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The Finnish presidential election of 1988
ElectoraiStudies(1988), 7:_?,279-283
Notes on Recent Elections The Finnish Presidential Election of 1988 STE~B~RGLU~D Uhwsi~y ofHelsinki, SF-OOIOHelsinki 10, Finland
In a recent comparative study of seven European countries with a semi-presid~ti~ system (Duverger, 1978) Finland comes at the top of a rank-ordering with regard to the constitutional role of the presidency. In terms of real power, it is second only to France (1958); and in terms of formal power, the Finnish presidency is second to none. * The powers vested in the president by the constitution of 1919 are indeed enormous. He is responsibfe for the foreign policy domain; he is a crucial part of the legislative process; he appoints the cabinet ministers and all other higher civil servants. He is the commander in chief; and he serves as the last resort within the judicial and administrative system in the sense that he may approve petitions by individual citizens. There is no doubt about it, the Finnish president is a very powerful man and the stakes of the presidential game corres~n~ngly high. The New Electoral
System
Until 1988 the President, who is appointed for six years, was chosen by an electoral college of 301 members, elected by the people in direct elections. Within the Finnish multi-party context, this kind of electoral system gives considerable leeway to the political parties and coalitions behind the various presidential candidates; and it was theoretically possible for ‘dark horses’ or outsiders, whose candidacy had not foxily been announced, to be elected as part of last minute deli~rations within the electoral college. The new electoral system of 1988 may be seen as an attempt to bring the electoral process closer to the people. It makes the presidential election a two-stage affair. The voters are given two ballots -for presidential candidates and for presidential electors. In the event that 50 per cent or more of UNthose voting (including blank or invalid votes) rally &hind one of the presidential candidates, he
is pronounced president; if not the presidential election is to be performed by the electoral college which has become less of a free agent than it used to be. The electors have to commit themselves to a specific candidate prior to the eiection; and the final choice must be made between candidates with such formal support within the eiectoral college. The Campaign When Mauno Koivisto ran for the presidency in 1982, he surfed into office on a wave of sympathy. He did not manage to obtain a majority in his own right in the electoral college; but with 144 of the electors committed to him, he was close enough for journalists and political scientists to marvel at the so called Koivisto effect; that is, the 19.2 per cent difference between the Koivisto vote in 1982 (43.1 W) and the Social Democratic share of the vote in the 1979 parliamentary election (23.9%). It is a multi-faceted phenomenon which has been attributed to every~ing from Koivisto’s humble origins to his charisma. Whatever accounts for the Koivisto effect, it was still there at the outset of the recent presidential campaign. The gallup polls gave Koivisto a clear edge over all his opponents throughout the entire campaign; and it was not until the last days prior to the election (3 1 January- 1 February) that his personal popularity began to hover around the 50 per cent mark. The opinion polls did, however, have a rather high degree of uncertainty attached to them. Koivisto was generally expected to gain by a high turnout. He might easily lose his majority, if his sympathizers did not show up in force on election day; and there were plenty of indications that they might not do that. This was the message conveyed by the polls, which reported a fairty large number of ‘don’t knows’ throughout the campaign. It was also the message implied by the
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The Finnish Presidentid
Social Democratic Party’s failure to mobilize the vote in the parliamentary election of early 1987. So there was always the possibility that Koivisto’s popularity would not be sufficient to produce a majority at the polls, in which case the matter would be referred to the electoral college where Koivisto was even less likely to command a majority in his own right. This was widely known and skilfully commented upon by the presidential candidates at various junctures of the campaign; and it probably helped boost the interest in an election with a sure winner. The questions were personal rather than ideological. Would Koivisto-or would he not-get a majority in the direct election? Who would come up second? Centre Party leader Paavo Vayrynen, who had been fighting an uphill battle, ever since his party was forced into opposition by the unorthodox govemment coalition between Social Democrats and Conservatives (which Koivisto himself had been instrumental in bringing about in the wake of the parliamentary election in 1987) or former Conservative party leader Harri Holkeri who was running for president with all the authority vested in him in his capacity as Prime Minister in the new coalition government? And who would provide the electoral votes required to elect Koivisto in the electoral college? This is not to say that ideology was not on the agenda. It was, but in a rather low-key fashion. The candidates took care not to scare off ‘marginal’ voters and confined themselves to rather genera1 statements on the topics that arose
Election of 1988
in the course of the campaign, whether foreign housing, trade, unemployment or other recurrent themes in Finnish politics. The incumbent also made the obvious observation that the President is not-and should not-be held responsible for day-to-day politics. The Results ln the end Koivisto did not get the 50 per cent required to win in the direct election. With 47.9 per cent of all the votes he was close; yet he failed to reach the mark. In his own words, he was somewhat disappointed. but not surprised. It is an open question what cost him the majority that was apparently within reach only shortly prior to election day. It clearly was not the blank or invalid ballots; and it probably was not the nonvoters, who were considerably fewer (17.4%) than in the parliamentary election of 1987 (24.1%). It may possibly be attributed to Centre Party leader Paavo Vayrynen. whose opposition was gaining momentum throughout the campaign, particularly during the final stage, as evidenced by his surprise lead over Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. But this is a rather shaky argument. Holkeri did play into the hands of Vayrynen by his last minute pledge in favour of Koivisto in the televised debate preceding the election by just a few days. The message was indirect, but straightforward enough. If Harri Holkeri himself was out of the race, he said he would recommend his electors to support the candidate with the largest following. that is,
TABLE 1. The Finnish presidential elections 1988. The distribution dential electors, and the number of electors.
Party Social Democratic Party, Rural Party, Pro-Koivisto movement Centre Party Conservative Party Movement-88 Minority Communists Invalid votes l Turnout (including invalid votes) Electorate 3.8 m l
Presidential candidate
Mauno Koivisto Paavo Vayrynen Harri Holkeri Kalevi Kivistij Jouko Kajanoja
of the votes for president, presi-
Presidential candidate votes %
Electoral college votes %
Number of electors (301)
47.9 20.2 18.1 10.4 1.4 2.0
46.5 21.7 20.2 9.6 1.9 (4.8)
144 68 63 26
82.6%
82.0%
The voters cast two ballots-one for a presidential candidate and one for the electoral college. For a candidate to be elected directly by presidential candidate votes, an absolute majority (more than 50%) of aN votes-including blank and invalid votes-was required. Invalid votes are included in the total percent distribution of votes for presidential candidates but not for the electoral college.
STEN BERGLUND President Koivisto. This was precisely what Paavo Vlyrynen had been suggesting throughout the campaign; and it probably eamed Viiyrynen a few additional votes during the final stage of the campaign, but they probably came from the Conservatives rather than from the Social Democrats. The election of the president by the electoral college took place on 15 February. When Holkeri made good on his promise and recommended his electors to vote for Koivisto, it paved the way for a quick reelection of the incumbent at the second vote in the electoral college but only at the cost of
281
party cohesion within the Conservative rank and file. Koivisto was elected with a total of 189 votes, 144 from his own electors and 45 cast by Holkeri electors; 18 Holkeri electors refused to follow their leader’s advice and continued to vote for him. All other electors voted for their own candidates, as shown in Table 1. A sizeable number of the Conservative electors thus shunned supporting a Socialist for President-an indicator, no doubt, that there is still plenty of room for adjustment in Finnish politics. Note: 1. Maurice Duverger, Ec&c an roi (Paris, 1978).
The Cypriot Presidential Election of 1988 PANAYOITELIASDIMITRAS*
Eurodim, 82 Constantinople Ave, GR-10435 Athens, Greece
On 14 and 21 February 1988, Greek Cypriots went to the polls to elect, for the seventh time in the country’s history, the President of the Republic of Cyprus-who is according to the Constitution a Greek-Cypriot.’ However, it was the first time that the election’s outcome was uncertain and a second round was required. Indeed, in the presidential elections of 1959 (Archbishop Makarios 66.8%, John Clerides 33.2%), 1968 (Archbishop Makarios 96.3%, Takis Evdokas 3.7%), 1973 (Archbishop unopposed) the overwhelming Makarios presence of the Greek-Cypriots’ national leader Archbishop Makarios did not leave any chances open to his opponents. After his death in 1977, then Speaker of the House Spyros Kyprianou became interim President and won two unopposed contests in 1977 and 1978 and was easily re-elected in 1983 with the backing of the communist Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) (Spyros Kyprianou 56.6%, Glafkos Clerides 33.9%, Vassos Lyssarides 9.5%). * The author is grateful to George Vassiliou, a director of MEMRB and eventual winner of the election, and Renos Lyssiotis, a director of Veritas, for making available unpublished opinion poll results that added significant insight to his understanding of the evolution of Cypriot public opinion; and to journalist Maria Ha~ioannou for the useful information and continuing assistance provided. Naturally, he is solely responsible for the contents of this article.
The Candidates ln 1987, however, it was clear at the outset that the common desire of President Kyprianou’s three political rivals to unseat him and their inability to agree on a common candidacy was making the 1988 election an open contest with each of the country’s four political parties backing a separate candidate. K yprianou’s centrist Democratic Party (DIKO) had the easiest choice when the President decided to seek a new five-year term: they backed their leader, who also received the support of Tassos Papado~~os’ small extra-parli~ent~ party Centre Union (EK). All other parties were nearly torn apart on their presidential strategy. The Speaker of the House Vassos Lyssarides’ socialist Unified Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK) was divided between those who leaned towards a common left candidate with AKEL and those who, giving priority to the ‘national issue’ (that is, the Cyprus problem) and perhaps influenced by the ‘brother’ party in Greece (PASOK), preferred a common ‘rejectionist’ front behind Kyprianou.z This serious cleavage in EDEK led its leader to declare his own candicacy that easily rallied the party’s rank-and-file and severely limited Kyprianou’s chances for reelection. AKEL’s choice was motivated by the will to ‘punish’ Kyprianou for having broken in December 1984 the AKEL-DMO coalition that had won for him reelection in February 1983. On the other hand, the communists knew that, even if they were one of the country’s two
Notes on Recent Elections The Finnish Presidential Election of 1988 STE~B~RGLU~D Uhwsi~y ofHelsinki, SF-OOIOHelsinki 10, Finland
In a recent comparative study of seven European countries with a semi-presid~ti~ system (Duverger, 1978) Finland comes at the top of a rank-ordering with regard to the constitutional role of the presidency. In terms of real power, it is second only to France (1958); and in terms of formal power, the Finnish presidency is second to none. * The powers vested in the president by the constitution of 1919 are indeed enormous. He is responsibfe for the foreign policy domain; he is a crucial part of the legislative process; he appoints the cabinet ministers and all other higher civil servants. He is the commander in chief; and he serves as the last resort within the judicial and administrative system in the sense that he may approve petitions by individual citizens. There is no doubt about it, the Finnish president is a very powerful man and the stakes of the presidential game corres~n~ngly high. The New Electoral
System
Until 1988 the President, who is appointed for six years, was chosen by an electoral college of 301 members, elected by the people in direct elections. Within the Finnish multi-party context, this kind of electoral system gives considerable leeway to the political parties and coalitions behind the various presidential candidates; and it was theoretically possible for ‘dark horses’ or outsiders, whose candidacy had not foxily been announced, to be elected as part of last minute deli~rations within the electoral college. The new electoral system of 1988 may be seen as an attempt to bring the electoral process closer to the people. It makes the presidential election a two-stage affair. The voters are given two ballots -for presidential candidates and for presidential electors. In the event that 50 per cent or more of UNthose voting (including blank or invalid votes) rally &hind one of the presidential candidates, he
is pronounced president; if not the presidential election is to be performed by the electoral college which has become less of a free agent than it used to be. The electors have to commit themselves to a specific candidate prior to the eiection; and the final choice must be made between candidates with such formal support within the eiectoral college. The Campaign When Mauno Koivisto ran for the presidency in 1982, he surfed into office on a wave of sympathy. He did not manage to obtain a majority in his own right in the electoral college; but with 144 of the electors committed to him, he was close enough for journalists and political scientists to marvel at the so called Koivisto effect; that is, the 19.2 per cent difference between the Koivisto vote in 1982 (43.1 W) and the Social Democratic share of the vote in the 1979 parliamentary election (23.9%). It is a multi-faceted phenomenon which has been attributed to every~ing from Koivisto’s humble origins to his charisma. Whatever accounts for the Koivisto effect, it was still there at the outset of the recent presidential campaign. The gallup polls gave Koivisto a clear edge over all his opponents throughout the entire campaign; and it was not until the last days prior to the election (3 1 January- 1 February) that his personal popularity began to hover around the 50 per cent mark. The opinion polls did, however, have a rather high degree of uncertainty attached to them. Koivisto was generally expected to gain by a high turnout. He might easily lose his majority, if his sympathizers did not show up in force on election day; and there were plenty of indications that they might not do that. This was the message conveyed by the polls, which reported a fairty large number of ‘don’t knows’ throughout the campaign. It was also the message implied by the
0261.3794/88/03/0279-051503.00 0 1988Butterworth & Co(Publishers)Ltd
280
The Finnish Presidentid
Social Democratic Party’s failure to mobilize the vote in the parliamentary election of early 1987. So there was always the possibility that Koivisto’s popularity would not be sufficient to produce a majority at the polls, in which case the matter would be referred to the electoral college where Koivisto was even less likely to command a majority in his own right. This was widely known and skilfully commented upon by the presidential candidates at various junctures of the campaign; and it probably helped boost the interest in an election with a sure winner. The questions were personal rather than ideological. Would Koivisto-or would he not-get a majority in the direct election? Who would come up second? Centre Party leader Paavo Vayrynen, who had been fighting an uphill battle, ever since his party was forced into opposition by the unorthodox govemment coalition between Social Democrats and Conservatives (which Koivisto himself had been instrumental in bringing about in the wake of the parliamentary election in 1987) or former Conservative party leader Harri Holkeri who was running for president with all the authority vested in him in his capacity as Prime Minister in the new coalition government? And who would provide the electoral votes required to elect Koivisto in the electoral college? This is not to say that ideology was not on the agenda. It was, but in a rather low-key fashion. The candidates took care not to scare off ‘marginal’ voters and confined themselves to rather genera1 statements on the topics that arose
Election of 1988
in the course of the campaign, whether foreign housing, trade, unemployment or other recurrent themes in Finnish politics. The incumbent also made the obvious observation that the President is not-and should not-be held responsible for day-to-day politics. The Results ln the end Koivisto did not get the 50 per cent required to win in the direct election. With 47.9 per cent of all the votes he was close; yet he failed to reach the mark. In his own words, he was somewhat disappointed. but not surprised. It is an open question what cost him the majority that was apparently within reach only shortly prior to election day. It clearly was not the blank or invalid ballots; and it probably was not the nonvoters, who were considerably fewer (17.4%) than in the parliamentary election of 1987 (24.1%). It may possibly be attributed to Centre Party leader Paavo Vayrynen. whose opposition was gaining momentum throughout the campaign, particularly during the final stage, as evidenced by his surprise lead over Prime Minister Harri Holkeri. But this is a rather shaky argument. Holkeri did play into the hands of Vayrynen by his last minute pledge in favour of Koivisto in the televised debate preceding the election by just a few days. The message was indirect, but straightforward enough. If Harri Holkeri himself was out of the race, he said he would recommend his electors to support the candidate with the largest following. that is,
TABLE 1. The Finnish presidential elections 1988. The distribution dential electors, and the number of electors.
Party Social Democratic Party, Rural Party, Pro-Koivisto movement Centre Party Conservative Party Movement-88 Minority Communists Invalid votes l Turnout (including invalid votes) Electorate 3.8 m l
Presidential candidate
Mauno Koivisto Paavo Vayrynen Harri Holkeri Kalevi Kivistij Jouko Kajanoja
of the votes for president, presi-
Presidential candidate votes %
Electoral college votes %
Number of electors (301)
47.9 20.2 18.1 10.4 1.4 2.0
46.5 21.7 20.2 9.6 1.9 (4.8)
144 68 63 26
82.6%
82.0%
The voters cast two ballots-one for a presidential candidate and one for the electoral college. For a candidate to be elected directly by presidential candidate votes, an absolute majority (more than 50%) of aN votes-including blank and invalid votes-was required. Invalid votes are included in the total percent distribution of votes for presidential candidates but not for the electoral college.
STEN BERGLUND President Koivisto. This was precisely what Paavo Vlyrynen had been suggesting throughout the campaign; and it probably eamed Viiyrynen a few additional votes during the final stage of the campaign, but they probably came from the Conservatives rather than from the Social Democrats. The election of the president by the electoral college took place on 15 February. When Holkeri made good on his promise and recommended his electors to vote for Koivisto, it paved the way for a quick reelection of the incumbent at the second vote in the electoral college but only at the cost of
281
party cohesion within the Conservative rank and file. Koivisto was elected with a total of 189 votes, 144 from his own electors and 45 cast by Holkeri electors; 18 Holkeri electors refused to follow their leader’s advice and continued to vote for him. All other electors voted for their own candidates, as shown in Table 1. A sizeable number of the Conservative electors thus shunned supporting a Socialist for President-an indicator, no doubt, that there is still plenty of room for adjustment in Finnish politics. Note: 1. Maurice Duverger, Ec&c an roi (Paris, 1978).
The Cypriot Presidential Election of 1988 PANAYOITELIASDIMITRAS*
Eurodim, 82 Constantinople Ave, GR-10435 Athens, Greece
On 14 and 21 February 1988, Greek Cypriots went to the polls to elect, for the seventh time in the country’s history, the President of the Republic of Cyprus-who is according to the Constitution a Greek-Cypriot.’ However, it was the first time that the election’s outcome was uncertain and a second round was required. Indeed, in the presidential elections of 1959 (Archbishop Makarios 66.8%, John Clerides 33.2%), 1968 (Archbishop Makarios 96.3%, Takis Evdokas 3.7%), 1973 (Archbishop unopposed) the overwhelming Makarios presence of the Greek-Cypriots’ national leader Archbishop Makarios did not leave any chances open to his opponents. After his death in 1977, then Speaker of the House Spyros Kyprianou became interim President and won two unopposed contests in 1977 and 1978 and was easily re-elected in 1983 with the backing of the communist Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) (Spyros Kyprianou 56.6%, Glafkos Clerides 33.9%, Vassos Lyssarides 9.5%). * The author is grateful to George Vassiliou, a director of MEMRB and eventual winner of the election, and Renos Lyssiotis, a director of Veritas, for making available unpublished opinion poll results that added significant insight to his understanding of the evolution of Cypriot public opinion; and to journalist Maria Ha~ioannou for the useful information and continuing assistance provided. Naturally, he is solely responsible for the contents of this article.
The Candidates ln 1987, however, it was clear at the outset that the common desire of President Kyprianou’s three political rivals to unseat him and their inability to agree on a common candidacy was making the 1988 election an open contest with each of the country’s four political parties backing a separate candidate. K yprianou’s centrist Democratic Party (DIKO) had the easiest choice when the President decided to seek a new five-year term: they backed their leader, who also received the support of Tassos Papado~~os’ small extra-parli~ent~ party Centre Union (EK). All other parties were nearly torn apart on their presidential strategy. The Speaker of the House Vassos Lyssarides’ socialist Unified Democratic Union of Cyprus (EDEK) was divided between those who leaned towards a common left candidate with AKEL and those who, giving priority to the ‘national issue’ (that is, the Cyprus problem) and perhaps influenced by the ‘brother’ party in Greece (PASOK), preferred a common ‘rejectionist’ front behind Kyprianou.z This serious cleavage in EDEK led its leader to declare his own candicacy that easily rallied the party’s rank-and-file and severely limited Kyprianou’s chances for reelection. AKEL’s choice was motivated by the will to ‘punish’ Kyprianou for having broken in December 1984 the AKEL-DMO coalition that had won for him reelection in February 1983. On the other hand, the communists knew that, even if they were one of the country’s two