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The foibles of bureaucratic control
Evaluation and Program Planning, Vol. 7, pp. 15-16, 1984
0149-7189/84 $3.00 + .OO Copyright 0 1984 Pergamon Press Ltd
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.
THE FOIBLES OF BUREAUCRATIC
CONTROL:
A Response to Ginsberg
THOMAS J. GAMBLE Yale University
offenses (running away, truancy) and others are illegal (assault, resisting arrest, drug charges, malicious mischief and so on). The judge often has the option to base his/her finding on either the status offense or the acts of delinquency. Prior to Act 100, such a decision did not interfere with the judges’ placement options and hence, judges often chose to find on the basis of the less serious status offense. However, following passage, the judge who wanted to use a certain placement alternative (for example, a local church-run institution) had to find on the basis of the acts of delinquency, providing the child with a record of “criminal” activity, that would otherwise have been absent. Hence, in regard to keeping children out of institutions and preventing premature labeling, there is good reason to suppose the reform was largely ineffective. In regard to encouraging local units of government to support community-based alternatives to institutionalization through the economic incentive just described, the attempt may also have failed. In any given county private charities (such as United Way agencies) provide some services to troubled youth. In at least one county, (and I believe many more) what happened is this: It did not take local planners long to realize that if the money the private agencies were already spending on such services was given to the local unit of government to be committed by them to services to troubled youth, then each $25 would attract an additional $75 from the state. The local unit could then return the now much larger amount of money to the private agencies. Hence, already in-place services could be supported largely by the state rather than wholly by local charitable contributions. Perhaps as a result of such practices, the state at issue quickly placed a limit on the amount of such funds it would pay to counties, but not until substantial economic damage had been done. One could well imagine, a la the Ginsberg-Campbell effect, that if the
In the late 1970s a large eastern state passed an important piece of social legislation. Let’s call it Act 100. Act 100 was the central piece in a statewide effort to deinstitutionalize status offenders. Status offenders are children who have committed acts that are proscribed only because of the perpetrator’s status as a juvenile. Examples include: running away; truancy; disobedience of parents, teachers, and other authorities; and so on. The feeling at the state level was that treating such children the same as juvenile delinquents (i.e., young people who have committed illegal acts) was doing more harm than good. By such practices these children may come to see and label themselves as delinquents, initiating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Also not escaping the notice of the state was the fact that institutional care was extremely expensive. Under Act 100 children determined to have committed status offenses could not be placed in institutions for delinquents, nor, of course, could they be labeled delinquent. The intent was clearly to prevent local judges from placing non-hardened, but troubled, children into expensive institutions. The Act also provided economic incentives for counties to provide non-institutional alternatives for dependent and delinquent children. The state would provide $75 for every $25 that the local unit of government committed toward community-based services to troubled youth. We have here a clear case of an attempt at bureaucratic control. The question is whether this legislative and incentive form of bureaucratic control exhibits the dysfunctional properties described by Ginsberg. I think so. I believe that local communities and judges acted in such a way as to preserve discretion and thereby foiled the state’s well-meaning (but perhaps ill-considered) attempts at reform. Here is what happened in at least some instances. Adjudication hearings are typically responses to a group of incidents. Some of these incidents are status
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas .I. Gamble, Department of Psychology, Box 1IA Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520. 15
16
THOMAS
state would have required that the local money be spent on new programs, local planners would have been busy renaming old ones. Hence, it seems quite likely to me that the passage of Act 100 had little positive effect on labeling or institutionalization, had little or no effect of the availability
J. GAMBLE
of new community-based options, (adding injury to insult) cost the than did previous practices. From my experience as a youth find that the effect pointed out Campbell) is quite robust and very
and very likely state more money service planner, I by Ginsberg (and important.
0149-7189/84 $3.00 + .OO Copyright 0 1984 Pergamon Press Ltd
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.
THE FOIBLES OF BUREAUCRATIC
CONTROL:
A Response to Ginsberg
THOMAS J. GAMBLE Yale University
offenses (running away, truancy) and others are illegal (assault, resisting arrest, drug charges, malicious mischief and so on). The judge often has the option to base his/her finding on either the status offense or the acts of delinquency. Prior to Act 100, such a decision did not interfere with the judges’ placement options and hence, judges often chose to find on the basis of the less serious status offense. However, following passage, the judge who wanted to use a certain placement alternative (for example, a local church-run institution) had to find on the basis of the acts of delinquency, providing the child with a record of “criminal” activity, that would otherwise have been absent. Hence, in regard to keeping children out of institutions and preventing premature labeling, there is good reason to suppose the reform was largely ineffective. In regard to encouraging local units of government to support community-based alternatives to institutionalization through the economic incentive just described, the attempt may also have failed. In any given county private charities (such as United Way agencies) provide some services to troubled youth. In at least one county, (and I believe many more) what happened is this: It did not take local planners long to realize that if the money the private agencies were already spending on such services was given to the local unit of government to be committed by them to services to troubled youth, then each $25 would attract an additional $75 from the state. The local unit could then return the now much larger amount of money to the private agencies. Hence, already in-place services could be supported largely by the state rather than wholly by local charitable contributions. Perhaps as a result of such practices, the state at issue quickly placed a limit on the amount of such funds it would pay to counties, but not until substantial economic damage had been done. One could well imagine, a la the Ginsberg-Campbell effect, that if the
In the late 1970s a large eastern state passed an important piece of social legislation. Let’s call it Act 100. Act 100 was the central piece in a statewide effort to deinstitutionalize status offenders. Status offenders are children who have committed acts that are proscribed only because of the perpetrator’s status as a juvenile. Examples include: running away; truancy; disobedience of parents, teachers, and other authorities; and so on. The feeling at the state level was that treating such children the same as juvenile delinquents (i.e., young people who have committed illegal acts) was doing more harm than good. By such practices these children may come to see and label themselves as delinquents, initiating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Also not escaping the notice of the state was the fact that institutional care was extremely expensive. Under Act 100 children determined to have committed status offenses could not be placed in institutions for delinquents, nor, of course, could they be labeled delinquent. The intent was clearly to prevent local judges from placing non-hardened, but troubled, children into expensive institutions. The Act also provided economic incentives for counties to provide non-institutional alternatives for dependent and delinquent children. The state would provide $75 for every $25 that the local unit of government committed toward community-based services to troubled youth. We have here a clear case of an attempt at bureaucratic control. The question is whether this legislative and incentive form of bureaucratic control exhibits the dysfunctional properties described by Ginsberg. I think so. I believe that local communities and judges acted in such a way as to preserve discretion and thereby foiled the state’s well-meaning (but perhaps ill-considered) attempts at reform. Here is what happened in at least some instances. Adjudication hearings are typically responses to a group of incidents. Some of these incidents are status
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas .I. Gamble, Department of Psychology, Box 1IA Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520. 15
16
THOMAS
state would have required that the local money be spent on new programs, local planners would have been busy renaming old ones. Hence, it seems quite likely to me that the passage of Act 100 had little positive effect on labeling or institutionalization, had little or no effect of the availability
J. GAMBLE
of new community-based options, (adding injury to insult) cost the than did previous practices. From my experience as a youth find that the effect pointed out Campbell) is quite robust and very
and very likely state more money service planner, I by Ginsberg (and important.