environmental Science and Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
The epistemic authority of solution-oriented global environmental assessments Peter M. Haas Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst MA, USA
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Science Legitimacy Authority Global environmental assessments (GEA) Solutions oriented global environmental assessments
The effectiveness and influence of solutions oriented global environmental assessments (SOAs) rests on their legitimacy. Based on the GEA literature this piece reviews the legitimacy of GEAs and discusses its implications, and challenges and for the legitimacy of SOAs. This article is part of a special issue on solution-oriented GEAs.
1. Introduction Solutions oriented global environmental assessments (SOAs) are a new breed of boundary organizations that perform global environmental assessments (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015; Kowarsch et al., 2016). Like GEAs they aspire to contribute to better informed policy debates between states and within countries by providing authoritative state of the art assessments to various audiences. As such they deliver advice to which states defer, as well as promoting public debates about the appropriate ways to govern such global environmental issues as global warming and biodiversity. The GEA literature as written by practitioners (Watson and Gitay, 2004; Watson, 2005; Leemans, 2008; OECD, 2015; United Nations, 2015; ch 2; Reid and Mooney, 2016) and scholars (Cash et al., 2003; Haas, 2004, 2017; Mitchell et al., 2006; Haas and Stevens, 2011; Andresen, 2014; Gupta, 2014) has largely focused on the design properties of GEAs in order to account for the variation in their effectiveness and influence. Unlike GEAs, SOAs are different in two ways. SOAs involve integrative assessments which require explicit deliberation about values and goals as well as technical policy responses to given issues. In this sense they are more directly political, and understood as being political, than GEAs. SOAs also require a broader array of experts and stakeholders than do GEAs because of their broader scope and deliberative focus. The underlying question about GEAs, and by extension SOAs, is really why do states and other target audiences willingly defer to their advice in the absence of material capabilities to compel or induce behavior? This question reorients attention to their legitimacy away
from their formal properties. Here I focus primarily on the features which will enhance SOAs legitimacy in the eyes of states, because states are the primary intended audiences for SOAs’ studies, and because states fund and design the GEAs. Seen through a principal-agent lens (Hawkins et al., 2006), states are the primary principals who must be satisfied in order to create and heed the SOA agents. In the absence of conventional material capabilities for inducing or compelling others to adhere to their analyses, GEAs, and by extension SOAs must rely on willing deference by their audiences to them. They are powerful to the extent that they enjoy legitimacy. Scientific “power” rests on scientists’ authority, and the willingness of principles – be they states, IOs or firms – to willingly defer to their claims. Steven Bernstein writes that “legitimacy is the glue that links authority and power” (Bernstein, 2011, 20). Scientists enjoy epistemic authority for expertise in global environmental issues. In the environmental domain they enjoy what Max Weber called Legal-Rational authority (Weber, 1958). Such authority rests on the perceived legitimacy of the experts, as they possess neither charisma for the ability to compel behavior. Science enjoins willing compliance with scientific or bureaucratic dictates because of the perceived impartiality and reason of the source. Their authority and influence ultimately rests on their legitimacy. Practitioners reflecting on the science-policy interface recognize the need for the legitimacy of GEAs, which they commonly ascribe to a combination of satisfying the demands of the member states, and providing authoritative and valid policy advice. 2. Legitimacy The nature of legitimacy is contested (Hurrell, 2005). Indeed Steven
E-mail address: [email protected]. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.013 Received 3 March 2017; Accepted 30 March 2017 1462-9011/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Haas, P.M., Environmental Science and Policy (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.013
Environmental Science and Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
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Bernstein writes that “there are no universally shared criteria of legitimacy in global governance” (Bernstein, 2011, 22). While criteria of scientific legitimacy appear to vary by groups conferring it (Borzel and Risse, 2005; Zurn et al., 2012, 75 ff; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2013; Kanie et al., 2014, 16-17, 211-214; Nasiritousi et al., 2016; Rittberger and Schoeer, 2016), here I focus on scientific legitimacy in the eyes of states. Many criteria for legitimacy are invoked; many from democratic theory and normative theory. Legitimacy has been most widely studied in the EU and, more generally applied to global governance by David Held and Koenig-Archibugi’s edited work on global governance more generally (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). The terms “authority” and “legitimacy” tend to be used interchangeably. Below I distinguish between input, process, and outcome criteria of legitimacy. This taxonomy is informed by Fritz Sharpf’s study of the legitimacy of the EU (Scharpf, 1999, 2009) and of climate change governance (KarlssonVinkhuyzen, 2013). Since “legitimacy” is itself contested, and there are many plausible criteria for legitimacy, I here provide a number of them which states are likely to apply to measure the legitimacy of scientific institutions. In practice, institutions are likely to be regarded as legitimate if they conform to many (or more) criteria (Fung, 2006). Usable knowledge (Cash et al., 2003; Haas, 2004; Mitchell, et al., 2006; Haas and Stevens, 2011)– knowledge which is credible, salient, and legitimate1– is an example of multiple legitimacy criteria which span input and process measures of legitimacy.
1997; 568-570; Aggarwal, 1998). A number of broad principles have been identified in the IR literature, including multilateralism (Keohane, 1990; Cox, 1992; Ruggie, 1993); embedded liberalism (Ruggie, 1983; Bernstein, 2001); state sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber, 1996), and possibly as an emergent norm, sustainable development. In a complementary manner scientific institutions must resonate with domestic norms and goals as well (Cortell and Davis, 1996). 2.2. Process A number of arguments have been presented about social processes which confer legitimacy on scientific institutions and scientists. 2.2.1. Fairness Robert Keohane (Keohane, 2001; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006) Thomas Franck, (Franck, 1990) and Oran Young (Young, 1991) speak of the need for fairness as a criterion of the legitimacy of international institutions in the eyes of states, and also presumably civil society. Fairness of course can have two senses. One is the common usage applied to outcomes, that member states are satisfied that their goals and needs are represented in the analysis. A second sense focuses on the deliberative process. A fair scientific process must provide for voicing alternative viewpoints, as well as not being biased towards privileged actors. A transparent process allows observers to understand how decisions were reached, and how experts were selected. Inclusiveness and participation are particularly valued legitimizing criteria for groups with little ability to promote input based legitimacy, and with limited ability to appraise political processes, such as developing countries, as well as non-state actors including NGOs and the private sector (Kahler, 2005; Scholte, 2005; Held, 2005).
2.1. Inputs Input criteria capture the functional roles played by GEAs, the background social facts they instantiate, and their affinity with broader generative norms and principles.
2.2.2. Deliberation and contestation Deliberation and contestation are valued processes for science in international affairs as forms of transparency (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014, 25, 28-29), as well as contributions to reflexivity and more effective policy and politically relevant knowledge (Stevenson, 2016; Dryzek and Pickering, 2017). Such public revelations confirm the ways in which expertise is performed and conclusive findings are warranted.
2.1.1. Functional roles Sociologists of science argue that science helps ameliorate risk and uncertainty, while also establishing categories to be governed and consolidating the social authority of scientists (Barnes et al., 1996; Gieryn 1999; Nowotny, 2016). Economic historians attribute its legitimacy to the instrumental value that science provides for promoting capitalist power and wealth accumulation (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; North, 2005; Mokyr, 2016). Sociologists of knowledge attribute it to the power science grants to the state for controlling its society (Porter, 1986; Hacking, 1990). Moreover, scientists cum scientists have been socially recognized as possessing valuable skills in public administration and governance which politicians in the regulatory state regard as necessary (Ezrahi, 1990; Drori et al., 2003; Drori and Meyer, 2006; Lentsch and Weingart, 2011).
2.2.3. Discursive practices Agreement on discursive practices may also serve as a key source of legitimacy for scientific expertise (Steffek, 2003; Adler and Bernstein, 2005; Helgadottir, 2016; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Risse, 2000, 2005). Discursive practice delimit the parameters of permissable deliberations and the legitimate forms of communication by establishing competent performance. The vocabulary which is used confers legitimacy, such as legality democracy, social justice, progress (Stephen, 2015; 778) and even sustainability. Thus in UN venues scientific experts must speak the arcane language of UN precedents as well as that of science.
2.1.2. Social facts Science’s legitimacy is also a social fact, in so far as the social prestige and authority of science and scientists enjoy a taken for granted aspect. Their legitimacy rests on their reputations for providing relevant expertise, and reliable and accurate information. Dan Bodansky argues that scientific expertise enjoys legitimacy in international deliberations because it confers trust in the warranted foundations of collective decisions. The professional pedigree and reputation for mastery of technical material confers legitimacy (Bodansky, 1999). Their independence from states reinforces their legitimacy.
2.3. Outcomes Institutions may enjoy legitimacy if they provide valuable outcomes for their constituencies, particularly the provision of global public goods (Hurd, 1999), such as global environmental protection. Under such circumstances, such as with central banks, illegitimate processes may be overlooked if the effects of the institutions are believed to work (Vibert, 2007). Science, along with other bodies of expertise that are overtly nonpolitical allow politicians to resolve debates without “overt expressions of interests and threats of violence.” (Kennedy, 2016; 48) although Steffek suggests that functional bodies such as science panels are likely to be valued for their direct contributions more than their indirect political functions (Steffek, 2015).
2.1.3. Norms and principles Science’s affinity with broader social norms and principles are likely to enhance its legitimacy to the extent that it explicitly articulates universal goals, or helps member states achieve those goals (Reus-Smit, 1
Legitimacy in this context refers to input criteria.
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Edenhofer, O., Kowarsch, M., 2015. Cartography of pathways. Environ. Sci. Policy 51, 56–64. Ezrahi, Y., 1990. The Descent of Icarus. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Franck, T.M., 1990. the Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. University Press, New York, Oxford. Fung, A., 2006. Varieties of participation in complex governance. Public Adm. Rev. 66, 66–76. Gieryn, T., 1999. Cultural Boundaries of Science. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Gupta, J., 2014. Global scientific assessments and governance: towards a science-policy interface ladder. In: Ambrus, M., Karin, A., Hey, E. (Eds.), The Role of Experts in International Decision-Making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Haas, P.M., Stevens, C., 2011. Organized science, usable knowledge and multilateral environmental governance. In: Lidskog, R., Sundqvist, G. (Eds.), Governing the Air. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 125–161. Haas, P., 2004. When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process. J. Eur. Public Policy 11 (4), 569–592. Haas, P.M., 2017. Coupling science to governance: straddling the science-policy interface. In: Littoz-Monnet, A. (Ed.), The Politics of Expertise in International Organizations. Routledge, London. Hacking, I., 1990. The Taming of Chance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hawkins, D.G., Lake, D.A. (Eds.), 2006. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Held, D., Koenig-Archibugi, M., 2005. Global Governance and Public Accountability. Blackwell, Oxford. Helgadottir, O., 2016. The Bocconi boys go to Brussels. J. Eur. Public Policy 23 (3), 392–409. Hurd, I., 1999. Legitimacy and authority in international politics. IO 53. Hurrell, A., 2005. Legitimacy and the Use of Force: Can the Circle be Squared. Review of International Studies 31(Special Issue on Force and Legitimacy in World Politics): 15–32. Improving Global Environmental Governance: Best Practices for Architecture and Agency. In: Kanie, N., Haas, P.M. (Eds.), Routledge, New York. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S., 2013. Legitimacy in an era of fragmentation. Global Environ. Polit. 13 (3), 56–78. Kennedy, D., 2016. A World of Struggle. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Keohane, R.O., 1990. Multilateralism: an agenda for research. Int. J. 45 (4), 731–764. Keohane, R.O., 2001. Governance in a partially globalized world. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 95 (1), 1–13. Kowarsch, M., Garard, J., et al., 2016. Scientific assessments to facilitate deliberative policy learning. Palgrave Commun. Leemans, R., 2008. Personal experiences with the governance of the policy-relevant IPCC and millennium ecosystem assessments. Global Environ. Change 18, 12–17. Lentsch, J., Weingart, P. (Eds.), 2011. The Politics of Scientific Advice. University Press, Cambridge, Cambridge. Mitchell, R.B., Clark, W.C. (Eds.), 2006. Global Environmental Assessments: Information and Influence. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Mokyr, J., 2016. A Culture of Growth. University Press, Princeton, Princeton. Mowery, D.C., Rosenberg, N., 1989. Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Nasiritousi, N., Hjerpe, M., et al., 2016. Normative Arguments for non-state actor participation in international policymaking processes. Eur. J. Int. Relat. 22 (4), 920–943. National Science Board, 2016. National Science and Technology Indicators 2016. National Science Foundation, Washington, DC. North, D.C., 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Nowotny, H., 2016. The Cunning of Uncertainty. Polity, London. OECD, 2015. Scientific advice for policy making: the role and responsibility of expert bodies and individual scientists. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers. OECD, Paris. Porter, T.M., 1986. The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820–1900. Princeton University Press, Princeton. Reid, W.V., Mooney, H.A., 2016. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: testing the limits of interdisciplinary and multi-scale science. Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain. 19, 40–46. Reus-Smit, C., 1997. The constitutional structure of international society and the nature of fundamental institutions. IO 51 (4), 555–589. Rittberger, B., Schoeer, P., 2016. The legitimacy of regional institutions. In: Borzel, T.A., Risse, T. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Ruggie, J.G., 1983. International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. In: Krasner, S.D. (Ed.), International Regimes. Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 195–232. Ruggie, J.G. (Ed.), 1993. Multilateralism Matters. Columbia University Press, New York. Scharpf, F.W., 1999. Governing In Europe. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Scharpf, F.W., 2009. Legitimacy in the multilevel European polity. Eur. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1 (2), 173–204. Steffek, J., 2003. The legitimation of interational governance: a discourse approach. Eur. J. Int. Relat. 9 (2), 249–275. Steffek, J., 2015. The output legitimacy of international organizations and the global public interest. Int. Theory 7 (2), 263–293. Stephen, M.D., 2015. ‘Can you pass the salt?’ The legitimacy of international institutions and indirect speech. Eur. J. Int. Relat. 1–25. Stevenson, H., Dryzek, J., 2014. Democratizing Global Climate Governance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Stevenson, H., 2016. The wisdom of the many in global governance. Int. Stud. Q. 60 (4),
3. Trades offs, contradictions and tensions for SOAs SOAs will probably have no problem satisfying most of these criteria. However, because of their broader focus they will encounter possible contradictions and tensions between some legitimacy criteria. The broad stakeholder foundation for SOAs raises questions of input legitimacy. Whereas natural scientists enjoy widespread authority, economists and social scientists, not to mention civil society stake holders, enjoy less social status and authority (National Science Board, 2016; ch 7). Thus there are tradeoffs between the inputs of authority and the process of representational fairness. Moreover, justifying the choices of SOA expert members may require walking a fine line between competence and inclusiveness. Recruitment on merit and by an authoritative actor – such as the UN Secretary General or a respected international organization – may help reconcile these tensions. Assaults on the integrity of science in the USA and UK threaten to undermine its legitimacy. Such campaigns, and the premature talk of a post-truth era, are but first moves in a broader delegitimation campaign. Yet the assaults only target inputs for scientific legitimacy, and SOAs may be able to insulate themselves from political attack by stressing multiple sources of legitimacy. An abiding paradox persists about the social purposes of science. Should it serve to challenge conventional ideas, and thus stress contestation within presumed consensus, or should it provide inputs of use to the principal audiences? The paradox of course is that by engaging in a critical enterprise they undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of many users, and to the extent that it seeks to satisfy the legitimacy criteria discussed here it loses its critical edge. 4. Conclusion Successful SOAs must balance a number of legitimacy criteria. In order to command legitimacy and influence they must satisfy as many criteria as possible, while remaining attentive to the various trade-offs and contradictions between them. References Adler, E., Bernstein, S., 2005. Knowledge in power. In: Barnett, M., Duvall, R. (Eds.), Power in Global Governance. Cambridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge. Aggarwal, V.K., 1998. Institutional Designs for a Complex World. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Andresen, S., 2014. The role of scientific expertise in multilateral environmental agreements. In: Monika, A., Arts, K., Hey, E., Raulus, H. (Eds.), The Role of ‘Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making Processes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Barnes, B., Bloor, D., et al., 1996. Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Bernstein, S., 2001. The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. Columbia University Press, New York. Bernstein, S., 2011. Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 18 (1), 17–51. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. In: Biersteker, T.J., Weber, C. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bodansky, D., 1999. The legitimacy of international governance. Am. J. Int. Law 93 (3), 596–624. Borzel, T.A., Risse, T., 2005. In: Grande, E., Pauly, L.W. (Eds.), Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance? Complex Sovereignty. Toronto University Press, Toronto. Buchanan, A., Keohane, R.O., 2006. The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics Int. Affairs 20 (4), 405–437. Cash, D.W., Clark, W.C., et al., 2003. Knowledge systgems for sustainable development. PNAS 100 (14), 8086–8091. Cortell, A.P., Davis, J.W.J., 1996. How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of international rules and norms. Int. Stud. Q. 40 (4), 451–478. Cox, R.W., 1992. Multilateralism and world order. Rev. Int. Stud. 18, 161–180. Drori, G., Meyer, R., 2006. Global scientization: an environment for expanded organization. In: Drori, G.S., Meyer, J.W., Hwang, H. (Eds.), Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organization. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. Drori, G.S., Meyer, J.W. (Eds.), 2003. Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization. Stanford University Press, Stanford. Dryzek, J.S., Pickering, J., 2017. Deliberation as a Catalyst for reflexive environmental governance. Ecol. Econ. 131, 353–360.
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science-policy interface. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. 360, 471–477. Weber, M., 1958. In: Gerth, H.H., Mills, C.W. (Eds.), Bureaucracy. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 196–244. Young, O.R., 1991. Political leadership and regime formation. IO 45 (3), 281–308. Zurn, M., Binder, M., et al., 2012. International authority and its politicization. Int. Theory 4 (1), 69–106.
400–412. United Nations, 2015. Global Sustainable Development Report. United Nations, New York. Vibert, F., 2007. The Rise of the Unelected. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Watson, R.T., Gitay, H., 2004. Mobilization, Diffusion and use of Scientific Expertise. Idees Pour le Debat. Paris, IDDRI Watson, R.T., 2005. Turning science into policy: challenges and experiences from the
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Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Environmental Science and Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
The epistemic authority of solution-oriented global environmental assessments Peter M. Haas Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst MA, USA
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Science Legitimacy Authority Global environmental assessments (GEA) Solutions oriented global environmental assessments
The effectiveness and influence of solutions oriented global environmental assessments (SOAs) rests on their legitimacy. Based on the GEA literature this piece reviews the legitimacy of GEAs and discusses its implications, and challenges and for the legitimacy of SOAs. This article is part of a special issue on solution-oriented GEAs.
1. Introduction Solutions oriented global environmental assessments (SOAs) are a new breed of boundary organizations that perform global environmental assessments (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015; Kowarsch et al., 2016). Like GEAs they aspire to contribute to better informed policy debates between states and within countries by providing authoritative state of the art assessments to various audiences. As such they deliver advice to which states defer, as well as promoting public debates about the appropriate ways to govern such global environmental issues as global warming and biodiversity. The GEA literature as written by practitioners (Watson and Gitay, 2004; Watson, 2005; Leemans, 2008; OECD, 2015; United Nations, 2015; ch 2; Reid and Mooney, 2016) and scholars (Cash et al., 2003; Haas, 2004, 2017; Mitchell et al., 2006; Haas and Stevens, 2011; Andresen, 2014; Gupta, 2014) has largely focused on the design properties of GEAs in order to account for the variation in their effectiveness and influence. Unlike GEAs, SOAs are different in two ways. SOAs involve integrative assessments which require explicit deliberation about values and goals as well as technical policy responses to given issues. In this sense they are more directly political, and understood as being political, than GEAs. SOAs also require a broader array of experts and stakeholders than do GEAs because of their broader scope and deliberative focus. The underlying question about GEAs, and by extension SOAs, is really why do states and other target audiences willingly defer to their advice in the absence of material capabilities to compel or induce behavior? This question reorients attention to their legitimacy away
from their formal properties. Here I focus primarily on the features which will enhance SOAs legitimacy in the eyes of states, because states are the primary intended audiences for SOAs’ studies, and because states fund and design the GEAs. Seen through a principal-agent lens (Hawkins et al., 2006), states are the primary principals who must be satisfied in order to create and heed the SOA agents. In the absence of conventional material capabilities for inducing or compelling others to adhere to their analyses, GEAs, and by extension SOAs must rely on willing deference by their audiences to them. They are powerful to the extent that they enjoy legitimacy. Scientific “power” rests on scientists’ authority, and the willingness of principles – be they states, IOs or firms – to willingly defer to their claims. Steven Bernstein writes that “legitimacy is the glue that links authority and power” (Bernstein, 2011, 20). Scientists enjoy epistemic authority for expertise in global environmental issues. In the environmental domain they enjoy what Max Weber called Legal-Rational authority (Weber, 1958). Such authority rests on the perceived legitimacy of the experts, as they possess neither charisma for the ability to compel behavior. Science enjoins willing compliance with scientific or bureaucratic dictates because of the perceived impartiality and reason of the source. Their authority and influence ultimately rests on their legitimacy. Practitioners reflecting on the science-policy interface recognize the need for the legitimacy of GEAs, which they commonly ascribe to a combination of satisfying the demands of the member states, and providing authoritative and valid policy advice. 2. Legitimacy The nature of legitimacy is contested (Hurrell, 2005). Indeed Steven
E-mail address: [email protected]. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.013 Received 3 March 2017; Accepted 30 March 2017 1462-9011/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Haas, P.M., Environmental Science and Policy (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2017.03.013
Environmental Science and Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
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Bernstein writes that “there are no universally shared criteria of legitimacy in global governance” (Bernstein, 2011, 22). While criteria of scientific legitimacy appear to vary by groups conferring it (Borzel and Risse, 2005; Zurn et al., 2012, 75 ff; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2013; Kanie et al., 2014, 16-17, 211-214; Nasiritousi et al., 2016; Rittberger and Schoeer, 2016), here I focus on scientific legitimacy in the eyes of states. Many criteria for legitimacy are invoked; many from democratic theory and normative theory. Legitimacy has been most widely studied in the EU and, more generally applied to global governance by David Held and Koenig-Archibugi’s edited work on global governance more generally (Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). The terms “authority” and “legitimacy” tend to be used interchangeably. Below I distinguish between input, process, and outcome criteria of legitimacy. This taxonomy is informed by Fritz Sharpf’s study of the legitimacy of the EU (Scharpf, 1999, 2009) and of climate change governance (KarlssonVinkhuyzen, 2013). Since “legitimacy” is itself contested, and there are many plausible criteria for legitimacy, I here provide a number of them which states are likely to apply to measure the legitimacy of scientific institutions. In practice, institutions are likely to be regarded as legitimate if they conform to many (or more) criteria (Fung, 2006). Usable knowledge (Cash et al., 2003; Haas, 2004; Mitchell, et al., 2006; Haas and Stevens, 2011)– knowledge which is credible, salient, and legitimate1– is an example of multiple legitimacy criteria which span input and process measures of legitimacy.
1997; 568-570; Aggarwal, 1998). A number of broad principles have been identified in the IR literature, including multilateralism (Keohane, 1990; Cox, 1992; Ruggie, 1993); embedded liberalism (Ruggie, 1983; Bernstein, 2001); state sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber, 1996), and possibly as an emergent norm, sustainable development. In a complementary manner scientific institutions must resonate with domestic norms and goals as well (Cortell and Davis, 1996). 2.2. Process A number of arguments have been presented about social processes which confer legitimacy on scientific institutions and scientists. 2.2.1. Fairness Robert Keohane (Keohane, 2001; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006) Thomas Franck, (Franck, 1990) and Oran Young (Young, 1991) speak of the need for fairness as a criterion of the legitimacy of international institutions in the eyes of states, and also presumably civil society. Fairness of course can have two senses. One is the common usage applied to outcomes, that member states are satisfied that their goals and needs are represented in the analysis. A second sense focuses on the deliberative process. A fair scientific process must provide for voicing alternative viewpoints, as well as not being biased towards privileged actors. A transparent process allows observers to understand how decisions were reached, and how experts were selected. Inclusiveness and participation are particularly valued legitimizing criteria for groups with little ability to promote input based legitimacy, and with limited ability to appraise political processes, such as developing countries, as well as non-state actors including NGOs and the private sector (Kahler, 2005; Scholte, 2005; Held, 2005).
2.1. Inputs Input criteria capture the functional roles played by GEAs, the background social facts they instantiate, and their affinity with broader generative norms and principles.
2.2.2. Deliberation and contestation Deliberation and contestation are valued processes for science in international affairs as forms of transparency (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014, 25, 28-29), as well as contributions to reflexivity and more effective policy and politically relevant knowledge (Stevenson, 2016; Dryzek and Pickering, 2017). Such public revelations confirm the ways in which expertise is performed and conclusive findings are warranted.
2.1.1. Functional roles Sociologists of science argue that science helps ameliorate risk and uncertainty, while also establishing categories to be governed and consolidating the social authority of scientists (Barnes et al., 1996; Gieryn 1999; Nowotny, 2016). Economic historians attribute its legitimacy to the instrumental value that science provides for promoting capitalist power and wealth accumulation (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; North, 2005; Mokyr, 2016). Sociologists of knowledge attribute it to the power science grants to the state for controlling its society (Porter, 1986; Hacking, 1990). Moreover, scientists cum scientists have been socially recognized as possessing valuable skills in public administration and governance which politicians in the regulatory state regard as necessary (Ezrahi, 1990; Drori et al., 2003; Drori and Meyer, 2006; Lentsch and Weingart, 2011).
2.2.3. Discursive practices Agreement on discursive practices may also serve as a key source of legitimacy for scientific expertise (Steffek, 2003; Adler and Bernstein, 2005; Helgadottir, 2016; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Risse, 2000, 2005). Discursive practice delimit the parameters of permissable deliberations and the legitimate forms of communication by establishing competent performance. The vocabulary which is used confers legitimacy, such as legality democracy, social justice, progress (Stephen, 2015; 778) and even sustainability. Thus in UN venues scientific experts must speak the arcane language of UN precedents as well as that of science.
2.1.2. Social facts Science’s legitimacy is also a social fact, in so far as the social prestige and authority of science and scientists enjoy a taken for granted aspect. Their legitimacy rests on their reputations for providing relevant expertise, and reliable and accurate information. Dan Bodansky argues that scientific expertise enjoys legitimacy in international deliberations because it confers trust in the warranted foundations of collective decisions. The professional pedigree and reputation for mastery of technical material confers legitimacy (Bodansky, 1999). Their independence from states reinforces their legitimacy.
2.3. Outcomes Institutions may enjoy legitimacy if they provide valuable outcomes for their constituencies, particularly the provision of global public goods (Hurd, 1999), such as global environmental protection. Under such circumstances, such as with central banks, illegitimate processes may be overlooked if the effects of the institutions are believed to work (Vibert, 2007). Science, along with other bodies of expertise that are overtly nonpolitical allow politicians to resolve debates without “overt expressions of interests and threats of violence.” (Kennedy, 2016; 48) although Steffek suggests that functional bodies such as science panels are likely to be valued for their direct contributions more than their indirect political functions (Steffek, 2015).
2.1.3. Norms and principles Science’s affinity with broader social norms and principles are likely to enhance its legitimacy to the extent that it explicitly articulates universal goals, or helps member states achieve those goals (Reus-Smit, 1
Legitimacy in this context refers to input criteria.
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3. Trades offs, contradictions and tensions for SOAs SOAs will probably have no problem satisfying most of these criteria. However, because of their broader focus they will encounter possible contradictions and tensions between some legitimacy criteria. The broad stakeholder foundation for SOAs raises questions of input legitimacy. Whereas natural scientists enjoy widespread authority, economists and social scientists, not to mention civil society stake holders, enjoy less social status and authority (National Science Board, 2016; ch 7). Thus there are tradeoffs between the inputs of authority and the process of representational fairness. Moreover, justifying the choices of SOA expert members may require walking a fine line between competence and inclusiveness. Recruitment on merit and by an authoritative actor – such as the UN Secretary General or a respected international organization – may help reconcile these tensions. Assaults on the integrity of science in the USA and UK threaten to undermine its legitimacy. Such campaigns, and the premature talk of a post-truth era, are but first moves in a broader delegitimation campaign. Yet the assaults only target inputs for scientific legitimacy, and SOAs may be able to insulate themselves from political attack by stressing multiple sources of legitimacy. An abiding paradox persists about the social purposes of science. Should it serve to challenge conventional ideas, and thus stress contestation within presumed consensus, or should it provide inputs of use to the principal audiences? The paradox of course is that by engaging in a critical enterprise they undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of many users, and to the extent that it seeks to satisfy the legitimacy criteria discussed here it loses its critical edge. 4. Conclusion Successful SOAs must balance a number of legitimacy criteria. In order to command legitimacy and influence they must satisfy as many criteria as possible, while remaining attentive to the various trade-offs and contradictions between them. References Adler, E., Bernstein, S., 2005. Knowledge in power. In: Barnett, M., Duvall, R. (Eds.), Power in Global Governance. Cambridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge. Aggarwal, V.K., 1998. Institutional Designs for a Complex World. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Andresen, S., 2014. The role of scientific expertise in multilateral environmental agreements. In: Monika, A., Arts, K., Hey, E., Raulus, H. (Eds.), The Role of ‘Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making Processes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Barnes, B., Bloor, D., et al., 1996. Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Bernstein, S., 2001. The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. Columbia University Press, New York. Bernstein, S., 2011. Legitimacy in intergovernmental and non-state global governance. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 18 (1), 17–51. State Sovereignty as Social Construct. In: Biersteker, T.J., Weber, C. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bodansky, D., 1999. The legitimacy of international governance. Am. J. Int. Law 93 (3), 596–624. Borzel, T.A., Risse, T., 2005. In: Grande, E., Pauly, L.W. (Eds.), Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International Governance? Complex Sovereignty. Toronto University Press, Toronto. Buchanan, A., Keohane, R.O., 2006. The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics Int. Affairs 20 (4), 405–437. Cash, D.W., Clark, W.C., et al., 2003. Knowledge systgems for sustainable development. PNAS 100 (14), 8086–8091. Cortell, A.P., Davis, J.W.J., 1996. How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of international rules and norms. Int. Stud. Q. 40 (4), 451–478. Cox, R.W., 1992. Multilateralism and world order. Rev. Int. Stud. 18, 161–180. Drori, G., Meyer, R., 2006. Global scientization: an environment for expanded organization. In: Drori, G.S., Meyer, J.W., Hwang, H. (Eds.), Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organization. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. Drori, G.S., Meyer, J.W. (Eds.), 2003. Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization. Stanford University Press, Stanford. Dryzek, J.S., Pickering, J., 2017. Deliberation as a Catalyst for reflexive environmental governance. Ecol. Econ. 131, 353–360.
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